

military overthrow of the state. Thus, one can say that the military and political struggles were not waged distinctly but in alliance. The outbreak of militant nationalism was not sudden but rather a gradual culmination of demands expressed in political form earlier. The absence of democracy, deep political mobilisation, and the growth of modern education and the press further channelled the grievances into a vocabulary of nationalism.

One can broadly assume that over the years, these central themes pointed out earlier constantly reinforce Kashmiri nationalism — fear of the other, religious identity, and loss of autonomy. The study uses 1989 as an entry point to delineate the nature and emerging aspects of Kashmiri nationalism.

Conceptual Definitions

Nationalism and its Typology

Nationalism is a political belief that people representing a natural community should live under one political system. The underlying question is what classifies a natural community: was the natural community invented, or was there a preexistence of nations? Additionally, today, what is the relation of nations and nationalism to modernity? The position taken by the perennialists and primordialists reflects whether it is natural or not; nations have been there for a long. The features of a nation, whether symbolic or mythical, pre-date the living memory of its members. The second position by modernists is that nations have emerged within a modern context and are created cosmetically. Schleiermacher (2004) and Fichte (1808) are the primary theorists who based their arguments on the primordial/perennial grounds where nations are an ancient and natural phenomenon. As the nation is immemorial, national forms may change, age and particular nations may dissolve, but the identity of a nation remains the same. Fichte (1808) advocated for the earthly fatherland and based his claim on ethnic-genealogical and cultural-linguistic elements.

The second set of understanding is the rational liberal understanding, which was shaped prominently by the ideas of Hans Kohn (1961), Elie Kedourie (1966), and Isaiah Berlin (1979). Their main argument rests on the premise that nationalism developed in response to the intellectual and political crisis during the Enlightenment. In this sense, nationalism is a unit bound together, and the group is looking forward to the highest organised activity, forming a sovereign state. As attaining sovereignty might take time, it satisfies itself with some form of autonomy or pre-state organisation but eventually would rest on sovereignty. However, this sovereignty operates on a dual principle of empathy towards fellow members of the nationality. Still, it is marked with indifference and distrust/hate for members and outlook within the nations and by the crystallisation of will. This aspect generated a debate and set a precedent for Benedict Anderson, Anthony Smith, and Ernst Gellner.

Modernists perceived nations as modern social constructs that emerged with increased communication and the growth of contemporary social and political processes such as capitalism, industrialism, state bureaucratisation, secularism, and urbanisation. So, nations became territorial political communities that constituted the chief political bond and overtook other formative allegiances. Gellner (1983) intervened in the debate by understanding nationalism as a peculiarly contemporary phenomenon with dual structural connections between society and the modern capitalist economy. He envisioned nationalism as imposing a high culture on society, replacing local low culture. Anderson (2006) maintains that the nation is an imagined political community because its members will never know of their fellow members, meet them, or hear of them. Yet, they all share a sense of communion and horizontal comradeship. It also has a finite character because beyond a nation are other nations. Hobsbawm (1990) sees nations as a result of the recent historic process. Hobsbawm agrees with Gellner in the invented notion of nations and writes nations are inventions both in their culture and form. A creative method of selection and composition of the past is designed, and then the symbols take a different significance through modern rituals and institutional forms that arise with industrialisation. As a Marxist, Hobsbawm links the political invention of the nation to

the needs of capitalism and the rising bourgeoisie seeking hegemony on coming into competition with old established groups and religious beliefs.

Another discourse around the study of nationalism is the marked differences between the rise of nationalism in the Western and the non-Western world. This idea of difference was given by Meinecke (1907), who differentiated between the *Staatsnation* and *Kulturnation*. The former was based on cultural similarity, while the latter was based on the unity of common political history and constitution. Kohn (1961) reworked the idea of two types of nationalism – civic and ethnic. He details how nationalism in the West emerged as a predominantly political occurrence. In non-Western societies, it grew as a protest against and in conflict with the existing state pattern- primarily to redraw the political boundaries in conformity with the ethnographic demands and found expression in the cultural field. Western nationalism originated with the concepts of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism; in Eastern/central Europe and the Asian contexts, it pitched on the natural fact of the community and sentiments held together not by will but by traditional ties.

There also exists an understanding that the nature of nationalism in developing countries differs from that of Western countries. One approach to studying nationalism can be viewing the concept in the background of colonial rule. Nationalism can be a product of a reaction of colonised people against their colonial masters. Chatterjee (1986) and Nandy (1994) agree that nationalism is essentially a Western construct. However, there is a lot of variation when the concept travels to non-western societies. Chatterjee (1986) explains that nationalism in Africa and Asia emerged to escape European domination yet could not be distant from it. However, anti-colonial nationalism creates its sphere of influence well before it begins its contestation with the other. It divides society into two categories: spiritual. The material involves science, technology, and economy, while spirituality is the inner sanctum of culture. Nandy (1994) argues that colonialism cannot express itself only through economic and political variables. Its impact on the sphere of psychology is more lasting.

