

in even today's high taxation countries, may wholly not stop their investing. If 75 % percent of profits are taxed away – are the remaining 25 % not better than nothing? Even if fully-fledged expropriations take place somewhere, it may still make sense to continue other business operations or to set up new businesses in the hope that they will enjoy a more pleasant fate. Remember that creditors who have just lost loan repayment claims in an insolvency of a sovereign or private debtor, often immediately hand out new loans to the same creditor if the prospects of the future debt service appear improved? Or think of the Medieval bankers, who, after being expropriated, expelled and sometimes persecuted, often gladly returned to give new loans. Furthermore, it is not so easy to transfer wealth to foreign countries with assured better net profit and wealth preservation expectations. And wealth, which leaves a country, improves the conditions for the wealth that stays. Thus, we believe that ultimately, the true means that effectively stops excessive taxation and other expropriations, and the true dilemma of prosthetics funded with taxation and other expropriations, remains the political power of the wealth owners, including their capacity of throwing a civil war.¹⁴

Section 2. Redistributive prosthetics funded with war, external violent wealth procurement and protectionism

War, external violent wealth procurement and protectionism

War and violent goods procurement as means of prosthetics funding

Examining ancient capitalism, e.g., in Rome, we have already seen how war and violent wealth procurement were used as means to fund prosthetics by state might and praeter-economic means. Robbing riches of neighbors, e.g., land, cattle and

14 This is not the place to analyze capitalist states' taxation politics in greater depth. However, such analysis would have to preoccupy itself with the – somewhat astonishing – fact that taxation often disfavors incomes, profits, and salaries, in the productive economy and favors incomes in the wealth economy, in particular capital gains. Because wealth owners draw a mix of disfavored productive and favored sterile incomes, their average tax rate, thus, goes down. Better earning salary receivers and professionals, who do not draw sterile income, are, accordingly, worse off. It is also remarkable that, as rental markets for dwellings are largely controlled and impose hidden social transfers on landlords to their tenants', tax laws often allow landlords to make good for these sacrifices by leaving capital gains at the sale of properties largely untaxed. The clear (microeconomic) signal for the better earning players in the productive economy is to enter the wealth economy as soon as possible. Macroeconomically, of course, the wisdom of these taxation policies, which further drain wealth into the wealth economy, is dubitable.

tools, and subjugating them into forced labor or into paying tributes worked well to feed and preoccupy one's surplus population. It even oftentimes allowed additional wealth generation by violence for the domestic owner's class, too. (We ought to add that there was, of course, no institutional or other guaranty that the domestic wealth owner's class would not immediately begin to appropriate the wealth or the income opportunities just won by their surplus population once more, e.g., quite typically, to displace soldiers who had become farmers from their newly gained land, even if that reproduced the problem). Nevertheless, warfare was a great relief. It could also reduce the need of prosthetics by diminishing the number of the surplus population as such through illness, death, or by dispersing them abroad. Warfare possesses yet another peculiar property, which gains great impact in modern capitalism, and which helps to shrink the problem of deficient productive spending for the future: War destroys land, buildings, other equipment and inventories, too. It, thereby not only creates new esoteric demand for the destroyed or damaged objects, but also renders their production more profitable, so that they become more competitive compared to sterile investments once more. In other words, aside any war prosthetically feeding the soldiers during the war and a won war often funding prosthetics for a longer term thereafter, and aside reducing the number of people in need of prosthetics, wars will almost always also improve the odds for the productive economy in the future, which by itself, will generate more employment generating spending afterwards (for some time). War is, accordingly, not only a mono-instrument of prosthetics funding, but it is multi-functional and operates on several levels; like a debt jubilee does away with excessive debt, it frees an economy of excessive goods.

Protectionism as means of prosthetics funding

If prosthetics are funded externally through war and violent wealth procurement or domestically through expropriation and taxation, the increment of employment-generating spending over the "original" capitalist employment-generating spending had a clear individualizable source, the subject of the subjugation or the tribute-payment or the expropriated or taxable subject. This is different with prosthetic increases of employment-generating spending from protectionism. Protectionism operates via influencing the market and additionally generated or attracted volumes of employment-generating spending often have no visible individual emitter. Protected firms, which profit, may not know who suffers in consequence of their well-being, the victims may also not know that they lose specific amounts to concrete favored firms, and even the bureaucrats who conceive and implement protectionist policies may not know whom they punish. In fact, often protectionism only prohibits prospective competitors from entering the market – the victims never really come into being.

