

2 Transnational Social Movements as agents of change in World Politics

Having established the normative ground of demands for human rights accountability among MDBs, I now turn to transnational social movements (for an elaboration, see Chapter 3) as the agents who can bring such change about. In fact, the question which movement tactics are capable of socializing MDBs into human rights accountability is at the core of the current work. As stated in the introduction, I understand socialization as a “process of learning to behave in a way that is acceptable to society” (Oxford Dictionary, 2018), whereby the society of interest is the community of public authorities abiding by human rights (e.g., states, IOs and nonstate actors). The agents of interest in my work are transnational social movements that engage with MDBs and thus kick off the socialization process. Before developing a causal mechanism of social movement influence on MDBs in Chapter 3, this chapter deals with the state of the art regarding the transnationalization of social movements and their tactics.

In social movement studies, there is an impressive body of literature on the nature of social movements and the effectiveness of their strategies to achieve social change, though the origins are notoriously difficult to determine with precision. According to Hellman (Hellmann & Koopmans, 1998), the first writings on social protest movements date back to the period of The Enlightenment. It was in the 20th century however that scholars began to analyze the origins and effects of social movements in a systematic manner. Up until the 1960s, the field was heavily influenced by the early work of Gustave Le Bon. In his most important work, “The Crowd – A Study of the Popular Mind” from 1896, Le Bon conceptualized protest movements as amorphous aggregations of uneducated people who are guided by their affects and deeply susceptible to manipulations from elites. In this tradition of thought, scholars in the 1950s conceptualized protest movements as irrational and inherently undesirable social phenomena (Kornhauser, 1965). Against the background of the recent experiences in Nazi Germany, where masses of people cheered the proclamation of “total warfare,” they saw movements as alternatives to, rather than expressions of, politics (Meyer, 2004). Toward the 1960s, when the civil rights movement in the United States and the student movements in Western Europe took off, the perspective changed dramatically. Not only did researchers find

out that movement activists were highly political animals involved in several political organizations at once (Parkin, 1968), and were well-educated and psychologically more fit than average (Keniston, 1968), but scholars also found that movement activism led to tangible concessions by governments (Button, 1978; Piven & Cloward, 1979). Increasingly, movement activism was re-defined as reasonable to achieve political goals¹. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, scholarship on social movements augmented considerably against the background of the so-called “new social movements.” Prominent examples of these movements were the civil rights, feminist and gay rights movements in the 1970s, and the environmental and peace movements in the 1980s. Scholars advocating a “new social movement theory” considered these movements “new” because the political issues identified could not be captured in terms of an economically defined class alone. According to Buechler (1995), new social movement theory emerged “in large part as a response to the inadequacies of classical Marxism to analyze collective action” (p. 441). While classical Marxism viewed everything outside economic contradictions as “secondary,” new social movements and accordingly new social movement theory put identity, politics and culture at the center. Two major theoretical paradigms which synthesize several insights into scope conditions of movement success are resource mobilization theory (RMT) and political opportunity structures (POS). While the former focuses more on the resources and internal organization of movements (e.g., McCarthy & Zald, 1977), their mobilization strategies (e.g., McAdam, 1986), or the determinants for choosing a certain course of action rather than another (e.g., Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2017), the latter is more concerned with political and discursive opportunity structures facilitating change. I discuss both these theoretical paradigms when addressing the scope conditions of movement influence in Chapter 3.

In this chapter, I laid the ground for the agents of change central to this work. Thus, I define transnational social movements (2.1), before I briefly elaborate on the transnationalization of social movements in Section 2.2. This transnationalization occurs against the background of an increasing exercise of power of international organizations (see Chapter 1). In Section 2.3, I categorize the means of movements into conventional and disruptive tactics, before I discuss the outcomes of social movements in Section 2.4. Tactics and movement (i.e., socialization) outcomes form building blocks for the causal mechanism I develop in Chapter 3.

2.1 Transnational Social Movements – A Definition

I begin with my conceptualization of transnational social movements (TSM). It shares with other definitions of concepts that it strives to be bounded enough to exclude related, but different social phenomena without excluding those phenomena of theoretical interest to my work. Different definitions of social movements have been proposed

1 Social movement scholars in the United States often refer to Mancur Olson as the founder of research on collective action. In “The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups” (1965), Olson examines why political groups emerge and persist, even though there is no rational incentive to do so from the perspective of each individual member.

in the literature (e.g., Benford and Snow, 2000; Goodwin & Jasper, 2003; McAdam & Snow, 1997; Tarrow, 1994). While existent definitions of social movements differ in their scope as well as in the aspects they deem particularly important, the most prominent definitions share the common core features: collective action, a combination of organized and non-organized components, some degree of temporal continuity, intentionality, and a shared goal. *Transnational* social movements complicate the matter, as they add a geographical element.

