Erdem Üngür

Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium
eungur@ulb.ac.be

Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery: Towards a Therapeutic Forgetting

Abstract

Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery (*Edirnekapı Şehitliği*, 1926), which is located in one of the oldest and largest cemeteries of Istanbul, contains the graves of mainly Muslim soldiers who died during the Balkan War and WWI, especially those wounded in the Çanakkale War (Gallipoli Campaign), which is considered the forerunner of the Turkish War of Independence (*Kurtuluş Savaşı*, 1919–1923) and one of the influential founding myths of the Turkish Republic. The soldiers who have lost their lives in the war against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) since the end of the 1980s are also buried here, creating a continuum of historical enemies. In addition, civilians killed during the 15 July coup attempt in 2016 are buried in a separate section next to the Edirnekapı Cemetery, adding another internal enemy – the Gülen Movement – to the official history. The physical correspondence of this mnemonical expansion is also visible in the expansion of the cemetery area, which has been gradually transformed into a public transportation hub since 2008. This article examines how the cemetery reproduces the myth of martyrdom and shapes the social frameworks of memory in favour of nationalism on the D-100 highway. The intersectionality of collective memory and urban infrastructure is analysed through the history and spatial formation of the cemetery, as a part of the greater mnemonic constellation on the D-100 highway.

Keywords: martyrdom, collective memory, banal nationalism, infrastructure, spatial mnemonics

1. Introduction

The D-100 highway in Istanbul is not just a modern transportation infrastructure, it is also a cemetery axis, which takes you through the necropolis of the city. The extramural cemeteries of the Historical Peninsula and the cemeteries at the edge of twentieth-century Pera have been bordered or fragmented by the D-100 highway since the 1970s. On this axis, in addition to the civilian Muslim, Christian, and Jewish cemeteries, there are also 'monuments' commemorating specific figures and events of the Turkish modernisation and nationalisation process, which are directly linked with the concept of martyrdom. A *metrobüs* passenger travelling from the Asian to the European side on the D-100 highway will sequentially encounter the following spatial arrangements[1]: the 15 July Maqam of Martyrs (*15 Temmuz Şehitler Makamı*), Bosphorus

1 The BRT (Bus Rapid Transit) system known as the *metrobüs* is crucial because of three main points. Firstly, it is a mobile public space, which means it bears the scars of ideological polarisation in Turkey; it is a space of dissensus and also reproduces the official ide-

Figure 1: Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery on the D-100 Highway Together with other mnemonic devices of Turkish nationalism (produced by the author)



Bridge (*Boğaziçi Köprüsü*, renamed *15 Temmuz Şehitler Köprüsü* or 15 July Martyrs' Bridge), the Republic, Democracy, and Martyrs Monument (*Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Şehitler Anıtı*), the Monument of Liberty (*Abide-i Hürriyet*, unofficial graveyard of the Committee of Union and Progress), the Istanbul Cağlayan Justice Palace (*İstanbul Çağlayan Adalet Sarayı*, renamed as *İstanbul Adalet Sarayı, Şehit Cumhuriyet Savcısı Mehmet Selim Kiraz Yerleşkesi*, i.e. the Istanbul Courthouse, Prosecutor-Martyr Mehmet Selim Kiraz Campus), Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery (*Edirnekapı Şehitliği*) and 15 July Martyrs' Cemetery (*15 Temmuz Şehitliği*), the Mausoleums of Adnan Menderes and Turgut Özal (*Adnan Menderes ve Turgut Özal Anıt Mezarları*), Martyr Mustafa Cambaz Metrobus Stop (*Şehit Mustafa Cambaz Metrobüs Durağı*), and Martyred Ambassador Galip Balkar Vocational School (*Şehit Büyükelçi Galip Balkar Mesleki ve Teknik Anadolu Lisesi*) (see Figure 1). The military cemeteries, mausoleums, monuments, and toponymic practices placed along this single axis act like spatial mnemonic devices that frame the collective memory and, at the same time, allow us to follow the historical evolution of the martyrdom myth in Turkey.

This paper will analyse one of these mnemonic devices on the D-100 highway, namely Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery, which contains the graves of mostly Muslim soldiers who died during the Balkan War and WWI, especially the soldiers wounded in the Çanakkale War and who died after being hospitalised in Istanbul. It also con-

ology through various media. Secondly, the 'passive' situation of a *metrobüs* passenger and the active transformation of the city landscape creates an effect of audience-performance. Thirdly, the Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery has been transformed into a transportation hub because of the BRT line that opened in 2008.

tains the graves of important historical figures of Turkish nationalism like Mehmet Akif Ersoy ('national poet' and Islamic intellectual) and Yusuf Akçura (ideologue and advocate of Pan-Turkism), which renders it a place of memory for Turkish nationalism. This feature has been amplified since the 1980s through the burial of Turkish soldiers who lost their lives during the war with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party). More recently, a new cemetery for the 15 July martyrs was built inside the Edirnekapı cemetery complex in 2017, which reinforced the official use of the concept of martyrdom by the state by giving it a more religious slant. Interestingly, there has been almost no academic research on Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery to date, apart from a master's thesis that reproduces the nationalist, militarist, and Islamist discourse of the state.[2]

In order to examine the reproductive character of Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery in relation to the myth of martyrdom, it is necessary to expound two main concepts: collective memory and martyrdom. The first section will briefly analyse collective memory in order to show the deterministic relationship between space and repetitive memory. The second section will analyse the concept of martyrdom, especially in the Turkish context, in order to show its relationship to Islam, militarisation, and nationalism; and how it is instrumentalised by the Turkish state as a necropolitical device. The third section will describe the historical spatial formation of Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery and analyse its functional transformation in relation with commemorations and banal nationalism.

2. Collective Conditions of Possible Memories and Active Forgetting

Origins of the term 'collective memory' go back to Emile Durkheim's *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1915) and Maurice Halbwachs' *The Social Frameworks of Memory* (1925). According to Halbwachs, memories are necessarily formed by collective situations such as family, religious, and professional situations, etc., which he referred to as the social frameworks of memory.[3] Individual memories are possible because society provides the necessary means to reproduce them and, in order to keep them alive, these memories must be shared between people. Space plays an important role in forming both individual and collective recollections, which are interdependent or dialectically related. Space, depending on time, determines the mental and physical formation and behaviour of human beings: 'when a group has lived a long time in a place adapted to its habits, its thoughts, as well as its movements, are in turn ordered by the succession of images from these external objects.'[4] External objects (including our own bodies) cannot be separated from the signs and symbols that society attaches

2 Türksever 2014. Although not being critical of the subordination of individuals to discriminatory nationalist collectives, it shows that the myth of martyrdom is reproduced in folk beliefs and folk narratives. In line with the ambitions of current political power in Turkey, it aims to prove that martyrdom is an essential part of being Turkish.

