

7. The Relation of Planning and Everyday Urbanisation

This chapter functions as a synthesis of the empirical evidence collected in the literature review and fieldwork, which was presented in the foregoing chapters. The findings from the preceding chapters on urban planning in Bahir Dar (see chapter 5) and practices of everyday urbanisation (see chapter 6) are jointly discussed here. The material is questioned in order to contribute to explanation building on urbanisation in Bahir Dar. With the purpose of describing the qualitative aspects of urbanisation in the Ethiopian context, the relation of planning and everyday urbanisation in the case-study site of Bahir Dar will be described as regulating systems in a location on which urbanisation impacts and urban growth has to be managed. The findings, thereby, contribute to the larger understanding of urbanity as assembled by a range of accounts of urbanisation. Chapter 5 proposes that the relation of the succeeding guiding principles of planning is not one of succession in practice but rather one of ruptures, continuities and parallels that can still be traced in today's city. Ruptures have, at times, left the relation of planning and other urbanisation practice unclear, while some practices were continued over the periods of time. At the same time, the changes in paradigms of planning do not mark a break from one period to another and cannot generally be interpreted as contradictions. Certain continuities within Bahir Dar's urban development throughout the changing political agenda have to be assumed. Especially under conditions of limited economic and material resources, the physical constructions and investment in infrastructure following prevailing paradigms of a time are not as flexible to change as the guiding ideas of urban development themselves. The phases of political urban development do not necessarily coincide with periods and fashions of the everyday practices of urbanisation. As a consequence, the phases of urbanisation cannot actually be distinguished as clearly as the clear-cut nature of changing rules suggests, and urban development has to be viewed as a continuum through the phases of government. Therein, the relationship between planning and urbanisation is dynamic and develops in its own time-frame, allowing for fluctuation, fall-backs and ephemeral constellations.

Here, it will be established in what relation the planning principles and practices stand to the distinctive local urbanities found across the sub-case neighbour-

hoods (see chapter 6.2). The inner city area, the textile workers' settlement, an informalised village and the BDU campus have all developed local specificities based on the visions under which they were constituted. They continue to shape the urban practice based on their design principles, while the practices related to different visions and ideals exist simultaneously. The chapter discusses whether the existing local structures and practices are addressed by urban policy and which modes of urbanisation have been put out of focus. What the reverse focus of planning on the short-term political agenda, national economic interest and investment means to efforts of ordinary citizens building the city in terms of access to housing, equal rights for ethnic and religious groups, opportunities of income generation and social configurations will have to be conceptualised. It has to be questioned whether there are segregational tendencies in urban development and in which way planning is at all grounded in ordinary city life. To establish this, the relations between planning and local realities will be specified for the study's neighbourhoods in the following. They can, thereby, be considered spaces of negotiation. From the specific constellations of negotiation in the neighbourhoods (see chapter 7.1), the topics of negotiation (see chapter 7.2) that make up the discussion and relevant themes of urbanisation in Bahir Dar will be named. They are related to the systematic of topics derived from the literature review (see chapter 2.2) and presented as "spheres of negotiation".

7.1 CONSTELLATIONS IN THE NEIGHBOURHOODS

Through the study of the relation of planning to urbanisation over time, it has become evident that the relations between planning and everyday practices constituting urbanisation in Bahir Dar are complex and cannot be described in absolute terms for the city as an entity. Urban policies in Ethiopia did not succeed one another entirely, but have shaped and left practices on the ground that have gone into competition with the revised urban policies drawn up by the following regimes. Just as "different types of cultural traditions form different types of cities" (Robinson 2006: 60), the date and the dominating planning paradigm in relation to everyday urbanisation at the time of construction is also relevant for shaping particular urbanities. The findings show that everyday urbanisation practice in Bahir Dar varies according to a neighbourhood's historical and geographical underpinnings. Distinct differences in urbanisation rationales among the sub-case sites reveal that the urbanisation practices are tied to planning rationales of certain time phases. As they have produced distinct socio-spatial arrangements that might have undergone change over time, the resulting neighbourhood settings do not resemble each other in crucial aspects of urbanisation. These can be named as ties to rural areas and access to cheap accommodation, as well as employment opportunities, type of formal access to housing, the housing typology and access to means of subsistence

(land and resources). These structures are far less dynamic than the changes in policy that are applied on the city-scale. Based on the shaping and simultaneous dependence of urbanisation rationales on these spatial structures, the neighbourhoods, therefore, display practices of urbanisation that reflect not only cultural and social diversity but also historic contingencies. Thereby, the engagement with the neighbourhood as a concept of building the city, establishing and, hence, urbanising in a mutual process of the individual with the neighbourhood can be summarised as typically distinct for the four sub-cases. The sub-cases demonstrate how at the time of establishment of the neighbourhoods the different contexts and compositions of materialities, cultures and planning paradigms triggered processes that have resulted in locally varied expressions of citizen engagement with their parts of the city. The situation of engagement between a population and its site of dwelling (and livelihood) described as “everyday urbanisation” has to be considered contingent due to the historical settings. The basic local parameters according to which the settlements were first installed hence have a defining impact on the space and material-related practices within the neighbourhoods to this day. Thereby, the construction activities, etc., forming everyday urbanisation are directed at the structures that are already in place and strongly shaped by the underlying guiding principles of construction of the urban structures. Path-dependent urbanisation in Bahir Dar is, hence, guided by formal projects of planning, but mostly by opportunities that are created by what is termed as particular for the “urban”: density, economic activity, access to infrastructure, learning opportunities, exposure to innovation, etc. The relations between the different rationales of urbanisation at the neighbourhood scale will, thereby, be examined in the following.

7.1.1 Historical Diversity

The city centre is one of the oldest parts of Bahir Dar (see chapters 5.1 and 6.1.1). The city centre's characteristics make it a location of opportunity. Its high density requires a high level of social interaction, the mix of building typologies caters for a large range of housing requirements across all income groups and the historical set-up as well as the permeability and connectivity of the area, result in a high diversity of population. Construction was often conducted according to the standards and material availability of different time periods and dependent on the individual capacities of the owners, leading to a historical mix of building typologies and building traditions. The livelihood strategies of the residents are also extremely diverse and go far beyond the conventions of formal employment in all income groups. The opportunities of income generation available in trade, the tourism industry, transport services, vending and small-scale production in combination with the offers of cheap accommodation further the influx of recent migrants. Despite its density, the neighbourhood therefore has to be considered particularly permeable and receptive for arrivals with limited resources. This is

also reflected in the high visibility of street children and establishment of individuals whose biographies move away from traditional roles of gender or profession. It is here that the entertainment district absorbs females escaping from their roles of wives, or where the stigma of working in craft can be overcome by men and women of the middle class.

Of course, these properties of the neighbourhood come with a reverse side of clashing interests such as a high land-use competition between dwellers, established livelihoods and current investment interest. The increasing density up to the point of overcrowding paired with a lack of investment in the Kebele housing stock has also led to an overall critical state of sanitation. Yet, these clashes and the information from the interviews reflect that there is a high level of engagement by neighbours with their neighbourhood. Despite the fact that many dwellers live in Kebele housing, these buildings are modified within the possibilities, and despite lack of tenure security, they are interpreted as family homes by their occupants. Since residence has been assumed more than two generations ago for many of the current young population, long-standing neighbourhood ties have been established. These social networks define the use of public space outside the houses, which function as semi-public spaces for socialising and have important roles in the preparation of food and subsistence practices. The small-scale craft workshops have established customer bases in the area and operate on these networks. They share the same public space for production, storage and showcasing. The residents are, hence, in continuous negotiation over the local space and flexibly appropriate it to suit their acute requirements. It can, thereby, be described as an extension of their dwellings and workshops. However, the large-scale investments in the shape of business centres, hotels and shopping facilities recently constructed in the inner city have distinctly different requirements from their environment than the established small-scale economies and residents. The economic interests of the new hotels with foreign guests, for example, clash with the established structures. The soundscape created by the local entertainment district (paradoxically promoted as a point of interest to tourists) is considered a disturbance to the economic interests of the travelling industry (Evans 19.02.2011). Here, however, the negotiation over the use of public space and the configuration and construction of urban spaces is no longer conducted between equals. With national interest standing behind the tourist industry, social, economic and political networks ensure that questions of urban development benefit the larger businesses and relocate opposing interests. The residents can, therefore, currently not be considered drivers of the development dynamic in the inner city.

Currently, newly erected international standard hotels clash with noisy night-life of the red-light district in corrugated iron shacks, which at the same time houses one of the oldest residential neighbourhoods. Looking from the main street, these smaller structures are hidden behind a line of multi-storey enterprise buildings, such as small shopping centres, representative buildings for NGOs, banks

or bars. Due to their age and the limited economic resources of the residents, some of the residential inner-city buildings are in a neglected condition. The provision of basic infrastructure is not secured for the Kebeles 05 and 06 (Tilahun 2010). De facto, the centre hosts mixed use that has been developing without major planning regulation for more than two decades. In the land-use plan of 1996, just as in the IDP land-use plan, plots are either reserved for residential or commercial activities (Genet GebreEgziabher 2011). Beyond that, the area is an “upgrading area” and subject to the set-up of detail plans, involving fundamental restructuring. The IDP declares the waterfront a “special planning area” for which the “Sustainable Vision and Waterfront Plan” is put in place (see chapter 5.5) and the market place will be moved. Because of the government’s priority on investment, a new land-use plan is being devised for the inner city, by which the residents of small-scale structures and of the production spaces are resettled into the expansion areas on the city’s outskirts, section by section. The Kebele houses showing the described signs of deterioration will be demolished and the occupiers relocated. There is not actually an issue with planning regulations, rather existing structures are informalised in order to legitimise their destruction and substitution. The development of the city centre is steered not through land-use proposals but through building specifications and tenure redistribution. The nationalisation of land, initially meant to secure the land for agricultural purposes, now gives state institutions a free hand in allocating the use-rights to occupants suiting their criteria. In the contested inner-city spaces, where land-use pressure is high, economically powerful pressure groups are advantaged in offering technical improvement. Housing and commercial activities in one of the oldest areas of town are substituted by the same use but in a more investment intensive, representative multi-storey structure. In this location with high development pressure, a multitude of land-use interests have to be negotiated. The current situation in the city centre sees a collision of interests between residents, the entertainment district (including the red-light district), commercial development and a booming tourist industry. Here, this has led to a situation in which planning and everyday urbanisation have distinct relations from plot to plot.

