

2. Developing the Shopping Mall

Countries considered to be “developing” on the prescribed scale of global economic growth—a status used to describe many African nations—are encouraged to promote themselves as active partakers in the global economy. The identity of the post-colonial nation as projected by contemporary corporate and government discourses is one that is increasingly based on such a globalized imaginary—a nation that has overcome its past colonial disarticulation and become resilient enough to compete in the new world order of economic globalization.¹ Entry into the global economy, however, is only accessible by emphasizing business-friendly and open markets and demonstrating increased middle-class wealth and disposable incomes—the hallmarks of the modern state. Developing nations are thus obliged to conform to a pervasive neoliberal institutional framework that is largely “characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade.”² Citizens of developing economies are central to globalization processes, and are encouraged to partake more actively in a shared consumerist culture.

In response to these demands, developing countries have created strategic policies to prompt economic growth within a targeted period of time.³ Kenya’s development plan over the next two decades, for example, has been spelled out in its strategic Vision 2030, which is the developmental constitution of the nation, aiming “to increase Kenya’s global competitiveness, to promote growth based on efficiency, and to attract more investment locally and internationally.”⁴ In Kenya, like most other developing nations, there is an indoctrinated ideology of nation-building that requires governments to keep pace with the global trends of progress exhibited by wealthy nations. Following the paths set by industrialized predecessors is a key step taken by postcolonial nations in their attempt to compete on an international scale. Kenya’s Vision 2030 openly states that it emu-

lates other “developed” countries, and follows their set patterns of growth couched in terms of strengthening the economy. This is achieved through a neoliberal agenda with an “emphasis on the deregulation of markets and the new priorities awarded to private business interests in the formation of policy and the delivery of public services.”⁵

As colonial governments and militaries began their withdrawal, many newly independent governments were obliged to retain the already existing structure of economic advisement. In the African context, “imperial businesses did not collapse alongside colonialism, but instead successfully adapted their operations by highlighting their role in the economic development of the continent” by cooperating with the newly formed independent governments as well as with local business elites.⁶ To this day, the single largest source of foreign direct investment in postcolonial nations often comes from the former colonizer. For both Kenya and Egypt, for example, most foreign direct investment comes from the United Kingdom.⁷ Many postcolonial nations “are today part of the Commonwealth of Nations, an intergovernmental organization that facilitates political, commercial, and cultural ties with the United Kingdom. All that makes it easier for businesses to set up shop abroad, send employees to work as expatriates, and hire local talent. Companies are also better able to negotiate special commercial ties and preferential access to markets.”⁸ It follows that contemporary investments in former British colonies will allow for the former colonizer to have a direct mimetic influence on the ways in which elements of postcolonial economies operate—a global imaginary facilitated by historical transnational ties. Thus, many developing countries must perform a balancing act as they attempt to reconcile the burdens of a colonial history with the demands of a global economy.

The Making of a Middle Class

Capitalist cultural competency is, in many ways, an extension of the ways in which the colonial empire positioned itself as the hegemonic locus of wealth and power, and the center towards which colonies gravitated, and of which colonial societies were expected to frame their imaginaries. Whether celebratory or begrudging, discourses of development are a crucial frame of reference, with many complex colonial inheritances being extended into the contemporary period under the guise of free market globalization, creating a strong progressive link between colonial legacies

and contemporary neoliberal policies.⁹ Even today, the same type of colonialist language is utilized by international investors who perceive of developing countries as “virgin” ground ripe for economic exploitation, and as “the *Next Big Thing*.”¹⁰ Developers are calculating the benefits accrued from investing in emerging economies where a “young and connected middle class is growing fast and still deciding on its favorite brands. In short, it is brimming with potential.”¹¹ Market researchers report that “institutional investors now regard Africa’s emerging middle class and its growing consumerism the most attractive aspect of investing in Africa, more than its commodity wealth.”¹²

In order to attract international investment and “to transform Kenya into a newly industrializing, ‘middle-income country providing a high quality of life for all its citizens by the year 2030,’”¹³ the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) has “re-classified” Kenya as a “middle-income” country, rather than a “low-income” one. This is a deliberate discursive rearticulation of the state of Kenya’s economy that is not necessarily reflected in economic reality. Kenyan Minister for Devolution and Planning, Anne Waiguru, admitted “that an increase in GDP per capita does not necessarily mean that Kenyans will be better off nor does it imply that the existing social economic challenges have ceased to exist. Kenyans will be just as poor—or just as wealthy—as they were a year ago.”¹⁴