Protectionism: State power giving the edge

If firms make M-outlays to realize profits in circuits, then they generate employment-generating spending, which is “original” and not “prosthetic”. If successful firms, or cities, countries, homelands of colonial empires, or imperialist countries can find employment-generating spending for their products, because their products are simply better or cheaper (or they more effectively supply them to markets in needed quantities etc.), then the M’ that they receive is also “original” and not “prosthetic”. Natural winners win because “natural” competitive advantages. They “pull” employment-generating spending towards themselves, without states influencing markets in their favor.

However, employment-generating spending becomes “prosthetic” when states use their state might to support protected firms selling commodities or purchasing supplies. The practice was known already in ancient Athens, Rome, and China, in medieval burger towns of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation and in Italian Renaissance city republics such as Venice. It also existed in what was later called “mercantilism” or “cameralism” in absolutistic states or princedoms and continues to exist until present times. Protectionism was at the center of economic policies of colonialism, imperialism, fascism and socialism. It also greatly helped catch-up developments of late-comers in capitalist development, e.g., of South-Korea, Japan and China. Previous state violence and war typically laid the foundations for the consecutive more moderate policies of protectionism.

While the worst practices of protectionism seem to have passed by with colonialism, imperialism, and fascism, protectionism as such has certainly not. It appears today in unilateral trade and foreign investment acts by states, treaties between states, and in acts by the World Trade Organization or other organizations. The employment-generating spending resulting from protectionist policies will increase employment-generating spending from abroad, which appear in the lower left corner of figures 6 and 7 on pages 121 and 122. Whatever its form, its essence is, to borrow an expression from *Clausewitz*, the continuation of firms’ microeconomic search for competitive advantages by political means.

Protectionism needing a concise economic understanding

Protectionism begins with governments, city councils, duchies, kingdoms, and empires. They need to understand, first, what every merchant already knows about the economy: Economic self-enrichment works through selling the greatest possible number of commodities to the greatest possible number of purchasers with the highest possible profits, i.e., to maximize M’-M. Protectionism’s core idea is a simple corollary from *correct* microeconomic insights of profit economies; therefore, it is and always was the most intuitive economic policy. *Protectionist policies only elevate how single firms think and operate anyhow on the level of state policy.* Market liberalism, conversely, becomes *counter-intuitive* for firms and well-meaning states as soon as

strong competitors arrive upon the scene (as freedom of opinion becomes counter-intuitive if it is “abused” for the wrong opinions).

States, second, need to find ways to favor selected firms and to implement appropriate measures to ensure this. Sometimes, recognizing possibilities for protectionist policies and implementing them is far from easy. Proper points of attack must be chosen, circumstances, which favor protected firms (or disfavor the competition), and a toolkit of law, ideology, administration and violence, to which the respective state has access, have to be marshalled into action. Protectionism requires a lot of continuous decision-making; it requires selecting favored firms, products, and target markets. It requires the generation of a political will and maintaining it to help the favored firms and to contrive a series of strategically chosen measures to implement them. As markets move quickly, somebody must continuously monitor how the policies work and adjust them if necessary.

Supply periphery and sales periphery

The protectionist state, starting from a more or less conscient understanding of $M-C-M'$ as its basic recipe, will specifically try to ascertain that there are as *many cheap and good supplies* as needed and that all resulting produce finds as *many and dear-paying customers* as possible. These two different purposes, as we have already seen in our initial discussion of $M-C-M'$ on page 95, draw a distinction between two peripheries, a functional supply periphery and a functional sales periphery (Absatz, débit, off-sale) for each product, behind them. The supply universe, figuratively on the left, should be a *low-price sector*, while the sales periphery on the right should be a *high-price sector*. As prices reflect valuations, the sectors can also be called low value and high value sectors.¹⁵ The favored firms (in the center) profit from *bridging* these sectors' value-differences. On page 91 et seq. we have used a two-chamber-metaphor for the role played by firms. The firms in the center can call the shots as long as they suck in or absorb goods, services, and labor in the left chamber. However, they have little control over the journey's crucial final leg. In chamber two, where they offer their products or services, they depend on prospective customers who must do the “sucking”, but whether these prospective customers have the esoteric demand, the necessary money, and whether they are willing to make the financial sacrifice to the favored firms, is out of the firms' control. Protectionism, now, applies tools to improve the odds of favored firms (beyond seduction by marketing etc.). In fact, the protectionist tools are *grosso modo* negative imprints of everything, which antitrust