To recapitulate on the lakeshore development, the elements of its vision are formulated as: “Public access to the waterfront and its natural areas”, “green, beautified and sanitary infrastructure and design”, “mixed use corridors”, “appropriate housing and jobs for all” as well as “access to rural-urban linkages” (Canadian Urban Institute 2011). But how does the special sensitivity of the special planning area on the lakeshore comply with the “action-plan” for development and the heavy building activities in this zone? It seems, that the water-front as part of the inner-city has been taken over by an investment driven development agenda. The recent development along the waterfront show foreign tourists and medium to high income groups as target users. These are very different from prevailing groups of young people and low-skilled income generation currently present. Their activities

are likely to be displaced to unknown locations, as alternative sites for washing, bathing or recreational space are scarce. A balance of interests, therefore, needs to be undertaken. Although the public has a chance to participate in the redevelopment process of the waterfront, the social capital necessary to attend and barriers of actively taking part in stakeholder participation need to be acknowledged. Against this setting, the developments undertaken under the IDP are in tight competition with public interests and with agricultural and informal economic use of the lakeshore. Conflicting interests of economic driven plans for tourism and the long-term perspectives for the lake-based livelihoods also need to be carefully looked into. The region around Lake Tana is a designated UNESCO Biosphere Reserve (zur Heide 2012). This status includes the opportunity to establish economic gains through sustainable tourism. However, tourism in the area relies on the ancient heritage of the island monasteries as well as the natural potential of the lake. It is a hugely popular spot for bird watching. If capitalising on tourism is to advance, maximising the immediate facilities by building on the lakeshore will have to step back behind the actual reason of visiting an intact natural habitat. Decisions for building – especially on the waterfront – should strongly consider these interests and consider moving construction activities to less environmentally sensitive areas.

Currently, the market is placed in the immediate central business district of the city. The variety of sales goods includes all types of farming produce, household goods and clothing items. The vendors are either seated in simple stalls or sell their goods on the ground from canvas. The vendors of farming produce are usually the farming families themselves. Other sources of income are derived from the trading activities. Young boys offer their services as carriers or try to make a percentage on advising foreign shoppers. Other trading activities, such as that of processed food, cultural goods such as crafts, lottery vending and sweet selling by children, the wood merchants or tourist geared trade, seek their trading locations outside of markets. They either chose to be close to their customers, to gather their trade in specific locations or to place themselves, where they are tolerated in the public space across the town. However, the market space is gradually sectioned into plots by the city administration and given to investors that build “high-rising” buildings in the central area. The remaining market in this location is thereby to be turned into a closed (in-door) vending space.

At the time of the observations, many pre-provided stalls still remained vacant in the two new market locations, although substantial trading activity could be observed. Many of the traders were farmers selling their own produce (vegetables and staple foods like lentils) and, thus, evading the regulated market structure. However, in the new larger stalls, crafts are sold by professional traders. Goods include blankets from imported material, local pottery, and imported Chinese house ware. Limited amounts of clothes are also available. The markets also have sections with services, where radios and watches are repaired or second hand items refurbished.

In the case of shifting the market to two other locations, the evaluation of benefits and disadvantages is complex. It seems there is no specific preference towards supporting “rural” or “urban” lifestyles in the relocation decision, although all types of livelihood are affected. The new locations are more accessible to farmers coming from the rural outskirts. They are close to the residential areas of the urban consumers and hygiene can be improved in the city centre as well as the more spacious new markets. Formalisation, however, always bears the risk of excluding the smallest scale traders, as these subsistence farmers come irregularly and cannot afford additional fees for their stands. In the new locations they currently have enough space to place themselves on blankets around the formal structures, but of course are dependent on their activities being tolerated by the authorities. In terms of poverty eradication, the support of this income (for rural and urban farmers) lacks planning security. Just like the traders that are not present at the market but have their own informal allocation system of trade in public areas, they can continue their income generation activities, unless a change in policy towards the informal occurs. The interests of informal traders and farmers not resident in the city but supplying the city’s demands, will have to be considered more carefully in the future planning implementation.

The individual practices of everyday urbanisation in the inner-city stand in very variated relations to the paradigms of statutory planning and the practices conducted under their “regulating fictions” (Robinson 2006: 11, see chapter 2.1). The historical centre has a great diversity of building typologies and standards, a highly mixed-use structure and dense occupation. As the commercial centre, it is the focus location for investment and population influx under the conditions of urban growth. A plan for urban-upgrading in the sense of urban renewal was in the process of set-up at the time of fieldwork. In effect, the current single storey building will be cleared to make way for multi-storey construction, with a focus on commercial development. Thereby, the recent redevelopment plans (see chapter 5.5) and hotel allocations along the waterfront show foreign tourists and medium- to high-income groups as target users in the design of public space. These diverge from groups of young people and low skilled income generation currently prevailing. The current user’s activities are likely to be displaced to unknown locations, as alternative sites for non-commercial use, such as washing, bathing or recreational space, are scarce and not replicated in urban planning. Beyond securing the land for agricultural purposes, the nationalisation of land now gives state institutions a free hand in allocating the use-rights to occupants suited to their own criteria. Thereby, the “development” of the city centre is steered not through land-use proposals but through urban design, building specifications and tenure redistribution. In the contested inner-city spaces, where land-use pressure is high, economically powerful pressure groups are advantaged in provision of technical improvement. Housing and commercial activities in one of the oldest areas of town

are replaced by the same use but in a more investment-intensive, representative multi-storey structure.

Some dwellers and business owners are offered the chance to conform to the newly imposed building standards. In order to stay in place, they have to be flexible and resourceful enough to comply with changing building standards in this area with high development pressure. If they cannot fulfil the requirements of changing building standards or adding significant floor space (in the form of additional storeys) to their buildings, they are given notice and their land-use permits are not extended. Some residents and businesses can comply with the changing requirements and stay in place, others cannot and have to shift to other locations. Thereby, the areas of destination do not necessarily display lesser land-use competition but rather more favourable power relations and easier access to land from the government perspective (see chapter 6.1.3).

Other neighbours are not given the opportunity to stay. The dwellers of Kebele houses are directly referred to relocation schemes as soon as their plots are due for redevelopment, just as small-scale businesses have to move to locations away from their customer base. Here, the current government breaks with the previous socialist line of nationalisation. The Kebele-owned structures will be replaced by private development as a spatial expression of the liberalisations for economic investment. The needs created by this turn in paradigms are predominantly designated to be accommodated in the symbolic city centre. With the resettlement of population on plots with land-use rights and house ownership, the stock of municipal real estate in housing is reduced and the state controlled rental market for housing is drastically transformed. The occupants do not have an awareness of these structural changes and assess the measures according to the impact they will have on their own living situations. Granting house ownership is, thereby, considered a major asset. The sites they are relocated to are less crowded, but the sites are often not fully serviced with basic infrastructure by the government.

By uprooting the existing economic and social structures in the city centre, the expected urban upgrading scheme will make the inner city less permeable for incoming population groups. When entering the city, the most pressing problem stated by the labour migrants is the lack and quality of housing that is accessible to them (Woldie Assaw et al. 2010: 67). Although changes in quantity and quality of the housing stock are likely since the last available documentation (Gebeyaw Walle 2003), the rather large group of migrant workers is generally not addressed by current urban policy. They do not have enough negotiation power to stand up for their interests, as the investors do in negotiations with local politics. With the increase of formal living arrangements and a rise of the economic threshold for access to housing in the city centre, it will become even more evident that only long-term dwellers can enter formal housing systems and all other status groups have to rely on informal arrangements.

With the mobilisation of investment for an “upgrading” of the city centre to a dense multi-storey inner-city commercial district with apartment living and tourist facilities, a major turn-over process has been initiated by the authorities, of which the limits have not been defined. Within this process, the behaviour of the state is tactical and decisions of land distribution are based on the best prospects of fulfilling the promises of a “regulating fiction” (Robinson 2006: 11) of modernity. Well-resourced locals are faced with the choice of complying or relocating. Those structurally affected by implementation are the urban poor, as they are marginalised and systematically dislocated. Thereby, the bad living conditions, hygiene and sanitation issues only play a minor role in the state’s reasoning for resettlement. Instead, the small-scale mixed-use dwellings are not deemed fit to represent a regional capital. There are no upgrading strategies for informal areas or long-settled residents in place to accompany the programme. The substitution of small-scale structures by the “modern” vision of a commercial centre applied, therefore, fails to consider the relations and dependencies between housing and location for income generation of the lower income groups and leaves them uprooted.

The development dynamic of the highly heterogeneous everyday urbanisation established in the centre is not the basis of statutory planning. The structures have been subject to continuous adaptation. Not all structures were conserved in their original state and have undergone various modifications to suit changing needs and been appropriated for living and income generation. While the existing buildings and establishments are now being inventoried instead of using the information for in-situ upgrading strategies, the information serves for compensation and relocation in favour of redevelopment. Despite some cases of individual gain through compensation, overall, the long-standing neighbourhood ties and social and business bonds on the micro-scale are in danger of losing out on the relocation in favour of larger-scale investment. Thereby, the technical assessment of living conditions in the formulation of government housing programmes justifies the practice and furthers tendencies of marginalisation of low-income groups by moving them out of the city centre.