This “reclassification” of Kenya as a middle-income country is thus largely symbolic and is meant to position the country as more internationally competitive, and as more attractive to foreign direct investment rather than instigating any real form of poverty alleviation.¹⁵ As part of the “trade, not aid” strategy, inflating the public’s purchasing power means that countries like Kenya will have to forgo specific international aid quotas set for social development in favor of appealing to more foreign investment directed towards economic development. Symbolically increasing the purchasing power of a nation serves to entice foreign investors with “increasingly attractive opportunities to supply goods and services to consumers with rapidly increasing disposable incomes.”¹⁶ In such ways, “consumers” are being discursively created with the anticipation that this will lead to action in the form of increased consumption.

Now that developing countries have “created” a middle class and have proposed people’s increased purchasing power, there must be a place specifically designed to capture this wealth and to circulate it within the global economy. That place is the shopping mall; the portal between develop-

ing countries and the global economy. To share in the consumerist codes of a global corporate capitalism, “from Nairobi to Johannesburg, major urban centers across the continent have seen a construction boom take hold—and the world of shopping is at the heart of it.”¹⁷ Neoliberalism in the guise of shopping malls has infiltrated most, if not all, global markets, where investors and governments have eagerly adopted the design and marketing successes of these commercial venues. By encouraging increased “consumer confidence,” new national identities are constructed on the basis of economic performance, inviting citizens to find consolation in consumption. This is despite the fact that poverty is endemic in many developing countries, and only a fraction of the population is able to partake in this new consumer identity.

The Globalization of Consumption and Contestation

Every era is defined by an architectural testimonial that physically locates prevailing elements of its collective social state. As an international signifier of a globalized modernity, shopping malls rate high on the list of important landmarks defining the contemporary era. The progressivist hopes of a nation have long been pinned to the concept of the shopping center, where the commercial establishment has served as a sign of progress for decades. As early as 1878, department stores were billed as “a place where almost anything may be bought,” a boast that has been systematically repeated in the contemporary era.¹⁸

Similar to how shopping malls are currently characterized as harbingers of globalization, the establishment of the Selfridges department store in 1909 “was considered a ‘monument to modernity’ and was one of the most frequented tourist venues in London.”¹⁹ This sentiment was echoed almost verbatim in Ghana in the 1950s, over half a century later, when the United Africa Company (UAC) was tasked with the “duty” of developing “a modern department store in time for independence,”²⁰ as a sign that the nation had arrived into its modern incarnation. The Kingsway department store was duly erected in Accra, and, in the language of its developer, was a symbol of “future peace, progress, prosperity and stability.”²¹ Thus, a direct correlative link was created between the notion of independence and the act of shopping. Another half a century into the future, when the Accra Mall was established in 2008, its founder, Joseph Owusu-Akyaw, noted that the commercial complex would usher the nation into a hitherto

unknown age of modernity.²² In the contemporary period, the opening—and reopening—of Nairobi's Westgate Mall was geared towards embodying and exhibiting these developmental ideals.

The surge in popularity of this commodity form is exemplified by its rapid growth. In the immediate post World War II period, "there were only eight shopping centers in the United States,"²³ a figure that had grown to 114,485 in 2013.²⁴ In the developing country context, nations are encouraged, and increasingly obliged, to become educated in the language of progress, and to become literate in its associated codes by building shopping malls as a sign of socioeconomic development. Nigeria opened its "first modern shopping mall in 2005," and, in Rwanda, "the construction of shopping malls is changing the retail market from high street trading to enclosed centres which is gradually becoming popular with locals adapting to formal retailing under one roof."²⁵ Although there were only 40 malls in Kenya in 2014, a figure that might seem low compared to the number of malls in the United States, this is, in fact, a relatively rapid increase, with scores more shopping malls being planned.²⁶

Cosmopolitan marketplaces, trading traditions, consumption practices, identity formations, and international networks of communication underline a rich and varied history of global connectivities. While traditional market forms exist in many nations, the shopping mall as the architectural epitome of corporate capitalism has superseded these in importance as a symbol of globalization, a signifier of economic progress, and a ready-made commodity form and spectacle. As an essential sign of a nation's social and economic progress, within the discourse of globalization, the mall is seen as a sophisticated urban necessity, regardless of how it fits within existing—and resisting—social, economic, and urban formations. The wholesale importation of the contemporary shopping mall is especially extolled in developing nations, since it can be transplanted, with little modification, into whatever local market exists.

