

ANALYSEN UND BERICHTE

Non-Alignment and Regional Cooperation: The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)*

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Bearing in mind the present situation of the world economy and the state of international economic relations, particularly the intransigent position of most of the developed countries opposed to the need to carry out structural changes aimed at speeding up the establishment of a new international economic order, . . . , the Conference reaffirmed that economic cooperation for development among non-aligned and other developing countries had come to be an imperative for all of them as an important part of a long process of struggle.

The Heads of State and/or Government reiterated their conviction that a key element in the success of the non-aligned and other developing countries in their struggle for the New International Economic Order is intensified cooperation among non-aligned and other developing countries on the basis of unity, complementarity, mutual interest, solidarity and mutual assistance in the context of the principle of collective self-reliance, with a view to accelerating their development, strengthening their unity and bargaining strength and countervailing power in the negotiations with the developed countries in order to achieve desired changes in the international economic system.

(From the 'Final Declaration' of the 6th Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries, Havana, Sept. 3-9, 1979)

We seek to overcome the fragmentation of our economies and, by coordinating our national development efforts, to strengthen them. The basis of our cooperation, built on concrete projects and specific programmes rather than on grandiose schemes and massive bureaucratic institutions, must be the assured mutual advantage of all participating states.

(Seretse Khama, late President of Botswana, in his Opening Statement to the Summit Meeting on Southern African Development Coordination, Lusaka, April 1-2, 1980)

Introduction

This essay looks at the endeavours the independent African states of southern Africa have been making since the first meeting of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in Arusha in July 1979 to strengthen cooperation among each other with the aim of thereby advancing their economic liberation.

More specifically, it looks at this initiative to develop regional cooperation in southern Africa in the light of the policies of non-alignment. Though the statements issued by

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SADCC so far, in particular the Lusaka Declaration »Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation«, do not explicitly refer to non-alignment, it is argued that they are in line with, and can be adequately understood in their global significance within the framework of the policies on »collective self-reliance« and »economic cooperation among developing countries« enunciated by various conferences of the movement of non-aligned countries during the past decade. In this sense, SADCC is also a test of the – often disputed – viability of the principles of non-alignment.

The essay begins by discussing the policies of the movement of non-aligned countries in regard to cooperation among developing countries and, in particular, the concept of »collective self-reliance«. Turning to southern Africa the dominating role which South Africa plays and which is the main bone of contention in the region is briefly outlined, before the focus is put on the analysis of SADCC's aims, its programmes and the institutional arrangements its 9 member states have opted for. This lays the ground for a discussion of issues related to regional cooperation in southern Africa, the difficulties and contradictions involved and the chances of succeeding.

The conclusion is that while there is every reason to avoid expecting miracles from regional cooperation in southern Africa, it can make a contribution to complete liberation in the region and thereby gives evidence of the importance and viability of the movement of non-aligned states and the principles and policies it has adopted in international relations.

1. Non-Alignment and Collective Self-Reliance

The movement of non-aligned countries was founded in Belgrade in 1961. What brought 25 African, Asian, Latin American and European countries together as members of a loosely-knit movement was initially principally their common desire to decrease international tension and maintain peace in face of cold war rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and their option not to join either of the big power military pacts. However, problems relating to their economic backwardness and their desire to promote economic development in their countries featured strongly in the non-aligned countries' conferences from the beginning. By 1979, when the 6th Summit Conference was held in Havana, the movement had grown to 96 full members.

Since 1970 economic issues can be said to have become a major concern of the non-aligned countries. The debate on the establishment of a »New International Economic Order« (NIEO) was sparked off by the non-aligned countries when they petitioned the United Nations in 1973 to convene a special session of the General Assembly to discuss the world economic system, the increasing gap between the rich and the poor and remedies for the situation on hand.¹ Precipitated by the OPEC countries' joint action and the re-

1 See »Action Programme of Economic Cooperation«, adopted at the Non-Aligned Summit in Algiers, 1973. In: M. Barrett Brown (ed.), *The Anatomy of Underdevelopment. Documents on Economic Policy in the Third World*. Nottingham 1974. p. 53.

sulting oil crisis in 1973, the 6th Special Session of the UN General Assembly was convened in 1974 and adopted the ›Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order‹.² This document has served as the point of departure of all subsequent conferences and negotiations between the rich and the poor at international level. The 3rd Summit Conference of the non-aligned countries was held in Lusaka in 1970, and Tanzania made a major contribution to the debate on the economic plight of the poor by submitting a paper programmatically entitled ›Cooperation against Poverty‹. The nature of the problem was clearly stated in the opening paragraph of this document: –

›Non-aligned nations aim to make their independence a reality, both politically and economically. To do this they need to develop; and they need to develop in such a manner that they can make their own decisions, and not have their progress determined by politicians, or businessmen, or corporations in the developed world. It is therefore necessary that we consider the nature of our position as poor areas of a rich world, and decide how we can obtain the changes we need.‹

The nature of the developing countries' position was seen as conditioned by the structure of, and the dominating interests in the existing world economic system; but the Tanzanian document did not fail to point out also that the situation in some developing countries is characterised by ›the internal dominance of groups whose personal interests are linked to the interests of external economic forces, and who recognize that their continued internal power is dependent upon the power exerted by the forces.‹³

Nevertheless, the basic assumption made is that changes within the world economic system can be achieved. It can be achieved essentially through pursuing a strategy of self-reliance.

›The only countries which have a primary commitment to the development in freedom of the non-aligned nations, are the non-aligned nations. The only people to whom poverty is the central issue, are the poor; only on that basis can we obtain the kind of international co-operation which is really of use to us. But we are all involved, and we are the stronger the more we act together. Whether we tackle our problems, and begin to fight against our economically subordinated position, depends upon our commitment, and upon our willingness to recognize the implications of our common involvement in the struggle for international economic change.‹⁴

Self-reliance, incorporated as it is into the policy of the non-aligned states of finding strength in their unity, has two sides to it, which have in fact come to be expressed separately as self-reliance and ›collective self-reliance‹.

Self-reliance, first of all, refers to the aim of each individual country to gain control over

2 Karl P. Sauvant, *The NIEO-Programme: a Framework for Restructuring the World Economy?* In: D. Ernst (ed.), *The New International Division of Labour, Technology and Underdevelopment*. Frankfurt/New York 1980. pp. 115–6.

3 *Cooperation against Poverty*. Paper submitted to the Conference of Non-aligned States in Lusaka, 1970, by the United Republic of Tanzania. pp. 1, 7.

4 *Ibid.* p. 23.

its own national economy, in particular its natural and human resources, rather than allowing continuing exploitation by external economic interests. While it is a basic principle of the non-aligned movement to acknowledge the sovereign right of each member state to choose its own path of development, it is agreed that joint action against the dominating interests of the world economic system has as its point of departure supportive action within each country. If the copper producing countries decide to reduce copper production and sales in order to narrow the market and gain some leverage over world market prices, and one of them then goes ahead to increase its own production believing it will benefit more that way, their joint action will fail.⁵ As Samora Machel, president of Mozambique, said in his speech to the OAU Summit in Freetown in July 1980, 'the struggle to establish the New International Economic Order begins in each one of our countries.'⁶

Since 1970 self-reliance has regularly been stressed by conferences of the non-aligned countries. The 'Lusaka Declaration on Non-Alignment and Economic Progress' adopted by the 1970 Summit pledged 'to cultivate the spirit of self-reliance and to this end to adopt a firm policy of organising their own socio-economic progress'.⁷ In 1972 the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries meeting in Georgetown adopted an 'Action Programme for Economic Cooperation among Non-Aligned Countries' in which the principle of self-reliance was reaffirmed and in which 'the non-aligned countries acknowledge that full control of their natural resources is a pre-requisite for effective economic cooperation among developing countries'.⁸

As these statements show the policy of self-reliance within individual countries and economic cooperation among them are seen as being closely inter-related. At the level of the non-aligned movement economic cooperation represents the area where joint action can be decided upon. In the 'Economic Declaration' adopted by the 4th Summit Conference in Algiers in 1973 the non-aligned countries affirmed their readiness 'to rely primarily on their own resources, individually and collectively, to assume the defence of their vital interests and to ensure by themselves and for themselves the organization of their development'.⁹ Based on the resolutions of the non-aligned conferences in Lusaka, Georgetown and Algiers to strengthen economic cooperation among themselves, the term 'collective self-reliance' was first explicitly used in an UNCTAD document in 1975.¹⁰ Collective self-reliance has been propagated all the more urgently by the non-aligned countries as

5 This actually happened when Chile acted counter to earlier CIPEC agreements after the overthrow of Allende in 1973.

6 Samora Machel, Speech to the OAU Summit Conference in Freetown, Sierra Leone, July 1980. In: AIM Information Bulletin (Maputo), No. 49, July 1980, Supplement, p. 10.