15 Clearly, these sectors are not solely defined in terms of geographical regions or political countries, but in terms of markets that may be independent of political or geographical borders. Africa may be a low value and low price sector for labor, agricultural products, and raw materials, but a high value and high price sector for certain luxury goods, etc.

laws forbid between competing firms and in the relations between firms and suppliers or customers. They consist in opening gates or filters that are advantageous for the favored firms, and in closing gates or filters that are bad for them or good for competitors.

Figure 16: *The sun of the protectionist state shines over its favored firms*

Supporting favored firms:	Damaging competing firms:
Force supplier sector of favored firms to supply them in sufficient volumes, at good quality, and at good prices	Force suppliers sector <i>not</i> to supply competing firms or to only supply them in limited quantities, at high prices or at lower qualities
Support supplier sector of favored firms, e.g., by pushing their labor costs down (e.g., slavery, maximum salaries) and granting them exemptions from taxes, fees, duties and customs	Damage supplier sector of competing firms, e.g., by trade restrictions, pushing up labor costs (e.g., minimum salaries) levying higher taxes, fees, duties and customs
Encourage, sometimes force, customers to buy minimum quantities or exclusively from favored firms	Prohibit or restrict customers from buying from competing firms

The logic of $M-C-M'$ dictates that firms ought to show a softer and friendlier face to the customer than they do to the suppliers. Accordingly, the repertoire of protectionism on the left supply and on the right sales side are not equal. This is one of the (several) reasons why capitalism can be so wonderful and so ugly. Laws in the US south admitted negro slaves to be flogged in cotton plantations in Alabama to keep them under control, but never would the laws in England have allowed a lingerie supplier in Bond Street to flog British ladies if they did not buy their cotton lingerie.

Medieval and Renaissance Protectionism

The Swedish economic historian *Eli F. Heckscher* was a convinced free-trader and, energized thereby, wrote an impressive two-volume book entitled “Mercantilism” (1932). While the book suffers from an idealistic method,¹⁶ Heckscher presented a

16 His stated goal, which he reiterates over and over, is to find “the” mercantilist “doctrine”, “social idea”, or even the mercantilist “mentality”. E.g., Heckscher distinguishes three main types of mercantilist policies, which are either (i) directed towards commodities, (“staple policies”, Stapel, entrepôt), (ii) directed towards procurement (“policies of provision”), or

very rich historic study of mercantilist practices. The first element of mercantilist policies, he found, was to prohibit high quality and low-price commodities from being exported to the disadvantage of the favored manufacturing or trading firms back home.¹⁷ This applied to raw materials, semi-finished goods, tools and machinery, and also to labor. It ascertained that there were enough apt inputs as base for the favored firms adding value and also bereaved competitors of these same inputs.¹⁸ Heckscher saw the medieval German “Bannmeilen”-laws, whereby cities forced the surrounding countryside to exclusively bring their products to the local city market, as a typical example of this.¹⁹ Initially, the focus may have been on basic goods – grains, meat, bacon, butter, cheese, grease, oil, and other food –, but later, e.g., as cities (e.g. of the Hanseatic League, Brussels, or the North Italian city republics) entered into foreign trade, the mercantilist grip extended to raw materials, semi-finished products, tools, other means of production for export goods or, again, labor.²⁰

While the preceding policies targeted the M–C-chamber, or, if the goods were processed, the M–C’-chamber, others addressed the sales-chamber, the C–M’-chamber (or C’–M’-chamber). A strong city-state, e.g., Venice, the first important European post-medieval robber and merchant-city-state, was powerful enough not