Governments and investors all over the world have been enthralled by the idea of erecting shopping malls as self-enclosed and profit-generating miniature cities that are capable of operating on their own terms and with little connection to traditional marketplaces. In most contemporary urban environments, the shopping mall is promoted as "a point of reference, making the city accommodate its presence."²⁷ Many shopping malls introduced into the developing country context do not have to work their way into the existing social and market structures since they are being built as

“mixed use complexes” complete with hotels, houses, private services and infrastructure, and can often even be accessed by private roads.

Because of the significant investments necessary to develop and construct shopping malls, there is only a handful of international architectural firms that specialize in mall construction. This monopolization has meant that shopping malls follow an “international standard,” and do not need to fit into the local existing market structure; they can be “transplanted” fully formed with little need for interaction with their surroundings. As can be seen in many developing countries, the design of the urban mall can—and in many cases does—appear fully formed.²⁸ This transplantation prevents—and protects—shopping centers from growing organically over time to encounter, be shaped by, and overcome the many social, economic, and political pitfalls and problems associated with urban growth.²⁹

When the Kingsway department store in Accra was accused of monopolizing the market and sidelining African retailers in the 1950s, its developers responded by noting that “department stores formed no part of the indigenous system of trading in West Africa,” and that they thus did not “trespass in the field of the African trader.”³⁰ Clearly, department stores, as precursors to shopping malls, were considered a uniquely Western phenomenon transplanted into a racially segregated African context. With their own rules of business, distribution systems, and customer base, such stores claimed to be divorced from the broader environment. Even though the mall does not always fit, and is not always welcome, in some urban contexts, where it is assembled onsite and introduced in its wholesale form, it remains socially and economically successful for those who can afford to partake in the social world offered within its walls, and for those who can afford to invest in it.

Standardization of Consumption

The concept of the contemporary enclosed shopping mall, as a product and an agent of globalizing forces, is an exercise in homogenization that demands to be uniformly understood and adopted all over the world. Out of the perceived chaos of modernizing nations, the mall is heralded as a mark of certainty and familiarity—a commercial comfort of a dominant consumer culture. Such standardization is meant to ease the process of doing business in countries with highly variable legal cultures, urban en-

vironments, infrastructures, and levels of economic and urban growth. Since generating profits is central to mall design, they are custom-built according to similar design principles all over the world, making them “ageographic.”³¹ Testament to the “global” and simultaneous “placeless” ideology of the contemporary shopping mall, the world is full of homogeneous Westgate Malls—none of which are related. In the United States alone, there are Westgate shopping malls in Minnesota, South Carolina, Ohio, Massachusetts, California, Texas, and Pennsylvania, to name a few. Elsewhere in the world, there are Westgate malls in Shanghai, Zagreb, Ottawa, Singapore, and Oxford.

As a representative of the modern, global city, the shopping mall fulfills many of the requirements of globalization by facilitating the standardization of international business so that foreign entities do not have to deal with the overwhelming differences between each nation’s legal cultures, structures, and requirements. To facilitate this regularity, and to promote a recognized “international standard,”³² shopping mall developers have banded together into powerful trade associations, such as the International Council of Shopping Centers, with strong global influence and lobbying leverage.³³ These consortia provide international representation of real estate firms specializing in the wholesale design and installation of malls, ensuring that the many diverse cultures, markets, languages, and wealth disparities in developing countries do not impose unnecessary barriers to global retail expansion. Within the language of globalized business operations, this is a key benefit. In many developing country contexts, however, this can become a source of contestation. While Westgate Mall’s establishment was an appealing prospect for many who could afford to shop there, it did much to disrupt the livelihoods of others in the surrounding informal markets and settlements.

