

dience itself, who may be driven by factors that might have nothing to do with the move of the securitising actor.

Furthermore, following the Copenhagen School, which assumes that, by building on *the grammar of security's* linguistic framework and universal set of rules, each social sphere produces its own different 'security dialects,' the present study assumes in the context of the Trusteeship System a predominance of a 'colonial dialect,' whose adoption facilitates securitising moves rather than an 'anti-colonial dialect'. It is held, that to be heard vis-à-vis the dominance of liberal ideology, securitising actors must "use appropriate words and cogent frames of reference,"<sup>91</sup> or in other words: "to tune his/her language to the audience's experience"<sup>92</sup> by adopting specific conceptual vocabulary concurrent with Western thought and language to rework securitising attempts. Jane Cowan's analysis of the *violent-language-rule* of the League's minority regime provides an insightful example.<sup>93</sup> In the aftermath of World War I, Cowan explores how League diplomats, committed to world peace, instituted a diplomatic code that prioritized politeness and indirect language, barring what they deemed as "violent language." Applied to the theoretical framework used here, the prohibition of "violent language" restricted the use of vocabulary typically used in securitising speech acts and prevented petitions directed against colonial grievances from reaching the public, as they had to be toned down to conform to prescribed language norms.

### 3.2 Paris School

Within Critical Security Studies, the so-called Paris School is more sociologically grounded than the Copenhagen School. The Paris School draws primarily from post-structuralist approaches, particularly from concepts of French sociologists such as Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault. In contrast to the Copenhagen School, the Paris School does not emphasize extraordinary measures but, beyond the study of official speech acts, focusses on ordinary routines, bureaucracies of security,<sup>94</sup> and the power/knowledge processes that unfold within them.<sup>95</sup> Criticizing the Copenhagen School, Paris School scholars, such as Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala, maintain that the social and political consequences of security are not due to a single actor's speech act, but to a multitude of actors within a Bourdieu-inspired field of (in)security from completely different professional logics.<sup>96</sup> It is not the individual speech act that is of interest, but

91 Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization," p. 192.

92 Ezeokafor and Kaunert, "Securitization outside of the West," p. 87.

93 Cowan, "Who's Afraid of Violent Language?"

94 Didier Bigo, "When Two Become One," in *International relations theory and the politics of European integration: Power, security, and community*, ed. Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams (London: Routledge, 2000); Didier Bigo, "Security and Immigration," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27, Special Issue (2002): 73, <https://doi.org/10.1177/03043754020270S105>.

95 Aradau, "From securitization theory to critical approaches to (in)security," p. 302.

96 Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984); Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and symbolic power*, ed. John B. Thompson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala, *Terror, insecurity and liberty:*

rather the complex social practice, which it represents. The result, taking up a concept by Deleuze, is an “(in)security assemblage,”<sup>97</sup> that is, a new ensemble of practices, applications, and technologies of security, which in turn give rise to a new space for action. Such a reading is conceptualized by Christopher Daase as “security culture.”<sup>98</sup>

Consequently, Bigo holds from this perspective that “securitization results from power positions,”<sup>99</sup> including non-discursive practices. Thus, from the Paris School’s perspective, securitisation can be discursive as well as non-discursive, intentional, and non-intentional, and performative. Since the Paris School does without an audience that grants extraordinary measures, its representatives speak rather of *insecuritisation*.<sup>100</sup> Drawing from Foucault’s governmentality, and especially his security *dispositif*, insecuritisation is not conceived as a state of exception or developed from a logic of the exceptional or the extraordinary, but as the normal state of a liberal society. Security practices are practices of normalization.<sup>101</sup> Thus, police practices, surveillance technologies and human rights discourses, in short, the whole contextual range of security routines are important to understand processes of *insecuritisation*.

Due to the exclusion of the audience Copenhagen School scholars repudiated that “one cannot make the actors of securitization the fixed point of analysis.”<sup>102</sup> Although at first glance the opposition between exceptionality and routine seems irreconcilable, there are fruitful overlaps between the Paris and Copenhagen School. For example, Balzacq’s discussion on the importance of context has found its way into the Copenhagen School, as well as the Bourdieu-inspired terminology of symbolic, social, or cultural capital of the securitising actor.<sup>103</sup> Balzacq sees the performative dimension of security, understood as situated acts that mediate the habitus of the actor, as important for the process of securitisation.<sup>104</sup>

A core tenet of the Paris School is that security discourses and practices can diverge: Security practices in the form of routines or bureaucratic acts can create insecurity even if they are not publicly designated as such.<sup>105</sup> It is argued that when security professionals go about their *métier*, insecurity is inevitably created, just like the dictum ‘When you are holding a hammer, everything looks like a nail.’ Accordingly, security professionals constantly reproduce the insecurities they aspire to eliminate. Insecuritisation is seen

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*Illiberal practices of liberal regimes after 9/11*, Routledge studies in liberty and security (London, New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 5.

- 97 George F. McHendry, “The politics and poetics of airport (in)security rhetoric: Materialism, affect, and the Transportation Security Administration” (Dissertation, Department of Communication, University of Utah, 2013), available from <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/276265588.pdf>.
- 98 Christopher Daase, “Sicherheitskultur,” *Sicherheit und Frieden* 29, no. 2 (2011)
- 99 Bigo, “Security and Immigration,” p. 74.
- 100 Côté, “Agents without agency,” p. 549.
- 101 Conze, *Geschichte der Sicherheit*, p. 104.
- 102 Buzan, Wæver and Wilde, *Security*, p. 30.
- 103 Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization,” p. 191.
- 104 Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization,” pp. 187–90.
- 105 Thierry Balzacq, ed., *How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve* (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 2; Karine Côté-Boucher, Federica Infantino, and Mark B. Salter, “Border Security as Practice: An Agenda for Research,” *Security Dialogue* 45, no. 3 (2014), <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010614533243>