My definition of transnational social movements (TSMs) overlaps to a large extent with that of transnational advocacy networks (TAN), as the literature also overlaps with regard to identifying advocacy/movement strategies. In this conceptualization chapter, I will make these overlaps explicit where suitable. There are two main reasons for choosing the term “transnational social movements” rather than “transnational advocacy networks.” First, to my reading, the term transnational advocacy network (TAN) is broader in scope, including a wider range of actors such as NGOs and academics, but also staff of international organizations (IOs) and like-minded states (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse et al., 1999). My work focuses more narrowly on social movements. These include major NGOs and academics as well, but exclude IOs and like-minded states, or bodies of such states. The purpose of this work is precisely to identify how transnational social movements target (rather than cooperate with) MDBs and how they use the state channel (especially parliaments of MDB member states) to achieve reform. Secondly, there is a very long tradition of scholarly work regarding the choice of conventional vs. disruptive tactics in social movement literature. While I refer to important contributions from scholarship on advocacy networks, I mainly draw on this rich amount of work on movement tactics to make my argument. In the following, I will first define social movements and then move on to a full definition of transnational social movements.

First, social movements are *collectivities (or collective actors)* that engage in collective action. According to Snow and colleagues (2004), collective action “consists of any goal-directed activity engaged in jointly by two or more individuals” (p. 6). As collectivities, social movements face collective action problems such as free-riding (people benefit from the collective good movements provide without contributing to its provision).

Moreover, social movements are typically composed of *organized and non-organized actors*. While some scholars (e.g., Piven & Cloward, 1977) were skeptical of large organizations and instead emphasized the importance of dynamic, loosely coupled networks, a majority of scholars (Gamson, 1975; Lofland, 1996) highlighted the importance of organizations such as Oxfam, Amnesty International, Greenpeace or Human Rights Watch for the movement as a whole. For advocacy networks and movements alike, organizations are critical to deploy resources for campaigns and to coordinate activities (Gamson, 1990). Other authors stressed the importance of organizations to mobilize large numbers of people at once, a process referred to as “bloc recruitment” (Oberschall, 1993, p. 24). Several scholars following this line of thinking have mainly focused on organizations within movements to study the movement as a whole (Lofland, 1996; McCarthy & Zald, 1977). However, social movements are not organizations, not even of a peculiar kind, but rather “networks of interaction between different actors which may either include formal organizations or not, depending on shifting circumstances” (della Porta

& Diani, 1999, p. 16). In line with Tarrow, I hold that movements involve organized and non-organized actors. A famous example is the civil rights movement of the 1960s in the US, which cooperated heavily with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference as well as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. While organizations are central to movements, their partial reliance on loosely associated, non-organized actors (e.g., academics who are not member of a movement organization, volunteers, or protestors in a demonstration without organizational affiliation) distinguishes them from interest groups (Tarrow, 1998).

While the reasons for joining a social movement can be manifold involving individual psychological (e.g., a sense of injustice), sociological (e.g., the potential recruit already knows someone in the movement) and structural (the lack of spouse, children and a demanding job) factors (Snow, Zurcher, & Eklund-Olson, 1980), those eventually forming part of the movement pursue, analogous to those participating in advocacy networks, *shared goals on the basis of shared values* (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 2). Thus, in contrast to scholars viewing advocacy networks (and by extension, social movements) as analogous to private firms (Prakash & Gugerty, 2010), I agree with those who emphasize the fundamental distinction between both types of collective actors: seeking profit is constitutive for private firms, while seeking to advance (their definition of) the public common good is constitutive for movements and advocacy groups. This has major implications for the way they operate. In contrast to private firms, movements immediately lose their influence when caught putting generation of resources over pursuing the public good, or when making false claims about the world. In fact, risking their moral standing and expert status is by far the greatest threat to movements and advocacy networks alike (Risse, 2010). Yet, in contrast to conceptualizations proposed by scholars with a tendency to presume only progressive movement values and causes, I follow Jasper (2004) who argued that movements might also pursue regressive goals. The formulations “shared goals” and “shared values” leave open whether movements seek to foster or retard social change, and whether their value base is normatively benign. Whether one or the other applies is an empirical, not a conceptual question.

The notion of shared goals also indicates that movements are strategic collective actors. In other words, movements (as well as advocacy networks) possess intentionality. Thus, despite their heterogeneity in terms of membership, they coordinate activities and calculate potential responses. This contrasts with other social phenomena driven by unconscious and impulsive group behavior (e.g., panics). It also contrasts with conceptions of movement actors as purely altruistic (e.g., Bob, 2010). Neither the notion of shared values, nor that of a shared visions of the common (public) good implies such other help preferences. Instead, key contributions in social movement (e.g., Jasper, 2008) and advocacy network (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) literature puts special emphasis on the rational, strategic acting of their objects of study. As Risse put it, “principled believers are no dummies” (Risse, 2010, p. 286).

An important feature that distinguishes movements from interest groups or political parties is their use of inside as well as outside tactics. While political parties may collaborate with movements and organizations that engage outside formalized channels of decision-making (e.g., the German Green Party supporting Green Peace, the Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Union, and other environmental organizations),

their focus as political parties is on conventional channels of influence (e.g., parliamentary activities). I will elaborate on conventional/inside and disruptive/outside means of engagement when discussing the causal mechanisms of change in Chapter 3.