3 Halbwachs 1992.

4 Halbwachs 1980, 133.

to them. Therefore, collective memory unfolds within a spatial framework. According to Koselleck, there is no collective memory but there are collective conditions of possible memories. These collective conditions are references determined by the seven major Ps: the Professors, the Priests, the Pastors, the PR-specialists, the journalists (*die Presseleute*), the Poets, and the Politicians –of course today it would be possible to replace some of these with e.g. social media influencers. Every collectivity, sitting on the diverse memories of individuals, is *a priori* an ideology or myth. This mnemonic conditioning has no direct relation to personal experiences and it is not criticised by history.[5]

In order to analyse the relationship between memory and history, Paul Ricoeur uses Koselleck's conceptual framework of 'space of experience' (*Erfahrungsraum*) and 'horizon of expectation' (*Erwartungshorizont*).[6] The dialectic between these two poles ensures the dynamic nature of historical consciousness. However, this dialectic tends to be obscured by history. Memory restores the link between the work of the historian and historical consciousness. Thus, Ricoeur analyses the relationship between history and memory in three steps. First, memory establishes the meaning of the past. Here, Ricoeur accepts Halbwachs' collective memory as a phenomenon but rejects the idea of a collective 'subject' of memory. Instead, he prefers to use Husserl's concept of 'personalities of a higher order', which offers a network of relationships with an intersubjective basis.[7] Second, history introduces a critical dimension into our dealings with the past. Ricoeur defines history as 'a critical authority that is able not only to consolidate and to articulate collective and individual memory but also to correct it or even contradict it'.[8] Memory narratives are interpreted as uncritical and stable 'repetition-memories'. Critical history can transform this 'repetition-compulsion' into the 'work of recollection'. Third, memory maintains the dialectical connection between space of experience and horizon of expectation. Memory is not the opposite of history. Like repetitive and recollective memories, there is also passive and active forgetting. Passive forgetting is like Freudian displacement. It is a deficiency of the active memory. It is escapist. If it is practiced by a semi-official history, it becomes an active forgetting, selective and systematic, which ignores the victims. At the other end of the spectrum of active forgetting is forgiveness. It is recollective and therapeutic. It gives memory a future.[9] While Craps et al. categorise the idea of the

5 Koselleck 2004a.

6 Koselleck claims that 'there is no history which could be constituted independently of the experiences and expectations of active human agents ... The tension between experience and expectation which, in ever-changing patterns, brings about new resolutions and through this generates historical time.' (Koselleck 2004b, 256–262).

7 'For Husserl the term refers to the nature of social entities such as institutions or social groups, which can be treated as if they were subjects. They are groups, communities, nations, the church, the state, and so on ... Personalities of a higher order are founded on individual subjectivities but have their own higher order identity.' (Moran and Cohen 2012, 242–243).

8 Ricoeur 2001, 477.

9 Ricoeur 2011.

determination of the social framework of memory by nation-states as an approach belonging to the twentieth century, official history still has a comparative advantage in the formation of collective memory.[10] According to Cinar, the institutionalised character of official history guarantees that it receives wider publicity from an early stage through continuous subjectivisation, and its standardisation through curriculum and bureaucratic supervision makes it more efficient.[11] Although non-state actors produce and conserve conflicting memories, not least by taking advantage of new media technologies, the production of spatial mnemonic devices on an urban scale are still dependent on state power. However, it is also possible to hack this deterministic relationship between space and repetitive memory. In Turkey, especially after 2010, NGOs like *Kara Kutu* ('Black Box') and *Hafıza Merkezi* ('Memory Center') started to document and archive mnemonic spaces belonging to alternative memories and carry out projects that allow individuals to remember critically and forget therapeutically.

3. The Concept of Martyrdom in Islam and Its Instrumentalisation by the Turkish State

The word *shahīd* (Ar.) or *şehit* (Tr.) has the meaning of 'martyr' and is closely related in its development to the Greek *martyrios* in that it means both a witness and a martyr.[12] Eldem mentions that there are two different concepts of martyrdom in Islam: battlefield martyrdom and afterlife martyrdom. *Şüheda el-ma'rake* (battlefield martyrs) or *şüheda e'd-dünya ve'l-ahiret* (this life and afterlife martyrs), who died on the battlefield for their religions, have the highest and respected rank in martyrdom. Being an afterlife martyr (*şehidü'l-ahiret*), on the other hand, was rather 'easy'. If a person was killed because of their religion, died while giving birth, or during a pilgrimage, became a victim of illness or an accident, drowned, or was subjected to a violent death, they were also counted as *şehit*.[13]

According to Kreiser, despite the high rank of death as a 'witness of the faith' (*şehit*) in Islam, war memorials were almost unknown before the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[14] With the formation of modern states, the military profession became a civic responsibility through 'compulsory military service' in accordance with the principle of 'total war'. The ideological framework, which is necessary for

10 Craps et al. 2018.
11 Cinar 2015.
12 Cook 2007. The Arabic word *shahīd* is written in Turkish as *şehit*. The legal term defining a witness in court is written in Turkish as *şahit*. Both of the terms originate from the Arabic source *shuhūd*, which has meanings such as 'to be witness to an event, to testify, to be ready somewhere'. Another important point is that there is one Turkish word to define both 'martyrdom' and 'martyrs' cemetery', which is *şehitlik*. According to the context, the word *şehitlik* might define either the concept of martyrdom as an abstract term or the physical place where the martyrs are buried.
13 Eldem 2005.
14 Kreiser 2013.

ensuring acceptance of the material and moral losses that result from this civic responsibility, is constructed in Turkey by the martyrdom myth.[15] Martyrs' cemeteries, as a spatial equivalent or embodiment of the martyrdom myth, serve as a reminder both of the price paid in the past for the right to citizenship and the present-day obligations that have to be fulfilled in order to access this right. Although the term martyrdom is used by a secular Turkish state, its religious connotation still remains.

The current large-scale normalisation and acceptance of *şehitlik* (martyrdom) as a part of daily life is mostly related to the compulsory military service in place in Turkey. According to Zürcher, universal conscription in the modern European sense was first discussed in the Ottoman Empire towards the end of Mahmud II's reign (1808–1839) and the suggestion of a five-year term of military service was included in the Imperial Edict of Gülhane (*Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu*, 1839). The first conscription law in the Republican period was issued in 1927 and there was a 900% increase in the number of conscripted soldiers between 1932 and 1939.[16] According to Altınay, discourses produced in the 1930s disassociated military service from the previous bad memories of the great wars, and also from the Ottoman past, by culturalising it through discourses of nation and race.[17] We can follow a similar genealogy for the myth of martyrdom in relation to nationalism. Eldem states that it was the 1897 Greek War that played a significant role in determining the new meaning of the concept of martyrdom.[18] The gravestone of the military volunteer Halid Bin Bayram (1897), titled *şehit*, is interpreted as a turning point because it shows the domination of a state-centred ideology on public space and the transfer of the concept of martyrdom completely to the state, without its religious ambiguity. Abdülhamit II (r. 1876–1909) made intensive use of this victory to build a nationalist ethos and, after this war, describing soldiers killed in war as *şehit* became standard procedure. However, the religious context of the term was never completely abandoned, as we might observe in the Kemalist Era of the new Turkish Republic. According to Azak, the use of the concept of martyrdom by the Kemalist elite shows how the Islamic concepts were successfully used to serve a secular nation-state.[19] Examples such as Mustafa Kemal's use of the title *Gazi* (honorific religious idiom for victorious Islamic warriors), or the commemoration of Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay as *şehit* in the official state discourse show that the uniting power of the term *şehit* for the Muslim community is taken up by the secular regime to encompass the unity of the nation-state and the indivisible integrity of the homeland.[20] With the theme of martyrdom, the state discourse opens up a