(iii) directed against competing products (“policies of protection” in a narrower sense) [see Heckscher (1932) German translation, page 64] or he uses notions like “commodity hunger” or “commodity fear” to describe the mercantilist “mentality”. However, nothing really works and he only discovers that mercantilist firms are *sometimes* hungry (seeking cheap supplies) and have *at other times* “fear” of competing commodities (seeking sales monopolies) or even show both inclinations *at the same time*. Had Heckscher taken the contractionary capitalist process, which he, of course, was aware of, as a starting point (“buy cheap in order to sell dear” (Heckscher (1932) volume 2, page 43), everything would have fallen in its right place. As he did not, he blamed mercantilism for being more contradictory than it really is. Heckscher sometimes also confused politically and militarily guided policies, e.g., prohibitions against supplying strategically crucial material such as wood, horses, steel, and weapons, as mercantilist policies, while, in effect, they may even have been economic sacrifices on the geopolitical altar. That anti-trust-laws largely only developed after Heckscher’s book was published partially excuses these conceptual weaknesses. The analysis of the different ways of market interference, on which anti-trust-laws are based, could have helped to better describe protectionist policies as well.

17 Heckscher (1932) page 71, page 131.

18 Heckscher (1932) page 134. “One could consider food as a factor of production, even as the most important of all” (translated from German by the author). Heckscher points out that mercantilism favored a large (page 142 et seq.) low income (page 148 et seq.) industrious (page 139 et seq.) working population and objects to the view that child labor had been an invention of the industrial revolution. According to Heckscher, mercantilists (like Colbert) supported child labor beginning at the age of four, five, or six (page 140 et seq.).

19 Heckscher (1932) page 72.

20 Heckscher (1932) page 74. 75.

only to prohibit foreign firms from importing commodities, e.g., salt, into what Venice considered her home market (Venice including in so-called *domini di terra ferma* around it), but also to force them to *open up their territories* to Venetian exports, e.g., again, salt.²¹

Colonialist protectionism and its end

Opening territories for the trade of superior (technologically and economically more developed) countries was also the first protectionist means applied by colonialist protectionism to support selling products from home abroad. England opened China up for English export and trade in the Opium wars between 1839 and 1868 (British cannon boats made Chinese authorities admit opium into their territory) and Perry opened Japan up for US supplies in 1853. Colonial powers often went further and forced territories, which they had opened for their commodities, to *exclusively* purchase them and to disallow competing foreign products. Furthermore, they established monopolies in their favor to render services connected to trades. E.g., England favored its own sea-related shipping and other services with the Navigation Act of 1660, which even Adam Smith, although the interfering hand was quite “visible” in that instance, praised as a masterwork of statesmanship.²²

Britain, France, or other states set up and protected triangle trades, which, e.g., supplied low quality “jewelry”, colorful glass pellets, to West Africa, exchanging them against robbed negroes, and took the latter as slaves to the US or the Caribbean, where they were traded against cotton for Europe. The British empire protected the other aforementioned triangle trade, which consisted of buying opium in India, selling it in China, buying tea and silk there and taking it, in addition to excess silver from the particularly profitable sale of opium, back to Europe.²³

It did not stay this way, though. While founded by colonial powers, colonies forced their way out and thereby cut off the former’s protectionist advantages. The countries of the first wave of colonialism, the Spanish and Portuguese kingdoms, had to accept the loss of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, etc., largely as results of liberation wars, in the first quarter of the 19th. century, and of Cuba after the Spanish-American war 1898. The most important powers of the second colonial wave were The Netherlands, England, and France. The Netherlands created a network of colonies, mostly in the form of trade posts, parallel to their war against Spain (1568–1648), of which the most important ones were lost again already in the 17th century. England saw its key colony in

21 Heckscher (1932) page 125.

22 Smith (1776) Book IV chapters 3, 5; Heckscher (1932) volume 2, page 6, 25.

23 Of course, triangle trades experience frictions; there is no guaranty that the volumes of goods always match.

North America, later the US, liberate itself in 1776. It was no accident that the US's rejection of England exporting its tea into the US, the Boston Tea Party, became a signature event of US independence. The British empire's colonial power went through several phases, but only appeared to grow more and more powerful for a long time. It enjoyed undisputed naval supremacy for over a century and was able to defend its interests in middle Asia against competing Russia in the Crimean War of 1856. In the end, though, it was also sacked and probably suffered more than any other country from the collapse of colonialism. India was lost in 1947, Hong Kong finally returned to China in 1997; other possessions had already become economically unimportant. After France had been stripped of its North American possession – Canada becoming British already in the 18th century, Louisiana sold to the USA in 1803 –, its focus shifted to Africa, where it held most of the north western part. France also moved to the Far East, where it possessed today's Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. However, France lost fourteen French colonies in Africa in 1960; Algeria followed after a bloody war in 1962. By then, France had also already lost French Indochina in the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954.