Although the evolutionary histories of these commercial spaces and how they fit within their social surroundings are multiple, the homogenizing forces of global corporate capitalism have meant that commercial forms are being progressively standardized and unified. In developing countries, “international architectural firms replicate models first tested in the United States or Europe, which are then filled with globally identifiable chains and brands.”³⁴ Specific points of reference and design that emerge from a dominant Western consumer culture are then universalized.³⁵ For example, “people who have worked their way around a mall once can use any other in a different city, even abroad, without ever having

to learn the local language or customs.”³⁶ Malls are built with the same kinds of tried and tested homogenous features to enhance functionality and efficiency.³⁷ This ubiquity of design has also meant that the security responses are also made homogenous, and “a strategy to reduce the risk of terrorism will be similar for most shopping centers” regardless of their particular socioeconomic or political contexts.³⁸

Neoliberalism and the City

Cities like Nairobi, considered to be “emerging” on the scale of global economic development, have become beholden to private investors to construct the urban landscape in a manner that it becomes indicative of economic viability, attractive to foreign investment, facilitative of a strong tourist trade, and protective of middle classes.³⁹ As governments and private interests attempt to attract foreign investment “they must market the city itself as a commodity.”⁴⁰ With increased global connectivities, many “cities have become more like city states, no longer tied to local or national borders but linked into an international network of urban economies and cultures. And the cities themselves are splintering into a multitude of semi-autonomous zones, creating murky regions of private/public partnerships and commercial interest.”⁴¹ Such emerging cities are being actively positioned as nodes of modernity that have more in common with—and can better connect to—other globalized cities, rather than with the impoverished districts in their own surrounding vicinities.

Many developing postcolonial cities have been shaped by a long history of private interests, causing sharp rifts and contestations between communities. There is a continuation of a colonial legacy formulated on capital accumulation in certain urban areas at the expense of the majority of poorer populations. While many public spaces in postcolonial cities remain fractured along historical racial and economic divides, these segregations are often enhanced in the contemporary period. The postcolonial city is geared to represent “a market-driven urbanity; it is a city shaped more by the logic of Market than the needs of its inhabitants; responding more to individual or corporate interests than public concerns. It is marked by an increasing deregulation and privatization of production, collective consumption, and urban space.”⁴² By concentrating investments in some areas of the city while ignoring other poorer ones these developments serve to enhance segregation and polarization. These tensions are

“most evident in the gated communities of the middle- and higher-income neighbourhoods” that often border slum areas, causing direct visual and communal frictions between the two types of daily lived experience.⁴³

Nairobi’s Deep Sea slum is one such example that is located in the up-coming and wealthy Westlands district, home to Westgate Mall. The slum hosts approximately 12,000 people, many of whom have settled there since 1963.⁴⁴ The Westlands neighborhood is thus home to some of the richest and poorest areas of Nairobi that must sit side by side and tolerate the daily friction this juxtaposition entails.⁴⁵ Even though the growth of shopping malls is expected to promote job creation and better infrastructure, these urban developments do not complement other demographic factors. The population growth of Nairobi is increasing at a rate that “is not commensurate with the country’s capacity to create jobs, not only in urban areas, but also in rural economies. The issue has led to proliferation of slums and gross inequalities. About 60 percent of Nairobi’s 3.5 million residents live in slums where provision of public services are inadequate.”⁴⁶

As economic and infrastructural development projects reshape markets and landscapes, “urban poverty appears to be increasing as life in the city has become more expensive. Unemployment in the formal sector has risen, while real wages have not kept up with price increases,”⁴⁷ causing a variety of hostilities directed towards places of consumption, and especially the shopping mall. To become part of a culture of consumption, “urban lifestyles require cash; which is difficult to access legally in countries with high unemployment levels. As a result, crime rates are higher in cities.”⁴⁸ Frustrations are increased when those most excluded from the distribution of wealth are still required to aspire to acts of conspicuous consumption. The growth of the economy and the increasing popularity of shopping malls do little to hide the uneven processes of development and unequal capital flows creating the sharp divide between rich and poor.⁴⁹

The signifiers of modernity, including open markets, luxury shopping malls, and credit card systems, are erected and established in many developing countries even before the public’s ability to become integrated into these systems or to partake in them in any meaningful way. Despite evidence to the contrary, the shopping mall is still billed by developers and advertisers as a space that can be universally enjoyed. However, such a seemingly democratic ideal can only be achieved through equity in purchasing power. As a point of comparison: in a country where “more than 45% of Kenyans live below the Kenyan national poverty line,”⁵⁰ and where

“more than 43% of Kenyans live on less than USD 1.25 per day,”⁵¹ a burger at Westgate’s Gourmet Urban Burgers “sold for between \$8 and \$9.”⁵² A consumerist culture is being actively encouraged in places where shopping malls will be frequented by only a fraction of the population, and envied, endured, or opposed by many others.