15 Düzcan 2014.
16 Zürcher 1998.
17 Altınay 2004.
18 Eldem 2005. Kreiser 2013 claims that the basis of a specific Turkish cult for dead soldiers was created during the wars from 1912 to 1925. This period might be seen as the maturation period, rather than a conflict with Eldem's thesis.
19 Azak 2010.
20 On 23 December 1930, Lieutenant Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay was beheaded by members of the radical *Nakşibendi tarikatı*, who were demonstrating against the policies of the secular government and for restoration of the caliphate. This incident was a traumatic event for

religious window and establishes the social legitimacy of compulsory military service while, at the same time, trying to rehabilitate the problematic relationship of the secular state with Islam.[21]

Following the creation of a 'nationalist and military martyrdom' during the 1897 Greek War, this started to become a cult during and after the War of Independence. The Battle of Çanakkale (1915–16), also known as the Gallipoli Campaign, is one of the founding symbols of this martyrdom myth. According to Okur, the Battle of Çanakkale was considered a psychological building block of a 'new' Turkishness by the Republican elites.[22] In accordance with this view, ever since its foundation in 1926, the Martyrs' Cemeteries Reconstruction Association (*Şehitlikleri İmar Cemiyeti*) has been regularly organising trips to the Çanakkale Martyrs' Cemeteries to commemorate the battle.[23] During the 1950s, work was initiated to construct a national monument in Çanakkale and, as a result of the efforts made by the Turkish National Student Union (*Milli Türk Talebe Birliği*), the anniversary of the Çanakkale Victory (*Çanakkale Zaferi*) started to be celebrated on 18 March. The failure to complete construction of the Çanakkale Martyrs' Memorial (*Çanakkale Şehitler Abidesi*), which was approved in 1952, led the *Milliyet* newspaper to launch an aid campaign. With the money collected from the public, the monument was completed in 1960.[24]

Following the declaration that 18 March was to be known as Martyrs' Day (*Şehitler Günü*) through a law enacted in 2002, the myth of martyrdom became more widespread with official ceremonies and activities being organised throughout the country, and mass visits to the Çanakkale Martyrs' Memorial began to take place.[25] According to Değirmencioğlu, Turkey fell under the spell of the myth of martyrdom following clashes after the 1980 coup in the Southeast of Turkey, leading to a period when the myth had never before been so powerful, neither in the Korean War nor the Cyprus War. He stresses the use of the concept by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan before the establishment of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) in 1997, and the increasing mythicisation process during the long AKP rule (2002-today). The declaration of 18 March as Martyrs' Day in 2002 was a catalyst in this sense.[26] The myth of martyrdom established around the Battle of Çanakkale has legitimised, and continues to legitimise, militarism in favour of the Korean War, the Cyprus War, the ongoing PKK War and the new wars in Syria and Libya, by using collective symbols like 'homeland', 'nation', 'religion', and 'flag'. Symbols of religious and secular sanctity are rendered

Kemalists, as it showed that not all citizens accepted the modern reforms and triggered the Kemalists' shift from a liberal secularism to a more aggressive and militant version (Ahmad 1988).

21 Düzcan 2014.

22 Okur 2016.

23 'Preparation for Military Service', a compulsory high school military course unique to Turkey, was also introduced in 1926 and continued to form part of the curriculum until 2012 (Altınay 2009).

24 Atabay 2014.

25 TBMM 2002.

26 Değirmencioğlu 2014.

part of the collective memory through many different channels, including Quran courses, the national education curriculum, flag ceremonies, children's book series, epics and fairy tales, literary works, TV series, as well as traditional and social media, in order to normalise the myth of martyrdom. Historical events that embody all of these symbols, such as the Çanakkale War, have the power to mobilise the masses according to the necropolitical regime of the government.[27] President Erdoğan published a message in 2017 on the occasion of the 102nd anniversary of the 18 March Çanakkale Victory. He said: 'just like in Çanakkale 102 years ago, on the night of 15 July, the most modern weapons were desperate in the face of our nation's constancy, faith, and determination'.[28] Erdoğan had also approved the text message sent by the Chief of Istanbul Riot Police (*Çevik Kuvvet Şube Müdürü*), in which he congratulated his men for 'repeating the Çanakkale epic' when they triumphed over the protestors at Taksim Square in 2013.[29] This 'narrativisation' is used as an ideological tool to acquire legitimacy: '[...] claims are embedded in stories which recount the past and treat the present as part of a timeless and cherished tradition.'[30] In addition to this, Yilmaz and Bashirov highlight that, being an integral part of the AKP's youth policies, motifs of martyrdom and sacrifice started to acquire cultic qualities after the 2016 coup attempt.[31] The adaptation of the concept of martyrdom to a modernisation process and its transformation according to the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis shows how the concept is instrumentalised by the Turkish state as a necropolitical device.

4. Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery

Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery (28,000 m²) covers almost one-third of the Edirnekapı cemetery complex, which is one of the oldest and largest cemeteries in Istanbul. In addition to soldiers from the Balkan War and WWI, it contains the graves of soldiers from the Republican period who fought against the PKK, as well as police force per-

27 'If we gave 250 thousand martyrs there [Gallipoli Campaign, 1915], nobody should speak if we give 25 thousand martyrs here [Istanbul Bombings, December 2016]. Martyrdom is the highest station in God's presence.' ('Biz orda 250 bin şehit verdiysek; 25 bin şehit de burada verirsek kimse buna ses çıkartmasın. Şehit olmak zaten Allah makamında en büyük makam.'; Ankara Mayor Melih Gökçek, TGRT News Live Broadcast Connection, 10 December 2016; Sözcü 2016). 'If Allah blesses us, I will be a martyr and inshallah you will be a martyr, too.' ('Allah nasip ederse ben de şehit olayım inşallah, sizler de olun.'; Minister of Environment and Urban Planning Mehmet Özhaseki, visit to Kayseri Security Directorate, 13 December 2016; CNN Türk 2018). 'Her Turkish flag is in her pocket. If she becomes a martyr, God willing, she will be wrapped with it. She is ready for everything, aren't you?' (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan talking to a 6-year-old girl on stage during the AKP Kahramanmaraş Ordinary Congress, 24 February 2018; New York Times 2018).

28 'Tıpkı 102 yıl önce Çanakkale'de olduğu gibi, 15 Temmuz gecesi de en modern silahlar, milletimizin azim, inanç ve kararlılığı karşısında çaresiz kalmıştır.'; Yeni Şafak 2017.

29 Şakul 2016.

30 Thompsons 1990, 61–62.

31 Yilmaz and Bashirov 2018.

Figure 2: Construction of Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery's 'Monument Road' in 1926 (Şehitlikleri İmar Cemiyeti Albümü (1938). Istanbul: Devlet Basımevi. Retrieved from İBB Atatürk Kitaplığı Sayısal Arşiv ve e-Kaynaklar, Alb000154, 736.5 736.5 1938 1)

sonnel and firefighters. Military personnel from the air force are buried next to it, in a separate section called Sakızağacı Martyrs' Cemetery (*Sakızağacı Şehitliği*). The main part of the cemetery, which had been left in ruins since the Ottoman period, was first repaired by the Martyrs' Cemeteries Reconstruction Association that was established in 1926 after the proclamation of the Republic, and the cemetery was transformed into a martyrs' cemetery.

