

Appendix: A Formalisation

Orthodoxy

Let: S = statehood T = territory G = government P = population I = independence

$G \rightarrow S$ *Inter alia*, juripoly means that government must always be realised through statehood.

$T \wedge G \wedge P \wedge I \rightarrow S$ Montevideo Criteria as grounding.

Population, not crucial to my argument, can nevertheless not be defined simply as a group of people but must be a group of people constituted by a relation with sovereign authority and located on territory.

$([T \wedge G] \rightarrow P) \wedge (\text{humans} \rightsquigarrow P)$ (Grounded in territory and government but triggered by the existence of human beings within those conditions.)

With regard to independence, the assertion is merely that a state can be neither legally nor territorially part of another state without being, for international law, identical to it. Sovereignty cannot be “nested”: $(S1 \subseteq S2) \rightarrow (S1 = S2)$

I limit the present inquiry into the relation between statehood, government, and territory.

$T \wedge G \dashv S$ The orthodox view is that statehood is grounded in territory and government.

Assumptions:

1. $G \rightarrow S$ (Limit on the political imaginary; government implies statehood; juripoly.)
2. $S \rightarrow T \wedge G$ (Montevideo criteria.)
3. $G \dashv T$ (Territory is juridical, grounded in governance.)
4. $T \wedge G \dashv S$ (Statehood is grounded in territory and government.)
5. $S \rightarrow G$ and $G \rightarrow S \Rightarrow S \equiv G$ (Government and statehood treated as equivalent.)
6. Grounding is asymmetric and transitive.

Argument:

7. $T \dashv S$
8. From (3) and (5): $(S \equiv G) \wedge (G \dashv T) \Rightarrow S \dashv T$
9. From (4) again: $T \dashv S$
10. From (3) again: $T \dashv G$
11. Substituting: $(T \dashv S)$ and $(S \dashv T) \Rightarrow S \dashv S \Rightarrow \perp$
12. $\therefore S \equiv G$ leads to circularity/self-grounding. A thing cannot self-ground.²¹⁹

Alternative

Assumptions:

1. $\neg(G \rightarrow S)$ Rejection of state juripoly.
2. $S \rightarrow G$ (All states have government.)
3. $T \dashv G$ (Territory is a juridical concept; grounded in governance.)
4. S includes G (Statehood necessarily includes government.)
5. Grounding is asymmetric and transitive

²¹⁹ Self-grounding $\neq$ self-constitution of e.g. liberal democracy.

Argument:

6. G can exist independently of S (from 1)
7. But S cannot exist without G (from 4)
8. $\therefore G$ is **ontologically prior** to S
9. $\therefore S \dashv G$ (Government grounds statehood)

Compare:

10. $G \dashv T$
11. Orthodox view: $T \dashv S$
12. If $G \dashv T \dashv S$, then consistent.
13. But if $G \equiv S$, then $T \dashv S \wedge S \dashv T \Rightarrow S \dashv S \Rightarrow \perp$ (Self-grounding is not possible.)
14. $\therefore T$ does **not** ground S — the contradiction is avoided only if T is first mediated by G but not by S but the latter is impossible if $G \equiv S$. Thus either $\neg(G \rightarrow S)$ or $\neg(T \dashv S)$. It is said that $T \dashv S$, thus $\neg(G \rightarrow S)$.

Q.E.D. *Territory can only ground statehood if states did not claim juripoly; if states claim juripoly, territory cannot ground statehood. That they assert both simultaneously is not logical but ideological — a distortion designed to insulate statehood from critique and to secure unjustified control over land as a factor of production.*