7 Lusaka Declaration on Non-Alignment and Economic Progress. In: M. Barratt Brown (ed.), op. cit. p. 13.

8 Georgetown 'Action Programme for Economic Cooperation among Non-aligned Nations'. In: M. Barratt Brown (ed.), op. cit. p. 25.

9 Economic Declaration of the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Algiers, In: M. Barratt Brown (ed.), op. cit. pp. 39, 41.

10 UNCTAD, Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries. Report of the Group of Experts, TD/B/AC. 19/1. Geneva 1975.

well as by the over 100 developing countries united in the 'Group of 77'¹¹ as it has become clear that the developed states are most unwilling to make substantial concessions to the Third World in negotiations concerning the restructuring of North-South relations. North-South confrontation then has led to a strengthening of the call for closer South-South relations, for greater stress on collective self-reliance, with the aim not only of creating more and closer ties of mutually advantageous cooperation, but also of reducing the Third World's dependence on, and thereby strengthening its bargaining power in negotiations with the rich countries of the North.¹² Whichever aspect is seen as more important, expanding economic cooperation among developing countries is the main feature of collective self-reliance as it is essential for the fulfilment of both aims.

Collective self-reliance has been referred to as an 'alternative development strategy', 'concerned with the attainment of fundamental structural redistribution of world production and trade, control over surplus generation and allocation, and power at both national and international levels. Its concern is the enhancement of Third World productive forces, surplus generation and the power to carry forward development strategies in its own interest and for its own benefit.'¹³ Its main features have been summarized as follows:-

1. The severance of existing links of dependency operated through the 'international system' by the dominant countries,
2. a full mobilisation of domestic capabilities and resources,
3. the strengthening of links – collaboration with other underdeveloped countries,
4. and the re-orientation of development efforts in order to meet the basic social needs (not just the minimum) of the people involved.'¹⁴

With regard to the first point there is a school of thought which advocates outright delinking. In this view, the established mechanisms of the world capitalist system are seen as the prime cause of the Third World's underdevelopment and, as a result, it is argued that only by delinking from such structural relations of dependency is self-reliant development feasible.¹⁵ However, as a policy proposal for the non-aligned and developing countries generally this approach is unrealistic as it cannot form the basis of consensus among them and, therefore, of collective action. The consensus among non-aligned countries is that collective self-reliance is not a strategy of delinking, just as self-reliance does not

11 The 'Group of 77' developing countries, which actually numbers well over 100, is the Third World pressure group within the UNCTAD framework. It is oriented towards international economic issues only. It is larger than the non-aligned movement; the latter regards itself, with some justification, as the catalysing factor within the Group of 77.

12 V. Matthies, *Süd/Süd-Beziehungen und kollektive »Self-Reliance«*. In: *Verfassung und Recht in Übersee*, Nr. 1/1978.

13 E. Oteiza, *Collective Self-Reliance: Some Old and New Issues*. In: J. J. Villamil (ed.), *Transnational Capitalism and National Development*. Hassocks, Sussex 1979.

14 E. Oteiza and F. Sercovich, *Collective Self-Reliance: selected issues*. In: *International Social Science Journal*. Vol. 28, No. 4, 1976.

15 See D. Senghaas, *Gibt es eine entwicklungspolitische Alternative für die Dritte Welt?* In: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 7/78, 18. Febr. 1978.

imply a policy of autarchy. Collective self-reliance is a strategy based on the developing countries' self-conscious definition of their own interests and their attempt to negotiate agreements of international cooperation on that basis.

Explicitly incorporating the international context, the ›Arusha Programme for Collective Self-Reliance and Framework for Negotiations‹, adopted by the Group of 77 as their platform for UNCTAD V in Manila in 1979, argues that

›a strategy of collective self-reliance should be viewed as an integral part of a global economic system, specifically as an essential element of an overall strategy of development encompassing the restructuring of international economic relations, and that Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries is a key element in a collective self-reliant strategy and thus becomes both an essential part of, and an instrument for the necessarily structural changes required for a balanced and equitable process of world economic development, ushering in a new set of relationships based on mutual interests and accomodations.

. . . a strategy of collective self-reliance embodies the potential for joint action by developing countries that will strengthen their capacity to negotiate with developed countries and reduce their dependency on them and . . . intensifying trade and economic linkages among developing countries is part of the structural change needed for a more rational international division of labour, leading to a more efficient use of world resources.¹⁶

It is implied that as the strategy for collective self-reliance is a Third World strategy for development initiatives to implement it should come from the developing countries themselves. Looking at collective self-reliance in a comprehensive way, in accordance with the non-aligned countries and the Group of 77, action can be located at every level between the national and the global level.

Diagram 1: Collective Self-Reliance

<i>Level of Action</i>	<i>Nature of Action</i>
National	Self-Reliance
Regional (Subregional) Continental (Regional) Third World (Interregional)	} Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries
Global	
	Negotiation for a NIEO and North-South Cooperation

Sources: ›Cooperation against Poverty‹, Lusaka 1970, p. 18; UNCTAD, ›Arusha Programme for Collective Self-Reliance and Framework for Negotiations‹, Manila 1979, p. 9
(The terms in brackets are the ones generally used in United Nations documents)

16 UNCTAD V., Arusha Programme for Collective Self-Reliance and Framework for Negotiations. TD/236, 28 Febr. 1979, pp. 7–8.

As the diagram shows economic cooperation among developing countries can take place at different levels. As the need to translate resolutions and statements of intent into practical programmes and concrete action imposes itself increasingly, unity becomes more difficult to achieve at Third World level. Cooperation at Third World or even continental level has to adopt a broader common denominator in order to accommodate a diversity of views, while at regional level more tangible results in terms of various forms of economic cooperation have been achieved, such as the Pact of Andean States in Latin America and ASEAN in South East Asia.¹⁷ Such initiatives to promote regional cooperation, however preliminary they may be, are seen as valuable practical contributions to the spirit of collective self-reliance and Third World cooperation. Speaking to the 5th Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Colombo in 1976 Samora Machel, president of Mozambique, put much stress on crossing the bridge from words to deeds:-

›These principles (of economic independence; P. M.) assert the interrelationship between the political and economic development of non-aligned and other developing countries. We have already formulated the principles and agreed on the need to act. Now we must act. Our experience shows that it is better to undertake many small concrete actions than to continue endless discussions and preparations for big projects which finally exist only in our words. We are therefore strong supporters of the policy of engaging in modest, but concrete actions . . .

It is our opinion that it would be a great success for our conference and our movement in the present phase, if we advanced concrete cooperation among ourselves, while at the same time acting jointly in the international arena.¹⁸

The cooperation the 9 founding members of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) embarked upon is one such case of concrete cooperation Samora Machel was talking about.

2. South Africa in Southern Africa

Economic cooperation among independent African states in southern Africa is specifically motivated by their opposition to the apartheid regime in South Africa. Their initiatives have to confront the dominating role which South Africa occupies in the political economy of southern Africa. Indeed, this role is a necessary point of departure when analysing the Southern African Development Coordination Conference.

South Africa's dominating role in southern Africa is based on the unequal development in the region initiated by the establishment of colonial rule and precipitated by capitalist penetration since the late 19th century when the mines were opened in South Africa.

17 For some basic information on the Andean Pact and ASEAN, see D. Sidjanski, *Current Problems of Economic Integration*. UNCTAD, TD/B/422. New York 1974.