When the association was first established, its aim was to reconstruct domestic and foreign war graveyards following the Treaty of Lausanne.[32] It started to work with the cemeteries in Çanakkale and the Edirnekapı and Karacaahmet Cemeteries in Istanbul, where the dead from Çanakkale and Istanbul hospitals were buried. The association, which rapidly started to make progress, opened the Martyrs' Monument (*Abide-i Şüheda*) in Edirnekapı on 30 August 1926, Victory Day (*Zafer Bayramı*), i.e. the fourth anniversary of the Battle of Dumlupınar (see Figure 2).

While the architect of the monument is unknown, we learn from the association's meeting reports that an architect called Ref'et Bey was involved in the general construc-

32 Articles 124–136 of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty regulate the rights and obligations of the parties in the territories of their cemeteries. This treaty also defines the territorial limits of Turkey as a new sovereign nation-state and it was criticised by Erdoğan after the 2016 coup attempt.

tion process.[33] The monument is a modest marble column with an octagonal base, which has visual similarities with the Monument of Liberty (*Abide-i Hürriyet*, 1911) and Aviation Martyrs' Monument (*Tayyare Şehitleri Abidesi*, 1916). The six façades of the monument are inscribed with important names and dates from the Çanakkale War and two façades are inscribed with the construction and inauguration dates of the monument both in Arabic and Latin script.[34] These names have also been given to the cemetery's streets and have been engraved on concrete signposts in order to spatialise the memory of the war. The association also constructed a fountain and planted pine and cypress trees.[35] In 1927, the decision was made to organise a Martyrs' Memorial Day (*Şehitler İhtifali Günü*) for the first time and, the following year, a map of the graveyard was sent to the Fine Arts Association (*Güzel Sanatlar Birliği*) requesting a project to scientifically and aesthetically reclaim and organise the space.[36] As a result of the aid provided to the community, over the years that followed, the association continued its work to reclaim the cemetery, and concrete roads, squares, and rectangular grave sections were built in accordance with the prepared plan (see Figure 3). Following the expropriation decision taken in 1946, the neighbouring area of Ferhat Pasha Farm (*Ferhat Paşa Çiftliği*) was expropriated and Edirnekapı Cemetery was expanded.[37] However, this expansion came to an end after the Second World War and the cemetery, which was located on the periphery of the city until that time, began to be surrounded by industrial buildings in the 1950s. In 1973–74, just before the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, a transportation tunnel was opened under Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery as part of the Bosphorus Bridge and Connecting Highways (D-100) project. Laqueur states that Edirnekapı Cemetery was the only graveyard near the D-100 highway that was not damaged by this road construction work.[38] The construction of the highway accelerated the expansion of Istanbul outside the city walls from the 1970s onwards, leaving the cemetery in the middle of the metropolis. The highway passes through Edirnekapı Cemetery and forms a border to the industrial area in the north. To the south of the highway, there are administrative units belonging to the municipality and a bus garage, in addition to the graveyards. Later, in the 1990s, the mausoleums of the previous presidents Adnan Menderes and Turgut Özal were also built in this area.[39] Between 2006 and 2007, the

33 Atabay 2014.
34 Yücel 1968.
35 Even the cypress trees, which are perceived by some veterans to be a metaphor for the Turkish nation 'with their roots in martyrs' blood', are an important part of the spatial mnemonics and subjectivisation process (Aciksoz 2020).
36 Yücel 1968.
37 Kurtuluş 2000.
38 Laqueur 2010 shows the presence of the military cemetery and the graves of celebrities such as Yusuf Akçura, one of the pioneers of the Turkism movement, and Mehmet Akif Ersoy, the poet and author of the national anthem, as the reason for the protection of the cemetery.
39 Adnan Menderes and Turgut Özal are considered to be martyrs in the Islamist political discourse. Menderes was hanged by the military junta in 1961 and there is an unproven theory about Özal being poisoned in 1993.

Figure 3: Plan of the cemetery showing the no longer existent part where D-100 Highway passes today (Şehitlikleri İmar Cemiyeti Albümü (1938). Istanbul: Devlet Basımevi. Retrieved from İBB Atatürk Kitaplığı Sayısal Arşiv ve e-Kaynaklar, Alb000154, 736.5 736.5 1938 1; reproduced by the author)



cemetery, which preserved its unity for many years, was divided in two by the removal of the part corresponding to the D-100 highway because of construction of the BRT *metrobüs* line. The two sides of the cemetery, separated by a ten meter high abyss, were connected through a pedestrian overpass, which also provides access to the BRT station downstairs. Following completion of the second stage of the *metrobüs* line in 2008 and the opening of the Topkapı-Habibler (T4) metro line between 2007 and 2009, the cemetery was transformed into a transfer hub that also linked to pre-existing minibus and bus lines. This transformation from a 'holy' place of commemoration for official ceremonies into an everyday transport centre led to a greater number of people experiencing the place and interacting with martyrdom (see Figure 4).

Since the introduction of the *metrobüs* system, the area around the martyrs' monument has taken on the character of a public square after being transformed into a transport hub. A large number of individual vendors (selling Turkish bagels, stuffed mussels, stewed beans and rice, electronic goods, textiles, tobacco, etc.), corporate stands (Vodafone, *Eminevim* [a real estate company], Turkcell, etc.), and a Red Crescent (*Kızılay*) mobile blood donation unit are located between the different modes of transport, enabling people to engage in activities like eating, drinking, trade, real estate, blood donations, etc. Although the seating units on both sides of the pedestrian flow are limited, they provide the opportunity to take a short pause. The fact that

Figure 4: Edirnekapı (Martyrs') Cemetery and its close surrounding area: 1) Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery (martyrs + civilians); 2) Sakızağacı Martyrs' Cemetery; 3) Necati Bey and Mısır Tarlası Cemetery; 4) Turkish-Armenian Cemetery; 5) Edirnekapı Cemetery (civilians only); 6) 15 July Martyrs' Cemetery (produced by the author)



the area is on top of a hill (northwest of Edirnekapı, the sixth hill of Istanbul), has dense tree cover, and is relatively cut off from car traffic gives it a quiet and recreational feel. However, it is not possible to spend a long time there during the rush hour and weekends because of the high density of pedestrians.

In particular this hurry and exhaustion of people during the rush hour erodes the ideological and ceremonial surface of the area, rendering it a scene of everyday life. Although the cemetery is dignified on special days by monuments and ceremonies (hot nationalism), it is also rendered invisible by becoming a part of everyday life (banal nationalism). However, in order to understand the sophisticated relationship between collective conditions of possible memories and the nationalism-martyrdom complex, it is necessary to highlight the transforming character of the commemorative practices in Turkey and particularly in relation to Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery.