Imperialist and fascist protectionism

Protectionist policies, though, as mentioned previously, did not end with classical colonialism. Neither M–C–M' had changed, nor had the search for sales markets become irrelevant. First, imperialism, as described by *Rudolf Hilferding*²⁴ and *Wladimir Lenin*,²⁵ continued to use protectionist policies – now with modern technology and mass-armies. Cheapening the national output through the input of unfree labor or robbed goods, thereby, of course, generating additional employment-generating spending, became an official state policy again – now the name of the “nation” (which sometimes included the national proletariat). Conquering countries to subjugate or even enslave them, as we have seen in the case of England and China, did not stop before previously culturally highly developed countries. In an even more tasteless and morally corrupt project, the late-comer Germany threw a grand scale attempt to degrade Russia, a former colonial power itself and the homeland of Tchaikovsky, Dostoyevsky, and Chekhov, into the status of a primitive colony in the middle of the 20th century. The attempted German eradication of the European Jews, too, had the economic dimension of a large-scale appropriation of Jewish wealth in Germany and the occupied territories, which would have improved Germany's economic position.

Protectionism after WW II

The end of even imperialism and fascism still did not imply the end of protectionism. The Marshall plan was protectionist in so far as it connected US-financing

24 *Hilferding* (1910).

25 *Lenin* (1917).

of European countries, largely by loans, with obligations to buy US-products.²⁶ Later the US allowed great volumes of foreign exports into its markets, partly in exchange for debt-financing its budget deficit by US-bond-purchases and partly in exchange for geopolitical favors in the Cold War. Thus, the US became a voluminous absorber of exports from Germany, Japan, and China (and other countries) and thereby nourished these competitors. The US has, though, recently attempted to turn this around and, e.g., re-conquer domestic and international markets for its productive firms, e.g., in the energy, semiconductor, automobile, steel, and tech sectors, including by protectionist means. Some measures, e.g., blocking technical supplies for gas pipelines from Russia (some allege the US even blew up Nordstream 1 and 2 in 2022) and general “sanctions” against Russia since the beginning of the Ukraine war, or an embargo against Iran, combine protectionist geopolitical and military objectives. Japan pursued protectionist policies when it kept foreigners from competing against Japanese firms, e.g., electronic industries, in Japan while it became a leading export power in the home markets of the dis-favored firms. China followed suit thirty years later. Socialist states had also run foreign trade monopolies, which, the different economic systems they backed notwithstanding, were protectionist in character.

Certain other state measures, which increase a country’s competitiveness abroad, must also be seen as protectionist. E.g., Germany, under the chancellorship of the social democrat *Gerhard Schröder*, in a project called “agenda 2010”, terminated previous political and legal measures in labor markets, which had raised salaries and thereby pushed down labor costs and secured cheap labor inputs for German productive firms. The agenda 2010 is believed to have significantly contributed to Germany’s lasting export success in the second decade of the 21st century. Manipulating the foreign exchange rate has reemerged as major protectionist tool, too. Almost all countries have, moreover, pursued policies of pushing down their domestic interest rates, which has the same effect. Such policies improve the competitiveness of favored firms and prosthetically increase their access to employment-generating spending to the detriment of foreign competitors.²⁷

As a summary, first, in contrast to what free traders still teach, there is overwhelming evidence for material protectionism almost everywhere, even today. Second, protectionism cannot be portrayed as an erroneous, nonsensical, fallacious, and illusionary misconception. Rather, protectionism offers proven recipes to microeconomically increase profits of favored firms and to macroeconomically help to

26 On the Marshall-plan: *Abelshauser* (2011) page 54 et seq.

27 The *International Bank for Settlement* (BIS) at Basel admits that monetary policies pursue the purpose of improving competitive positions abroad. It speaks of the “domestic transmission channel” of monetary policies in that sense (*International Bank for Settlement* (2016) pages 5, 13, 82 et seq.).

close domestic circuits – to the detriment of those abroad. We have a blatant contradiction between economic realities (over centuries and up to today) and the image painted of capitalism by liberals and neoliberals. Capitalist self-observation again admirably detaches itself from realities.