7.1.2 Housing Area

Following the establishment of the textile mill from Italian reparations under Emperor Haile Selassie, the development of this area as a sub-centre was suggested by the 1962 master plan. The actual urban development has conformed to this proposal, even if Guther’s ideas for architectural standards might have been left out of focus. As a layout, this type of urbanisation fits with the modernist vision that the Guther plan devised for the city. However, as a continuation of the imperial plan, the socialist government of the time provided plots for the factory’s work force for household establishment and granted house ownership. The idea that industrial production with attached urban residence is an adequate spatial expression of ur-

banity and serves national interests, is continuous throughout the changing ruler-ships and a strong continuity in the changing government's positive assessment of such structures has to be assumed. Although socialist politics were undoubtedly anti-urban (see chapter 3.4), the idea that socialism did not engage in urbanisation cannot be upheld when studying this neighbourhood. The high standard of public facilities provided exclusively for this area (swimming, tennis, library) in the socialist era remains high-level in comparison to other neighbourhoods to this day. The facilities find wide appreciation and are in good use also by residents from other parts of town.

The neighbourhood established in the realm of the textile mill drew a large number of workers from the regions surrounding Bahir Dar. As the urban population was initially reluctant to work with the large machines, these rural-urban migrants came into the city in the classic sense of industrially driven urbanisation. The factory, thereby, functioned as one of the original pull-factors into the city. This complementary relation with formal employment in the factory explains the strong residential qualities of the neighbourhood. The establishment of housing in the neighbourhood is specific to the area, however. In order to support the industrial endeavours, the workers were rewarded with rights to stay in company housing or were given tenure rights to land on which they could become house owners. While the tenants of company property see their dwelling there as temporary, those resident in their own homes are strongly engaged in their area of residence. This property attributed by the former socialist government has resulted in high personal investment in these plots. The occupants consider the houses family assets. Thereby the set-up of the neighbourhood is designed in a way that grants each house (also the Kebele houses in this area) a private outside space. These spaces are often used to construct outdoor kitchens and offer opportunity to engage in food preparation and subsistence activities. However, they do not require negotiations over the use of this space with the neighbours.

In the textile village, industrial development has respatialised social positions and resources. Following an active recruitment campaign to work in the factory and settle in Bahir Dar by the government of the time, social roles have shifted from tradition, and new social statuses were attained in the course of urbanisation. They emerge through self-invention and negotiation of new social standards in the forming urban society. Inhabitants who were attracted by work opportunities in the textile factory were enabled to establish their own households and families with their earnings. The further support granted by providing plots on which houses could be constructed secured settled ownership status and long-term land-use regulations. Granting residents land-use rights in connection with ownership to the buildings has led to secure investment conditions that furthered a sense of belonging and establishment of the local community. It has also resulted in a high conformity to formal building regulations by the residents' construction activities. Those that chose to grasp the chances that the establishment of the factory offered

have often made a good life for themselves and their families as a result. They can now be considered part of Ethiopia's middle class.

In combination with housing provided for highly skilled staff, the location can attract (young) professionals from distant locations and compete with other employers located in places such as Dire Dawa or even Addis Ababa. However, the model mainly functions for satisfying an existing need for housing in a formally employed population group. The relative wealth of the population results in the fact that sub-letting is not that common in the area and the rental market is small. Those not in contracts with the factory can enter through the relatively small amount of Kebele housing or do so informally. Obtaining plots here through the official land-distribution system today is unlikely, as it is quite a consolidated neighbourhood. Thereby, the middle class is served and other population groups are left out, resulting in a homogeneity of the population structure. While the older residents and their families are mostly Orthodox who came from the surrounding rural areas, some Muslims have come as qualified workers from other areas of the country and moved into the neighbourhood recently.

Despite the strong synergies between the governmental and administrative efforts to establish a residential area around the textile mill and the appropriation by the incoming workers of the structures provided, it is evident that in other locations the employment structure and spatial ideals of modernity do not coincide in the way they do in this neighbourhood. The example of the textile village illustrates that there have been synergies between planned urban extension and everyday practices of building and appropriation. However, the extent to which these can serve as examples for future urban development has to be questioned. The historical background shows that the development experienced here was only possible on the grounds of the reparation payment received from Italy. Such a factor cannot be foreseen in forecasting urban structures and is not replicable. For further planning, the idea of synergy, therefore, has to be conceptualised and grounded in the given economic circumstances.

7.1.3 Urban Village

The third constellation between planning and everyday urbanisation that could be observed in the course of the study in Bahir Dar is that of competing systems of land-tenure. The expansion of the city over former agricultural lands has led to the formation of villages in the city, in which lifestyles can superficially hardly be distinguished from those of rural communities. The style of building is dependent on local materials and resembles that of the rural villages. Agriculture for subsistence is carried on land surrounding the homes.

The site on which the village-like structure chosen as a sub-case developed was already part of the area designated for urban development in Guther's master plan but it remained untouched pasture ground for a long period. Several governments

ignored the settlement practice that formed on what used to be the urban fringe. Their land-use on administratively urban land can basically be described as agricultural – usually considered a uniquely rural feature. Through practice, urban agriculture can, thus, be considered a constituting element of the city. The practices and the structures and spaces produced for their purposes rely on self-sustaining principles and community support, yet have become practices of urbanisation over time. The settlement practices on the sub-case site seem to follow traditional practices of land-subdivision within growing clans. Simultaneously the traditional lifestyles are updated by the proximity of the location to the city centre. Although some residents are completely self-reliant in terms of consumption, especially the younger people can profit from the opportunities of education and employment the city brings. Thereby, these are gradually taken up as add-ons to the traditional lifestyle, with a slow shift away from subsistence practices. The living arrangements are extremely diversified but also grounded in the free availability of natural resources. While these practices allow flexibility and, therefore, strong resilience to periods of uncertain economic development, as well as displaying a strong degree of sustainability, they require a strong labour investment in the construction of the location. Since the social ties are very strong, the self-reliant building of housing and stables as well as agricultural activities, are tackled within the closely-knit community. The lifestyle is thereby highly dependent on the specific features of the location, as a lot of building material is produced on site, food is cultivated on the land and even clothes are produced from cotton shrubs in the gardens.

The accounts show that, until now, there has been something of a peaceful co-existence of traditional land-holding and *de jure* state ownership. While it has to be acknowledged that there is a tradition for new-comers to settle on the urban periphery, some of these actions were meanwhile undertaken three generations ago. In traditional manners, they have sub-divided land according to family requirements, self-constructed their dwellings and rely on social organisation by elders. The densification and the emergence of the village-like structure evolved through further partition of the land according to custom, by which the relatives are given partitions to settle on. Despite the nationalisation of land under socialist rule, the small settlement thrived to include what are today several hundred inhabitants.

With the change of power to the current government and the arrival of a new urban agenda for investment and economic development in 2005 (Ministry of Works and Urban Development 2007: 20; see chapter 3.5), the site – no longer on the geographical sidelines – has been identified as a potential site of investment in relative proximity to the city centre and located on the city's main regional connection road. An investor has made a proposition to the municipality and declared interest in developing the site. While the village, as a product of continuing Ethiopian building traditions, has survived several political reforms of urban policy and development approaches, it has now been rendered informal by the administration. Although state ownership of the land has not been enacted till now, the

residents' claims are not acknowledged as customary rights to their dwellings but are rather rendered illegal and their settlements named informal in the course of increased land-use competition. Against government argumentation, in which this use of the plot on the former urban fringe is unsuited to what is now part of the inner-urban fabric, and despite maintaining habits of subsistence to support their livelihoods, the residents are urban dwellers and have taken advantage of the opportunities the city has given them in terms of education and income diversification. Despite its traditional appearance, the village can, therefore, not be considered a place of standstill. The practices there are not archaic, but rather assume adaptation and are questioned as to their practicability concerning the question of securing the inhabitants' livelihoods. This innovation, therefore, contrasts the narrative of backwardness used to legitimise their eradication in favour of developmental ideas of urban planning.

The settlers are given no opportunity to engage with the development designated for the site by investment and formal planning. With the recent proposals for "development", the structures of the village and its inhabitants have been marginalised in the sense that the practised de facto land-use and land-rights systems are being overturned in the state-lead development endeavours in favour of capital-intensive commercial development. Some of the residents know about their own resettlement, others have not been officially informed and are in a state of limbo. They will receive no compensation for their houses as they are not legal owners, only new plots for reestablishment will be provided in an undisclosed location.

The set-up of subsistence, which is highly dependent on local assets (trees, fields, wells), is, thereby, undermined with insecure outlooks on its reestablishment. By resettlement, one of the most resilient of all (urban) settlement types is being destroyed. Those members of the community who are heavily reliant on subsistence will face severe challenges in the course of relocation. The households unsuccessful in acquiring new skills suited to urban lifestyles in education (driving, technical or school) are those that will prove most vulnerable in the face of losing their agricultural assets in the course of resettlement. Overall, the situation has to be described as a dominance of a developmental planning agenda over existing settlement structures.

7.1.4 Academic Compound

The Bahir Dar University Campus is a spatial expression of the government policy of "development" through an education programme focused on business and engineering. As such a structure, the state takes patronage of it. The university administration, thereby, acts as a project developer, as it is responsible for carrying out various building projects on the large campus areas. The national government provides the buildings and facilities of the university through the university programme executed with the GIZ. This construction endeavour constitutes an

enclosed entity physically and, to a large degree, also socially. Among all the arrivals to Bahir Dar, those seeing education in the government institutions are privileged through an expanded system of subsidised study. However crowded, BDU is providing living space for a large number of students that is considered modern by governmental standards and in the perception of the students that live in the rooms. They are exposed to an experience of cultural exchange among a student body from across the country and engage in practices of communal learning and shared routines. The university campus can be considered a “city within the city”. Entering this education system secures a livelihood within the city for those selected to join and prescribes daily routines within the campus facilities and environment. By design, most of the space here is attributed a specific function in this routine. As a result, the residents – the majority of them students – do not actually have much opportunity (nor the desire) to actively shape their surroundings. Appropriation is limited to the practices conforming to the campus rules, for which decision power is in the hand of administration and government. The students view themselves as privileged to be on campus, however, and mostly value the facilities. Thereby, they remain among their peers and dissociate from the rest of the city. In this regard the students of “modern” education differ strongly from those found in the traditional education systems of the churches, who live on the church grounds but take the freedom to connect to the neighbourhoods. The university, therefore, has to be considered somewhat isolated from the urbanisation processes that target the other neighbourhoods, but it also does not take an active role in influencing these processes by encouraging the students to form networks in urban society. Instead, the focus lies on inter-ethnic exchange among the students and the education. The campus, in its rather static state of design, is attractive as a site for its purpose. However, it does not create a long-term commitment by the incoming students or staff to the campus nor does it further the attachment by supporting interactions and connections to the outside city.