After its inauguration in 1926, Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery was used as an official commemoration site on national and military holidays. Not only Çanakkale Naval Victory Day (*Çanakkale Deniz Zaferi*, 18 March 1920) but also the Liberation Day of Istanbul (*İstanbul'un Kurtuluşu*, 6 October 1920), Victory Day (*Zafer Bayramı*, 30 August 1922, national holiday), and Republic Day (*Cumhuriyet Bayramı*, 29 October 1923, national holiday) were celebrated here by state authorities. After 1953, the official commemoration of the 16 March Martyrs (*16 Mart Şehitleri*) was also transferred from Eyüp Sultan Cemetery to Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery following the exhumation and reburial of the remains.[40] In addition, non-public military commemorations, such as the Anniversary of Turkish Land Forces (*Türk Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı Kuruluş Yıl Dönümü*, 28 June), the Anniversary of Turkish Air Forces (*Türk Hava Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı Kuruluş Yıl Dönümü*, 1 June), the Commemoration of Aviation Martyrs (*Hava Şehitlerini Anma Günü*, 15 May), the Commemoration of Naval Martyrs (*Deniz Şehitlerini Anma Günü*, 4 April), the Commemoration of Land Martyrs (*Kara Şehitlerini Anma Günü*, 25 April), the Commemoration of Police Martyrs (*Polis Şehitlerini Anma Günü*, 10 April), and the Commemoration of Foreign Affairs Martyrs (*Dışişleri Şehitlerini Anma Günü*, 25 May) took place in this cemetery. Under the law enacted in 2002, all martyrs' commemoration days are now united in Martyrs' Day (18 March).

National commemoration days are crucial to the construction of national identities and collective memories, but they are also battlefields of conflicted memories. In relation to collective memory, Sherman defines such commemoration days as 'the practice of representation that enacts and gives substance to the discourse of collective memory'.[41] Cinar determines three main functions for national commemorations: constructing public memory (engaging the public as a national subject); historicising the nation (bringing people together as parts of the same national community, not only spatially but also temporally); and nationalising time (becoming constituting elements in the routine of everyday life). However, she also emphasises the contested position of the official discourse of the state, which is open to transformation in time.[42]

In Turkey, the early Republican form of the national celebrations continued in open urban places until the 1950s, after which they were taken out of the streets and into stadiums. After the 1980 coup, the stadium performances were modernised and brought into homes via television. They provided symbolical support for secularism and opposition to the rising political Islam, especially after 1994 when the Islamist Welfare Party assumed power over the municipalities of Istanbul and Ankara for the

40 The '16 March Martyrs' commemorates an event that took place on 16 March 1920 when the military station in Şehzadebaşı was raided and six Turkish soldiers were killed during the British occupation of Istanbul. However, commemoration of this event stopped after the 1960 coup (with the exception of 2005) before unofficially starting up again in 2017.

41 Sherman 1994.

42 Cinar 2005.

first time.[43] With the rise of the AKP after 2002, Kemalist holidays, such as National Sovereignty and Children's Day (*Ulusal Egemenlik ve Çocuk Bayramı*) on 23 April, Commemoration of Atatürk, Youth and Sports Day (*Atatürk'ü Anma, Gençlik ve Spor Bayramı*) on 19 May, and Republic Day on 29 October, were increasingly trivialised and rendered invisible by the introduction of 'new' national ceremonies, including the commemoration of the conquest of Constantinople (*İstanbul'un Fethi*, 1453), the Victory of Malazgirt (*Malazgirt Zaferi*, 1071), or the Commemoration of the Sarıkamış Martyrs (*Sarıkamış Şehitlerini Anma*, 1914), which placed an emphasis on the pre-Republican past, martyrdom, and Islam.[44][45]

Victory Day, which commemorates victory in the 1922 Battle of Dumlupınar during the Turkish War of Independence (*Kurtuluş Savaşı*, 1919–1923), provides a prime example of how collective memories contest and create spaces of conflict. Victory Day was first celebrated on the war field in 1924 and was officially proclaimed as being the army's festival two years later, with a law enacted in 1926 (which is also the year that the Martyrs' Cemeteries Reconstruction Association was established). In comparison with other national holidays, the identity of Victory Day is more military than civil, and it is mostly associated with the army and the state.[46]

In the course of the 1997 post-modern coup, mass participation in Victory Day commemorations took the form of a demonstration against Erbakan's Islamist Welfare Party government.[47] After 2007, during AKP government rule, when Abdullah Gül was elected president, the Victory Day commemorations once again became a symbolic battlefield between the army (Kemalism) and the AKP (Political Islam). However, the war ended in the AKP's favour with the start of the 'Ergenekon Trials' (*Ergenekon Duruşmaları*) in 2008 and the resignation of the four chief commanders of the Turkish armed forces in 2011. In 2019, Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery was not included in the state's official ceremony programme and there were only two institutions celebrating Victory Day, the Governorship of Eyüpsultan ('Islamic' district where the cemetery is located) and the Turkey Motorcycle Platform (*Türkiye Motosiklet Platformu*, a 'Kemalist' association), thereby revealing conflicting memories.

In Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery, there are also commemorations related to two specific historical figures. The body of Cengiz Topel, a Turkish air force fighter pilot who was shot down while supporting the Turkish Cypriots during the Erenköy Resistance (or Battle of Tylliria) inter-communal conflict, was buried here in 1964. Topel's name was later given to streets, schools, and mosques in Turkey and he is still unofficially commemorated today in the Sakızağacı Section of Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery. According to Bora, the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus (or the 'Peace Opera-

43 Öztürkmen 2001.
44 Lüküslü 2016.
45 According to Alkan 2017, these 'non-Kemalist' commemoration days were first seen after the 1950s, especially after the 1960 and 1971 coups. Brockett 2014 also points out that Constantinople's conquest was publicly commemorated since 1953.
46 Öztürkmen 2001.
47 Şakul 2016, 194.

tion', *Kıbrıs Barış Harekâtı*) in 1974 transformed the anti-imperialist rhetoric of the government at the time into a nationalist discourse, and it was this political manoeuvre that provided the means to enable the reproduction of nationalism in Turkey for generations.[48] In June 2019, the Cyprus Monument (*Kıbrıs Anıtı*) in Istanbul was attacked by nationalists in protest against the new mayor of Istanbul, who is a member of the opposition party CHP (Republican People's Party). The monument was attacked because it showed Makarios III (the first President of Cyprus) instead of Cengiz Topel and the attackers later commemorated Cengiz Topel at his graveside.

The author of the Turkish National Anthem (*İstiklâl Marşı*), Mehmet Akif Ersoy, who was buried in Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery in 1938, is another symbolic figure of Turkish nationalism and Islamism commemorated by civil and governmental organisations, especially since the coup of 1980. A regulation in 2008 officially defined a date to commemorate both Mehmet Akif Ersoy and the adoption of the state anthem (12 March). A further regulation introduced in 2019 separated these two events and transformed the memorial day of Mehmet Akif Ersoy into a memorial week (20–27 December), thereby increasing the commemoration's impact. Erdoğan frequently quotes from Mehmet Akif Ersoy to attack his political opponents and has introduced him into the cultural and educational infrastructure as a symbol of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis through syllabuses, books, plays, poetry competitions, and commemoration trips, etc.