The study of ethnic nationalism in South Asia has taken two prominent trajectories – the state-centred nationalist and ethnic-nationalist projects. Brass (1991) explains that one of the shortcomings of the theory of ethnic groups is that it reifies the classes or the ethnic groups. He proposes that the state is an institution where elites are engaged in a conflict to access greater power. The groups compete to establish their rule to control resources and legitimacy. Since the state is a resource and distributor of resources, it can provide a political formula for differing claims. On the other hand, the ethnic-nationalist claim is the outcome of the shortcomings or failure of the state-centred project. Oommen (1997) elucidates that the heightened ethnic consciousness of an ethnic group combined with territorial and language dimensions forms the cornerstone of the separate state formation.

Political Dimensions of Kashmiri Nationalism

Rai (2004) and Zutshi (2004) locate the Kashmiri political and national identity before 1947. Rai's account links colonial history to the present and dissects the role of religion and secularism in the Kashmir conflict. Her primary concern remains to examine how the Dogra Maharajas used the Hindu religion to stake a claim to authority and ensure legitimacy. Adding a new dimension to the study of the Kashmir conflict, her work documents the arbitrary rule of Dogra princes and how the formerly utilised services of Kashmiri Pandits and Punjabi Hindus as their allies. On the other hand, Zutshi notes that Kashmir could have been politically dormant had the Indian and Pakistani states accommodated Kashmir's regional aspirations. Instead, Kashmir became a confrontative emblem between their competing nationalist imaginations.

Bose (2003) argues that the Kashmir crisis might have originated in partition, but other factors combined to continue the conflict. The non-existence of democracy and the militant movement became factors other than the complex regional, linguistic, and religious causalities. Ganguly (1996) and Behera (2000) explore how existing political institutions have shaped the Kashmir conflict. Ganguly (1996) explains that the 1989 insurgency resulted from the profoundly paradoxical exercise engaged by the

Indian nation-state since 1989. The effort was on one side to entice the Muslims of Kashmir into fuller integration into the Indian Union by providing them with every effort for political education and mobilisation, but on the other hand, perceiving the separatist threats, damping down the institutions that engendered popular political participation in Kashmir. The apparent result was institutional decay that left no other way than political violence to show their discontent. He argues that social mobilisation and consequently increased political participation, unless accompanied by robust political institutions, becomes a reason for political instability. Behera (2000) aptly asserts that the logic of the modern nation-state that recognises a nation's demographically compact form is problematic for pluralistic societies like India. She contends that the self-assertion of a formerly non-dominant identity becomes inherently a site for violence. She reminds us how the balance between competing nationalisms was maintained legally and constitutionally by the Delhi agreement, Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. However, the breakdown of this framework occurred when the Indian state imposed itself on the Kashmiri people through legal integrationist measures by abolishing the legal and political space. Over the years, the claims for autonomy grew into claims for Azadi.

Varshney (1991:999) writes that at the core, the Kashmir problem is the result of three forces – religious nationalism represented by Pakistan, secular nationalism represented by India, and ethnic nationalism (Kashmiriyat) embodied by Kashmiris. He chooses to pit the contesting nationalisms in Kashmir in different phases. Phase one covers 1947–1953, suggesting ambiguity; the second phase marks shrinking religious nationalism favouring secular nationalism during 1953–1983. Phase three characterises diminishing secular nationalism and the resurgence of Islam to Kashmiri nationalism from 1983 to 1991. Aggarwal (2008:227) remarks that nearly all political actors evoke Kashmiriyat. Kashmiriyat is an abstract noun that signifies “origin or affiliation” to Kashmir, referring to the ethos of being Kashmiri. However, little agreement exists over the precision of the term”. Kashmiriyat refers to the class of terms known as empty signifiers, which have been prevalent in Indian politics for at least a century.

Militant Dimensions of Kashmiri Nationalism

Sikand (2007) notes that the appearance of radical Islamist groups added a new dimension to the ongoing conflict in the region. It made India, Pakistan, and Kashmiris equal stakeholders in the conflict. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) initiated an uprising against Indian rule in 1989. However, by the 1990s, the JKLF had been pulled off by Pakistan-based Islamist groups.

Puri (1995) argues the initial mishandling of the situation by Indian forces, with their ruthless and tactless repression, led to a mass uprising, including by sections of government employees and the police force. Firing at the funeral procession of a political leader, Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq, can be seen as one such instance. A political leadership, which for some years was waiting for such an opportunity, seized it. The most organised militant outfit was the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), headed by Amanullah Khan in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Yasin Malik was its leader on the Indian side of the Line of Control. Gradually, every separatist political leader formed a separate militant outfit, which could bank on armed support from across the LoC. Finally, Hizbul Mujahideen, an outfit sponsored by Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence, emerged as the strongest. The various separatist organisations formed a loose political alliance under the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC). It became a kind of conglomerate of all secessionist parties. The mass militancy could not be maintained for too long. The expectations raised by it proved illusory. As pro-Azadi (nationalist) militants were replaced and, in some cases, eliminated by pro-Pakistan militants, the Kashmiri nationalists were alienated. Yet, as alienation from India increased, the militancy survived with massive popular support. The militant phase in Kashmir, without the active involvement of the people, continued through various ups and downs till it reached a point where it became no longer dependent on local political backing.