In contrast to riots or spontaneous demonstrations organized in the immediate aftermath of an event, movements possess a degree of *temporal continuity* (Snow et al., 2004). Consider the women's movement, which had its roots in the early 19th century and persisted across generations. Other movements, however, are rather short lived, indicating that the time span may vary considerably. Typically, we can observe periods of heightened activism followed by a time of dormancy, which Tarrow (1998) captured with the term *cycles of protest*. However, temporal continuity is a central feature of movements. Bringing together these elements, I propose the following definition of social movements as *collectivities composed of organized and non-organized actors that engage in sustained and intentional interactions with power-holders to pursue shared social goals on the basis of shared values*.

Social movements turn into transnational social movements (TSM), if they possess “constituents in at least two states” and are “engaged in contentious interactions with power-holders in at least one state other than their own, or against a transnational institution or a multinational economic actor” (Tarrow, 2001, p. 11). Overall, I agree with Tarrow’s definition, but make a small refinement to the last part, as the distinction between a “transnational institution” and a “multinational economic actor” is not only misleading, but is also unnecessarily introduces complexity. It is misleading, as most activity of transnational social movements is directed against international organizations, rather than transnational institutions (Tallberg et al. 2018). The distinction unnecessarily introduces complexity, as it remains unclear what exactly the difference between “multinational economic actors” and “transnational institutions” is. In my understanding, MDBs (a term more common than multinational economic actors) are a specific subtype of international organizations.

In sum, I end up with the following definition: Transnational Social Movements (TSM) are *collectivities with constituents in at least two states, composed of organized and non-organized actors that engage in sustained and intentional interactions with power-holders in at least one state other than their own, or against an international institution, to pursue shared social goals on the basis of shared values*.

2.2 The Transnationalization of Social Movement Activity


Modern social movements of the early 20th century were tied to the emergence of the modern nation state. The role of the state as the primary target of social movements is hardly challenged even today. Yet, since the 1960s, the social, cultural, technical and political changes commonly discussed under the heading of “globalization” have transformed social movements as well. In their seminal contribution “Transnational protest and global activism” (2005), Della Porta and Tarrow identified diffusion, domestication and externalization as the three main forms of transnational contention. According to the authors, *diffusion* occurs when “challengers in one country or region adopt or adapt the organizational forms, collective action frames, or targets of those in other countries

or regions" (Della Porta & Tarrow, 2005, p. 3). An example of diffusion is the Western European movement's adoption of "sit-ins," a tactic of contention first practiced by the American civil rights movement (Tarrow, 1989). In another variant of diffusion, themes and practices of the 1960s students' movement in the United States spread to Western Germany, primarily through students who had studied in the United States (McAdam & Rucht, 1993). According to Della Porta and Tarrow, the relationship between processes of diffusion, transnational networks and identities can be described as a virtuous cycle. Sustained diffusion requires, but also helps produce the latter (Della Porta & Tarrow, 2005). Next, *internalization* or *domestication* refers to "the playing out on domestic territory of conflicts that have their origin externally" (Della Porta & Tarrow, 2005, p. 4). Examples include the mobilization of farmers at the national level to protest against EU policies (Bush & Simi, 2001), or national protests against IMF-induced spending cuts in Argentina in 2001 (Auyero, 2003). Third, *externalization* describes the attempt by NGOs in one location to stimulate an international alliance with movements in another location that lack resources and/or opportunities. In a common variant of externalization, domestic and international actors jointly tackle IOs or liberal states to exercise pressure on their national government (Della Porta & Tarrow, 2005; Keck, 1998). At the European level, feminists, environmentalists, and unions have also managed to use the European Court of Justice to obtain favorable results (Della Porta & Tarrow, 2005). Della Porta and Tarrow concluded that diffusion, internalization, and externalization represent three processes through which we can observe a transnationalization of movement activity.

Scholars hinted at several driving forces enabling these developments. For Della Porta and Tarrow (2005), the end of the Cold War encouraged movement connections and solidarities that were formerly blocked by the Iron Curtain. Moreover, the revolution in communication technologies (primarily the Internet) and an increasing knowledge of common languages enabled enhanced communication on a regular basis, while cheap international travel was conducive to physical meetings at international summits (e.g., the World Social Forum; Della Porta & Tarrow, 2005). The availability of information from around the globe and regular physical interaction also lead to an enhanced ability to put oneself into the position of an unknown and distant other, to show empathy and solidarity. The increasingly widespread willingness among citizens to engage in the face of human rights violations are a clear indication of this (Finnemore, 2004; Furia, 2005). International Organizations, finally, play an important role in that. They serve as forums where movement actors come together to discuss issues of common concern. Examples include the increasing number of NGOs applying for a "consultation status" under the UN framework or the increasing activity of lobby groups and unions at the international level (Zürn & Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2013).

In 2015, more than 4,000 NGOs acquired consultative status within the United Nations (United Nations, 2015), while the EU's interest group register lists 7400 organizations (a large portion of which are NGOs; European Union, 2017). Moreover, hundreds of NGOs attend the annual meetings of the World Bank (World Bank Group, 2017) or the World Trade Organization (WTO, 2017). While IOs are potential movement allies to advance change internationally or within states (Liese, 2006; Uhre, 2014), they also in-

Graph 1: NGOs with consultative status at the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)



Source: Zürn, 2014, p.56

creasingly become targets of movement activism themselves (Zürn & Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2013).