All these military and public ceremonies (together with their media coverage) are important tools for effecting constant change in the collective memory in favour of martyrdom. However, the most important events that reinforce the myth of martyrdom today are the ongoing war with the PKK, which started in 1984, and the controversial coup attempt in 2016. Since 1984, and especially in the 1990s, Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery has become popular with the media, especially on the eve of *Kurban Bayramı* ('Feast of the Sacrifice', Ar. *ʿĪd al-ʾAḍḥā*) when families come to visit and pray for their children who were sacrificed for their homeland. During the 1990s, all the mainstream newspapers and TV channels regularly spread patriotic propaganda by labelling the PKK guerrillas as terrorists and showing Turkish mothers in Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery crying for their lost sons. When Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the PKK, was caught and sentenced to death in 1999, the news again showed mothers in Edirnekapı Cemetery asking the government for his execution.[49] In May 2007, a Turkish newspaper reported on the rage of Infantry Commando Sergeant Samet Kırbaş's father, who shouted at the commanders attending his son's funeral in Edirnekapı Cemetery: 'What are we waiting for? We should enter northern Iraq. My son is dead; don't let other young people die!'[50] Five months later, on 17 October

48 Bora 2006.

49 During the EU-accession reforms of 2002, the Turkish parliament lifted the death sentence from the constitution. Öcalan is now serving a life term in a special prison on the island of İmralı in the Marmara Sea.

50 'Daha neyi bekliyoruz? Kuzey Irak'a girelim. Benim oğlum öldü. Başka gençler ölmesin.'; Milliyet 2007.

2007, the Turkish Parliament voted overwhelmingly to authorise sending troops into northern Iraq to confront Kurdish rebels.

However, with the 'Kurdish Opening' (*Kürt Açılımı*) of the AKP, state discourse started to change in favour of dialogue and peace after 2009. As a result of clashes between the relatives of martyrs and socialist/leftist organisations, press and media outlets were banned from the cemetery in order to ensure the democratic opening process was able to continue without interruption, and to maintain public order and security during this period.[51] Four years later, Öcalan's call for a new ceasefire and the PKK's disarmament started the 'Peace Process' (*Barış Süreci* or *Çözüm Süreci*), which lasted until 2015.

Another important source for reproducing the myth of martyrdom is the newly established 15 July Martyrs' Cemetery. This cemetery has been created inside Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery, but with a separate and monumental entrance gate that contains two mosaic panels illustrating the coup attempt and the civil resistance. The 267m² cemetery, which contains 20 individual graves, was built in 2017 and registered as a military martyrdom site (*şehitlik*) by the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality one year later. Although the people killed during the coup attempt on 15 July 2016 were civilians, and not military personnel, they were also declared to be martyrs.[52] The official narrative of the event was that it showed a faithful nation resisting a military coup for the sake of democracy. This narrative was supported by 'democracy watch' (*demokrasi nöbeti*) meetings, continuous media propaganda, new commemoration days and rituals, new additions to the school curriculum, new monuments, the renaming of bridges, schools, and streets, and a new museum, etc.[53] In 2016, under Law No. 6752, 15 July was declared a public holiday and named Democracy and National Unity Day (*Demokrasi ve Millî Birlik Günü*), and official commemorations have been taking place in the 15 July Martyrs' Cemetery ever since. This event could be interpreted as expanding the notion of martyrdom into civilian life, rendering the distinction between military-civilian and state-citizen meaningless.

In addition to special days and places, nationalism has to be reproduced in everyday life in order to endure. This banal nationalism is structured in enunciation,

51 Cumhuriyet 2009.

52 There has even been controversy over the compensation paid to the martyrs of 15 July, which was higher than the regular compensation paid to the martyrs who lost their lives fighting against the PKK. Act No. 3713 (1991) and Act No. 5233 (2004) determine the compensation for damages incurred due to terror and the fight against terror. However, in 2014, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan claimed that 301 workers killed in the Soma Mine Disaster should also be counted as civil martyrs (HaberTürk 2014). In 2015, the 'Minery Martyrs' Cemetery and Monument' was inaugurated by the Manisa Municipality in Soma and official commemorations are held since (Manisa Municipality 2015). In 2020, the Head of Religious Affairs, Ali Erbaş also claimed that people who died in the Elazığ Earthquake should be counted as martyrs (Sabah 2020).

53 See Altınordu's 2017 social performance analysis for more detailed information on the mobilisation of the masses and the memorialisation of 15 July. See Caliskan 2017 and Azeri 2016 for a general analysis of the process.

through simple words and symbols, which address 'us' as a national first person plural and situate 'us' in the homeland within a world of nations.[54] Similar to Kant's categories of time and space as the necessary condition of all possible experience; the linguistic and spatial reminders of nationalism (which according to Billig permit us to forget that we are being reminded) establish, in advance, the necessary conditions for possible nationalistic experience. Inspired by Essed's notion of 'everyday racism', Özkırımlı adapts this concept to nationalism as 'the integration of nationalism into everyday situations through practices that activate underlying power relations'.[55] However, the success of this activation or the process of subjectivisation is dependent on individuals.

The issue of how nationalism generates such powerful emotions, which culminate in the acceptance and promotion of martyrdom, can be explained by a need to protect one's own life or the lives of loved ones.[56] According to Billig, the flaggings (or enunciations) of nationhood are unlike messages from the unconscious mind. Since we do not need psychoanalytic training to read these signs, they work in the domain of the conscious. However, Billig claims that the constant repetitions 'permit us to forget that we are being reminded' and 'only a conscious willingness to look towards the background' will allow us 'to notice the flaggings'.[57] In Ricoeurian terms, this act of forgetting is similar to a 'passive forgetting", which works in a similar way to Freud's 'screen memories', and only a critical approach to history can get us out of the repetitive memory of nationalism: '[...] forgetting things, screen-memories, failed actions take on gigantic proportions on the scale of collective memory, which history alone, and more precisely the history of memory, is capable of bringing to light.'[58]

Billig continuously highlights in his work that, although his topic is the unconscious aspects of nationalism, this is not the repressed, Freudian unconscious.[59] However, being aware of the potential effects of these enunciations does not explain how this psychic mechanism might work. Banal nationalism is mostly criticised for excluding hot nationalism, ignoring the agency of the people (i.e. agency-centred everyday nationalism vs. state-centred banal nationalism) and overlooking the imaginary dimension of nationalism.[60] In particular, the imaginary dimension, in relation to affects and emotions, empowers the necessary conditions of the nationalistic experience. When objects, discourses, and symbols coincide, powerful emotions can arise.

Affective centres, such as the Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery Monument, in front of which state ceremonies take place, or the tomb of Mehmet Akif Ersoy, where conflicting memories are commemorated, have the capacity to activate 'hot nationalism' through rituals and ceremonies. The tombs of the 'terror martyrs' also have the same

54 Billig 1995, 174.
55 Özkırımlı 2000, 231.
56 Özkırımlı 2000, 224.
57 Billig 1995.
58 Ricoeur 2004, 447–448.
59 Billig 2009, 348.
60 Antonsich and Skey 2017.

