

# 1 From “Classical” and “New” Approaches in Migration Studies to the “Mobilities Perspective” on Migration

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Migration is a highly politicized and controversial topic and it is often dealt with in public debates (Castles 2008, Favell 2014, Bommers 2003). While academic scholars form a different kind of readership and produce a different body of work than policy-makers, nearly all current thinking on migration is bound up with the reproduction of nation-states and nation-society-centered reasoning (Favell 2014: 70-74). (National) Politics clearly influence research on migration, especially in the case of politics-focused works as “the final analysis has very little to say about immigrants themselves, if rather a lot about how elites view, debate, and understand the question.” (ibid.: 99) Politicization, as Bommers notes, always implies a problematization as “migration only becomes a problem when viewed in terms of politics.” (2012a: 27) Therefore, we cannot make a clear distinction between normative scholarly or normative political statements (ibid. 2003: 54). Neither would we know whether studies, promoting a specific understanding of migration, are “policy relevant” or rather “policy driven” (Castles 2008: 6), and how results are or will be interpreted in light of political interests. Such politicization of migration research urges us to reflect about the relationship between academic knowledge production and policy, because it powerfully illustrates the essential dilemma in migration studies, fueled by scholars’ increasing dependence in this field on research commissioned to address short-term policy concerns of governments and international agencies (ibid.). I believe that we need to consider this dilemma in academic work, and that is why I will address it throughout the book.

If migration is not a new phenomenon, today, more than ever, it is considered a structural feature of most industrial countries. As increasing globalization, capitalistic demands for certain kinds of labour, and the desire of individuals to

migrate to improve their life chances persist, migration is likely to continue to be an important phenomenon in the future (Massey et al. 1993, Pries 2001a, King 2012). It is no surprise that it has been long (almost a century) and widely studied in the academic world. Migration studies is an interdisciplinary field, one including scholars from various academic disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, history, geography, economics, political science, demography, and legal studies. The nature of migration is complex and multi-faceted and it underlies ongoing processes of social change, and migration scholars observe and theorize these developments. In their famous review of migration theories, Massey et al. noted that there is “no single, coherent theory [...], only a fragmented set of theories.” (1993: 432) Indeed, constructing one “universal” theory seems like an (over)ambitious project. Twenty years after the essay by Massey and his colleagues, scholars are still nowhere near a general theory of migration, if such a thing is possible. In spite of their fragmented character, migration studies are most often divided into “classical” and “new” approaches.

## 1.1 “CLASSICAL” APPROACHES IN MIGRATION STUDIES

The “classical” approaches focus on the reasons for and causes of migration as well as on processes of migrants’ incorporation into the country of arrival (Mau 2010, De Haas 2008, Pries 2001a, Apatzsch/Siouti 2007, Lutz 2004, Castles 2008). To this day, theories of assimilation, integration, and multiculturalism—as part of the “classical” approaches—have been very influential in migration research. They all focus on migrants crossing international borders and entering a new country: a societal and cultural sphere that is differently organized than that which they have lived in before. The common scholarly interest lies in the question of how the migrants deal with this change over time and how they impact the established societal structures in the country of arrival.

### Assimilation

The concept originated during an era of rapid industrialization, urbanization, and a wave of mass immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe to the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Rumbaut 2015: 83). Before assimilation became a familiar term in public policy debates about immigration, what became known as the Chicago school of sociology popularized it in the 1920s and 1930s (Park and Burgess 1969 [1921], Park 1930 and 1950,

Srole 1945, Warner/Srole 1945, see also Favell 2014). Until recently, scholars in the United States have used the term assimilation more often than European scholars. Reviewing this American debate is important. It was the first sociological formulation dealing with (one form of) mobility, touching on the question of citizens and foreigners in clearly defined (nation-)states, a phenomenon we know as “immigration.” There is an extensive body of literature examining assimilation theoretically and empirically. I will, however, only focus on Gordon’s “classical” formulation and Portes and Zhou’s more recent reformulation, thus distinguishing linear and segmented notions.

### Linear and Segmented Assimilation

Gordon’s work (1964) is perhaps the most important theoretical formulation: it was acknowledged, reviewed, and further developed in almost all further scholarship. In his study, *Assimilation in American Life*, he asks the seemingly simple—though highly sociological—question: “What happens when people meet?” (ibid.: 60) He identifies displacement of an aboriginal population and immigration as the decisive types of the American experience that constitute the setting for these meetings. “Assimilation” accordingly describes the process and the result of such meetings.<sup>1</sup> Gordon’s main contribution are his “assimilation variables” (or stages), which constitute the process (ibid. 71). The first stage is that immigrants change their cultural patterns, including language and religious beliefs, to be more like those of the host society. This is the stage of *cultural assimilation* or “acculturation.” The second step is when immigrants enter the structure of the host society, which they achieve when they participate in societal groups and institutions and thus engage in various relationships with non-immigrants in the sense of *structural assimilation*. The third stage is that of intermarrying, also known as “amalgamation,” understood as *marital assimilation*. Immigrants are at the stage of *identificational assimilation*, the fourth step, when they develop a sense of the host society’s peoplehood. As a fifth step, immigrants reach the point where they do not encounter prejudiced attitudes any more, and are thus in the stage of attitude *receptional assimilation*. The sixth step is that they do not encounter discriminatory behaviour any more, a stage Gor-

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1 Gordon sees the need for a term that would denote the standard to which the immigrants’ relative degree of adjustment can be measured. Drawing on Fishman (1961), he argues that the cultural patterns of middle-class, white Protestant groups of Anglo-Saxon origins (WASP), “whose domination dates from colonial times and whose cultural domination in the United States has never been seriously threatened” (Gordon 1964: 73, original emphasis) best describes this standard.

don labels *behavioural receptional assimilation*. The last and seventh stage is reached when issues involving value and power conflicts do not arise any more in public or civic life: civic assimilation. It is likely that cultural assimilation is the first process to occur when a minority group arrives, even when none of the other stages follow. But, if a minority group is spatially segregated, as the indigenous peoples of America, the acculturation process proceeds only very slowly. It can also be delayed by an “unusually marked discrimination” which African-Americans in the United States face(d).<sup>2</sup> If “*once structural assimilation has occurred [...] all of the other types of assimilation will naturally follow*” (1964: 81, emphasis in original), accordingly structural assimilation is the “keystone of the arch of assimilation.”

If the concept of assimilation became prominent from the 1960s on-wards, it underwent a systematic reevaluation with the beginning of a new era of mass immigration into the United States in the 1990s. It reemerged within contemporary scholarship, which sought a conceptual repertoire for investigating similarities and differences between “old” and “new” immigration (Rumbaut 2015: 87f, Kivisto 2001: 570).<sup>3</sup> Most influentially, this was done by Portes and Zhou (1993) who introduced the notion of “segmented assimilation.”<sup>4</sup> Drawing on empirical observations of the second generation of “new” immigrants, they postulate that the process of assimilation becomes segmented and features several distinct forms of adaptation: first, a growing acculturation and parallel integration into the white middle class; second, a permanent poverty and assimilation into the underclass; and third, a rapid economic advancement while deliberately preserving the values of the immigrant community (1993: 82). “Segmented assimilation” differs from the classical framework insofar as it highlights the “absorption” of immigrant groups by different segments of American society, ranging from middle-class suburbs to impoverished neighbourhoods. To assimilate and become an “American” may be mainly an advantage for immigrants entering the realm of the middle-class. When they enter the bottom of the social hierarchy,

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- 2 Gordon uses the terms “negroes” and “American Indians” (1964: 75,78) which I distance myself from by replacing them with African-Americans and Indigenous Peoples of America.
  - 3 The new immigrants were not predominantly white anymore and faced a different economic situation of an “hourglass economy,” describing the disappearance of intermediate opportunities, and leaving a gap between low wage menial jobs and high-tech or professional occupations that require college degrees (Portes/Zhou 1993: 76f).
  - 4 For other works making the case for the ongoing significance of assimilation theory, see Alba/Nee 1997, Zhou 1997, Joppke/Morawska 2003, Brubaker 2003, a.o.

the forces of assimilation stem from the underprivileged segments and can result in distinct disadvantages, displayed by both the mainstream society and the ethnic community. As American society offers different possibilities to different immigrant groups, the process of assimilation is segmented accordingly. How it proceeds depends upon the financial capital of the migrant family, the social conditions they left behind, the context that receives them as well as cultural features like values, family relations, and social ties (ibid.: 999).