18 Samora Machel, Speech to the Non-Aligned Summit in Colombo, Sri Lanka. In: *AIM Information Bulletin* (Maputo), No. 5, 1976.

The relationship which developed between the mining industry and the neighbouring African colonies was based on migrant labour. This feature has come to characterise the economies of southern Africa to such an extent that they have been called 'labour reserve economies'.¹⁹ The main suppliers of migrant labour outside South Africa are all among the SADCC countries. In 1976–77 there were close to 400 000 foreign migrant workers in South Africa. Of these, 200 000 came from Lesotho; 65 000 from Botswana; 50 000 from Zimbabwe, then still under white settler rule; 40 000 from Mozambique; 20 000 from Swaziland, and 17 000 from Malawi.²⁰

While the economies of the colonial countries were being distorted in their own path of development, the South African mining industry was thriving. As new raw material reserves were discovered in southern Africa exploitation was controlled to a large extent by the same mining trusts, increasingly geared to expansion. The diamond mines in Angola's Lunda Province, Botswana's copper/nickel and diamond mines, the copper mines in Zambia, the Wankie coal mines in Zimbabwe, the Mwadui diamond fields in Tanzania – everywhere South African companies like Anglo-American and De Beers, together with international companies like American Metal Climax (AMAX) and Rio Tinto Zinc operating from a base in South Africa, were to be found spreading the tentacles of their economic empire across southern Africa.²¹

This incorporation of large parts of southern Africa into the sphere of influence of the South African economy led to the concomitant establishment of infrastructural networks in transport and communications and other areas in accordance with the requirements of the latter, thereby rendering the independent development of the other southern African countries more difficult still.

Given the unequal development in southern Africa and the rapid growth of the South African economy, South Africa was obviously first choice for many capitalist enterprises seeking lucrative markets in the region. As a result considerable production capacities have been established with the help of which South Africa has become an important supplier of agricultural products, consumer goods and industrial inputs to southern African states. Even the most ardent opponents of racism in South Africa, such as Tanzania, have taken resort to supplies of maize from Africa in times of dire need. Table 1 shows the extent of the import and export trade which SADCC members conducted with South Africa in 1976. The virtual monopolisation of the BLS countries' markets by South Africa is particularly striking.

On the basis of its economic power South Africa has endeavoured to present itself as a suitable partner, familiar with African problems, for its northern neighbours. With the

19 Samir Amin, *Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Their Historical Origins and Contemporary Forms*. In: *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 10,4 (1972).

20 Amon J. Nsekela (ed.), *Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation*. Rex Collings, London, 1981, p. 255. For a historical analysis of migrant labour in South Africa, see F. Wilson, *Labour in the South African Gold Mines 1911–1969*. London, 1972.

21 Ann Seidman & Neva Seidman Makgetla, *Outposts of Monopoly Capitalism*. Zed Press, London, 1980, pp. 93–118.

Table 1

SADCC countries' exports to, and imports from South Africa in 1976
(Million US Dollars)

	Exports		Imports	
	Total	South Africa % of Total	Total	South Africa % of Total
Angola ¹	1,202.4	–	614.3	9.9
Botswana	176.2	15.1	208.4	81.4
Lesotho	16.9	90	206.5	94
Malawi	160	5.5	206	29
Mozambique	149.8	7.7	300	15
Swaziland	193.7	20	146	87
Tanzania	490.1	–	638.8	–
Zambia ²	910.8	–	714.1	7.3
Zimbabwe ²	685	16	460	38

1. Figures refer to 1975.

2. Figures refer to 1977.

Source: Amon J. Nsekela (ed.), *Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation*. Rex Collings, London, 1981, p. 261–3.; *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, 16, 4–9 (1980). Lusaka.

aim of gaining respectability as an African country it has projected itself as a 'regional power', similar to Nigeria, the Ivory Coast or Kenya, whose economic growth is supposed to (but rarely does) trickle down to its poorer neighbours.²²

For the past 20 years South Africa has put forward a variety of proposals for regional cooperation in Southern Africa with itself as the regional power invariably serving as the patron.²³ Significantly, when Verwoerd advanced his notion of a 'commonwealth' in 1969 it was related to his policy of separate development within South Africa, i. e. the establishment of African homelands eventually to be granted 'independence'. Once they were 'independent' they were to be absorbed in Verwoerd's commonwealth. This aim of gaining recognition for its apartheid policy through regional cooperation is a constant theme in South Africa's proposals.

In 1979 Botha called for a 'Constellation of Southern African States' (CONSAS) in a speech to government officials and South African businessmen. Again, his proposal

22 G.M.E. Leistner, Can Southern Africa get together? In: *South African Journal of African Affairs*, 9, 2 (1979), p. 84.

23 For a South African overview of these proposals, see D. Geldenhuys and D. Venter, *Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa: A Constellation of States?* In: *International Affairs Bulletin*, 3, 3 (1979).

reflects South Africa's desire to buy allies and thereby the prolongation of its own apartheid rule with the help of the superior economic resources it has at its disposal.²⁴ However, when CONSAS was formally constituted in July 1980 South Africa was alone with its internationally ostracised, 'independent' homelands Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda. Whatever South Africa may have hoped for CONSAS is, as one South African observer put it, 'to all intents and purposes an institutionalised formula to reshape relations on the economic, political and military/security levels between the Republic of South Africa and its former homelands' with much stress being put on the economic level in 'an attempt to redress the economic inadequacies of separate development'.²⁵ This predictable outcome shows the limitations of South Africa's economic leverage in southern Africa.

The other side of South Africa's policy in southern Africa is geared towards strengthening its military power, with the help of its Western allies, and using it to attack other countries in the region from which it feels threatened, in a desperate attempt to change the tide of events. Such military action is conducted behind the flag of a crusade against communism. The irony of history is that it is South Africa itself through its incursions onto the national territory of other countries which provides the Soviet Union with the best cover to pursue its own hegemonic ambitions. Events before and after Angola's independence are the most obvious, but not the only example of this in the region.

South Africa's most drastic military action is presently directed at and around Namibia in order to thwart the SWAPO-led armed struggle and to maintain a balance of power favourable to its forces as the United Nations and the Western contact group continue their search for a negotiated independence settlement. South African incursions into southern Angola, allegedly on anti-SWAPO hot pursuit operations, have become a practically daily occurrence. It is clearly part of South Africa's military policy in southern Africa to destabilise the governments in those countries most sympathetic to the liberation struggle by supporting opposition groups. UNITA in Angola, a movement founded in 1966 with some support in the central plateau and which has opposed the MPLA government and Soviet/Cuban presence in the country since independence, and MNR in Mozambique, a post-independence creation, are two cases in point. Both continue to engage in military actions in parts of Angola and Mozambique respectively. But the Zimbabwean government has also criticised South Africa several times already for harbouring remnants of the Rhodesian security and Bishop Muzorewa's military forces, known as 'auxiliaries', and training them for future military adventures.

It has been suggested that a link between South Africa's offers of cooperation to its northern neighbours and its destabilisation policy can be seen in that by disrupting transport through Angola and Mozambique it strengthens other countries' dependence on the

24 Centro de Estudos Africanos (Maputo), *The Constellation of Southern African States: A New Strategic Offensive by South Africa in the Region*. Analysis No. 2, 1980.

25 Deon Geldenhuys, *The Constellation of Southern African States and the Southern African Development Co-ordination Council: Towards a New Regional Stalemate?* South African Institute of International Affairs, Braamfontein, 1981, pp. 15, 34.

southern routes.²⁶ The incidence of sabotage against the Benguela railway and, in particular, the Harare – Beira rail link and Beira harbour by UNITA and MNR respectively since the foundation of SADCC lends credibility to this hypothesis. Certainly, South Africa can be expected to use all means at its disposal to prevent closer unity of independent states in southern Africa.

3. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)

3.1 Development and Aims

When the Front Line States Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia met in Arusha in July 1979 their discussion focussed on the possibility of economic co-operation in southern Africa to supplement what has and continues to be their objective, the political liberation of the people in the white minority, colonial-ruled countries in the region. As President Khama of Botswana said in April 1980, 'whilst in pursuit of this objective, we realised the urgent need to extend the struggle from the political to the economic sphere.'²⁷

This 'urgent need' imposed itself upon the Front Line States because, as they had been intensifying their support of the struggle for political liberation in Zimbabwe since the Smith regime's UDI in 1965, their economies had become increasingly dependent on South Africa. For instance, when Zambia applied sanctions and cut its trade links with the Smith regime in 1973 its dependence on trade relations with South Africa increased. And when in 1978 it decided to re-open its border with Zimbabwe, to let rail traffic from South Africa pass its vulnerability to pressure from the South African government increased further.²⁸ Similarly, when Mozambique applied sanctions against the Smith regime in 1976, thereby forfeiting considerable income from the use of its railways and harbours, its dependence on South Africa for such entrepôt trade traffic increased.

To quote Seretse Khama again: – 'We may be proud of our political independence; but before we achieve some degree of economic independence, our task is not complete.'²⁷ In southern Africa this implies to a large extent economic independence from South African regional hegemony.

The strategy which the Front Line States put forward to advance their aim was intensified economic cooperation among themselves and other 'majority-ruled states of southern Africa'. The political breakthrough in Zimbabwe which led to that country's independence in April 1980 was particularly significant in getting the SADCC initiative off

26 F. A. Kornegay, Jr. & V. A. Vockerodt, *Lusaka and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa, Part. II: The South African Dilemma*. In: SADEX (Washington), 2, 4 (1980).

27 Seretse Khama, President of Botswana, Opening Statement to the Summit Meeting on Southern African Development Coordination: Lusaka, April 1–2, 1980. Zambia Information Services Background No. 10/1980.

28 Contingency Planning Secretariat, Cabinet Office, *Why Zambia Re-opened the Southern Railway Route*. Lusaka, n.d.

the ground. Not only is Zimbabwe geographically centrally located in the region and does it represent an enormous economic potential, but it also occupied a major place in South Africa's attempt to launch its own Constellation of Southern African States. Once the South Africa-backed bid for power by Bishop Muzorewa had failed, the Constellation as an attempt to expand South Africa's political influence into southern Africa was doomed to failure.

It was under the impact of the resounding election victory of ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe that representatives from 9 southern African countries met in Lusaka on 1st April 1980. In addition to the Front Line States Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe attended. With the political independence of Zimbabwe achieved, it was a most suitable moment to focus more strongly on economic development. The governments present at the Lusaka Summit Meeting adopted a declaration entitled 'Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation', which has become the blueprint for SADCC. The development objectives to be pursued by the coordinated action of the SADCC member countries are defined as follows:

1. the reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa;
2. the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration;
3. the mobilisation of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies;
4. concerted action to secure international co-operation within the framework of our strategy for economic liberation'.²⁹

It was agreed at Lusaka that SADCC would not engage in elaborate institution building, but would concentrate on practical efforts to implement projects beneficial to regional development. To this effect, areas of common interest were identified and individual member countries were given the mandate to prepare draft programmes and propose projects for consideration by SADCC.

The area of transport and communications has been given highest priority by SADCC. It was recognised that the improvement of such links is fundamental to the implementation of projects in other important areas, such as food security, industrial production and trade. As the sectoral paper prepared by a group of consultants for the Arusha conference argued:— 'No serious degree of economic integration can be achieved within the region as a whole until it becomes significantly easier, faster and cheaper to move messages, persons and goods than it is today.'³⁰

Moreover, 6 SADCC members, the BLS states, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, are land-locked and, with the exception of Malawi, all are heavily dependent on transit routes

29 Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation. A Declaration by the Governments of Independent States of Southern Africa, made at Lusaka on the 1st of April 1980.

30 Transport and Communications. In: Amon J. Nsekela (ed.), Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation, op. cit., p. 71.

through South Africa for their overseas trade.³¹ This makes especially the Front Line States among them vulnerable to pressure from South Africa. Indeed, South Africa has on several occasions already used the reduction of trade passage to Zambia and Zimbabwe to show them its muscle. As all SADCC countries have economies strongly dependent on foreign trade this dependency is a serious potential constraint on their development. Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania do provide outlets to the sea, but for various reasons (civil war, repercussions of support for the liberation struggles in Namibia and Zimbabwe, lack of skilled personnel and mismanagement, or low capacity) their rail links are at present unable to adequately cater for the region's overseas trade.

Transport and communications development, therefore, is the area in which SADCC countries started identifying projects immediately after the Arusha conference. The areas of cooperation (and their coordinators) agreed upon in the programme of action formally adopted in Lusaka are as follows:–

- the creation of a Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC) based in Maputo (Mozambique);
- regional food security (Zimbabwe);
- coordinated control of foot and mouth disease in cattle on a regional basis (Botswana);
- establishment of a regional sub-centre of the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (Botswana);
- regional industrial development (Tanzania);
- formulation of a regional energy conservation policy (Angola);
- sharing of national training facilities and assessment of need and opportunities for cooperation in manpower training (Swaziland);
- establishment of a Southern African Development Fund (Zambia).³²

Subsequent SADCC conferences held in 1981 identified additional areas of cooperation to be incorporated into the programme of action:–

- forestry, fisheries and wildlife (Malawi);
- regional mining development (Zimbabwe);
- soil conservation and land utilisation (Lesotho, Zimbabwe).

3.2 Programmes and Pledges

The 4 point SADCC strategy cited above explicitly refers to 'concerted action to secure international cooperation', as SADCC members realised that they would not be able to finance their projects without international credits and aid. Annual meetings between SADCC and its international development cooperation partners have, therefore, beco-

31 Guy Arnold and Ruth Weiss, *Strategic Highways of Africa*. Julian Friedman, London, 1977.

32 Southern African Development Coordination Conference. Communiqué. Zambia Information Services, Press Release No. 4/1980.

me a specific feature of SADCC's mode of operation. The initial conference in Arusha was the first such meeting. Its topic was the formulation of a viable framework for regional cooperation in southern Africa, and the SADCC strategy adopted in 1980 was drafted there.³³

The Maputo Conference in November 1980 was quite different in nature. It was a pledging conference with the purpose of securing financial and technical support for the projects of regional cooperation which SADCC had agreed upon. Apart from the SADCC members, 30 governments and 19 international organisations attended.

In accordance with the priority given to transport and communications the main focus was on this area. SADCC members had agreed on a detailed programme of 97 projects prepared by the Maputo-based Southern African Transport and Communications Commission, 26 of which were road projects, 25 railways, 8 ports and water transport, 12 airports and air transport, 25 telecommunications, and one was multi-modal covering technical assistance for SATCC itself.³⁴ The total estimated cost for this programme was US \$ 1912m. To guide implementation SADCC established 4 priority classes. Top priority was given to the 43 projects involving the rehabilitation or upgrading of existing facilities. Next in order of priority were the 21 new telecommunications projects, followed by 13 new transport projects and, fourthly, studies. The rehabilitation and upgrading projects did, however, require the bulk of the estimated finance, a total of US \$1533 m.

The SADCC transport and communications programme argued that 'in the short run it seems that rehabilitation or up-grading of existing railway and port facilities will create sufficient capacity to take care of the transport demand, even if it increased by additional mining activity.'³⁵ This explains the stress put on such projects. Close to half the funds earmarked for this top priority class will be spent in Mozambique. With three large harbours, Maputo, Beira and Nacala, all of which need rehabilitating and/or upgrading, Mozambique is the main regional trade route for Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe as well as an important potential outlet for Botswana, Zambia and even Zaire. Investments are also needed on all railways linking Mozambique to its hinterland. The other two regional railway outlets, the Benguela railway through Angola and the Tanzania-Zambia-Railway (TAZARA) are also to be rehabilitated, US \$ 60 m. and US \$ 50 m. respectively being earmarked for that purpose. TAZARA was allocated an additional US \$ 43 m. for various projects under priority class 3.

The total amount pledged at the Maputo Conference was over US \$ 650 m. The bulk of these funds will go towards financing the transport and communications projects. Unless

33 The collected 'sectoral papers' submitted to the Arusha Conference have been published on behalf of SADCC, see Amon J. Nsekela (ed.), *Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation*. Rex Collings, London, 1981.