Figure 5: The pedestrian flow inside Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery between the BRT stop on the D-100 level and tram/bus stops on the upper level. The continuous line represents the affective corridor used by commuters. The dotted line represents the pedestrian flow to affective centres such as the monument, terror martyrs' graves, or the tomb of Mehmet Akif Ersoy (produced by the author).



capacity for the martyrs' families. In contrast, the affective corridor inside Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery, which allows only temporary visual contact with the tombs of soldiers from WWI, functions more like 'banal nationalism', transforming the image of martyrdom into an everyday urban background because of the rapid circulation and repetitive flow of human bodies (see Figure 5). However, subjectivisation works in a more complex way and both of these affective spaces have the capacity to produce a 'critical approach' against martyrdom. These affective spaces are also made invisible or mute as a result of people adopting individual psychic defence mechanisms similar to George Simmel's blasé attitude, or, for instance, using personal audio devices as a 'sensory strategy' against the affective atmosphere, which could reinforce the blasé attitude or increase/decrease the effects.[61]

61 Simmel 2002, 103–110; Jungnickel and Aldred 2014.

5. Conclusion

Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery, which has been constructed based on a modern plan with orthogonal roads and circular squares, presents the Çanakkale War as the founding myth of the newly established modern nation-state. Its tombs, flags, and monument remind future generations of the people who died for their country and establish martyrdom as a holy and patriotic notion. Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery is, in fact, an intersection of two infrastructures: the D-100 highway, an important transport route and urban infrastructure that includes a public BRT line through which thousands of people pass every day; and a mnemonic/affective infrastructure consisting of monuments, graves, flags, and ceremonies that reproduce and transform the collective memory on a daily basis. Through the BRT, Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery becomes a place of repetitive memory and this repetition renders martyrdom normal, and even necessary in patriotic and religious terms, albeit invisible in the banal sense and leads to a passive forgetting. However, it is also a place of experience, e.g. during ceremonies and for martyrs' families, which reproduces hot nationalism and leads to an active and selective forgetting which excludes other victims. While diverse and conflicting memories are reproduced, spatial mnemonics provide the necessary conditions for the myth of martyrdom to endure, and this is instrumentalised by the state. With new enemies and new wars, the need for the martyrdom myth grows increasingly important in order to mobilise people.

As briefly explained in the introduction, Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery is not the only place where the (re-)production of the martyrdom myth occurs in spatial terms. Numerous examples of spatial mnemonic devices can be found throughout Istanbul for the framing of collective memory by the state. Some of these revitalise the necropolitics of the state by infiltrating everyday practices through spatial arrangements. One specific feature of the D-100 highway is that it has the potential to create a relational and holistic image of martyrdom by linking separate spatial mnemonic devices together thanks to its linear, continuous, and public structure. Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetery is analysed as a single unit of this multi-partite and multi-layered memorial axis. I hope that this urban mnemonic landscape may transform the traumatic and escapist forgetting into an active and therapeutic forgetting in order to provide the necessary conditions for peace.

Bibliography

Aciksoz, Salih Can. 2020. *Sacrificial Limbs. Masculinity, Disability, and Political Violence in Turkey*. Oakland: University of California Press.

Ahmad, Feroz. 1988. 'Islamic Reassertion in Turkey'. *Third World Quarterly*. 10, 2. 750–769.

Alkan, Mehmet. 2017. '*Malazgirt'in Asıl Keşfi 1960 Darbesi Sonrası Oldu*' [The Real Discovery of Malazgirt Was After the 1960 Coup]. *Bianet*. URL: http://bianet.org/bianet/print/189425-malazgirt-in-asil-kesfi-1960-darbesi-sonrasi-oldu (accessed 3 December 2019).

Altınay, Ayşe Gül. 2004. *The Myth of the Military Nation. Militarism, Gender and Education in Turkey*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Altınordu, Ateş. 2017. 'A Midsummer Night's Coup. Performance and Power in Turkey's July 15 Coup Attempt'. *Qual Sociol*. 40. 139–164.

Antonsich, Marco and Skey, Michael. 2017. 'Introduction. The Persistence of Banal Nationalism'. In Antonsich, Marco and Skey, Michael (eds.). *Everyday Nationhood. Theorising Culture, Identity and Belonging after Banal Nationalism*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Atabay, Mithat. 2014. *Şehitlikleri İmar Cemiyeti* [Martyrs' Cemeteries Reconstruction Association]. İstanbul: TSİV Yayınları.

Azak, Umut. 2010. *Islam and Secularism in Turkey. Kemalism, Religion and the Nation State*. London: I. B. Tauris.

Azeri, Siyaves. 2016. 'The July 15 Coup Attempt in Turkey. The Erdogan-Gulen Confrontation and the Fall of 'Moderate' Political Islam'. *Critique*. 44, 4. 465–478.

Billig, Michael. 1995. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage Publications.

Billig, Michael. 2009. 'Reflecting on a Critical Engagement with Banal Nationalism. Reply to Skey'. *The Sociological Review*. 57, 2. 347–352.

Bora, Tanıl. 2006. 'Ecevit'teki Şeytan Tüyü' [Devil's Luck of Ecevit]. *Birikim*. 212. 5–10.

Brockett, Gavin. 2014. 'When Ottomans Become Turks. Commemorating the Conquest of Constantinople and Its Contribution to World History'. *The American Historical Review*. 119, 2. 399–433.

Caliskan, Koray. 2017. 'Explaining the End of Military Tutelary Regime and the July 15 Coup Attempt in Turkey'. *Journal of Cultural Economy*. 10, 1. 97–111.

CNN Türk. 2018 (2016). 'AK Partili Özhaseki: İnşallah sizler de şehit olun' [AKP Member Özhaseki: I Hope You Also Become a Martyr]. 13 December 2016/11 December 2018. URL: https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/ak-partili-ozhaseki (accessed 03 October 2018).

Cinar, Meral Ugur. 2015. *Collective Memory and National Membership. Identity and Citizenship Models in Turkey and Austria*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Cook, David. 2007. *Martyrdom in Islam*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Craps, Stef et al. 2018. 'Memory Studies and the Anthropocene. A Roundtable'. *Memory Studies*. 11, 4. 498–515.

Cumhuriyet. 2009. 'Edirnekapı Şehitliği'nde Basın Açıklaması Yasak' [Press Statement is Banned in Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetry]. 25 September 2009.

Değirmencioğlu, Serdar M. 2014. 'Sunuş' [Introduction]. In Değirmencioğlu, Serdar M. (ed.). *Öl Dediler Öldüm. Türkiye'de şehitlik mitleri* [They Said 'Die' and I Died. Myths of Martyrdom in Turkey]. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. 13–20.

Düzcan, Bekir. 2014. 'Çanakkale İçinde Kurdular Beni. Şehit(lik) Imgesi Üzerinden Toplumsal Bedenin İnşası' [They Constructed Me in Çanakkale. The Construction of the Social Body through the Image of Martyr(dom)]. In Değirmencioğlu, Serdar M. (ed.). *Öl Dediler Öldüm. Türkiye'de Şehitlik Mitleri* [They Said 'Die' and I Died. Myths of Martyrdom in Turkey]. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. 111–131.

Eldem, Edhem. 2005. *İstanbul'da Ölüm. Osmanlı-İslam Kültüründe Ölüm ve Ritüelleri* [Death in Istanbul. Death and Its Rituals in Ottoman-Islamic Culture]. Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Archive and Research Centre.