The dilemmas of funding prosthetics with external violent wealth procurement and protectionism

Nevertheless, protectionism was and is subjected to dilemmas, which severely limit its microeconomic and macroeconomic capacity. First, protectionism, *per se*, can at best shift deficient employment-generating spending around its space. However, as a “beggar-your-neighbor”-strategy, which it will always remain – it is asymmetrical by definition-, *it can never solve the worldwide deficiency of employment-generating spending as such*; it can only redistribute it. Second, like external violent wealth procurement, it generates displeased victims and opponents. These victims or opponents will apply defensive counterstrategies (I do not want to be your hinterland) and offensive protectionists strategies (you should be my hinterland). There will also be competition between protectionists to secure other countries as the hinterland (A-country should be *my* hinterland, not yours). All this will diminish the effectivity of protectionism. Third, and worse, protectionism will often lead to war, wars of liberation, and wars between protectionist pretenders. Fourth, protectionisms is an awkward and obstinate tool to handle in itself. In a world with complex nets of supply lines and trade systems, like that of today, it is very difficult to select macroeconomically relevant favored firms, products, and markets. Often hard and self-defeating choices have to be made, e.g., if a country’s production includes primary products, intermediary products, and final products; protection of the final product may be damaging to earlier stages’ products (or the other way around). What is good for sales of colored cloth, may not be good for the sales of cloth in general. When Jacob I, as Heckscher reports, in the early seventeenth century tried to enforce laws that *only* allowed the export of *colored cloth* from Britain to the continent to favor the dyers, he was challenged by a jurist (with the exquisite name of Julius Caesar) whether he wanted “in order to employ 10,000 dyers... render 100,000 spinners and weavers unemployed”.²⁸ Favoring product A will often put product B at a disadvantage, favoring product C or products D and E. Fifth, each single product can only be favored by setting up a kind of a “nozzle pipe” (as in figure 4 on page 92), so if protectionist policies address more than one product market and install more than one “nozzle pipe”, the more there are, the more likely it is that they will blow dust into each other’s faces. With the scientific, technical, and economic progress and trade systems changing more quickly, the consequences of acts in one area for

28 Heckscher (1932) page 134.

other areas become more unforeseeable and difficult to manage and a protectionist central observer and gate keeper will quickly become overstrained. A protectionist mega-cockpit is not as easily to control as a Benthamian panopticon prison.

A sixth dilemma of protectionism could be ideological. Protectionism collides with central soft power contents of the main capitalist countries. The USA, the EU, and Japan, etc., no longer base their soft power on religion, dynasties, and nation, but on universal human rights, democracy and economic liberty. This does not fit together with protectionism, which is asymmetrical and recklessly egoistic instead of being caringly universal and altruistic. Conversely, states have always been very good at materially violating their official soft-power-claims without a great loss of consensus and legitimacy and without generating significant opposition back home. (Populations only tend to discover contradictions after hefty defeats – but not before). This is particularly true in a world, like ours, which marches into a generally bellicose international atmosphere and things get more and more subjected to military logic. We can, thus, eliminate the contradiction between protectionism and the ideology of the leading Western capitalist countries from the list of its dilemmas. To the contrary, the sharpening geopolitical antagonism and international bellicosity will probably give way to more protectionism between the blocks in within the blocks.

After all: Apart from being stuck in tricky practical intricacies, the main dilemmas of protectionism are that it is hopelessly insufficient in generating the necessary prosthetic spending at a world-wide level and that it will be opposed, by economic policies or militarily, by its victims. One the other hand, in an international situation of long-term and grand-scale confrontation between strategic blocs, such as between the West and Russia and the West and China (which may well merge into one, single confrontation), and where geopolitical hostility and military logic increasingly dominate, states care less about “making enemies”. In fact, even the intrinsic inefficiencies of protectionism become less burdensome due to parallel sectorization and de-globalization of the world economy. Within blocks countries can also more easily be disciplined to accept protectionism and more political-economic trade-off become possible. While protectionism will, thus, remain at a great distance from solving the problems of world-wide capitalist circuit closure, it may experience a new spring as a prosthetic tool in a partly de-globalized world of militarized block-economies.