34 This information is drawn from the official conference paper: *Transport and Communications Projects*. In: Aloysius Kgarebe (ed.), *SADCC 2 – Maputo. The Proceedings of the Second Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference*, held in Maputo, People's Republic of Mozambique on 27/28 November 1980. SADCC Liaison Committee, London, 1981, pp. 169–219.

35 Aloysius Kgarebe (ed.), *SADCC 2 – Maputo*, op. cit., p. 172.

Table 2

SADCC Maputo Conference, Nov. 1980 – Pledges of Support

Country/Organisation	Amount pledged (US \$ m.)		Comments
Sweden	(11 + 11)	22	
Netherlands	(16 + 16)	32	
Norway		6	
Finland		6	
Denmark		10	
U.S.A.	(25 + 25)	50	
Italy		15	
Fed. Rep. of Germany		2	
Australia		1	
Belgium		8.50	
African Development Bank		384	1982–1986
EEC		100	spread over
			5 years
UNDP	Total	20	over 5 years
		656.50	

Unspecified pledges were made by G.D.R., U.K., Switzerland, Canada, Austria, Yugoslavia, Brazil, France, Venezuela, Kuwait Fund, OPEC Fund, BADEA, World Bank.

Source: SADCC, Record of the Ministerial Meeting held in Maputo, Mozambique on the 26th Nov. 1980 and reconvened on the afternoon of the 28th Nov. 1980. Annex VI.

otherwise specified the amounts pledged were for the budget periods 1980–81 and 1981–82. It is likely, therefore, that these countries will make more funds available in the following years. Similarly, unspecified pledges will materialise as projects are submitted for approval by donors. As Table 2 shows, apart from the African Development Bank with by far the largest single pledge and UNDP, all other pledges came from Western capitalist countries. Though a number of East Bloc countries, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary and Romania, attended and COMECON sent an observer, only the GDR made an unspecified pledge. This confirms the general pattern that Third World countries must rely essentially on Western and oil funds for the external funding of their development efforts.

In the case of SADCC this is an interesting observation as two of its members, Angola and Mozambique, are closely allied to the East bloc. This was a controversial issue at the Maputo Conference in a different context, namely with regard to the EEC pledge. It will be made available to member countries of the Lomé Convention only, i. e. to SADCC members with the exception of Angola and Mozambique. This is in line with EEC policy to favour development in the ACP-states associated with the European Community, but obviously runs counter to SADCC's aims of regional cooperation. It appears that

West Germany is reluctant to extend the EEC funds for SADCC to Angola and Mozambique as both so far refuse to accept the so-called 'Berlin clause', which incorporates West Berlin into agreements like the Lomé Convention of which West Germany is a signatory. This problem shows the difficulties of regional cooperation among countries with different international relations. On the other hand, the loose institutional structure SADCC has opted for will make it fairly easy to accommodate such specific policies of partner countries or institutions, as pledges are made for given projects. As Table 2 shows, a number of EEC member states made separate pledges. Some of these are for projects in Angola and particularly Mozambique.

It has been argued that the pledges made at the Maputo Conference do not constitute really new funds, that the US \$ 100 m. pledged by the EEC, for instance, would have been available to the signatories of the Lomé Convention in the region anyway. This may be so. The significance of the Maputo Conference, however, is that pledges were made within the framework of a programme drawn up by SADCC, thereby allowing international credits and aid to be channelled into development priorities as perceived by the countries of the region themselves. In this respect the Maputo Conference was an important step forward in the fulfilment of the SADCC strategy.

By mid-1981 it was reported that of the 97 projects tabled at the Maputo Conference 22 were being implemented, 29 had been prepared and submitted to agencies which had pledged support, 43 were in the process of detailed proposal preparation before submission to prospective donors, and 3 projects had been withdrawn.³⁶

The only other area of cooperation for which a programme was submitted to the Maputo Conference was 'regional food security'. The serious food shortages several SADCC members have suffered during the past years, notably Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, and the fact that they have had to rely on South Africa to supply part of the shortfall make this an important programme in the context of SADCC's aims. Though Zimbabwe had a considerable surplus of maize at the end of the 1980-81 crop season there were bottlenecks in the transport network to the other SADCC countries as well as shortfalls in storage facilities. These are the problems a programme in this sector has to tackle.³⁷ Zimbabwe prepared the report on 'Regional Food Security' tabled at Maputo.

The report proposes initial projects to establish the basic infrastructure of agricultural cooperation, namely the formation of an agrarian coordination body for regional interaction on all agrarian issues; the elaboration of a regional and national early warning system for regional food security;³⁸ the establishment of a regional data bank for basic agricultural information; and the compilation of an inventory of regionally or nationally available or potential agricultural resources. Other projects, such as a regional food re-

36 SADCC, Progress Report on Lusaka Programme of Action (submitted to the Summit Meeting in Salisbury, July 1981). In: SADEX (Washington), 3,5 (1981), p. 4.

37 In an article in the 'New African', May 1980, Richard Carver points to the fact that the bulk of Zimbabwe's commercial agriculture is in the hands of white farmers, whose interests might, he suggests, run counter to SADCC aims.

38 R. Laishley, Food Monitor paying off. In: Times of Zambia, 18 January 1982.

serve system; improved storage techniques and facilities; development of food processing technology; an improved marketing system; and coordination of regional food imports if required, can then build up on the available infrastructure. Only a small part of the sum pledged during the Maputo Conference went into the regional food security programme. Even in future, it is likely to be much less costly than the transport programme. As the pledges made at Maputo covered several years, some up to 1986, the 3rd SADCC conference with its international partners, held in Blantyre in Nov. 1981, had an essentially consultative nature with regard to areas of cooperation for which programmes had already been tabled. Nevertheless some new pledges were made and others confirmed. The 19 countries and 11 international organisations which attended the Blantyre Conference reflected the composition of SADCC's international partners already apparent in Maputo the year before, comprising African organisations, oil funds, UN agencies and Western countries.³⁹ SADCC had cleared documents in two further areas of cooperation for presentation to of the Blantyre Conference, on manpower and industrial development prepared by Swaziland and Tanzania respectively. The 4 areas of cooperation, transport and communications, food and agriculture, manpower, and industry, were considered in separate working groups to allow consultations to concentrate on the specific issues involved in each case.⁴⁰ The Blantyre Conference, therefore, saw a further expansion of the scope of SADCC's links with its interantional development cooperation partners.

3.3 Institutionalisation

Just as SADCC's principal focus on transport and communicaions projects makes it a novel initiative in regional cooperation among Third World countries, so too does its approach to its own institutionalisation. However, the way it is shaping its institutions does also clearly reflect the principles of the non-aligned movement. The idea behind this approach is to establish as loose an organisational set-up as possible, allowing for maximum independence and sovereignty of individual member states, and as structured a setup as is necessary to implement the objectives agreed upon. It implies, in other words, that the establishment of institutions beyond what is needed to achieve the organisation's

39 The delegations present at the Maputo Conference were: – **Countries:** – Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, GDR, FRG, Hungary, India (observer), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., USA, Venezuale, Yugoslavia, Zaire (observer);

International organisations: –African Development Bank, Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), COMECON (observer), Commonwealth Secretariat, ECA, EEC-European Investment Bank, FAO, IFAD, Kuwait Development Bank, International Communications Union, Norden Investment Bank, OAU, OPEC, SIDA, UN – Office of the Secretary General, UNCTAD, UNDP, World Bank.

The delegations present at the Blantyre Conference were:

– **Countries:** –Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, FRG, France, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden Switzerland, U.K., USA;

International organisations: – African Development Bank, BADEA, EEC – European Investment Bank, ECA, FAO, ILO, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNFPA, World Bank.

40 Tempo (Maputo), No. 582, 6 de Dezembro de 1981, pp. 48–50.

aims is avoided, and that decisions are taken essentially at the political level, rather than by technocrats appointed at the administrative level. At the political level, given the basic agreement on common interests which led to the formation of, or adherence to the organisation in the first place, decisions can be based on the principle of consensus.