HaberTürk. 2014. 'Soma'da ölen 301 madenci sivil şehit sayılacak' [301 Miners Who Died in Soma Will Be Counted as Civilian Martyrs]. 18 May 2014. URL: https://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/949279-somada-olen-301-madenci-sivil-sehit-sayilacak (accessed 30 August 2020).

Halbwachs, Maurice. 1980. *The Collective Memory*. Translated by Francis J. Ditter and Vida Yazdi Ditter. New York: Harper & Row.

Halbwachs, Maurice. 1992. *On Collective Memory*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Jungnickel, Katrina and Aldred, Rachel. 2014. 'Cycling's Sensory Strategies. How Cyclists Mediate their Exposure to the Urban Environment'. *Mobilities*. 9, 2. 238–255.

Koselleck, Reinhart. 2004a. 'Gibt es ein kollektives Gedächtnis?' *Divinatio*. 19, 2. 1–6.

Koselleck, Reinhart. 2004b. *Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time*. Translated by Keith Tribe. New York: Columbia University Press.

Kreiser, Klaus. 2013. 'Vom namenlosen Glaubenszeugen zum patriotischen Heldenkult. Kriegerdenkmäler und Gedenkstätten'. In Hettling, Manfred and Echternkamp, Jörg (eds.). *Gefallenengedenken im globalen Vergleich. Nationale Tradition, politische Legitimation und Individualisierung der Erinnerung*. München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag. 469–486.

Kurtuluş, Hatice. 2000. 'Ferhat Paşa Çiftliği. İstanbul Metropolitan Alanının Oluşumunda Büyük Özel Mülk Çiftliklerin Rolü Üzerine' [Ferhat Paşa Farm. On the Role of the Big Private Farms in the Formation of the Istanbul Metropolitan Area]. In Atacan, Fulya et al. (eds.). *Mübeccel Kıray İçin Yazılar* [Writings for Mübeccel Kıray]. İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık. 321–334.

Laqueur, Hans-Peter. 2010. *Hüve'l-Baki. İstanbul'da Osmanlı Mezarlıkları ve Mezar Taşları* [Hüve'l-Baki. Ottoman Graveyards and Gravestones in Istanbul]. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.

Lüküslü, Demet. 2016. 'Creating a Pious Generation. Youth and Education Policies of the AKP in Turkey'. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*. 16, 4. 1–13.

Manisa Municipality. 2015. 'Maden Şehitliği Dualarla Açıldıb [Mining Martyrs' Cemetery Opened with Prayers]. 30 May 2015. URL: https://www.manisa.bel.tr/Haberler/5389_maden-sehitligi-dualarla-acildi.aspx (accessed 30 August 2020).

Milliyet. 2007. 'K. Irak'a Gidelim' [Let's go to Northern Iraq]. 26 May 2007.

Moran, Dermot and Cohen, Joseph. 2012. *The Husserl Dictionary*. London: Continuum.

New York Times. 2018. 'Erdogan Tells a Weeping Girl, 6, She'd Receive Honors if Martyred'. 26 February 2018. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/europe/turkey-erdogan-girl-martyr.html (accessed 10 January 2019).

Okur, Mehmet Akif. 2016. 'The Meaning of Gallipoli in Turkish National Identity'. In Gürcan, Metin and Johnson, Robert (eds.). *The Gallipoli Campaign. The Turkish Perspective*. New York: Routledge. 173–180.

Özkırımlı, Umut. 2000. *Theories of Nationalism. A Critical Introduction*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Öztürkmen, Arzu. 2001. 'Celebrating National Holidays in Turkey. History and Memory'. *New Perspectives on Turkey*. Fall. 25. 47–75.

Ricoeur, Paul. 2004. *Memory, History, Forgetting*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.

Ricoeur, Paul. 2011. 'From "Memory–History–Forgetting"'. In Olick, Jeffrey K.; Vinitzky-Seroussi, Vered and Levy, Daniel (eds.). *The Collective Memory Reader*. New York: Oxford University Press. 475–480.

Sabah. 2020. '"Depremde ölenler hükmen şehittir"' ['Those Who Died in the Earthquake are Martyrs by Default']. 27 January 2020. URL: https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2020/01/27/diyanet-isleri-baskani-depremde-olenler-hukmen-sehittir (accessed 30 August 2020).

Sherman, Daniel J. 1994. 'Art, Commerce and the Production of Memory in France After World War I'. In Gillis, J. R. (ed.). *Commemorations. The Politics of National Identity*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Simmel, Georg. 2002 (1903). 'The Metropolis and Mental Life'. In Bridge, Gary and Watson, Sophie (eds.). *The Blackwell City Reader*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 103–110.

Sözcü. 'Melih Gökçek: 25 bin şehit versek kimse ses çıkartmasın' [Melih Gökçek: If We Gave 25 Thousand Martyrs, Nobody Should Oppose]. 11 December 2016. URL: https://www.sozcu.

com.tr/2016/gundem/melih-gokcekten-tepki-ceken-aciklama-1559107 (accessed 8 December 2018).

Şakul, Kahraman. 2016. 'Contemporary Turkish Perceptions of the Gallipoli Campaign'. In Gürcan, Metin and Johnson, Robert (eds.). *The Gallipoli Campaign. The Turkish Perspective.* New York: Routledge. 181–204.

TBMM. 2002. *18 Mart Gününün Şehitler Günü ve 19 Eylül Gününün Gaziler Günü İlan Edilmesi Hakkında Kanun Tasarısı ve İçişleri Komisyonu Raporu* [Draft Law on the Declaration of the Martyrs Day of 18 March and Veterans Day of 19 September and the Report of the Interior Commission]. 1/999. Period: 21. Legislation Year: 4. 7 June 2002. TBMM: Ankara.

Thompson, John B. 1990. *Ideology and Modern Culture. Critical Social Theory in the Era of Mass Communication*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Türksever, Zeynep. 2014. *Türk Halk İnançlarında Şehitlik Üzerine Halkbilimsel Bir İnceleme. Edirnekapı Örneği* [A Folkloric Study on Martyrdom in Turkish Folk Beliefs. The Case of Edirnekapı]. Unpublished Master Thesis. İstanbul Üniversitesi, İstanbul.

Yeni Şafak. 2017. 'Çanakkale Zaferi Mesajları! 18 Mart Çanakkale Zaferi' [Çanakkale Victory Messages! March 18 Çanakkale Victory]. 18 March 2017. URL: https://www.yenisafak.com/canakkale-zaferi-mesajlari-18-mart-canakkale-zaferi-h-2630048 (accessed 15.01.2019).

Yilmaz, Ihsan and Bashirov, Galib. 2018. 'The AKP after 15 Years. Emergence of Erdoganism in Turkey'. *Third World Quarterly*. 39, 9. 1812–1830.

Yücel, Erdem. 1968. 'Edirnekapı Şehidliği Abidesi' [The Monument of Edirnekapı Martyrs' Cemetry]. *İstanbul Ansiklopedisi*. 9, 4935. İstanbul: Koçu Yayınları.

Zürcher, Erik-Jan. 1998. 'The Ottoman Conscription System. 1844–1914'. *International Review of Social History*. 43. 437–449.