Schofield (2003) writes that by 1989, several militant groups had begun to function in the valley. They were spread around the major towns of Srinagar, Anantnag, Baramulla, and Sopore, and their objectives remained either complete independence or unification with Pakistan.

The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, led within the Valley, was the most prominent, and its aim was fighting for an independent state of Jammu and Kashmir. Some political parties who were part of the Muslim United Front had formed militant wings.

Definition, Rationale, and Scope of the Study

Since most of the literature on Kashmir is security-centric, which understands Kashmir in the context of the rivalry between India and Pakistan or looks at conflict resolution, there is a gap in terms of understanding the changes and continuities in Kashmiri nationalism.

The political elite invokes nationalism in civic or ethnic form as a political assertion of group identity. The political elite uses nationalism to replace some previously dominant cultural groups and create a new one. Theoretically, the route toward nationalism takes two ways: pursuing national identity through the formation of the nation-state or exercising national identity through invoking the shared commonality of religion, language, race, etc. This thesis does not seek to reject these routes to nationalism but instead shows that nationalism does not emerge without the intervention of the other variables. Core elements of both forms are used interchangeably to fulfil the goals of nationalism. For example, civic nationalism shares shared values, myths, and symbols, mainly if there is no principal territorial or population base from which they can establish a political community.

Similarly, ethnic nationalism imagines itself within a state. The idea of a demarcated territory for an ethnic base takes a lot from civic nationalism. Therefore, the categorisations are borrowed from each other. The mobilisation of the ethnicities forges the resurgence of ethnic nationalism. Re-defining and re-educating the ethnic intellectuals politicise culture and are constantly involved in the production of the 'other' and the 'outsider' within. One also needs to understand the possibility of the emergence of multiple narratives from margins. The counter-narratives that emerge from the margins continuously evoke and erase the nation's boundaries and also late the ideological support through which the demand for the country is essentialised.

Kashmir becomes an exciting ground for understanding the juxtaposition of various forces. Since the formation of Kashmiri nationalism precedes the formation of the nation-state or the accession, this study focuses on the changing meanings, interpretations, and perceptions of Kashmiri nationalism. Also, to bridge theoretical and practical perspectives, this study unpacks Kashmiri nationalism and its central dilemma of not being equated with or within any global movement of terrorism.

The study's rationale understands Kashmiri nationalism's essence and the forms it assumes. Moreover, minimal comprehensive studies on Kashmiri nationalism have explored its dimensions, actors, trends, successes, limitations, failures, etc. The research agenda remains exciting as it would inform and expand our knowledge about Kashmiri nationalism's moderate and militant dimensions.

The scope of the study is not only limited to Kashmir, but it also informs and expands the theoretical base to nationalism studies, locating its structural fault lines. The study covers the period from the beginning of militancy in 1989 to 2016. However, the study provides a historical overview as Kashmiri nationalism cannot be studied without examining the creation of Kashmiri identity through centuries. This study ended in 2016 when a unique political formulation between the PDP and BJP alliance government came to power in Jammu and Kashmir after the BJP won an unprecedented 25 seats in the state assembly elections.

The study's main objective is to understand the internal contestations within Kashmiri nationalism. It analyses the changes in form, meaning, and conceptualisation and tries to understand the growth of Hindu nationalism in Jammu and its impact on Kashmiri nationalism.

The significant questions this research looks at are how self does/other contestation play a role in the conception and sustenance of Kashmiri nationalism. How do religious symbols provide a moral vocabulary for Kashmir nationalism, and how is the goal of nationalism recalled, recognised, localised, and reconstructed through commemorative practices? How is collective memory used to foreground a counter-memory, and how does the performing of nationalism provide visions of nationhood and possible strategies of cohesion and resistance? How

do symbols and concepts become a powerful source of inspiration and legitimate the struggle for political identity?

Hypotheses and Methodology

The research questions are answered by testing the following hypotheses.

- The first is Kashmiri nationalism, essentially a contestation of 'self' and 'other'.
- The second one is the weakness of democratic institutions, which has created social categories for the distribution of patronage, resulting in chasms based on ethnicity, religion, and region.

This work utilises primary as well as secondary sources to test the hypotheses. Data from existing literature, such as books, research articles, and news articles from different magazines and internet sites, has been collected. Primary sources are also used extensively, including the published material of various Kashmiri political organisations, personal diaries, observer accounts, posters, unpublished documents, and memoirs. The researcher's knowledge of Urdu and Kashmiri languages enabled the use of books and newspapers from these languages.

The thesis was compiled after elaborate fieldwork in Kashmir from April to July 2017, including a field trip to Jammu in December 2017. In addition to using the available material in local libraries, interviews were conducted with various political actors, analysts, journalists, and scholars. The interviews were primarily narrative-based, without a specific questionnaire, allowing the interviewee to speak without inhibitions. The interviewees were chosen through snowball sampling, where they introduced me to their acquaintances, and the circle grew.