In accordance with this approach, which can perhaps be called the non-aligned approach to the institutionalisation of cooperation agreements, SADCC's most important bodies are the Summit Meeting and the Council of Ministers. The institutions necessary to ensure the technical functions of SADCC are the Commissions for sectoral areas, and the Secretariat. The 2nd Summit Meeting, held in Salisbury in July 1981, two years after SADCC's inception, formally adopted a 'Memorandum of Understanding on the Institutionalisation of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC)' on the basis of earlier draft proposals prepared by Botswana. The Final Communiqué issued after the Salisbury Summit said: 'SADCC has eschewed the creation of a large and unwieldy bureaucracy in favour of a system which places responsibility for implementation of its programme on the Governments of Member States.'⁴¹

The only new institution to be agreed upon at Salisbury was the SADCC Secretariat. It was decided that the Secretariat would be based in Gaborone, that it would be established as from 1st July 1982 and that Zimbabwe would nominate its first officer-in-charge, the Executive Secretary.

The supreme body of SADCC is the Summit Meeting. It is 'responsible for the general direction and control of the performance of the functions of SADCC and the achievement of its objectives.'⁴² It meets at least once a year.

The body charged with the overall execution of SADCC policies is the Council of Ministers, which also meets at least once a year. It is responsible 'for the overall policy of the SADCC, its general co-ordination, the supervision of its institutions and the supervision of the execution of its programmes.'⁴² Commissions for sectoral areas and the Executive Secretary, while established or appointed by the Summit Meeting, report to the Council. The Council of Ministers may, if the need arises, appoint ad hoc-Committees of Ministers for particular programme areas. The Council has a Standing Committee of Officials to assist it in its business, and may appoint Sub-Committees of officials for particular programme areas, if the need arises. The Council also convenes the annual consultative conference with SADCC's international development coordination partners. Decisions taken by the Council of Ministers are subject to the approval of the Summit Meeting. The Chairmanship of the Summit Meeting and the Council of Ministers has, during the initial years of SADCC from 1979 and into 1982, been held by Botswana, but in future it will rotate among members.

The main technical bodies of SADCC are the Commissions for sectoral areas. By the

41 SADCC, Summit Meeting, Salisbury, July 20, 1981, Final Communiqué. In: SADEX (Washington), 3, 5 (1981), p. 1.

42 Memorandum of Understanding on the Institutionalisation of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). n. p., n. d.

end of 1981 only one such commission, the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC), based in Maputo, had been established. Not every area of cooperation SADCC has embarked upon may need such a commission. The Summit Meeting will decide, according to practical requirements, on the establishment of further commissions. SADCC Commissions are governed by separate Conventions approved by the SADCC Council of Ministers and ratified by member countries.⁴³ The supreme body of SADCC is the Council of Ministers, its executive body is the Coordinating Committee supported by a Technical Unit.⁴⁴ SATCC's objectives are to contribute to the fulfilment of SADCC's 4 point strategy by promoting rational and integrated utilisation of the transport and communications systems existing in the region; by promoting new development programmes and projects, and the modernisation of existing systems; and by seeking participation of the independent states in the region.

The SADCC Secretariat is an administrative body established 'for the general servicing of the SADCC and for liaison with its specialised institutions'.⁴² As SADCC activities expand to cover more specific areas of cooperation the Secretariat can ensure the smooth functioning of the organisation by providing the Council of Ministers with administrative support. It does not have decision making or executive functions of its own.

SADCC is conceived as being fairly open. As the non-aligned movement, it is geared to incorporating other like-minded members. The Lusaka Declaration explicitly states that the 9 signatories 'do not envisage this regional economic coordination as exclusive. The initiative toward economic liberation has flowed from our experience of joint action for political liberation. We envisage regional co-ordination as open to all genuinely independent Southern African States',⁴⁵ i. e. those recognised by the OAU. What is actually seen to belong to the Southern African region has not been defined, but can be assumed to be flexible. Tanzania, for instance, is geographically East African, but by virtue of its support for the liberation struggles in Southern Africa and its chairmanship of the Front Line States it has politically become part of southern Africa and a founder member of SADCC. Namibia and Azania/South Africa are, of course, part of the region. SWAPO was invited to attend the Lusaka Summit Meeting of SADCC, and Namibia under SWAPO leadership is confidently expected to become SADCC's 10th member once independence is achieved, though South Africa has still not given up its own designs for Namibia's future.⁴⁶ The SATCC Convention explicitly accords all liberation movements of southern Africa recognised by the OAU, i. e. SWAPO for Namibia, and ANC and PAC for Azania/South Africa, observer status on its Council of Ministers and Co-ordinating Committee. Further north, Zaire attended the Maputo Conference as an observer

43 The SADCC Convention was ratified by July 1981.

44 The Convention on the Establishment of the Southern Africa Transport and Communications Commission. n. p., n. d.

45 Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation. op. cit.

46 For a discussion of some of Namibia's options from an economic perspective, see. W. Zehender, Außenwirtschaftspolitische Perspektiven für ein unabhängiges Namibia, In: Afrika Spectrum, 15, 2 (1980), pp. 135-144.

because of its interest in the regional transport system, particularly the Benguela railway, and might consider joining SADCC in the future.⁴⁷

Members are free to maintain other ties of cooperation outside the framework of SADCC, such as the BLS states' membership in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) with South African. Members are also not obliged to participate in areas of cooperation within SADCC from which they do not expect to reap any benefits. This flexibility built into SADCC's institutional framework in numerous respects ensures that members' national independence and sovereignty remain uppermost and that they can participate in joint regional activities in line with their national interests as they perceive them.

4. SADCC: Problems and Prospects

Having looked at the aims and activities of SADCC and its member states we now turn to a discussion of its prospects. Numerous arguments can, have and will continue to be brought forward to argue why SADCC is bound to fail or, at best, will only achieve very limited results. None of these arguments are without some foundation. Therefore, they warrant closer consideration.

4.1 The 9 SADCC members – a mixed group

A look at the 9 signatories of the Lusaka Declaration quickly reveals the diversity among them with regard to political systems, level of development, socio-economic structures and basic demographic features. Angola and Mozambique profess scientific socialism; Tanzania and Zimbabwe, while also in favour of socialism, stress the indigenous character of their development path more strongly; Zambia with its own humanist philosophy sees socialism as a transitional phase on the way to humanism; Malawi has a system based on private capitalist enterprise and is the only African state to maintain diplomatic relations with South Africa; Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are tied to South Africa through a Customs Union agreement; Botswana has a liberal-democratic system, while Swaziland is one of Africa's few monarchies. Again, some of the 9, notably Angola, Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe, have rich mineral resources, while others, like Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique, are principally producers of agricultural products. The extent of dependence on South Africa differs substantially among them. (see Table 1) Angola and Tanzania have only very few economic ties with, while the

47 It has been suggested, however, that there may be reservations among some SADCC members regarding Zaire's membership. See R. Hofmeier, Die Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). In: Afrika Spectrum, 16. Jg., 81/3. p. 254.

BLS states, on the other extreme, are most dependent on South Africa. The list of differences could be continued.⁴⁸ (see also Table 3)

Table 3

Selected Demographic and Economic Indicators, 1979

	Area '000 km ²	Population		GDP US \$m.	GNP per Capita	Main Exports
		Mill.	density per km ²			
Angola	1247	7.2	5.8	2 490	440	oil, coffee, diamonds, sisal
Botswana	582	0.8	1.3	460 ¹	620 ¹	copper/nickel, diamonds, livestock
Lesotho	30	1.3	43	240	340	cattle, diamonds, sheep
Malawi	119	6	50.6	1 220	200	tobacco, tea, sugar, groundnuts
Mozambique	783	11.7	15	2 360	250	cashewnuts, sugar, cotton, tea
Swaziland	17	0.6	34.6	310 ¹	590 ¹	sugar, wood, iron ore, asbestos
Tanzania	945	18.6	19.7	4 130	260	coffee, cotton, cashewnuts, sisal
Zambia	753	5.7	7.6	3 240	500	copper, cobalt, zinc, lead
Zimbabwe	389	7.1	18.3	3 640	470	tobacco, gold, asbestos, maize
Total/average	4864	59	12.1	18 090	—	
South Africa	1224	29.2	23.9	52 920	1720	gold, diamonds, coal, maize

¹ Figures are for 1978.