2.3 Social Movement Tactics

Social movements are collective actors that seek to pursue public goods on the basis of shared values by strategically engaging in certain types of action (see Section 2.1). In doing so, movements face several tradeoffs, choice points, and dilemmas as they choose their “repertoire of contention”² (Taylor & Van Dyke, 2004; Tilly, 1995). A particularly relevant and recurring dilemma in the interaction between TSM and their opponents is the choice between “conventional” and “disruptive” tactics (e.g., Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Gamson, 1990; Giugni, 1998; Tilly, 1995). Similarly, the literature on non-governmental organization (NGO) advocacy in international relations literature discusses the effectiveness of “inside” vs. “outside” tactics (e.g., Carpenter, 2011; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; O’Brien, 2000; for an overview, see Risse, 2012). This basic classification of tactics into the conventional (inside) and disruptive (outside) also sits well with Daase and Deitelhoff’s (2014) recent differentiation between “opposition” and “dissidence”. Daase and Deitelhoff claim that conventional and disruptive *means* of contention tend to go along with different *objects* of contention: contention in political systems that allow for opposition through conventional channels tends to center on single policy decisions, while

2 The notion of “repertoire” borrowed from theater refers to the set of actions available to a TSM in a given period. Repertoires thus involve a bundle of tactics.

the repression of such opposition invokes disruptive tactics and a repudiation of the order as a whole (Daase & Deitelhoff, 2014, 2017). In between both extremes, political and institutional reforms tend to be accompanied with conventional and disruptive tactics. The following table summarizes their conceptualization of opposition and dissidence in relation to the objects and means of movement contention:

Table 1: Conventional and Disruptive Tactics as Means of Contention

	Opposition		Dissidence
Object	Single Decisions	Political and Institutional Reform	Order as a whole
Means	Conventional tactics (Inside formal channels)		Disruptive tactics (Outside formal channels)

Source: adaptation from Daase & Deitelhoff, 2014, p.12

This typology is useful to hint at a general pattern in the relationship between tactics, means, and objects of contention. In line with this general pattern, the social movements I analyze demanding political and institutional reform toward enhanced human rights accountability at the World Bank employed both, conventional and disruptive tactics. Yet in contrast to Daase and Deitelhoff (2017), I argue that conceptualizing opposition and dissidence according to tactics *and* goals is misleading, as the relationship between means and objects should remain an empirical, rather than a definitional question. By way of example, communist parties in Western Europe reject the order as a whole, but operate within the confines of parliamentary democracy (Daphi & Anderl, 2016). Similarly, dissidence does not necessarily involve a rejection of the existing order as such. Practices of civil disobedience are dissent because they take place outside established rules. Yet, it is also civil as long as rule-breaking is proportional to the aspired goals (i.e., preserving the physical and psychological integrity of its opponents), if these goals are a matter of conscience, and if it accepts the constitutional order as a legitimate structure for its actions (Dworkin, 1977; Rawls, 1971).³ Thus, despite the use of disruptive, even violent tactics, activists might not question, but rather defend the democratic order. In my work, I therefore focus on the differentiation between conventional and disruptive *tactics*.

3 As Ladwig (2006) correctly argues, even violence might be primarily used as part of this symbolic critique: When Beate Klarsfeld slapped Kurt-Georg Kiesinger (a former German chancellor and member of Hitler's NSDAP) in the face, the strength of the message arguably outweighed the pain inflicted. A drastic example of the symbolic use of violence is auto-destruction. Where activists go in hunger strike and expose themselves to great risks, it becomes very clear to outsiders that their concerns are urgent. Rather than being opposed to the constitutional order, civil disobedience within the confines of a democratic state may express concern that key values of the democratic order are not respected sufficiently.

An early and comprehensive review on the effects of different social movement tactics was provided by Gamson (1975). In his book, *The Strategy of Social Protest*, Gamson tracked the impact of 53 social movements that challenged the U.S. government in the United States between 1800 and 1945. Gamson argued that the use of disruptive tactics was conducive to both, the acceptance as challengers as legitimate representatives of contention, and secondly, the realization of tangible improvements - Gamson's two measures of success. Several authors (Frey et al., 1992; Goldstone, 1980) who used Gamson's data to test, reanalyze and refine his conclusions confirmed his main findings concerning the effectiveness of disruption, also resonating with studies by Mirowsky and Ross (1981) and Steedly and Foley (1979). There also was agreement, that disruptive tactics are generally more promising, the more resources a movement has at its disposal (see Kolb, 2007; for a review). What remained a topic of hot debate was the effectiveness of using violence.