The practice of housing students on campus is, thereby, a critical issue that has been in discussion for several decades as the evaluation is ambiguous. While providing comparatively modern living facilities for a large number of students that would not be available in the town’s neighbourhoods in this quality, there is also criticism that the closed campus set-ups are not actually favourable to academic advancements regarding society. From the perspective of societal benefit, the UNESCO Conference on Higher Education in Africa “called for residential universities to consider becoming ‘non-residential or partly residential establishments’” in 1962 (Livsey 2014: 682). As Livsey (*ibid*) further states, “it argued residence removed students ‘from that sense of one-ness with their societies without which they cannot effectively serve their societies’”. In reverse, this can be seen to confirm that the university campus in Bahir Dar has been designed for achieving academic results, not to function as part of the city. Conventional rules of land-use rights acquisition are invalid, as the rules for entering rely on scholarly

merit. Students unsuited to their government-assigned careers have to drop out. Those with insufficient marks turn to the private education sector if they can afford to. Entering the facilities is only possible by qualifying and conforming to the government's education system, leading to the assignment of a course and thus the city of residence for the students prescribed by the administration. By conforming to the rules and high standards set for entering, the students and staff members enjoy privileges distinct to the academic living environment. Outside of campus students from private universities recount that Protestants face difficulties in finding accommodation in the city's neighbourhoods, due to their religion and accounts of harassment of women in the streets is common. Meanwhile, questions of religion, ethnicity and gender are explicitly required to be handled in an egalitarian manner on the Bahir Dar University campus. The conditions of living here are described positively by those able to conform and are considered a merit. This phenomenon of modern space lending students (and staff) distinction, thereby, also has a history in modernist planning (cf. Livsey 2014: 683).

The dual benefit of keeping the university functional as an education facility by letting the students escape the dysfunctional private rental market through provision of campus accommodation while setting students and members of staff apart from the "rest" of the city's population is described by Livsey (2014: 684) as an "entanglement of practical and symbolic considerations". While this might be true from the university administration's perspective, the resulting low engagement and identification with the city of Bahir Dar and the remaining society can also be seen as a wasted potential for the city's progress. If personal ties in the city cannot be established and a local professional network entered, the potential of educated young residents will move to other attractive working locations in their home areas, in Addis Ababa and abroad. Regarding the university as a closed institution exempts it from functioning as a facility for the city and neglects the opportunity of seeing the students not as subjects but as agents of urbanisation.

7.2 SPHERES OF NEGOTIATION

As it turns out, there are four very distinct relations between planning and urbanisation found across the four sub-cases. Within these neighbourhoods, the topics identified from the theoretical debate on urbanisation are recurring issues, however, they are discussed in variations in the different sites. The issues of legal status, modernity, urbanity and citizenship identified as conceptual dialectics on which rapid urbanisation has been negotiated in other geographical contexts are, hence, mirrored in the negotiations undertaken in Bahir Dar's urbanisation process. Thereby, the location's specific constellations lead to a locally specific negotiation outcome that will be described in the following by moving the insights from the empirical case study into the thematic realms termed as "spheres of negotiation".

Hereby, the discussions are reflected regarding their site-specific understandings and dialectic realities to conceptualise the rationales that are at work in urbanisation and to uncover the mechanisms they rely on in argumentation.

7.2.1 Negotiations of Legal Status

In Bahir Dar, statutory urban planning considers informality as opposing the formal plans and arrangements that it has set-up itself (see chapter 5). However, these plans often do not consider the factual developments on the ground, but rather rely on projections of an ideal urban development. This repeatedly leads to clashes between existing structures, everyday building practice with plan and projects. Thereby, the concept of informality is central in the negotiations that are undertaken in the realms of local economy, land administration and the erection or sanction of building structures, as the determination or non-determination decides in the case of competing urbanisation interests.

Local Economy

Looking at the textile area, the empirical findings suggest that, while industrialisation is a driver of urbanisation, the situations in the other sub-cases show that it is only one economic factor underlying the urbanisation process among others. In fact, urbanisation in Bahir Dar is happening outside the political-economy frameworks based on models of urbanisation through industrialisation and is creating a distinct heterogeneous type of urbanity beyond conventional descriptions. The economy, therein, is an important driver, not so much in the form of industrialisation but rather in form of formal and informal services in the local economy as well as in construction as a present phenomenon of the growth dynamic. Most job opportunities described by the interviewees can be found in the micro-economy, administration, hospitality and in building. The attempt at statistical description of informal labour in Bahir Dar undertaken by the Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (CSA 2003), meanwhile, does not connect the population influx with informal work opportunities and thus processes of urbanisation. While the strong development of a service sector can be observed by studying the services available, the “informal” organisation of these economic structures supporting a wide range of urban dwellers is considered a failure within the regulated system, rather than the prevalent economic system itself. The National Urban Policy does not address the population movement and increasing informal modes of seeking livelihoods. Instead, the binary of formal and informal economic sectors is upheld by Ethiopian politics and administration, which is reflected in the land-use categories of the IDP and spatial segregation of labour and housing (see chapter 5.5). The activities monitored are, thereby, limited to those of income generation, while building and appropriation practices are ignored in the surveys. Distinguishing between formal and informal is declared as relevant by the official surveys because informal

working conditions are rendered as exploitative by the government. There is also a concern for tax evasion that justifies the investigation. There is, hence, an implicit understanding that the question of formality and informality is linked to that of legal status of practices and structures, while this is not actually transferred into a more complex conceptual understanding of the relation of formal and informal. Meanwhile, subsistence activities, domestic labour, home production, foraging, informal employment and other modes of informal work beyond criminal activities of drug trafficking, blackmail, etc., are common occupations in Bahir Dar. They are not evenly distributed across the neighbourhoods. As the results from the empirical data show, the inner city and the informal village host far more opportunities to engage in small-scale income generation. Thereby, the city centre provides a wide range of occupations, opportunities of subsistence are particularly found in the urban village. While formal wage labour can gain from strict enforcement of labour regulations, undifferentiated exertion of such would lead to the eradication of both low-threshold income opportunities for the low-skilled workforce and cheap labour for the cities' economic and physical expansion. As Meagher (2011: 69) described for Nigeria, this disregard of informal and small-scale economy leaves those in informal operations with the choice of neglect or conspiracy towards the state. This is particularly difficult, as the findings from this case study suggest that informal income opportunities are a major factor of reliance for a large proportion of the urban population and should be investigated as a driving force of urbanisation. Therefore, those neighbourhoods providing such opportunities act as arrival destinations and are attractive to urban migrants with lower education levels, their structures are neglected in the distribution of resources for upgrading and development. It has to be assumed that lifestyles based on local economies of opportunity rely on different city structures than those proposed by plans assuming Fordistic production and income generation in the city. The economies anticipated by urban planning, thus, need thorough questioning. The focus on industrialisation has resulted in waiting for investment in vain. Meanwhile, existing business models in crafts, repairs, local production and services that might be less capital strong are not regarded as relevant and are overlooked or disregarded in spatial planning in favour of economically promising but also capital-concentrating ventures, for example in tourism. That the formal developments rely on cheap labour from the informal sector (hotels obtaining bread from home production, grass harvested from the lake for coffee ceremonies, informal domestic labour in the wealthy households, building material from informal excavations, etc.) is, thereby, paradoxically taken for granted. While formal status is occasionally disregarded and withdrawn, these are examples where there is an interest (on the part of politics or investors/citizens) in maintaining structures and services in an informal state.

Building structures

The assumption stands that slow housing delivery is the reason for the construction of informal dwellings (cf. Achamyeleh Gashu 2014), which the government counters by an urban expansion programme providing more formal dwellings. This “myth of delivery” has to be questioned on the grounds of findings by Ge-beyaw Walle (2003), who shows that the housing problem is more persistent, due to the fact that the majority of the population could not fulfil formal building requirements (see chapter 6), and has to be assumed to continue to do so. Assuming less than 30% of the population can manage to comply with government building standards and limited condominium provision, the majority of Bahir Dar’s population is beyond the reach of the formal housing market. In fact, there is a danger of criminalising these informal livelihood practices by implementing slum-upgrading or public housing programmes, especially when housing is not sufficiently accompanied by the provision of social, economic and technical infrastructure as well as spatial arrangements that allow for survival. Thereby, building regulations are instrumentalised to legitimise eviction and destruction on the basis of non-compliance with changed building standards. Meanwhile, the affected local building culture in Bahir Dar is not well documented and there is a lack of description of the population’s practices. The Ethiopian building structures resulting from everyday practices rooted in history have more recently been declared slums by international organisations (UN-Habitat 2007: 22), but also by national politics (Ministry of Works and Urban Development 2007: 4). Thereby, the qualities of these areas regarding social structures, subsistence and other factors contributing to sustainability and resilience of the cities’ populations are neglected. Instead, the existing structures are legally informalised by a change of building regulations, given notice of the change and made subject to clearance if they cannot comply. There are no upgrading strategies for informal areas or long-settled residents in place.

