

elite could participate in manipulating the masses for mobilisation. As such, mobilisation could only occur with the tools available or via methods that would compensate for the tools unavailable, such as the necessary economic and political institutions. Using compensatory tools often meant the uniqueness of the people themselves – characteristics they regarded as distinguishing themselves from others. The peripheral elites had no option but to try and satisfy such demands by taking things into their own hands. Elite manipulation then served to crystallise mass discontent.

At every step, the relationship of Pakistani nationalism to Kashmiri nationalism is that of repressed existential envy and negativity. As it is, nationalisms born out of reaction are marked by profound ambiguity and ambivalence. This forced relation also meant that the elite group had to fit their social character in a desired social form to make their involvement natural and legitimate. This required mobilising the masses to meet a narrative, not just their demands. Just as they needed a shortcut toward a high culture, they also needed a shortcut to a history that would legitimise this nationalism. Forcing this process of development and creating a high culture and history due to necessity suggests that the role of the elite in more ethnic-oriented nationalisms was more conscious and manipulative. This further indicates a requirement to rise above the law, which is why ethnic nationalism is seen to sometimes act as a bulwark to liberal democracy and lend itself more readily to authoritarian rule.

Pakistan's Irredential Claim and Kashmiri Nationalism

This section focuses on how Pakistan's Kashmir policy works as an external factor for Kashmiri nationalism. The policy is primarily embedded in the context of negative imagery. The basis of Pakistani nationalism was never territorial; rather, it emerged from community separatism and religiously derived nationality. The proponents of Pakistan neither occupied the land they demanded nor had ever lived together in the past. At the time of the formation of the Pakistani state, the state power was re-

tained by the one dominant ethnic group – Punjabis. Khan (2001) notes that the issue became a source of trouble as the control of the state apparatus and institutions was in the hands of a single ethnic group. This ethnic group used the institutions for their political leverage.

In a way, national identity was imposed from above, and it did not emerge as a horizontal comradeship that could cut across boundaries and social groups and penetrate with varying degrees of consciousness. Thus, national identity is superimposed by religious identity and makes way for Islam to project its relationship to the state. Akhtar (2007) notes that due to the chaos of partition and the more significant need to protect the state's territorial integrity, Islam came to occupy centrality in the Pakistani state. The ideological orientation of the new state was challenged constantly over the accession of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, which had not followed partition logic. The centrality of this contentious relationship is maintained by forging an idea of a nation through a web of emotional, familial, and political ties. Thus, all the political actors, from conservatives to liberals, have placed a claim and strategy to claim Kashmir.

The conservative Islamists have opted for a combative approach to staking their claim to Kashmir, while the liberals have followed a mainly managerial position. Yasmeen (2003) notes that the Pakistani government has balanced various constituencies in Kashmir. They operate in an international environment that identifies terrorism as a significant global threat, which led to a changed policy position in Kashmir. The Pakistani government curbs the activities of Islamists in Kashmir.

The changed Kashmir policy marked a paramount change in Pakistan's position on Kashmir. The state had tried to alter the status quo during the Cold War era. Traditionally, three positions determined Pakistan's involvement in Kashmir: orthodox, the Islamists, and the moderate. The moderate positions have mainly prevailed in the balance of power. They were urging for a change in the foreign policy through a political rather than a military solution. Yasmeen (1995) thinks the Kashmir issue is rooted in a negative context. The military control over the Kashmir policy resulted in the predominance of the efficacy of Jihad and the policy of encouraging and actively using Jihad in anti-India militancy.

These groups had acquired some experience in the Afghan war. This resulted in the triangulation of Jihad policy by making Jihadis stakeholders in the Kashmir policy. Gul (2002) writes that some of the madrassas in Pakistan with close links to the Taliban became the supplier of the Jihadis. As the cross-border movement drew criticism, the Pakistani state constantly denied these accusations by reinforcing that it was only providing political, diplomatic, and moral support to Kashmir. Yasmeen. S (2003) points out that the Pakistan foreign office maintained that it was helping the Kashmiris to make a demand for a referendum by urging the international community to resolve the Kashmir dispute. The democratic leadership was not a mute spectator to the Kashmir policy predominantly formulated by the military and exploited Kashmir for their interests. They also repeatedly used the Kashmir issue to divert away the domestic policy issues.