Sources: Amon J. Nsekela (ed.), *Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation*. London, 1981. p. 248–9. World Bank, *World Development Report 1981*, Annex, Tables 1 and 3.

What does the undisputed existence of such differences mean in relation to cooperation among the countries concerned? Asked how cooperation among the 9 would affect Mozambique's aim of socialist development Samora Machel answered:

... we look at cooperation as based on relations of equality, mutual benefit and non-interference. (...) The conference on regional cooperation that took place in Lusaka has very concrete objectives, common to the 9 countries involved. What unites us is

48 First Steps Toward Economic Integration. In: Amon J. Nsekela (ed.), *Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation*. op. cit. pp. 15–17; for a further discussion of the distinctive features of several SADCC member states, notably Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, see *Afrika Spectrum*, 16. Jg., 81/3.

very much stronger and much more important than the fact that we have different political options. What unites us is the common desire to intensify our relations, to exchange our experiences, to cooperate in projects of regional development, to free ourselves gradually from economic dependence on South Africa in which the history of imperialist domination has placed our countries. Not one of the 9 present at the Lusaka conference manifested the pre-occupation that the type of cooperation we wish for may condition us politically.

On the other hand, by subscribing to the declaration proposed by the ministerial meeting in Arusha, all of us reaffirmed the idea that by promoting cooperation we would all be freer from the sub-imperialism of South Africa and, therefore, each one of us could more freely promote the projects for our national development.⁴⁹

Differences exist, but common interests are also there. If the latter are seen as being more important then cooperation is possible, though contradictions which result from the continuing differences can always disrupt the process of cooperation. It is this fragile nature of mutual ties in specific areas of cooperation which has given sceptics their ammunition. However, continuing efforts by developing countries to establish such ties would appear to indicate that the awareness of the importance of cooperation among themselves to promote their own respective national development efforts is increasing, notwithstanding setbacks and disappointments. The recognition of common interests the pursuance of which provides each participant with tangible benefits is certainly the only basis on which co-operation can thrive. This principle has become the basis of cooperation among Third World countries generally. It has been developed essentially through the non-aligned movement in its endeavours to strengthen the position of the poor countries in international relations. Speaking to the Conference of the 'Group of 77' in Arusha in 1979 Julius Nyerere argued the point forcefully that unity was needed to achieve the aims of the Third World given their external dependencies and that to achieve unity the focus must be on the agreed areas of joint action and all other issues left aside. He said:

'The immediate reason for each nation joining the Group of 77 depended on the point at which it had experienced the economic frustrations of power external to itself. (. . .)

I stress the fact that it was out nationalism which has forced us together. . . . our diversity exists in the context of one common and over-riding experience. What we have in common is that we are all, in relation to the developed world dependent. (. . .)

We may have to co-operate functionally with governments which we intensely dislike and disapprove of. For the object is to complete the liberation of the Third World countries from external domination. That is the basic meaning of the New International Economic Order. And unity is our instrument – our only instrument – of liberation.⁵⁰

49 Interview with Samora Machel, President of Mozambique, In: *Africa*, No. 107, July 1980.

50 J. K. Nyerere, *Unity for a New Order*. Arusha, 1979.

4.2 Competition or complementarity?

Can and do developing countries complement each other, or are they rather in competition with each other? This is obviously an important issue when embarking on regional cooperation. Again, a straightforward answer is not possible.

Certainly, given the inherited orientation of their economies towards the world market the competitive relationship is very marked. Developing countries are in competition for markets to sell their raw materials, be it coffee, copper or cotton. Furthermore, as raw material producers and exporters their demand for manufactured goods can usually only be satisfied by importing from the industrialised countries. This strengthens their competition for export markets needed to earn foreign exchange to pay for their imports.

Competition also exists for international aid to finance development projects. This again reflects the dependent and underdeveloped structure of Third World economies, as a result of which internal sources of accumulation are inadequate or inadequately exploited. Competition between developing countries will also persist when they embark upon nationalist policies of development aimed at creating an integrated national economy. For instance, Mozambique, Tanzania as well as Zambia, each having recognised the importance of basic industries for national development, have all declared their intention to establish an iron and steel industry, though market capacity is below 500 000 tons p. a. for each of them.⁵¹

Such competition is a reality, and it limits the scope for cooperation. It is strengthened by the orientation of Third World countries' production and trade towards world market requirements. This makes it difficult to develop relations of exchange between each other. Trade among SADCC members is still negligible and represents only a fraction of their total external trade,⁵² not to mention inadequacy of transport and communications links which SADCC members have made their initial priority area of cooperation.

Even given their present economic structure, however, SADCC countries are not only in competition with each other. As Table 3 shows, they do not all export the same raw materials. Also, all have some production of manufactured goods though admittedly it does often cover the same range of consumer-oriented, import substituting industries.⁵³ But complementarities do exist. In their bilateral relations Mozambique and Tanzania, for instance, have begun using them for their mutual benefit. Mozambique, with an excess capacity in its cement industry, provides Tanzania with cement to meet its internal shortfall, while Tanzania provides Mozambique with commodities in short supply there, e. g. printed cotton materials, in exchange.

51 Zambia announced in 1980 that it would abandon its 'Tika' iron and steel project, but not as a result of regional considerations. Internal reasons were given for the decision one of which was that the project was not economically viable.

52 Amon J. Nsekela (ed.), *Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation*. op. cit., p. 236.

53 International trade figures show that trade among developing countries represents a small percentage of total world trade, 7 % in 1980 according to the World Bank, *World Development Report 1981*.

As a regional group SADCC has a resource endowment which would allow it to establish industries basic to economic development from its own resource base. The region has sizeable quantities of coal, iron ore, diamonds, gold, uranium, bauxite, chrome, copper ore, lead, nickel, zinc, asbestos, substantial potential for the generation of hydroelectric power – and still vast areas of unexplored sub-soils. The very diversity often cited as a stumbling block for Third World cooperation is, as far as economic resources are concerned, a strong point of departure for cooperation. Agricultural resources can also be incorporated into this picture of complementarity or, at least, potential complementarity. The case of Zimbabwe's surplus production of maize has already been mentioned. As long as Tanzania, Zambia or Mozambique have not achieved national self-sufficiency in basic food crops Zimbabwe can supply them with their shortfalls. What is needed to develop such complementarities in the region is to initiate projects in those areas which impede their exploitation, be it transport and communications, manpower training or availability of suitable technology.⁵⁴

In short, diversification as an important element of national self-reliant development strategy can strengthen collective self-reliance by increasing complementarities between developing countries.⁵⁵ As competition between developing countries is largely determined by their dependence on the world economic system, reducing dependence by diversification will also reduce such competition.

4.3 The extent of cooperation

The SADCC countries have opted for a low level of organisation and obligation in their cooperation. This approach contrasts with the forms of cooperation usually referred to in discussions on economic integration or the establishment of a common market. Both economic integration and the common market involve a higher level of organisation and a greater extent of cooperation. This very fact, however, has in practice frequently led to problems in the relations between the member states. A greater extent of cooperation requires a more profound agreement on political and socio-economic policy options to be successful. If such agreement is not achieved cooperation undergoes severe strains. In the case of the East African Community this was one of the main reasons for the demise of this common market in 1977.⁵⁶

To some extent cooperation between several countries will always involve forfeiting part of one's own independence for the benefit of mutually advantageous terms of cooperation. However, depending on the concrete power relations within an established group of countries a member state might find itself obliged to forfeit a greater amount of its inde-

54 Economic Dependence and Regional Co-operation. In: Amon J. Nsekela (ed.), *Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation*. op. cit., pp. 45–49.

55 S. S. Mushi, *Tanzania Foreign Relations and the Policies of Non-Alignment, Socialism and Self-Reliance*. In: K. Mathews and S. S. Mushi (eds.), *The Foreign Policy of Tanzania*. Nairobi (forthcoming).