The success of negotiation for legal status is dependent on the type of building or enterprise that it is negotiated for. Just as in the cases of informally erected settlement structures, the substitution of existing buildings by projects fulfilling new standards of building material, height, density and land use are a recurring planning principle, also exercised in the latest implementation of the IDP. Rendering settlements informal is, therein, limited to sites of poverty while building conforming to understandings of “development” can be legalised. The informal status legitimises state sanction, such as tearing down and resettling. Regulation, here, is undertaken by the sovereign changing the regulations to disregard existing structures for ones that are designed to fulfil new standards of “development”. To what extent personal influence plays a role in the negotiations could not be established, but it is a relevant factor, as the individual promise of “development”, of being able to override the rules of a plan in the “national interest”, is a game-changer. The powerful have mechanisms to legalise their projects against local public interest (such as in the case of construction of the Kuriftu hotel on former public-use land, and

the construction of the regional parliament in a forest zoning occupied by informal settlers). For fulfilling these promises, however, one needs to promise capital-intense measures. The system offers possibilities of negotiation and bribery to pursue personal interests in questions of urban development. Less wealthy residents, in turn, have no negotiation power. For them, hurdles to enter the formal housing system are unequally higher. Everyday urban structures are, hence, disadvantaged in the planning procedure and, thus, do not hold a strong basis of negotiation for the expansion or future development of the city.

Those affected by planning implementation and dislocation are those not able to comply for economic reasons. Thereby, the resettlement is evaluated differently among the affected. For some it is the chance of accessing a plot for home-ownership or gaining formal resident status, for others it means losing customers or poses an effort of establishment unable to be met due to age or sickness. Beyond that, there are issues with the land offered as compensation: Mixed-use informal and historic structures are compensated with single-use residences, as there is also no "mixed-use" designation in the land-use plans. Planning, therefore, does not consider the relations and dependencies between housing and space for income generation.

Land use

Formal land administration in Bahir Dar is undertaken in competition with community-regulated practices, as well as being challenged by national intervention. In the absence of state interest in land-use of certain plots, a dominance of *de facto* rights could prevail. There are practices of urbanisation that do not refer to statutory planning as the regulating institution but rather rely on traditional reference systems to divide the resources, including the sub-division of land. While formal growth is mainly situated in the expansion areas (see chapter 5.5), informal urban growth is not only assumed on the urban fringe but also through densification or crowding into existing structures in the city centre. Reasons that contribute to this lie in the fact that either relatives or contact persons from the rural areas serve as first references when entering the cities, cheap sub-letting is available or land can easily be appropriated. In the sub-cases reviewed, these practices of land distribution were not conducted for profit. So, although there is a system of informal brokerage for other sites which capitalises on the informal subdivision of land (Achamyele Gashu 2014, see chapter 6.1.3), the socio-cultural norms play a big role in a number of locations that can be seen as "enclaves" from the perspective of the city but are actually rather quite dominant Ethiopian settling practices on the national scale. Resulting from this, there are discrepancies between the IDP's proposals and the interests of present (informal) land use. The continuation of these traditionally rooted but constantly reinterpreted family practices led to a coexistence of traditional land holding and constitutional state landownership. At the same time, the implementation of the plan's proposals is subject to a separate set of balancing

interests. Viewing the results of these procedures, the small scale and poor “informal” is disregarded by formalist planning and put into a disadvantaged position in relation to investment interest of local or even national importance. Informal settling structures such as traditional housing are not considered in the execution of planning and, thus, do not form a basis of negotiation for the expansion or future development of the city. Meanwhile, investors can directly negotiate with the municipality on allocating their project proposals and are treated favourably in the hope of economic gain for the city. Of course such tactical behaviour calls the plan into question, since plots that are required in prime locations can be occupied plots, public space, or nature conservation areas, in which land-use specifications are then overridden. Some of these ventures are, thereby, initially informal, but can rely on their power to change the land-use regulations according to their requirements and, thus, obtain legalisation. This has been done by various hotels on the shoreline or in the case of the building for the regional government (see chapter 5.5). Those informal(ised) structures that do not conform to the government’s ideas of the urban, however, are dislocated on the grounds of non-compliance with the standard. This is particularly critical, as it has earlier been described that the building standard is fluctuant and set by the sovereign, by whose legitimisation the land can be cleared and transferred to new land-use proposals. At the time of data collection this applied to a number of buildings in the downtown entertainment district, which were faced with clearance on the grounds of non-compliance with new multi-storey building regulations (see chapter 5.5). There is, therefore, an unequal power situation in the negotiation of access to urban land and land-use issues between the occupants, possible developers and the municipal and national levels of governance. In these constellations, the wealthy have contacts and money to avoid the formal system and find illegal/informal ways of accessing legal plots. Those who cannot comply with the two-year rule of residence before accessing a building plot or do not have the money to construct either have to succumb to insecure rental arrangements or have to build informally and rely on a chance of formalisation (for example by compensation in resettlement schemes).

In mutual contribution, the competing land regulating systems of traditional practice and development through investment limit each other’s reach and have led to a temporary dominance of *de facto* rights in some areas. However, under increased development pressure, government-supported projects eventually gain the upper hand over everyday practices due to the unequal power-relations. Planning law in Bahir Dar, therefore, currently has to be considered to have a consolidating effect regarding the inequalities of land access in favour of the wealthy.

It can currently be observed that urban policy does not clearly correspond to the formation of livelihood strategies connected to the process of urbanisation. The current (informal) development of urban structures, operational and economic practice is often not anticipated. On behalf of the residents, this is resulting in

avoidance of regulations rather than demanding their stronger enforcement. In these hybrid rationales of urbanisation, the findings show that, in practice, formal and informal cannot be clearly distinguished, as they are based on shifting understandings of what is lawful and are practised by all income groups as well as practices of the state itself. Informality as a sector is, thereby, not suited to conceptualising the modes of moving into the city and culturally dominant forms of urbanisation beyond formal planning. The government's description of informal economic activities needs revision. Instead, principles of agency (formal and informal), thereby, lead to parallel existence of principles of regulation (e.g. housing access, land, and building permits). Just as Jenkins and Eskemose (2011: 14) have described for the land and housing in Maputo, Bahir Dar's physical aspects, but also the negotiation of labour, is undertaken in a "complex hybrid interaction" (*ibid*) between formal and informal agents and operations. Thereby, the coexistence of formal and informal urbanisation is not only due to differing demands that are provided for but came about due to historical constellations and incidents, as well as a continuing socio-cultural practice. Different informal arrangements are, hence, used to access limited resources more easily. Informal practices can facilitate life in conditions of uncertainty, thus frequently making it socially or economically profitable to disregard law-abidance in questions of urbanisation.

Roy's (2009) observations that legal status is negotiated differently in contexts of poverty and wealth also apply to the situation in Bahir Dar. In this negotiation, legal status does not guarantee an equal attitude on behalf of the state towards structures and practices of the status quo. Urban development producing small-scale informal structures has been in danger of being subsumed under the label of "slum", leaving no space for differentiated analysis of practice and needs assessment related to the solution-finding expressed in such technically low-standard accommodation. Thus, the informal structures in the poverty-prone areas are not ignored but rather required to change at the random convenience of the state. The engagement that the residents have invested in urbanising the space and making it functional for their purposes is, thereby, overturned in favour of competing interests. Meanwhile, socio-economically potent stakeholders are able to negotiate on the legalisation of their practices. Larger investments can, thereby, be declared as in the national interest, while politics and administration itself builds contrary to the plans the urban development divisions have set up. The instruments are, hence, factually not acknowledged when other deals can be struck. So, although the instruments are supposedly universal, planning, in practice, takes differing approaches towards legal status according to the outcome it is negotiating for. The term "informality" is, thereby, used by the regional and municipal planning authorities to stigmatise undesired structures and practices; the formal and informal division is de-facto made along the income divide. The changing building regulations affect the poor who cannot conform to new standards and, therefore, have (involuntarily) distributive character regarding socio-economic segregation. The

current system of urban development, hence, has the potential to consolidate or further segregation in access to the city.

7.2.2 Disputed Modernity

What can be deduced from the literature available is that Bahir Dar's origins, with their implications for today's living, have a history of several centuries. The urban development process is largely evolutionary and continuous. The influential rationales of urbanisation of the phases of urban development have left various layers of material structure in Bahir Dar. Structurally, Bahir Dar, hence, needs to be described as an aggregation of different elements that are partly overwritten, but partly integrated into the present-day appearance in the sense of a palimpsest. It is even possible to identify the neighbourhoods according to their period of construction. Thereby, it integrates elements of exchange with foreign cultures, European understanding of towns and construction on the firm basis of local urbanism. Bahir Dar differs from other "traditional" Amharic cities such as Gondar, for example, in the sense that it was the subject of a major expansion project in the master plan from 1962, which significantly changed the existing core with an infrastructural grid, demanded the substitution of existing tukuls and projected for an industrial economic basis. It is, therefore, perceived as a "modern" or even "new" town in popular understanding, and even in the local population it is falsely assumed that there is an urban history reaching further back.

While the understanding of what is considered "modern" has changed over time, Bahir Dar has since continuously been subjected to restructuring and expansion to maintain its status as "modern". Urban policy frames the issue of urbanisation in a rhetoric of "development" and sees this as a positive expression of progress. Thereby, the idea of "development" is a guiding theme in questions of urban growth, resulting in an agenda for "delivery" of housing units and infrastructure provision. In official narratives, Bahir Dar's urban identity is determined by its function as a seat of administration and distinction of the city's structures from the traditional. Bahir Dar is portrayed as a planned city and known for its grid structure. Industrialisation, still, is a major factor that policies rely on and assume that it is a process that can be politically induced.

Bahir Dar's statutory urban development has formulated a range of development aims it wants to address in the BDIDP (see chapter 5.5). The origins of the guiding principles of Bahir Dar's current urban development are not officially documented but lie in the origin of the planning instruments and are openly complemented by ideas of progress derived from images of Dubai, from China and facilities of consumption from the West. These include fast food chains, shopping centres and leisure facilities. Trying to comply with such imaginaries is, thereby, highly conflictive and leads to controversies on the aims of urban development

in the face of a large proportion of the population that is struggling with meeting their basic needs.