Make Way for the Mall

Governments, property developers, retail chains, and marketers, to name a few entities promoting a neoliberal ideology, are converging to create a “formal shopping culture” in many developing countries where the retail landscape is often dominated by informal markets.⁵³ While some slum residents might find employment as security guards and other service staff at formal shopping centers and malls,⁵⁴ others are often absorbed into the surrounding informal markets—ones that are often regarded as illicit and criminal. These are defined by a “diversified set of economic activities, enterprises, jobs, and workers that are not regulated or protected by the state,” in which independent stores, kiosks, cottage industries, and open markets, account for a large share of retail.⁵⁵ Despite providing a large variety of market forms, traditional and informal markets are not only marginalized by expansionist policies, but are often discounted by investors who argue that “as incomes rise across Africa, there remain relatively few retail options.”⁵⁶

In order to address this supposed lack of retail spaces, many governments have formally enshrined the shopping mall in their future developmental plans. Kenya’s relationship with the mall has been etched into its 2030 Vision, with Westgate Mall serving to satisfy some of these economic objectives along with the construction of a variety of other shopping and mixed-use complexes in the coming years.⁵⁷ A largely privatized infrastructure of roads, housing developments, and shopping malls are in the process of replacing—and displacing—informal markets where the majority of the population operates,⁵⁸ and igniting a variety of hostilities along the way.

Increasingly, traditional market forms are being gradually marginalized as antiquated and outdated. As phrased by one retail consulting organization: “most African cities lack the existing shopping infrastructure of other markets, so malls are likely the only way organized retailers can open new stores.”⁵⁹ The Kenyan supermarket chain Nakumatt—West-

gate Mall's anchor store—attempts to formalize grocery retail and entice customers away from informal and traditional markets, causing contestation in the process.⁶⁰ Nakumatt was the scene of many of al-Shabaab's atrocities during the attack, and it was in the Nakumatt storeroom packed with potential products and profits that the terrorists took refuge. The supermarket became an outlet for imported goods and imported terrorism, both of which followed similar global distribution routes to arrive at the destination of the shopping mall.

In rapidly developing cities, polarization, confrontation, and hostility are on the rise, and “the unfolding pattern is one of disjointed, dysfunctional and unsustainable urban geographies of inequality and human suffering, with oceans of poverty containing islands of wealth. Socio-economic conditions in African cities are now the most unequal in the world.”⁶¹ In Kenya, like many other developing countries with radically unequal wealth distributions, the poor “are encroaching and stretching their heavy presence into the streets and other out-door public spaces, where they appear as if ‘they are everywhere.’”⁶² Since informal markets and settlements are often regarded as “a spatial problem rather than a social one,”⁶³ the day before the Westgate Mall attacks, on September 20, 2013, Kenyan media announced that Nairobi was set to unveil an “anti-Hawking squad.”⁶⁴ The Inspector General of Police, David Kimaiyo, organized “a team of 450 officers to help get rid of hawkers from the streets of Nairobi,”⁶⁵ riling up public anger in the surrounding slums. The informal settlements that have grown around the Westlands district have regularly come under attack by the Kenyan authorities, with many residents experiencing brutality and intimidation over the years, resulting in violence enacted on both sides.⁶⁶ Describing the struggle over a prior forced eviction from the informal Westlands market, one trader notes: “We used street children. We trained them to fight. We made petrol bombs, and we had bows and arrows” to defend against forced evictions.⁶⁷

Informal traders “are a part of the economy that spurs consumption, yet they function as quintessentially vagrant figures requiring discipline.”⁶⁸ Through increasingly restrictive government and corporate policies, crime and poverty are being made synonymous and a conceptual link is being created between informality, illegality, and, increasingly, terrorism.⁶⁹ In order to separate formal and informal markets, and to take control of the discursive boundaries between them, there are sustained attempts at formalizing markets into government approved corporate enti-

ties. Informal market activities come under constant threat by authorities in their attempt to clean up the city and rid it of all kinds of crime.