The support for militancy to alter the status quo came under global scrutiny in the second half of the 1990s. The perception of the Indian state about Pakistan being a weak state also impacted the Kashmir policy. The ousting of Benazir Bhutto as the prime minister of Pakistan and the coming back of Nawaz Sharif opened the space for implementing the moderate agenda. The moderates figured out that the Kashmir policy needed a change, and there should be a reduction in the tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. However, the nuclear tests followed by Kargil derailed the process. Hence, the military administration opted for invariably managing Kashmir in 2000; Pakistan pushed for a unilateral ceasefire, expressing a strong will to engage in Kashmir. The change of positions was evident in government actions and pronouncements on Kashmir. For example, regarding the Kashmir solidarity on 5th February 2002, Musharraf repeated Pakistan's resolve to assist Kashmir in diplomatic and political ways.² It was asserted that Pakistan's willingness to negotiate should not be considered a weakness. Farooq (2001) and Malhotra (2001) elucidate that Pakistani foreign policy is a political process that seeks to resolve the freedom struggle by political means. This policy change was visible in the Pakistani approach during the Agra

² Vajpayee must show courage: Musharraf, The News, 6 February 2001.

summit, where Pakistanis gave up their rigid insistence on the Kashmir dispute.

After 9/11, the context for Pakistan's Kashmir policy. As Islamabad opted to join the United States-led s-r on terror, the garrison is intelligence sharing with America.

The changed political milieu also impacted Pakistan's Kashmir policy. Pakistan's support for Kashmiris could be perceived as a confirmation of its credentials as a state supporting terrorism. This made the Pakistani government more watchful of its Kashmir policy, thus replacing the military solution with a political solution. In an address to the nation in 2002, Musharraf categorically maintained that the support for Kashmir wouldn't be severed. Political and diplomatic support would flow towards it. He made an appeal for involving the international community in the resolution of Kashmir and also announced measures to restrain the Jihadis and banned organisations like Laskhar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad. However, groups like Harkat-ul-Ansar, Hizbul Mujahideen and Al-Badr were not disbanded as these groups were indigenous Kashmiri groups. The speech indicated a significant transfer of the Pakistani position in Kashmir. The Pakistani state intelligently modified its strategy but did not directly forsake its claim on Kashmir. Officially, a clear-cut distinction was made between genuine freedom struggle and acts of terrorism. Akhtar (2011) reproduces that in a UN session, Musharraf stated that the struggles of the people for self-determination cannot be banned law in the name of terrorism. The leadership in Pakistan realised that it was essential to bring out some discernible change in its Kashmir policy so that Pakistan's stance on Kashmir remains unchanged and also the international pressures are deflated.

In the context of Kashmir, General Musharraf repeatedly requested the international community to intervene and pressurise India to settle the Kashmir issue. In the aftermath of the parliamentary attacks in 2002, the pressures increased dramatically, and Pakistan had to reduce its involvement in providing diplomatic, political, and moral support. The crackdown after 9/11 had substantially expunged the foreign militants and drastically reduced the finances, too. Pattnaik (2008) notes that

the efforts towards re-approachment with India have saved Pakistan's reputation from further fall.

As a part of the changed strategy, militant organisations were subservient to political organisations. To evade international scrutiny, it was essential to engage through the political medium, and pro-Pakistan militant organisations were effectively utilised for this purpose. As part of the changed strategy, Jamaat-e-Islami and Hizbul Mujahideen went on to support the formation of the political party called the People's Democratic Party. A new political formation would challenge the primary political party, the National Conference. As a political party, NC embodied Kashmiri nationalism, even though it took a volte-face position in 1975.

Nonetheless, it tried to retain some commitment to Kashmiri nationalism. On the other hand, the People's Democratic Party used ethnic religious motifs instead of civic ones. It can be observed that the ethnic-religious lobby within the state, which earlier espoused a pro-Pakistan religious approach, moved strategically towards a political party based on ethnic contours.