Urban Design

Urban design in Bahir Dar is currently focused on avoiding urban sprawl in formal development by aiming to avoid fragmentation. It does not assume responsibility for informal urban construction and is not suited to the actual needs of housing even below the standards of the “low-income” condominiums. It has no in situ upgrading schemes by which density could also be reached in incremental steps but rather tries to substitute what is not considered dense and modern enough by an idea of “the urban” of undefined origin. Even though residents are allocated alternative sites and might be compensated if they are the lawful owners of their houses, and though there are chances for some in the relocation, it is unclear how this claim of poverty alleviating planning is compatible with the priority given to high-level investments and the practice of “slum” clearance-induced displacement.

What can be established from the “travelling plans” having reached Bahir Dar, as well as the ideas that have circulated to the city is that current planning in Bahir Dar is grounded in a developmentalist understanding. The development aims have been transferred from a foreign context and universalist planning paradigms. Implementing planning concepts such as the IDP contains an implicit comparison, which in this case is not sufficiently justified by data suggesting a similarity between the context of origin and the context of implementation. Siding of the government with private developers in the hope of economic gain for the larger good further defines new building standards on the basis of new economic possibilities but has to make deals with private investment (in tourism) to fulfil these visions and standards. The offers politics makes are not always attractive. Building commercial structures in the city centre is successful with investors, while the industrial park could not attract enterprises. Therefore, suggestions for projects by the developers are taken on directly. Adjunct to this, aesthetic visions are consulted, by which ideas of modernity are linked to appearance. Dubai is a frequent reference on which stakeholders would like to model Bahir Dar’s physical structures. The underlying economic models of the oil business are, thereby, dismissed. Due to the gap between need and “regulating fiction” (s.a., Robinson 2006: 11), these standards are not very useful for progress in the Ethiopian context and run the risk of increasing disparities. They have led the Ethiopian state to set urbanity in the sense of modernism as the standard in its practice of urban expansion.

The modernisation scheme based on political imaginaries forces the residents to leave the area on the grounds of declaring their houses unsuited to the building standard. To reach the standards of urban development set by the modernisation vision, it is dependent on attracting investment and cannot consider upgrading strategies based on existing structures, as these would not be economically powerful enough. This strategy is extremely risky, as the anticipated investment is highly

volatile and dependent on external factors, leaving it beyond national political control. It relies on foreign investment, imported goods and external expertise as well as making local resources available to outside interests in the hope of economic gain. The question arises of how people are to make a livelihood in the condominiums and other mono-functional designs if the industrial set-up underlying this spatial division of residence and labour does not accompany the planning?

Basic needs

The current development of urban structures (formal and informal) is often not sufficiently accompanied by provision of social, economic and technical infrastructure or spatial arrangements that allow for survival. The distribution of infrastructure provision, thereby, mirrors uneven socio-economic development in the different neighbourhoods. Thereby, lack of basic infrastructure largely affects the urban livelihoods of low-income households and rural-urban migrants and, therefore, large proportions of the urban population that rely on inconsistent incomes. These parts of the urban population are currently particularly vulnerable to economic instabilities and food insecurity, in addition to sanitary issues caused by lack of access to water and sanitary infrastructure. Bahir Dar's high levels of poverty lead large parts of the population to face issues of food security, health, impermanent shelter, or difficulty in accessing education. Unequal access to basic infrastructure, therefore, furthers social inequality.

Urban planning, thereby, does not acknowledge these issues sufficiently when solutions for "upgrading" are sought. As urban agriculture is promoted and the provision of fallow land is cheap, it is easier to provide than costlier facilities such as clinics, which remain an unresolved issue. Bahir Dar's hospital, hence, is the only public hospital for an area of 1.5 million inhabitants (Mulugeta Tadesse et al. 2006: 32). However, it is not only the physical access to basic infrastructure that proves difficult for certain population groups; access to education, which is widely available in the city and often the reason for moving into its proximity, is difficult to attend on a regular basis if basic needs (food, water, clothes, shelter) are not secured.

While individual proximity to infrastructure is considered progressive in Bahir Dar, by international standards it is considered a basic right. Within the city, there are disparities created by unequal service provision and planning. The provision of infrastructure in the city is not systematic and partly delegated to NGOs (water) and private companies (waste collection). While waste collection and recycling can be viewed as income generating, other basic services are in a fundamentally critical state and create disparities among areas that are serviced and serviceable and those that are not. Sanitation, for example, relies on a tank system and is only available to those who can pay for these installations and services and only in areas that are accessible to the sewage trucks. All other residents resort to the bush, and public urinating has become a major issue. As even the Felege Hiwot

Hospital only recently started treating its sewage before disposing of it into Lake Tana, the hygienic conditions are dire and have to be expected to worsen in the course of urbanisation, if efforts to improve them are not drastically increased.

In the realm of basic infrastructure provision for the incoming population, many responsibilities are tacitly delegated by the state to the private sphere. The BDIDP thus informally assumes the public will take charge of issues that should actually lie in the public sphere of responsibility (provision of infrastructure, social resources). Yet, the priorities need to be further revised: In the provision of basic services, the tourism sites currently have a high government priority for receiving infrastructure. Meanwhile the inadequate service provision in other areas is used as legitimisation for “slum removal”. Those most prone to poverty and in dire living conditions are, further, excluded when their shelters are deemed inadequate. While some profit from resettlement, for others the requirements made by this are too high (e.g. elderly and sick people). The concern for service provision should therefore be reconsidered and addressed by in-situ upgrading instead of resettlement.

Generally, there are mutual influences of planning paradigms, policy aims and everyday practices. The contents of the BDIDP and the administrative practices to realise it as well as governmental practices beyond the plan have very nuanced effects on the reality of everyday practices dependent on the neighbourhood context. At the same time, the practices shape the structures introduced by statutory planning through appropriation and develop the city without regard to the land use designated by the plan. Thereby the high level of conformity that urban planning demands of the urban population stands in contrast to the diversity of biographies and lifestyles that can be found in the city. The conformity that is demanded can often not be lived up to, and so the system makes excuses for exceptions it welcomes, while strongly sanctioning exceptions that it deems irrelevant. As traditional accommodation is considered inferior, informal practices are rendered illegal and practices of foraging are not at all acknowledged institutionally, the plan dismisses these local interpretations of the urban that reach beyond its own definitions of urban livelihoods. Meanwhile, investment-intensive development projects on the lakeshore can be executed by negotiating the plan’s terms. And, although planning now has a legal and political base, non-compliance with the plan is not sanctioned and is tolerated for economic gain. The impacts of this negotiation practice on the individual urbanites are substantial, as traditional accommodation is not granted permanent legal status and the resources on which the urban livelihoods depend informally are not considered in the plans for urban development. Since these practices and urban lifestyles that do not conform to the plan’s understandings of industrially underpinned urbanity are largely those of the urban poor, it has to be acknowledged that the implementation of the BDIDP systematically jeopardises

the material livelihoods of the urban majority in favour of what are considered “modern” developments by the administration.

7.2.3 Understandings of Urbanity

While statutory planning aims at furthering rural-urban linkages in the sense of attempting to connect rural and urban geographies and economies, urban planning remains largely unaware of the blurred conceptions of rural and urban for which the city is and will stay a melting ground. The administration is strictly divided into rural and urban responsibilities and a lot of effort is put into trying to keep the population in the countryside as well as reshaping the urban economy to suit ideas of urbanity. Infrastructure is meant to make the countryside more attractive, while wholesalers are supported in the re-conceptualising of the market with the aim of replacing the current practice of direct vending by the farmers. This binary understanding of rural and urban as well as the common stereotyping of the farmer as backwards and slow, thereby clashes with realities on the ground. There is an adaptation of subsistence activities to the urban context, blurring the practical distinction between agricultural farmland and urban land use of residence, industry and service. There is a reciprocity and links to the rural areas, reflected in circular, temporary and seasonal migration, etc. Informal land subdivision on the urban fringe and a fleeting population of temporary migrants as well as entangled economies challenge the common understanding of what a city is. The descriptions of urbanisation from the “Western” or European context are insufficient to serve as criteria for the qualification of phenomena and structures we are currently observing in Africa as urban, although they clearly belong to the city. If urban planning is to address and accompany the rapid urbanisation adequately, these knowledge gaps and assumptions need to be overcome. To do so, the question of what the urban is can most coherently be answered by looking through the “rural”.

Natural Resources

The urban development strategy of substituting subsistence strategies based on natural resources by offering space for commercial or industrial projects in the expansion areas is risky and implies a change of livelihood for those currently reliant on this habitat. Natural resources are, hence, a recurring topic of negotiation on various scales. Beginning with the disputes over the use of the Nile water for hydropower or irrigation, which is still the subject of international conflict, the access to natural resources as a livelihood base has become increasingly beset by conflict even on the small scale. Fish, wood, stones, sand and grass are collected and traded in specific locations (the wood harbour) or processed and taken for sale in the neighbourhoods of Bahir Dar. The resources are not systematically administered or monitored, although locally there might be (traditional) responsibilities

towards their administration. As the population density in the Lake Tana region has risen over the years, traditional livelihoods continue and pressure even on the renewable resources rises. The subsistence gatherers are in increasing competition with the commercial exploitation of the landscape and will not be able to survive without protection. At the same time, contravening interests have arrived in the course of urbanisation in the form of construction. Livelihood strategies based on foraging are outside the scope of taxation. They technically have to be considered informal urban livelihood strategies. So, it happens that widespread practices of foraging and third-party support do not appear in the assumptions of modern and industrially reliant urban development, although they are very contemporary urban lifestyles. Whether they are desirable and to what extent they are sustainable has not been the subject of discussion. Instead, they are dismissed in favour of third-party interests. Thereby, the go-ahead for large-scale developments binds or even destroys natural resources (such as sand, stones, natural habitat, soil, water etc.) to an unspecified amount. It is, hence, not clear to what extent this distribution of scarce resources away from subsistence-based lifestyles aligns with the aim of pro-poor development.