### **Pondering Critiques**

Gordon's work on assimilation was not received without criticism. It was mainly criticized for constructing a linear process, whose goal is the complete absorption of immigrant groups into a WASP "core culture," not acknowledging other outcomes of the process "when people meet." The theory is not only normative and teleological, but it also suggests that it is only the immigrants' responsibility to adapt, making it a one-sided process. As Gordon underlines, his typology was meant to be a neutral ideal-typical classification; yet, it is often equated with the conservative idea that immigrants must conform to the norms and values of the white majority in order to be accepted.<sup>5</sup> Notwithstanding Gordon's intentions, his essentializing understanding of culture as a homogenous unit in the process of acculturation, the first stage of assimilation, must be challenged (Amelina 2008: 10). The alternative framework of "segmented assimilation" modified some of the central aspects of critique, albeit perpetuating the same functionalist assumption that it is the immigrant's obligation, duty or debt to adjust to the norms and rules of the country of arrival. Pries uses the German expression of *Bringschuld* (2015a: 14), effectively underlining the notion of normativity. For several migration scholars, the notion of assimilation thus remains "ill-suited" (Rumbaut 2015: 86) and even "harmful." (Prodolliet 2003: 25)

### **Integration**

The discussion about assimilation as an academic concept was received quite differently in Europe than in the United States. American scholars commonly used and still use it, while integration is the more popular concept in European immigration countries (Favell 2014: 65, Wessendorf 2013: 6f). It is a "two-way process which also involves social and cultural transformations in the majority society." (Wessendorf 2013: 7; see also Banton 2001, Pries 2003) In this section,

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5 Some scholars argue that his theory has been misinterpreted (Favell 2014, Rumbaut 2015).

I address the works of the German sociologist Hartmut Esser (1980, 2001a, 2001b, 2003, 2009, 2010) and the Canadian cross-cultural psychologist John W. Berry (1997, 2005, 2009, 2010 et.al., 2011) because they conceptualize integration as going beyond assimilation as the only theoretical outcome: they distinguish different patterns of immigrants' relation to the host society within the processes of integration.

### **An Assimilationist View on Integration**

Esser's work is well known in the German and European scholarly context. His "course model" (*Verlaufsmodel*) constructs the typical paths of migrants' integration into either the society of origin and/or the ethnic community or into the society of arrival (1980: 209; 2001a: 20f; 2001b: 19, 2010: 145). Accordingly, he discerns four kinds of integration possibilities (table 1).

*Table 1: Types of Social Integration of Migrants and Ethnic Minorities*

		<b>social integration into the society of arrival</b>	
		multiple integration	segmentation
<b>social integration into the society of origin/ ethnic community</b>	yes	multiple integration	segmentation
	no	assimilation	marginalization

Source: Esser 2001a: 21, own translation from German original

Multiple integration describes the social integration of actors into both societies—of origin or ethnic community and of arrival. Segmentation is characterized by an inclusion into the society of origin or ethnic community and an exclusion of spheres in the society of arrival. Assimilation is the integration into the society of arrival and a giving up of integration into ethnic contexts. And marginalization describes the expulsion out of both societal contexts (2001a: 21). Since marginalization and segmentation do not promote a participation in the country of arrival, only two possibilities remain for migrants' social integration:

multiple integration and assimilation. Multiple integration requires a simultaneous social integration in several—socially and culturally—different realms. It manifests itself in multilingualism, a mixture of social circles and a bi- or multiple identity construction, which Esser evaluates as empirically rare:

“Multiple integration is often desired, however, theoretically it is hardly realistic and empirically, it is very rarely the case. [...] Why [it] is so rare, is easy to explain: it requires a degree of learning and interaction activities and, in particular, occasions that remain closed for most people—and even more so for the usual (labour-) migrants, who face significant restrictions on the organization of their everyday life. This type of ‘multicultural’ social integration would be possible at best for the children of diplomats or for academics [...]” (Esser 2001b: 20f)<sup>6</sup>

Therefore—Esser reasons—social integration into the society of arrival is actually only possible in the form of assimilation (ibid., 2001a: 22, 2003: 20). Theoretically, it does not need to be a one-sided process, but empirically there is “such a thing as a *standard* to which migrants must orient themselves almost ‘one-sidedly.’” 2001b: 23, original emphasis)<sup>7</sup> This standard results from nation-states that would distribute social positions through their dominant institutions (“*Leit*”-*Institutionen*), which, in turn, follow a dominant culture (“*Leit*”-*Kultur*) (ibid.: 28, 2010: 149f). Esser argues that a successful social integration of immigrants requires cultural adaptation so as to avoid ethnic stratification, that is the systematic co-variation of ethnic variables (such as culture, religion) with certain structural variables (such as education, profession, income), resulting in ethnic hierarchies (2001b: 36, 2001a: 26, 2010: 146). As this would be the case in multicultural societies, he sees no (political) alternative to assimilation (Esser 2001b: 66, 2001a: 29).

Esser’s integration theory has met with much criticism. For him, the integration goal is clearly assimilation and thus the points of critique stated above also

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6 “Die Mehrfachintegration ist zwar ein oft gewünschter, theoretisch jedoch kaum realistischer und auch empirisch ein sehr seltener Fall. [...] Warum sie so selten ist, lässt sich leicht erklären: Sie erfordert ein Ausmaß an Lern- und Interaktionsaktivitäten und, vor allem, an Gelegenheiten dazu, dass den meisten Menschen verschlossen ist—und das erst recht bei den üblichen (Arbeits-)Migranten mit ihren deutlichen Restriktionen der Alltagsgestaltung. Dieser Typ der ‘multikulturellen’ Sozialintegration käme allenfalls für Diplomatenkinder oder Akademiker in Frage [...]”

7 “[T]atsächlich so etwas wie einen *Standard*, an dem sich die Migranten nahezu ‘einseitig’ zu orientieren haben.”

apply. Particularly, his usage of the notion of “dominant culture” needs to be questioned; he posits that the immigrants’ conventional cultural knowledge is an obstacle for processes of structural assimilation, equating cultural borders with the borders of a nation-state (Amelina 2008: 12, Pries 2003: 32). Additionally, he does not consider both the psychological and mental states of immigrants as well as external impacts, such as nation-state policies, that are likely to function as barriers. His “theorem of irreconcilability” (Geißler 2004: 294) of multiple integration cannot be confirmed in view of the Canadian example of multiculturalism. It is an improper generalization.

**A Multicultural View on Integration**

Situated in the field of cross-cultural psychology, Berry is interested in the question of what happens to those individuals who have developed in one cultural context and attempt to live in a new one. He argues that all cultural groups “must deal with the issue of how to acculturate” (1997: 9), which implies two central choices. First, they can choose cultural maintenance, implying reflection on the extent to which their cultural identity and maintenance is important. Second, they can choose contact and participation, tackling the question about the extent of their becoming involved in other cultural groups, or remaining primarily among themselves. Berry generates a conceptual framework that posits four acculturation strategies (table 2).

*Table 2: Acculturation Strategies*

		<b>ISSUE 1</b>	
		is it considered to be of value to maintain one’s identity and characteristics?	
		yes ↔ no	
<b>ISSUE 2</b>	yes ↕ no	integration	assimilation
is it considered to be of value to maintain relationships with larger society?		separation/ segregation	marginalization

Source: Berry 1997: 10, slightly modified representation of the original table

When individuals do not maintain their cultural characteristics and seek relationships with other cultures of the society, the strategy is “assimilation.” It involves culture shedding; the unlearning of (certain) previous cultural patterns. When, in contrast, the individuals value their cultural characteristics and do not wish to interact with others, then “separation” is the strategy. It involves a rejection of the dominant culture, which is likely to be reciprocated. When cultural groups are interested in both maintaining their culture while interacting with other groups, the strategy is “integration.” Yet, it can only be pursued when the dominant groups are open and have an inclusive attitude towards cultural diversity, as in societies that are explicitly multicultural. When individuals have little interest in or possibility for cultural maintenance and for establishing relationships with other groups, it is “marginalization,” but people rarely choose it as a strategy, rather they become marginalized due to a combination of forced assimilation and forced exclusion (1997: 9ff, 2005: 704f, 2009: 366, 2011: 2.6).