In cities that are in the act of reconstituting themselves according to modern infrastructures, existing informal settlements are routinely destroyed to make way for new developments. Governments' neoliberal policies have assisted "in pushing the poor with insecure tenure rights out of city centers to grab high-value lands to hand over to corporations in pursuit of mega projects like shopping malls, leisure sites, or office buildings."⁷⁰ The informal markets around Westlands are prime real estate,⁷¹ and so are being eyed by developers who designate these areas as "undeveloped land."⁷² Such designation is the classic justification for colonial takeover of foreign assets, where "British imperial ambitions engendered a process of violent enclosures beginning in the early 1890s."⁷³ Ironically, such rhetoric is now being revived by post-colonial governments claiming to resist the history of such colonial manipulation.

As global corporate networks become increasingly powerful in their spheres of influence, governments and national policing efforts are gradually withdrawn as part of an ideology that "advocates the economy and society be freed from the state regulations, and be controlled, instead, by individuals and corporate bodies in accordance with their self interests, mediated through the invisible hands of the market."⁷⁴ In many cases, governments all over the world, but especially those of developing countries, are often only too willing to give up, and give up on, social services and welfare programs, and to pass on infrastructure projects to private interests. This situation poses serious questions for the ethics of business, and blurs the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate modes of capital accumulation. In many ways, "global governance has failed to keep pace with economic globalization. Therefore, as unprecedented openness in trade, finance, travel and communication has created economic growth and well-being, it has also given rise to massive opportunities for criminals to make their business prosper."⁷⁵ A combination of capitalist production, open markets, poverty, organized crime, and terrorism becomes embroiled in a complex global network.

Transnational Networks of Capitalism, Terrorism, and Poverty

In al-Shabaab's native Somalia, the collapse of the government and formal economic system has provided a space for all kinds of businesses to flourish and for terrorist networks to profit, whether defined as legal or illegal.⁷⁶ A series of catastrophic historical events led to the current unstable political situation in al-Shabaab's native Somalia, and the rise of a particular type of militant Islamist ideology. Somalia's civil war is over two decades old, and has been defined by the breakup of the country into a variety of locally-ruled territorial enclaves, and the onset of a deadly drought and famine forcing many to seek refuge in neighboring countries, including Kenya, and further afield.⁷⁷ The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) took control of the country in 2006, with al-Shabaab as their militant wing,⁷⁸ displacing the warlords and forming a fragile political unity based on an ideology of militant Islam. This nascent stability was welcomed by many Somalis, but not by Western nations, especially the United States who orchestrated the demise of the ICU by supporting an Ethiopian military invasion.⁷⁹ While a Transitional Federal Government was created and propped up with foreign aid and troops, al-Shabaab managed to take control of much of Somalia as well as the capital. During this time, "Mogadishu earned its reputation as the most dangerous city on earth. In a harbinger of the Islamic State's ambitions, al-Shabab administered territory, provided services, and levied taxes—none of which the Western-backed Somali government could manage."⁸⁰

Despite al-Shabaab's power being much reduced in recent years, it still managed to create international networks with similar terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda, and to attract a number of foreign fighters. In many ways, terrorist organizations work to better their own organizational practices, whether in terms of surveillance, internal communications, outreach to external markets and audiences, marketing and branding, or engaging in profit making through both legal and illegal means. As necessary sources of income, terrorist networks rely on a range of businesses and learn from the corporate model and its means of accumulation, production, and distribution.⁸¹ Employing a variety of methods, "terrorists and their abettors utilize existing traditional frameworks—such as companies and nonprofit entities—to raise funds, receive support, and integrate themselves into the community."⁸²

The encouragement of both material and imaginary global exchanges has had a variety of other consequences, and has simultaneously paved the way for global networks of terror to operate, communicate, spread, and converge. Globalized and diffuse corporate and terrorist networks capitalize on the same form of flexible organizational structures. Importation of global business practices is not just something that governments and corporations practice; terrorist networks and other forms of organized crime are also products of economic globalization and liberalization of international markets.⁸³ Even as terrorist networks disavow the corruption and trappings of Western modernity in many of their ideologies, they simultaneously emulate global capitalist ventures in their structure, commercial activities, and their use of technologies of warfare and digital communication.⁸⁴ Terrorist networks have learned from global capitalist networks and follow tried and tested business models to finance their operations. There are estimates that al-Shabaab's attack in Westgate Mall "cost the group 'close to \$100,000,' calculating the price of the automatic rifles, bullets and grenades that were used, along with training costs."⁸⁵ While this figure is speculative, it does pose interesting questions regarding the terrorist group's financial capabilities. There is further evidence of collaboration between corrupt elements in government and terrorist organizations, as they "build alliances with political leaders, financial institutions, law enforcement, foreign intelligence, and security agencies."⁸⁶ For example, many "reports from United Nations investigators have found Kenya's forces involved in an illicit charcoal trade from which the Shabab and local administrators shared revenues."⁸⁷