Agriculture as a means of subsistence, shaping the urban area into agricultural land, faces a different situation. Agricultural land use on administratively urban land is found in the villages of the Negede (Wayto) people, whose livelihood is traditionally based on the resources of the Nile, but the insecure and infrequent income situation of the lower income groups also leads to the common practice of urban agriculture. This includes keeping cattle as well as crop activities. The mode of survival is traditionally rural but has become a widespread lifestyle in the city. Being supported as “urban agriculture”, this form of land use is allowed to temporarily occupy vacant land and has the support of administrative structures.

Another phenomenon one can observe is the formation of a multitude of collective forms of resource management in the cities. Examples of this are collective saving and insurance groups, which are semi-formal communal institutions, installed for managing livelihood resources (see also Pieterse 2010). In Ethiopia, these are the well-known iqubs and iddir. Through a joint effort to save or the possibility to take up micro-credits, they provide access to productive assets and employment opportunities. These would have been denied to the individual and are facilitated by the urban socio-economic context in which these assets and opportunities can be easily accessed. These groups are, thereby, also forms of socialisation and, among other things, can be taken as signs of socialisation and social engagement. They act as strong group definitions.

Migration

The mobile population is a vital part of Bahir Dar’s development dynamic. Migrants can be seen as work-seeking daily labourers on the street; they are domestic employees in most established households and form a large proportion of students

in the city's educational facilities. Although the young are the most visible on the streets and the building sites, the interview material shows that coming to the city is a cross-generational phenomenon. The possibility of entering the city through pre-arranged work and housing or marriage and, thus, joining existing households might have obscured the fact in the common account, as it reduces the visibility of older migrants. Major differences can be established between urban visits, multi-local set-ups and permanent residence. While some residents do take permanent migration decisions, others choose multi-locational set-ups or come into the city temporarily.

The temporary residents come to achieve educational aspirations, follow paths of emancipation from traditional societal roles and pursue personal development. Although the motives of those residents coming for a period of time – whether it is clearly timed or an indefinite limitation – differ strongly. All the “visitors” have in common that their attempts and efforts at interacting with the wider urban community are comparatively low. Ties to other areas are, therefore, maintained, either through contact to the home area or through contact to peers and friends from the home area. Overall, the actions undertaken within these rationales are not generally individualistic but rather aided or enabled by the family and, if successful, result in shared benefits for the family. The family, thereby, often negotiates the stay. This mobility is then embedded in a social structure that actively or passively supports the personal allocation decisions within the suggested frame of time and place.

Urban visits can be the result of multi-local strategies that do not have their base in Bahir Dar and are, therefore, just a temporary stay with no intention of returning regularly or at a given point in time. So, while from the perspective of urban policy these are temporary stays, from the perspective of migration patterns, some can also be considered part of multi-local strategies. The multi-local set-ups encountered in Bahir Dar are extremely diverse. Meant is not a biography of movement but the simultaneous maintenance of various households by an individual or a group. Just as there are students who come to Bahir Dar temporarily for the duration of their course, young people from Bahir Dar move between locations to complete degrees with frequent visits home and the intention to return or to move on after the three, four or five years that the course takes. On the other hand, there are multi-local strategies that are possible to maintain, due to proximity. Bahir Dar can conveniently be reached from the regions surrounding Lake Tana as well as those located along the asphalt roads from Gondar and Addis Ababa. Although high schools can now also be found in many of these areas, Bahir Dar still offers opportunities in trade and employment, access to services and infrastructure (electricity, telephone, internet, banking, transport) and various types of education and qualification that suggest frequent stays to those wanting a share without leaving other commitments behind. The third aspect is that of commitments in the city that cannot be ignored while employment is found elsewhere.

This reverse situation of finding qualified work in the countryside is largely due to government development programmes for which technically qualified personnel is greatly sought. As the engagements are temporary, it does not make sense for these contractors to shift their sites of residence to their work location, and so they choose to commute on a daily, weekly or monthly basis instead. However, multi-local does not only mean coming from the countryside and moving into the city but also staying on real estate in the city and seeking jobs wherever they are offered in the surrounding area – including working on site in government measures in the countryside.

Nevertheless, there are newcomers who make a final decision to move to the city and choose this as their only and long-term home base. They have taken up permanent residence. Some of those stating that they have no other plan than to stay in Bahir Dar did so out of lack of other opportunity, while for some it is a conscious decision to stay in the city. Some permanent residents have come due to breaks in their previous lives. Since returning to these set-ups is impossible (due to war, divorce, disputes, famine), the city is a refuge. Beyond that, those definitely staying in Bahir Dar named factors for wanting to stay in town mainly as socio-economic dependencies such as house ownership, family ties, professional networks, support of kin, family bonds and marriage but also advantages of the location through income opportunities, better living conditions than elsewhere, qualified employment, possibilities of asset building, etc. It has to be assumed that, as with the other statuses, the answers given on wanting to stay permanently are linked to the current living conditions the interviewees encountered in Bahir Dar. Despite committing themselves in their answers, most of the interviewees had witnessed a lot of structural changes in their lifetimes which affected them to varying degrees. It, therefore, has to be assumed that they are all aware of the rather large uncertainties the current urbanisation developments entail and that they are living under. Investing in housing and other forms of asset building is hence a bet on a stable future in Bahir Dar that will return the investments in cash or use value. Expressing the explicit wish to stay, therefore, can be seen as the optimistic expression that urban development will continue to take a good course for the urbanites personally.

Thereby, population movement into the city cannot be understood as a passing phenomenon. Participating in the country's economic rise means going to the city. Yet, the findings suggest that migration patterns are circular or include movement to and fro. Place-making activities (initially) rely on family structures for support and can seldomly be described as emancipative strategies, as urbanisation in Western contexts occasionally is. They rather follow optimisation decisions for the extended family. Hence, besides the diversification of income strategies within households, individual and household multi-locality is observed. These biographies of temporary stays need further investigation, as do the household structures resulting from these patterns of movement. However, by transcending the

geographies of rural and urban on a frequent basis, the boundaries of the city and the concept of an “urbanite” are called into question. In the actions of trade, education, seasonal work, etc., behind these movements, social positions are renegotiated without reference to tradition, and resources are re-spatialised by remittances or investment in locations other than the place of income generation, as the labour force finds new and dynamic concentrations.

To date, movement has not been included in the planning conceptualisations of the urban. Thereby, moving for economic, social or educational reasons has to be subsumed under this assumption. While the administration does acknowledge a population influx, it has no further data on the quality or intensity of patterns of movement. Faced with this, the regional political line is to try to keep the population from the rural areas in place and minimise push-factors such as bad living conditions in the rural countryside as factors resulting in rural-urban migration and urban growth. These efforts are rather unsuccessful, as there is currently no promise beyond subsistence in the rural areas. In addition to the restrictions on establishing a substantive livelihood in the rural areas, the city offers prospects of alternative lifestyles and proximity to infrastructures – both considered modern and, therefore, desirable. The motives for coming to the city and also the opportunities taken up are very heterogeneous – they are somewhat diffuse in their formulation as aspirations. Moving into the city is equated with “development” in a personal and cultural sense. Thereby, informally created opportunity as a major factor for securing a livelihood needs recognition. The mix of infrastructure (internet communications), concentration of people, resource accumulation is specific to the city in relation to the rural. These opportunities offered by the city are taken up without pre-knowledge, as they are impossible to anticipate without formal education. All other learning and even the certificates strongly depend on circumstance. Hence, the opportunities actually taken are not restricted to opportunities given in formal employment on arrival but rather widely diverse in the range of finding incomes and subsistence strategies. These individual rationales might not be strategic, due to the high uncertainty of environmental and economic set-ups, but, being based on chance and opportunity, they are highly tactical in aiming for improved living conditions for the person concerned and often also for household or family members. Thus, although land is rare, migration can only seldom be understood as a forced move from the countryside, supposedly grounded in land deprivation of the young.

Unlike the students arriving in Bahir Dar, however, who are fully accommodated, there is no official reception structure for rural-urban migrants. The young migrants coming to the city to engage in wage labour question the rural-urban dichotomy by forming a category of urban residents that does not fully suit the implications of urban “development”. Currently, the influx of daily labourers to Bahir Dar is strongly supported by labour opportunities in the construction industry. They are often young people from the rural areas arriving as migrants in the city,

but due to lack of education they do not have the access to what is associated with the modern and the “developed”. Instead, they form the workforce to put in place the structures and secure these items and services for the “middle class” and businesses in a rather exploitative relationship. An increasing socio-economic segregation between socially or economically advantaged urban residents and labouring arrivals becomes evident. Residents arriving outside of education programmes can only access rental housing or buy (on a very dense market), since the land distribution system only allows entry after two years of waiting. In addition to the fact that immediate reception structures for arrivals other than state university students are not in place, it has to be assumed that large parts of the incoming population cannot meet the requirements for entering the land distribution system set by the statutes. Many low-income migrants, therefore, find accommodation in informal hostels, adding overcrowding to the already precarious living situations.

However, the act of moving to the city has implications beyond this, as a gender-specific review reveals. A move to the city also entails personal development. Conflict in the area of origin as a reason for coming to the city is particularly important from a gender perspective, as it can explain some of the contingencies of female migration as well as the phenomenon of street children in the city. While the family network might not be broken, the city still holds roles and identities that migrants can take on only here and not in their immediate family networks. As the examples of prostitution and street children show, these are, however, not always positively connotated socially. So while the modes of entry into the city can vary according to sex, the role that the city takes on in turn, can nevertheless be interpreted as that of a refuge from expulsion from traditional living arrangements. For many of the female migrants, making a living in the city either involves going into exploitative domestic work or becoming one of the many sex workers in Bahir Dar (Bevan et al. 2008: 51). These alternative identities are often accommodated informally.