Berry sees parallels between the acculturation strategies and the national policies of different countries. However, the preferences for acculturation strategies vary—for both cultural groups and national policies—depending on the context and time period. Berry proposes to generally consider two societal contexts when studying acculturation; the society of origin and the society of settlement, where most political action can be taken in the latter. For that, he promotes multiculturalism and pluralism in public education, social legislation, and institutional change as he advocates for integration as a mutual accommodation, implying costs on both sides:

“[...] to the dominant society in changing school curricula and health services; to the acculturation group in shedding some aspects of their culture that are valued but not adaptive.” (Berry 1997: 27)

The political management of diversity depends therefore on both the acceptance of it as a cultural (or empirical) fact, and the mutual willingness to change. Berry assumes that there is no cultural group to remain unchanged as “acculturation is a two-way interaction, resulting in actions and reactions to the contact situations.” (2009: 365)

As so often occurs in academic discourse, Berry’s acculturation strategies were criticized by fellow scholars in the field. Most importantly, they question whether the acculturation strategies are real strategies intentionally put forward by the individuals themselves (Cresswell 2009, Waldram 2009) and they criticize classifying individuals as high or low on the receiving-culture acquisition and on the heritage-culture maintenance scales, using *a priori* values. The criti-

cisms suggest that not all of Berry's strategies may exist in a given sample and that various samples may contain subtypes (Rudmin 2003).<sup>8</sup> In sum, Esser and Berry conceptualize the same process, but they come to exact opposite theoretical, empirical, and political conclusions.

## **Multiculturalism**

The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s in the United States signaled a shift from the paradigm of assimilation to multiculturalism. Without a doubt, multicultural positions criticize and are resistant to the imperatives of assimilation (Goldberg 1994: 3-6). The policies were first introduced in Canada and Australia in the 1970s, and in several liberal democracies soon after, such as Great Britain, The Netherlands, and Sweden. However, Canada often serves as the prime example as it is there where, "multiculturalism has always been at its strongest." (Crowder 2013: 2) The origin of Canadian multiculturalism, however, was rather unintended. The "quiet revolution" of the 1960s resulted in increased self-expression on the part of the Canadian province of Quebec. In order to address the "Quebec question," the federal government set up a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, in which public hearings were held. Some of these were made by non-British and non-French cultural groups and many statements in these hearings challenged the conventional national assimilation model of Anglo and Franco conformity. In 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau reversed the bicultural recommendations of the Commission (but notably not the bilingual) and declared multiculturalism as the official state policy (Ley 2010: 191). Most of the well-known theories of multiculturalism have been formulated by political scientists and/or philosophers in response to the implementation of the official policies. Though there is a great body of literature on multiculturalism, I restrict my review to the works of the Canadian political philosopher, Will Kymlicka (1989, 1995, 2002, 2010). He is widely acknowledged to be the leading theorist of multiculturalism.

## **The Political Philosophy of Liberal Multiculturalism**

In his works, *Liberalism, Community, and Culture* (1989) and *Multicultural Citizenship* (1995), Kymlicka constructs a systematic case for multiculturalism based on a liberal approach to minority rights. For him, a just society needs to compensate people for the worst effects of undeserved disadvantage and since

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8 For an in-depth discussion of the supposed shortcomings of Berry's work, see particularly Rudmin 2003, 2009.

the state compensates for undeserved *economic* disadvantage, it must also compensate for undeserved *cultural* disadvantage. It should accord positive recognition for minority cultural groups by implementing a more active policy, and accordingly, treat cultural groups differently. Kymlicka underlines that differential treatment of citizens is not always bad for it depends on the reasons —as in the case of the indigenous peoples in Canada:

“To give every Canadian equal citizenship rights without regard to race or ethnicity, given the vulnerability of aboriginal communities to the decisions of the non-aboriginal majority, does not seem to treat Indians and Inuit with equal respect. For it ignores a potentially devastating problem faced by aboriginal people but not by English-Canadians—the loss of cultural membership.” (1989: 151)

Here, he sets out that a differentiated treatment of indigenous peoples is not only desirable but indeed required in order for these minority groups to meet with respect and fairness (1989: 4). However, another of Kymlicka’s concerns is about liberty or the cultural conditions for freedom. He reasons that cultural membership is especially important in this regard as it provides humans with the necessary context for the freedom of choice (and the freedom to revise these choices). He assumes that, for most people, the culture in which they have been brought up matters most as people do not usually change their whole set of cultural affiliations. They may select amongst different aspects of culture, which in fact presupposes rather than denies the importance of their own culture (1989: 165ff). For that reason, it is likely that a modern society, which contains people affiliated with diverse cultures, needs to accommodate or encourage more than one culture (1995: 84-93). These goals are to be secured by the state as it has an obligation to guarantee the cultural conditions for this freedom, which is particularly relevant for indigenous groups: they are very disadvantaged in settler societies, not because of their choices, but because of the circumstances of colonization for which they are not responsible (1989: 186, 1995: 50).

In *Multicultural Citizenship* (1995), Kymlicka introduces a key distinction between two kinds of cultural minority. That is, “national” and “ethnic” minority. National minorities have been incorporated into the modern state by either conquest, colonization, or federation, but they have never relinquished their claims to a “societal culture” of their own, as in the case of indigenous peoples, national groups like the Québécois in Canada, or the Basques in Spain (Kymlicka 1995: 19, 79; 2002: 3ff, 2010: 101f). By contrast, ethnic minorities are immigrant groups, whose members have generally chosen to become part of a new society. They are encouraged to maintain some aspects of their ethnic par-

ticularity, but they also need to integrate into the dominant pattern, which they can do in their own way. Accordingly, national and ethnic minorities are entitled to different kinds of rights: the rights of national minorities are much stronger, while ethnic minorities have weaker ones. Kymlicka distinguishes three forms of group-specific rights. First, there are self-government rights to secure forms of political autonomy or territorial jurisdiction, granted to national minorities. Second, polyethnic rights for ethnic minorities, which are predominantly designed to assist in the integration of immigrants; and third, special representation rights, granting the representation of minority groups in political processes (1995: 27-32.). Obviously, Kymlicka promotes special cultural rights to specific kinds of minorities, running the risk of accepting illiberal, patriarchal, and harmful traditions. In that respect, he argues that the state is entitled to intervene in illiberal cultures in order to liberalize them: to protect the basic civil and political liberties of group members and to promote their capacity for personal autonomy. He sees liberalization as a matter of degree, and not as something essential to some cultures while not to others (1995: 94ff). This means encouraging a culture to change. It is

“[...] a deeply (and intentionally) transformative project, both for minorities and majorities. It demands that both dominant and historically subordinated groups engage in new practices, enter new relationships, and embrace new concepts and discourses, all of which profoundly transform people’s identities and practices.” (2012: 103)

Kymlicka’s theory of minority cultural rights has attracted a wide range of criticism. The distinction between claims of national minorities and those of immigrant minorities, for instance, is not transferable: while it clarifies the stakes in multinational cases where both groups are present, it fails where these groups are not at the center of the political or legal dilemmas. The question of post-slavery African-Americans in the United States is an example. Here, Kymlicka’s distinction does not fit as African-Americans were neither a national minority nor a voluntary immigrant group (Favell 2014: 24f). Many critics take issue with the question of how to deal with minorities that follow illiberal social practices, or as Favell phrases it: “Should a tolerant society tolerate the intolerant?” (2014: 13) Some critics believe that Kymlicka treats illiberal groups too restrictively (Kukathas 1992), while others claim that he concedes too much to such groups, and so allowing them to mistreat their own members (Barry 2002, Okin 1999). Okin asks the relevant question whether multiculturalism is bad for women, and answers it with an unqualified “yes.” She argues that multiculturalism as the accommodation of cultural minorities reinforces patriarchal traditions because

most of the groups that are to be accommodated “have as one of their principle aims the control of women by men.” (Okin 1999: 13) Group leaders of minority groups are therefore more likely to be men, and “under such conditions, group rights are potentially, and in many cases actually, antifeminist” (ibid.) because the (sexual) servitude of women and other severe harm done to women by men of their own cultural groups is presented as synonymous with cultural traditions (ibid.: 16).