Increasingly, there is a blurring of clearly defined lines separating legal and illegal activities, and there are many actors who muddle the distinction and confuse any notion of the legitimate. In many instances, "connecting these converging threats are 'facilitators,' semi-legitimate players such as accountants, attorneys, notaries, bankers, and real estate brokers, who cross both the licit and illicit worlds and provide services to legitimate customers, criminals, and terrorists alike."⁸⁸ Criminal transnational "networks rely on industry experts, both witting and unwitting, to facilitate corrupt transactions and to create the necessary infrastructure to pursue their illicit schemes, such as creating shell corporations, opening offshore bank accounts in the shell corporation's name, and creating front businesses for their illegal activity and money laundering."⁸⁹ With Kalashnikov weapons, for example, produced "at the rate of a million a year,"

many of the weapons used by terrorists “are manufactured—legitimately, for international trade—in more than 30 countries, with China leading the way. But legal weapons can quickly become illicit contraband. China exports principally to African states. There, they can end up on the illicit market either because underpaid soldiers sell them on, or because states supply rebel forces in other countries.”⁹⁰

In its global business transactions, al-Shabaab is known to have “benefited from several different sources of income over the years, including revenue from other terrorist groups, state sponsors, the Somali diaspora, charities, piracy, kidnapping, and the extortion of local businesses,”⁹¹ as well as profits accrued from Somalia’s Kismayu port, which “not only accorded al-Shabaab regular income in terms of port fees and taxes but was the main export point of charcoal to the Middle East, which earned the group some \$25m a year.”⁹² While any figure related to terrorism profits and financing is difficult to calculate accurately because of the opaque and clandestine nature of many of these organizations, it does highlight how capitalism and terrorism are strange bedfellows, with one supposedly oppositional ideology morphing into the other—even as they denounce each other. The easing of border restrictions for the promotion of global trade has simultaneously contributed to the diffusion and globalization of a variety of legitimate and illicit networks of capitalism and terror.

Many of the profits made through international terrorist business networks are used to entice people in poor communities to join terrorist groups. Attraction to terrorist organizations is often, directly or indirectly, linked to poverty as well as “other factors that may cause support for terror, such as economic inequality or low levels of education,” rather than purely as a result of religious ideology.⁹³ For those who do join al-Shabaab, analysts report that “salaries of \$100-\$300 per month are offered, joining bonuses of \$400 are paid for the new recruits to hand to their families, and the family of a suicide bomber can receive ‘a couple of thousand’ dollars. This contrasts with a gross [Somali] national income per person of a mere \$107 per annum in 2011.”⁹⁴ Although al-Shabaab’s rhetoric is steeped in religious discourse, the assault on Westgate Mall was not simply religiously-motivated, and, from the outset, was also framed as a response to economic inequality among other social and political grievances.

By appealing to an anti-imperial consciousness, al-Shabaab has attempted to tap into a global network of ethnic Somalis and others who respond to the group’s rhetoric against past colonial injustices and con-

temporary neocolonial ones. Through divisive discourses, al-Shabaab attempts to encourage financial support from sympathizers to engage the media to circulate their ideological stance. In a worldwide campaign to attract supporters who share sentiments of exclusion and marginalization, al-Shabaab attempts to attract ethnic Somalis at home and abroad, including the large refugee population in Kenya as well as those further afield.⁹⁵

Al-Shabaab's reach and threats against targets all over the world, including the Mall of America, have become increasingly international. True to the tenets of global connectivities and the international movement of goods and people, the Mall of America is relevant to the Westgate Mall story, not only because it has often been heralded as the shopping mall par excellence, but also because "Minnesota is home to the biggest Somali population in the United States." These various international connections between Somalia and Minneapolis has meant that "Minnesota's population has proven to be a ripe recruiting ground for al-Shabab."⁹⁶ Indeed, "some of the young men who volunteered to fight in Somalia had grown up in the Cedar-Riverside neighborhood of Minneapolis, which is one of the poorest places in the United States" where Somali-American family incomes are low and unemployment rates are high.⁹⁷ As economic migrants become trapped within a global cycle of poverty, many of those who migrate from conditions of poverty or conflict in their homelands end up living in continued disadvantaged conditions far from home.