Although we are seeing the passage from a predominantly rural society to an urban society on the national scale, the distinctions between the two concepts on the city scale are not clear cut. Models of transgression from rural to urban lifestyles are not linear. According to these results, urban areas accommodate a large diversity of livelihoods but also impact on the rural households engaging in exchange (see Abeje Berhanu 2012: 62). A distinction between rural and urban is not clearly possible in the cases of seasonal migrants, in the practice of urban agriculture, in the use of the city’s markets for the trade of rural produce and offering of agricultural supply. Although there are purely “urban” lifestyles, many urban residents maintain “rural” modes of income generation or social and cultural connections. The description of the recurring presence of migrants from the rural areas is an empirical proof of the strong rural-urban connections but, at the same time, challenges the distinctiveness of the two concepts. It shows that, here, a clear divide

of the population into rural and urban is not possible, as the individuals making up the population of both areas are at least partly and temporarily identical. This “urbanity of movement” (Simone 2011) that Bahir Dar is experiencing counters the duality of rural and urban. This research shows that developments in rural and urban areas in Ethiopia are highly connected, as internal migration from the rural areas to the urban centres determines the population growth and spatial development of the urban areas. In this realm, practices and lifestyles undergo a spatial transition and form hybrids. This means that the urbanites do not simply seek ways to survive in the city. Although coping strategies can be found and make up a substantial part of the lifestyles encountered in Bahir Dar, the multi-locational lifestyles and temporary nature of the stays and mobility of the population suggest that, in the sense of manoeuvring, they are playing the city and have a much more active role in using it in their own interests to diversify the livelihoods of their households and grasp formal and informal qualification opportunities than generally assumed in the descriptions of “urbanisation under poverty”. Here, opportunities are provided by concentration of infrastructure and social resources, rather than policy intervention. The most obvious examples of these transcending agencies would include subsistence and traditional practices that consequently have to be understood not as rural practices in the city but rather as site-specific urban practices. Looking at these examples, it is evident that a conventional distinction of rural and urban is hardly applicable. Yet, the social concepts of rural and urban can be interpreted through each other. From the perspective of a rural pastoral lifestyle, urban gardening is truly urban. Beyond that, there are interconnections between the divided. Consequently, what makes up the “urban” in Bahir Dar does not necessarily suit existing conceptions of a city but rather develops as locally contingent urbanities. Yet the formation of urban/rural cultures and livelihoods in a socio-cultural sense is overlooked as a factor in shaping the physical structure of the city and its urban practice. Everyday urbanisation, *de facto*, does hold claims on urban natural resources, which are the basis of urban livelihoods, but this is institutionally not acknowledged. They first have to be described in order to be able to be acknowledged as such and need to be judged by their context of development. Against this, reliance on the formal economy and with it increasing formal regulation and governmental standards will limit the possibilities of livelihood diversity in the city.

The socio-cultural transformation, thereby, has reached an extent where its requirement for space and resources has brought it into conflict with competing rural lifestyles, especially on the urban fringe. Nigussie Haregeweyn et al. (2012: 150) describe the urban expansion as posing serious threats to the livelihoods of small-scale farmers on the urban fringe, who earn their living by farming the productive agricultural lands under urbanisation pressure (see also chapter 5.5). While the administrative boundaries mark a clear boundary of responsibility between institutions, the physical determination of what belongs to the city and what does not

is questioned by the practice of informal sub-division on the urban fringe. While some farmers' existence is threatened by urban expansion and the process is not seen as desirable, other actors display agency in using the developments to create new (informal) forms of market access and personal gain. Urbanisation, hence displays a range of survival strategies that are "in-betweens" of rural or urban, but coexist or even depend on each other and make Bahir Dar as a city.

7.2.4 Questions of Citizenship

In the course of implementing the IDP, first trials are being made with public participation. As a result, the mutual support of planning institutions and everyday practices is being discussed in the public realm for the first time. Thereby, the question of who is considered a stakeholder and can therefore exercise citizen rights is in need of closer inspection (as described in chapter 7.2.3.). The societal roles are changing within urbanisation and positions of power formerly defined by religion, ethnicity, gender, family and rural or urban origin will be renegotiated in urban society connected to the global. Urbanisation is, hence, seeing new forms of agency and the formation of new urban identities that are an emancipation from traditional role models. In connection with an increasingly large fleeting population, the question has to be posed as to how the different (emerging) social groups can negotiate their interest by participating in urban development.

Access to information

Beyond traditional understandings of infrastructure, the younger generation pointed out a desire to live in the city, due to the access to information they can gain here. Thereby they do not only refer to the possibilities of education, but rather access to the internet and other communication services. Here, a shift from access to information is visible. While the older generation still relies on oral traditions of knowledge transfer, administration is engaged in party controlled systems of data collection (Gagliardone 2014), the younger generation aims at engaging in a global network of information exchange. Thereby, the exchange of opinion is politically monitored (*ibid*), leading the state to be in the role of the facilitator but also of the restricting body at the same time (cf. Watson 2002: 36-37). Mobile phone services are uniquely in state hands, contents of the internet (such as search engine results) are filtered and services such as skype were not legal for the longer period of time. Unmonitored forums for the change of critical opinion are, therefore, established outside of state control. They are organised by the diaspora to evade the controlled networks, or have clandestine communication structures and media.

Diversity

Society in Bahir Dar is made up of a variety of ethnicities, religions and origins as well as hosting different genders. Family structures and the people of the same

regional origin form loose groups of support within the city. Thereby, not all of the socialities are declared to be in line with local tradition. In Bahir Dar, Amhara culture is dominant, and there are hierarchical conceptions of citizenship based on Amhara ethnicity, Orthodox religion, male gender and urban origin. The patterns are reflected in the spatial set-up of the city. Although their political significance has shrunk to personal influence, the Orthodox Church is recognised as a powerful institution. It is no longer the sole organising element of the city structure and has to comply with the plan, but it has influence on the population and still attracts large numbers of scholars to its grounds. The Muslim community is well established but concentrated in the city centre and around Kebele 13. The Wayto have not been assigned permanent sites of settlement and are segregated from other population groups. The access to land for the Negede (Wayto) population is described as highly contested: The accessible land is either not suitable for permanent construction, as it floods annually, or settlers are in competition with "big people" who can pay the government beyond their own financial capacities. The community does not hold land titles and has to move its huts at the request of the government. Meanwhile, ritual places are contested by other uses and, due to the group's weak position in negotiation, many of them have been claimed and expropriated by others. Their communities are, therefore, in constant expectation of being given notice to leave the land. They have already been displaced several times, which puts them in the position of having to migrate around the urban area of Bahir Dar and leaves them in a precarious and highly vulnerable situation (Ajala 2008: 27, Darmon 2010: 2, Oestigaard 2011: 27) and marginalised. Like the Wayto, rural urban migrants, females and Protestants face frequent discrimination. Labour is still very related to gender roles and accessing the city thereby differs for men and for women, which becomes especially clear at the arrival points at the bus station in the city centre. As domestic work and sex-labour are distinctly female occupations, these are opportunities uneducated females can access on arriving in town. The situation awaiting the unaccompanied women in the city is not protective. Female construction workers coming into the city from the surrounding rural areas, for example, are about four times more likely to engage in risky sexual practices than their male counterparts (Mekibib et al. 2013: 299), and female respondents in a study on street children in Bahir Dar said they had been victims of sexual harassment (Amare Sahile and Sinkinesh Takleargay 2008: 77). As a result of their social situation, the female in-migrants face vulnerability.

The understandings of dominance underlying these occurrences are still strong in the older population, while the younger generations are starting to question them. They have stated "a desire not to be defined by difference". Despite modernisation within Amhara urban society, attempts to extend the urban mix of societies mix beyond a cohabitation with Muslims to a blend of cultures with Wayto and Protestants as well is not represented in the rationales of everyday urbanisation. In this respect, planning is far more considerate than ordinary attitudes. The IDP

is attempting to counter discrimination based on ethnicities or religion. However, the idea behind this attempt is not solely explained by a wish for peaceful cohabitation, but by the fact that politics is trying to expand its reach in urban areas and increase their governability. In the face of the overwhelming movements and societal transformation evident in the cities as a result of the course of urbanisation, governance is causing substantial problems due to limited capacities and struggles over limited resources. By expanding the area of formalised planning and subjecting urban development to its rules, the state is also seeking to establish its own legitimisation. The suggestion it makes is that, by conforming to state-led development, personal improvement can lead the way out of poverty, for example by entering the state's higher education system. Thereby, the current urban identities newly shaping in the course of urbanisation have not been explored and are hardly anticipated. The current policies still seek to improve understanding between cultures without knowledge of how digitalisation and globalisation will change the citizen's self-understanding. Lifestyles will diversify in the urbanisation process.

Based on this, urbanisation is seeing new forms of agency. Waiting for a green card in the lottery or signing up for domestic work in the United Arab Emirates are, thereby, high-risk strategies in comparison to entering higher education but nevertheless highly popular among the younger population. Urban-rural and modern-traditional clashes can cause individuals to take on a variety of identities to suit different expectations. Moving to the city facilitates taking on roles outside of traditional gender stereotypes, as economic independence is accessible for more women. However, the new roles bring new power issues. In connection with an increasingly large fleeting population, it must be asked how participation in urban development will be exercised in the future.

Social roles are being invented, while a new urban society is being negotiated. Yet, the urban planning mechanisms in place have the potential to increase economic and spatial segregation within Bahir Dar, between what is in danger of being viewed as "deserving and undeserving citizens". However, the reasoning behind the assumptions of how "urbanites" should be defined and rewarded by the system is driven by the question of governability. Thereby, the failure to gain relevance for these lifestyles is interpreted as a "governance void" on behalf of the administration, over which urban planning is still waiting to expand its reach and hence secure power. The question of who defines an urbanite, therefore, has fundamental power implications. Public discussion of this question needs to be encouraged against the current practice of censorship and intimidation.