### What happens in the Country of Arrival?

Approaches of assimilation, integration, and multiculturalism are not always clearly distinguishable from one another, but each approach contains conceptual particularities which are based on different epistemological stances, philosophical positions and, not least, empirical results. Most obviously, they differ in the conceptualized *outcomes*. While assimilation clearly demands a one-sided effort on behalf of immigrants in order to (culturally) adjust to the society of the country of arrival; multiculturalism rather gives national and ethnic minorities positive recognition in public policy and public institutions. Integration, however, remains ambiguous. As we have seen, Esser (2001a, 2003) conceptualizes integration as assimilationist, while Berry (1997, 2005, 2011) conceptualizes integration as a “mutual accommodation,” which is more likely to work in a multicultural social environment. In addition, Kymlicka (2010, 2012), asserts that integration is indeed an essential part of multicultural policies. Hence, integration may be both assimilationist or multiculturalist.

It is important to note that assimilation, integration, and multiculturalism are not only theories of migrants’ incorporation, but (were) also agendas of policy-making in Europe and North America. While some European countries such as Germany, Switzerland, and Austria completely prohibited permanent settlement and family reunion, only accepting temporary migration (as “guest workers” mostly) in the early stages of post-1945 migration, settler societies like the USA, Canada, and Australia, and also other European countries rather correspond(ed) with assimilationist models of policy-making, reaching from the period of post-1945 up to the 1970s.<sup>9</sup> Back then, both policy models shared the belief that cultural pluralism is not a desirable goal for the processes of nation-state building. From the 1960s onwards, this belief was challenged as it was obvious that immigrants were not necessarily becoming culturally assimilated, partly due to dis-

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9 Politically, assimilation was not only used in the context of immigration, but also in times of colonization (Rumbaut 2015).

criminary practices and racism which lead to spatial segregation and social exclusion. The formation of ethnic communities and the emergence of cultures of resistance compelled these countries to face an enduring cultural diversity and it led to the introduction of multiculturalist models of policy-making. Those European countries that followed exclusionary models of policy-making, however, had to realize that the migrants expected to remain temporal “guest workers” stayed on, yet some countries became aware of or accepted this development as part of the social reality only later. Germany, for instance, refused the self-description as an “immigration country”—regardless of the clear empirical facts—up until the 1990s. Albeit this late realization, most European immigration countries, such as Germany, Switzerland, France, Italy, Denmark; meanwhile also the United Kingdom, Sweden, and The Netherlands, and to a certain degree also the United States follow integrationalist models of policy-making, which are—as I see it—neither as liberal as multiculturalist models, nor as assimilationist as the theory suggests (Castles 2008, Vertovec/Wessendorf 2010, Kymlicka 2010, Pries 2003, Crowder 2013, Goldberg 1994, Triadafilopoulos 2012, Joppke/Morawska 2003, Bommes 2012a).

I argue that using assimilation as an analytical concept in migration studies is problematic as it, first, casts a country’s factual citizens into the role of successful or unsuccessful assimilated “migrants” over generations. It seems as if assimilation triggers a competition, or as FitzGerald puts it “a sort of ethnic Olympic Games in which national or racial groups are entities moving through time that spar with each other.” (2014: 131) This is, for instance, the case when assimilation is studied for the “second generation,” turning *ius soli* national citizens back into “migrants.” It reminds us of the European case, as for instance, in Germany. Germany has a long tradition of *ius sanguinis*, although it has also restrictedly acted upon the *ius soli* principle since 2000, yet Germany partly turns factual non-migrants into “persons with a migration background” regardless of their nationality or citizenship. *When does a migrant become a non-migrant, then?* The notion of migration becomes problematic, especially when reified over generations and investigated through the lens of assimilation. The concept appropriates the “sedentary bias” in migration research, which is the “unquestioned assumption that migration is a bad thing” (Castles 2010: 1568) as it constructs migrants as “deficit-beings” (Thränhardt 2005, Shinozaki 2008) who need to change their ways of being. Second, if we examine these ideas from another perspective, assimilation as a concept is likely to nurture the politicization of migration research. In fact, Castles points out that the “assimilation turn” has helped to justify changes in national policies either by integration contracts or citizenship tests

in several European countries (2010: 1572). Here, the question whether such research is “policy-relevant” or “policy-driven” becomes blurry again.

Political positions on migration often appear entrenched and the politicization of migration research is evidently strongest with regard to the approaches discussed because the question of how to accommodate immigrants is an issue of genuine interest for nation-states and multinational countries, which increasingly have to deal with it. Assimilation and integration take the nation-state-society for granted as the exclusive context of migrants’ incorporation (Favell 2014: 66f, Pries 2003: 30)—and evidently so does multiculturalism for the multinational state. The approaches reproduce a unitary vision of the modern (multi-)national state. If we would not take a state and a society as the unchallenged backdrop of these conceptualizations, the question of: “Who or what is integrating whom with what?” is not so easy to answer (Favell 2014: 75). Integration can thus simply not be measured until a representative control group of the national population has been specified and power hierarchies resulting from that are mirrored in the research of integration issues.<sup>10</sup>

From a sociological perspective, the approaches of assimilation, integration, and multiculturalism thus give answers to the following question: *What happens in the country of arrival*, once individuals have migrated, to them and the society they have entered? Migration theory gives us mainly two answers: first assimilation (or: assimilationist integration), suggesting that it is the migrants’ task to—structurally and culturally—incorporate into the host society; and second multiculturalism (or: multicultural integration), suggesting a mutual accommodation as a responsibility of both the migrants as well as the host society, wherein cultural heterogeneity of the population is appreciated.

## 1.2 “NEW” APPROACHES IN MIGRATION STUDIES

The so-called “new” approaches resulted out of great shifts and enhancements in migration studies. They are further developments of “classical” perspectives, aiming to capture new (or newly recognized) dynamics of migration. They include the “intermediate,” that is the activities, relations, and social spaces between or beyond the country of origin and the country of arrival. Despite several other approaches that constitute the “new”; I will focus on (migrant) transnation-

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10 Favell offers a state-of-the art review of European research on integration, especially on commissioned studies on integration policy and survey and census-based works (2014: ch. 5).

alism, diaspora, and cosmopolitanism. I choose them, particularly because they all are meant to transcend the nation-state model and reconcile cross-border activities with experiences of “cultural otherness.”

### **(Migrant) Transnationalism**

In the 1990s, scholars announced a “transnational turn” in the field of migration studies: The term “transnationalism” entered the lexicon and gained remarkable foothold. I understand it as a specific research perspective, which indicates increasing cross-border interactions of institutions, organizations, social groups, and individuals. These interactions feature various shapes of duration, continuity, and intensity, and they range beyond at least two nation-states, thereby creating new social formations (e.g., relationships, networks, communities, fields, and spaces). Referring to a variety of phenomena, transnationalism requires empirical research and theorization on various scales and levels of abstraction. By now, the transnational approach commonly shapes empirical and theoretical research not only in migration studies, but across all disciplines of social sciences and humanities. I will introduce some of the key theoretical, empirical, and methodological discussions in this section, dividing the review into “classical” and “new” scholarship so as to outline the ongoing developments in this research field.

### **Classical Transnationalism**

The transnational perspective initially took hold in social anthropology and later, sociology. The pioneering work of Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Szanton Blanc (1992, 1994) discussed the distinctive features of migration in the context of a new influx of immigrants from economically less developed countries to the most advanced industrial nations of a capitalist world system (Dahinden 2009, Faist 2011, Kivisto 2001, Østergaard-Nielsen 2012, Pries 2001a). The immigrants did not break off all social relations and cultural ties to their homelands. Unlike the credo of assimilation theory, Glick Schiller et. al., rather see that

“[...] a new kind of migrating population is emerging, composed of those whose networks, activities and patterns of life encompass both their home and host societies. Their lives cut across national boundaries and bring two societies into a single social field.” (1992: 1)

They make two initial points: one is historical and the other is theoretical. Compared to earlier immigration, they posit that there is something qualitatively dif-

ferent about the immigrants they examined.<sup>11</sup> More importantly, the authors offer a rationale for a new analytical framework by introducing the two terms of “transnationalism” and “transmigrants.” The former is “the process by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement,” while the latter are the “immigrants who build such social fields.” (1995: 1) Grasping the dialectical interplay between homeland concern and realities in the host country, they were particularly interested in the impact this interplay has on immigrants, e.g., on their identity constructions, which contest static categories of difference (Glick Schiller et al. 1992: 8-29, Basch et al. 1994: 30-34, *ibid.*: 1995: 49ff).