In order to attract global funding and recruits, al-Shabaab engages in global media campaigns, including one titled "Minnesota's Martyrs: The Path to Paradise," aimed at a Somali-American population.⁹⁸ In another promotional campaign, the group released a video, using Donald Trump as a reason to join the cause. "Citing 'historical injustices' against African-Americans, including police brutality and racial profiling, the video urged them to convert to Islam and engage in jihad at home or abroad."⁹⁹ In the communication war that arose during, and in the aftermath of the Westgate Mall attacks, some corporate and government-news networks retaliated to al-Shabaab's recruitment messages by initiating the "Outreach to Foreign Muslim Audiences" program on the Voice of America (VOA) channel.¹⁰⁰ Through similar forms of promotion, targeted members of the public have been subjected to a tug of war between the official anti-terror efforts and al-Shabaab's simultaneous recruitment campaigns to join its international network of terror.¹⁰¹

In order to “transnationalize” itself,¹⁰² al-Shabaab has positioned itself as a globally-identifiable brand by attracting international funding and foreign recruits, pledging allegiances to al-Qaeda and to the Islamic State as an extension of its franchise, and maintaining international connections with other like-minded terrorist networks.¹⁰³ Ironically, however, even as they benefit from globalizing practices, and modern technologies, groups like al-Shabaab simultaneously appeal to an anti-imperial consciousness in order to tap into an international network of sympathizers. Their message of rectifying past colonial injustices and fighting against contemporary neoliberal grievances that are progressively inequitable, unbalanced, and exploitative is delivered through information and communication technologies with a significant and often sophisticated know-how.¹⁰⁴

Extremist organizations often heed the rules of marketing and publicity, even utilizing the same language and terminologies to address their audiences as “consumers,” and to publicize their “brand.”¹⁰⁵ The language and logic of capitalist practice has entered into the casual everyday speech of its alleged opposite. The infiltration of corporate language into everyday terrorist practice helps to highlight the porous boundaries between the ideologies of terrorism and capitalism, and debunks their supposed mutual exclusivity. The twin phenomena of capitalism and terrorism cannot always be separated, and just as the inequalities exacerbated by capitalism are addressed by a violent militant response, so too do terrorists use the very mechanisms of the capitalism they seek to destroy.¹⁰⁶

Westgate Mall provided a space in which al-Shabaab terrorists traversed this discursive separation to not only do harm to people and property, but to damage an imagined community of consumption even as they engaged with it. The importance of malls to the global circulation of corporate culture and their centrality to the contemporary urban experience means that they have inevitably become both icon and beacon: icon of consumption for some and beacon for disgruntlement for others. Despite the hostility of the attack on Westgate, al-Shabaab was enticed by the idea of the shopping mall as a target, and became caught somewhere in between these coinciding elements of attraction and aversion.

In cities marked by ever increasing hostilities, security-oriented “shopping centres have filled a void to become one-stop-shops for those who yearn to feel ‘safe.’”¹⁰⁷ In these gated communities, there is an “intensely privatized and quasi-anarchic vision of urban growth,”¹⁰⁸ in which privatized living and shopping complexes are coming under an increasingly mil-

itant security paradigm. In many areas, it becomes impossible for some people to access certain parts of the city, escalating proactive and reactive fears and animosities. Those marginalized by neoliberal economic policies are exploited, and even at times recruited, by terrorist groups, making the gap between affluence and impoverishment a space for justifying the many violent activities on both sides of the class divide—to secure or to contest. Westgate Mall accommodated the multidirectional flows of global exchanges with a mix of imported goods and terrorist attacks. In this sense, the space of Westgate Mall “is not just phenomenological, rooted in the presence, memory, or anticipation of dwelling. It is not just semiotic, based in the interrelation of legible signifiers. And it is not just the result of systems of social exchange, produced by flows of capital and labour. It is all of these.”¹⁰⁹

In order to explore some of these intersecting issues, the next chapter examines the evolutionary trends of shopping mall design, and how these have been adopted all over the world. It emphasizes the initial construction and design of mall space as dictated by the imperative to encourage a culture of increased consumption, then returns to Nairobi’s Westgate as a way of measuring the degree to which twenty-first century African urban space imported and embedded a capital consumption ideal that nonetheless fed a violent anti-capital response.