56 Ngila Mwase, *The East African Community: A Study of Regional Disintegration*. The University of Dar es Salaam, ERB Paper 77.10, Dar es Salaam, 1977.

pendence than it would really wish to. Such a country may find it extremely difficult to break away from such a tightly-knit and highly organised group of countries. Its relations within such a structure can only be described as relations of dependence, though in fact a greater extent of economic cooperation and integration of production patterns will have been achieved. Relations within the East bloc 'Council of Mutual Economic Aid' (COMECON) have been described in these terms.

The SADCC countries place principal stress on their national independence.⁵⁷ For them national development efforts are basic; regional cooperation is geared to supplement and coordinate national efforts. The conscious limitation of the extent of cooperation and institutionalisation SADCC has opted for draws the lessons from experiences of cooperation based on textbook theories of economic integration which proved unsuitable in reality. What is more important, their form of regional cooperation is concretely related to the conditions in southern Africa, i. e. the overall aim of reducing dependence on South Africa and the need to establish a broad common denominator so that even those southern African states presently most dependent on South Africa and even linked to it by cooperation agreements can participate in this initiative and benefit from it. In this sense it would seem that SADCC can claim to be making a novel contribution to economic cooperation in Africa, and the specific organisational structure it has adopted may prove to be an important element of its progress.

3.4 Who will benefit?

Even though SADCC has established regional cooperation at a fairly low level of organisation and obligation, the question still arises whether all member states will benefit equally.

Two areas of concern can be identified here. Firstly, there is the possibility that some member states will benefit more than others, that one, say Zimbabwe, will establish itself in a position of regional supremacy. Given the distinctly unequal development of the SADCC member countries the economically better off might well strengthen their position further. SADCC can only play a secondary role in reducing regional inequalities, secondary to each country's own efforts. To succeed in its objective to create an 'equitable regional integration', however, it must consciously attempt to avoid an unequal distribution of benefits which would enhance already existing inequalities. This will be important if SADCC reaches a stage where the formation of industrial enterprises to cater for the region is considered so as to reap economies of scale. The location of such industries then becomes an issue. The case of the BLS states which, as members of the Southern African Customs Union, are swamped by South African goods is a negative example.⁵⁸

57 R. H. Green, Southern African Development Coordination: Toward a Functioning Dynamic? In: IDS Bulletin (Sussex), 11,4 (1980).

58 James H. Cobbe, Integration among Unequals: The Southern African Customs Union and Development. In: World Development, 8, 4 (1980), pp. 329–336.

With regard to the present situation in the region, it should be noted that the form of organisation SADCC has adopted is well suited to avoid unequal distribution of benefits from regional cooperation. It does not establish a common market area with free or privileged flow of goods across the borders. No trade tariff reductions are involved at all so that there is nothing to prevent member countries from maintaining protective tariffs or introducing new ones. Free trade areas of various kinds are the form of organisation of economic cooperation which tend to enhance unequal development within a region,⁵⁹ and, as a result, strain the partnership.

With regard to potential benefits, the relations within SADCC ultimately also have to be analysed in the context of the present situation in the whole of southern Africa. It is precisely to counter the attempts by South Africa to strengthen and expand its regional supremacy that SADCC was initiated. Its prime aim, therefore, is clearly defined, and if progress is made towards that aim all member states will benefit.

This aim also has a longer-term implication. On the assumption that a future government of Azania under African majority rule would maintain the country's present wealth, it would inherit a situation of regional predominance. If progress towards greater independence of SADCC members from South Africa has been made by then, cooperation with Azania could take place on a slightly less unequal footing than would be the case today.

The second area of concern, related to the first, but ultimately of prime significance, is that regional cooperation in southern Africa will not benefit the SADCC member countries as much as the multi-national companies. The international finance being sought by SADCC to develop transport and communications, and the economic potential of the region generally will, it is argued, only enhance penetration by the MNCs and allow them to strengthen their already existing network of links in southern Africa. This is undoubtedly a real danger, all the more so as some MNCs, take for instance Lonrho,⁶⁰ already have established links in some SADCC member countries, in particular Zimbabwe. This concern ties up with the first one in that the MNCs' investment pattern favours, in terms of location, the infrastructurally more developed industrial centres in countries with a favourable investment climate. In southern Africa this has led to most of them setting up their base in South Africa. Given their sense of economic advantage and the realisation that it will be very difficult for SADCC countries to cut their trade links with South Africa MNCs reaction to SADCC will not necessarily be negative. Indeed, as one South African writer put it, 'it is perhaps not surprising that some South African businessmen tend to welcome SADCC's plans: by improving the black states' infrastructures, trade penetration could be facilitated.'⁶¹

59 The East African Community as well as the Southern African Customs Union are examples of this in practice.

60 S. Cronjé, M. Ling and G. Cronjé, *LONRHO – Portrait of a Multinational*. Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1976.

61 Deon Geldenhuys, *The Constellation of Southern African States and the Southern African Development Co-ordination Council: Towards a New Regional Stalemate?* op. cit., p. 43.

SADCC's aims do not, in principle, run counter to cooperation with MNCs. Having opted against a free trade model, however, again shows its importance here in that those members who for reasons related to their own political and economic systems aim to curb or prevent MNC activities in their countries – Tanzania, for instance, took over all Lonrho assets in 1978 – can pursue their policies unhindered. With regard to trade links among themselves, which might benefit MNCs as well, SADCC's approach is to plan them carefully. Talking about preferential trade arrangements within SADCC the late Seretse Khama said:– '... they should be planned ones so as to flow from and serve the needs of coordinated national and regional development. Our trade arrangements should not be at the mercy of free market forces or foreign companies.'⁶²

In sum, the political strength and clarity of orientation of SADCC member states will be crucial in deciding whether economic cooperation between them enhances their independence, or increases their dependence within the capitalist world system on MNCs and their agencies within the region. The significance of this point is underlined by the conclusion reached in a number of studies on regional cooperation experiences which show that the predominance of MNC corporate interests over national and regional interests was the principal reason for their failure.⁶³

Conclusion

'Our Movement is a Progressive Movement; but it is not a Movement of Progressive States.'⁶⁴ This statement by Julius Nyerere aptly characterizes the non-aligned movement. Its progressive nature lies in the unity of its member states on the basis of their joint desire to strengthen their national independence and sovereignty in face of their common situation of dependency within the existing international economic order and great power rivalry in the world.

It has been shown that the Southern African Development Coordination Conference is based on similar principles. Notwithstanding the diversity of its 9 member states the Lusaka Declaration was adopted and a programme of economic cooperation at regional level embarked upon, which is in line with the non-aligned movement's overall policy of collective self-reliance. It has become clear that to loosen the relations of dependency which presently exist in southern Africa is a path beset by extremely large difficulties. The projects initiated will take their time to mature and changes cannot, therefore, be expected overnight. To the extent, however, that SADCC does succeed in increasing its

62 Seretse Khama, Introduction. In: Amon J. Nsekela (ed.), *Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation*, op. cit. p. xii.

63 Constantine V. Vaitsos, *Crisis in Regional Economic Cooperation (Integration) among Developing Countries: A Survey*. In: *World Development*, 6, 6, June 1978.

64 President Nyerere's Speech to the Non-Aligned Conference, Havana, Sept. 1979. NAC/CONF.6/DISC.17, Sept. 5, 1979.

member states' national independence it will also contribute towards improving conditions for the complete liberation of southern Africa from white minority rule.

Finally, in pursuing their aims SADCC members seek international cooperation, but are decided not to make their progress dependent on it. The Lusaka Declaration is quite explicit on this point: –

»We are committed to a strategy of economic liberation. It is a strategy which we believe both needs and deserves international support. Southern African regional development must be designed and implemented by Southern Africans. It will, however, be achieved more rapidly and will be more effective if development takes place within the context of global cooperation. . . .

However, as with the struggle for political liberation, the fight for economic liberation is neither a mere slogan to prompt external assistance nor a course of action from which we can be deflected by external indifference. The dignity and welfare of the peoples of Southern Africa demand economic liberation and we will struggle toward that goal.⁶⁵

This statement reflects the both principled and pragmatic approach SADCC members have adopted as the basis for their collective action.

65 Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation. A, Declaration . . . op. cit.