The transnational perspective on migration stresses the emergence of new social formations such as fields or spaces. Cross-border practices embedded in *transnational social fields* are dependent of networks and positions of individuals and institutions. Transnational relations within such fields can evolve into *transnational communities* (Levitt 2001b), which engage in transnational activities: including migrants and non-migrants alike, by *ways of being* and *ways of belonging* (Levitt/Glick Schiller 2004). While ways of being describe individuals who are embedded in transnational relations of the field without identifying with that field, ways of belonging refer to practices that demonstrate a conscious connection to a particular group (*ibid.*: 11). Some scholars prefer the notion of fields, and others prefer spaces. The most sustained and theoretically ambitious works concerning the latter notion have been—as I believe—advanced by the political scientist Thomas Faist (2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2010b, 2011, a.o.) and the sociologist Ludger Pries (1996, 2001a, 2001b, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2015b a.o.). Faist considers the migratory system as a boundary-breaking process which penetrates two or more nation-states and becomes part of a singular transnational social space. It expands as technological possibilities grow and mobility steadily increases. Central to his argument is the degree of formalization, which brings him to differentiate four types of transnational social spaces:<sup>12</sup> a low degree of formalization applies to networks, such as *diffusion* and *issue networks*, while a high degree of formalization targets institutions, such as *small kinship groups* as

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11 In the aftermath, it has often been stated that the historical argument is incorrect as transnational phenomena are not historically new, so that correctives were needed and taken.

12 In his well-known monograph *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces* (2000b), Faist distinguished only three types of social spaces (ch. 7: 195-241). In the course of his ongoing work, he complemented this typology.

well as *communities and organizations* (2000a: 202-206, 2000b: 195f, 2006: 4, 2011: 27f). In Pries' model, *transnational social spaces* form one ideal type amongst others.<sup>13</sup> They are a combination of both relational social spaces and relational geographic spaces. Essentially, he identifies three *ideal-types* of social spaces as relevant for transnational studies: *everyday life*, *organizations*, and *institutions*, in which *everyday life* represents the micro-level, while *organizations* represent the meso-level, and *institutions* represent the macro-level (2015b: 41ff, 2010: 15, 2005: 172f, 2008: 88-95, 2001: 4ff). Both models go beyond the migrant experience as they include the border-crossing activities of, for instance, larger social configurations like organizations. I believe that Pries' theoretical framework is almost a general social theory rather than a theory on migration as it takes into account a diversity of social phenomena, not only transnational or migratory ones. Faist, however, focuses more on the variety within the transnational social space. Both works contribute in their own way to disentangling the superposition between state, territory, and culture/sociality.

The most important (theoretical) advancement of classical transnationalism is the well-known critique of mainstream, nation-stated social sciences. Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller (2002) designated *methodological nationalism* to describe the taking for granted of national units as the lens of social science analysis in which the nation-stated order of the world shapes immigration:

"[...] nation-state building processes have fundamentally shaped the ways in which immigration has been perceived and received. [...] [*M*]ethodological nationalism [is] the assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world." (Wimmer/Glick Schiller 2002: 301f)

Social sciences tend to equate society with boundaries of a nation-state, which implies that belongings and practices enacted across state boundaries are extraordinary. While nation-states are still extremely important; social life, however, is not confined by their boundaries. There is a general agreement amongst transnational scholars to challenge and overcome methodological nationalism as it impairs the exposure of transnational phenomena (Basch et al. 1994, Faist 2000, Wimmer/Glick Schiller 2002, Levitt/Glick Schiller 2004, Vertovec 2004,

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13 In the broader context of his theoretical work, Pries approaches transnationalism as one of seven ideal types of the "internationalisation of sociality." (*Internationalisierung der Vergesellschaftung*) For further reading about his definition of transnationalism and the six remaining ideal types of the internationalisation of sociality, see Pries 2008.

Pries 2008, Østergaard-Nielsen 2012). Notwithstanding, one of the most severe criticisms is that transnational studies are themselves stuck in exactly what they try to oppose; and thus, not able to overcome the “methodological nationalism trap” since the nation-state still dominates in (comparative) studies. They have been criticized for using ethnic categories as the main variables to explore research outlines, thus looking through an ethnic lens and (sometimes) triggering naturalizing views on ethnicity (Østergaard-Nielsen 2012: 121, Faist 2010b: 23, Amelina/Faist 2012: 1710). To overcome this bias, Amelina and Faist (2012) propose to use *multi-sited ethnography* (Marcus 1995), the *mobile methods* approach (Büscher/Urry 2009), as well as the *self-reflexive* approach more often in empirical studies.<sup>14</sup>

### New Transnationalism

Since the “transnational turn,” we better understand how migrants remain connected to their countries of origin and their countries of arrival, and sometimes even to other places. Recent literature gets into dialogue with spatial mobility. I perceive this mobility-occupied scholarship in transnational studies as “new” instead of “classic.”

Janine Dahinden, for instance, proposes to distinguish between “*transnationality based on sedentariness*” and “*transnationality based on mobility*” (2010: 20). She argues that her empirical findings about cabaret dancers in Switzerland (2009) do not fit into the “classical transnational paradigm.” She emphasizes the dynamics of the dancers’ circular mobility: in order to stay mobile, they need to “settle down” so as to establish networks that would provide them with relevant information about other places where they can work. For some, mobility is permanent and is used as a strategy; for others, the mobile *parcours* ends quickly (ibid.: 2009: 3).<sup>15</sup> Based on the combination of *transnational mobility* (as the physical movement in transnational space) and *locality in the sending or/and the receiving country* (as being socially, economically, or politically anchored) Dahinden proposes four ideal types of transnational practices: (1) *localized diasporic transnational formations* characterized by low levels of transnational

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14 Luin Goldring and Patricia Landolt (2014) present an impressive example of how they worked through challenges rooted in methodological nationalism during their research on Latin American incorporations and transnational engagements in Canada. In an honest and self-reflexive way, the authors recognized the limits of their original formulations and developed solutions *on the go* by reformulating conceptual categories and analytical themes.

15 For similar results, see Morokvasic 2003.

mobility and high levels of local anchorage in the receiving and low levels of local anchorage in the sending country, (2) *localized mobile transnational formations*, describing simultaneously high levels of mobility and high levels of local anchorage in receiving and sending countries, (3) *transnational mobiles*, describing individuals that are more or less permanently on the move with low levels of local anchorage in the receiving country, and (4) *transnational outsiders* characterized by low transnational mobility and a low degree of local anchorage (2010). Dahinden's typology is a prime example emphasizing the complex relations between migrants' transnational activities and mobilities. She reminds us that locality is as important as analyzing mobilities because migrants must touch down somewhere—or as Tissot vividly puts it “mobility is not floating in the sky; mobility needs anchors.” (2016: 7)

The works of Magdalena Nowicka also deal with mobility in the context of transnational studies, mostly examining “mobile transnational professionals” (2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2008), who are highly-skilled people working for an international organization. They usually undertake several trips abroad per year that are no shorter than one or two weeks and no longer than four weeks. Additionally, her respondents often travel for holidays and leisure time, but also to visit their families in their countries of origin. Given these premises, mobile professionals cannot be understood as “typical migrants” (2006b: 98) and/or as “transnational migrants” because they are not necessarily bound by ties of family and kinship, and by categories such as race, ethnicity, language, and nationality. Unlike “migrants,” they are not expected to integrate as they are disembedded from the context of the nation-state through their embeddedness in the international organization (ibid.: 19f). Nowicka is interested in the individuals' strategies and actions so as to understand the construction of spatial relations within the context of extensive mobility (ibid.: 21). Her main findings suggest that “being present” and “being absent” are important, but not as absolute categories that are mutually exclusive. They rather indicate a gradual change in the quality of interactions, in which instruments of distant communication are not able to replace physical proximity as “one not only meets people, one meets places.” (Nowicka 2006b: 231) For mobile professionals, temporal aspects are significant, too. They are not so much bothered by the simultaneity of events, but more by time delays, temporal shifts and gaps between action and reaction, which influence social relationships, especially between partners. Space matters insofar as it reconstitutes how the mobile professionals socialize with others, but it does not matter in terms of belonging or identity (ibid.: ch.5: 227-242, see also 2007a, 2008). Nowicka's works indeed put mobility to the fore when dealing with transnational experiences and their consequences in the lives of individuals.