In contrast to Gamson, Button (1978) found that massive and severe disruption is counterproductive, as it represents a societal threat that will likely be met with repression. Investigating riots in the United States during the 1960s, Button adopted a "political opportunity structure" approach and proposed a set of general conditions for political change: those targeted have the resources available to satisfy movement demands, a relevant share of the elite and a relevant share of the public is sympathetic to movement goals and movement goals should be limited, specific and clear (Button, 1978). In line with Snyder and Kelly (1976) who looked at major strikes in Italy toward the late-18th century, however, Button found a negative relationship between violence and success. In the aftermath of a series of urban riots in the United States, scholars engaged in a debate around the differences between riots and social movements. Whereas riots involve the use of physical force to voice opposition (Braha, 2012), Tarrow (1996) defined social movements as "sustained challenges to power holders in the name of a disadvantaged population living under the jurisdiction or influence of those power holders" (p. 874). Nevertheless, riots such as those in the 1960s in the United States provided important cases to analyze the effects of disruption on outcomes in social movement protests (Cloward & Piven, 1993; Gurr, 1980; Kelly & Snyder, 1980). For instance, Colby (1982) and Jennings (1979) argued that the number of riots increased political representation. A second strand of literature focuses on labor conflicts, particularly strikes (Guigni, 1998). Again, most data comes from the United States, where movement studies became very popular in the 1970s. While Taft and Ross (1969) found little evidence that violence helped Unions during U.S. labor conflicts in the 1960s and Welch (1975) even suggested a negative effect (finding that riots increased the urban expenditure for control and repression), Shorter and Tilly (1971) found that strikes involving violence were more successful than peaceful ones in the 1970s in France. No differential effect for disruptive tactics on socio-economic gains such as income or employment on the local level was found in studies by Kelly and Snyder (1980) as well as Levitan, Johnston, and Taggart (1975). This ambiguity largely holds for more recent studies as well. While Guigni did not find much evidence for any positive effect of disruption in the United States, Italy, or Switzerland (Guigni, 2004), Katrine Uba showed that anti-privatization protests in India greatly benefitted from disruptive tactics (Uba, 2005). In his study, King investigated the potential disruption carries to affect the behavior of corpora-

tions. To recap, works on disruptive tactics reveal that disruption only works under a set of circumstances, and rarely alone. Still, even where disruptive tactics failed to reach movement outcomes, there is explicit or implicit agreement that disruption has high potential in causing *crisis* at their respective target institutions. This is of paramount importance, as authors of different disciplines have reached the conclusion that institutions open up for change due to external shocks. In particular, sociological institutionalists point to shared organizational scripts and norms of appropriateness which discourage institutions to step out of established practices. Moreover, their bureaucratic culture (e.g., “standard operating procedures”) makes it difficult for organizations to engage in substantial reform (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). If at all, target institutions often seek to merely adjust policies to external demands superficially. So-called “jolts” (i.e., social upheavals and political pressure) have the potential to destabilize established practices (Hinings, Greenwood, & Suddaby, 2004). The resulting uncertainty then opens the space for reform and even processes of “double-loop learning” (Agyris & Schön 1980) during which actors profoundly change their identities and interests (Checkel, 1999). Similarly, proponents of rational choice institutionalism seem to agree on the importance of exogenous shocks to trigger institutional change. Typically, institutions tend to settle around equilibria which are relatively stable. Shocks which have their source in events outside of the institution can disequilibrate the institution and thus enable change. Finally, historical institutionalists theorize that once created, institutions can be characterized by inertia, stickiness and path dependencies (Hay, 2011, p. 68). Exogenous shocks then present critical junctures, since the constraining forces inherent to institutions are lifted, even if only for a short period. At such junctures, multiple pathways are possible as institutional actors proactively seek to “reexamine their surroundings, reconsider their positions, and develop fresh new approaches” (Béland & Cox 2010, p. 11).

On the other hand, several authors have argued that conventional tactics proceeding through inside channels are more effective than disruptive ones, as political and institutional change depends on public and, in particular, elite support which disruptive engagement is unable to generate. A particularly elaborate version of this argument has been made by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011). While the authors studied the mobilization of rebellions within the context of nation states, the causal mechanisms they identified are largely applicable to the choice of conventional or disruptive tactics by social movements on the transnational level. Chenoweth and Stephan suggest two main reasons for the strategic advantage of nonviolent (conventional) over violent (disruptive) tactics. First, social movements depend on the sympathy of political and societal elites. If movements engage in disruptive tactics, oppression of the challengers is likely to be accepted by these elites. In contrast, repressing nonviolent campaigns (i.e., through violent means) may backfire, as third parties tend to condemn excessive responses. Externally, international bystanders are more likely to condemn an excessive response by government, potentially leading to withdraw funding, or direct funding toward the challengers. Internally, sections inside the regime (i.e., civil servants, judiciary or police) are also more likely to sympathize with the victims of excessive repression, leading to an erosion of regime support from within. From the perspective of the regime in power, repressing a nonviolent campaign is thus more costly than repress-