The new political formation was carved so that it did not appear distant from the Kashmiri separatist position, at least theoretically. Borrowing heavily from the separatist stance, it blurred the boundaries between the separatist and mainstream discourse. Chaudhry and Rao (2004) write that the formation of the People's Democratic Party has to be located in the larger political context. The political context was to encourage an articulation of political grievances through a non-separatist channel. It was a step towards democratisation and curtailing the relevance of the National Conference.

Another reason for Jamaat-e-Islami's support of the People's Democratic Party was the patronage of the National Conference provided to a pro-government militia called Ikhwan. Ikhwan, in particular, targeted the Jamaat cadre and ground workers of Hizbul Mujahideen. It was paid for and supported by mainstream security agencies. Ikhwan became entirely instrumental in suppressing militancy but also became infamous

for targeting Jamaat-e-Islami ruthlessly.³ So, forming a political party that could deal with Ikhwan was necessary. The newly formed party was the People's Democratic Party. Wani (2004) opines that there was a viable political gap that Mufti Muhammad Sayed decided to fill up. Hence, he formed the People's Democratic Party. It should also be pointed out that the formation of the PDP coincided with a change in central policy over Kashmir.

The election manifesto of the People's Democratic Party (2001) focused on three main issues, namely, safeguarding the life and property of the people from the Ikhwan, restoring peace by persuading the central government to initiate a dialogue process with Pakistan and the militants, for which opening the roads between two parts of Kashmir would act as a prelude, providing a fillip to the economy and providing a source of assured livelihood to each family. Maqbool (2016) notes that the party aimed to mobilise public opinion to bridge various strains of opinion in the state and the country. It aimed to engage with all stakeholders and resolve the people's grievances through constitutional means, like restoring and protecting human rights. Thus, the formation of the People's Democratic Party made the militant structures subservient and provided an option for opposition in Kashmir.

Another major strategic policy shift in the aftermath of 9/11 is visible in Musharraf's out-of-the-box solution for ending the dispute. The idea involved partial stepping back of all parties—Pakistan, India and Kashmiris to an extent. Musharraf (2008:89) envisaged "identifying the geographic regions of Kashmir that need resolution—second, demilitarising to the identified and curbing all militant aspects of the struggle for freedom and third, introducing self-governance or self-rule in the identified region or regions. Fourth, and most important, having a joint management mechanism with a membership consisting of Pakistanis, Indians, and Kashmiris overseeing self-governance and dealing with resid-

3 Jamaat-e-Islami and Hizbul Mujahideen targeted the cadre of other militant organization brutally during the 1990s over the slightest political difference. Many of the militants were killed through this rivalry. To safeguard ones interest many defected towards Ikhwan after its formation in 1995.

ual subjects common to all identified regions and those subjects that are beyond the scope of self-governance".

However, like other Pakistani policy positions on Kashmir, this position was also subtly targeting Kashmiri civic nationalism. It surrendered the right of self-determination for Kashmiris and divided the state on a regional, linguistic, and racial basis. The people-to-person contact, softening of borders, and easing travel formalities were a diplomatic way of converting the line of control to a permanent border and separating the two parts of Kashmir. Kashmiri nationalists rejected the move. Secondly, Musharraf's proposal was implemented in consultation with stakeholders. The formula envisaged that the area should be de-militarized and there should be movement from one part of Kashmir to another. But at the same time, it also says borders cannot be withdrawn, which is akin to making the line of control into an international border. Secondly, self-government here clashed with self-determination. If the self has the right to govern, how could the notion of self-determination be negated? The joint management system would only give endless powers to the external rulers.

Conclusion

The external factors contribute in both negative and positive ways to the Kashmiri nationalism. As an external factor, the Kashmiri diaspora represents pursuing a culturally diverse political territory. Attainment of a state functions as a starting point for civic nationalism, so the diaspora intervenes in exciting ways to imagine and reinforce the idea of a state. The Kashmiri diaspora promotes the ideals of territoriality, citizenship, civic rights, and legal codes. Through its interaction with modernity, it eliminates cultural cleavages for the formation of a unified culture. It endorses a welfarist culture that emerges and is nourished by factors such as advanced communication and education. In a way, it negates all the primordial affinities and claims commonality on non-genealogical variables.