## Diaspora

Like transnationalism, the term *diaspora* is extensively used throughout the social sciences and humanities. Both terms are often used interchangeably; in fact, many scholars understand a diaspora as a specific kind of a “transnational community.” But for quite a long time, the notion was not considered worthy of scholarly discussion about ethnic communities and immigrants as its meaning was very narrow, only applying to the exile of Jews from their historic homeland (Safran 1991: 83). It was not until the 1980s that the use proliferated and its meaning stretched to include migrants who maintain emotional and social ties with their homelands (Brubaker 2005). In this section, I will first delineate the definitions, meanings, and uses of the notion before presenting empirical results in the form of ideal types of a diaspora.

### Definitions, Meanings, and Uses of Diaspora

By now, the use of the concept is ever-broadening. The expression “diaspora diaspora”—coined by Brubaker (2005)—draws attention to its overuse and extensive dispersion in semantic, conceptual, and disciplinary space. It warns of its becoming stretched “to the point of uselessness” and subsequently losing its ability to make distinctions (ibid.: 3). Safran (1991) proposes that it be applied to minority communities under the condition that the members (or their ancestors) have been dispersed from an original “center” to two or more foreign regions and that they maintain a collective myth of their homeland. The myth relates to the belief that the diasporas are not fully accepted by the host society; they feel strongly committed to their homeland and they often wish to return (1991: 83f). Diasporas, however, persist without a return, yet the myth remains an important means of solidifying ethnic consciousness and solidarity, often exploited for a variety of political and social purposes by the diasporas, their homelands, and their host societies (Safran 1991: 91f). Additionally, diasporas preserve their identity by resisting assimilation and as a consequence of exclusion. They also often engage in self-segregation. Such *boundary-maintenance* must persist over generations, and thus, distinctive communities are held together by active solidarity and dense social relationships, cutting across state boundaries and linking members of different states into a single “transnational community.” (Brubaker 2005) In this context, Vertovec (1997) elaborates on the “diaspora consciousness” and draws attention to the “awareness of multi-locality,” which stimulates the need to connect oneself with others, both “here and there” who share the same “roots and routes”—culminating into a kind of “collective memory.”

### **Ideal Types of Diaspora**

Cohen (2008) presents an impressive and extensive account of “global diasporas.” He classifies historical examples as ideal types by highlighting their most important characteristics. Drawing on the experiences of Jews, Africans, and Armenians, the first type is that of the “victim diaspora.” Forcible dispersion is an important characteristic, yet Cohen acknowledges that many Jewish communities all over the world resulted rather from trade and financial networks, highlighting their nuanced experiences (2008: ch. 2: 21-36). Africans and Armenians both experienced a “break event” in their histories: Atlantic slavery in the case of Africans and the 1915-1916 genocide in the case of Armenians. These events lead to a wide dispersion and the construction of a collective memory and myth about their homelands (ibid.: ch. 3: 39-59). The second one is the “labour diaspora,” in which his central example is that of indentured Indian workers, who were deployed in British, Dutch, and French tropical plantations from the 1830s to the 1920s. The “imperial diaspora” is the third type. It draws upon the seventeenth-century emigration from Britain, in which most British emigrants sought new opportunities mostly in the United States, but also in countries of empire settlement such as New Zealand, Canada, Australia, Rhodesia, and South Africa. He further mentions the “trade diaspora,” based on the Chinese and the Lebanese, who were permitted to engage in commerce by the colonial regime (ibid.: 83-100). The last type, the “deterritorialized diaspora,” focuses on the history of Caribbean peoples, Sindhis, and Parsis, who have been multiply and forcibly dispersed and continue to migrate. The ideal types emphasize that the notion of diaspora neither refers to a single, endogamous, ethnic group with fixed origins and a uniform history, nor to a lifestyle cut off from fellow citizens in the places of settlement where political aspirations fully focus on the places of origin.

### **Cosmopolitanism**

The view of cosmopolitanism is an old one. It is a major area of interest which has generated a good deal of scholarship by now. It is not a migration approach *per se*, yet it is analytically used in ever more scholarly work on migration. As with (migrant) transnationalism and diaspora, the concept draws attention to transformative processes resulting from border-spanning markets, networks, patterns of attachment, and new forms of governance. I will briefly sketch the main intellectual traditions of thinking and theorizing cosmopolitanism, accordingly differentiating between the (moral, political) idea of “cosmopolitanism as a world order” and “cosmopolitanism as a social practice” of individuals.

### **Cosmopolitanism as a (Moral) Idea of World Order**

Cosmopolitanism is, first and foremost, a moral idea about a societal order of humanity. It has its roots in ancient Greek philosophical writings and was then further elaborated during the Enlightenment, most importantly by Kant (1795). As a philosophy, it means seeing humans as “citizens of the world.” Without a doubt, such a vision comes with an idea about a certain political order, which I will briefly explicate with reference to the modern works of Ulrich Beck (2000, 2005, with Sznaider 2006, 2008, a.o), who—most influentially—introduced cosmopolitanism to the field of social sciences.

In his social theory, Beck introduces the distinction between cosmopolitan philosophy and cosmopolitan sociology. His works mainly advance the idea of a “cosmopolitan sociology” (or, for that matter, social science) and focus on cosmopolitanism as a political project. World-wide globalization processes make it necessary to shift away from methodological nationalism toward a multi-perspectival methodological cosmopolitanism to grasp the multi-dimensional processes of change that have transformed the contemporary social world, Beck argues. Globalization is tantamount to a revolution having taken us from the “first age of modernity” to the “second age of modernity,” the latter underlying an epochal break that requires a paradigm shift in both social science and politics:

“[...] towards the end of the twentieth century the *condition humana* opens up anew—with fundamentally ambivalent contingencies, complexities, uncertainties and risks, which conceptually and empirically still have to be uncovered and understood. A new kind of capitalism, a new kind of economy, a new kind of global order, a new kind of politics and law, a new kind of society and personal life are in the making which both separately and in context are clearly distinct of earlier phases of social evolution.” (Beck 2000: 81)

These new conditions produce a tension of national sovereignty and human rights, bringing about a transition from a nation-state world order to a cosmopolitan world order. Accordingly, in the “first age of modernity” international law would precede human rights, while in the “second age of modernity” human rights would precede international law (ibid.: 82-85). Thus, Beck pleads for a separation of the state and the nation, not least as an answer to the world wars of the twentieth century. Instead, a cosmopolitan state would guarantee the co-existence of national identities through the principle of constitutional tolerance. It acknowledges both equality and difference: the “other” must be present, given voice and be heard, culturally as well as politically.

His cosmopolitan project would influence the relationship between migration and mobility. In the nation-stated perspective, migration and mobility are discrete: while movement within nation-states is called mobility, and perceived as desirable, movement between nation-states is called migration and perceived as undesirable. When staying in one place becomes less and less important due to the global and transnational transformations, Beck asks “[...] why should migrants remain migrants and not be welcomed as mobile?” (2000: 94) A deterritorialized society can break down established dichotomies, he argues. Admittedly, Beck concedes that his vision is not quite yet realistic as there is no desire for such political action.

### **Cosmopolitanism as a Social Practice**

Scholars increasingly use cosmopolitanism when studying social processes of individuals who engage in cultural multiplicity, often in migratory contexts. So, cosmopolitanism describes a specific mode of engaging with the world so as to engage with the “other,” and thus be open to divergent cultural experiences. Such openness is largely acquired through experience, most importantly through travel. A cosmopolitan may even develop a habit of mind through which s/he can end up anywhere in the world and feel strange and familiar at the same time. As a practice or competence, cosmopolitanism is marked by a personal ability to make one’s way into other cultures by listening, observing, reflecting and maneuvering through their systems of meaning (Vertovec/Cohen 2002: 1-11, Iyer 1997).