ing a violent one. Interestingly, a great deal of work exists on political allies, while not that many studies have focused their attention on the role of opponents within the system, so-called veto-players (notable exceptions in this regard are works by Burstein & Hollander, 1995; Busby, 2010; Jasper & Poulsen, 1993; as well as Risse-Kappen, 1995). Secondly, drawing on correspondence inference theory (Abrahms, 2006), Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) argued that people make judgments about appropriate behavior toward adversaries based on the latter's previous actions. The theory makes a strong case for conventional tactics, as movements using conventional tactics appear more amenable to negotiation than disruptive ones in the eyes of bystanders, particularly the public (DeNardo, 2014). While social movement scholars emphasize that conventional tactics proceed through inside channels, scholars of international relations emphasized the power of norm entrepreneurs to shame (Rittberger & Schimmelfennig, 2006; Tannenwald, 2007) or persuade (Checkel, 2001; Payne, 2001) decision-makers. In his influential essay "Let's Argue," Thomas Risse (2000) expanded this debate by introducing *arguing* as a logic of social action. According to Risse, arguing refers to a process whereby actors "challenge the validity claims inherent in any causal or normative statement," aiming for a "reasoned consensus" (Risse, 2000, p. 7). While these works on arguing opened up a normatively and theoretically promising research avenue, other authors focused on "persuasion" as the concept that lies at the heart of conventional tactics—for two main reasons: first, to say that arguing took place is an ambitious claim which, at the same time, is extremely difficult to verify empirically (Deitelhoff & Müller, 2005). In fact, Risse himself pointed to the work of Habermas to emphasize that arguing constitutes a "counterfactual presupposition" (or an ideal type) rather than a statement about the empirical world (Risse, 2000, p. 17). Still, to engage in a verification concerning the degree to which arguing took place would, if possible at all (for a well-reasoned argument against this possibility see Hanrieder, 2008) go beyond the scope of this work. Secondly, recent psychological research on the relationship between emotions and cognition raises doubts with regard to the theoretical possibility of arguing (Schaal & Heidenreich, 2013). Arguing assumes a purely rational exchange of arguments. Yet, there is consensus among cognitive psychologists that emotions, the tendency to employ mental heuristics and shortcuts play a role in all decision-making contexts. Damasio (1994) showed that political communication, as all communication, does not only transport arguments, but also values and emotions. Critically, we depend on emotional activity to think rationally. Without any emotional arousal, rational thinking is inhibited if not impossible. Importantly, though, the works cited here concur in that the use of conventional tactics may lead to promising outcomes. Conventional tactics maintain good rapport with the opponent and ensure future cooperation. Yet, the cited studies above suggest that disruptive tactics may be necessary to increase pressure and to open up the discourse where access is severely limited and targets remain unresponsive due to organizational inertia. Taken together, these findings suggest the usefulness of tactics is highly context-bound, involving a complex interplay between actors seeking change, their surrounding (discursive) structures, and individual-level, psychological factors on

behalf of frame recipients.⁴ Furthermore, trade-offs between both tactics may emerge, where TSMs need to make a basic decision for the use of one or the other (Jasper, 2008).

In his study on urban protests, Schumaker (1978) emphasized that disruptive tactics are more likely to work where the scope of conflict is narrowly limited to the protest group and their immediate target. Yet, where protest groups are small, they are more likely to face repression when using disruptive tactics, suggesting a mix of tactics (O'Keefe & Schumaker, 1983). Similarly, Staggenborg contradicts Piven and Cloward's finding that the transformation of movements into more professional and bureaucratic social movement organizations does not prevent them from using innovative, disruptive tactics. According to her study on the "Pro-Choice Movement" in the United States during the 1980s, it was the combination of militant tactics (e.g., by the Reproductive Rights National Network) with conventional tactics of highly professional organizations that enabled the movement's success (Staggenborg, 1991). In his article "Outside Lobbying," Kollman (1998) explored the effectiveness of interest groups to influence the U.S. Congress via the mobilization of the public. In contrast to authors who argued that strategies involving the public are primarily aimed at recruiting new members, Kollman postulated that the public is an important vehicle to demonstrate widespread support among the electorate, thus increasing pressure on decision-makers. Particularly where leaders of interest groups calculate that the public supports their claims, appeals to the public are an essential component of the overall lobbying strategy that involves both conventional and disruptive tactics. Kollman substantiated this argument by reference to more than 90 interviews with interest group leaders and policy makers as well as a statistical analysis of public opinion data. Perhaps the most influential study suggesting mixed tactics is that by McAdam and Su (2002). Therein, the authors investigate the outcomes of conventional and disruptive anti-Vietnam War protests from 1965 to 1973 in the United States. Using time-series analysis of protest event data coded from *The New York Times*, they analyze the impact of movement activity on voting behavior in the U.S. Congress. The results are mixed with respect to conventional and disruptive tactics, indicating that different tactics had positive effects (mainly on agenda setting) as well as negative effects (in terms of policy outcomes) on congressional voting behavior at different points in time. Comparing the anti-Vietnam-War protest with the civil rights movement, McAdam

4 On an anticipatory note, I am interested in movement tactics in relation to a specific set of scope conditions. In that, I follow Zürn and Checkel (2005) who have convincingly argued that the narrow focus on one side of the structure-agency relationship is shared by both, rational choice and constructivist scholars. Even if one agrees with the constructivist notion that ontologically, agency and structure co-determine each other (Ulbert, 2005), most constructivist studies take either structure or agency as their starting point, too. According to Zürn and Checkel, positivism – which, according to the authors is embraced epistemologically by rationalist as well as (most) constructivists in IR (including the present work) – lies at the heart of this imperative to define a starting point. For “the simultaneous study of the mutual constitution of structure and agency barely seems possible” within a positivist epistemology (Zürn & Checkel, 2005, p. 1051). I elaborate on the relation between rational choice and constructivist accounts and their respective logics of action in relation to IOs in Chapter 3.3.

and Su stressed the importance of a general commitment among movements to the principals of democracy, while maintaining an ability to disrupt. As they conclude:

“This observation motivates us to close by speculating on the paradoxical nature of politics in the United States and the peculiar strategic challenge it poses to movements. To be maximally effective, movements must be disruptive/threatening, while nonetheless appearing to conform to a democratic politics of persuasion. Democratic theory notwithstanding, threat and disruption (and even violence) have been effective means of mobilizing power in the United States, but typically not when practiced by groups perceived as antidemocratic.” (McAdam & Su, 2002, p. 718)

Rectifying McAdam and Su's findings, a qualitative study on corporative and public interest groups in Denmark (Binderkrantz, 2008), as well as large-n study drawing on surveys of interest groups in Austria, Germany, Ireland, Latvia and Spain (Dür & Mateo, 2013), confirm that a combination of direct contacts with decision-makers (inside strategies) and the mobilization of the public (outside strategies) are most effective. As Dür and Mateo emphasized in their recent study, inside and outside tactics are dependent on a different set of scope conditions. While access to decision-makers matters for inside tactics, the advocacy group's endowment with material resources and the issue area (especially distributive politics) are critical for the latter (Dür & Mateo, 2013).

In my work, I follow scholars in this third camp (i.e., scholars who seek to build bridges among those advocating conventional and those advocating disruptive tactics). I agree in that both tactics represent a distinct potential under a given set of conditions and should thus be considered as complementary in achieving movement outcomes (e.g., the socialization of MDBs into human rights accountability). I now turn to the debate regarding the outcomes of social movements.

2.4 Socialization and the Outcomes of Social Movements

The title of this work states: “Socializing Development Transnational Social Movement Advocacy and the Human Rights Accountability of Multilateral Development Banks.” Traditionally, socialization literature in international relations (IR) focused on states. In an early contribution, Waltz (1979) referred to socialization as a mechanism that ensured conformity among states. The groundbreaking work by Wendt (1999) provided avenues for novel, constructivist research on state socialization through structures of meaning and the construction of shared identities. Increasingly, the potential of TAN came to the fore as socializing agents. Since, several influential conceptions of the term socialization emerged. These studies hint to similar, but at times also slightly different socialization outcomes. For instance, some authors hold that socialization leads to sustained compliance with the promoted norms regardless of incentives (Goodman & Jinks, 2013; Risse & Sikkink, 1999; Schimmelfennig, 2005), while other emphasize the adoption of new roles in line with the favored norms (Beyers, 2005) or the adoption of novel interests and values (Gheciu, 2005). Capturing different elements of these works, Risse and Sikkink (1999) defined socialization as the process by which principled ideas translate into “collective understandings about appropriate behavior which then lead

to changes in identities, interests, and behavior” (p. 11). Given this broad definition (resembling closely the early, sociological understanding of socialization as found in the work of Emile Durkheim, 1922), there is a need to break the concept down to make it viable for empirical study (Zürn & Checkel, 2005). I hold that, once more, a dialogue between social movement research and IR research on socialization is fruitful at this point to refine the definitions and measurement of socialization outcomes. In the following, I distinguish between socialization effects internal and external to the movement. Discussing the range of external movement outcomes, I follow a common distinction (Bosi et al., 2016) regarding effects on people, policies and institutional reform. My work focuses on the latter two, effects on policies and institutional reform.

On a general level, scholars differentiate between effects *internal* or *external* to the movement (Bosi et al., 2016; Guigni, 1998). For instance, strengthening internal cohesion and solidarity is important for sustained movement activity. Tactics such as high-risk activism or criminal activities are particularly suitable to create in-group bonds, whereas they tend to have little effect in terms of policy change (della Porta, 1995). While concern for internal effects may at times override concerns for outreach empirically, I am concerned here only with outcomes external to the movement. A famous typology of (external) movement outcomes was provided by Gamson in 1990, when he defined (a) the acceptance of a contending group by its target as representatives of legitimate interests, and (b) the gain of material advantages as the two overriding categories. Gamson argued that movement success ranged from full response, over pre-emption, to cooptation and lastly collapse along these two dimensions. Building on this typology, Amenta, Carruthers, & Zyland (1992) defined three categories of success: recognition, institutionalization (“transformation of challengers into a member of the polity”) and policy gains. Within each category, different levels of success can be identified (Amenta et al., 1992). Rochon and Mazmanian (1993) emphasized that different outcomes may relate to each other and argued that a high degree of acceptance made substantial policy gains more likely. From the early 1990s onwards, a plethora of studies (Burstein & Hollander, 1995; Burstein & Linton, 2002; Giugni, 2008; Giugni & Passy, 2002; Kriesi, 1995; Uba, 2009) considerably contributed to our understanding of movement success. A consensus emerges that outcomes can be grouped into three broad categories according to the object of change: people, policies, and institutions (e.g., Bosi et al., 2016).

First, social movements have effects on *people*. Specifically, people’s personal biographies, political values and behavior are, among other things, shaped by social movements. Whereas scholars looking into resource-mobilization analyzed why and when individuals joined social movements and why they behave the way they do, works looking at movement outcomes addressed how participation in movements changed the lives of former activists on a personal level (see Giugni, 2009 for a review of such works). Rather recently, the focus has shifted to “institutional activists” (Grotsky, 2012; Pettinicchio, 2012) or “activists in office” (Watts, 2006), analyzing how a personal history of social movement participation influences the behavior of policy-makers and bureaucrats (Kim, 2013). Moreover, scholars (e.g., Polletta & Jasper, 2001) looked at the impact former activists have on their peers, friends and family members, ultimately leading to changes beyond the individual.