In their edited volume, Nowicka and Rovisco (2009) see cosmopolitanism as *a mode of self-transformation*, which can occur when individuals engage “in concrete struggles to protect a common humanity and become more reflexive about their experiences of otherness.” (ibid.: 6) Self-transformation always implies a sense of self-scrutiny regarding both the ways of positively engaging with other cultures and the ways of potential commitment to the building of a more just world under conditions of uneven globalization. Therefore, individuals can *actually* become more cosmopolitan—reflexively and emotionally. Nowicka and Rovisco do not see cosmopolitanism necessarily as based on the transcendence of particularistic and parochial ties, but they rather see “actually existing cosmopolitanism” (Robbins 1998) in connection with cosmopolitan institutions (i.e., United Nations, and NGOs) because, on the one hand, cosmopolitan ideas are sometimes already ingrained in formal structures, and on the other, individuals deploy a set of cosmopolitan practices and outlooks to differing degrees in a variety of contexts.

There are several works examining how patterns of mobility shape cosmopolitanism; how it enables, but also how it constrains the cosmopolitan experience. Paul Kennedy (2009), for instance, examines sixty continental “skilled-middle class migrants” from fourteen European countries that settled in Manchester. He traces back their “cosmopolitan career trajectories” and their different personal quests by exploring how they develop social relationships and personal networks both with other non-British nationals as well as locals. His respondents face difficulties gaining entry into local networks, so that many of them engage in social relationships with other foreigners, yet through incidents of encounters with both foreigners and locals, they eventually find paths into the local society. They become more cosmopolitan by going abroad as they become exposed to a multitude of experiences involving engagements with cultural others, which would have been less possible otherwise. Nowicka and Kaweh (2009b) examine cosmopolitanism as a mode of personal interaction with culturally different “others” in foreign geographical contexts as well. They focus on mobile professionals who work for the United Nations (UN). Their main results suggest that the physical presence of individuals alone is not sufficient to develop “real-world cosmopolitanism” (Beck 2004: 133), but that it requires a constant effort to overcome one’s emotional distance from “the other.” The organizational context of the UN enhances the self-understanding of the professionals as “citizen of the world,” while their narratives contrast between world-openness and the everyday practices of UN professionals abroad, triggering moments of openness and closure towards “the others.”

Literatures on this issue mostly focus on the extensive mobility of individuals (Nowicka and Rovisco 2009a: 7) and thus many criticize cosmopolitanism as being a preoccupation of an elite as only they are able to afford (extensive) travel. The above-mentioned studies, however, emphasize that the movements of people across national borders do not foster cosmopolitan self-transformation of the individuals *per se* and that conditions for positive interaction with others are not created *a priori*. Though “actually existing cosmopolitanism” (Robbins 1998) is often developed in mobile transnational contexts, it goes too far stating that it is an essential quality of mobile people. There are other works that emphasize the cosmopolitan practices of individuals without requiring them to be mobile. Römhild (2010), for instance, observed practices of cosmopolitan solidarity of migrants and non-migrants in ethnically diverse settings.

## **What happens in the Country of Arrival, in the Country of Origin, and/or in other Destinations?**

As we have seen, the “new” approaches differ from the “classical” ones in that they conceptualize social reality beyond the borders of one nation-state, i.e., they differ in their spatial reach. These literatures emphasize that migration is no longer only assumed to be a singular spatial and temporal act of displacement of humans. The transnational approach, in particular, highlights the fact that decisions to migrate and re-migrate are not necessarily irrevocable and irreversible, but living transnational lives may become a strategy to ensure survival and betterment, shaping the lives of many (Pries 2001a: 32; Faist 2011: 27 and 2006: 3).

The political impact of these approaches is—comparably—limited, albeit they discuss phenomena that are embedded within bordered political processes. (Migrant) transnationalism influences institutions and policies in the countries of origin and residence, and is influenced by them (Goldring et al. 2003, Østergaard-Nielsen 2012). Some emigration countries, for instance, have shifted towards “global nation policies,” which are characterized by the extension of dual citizenships to emigrant populations or in granting them external voting rights (Smith 1997). Another set of policies aims to maximize the migrants’ economic contribution to their homelands by facilitating channel remittances<sup>16</sup> through policy programs on local and regional development (Goldring 2002, Goldring et al. 2003; Faist 2011). While (migrant) transnationalism provides some governments with new options for economic, social, and political ties with nationals abroad, the receiving countries play a role in the extent to which they tolerate the cross-border activities of migrants. Some regard transnational activities as hindering integration (e.g., Denmark), and others support the transnational engagement of migrants (e.g., Spain) (Østergaard-Nielsen 2009, 2011 and 2012). Generally, the political influence of migrants’ transnationalism is more pronounced in peripherally-positioned countries of origin, where it is accompanied by policies and administrative measures, yet it always depends on the political clout of emigrant organizations, the processes of democratization in the countries of origin, bilateral relations between the two countries and the impact of global rights regimes (Levitt/Del la Dehesa 2003, Goldring et al. 2003). Receiving states engage rather

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16 There has been much work done in transnational studies regarding remittances: Goldring, for instance, differentiates between individual and collective economic remittances (2004). Levitt introduced the notion of social remittances (2001a) and—drawing on Goldring (2004)—further elaborated on individual and collective social remittances (with Lamba-Nieves 2011).

less in setting up policies promoting (migrant) transnationalism as can be seen in the lack of tolerance for dual citizenship or in the withdrawal of funding for migrant associations in some countries. As a term, transnationalism is not officially used for policy-agendas, but we need to keep in mind its importance as it “pose[s] a challenge to national regulation, especially in the field of migration control.” (Castles 2004: 2012) In the case of cosmopolitanism, the imagined or desired “cosmopolitan world order” which implies a “cosmopolitan citizenship” does not exist in empirical (political) reality, but some nation-state-transcending structures do: foremost examples are the United Nations and the European Union. Diaspora, however, is probably the most politicized concept out of the three, and yet none of these concepts has such an impact on the agendas of policy-making as have the notions of assimilation, integration, or multiculturalism. In fact, the “dilemma of migration studies” is there at its strongest.

Most (political) hegemony, however, lies behind the concept of assimilation: symptomatic of that is the discussion about the relationship between assimilation and transnationalism. Pioneering contributions in transnational studies challenged that “the incorporation of immigrants takes place in the container of the respective nation-state in which immigrants settle for longer periods of time” (Faist 2011: 30); rather assimilation and transnationalism were seen as contrasting and antithetical modes of incorporation (Glick Schiller et al. 1992: 16), while other scholars usually view transnationalism as a temporary phenomenon that will eventually pass in favour of assimilation (Alba/Nee 1997, Esser 2003, Joppke/Morawska 2003). Debates evolved into a dispute between “assimilationists” and “transnationalists” about temporality (Bommes 2012c). Meanwhile, most transnational scholars concur that integrating into the society of arrival and maintaining ties to the society of origin does not need to be mutually exclusive (Morawska 2003, Levitt 2003, Levitt/Glick Schiller 2004). The notion of “simultaneity” (Levitt/Glick Schiller 2004) clarifies that neither assimilationist nor transnational practices are fixed, but change over time. Their relationship is one of simultaneity of connection, which implies different combinations of different forms of incorporation with different forms of transnationalism. Such an understanding takes into account contextual conditions and goes beyond assimilation as the only analytically viable way of conceptualizing migrants’ incorporation. Besides, King reminds us that the biggest value of transnational studies in reformulating migration theory is exactly that it questions the linear, no-return model, by placing a big question mark over the extensive body of literature about assimilation (2012: 25). Most adequately, Wessendorf captures the heart of the discussion as follows: “[...] variations in transnationalism and integration [...] demon-

strate how difficult it is to fit individuals into sociological categories” (2013: 9)—that are often perceived as mutually exclusive, I would add.