Secondly, social movements have an impact on *policies* (see Amenta et al., 2010 for a review of such work). Most studies in this camp share the assumption that most movements target political authorities with the aim to achieve changes at the policy level (Giugni & Passy, 1998). A relatively new strand of literature broadened the empirical scope of targets, looking at policy changes among businesses, particularly transnational corporations (see King & Pearce, 2010 for a review of such work). This shift of attention led to an increasing interest in the nature and characteristics of the targets addressed by social movements. Whether decision-makers are elected politicians, bureaucrats, or managers matter to understand under what conditions they respond to movement demands. A further differentiation within this category of outcomes is that between single decisions (e.g., building a new road) and more structural political reforms (e.g., a new health care bill; Daase & Deitelhoff, 2014).

Third, movements may alter social *institutions*. In this camp, some authors looked into formal changes in the political system (e.g., Banaszak, 2010; Kitschelt, 1986; Suh, 2011) or political regimes (e.g., Breuer, Landman, & Farquhar, 2015; Meirowitz & Tucker, 2013). Also, the institutionalization of social movements themselves has attracted considerable attention. This may either proceed by developing into a more professional, hierarchical and bureaucratic organization (Banaszak, 2010; Suh, 2011), or via the transformation of a social movement into a political party. Examples of the latter include the emergence of Green Parties out of the anti-nuclear movement in the 1980s in Western Europe (Kitschelt, 1986), or the transformation of the women's movement in Northern Ireland (Cowell-Meyers, 2014). Others devoted their attention to rather informal institutions such as social norms and practices. In this vein, authors refer to "cultural" consequences of social movements. A prominent example is the cultural revolution of the 1968 movements in Western Europe and the United States (see Earl, 2004 for a good review of the relevant literature). Due to recent world history events including the Arab Spring in the Middle East and Northern Africa, the "Coloured Revolutions" in Eastern Europe as well as anti-government protests in Hong-Kong, Thailand, and South Africa, an increasing amount of attention has been devoted to the role of movements in bringing about radical regime change (Breuer et al., 2015; Meirowitz & Tucker, 2013).

Whether their focus is on personal, political or institutional outcomes, most works reviewed so far are confined to one type of consequence. This is surprising, as scholars called for a broader focus on success, looking at the interactions among the three outcome categories already in the late 1990s (Giugni, 1998; Tilly, 1998). In the words of Bosi, Giugni, and Uba, future research needs to determine "How do different types of effects of protest activities relate to each other? What are the processes and mechanisms underlying the interrelations between different types of effects or between the same types of effect over time? Under what conditions does each interrelation of effects work, fail to occur, or even reverse?" (Bosi et al., 2015, p.24). As elaborated upon in the previous chapter, I am interested in the human rights accountability regime of MDBs. Since this accountability regime consists of standards as well as institutionalized mechanisms for sanctioning misbehavior, I seek to look at both policy and institutional change. Both these dimensions matter most for the human rights accountability of MDBs (Heupel & Zürn, 2017). A standard conception of socialization that corresponds to this research interest was advocated by Checkel (2005) who defined socialization as the "process of

inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” (p. 804). Still, this conception remains broad. Checkel himself acknowledged that his definition was open for different socialization outcomes such as role-playing or internalization (Checkel, 2005, pp. 804-805). In the present work, I thus adopt a narrower conceptualization tailored to my outcome of interest and define the socialization of MDBs as *the process, through which these banks adopt political and institutional reforms that enhance their human rights accountability*. While this process can take several forms, I am particularly interested in the role of transnational social movements.

Summing up the literature on social movement strategies and outcomes, there is an emerging acknowledgement that we need to evaluate strategies against the background of the political opportunity structure under which they are applied by movement actors. The statement that conventional or disruptive tactics are good per se is thus misleading. Instead, they make much or little sense respectively depending on the given scope conditions. Moreover, the literature increasingly tends to emphasize the relevance of mixed tactics, combining conventional and disruptive engagements. However, it remains unclear which combination is most effective. Critically, it remains unclear whether conventional and disruptive tactics should occur simultaneously or in a sequenced fashion (conventional before disruptive tactics or vice versa). Finally, while there is a rich body of literature theorizing how the causal mechanisms proceed for conventional and disruptive tactics, we lack a better understanding of the mechanisms connecting mixed tactics to movement outcomes. In my work, I seek to fill these gaps. Therein, I move beyond the macro-to-macro perspective looking at the presence of movements and the nature of policy or institutional change. Instead, I enrich my analysis by including the individual level as well, enriching my analysis with in-depth interviews obtained with policy makers, IO staff and activists. Methodologically, I seek to follow Bosi’s example and to adopt process tracing as a tool to trace the interaction between transnational social movements and their targets. The process-tracing of TSM strategies allows me to enrich the narrow focus on conditions to mechanisms. By engaging a comparative (instead of single) case-study design, I contribute to systematically identify the environmental factors conditioning the effects of disruptive and conventional strategies.