To conclude, what the “new” approaches have in common is their refusal to conceptualize migration as a one-way street per se. From a sociological perspective, the “new” approaches not only give us answers to the question of *what happens (only) in the country of arrival, but also in the country of origin and/or in potential other destinations after initial migration*. Migration theory can give us as much as three answers: (migrant) transnationalism, diaspora, and cosmopolitanism; all of which imply a more extended understanding of migration than that of “immigration.”

### **1.3 MOBILITY STUDIES AS A NEW RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE ON MIGRATION**

In the previous sections, I have delineated—what I believe are—the most influential theoretical approaches in research on migration. The review simultaneously demonstrates that geographical (im)mobility of those constructed as migrants (through the approaches and, of course, political representations) is often overlooked in migration literatures in general and, more specifically, in the sociology of migration. To that end, I take a closer look into the field of mobility studies to see what it can offer us for the study of migration. In this section, I will present the main contributions in “mobility studies,” which function throughout my work as my analytical perspective: the “mobilities perspective.” After having introduced the paradigm and its most crucial conceptualizations and methods, I will discuss the relationship between “migration studies” and “mobility studies” accounting for the gap affecting both literatures that my study aims to reduce.

#### **The “Mobilities Paradigm”**

Though mobility is not new, the “mobilities paradigm” (Sheller/Urry 2006, Hanam et al. 2006, Urry 2007) entered into academic discussions only a decade ago. It seeks to enhance the “mobilities turn” (Urry 2007) which would influence and include works from the fields of anthropology, cultural studies, geography, migration studies, science and technology studies, tourism and transport studies, and sociology.

## The (Sociological) Beginning

It is surprising that the “mobilities turn” has had only “scant evidence [...] within the discipline of sociology itself” (Sheller 2014a: 45) as its beginnings can be traced back to this field exactly. Mobility studies have been greatly enhanced, maybe even launched by the works of the sociologist John Urry (1946-2016). We can find influential initial ideas that would later become more precisely linked to the “mobilities turn” in his book, *Sociology Beyond Societies* (2000) and in his agenda-setting article, “Mobile Sociology” ([2001] 2010), in which he develops a “post-societal” agenda for sociology; going beyond sociology’s notion of the “social as society.” (Urry [2001] 2010: 348) Urry also challenges the idea of mobility in sociology as “social mobility”: it is neither restricted to the territory of the nation-state society, nor does it only include the flows of humans. It rather consists of the relations between humans and objects, which cannot be grasped by the classical sociological debates on “agency vs. structure” or “methodological individualism vs. holism.” (Urry [2001] 2010: 357) Positing a relational basis for sociological theorizing that puts mobility at its center (Sheller 2014a: 45), Urry lucidly challenges the sedentarism of sociological thought.

Mimi Sheller, another sociologist and advocate of mobility studies, sees another main reason why the field of sociology has been resistant to the “mobilities turn”: notably, because Urry’s approach was often wrongly equated with theories of global fluidity and liquidity as, for example, formulated by Castles (1996) and Bauman (2000). The “mobilities turn” has been misunderstood by many scholars of sociology, history, and anthropology to carry too much of a normative thrust, implying that mobility is the most desirable state of being. For all that, Sheller sees mobility studies as an opportunity to re-unite in a transdisciplinary framework:

“The new transdisciplinary field of mobilities research effectively [...] brings together some of the more purely ‘social’ concerns of sociology (inequality, power, hierarchies) with ‘spatial’ concerns of geography (territory, borders, scale) and the ‘cultural’ concerns of anthropology and media studies (discourses, representation, schemas), while inflecting each with a relational ontology of the co-constitution of subjects, spaces, and meanings.” (2014a: 47)

Mobilities research assumes that the world is constituted by relations rather than entities, and therefore advocates for a relational ontology, meaning that to be in the world is consequently to be in the world of others; which is, however, not only a world of other humans but also of objects, materials, and artefacts. It is thus compatible with many disciplines.

## The Paradigm

There are several programmatic key texts that declared the “mobilities paradigm.” (Sheller/Urry 2006, Urry 2007, Hannam et al. 2006, Sheller/Urry 2016) These contributions outline the emerging agenda within mobility studies, their main areas of concern, as well as their theoretical and methodological tools. Because the whole world seems to be on the move—asylum seekers, international students, terrorists, holidaymakers, business people, refugees, commuters, the early retired, young mobile professionals, prostitutes, and armed forces—the paradigm makes a case against the a-mobile and sedentarist preoccupations of social science research (Sheller/Urry 2006: 208, Urry 2007: 12). It is more than a simple assertion of the novelty of mobility:

“We do not insist on a new ‘grand narrative’ on mobility, fluidity, and liquidity. The new mobilities paradigm suggests a set of questions, theories, and methodologies rather than a totalizing and reductive description of the contemporary world.” (Sheller/Urry 2006: 210)

Evidently, it is a rather broader conceptual project, promoting a movement-driven social science (Urry 2007: 18) that is concerned with power because mobility is a resource to which not everyone has access: it is unequally distributed. The study of mobility likewise involves immobilities and highlights their dialectical relationship: mobility only exists through immobility and vice versa (Urry 2003: 138, Hannam et al. 2006: 2, Adey 2006: 86). Mobilities cannot be understood without the necessary spatial, infrastructural, and institutional moorings that configure and enable them. The relation of mobilities to associated immobilities or moorings is therefore at center stage. The “mobilities paradigm” equally interrogates the master narrative that links mobility with freedom because mobilities are rather shown to be controlled, tracked, governed, and often under surveillance (Sheller/Urry 2016: 3). Such frictions and turbulences of differential mobilities are suited to deal with the realm of migration, tourism, and travel, amongst others. Scholars in the field agree that migration studies are crucial to mobilities research, and I would add, vice versa. Not only does the latter offer studies of transnational migration and diaspora trenchant critiques of bounded and static categories of nation, ethnicity, citizenship, etc., but the relation between migration, tourism, transnationalism, return migration, and diasporas is crucial as it implies obligatory as well as voluntary forms of mobility, enabling complex connections of social or political obligation (Hannam et al. 2006: 10-14, Sheller 2014a: 48).

## Conceptualizing (Im)Mobility

Empirical and theoretical works are increasing in the field of “mobility studies,” yet efforts to conceptualize (im)mobility are just beginning. The geographer Peter Adey (2006) advisably warns us that despite his own conviction that everything is mobile, the term mobility needs to be conceptualized to prevent blurriness and the construction of just another buzzword, because “if mobility is everything, then it is nothing.” (Adey 2006) He presents the argument for a relational politics of (im)mobility, stressing the differences between movements and, at the same time, their contingent relatedness. Adey sees movement not as a simple thing undertaken by a few, but rather as being present everywhere while being experienced in many different ways, gaining meaning through its “embeddedness within societies, culture, politics, histories.” (ibid.: 83) Mobilities are, like power, relational and this relatedness impacts upon what they mean and how they work (ibid.: 87).

Tim Cresswell (2006) adds a constructivist idea to Adey’s relational approach. Mobility is a “blank space” that is often used as an alternative to stability, place, and boundedness while it is, at the same time, celebrated as progress, freedom, and modernity and rejected as deviance, shiftlessness, and resistance (ibid.: 2). Introducing an interpretative framework, Cresswell articulates what mobility specifically means. He starts—as it were—right at the beginning, explaining that the basic signifier of mobility is to get from point A to point B. Mobility is thus a displacement, characterized by the act of moving between locations:

A-----B

He makes the point that the content of the line that links A to B remains unexplored in most literatures, especially so in the classic migration theory, in which the choice to move would be the result of push and pull factors, telling us something about A and B, while nothing about the line. Cresswell, however, thinks that the movements (the lines) are full of meaning, which produce and are produced by power. He introduces an analytical distinction between movement and mobility. The former is mobility abstracted from power: “movement is the general fact of displacement before the types, strategies, and social implications of that movement are considered.” (ibid.: 3) Mobility, hence, is a socially produced motion, which Cresswell understands through three relational moments. First, human mobility is a simple fact, an empirical reality that is analyzed by modelers, migration scholars, transport planners and so on. It is here that it is at its

most abstract, coming closest to pure motions. Second, there are ideas about mobility that are represented through different channels. Such representations of mobility capture and make sense of it through the production of meanings that are frequently ideological. Third, mobility is practiced, experienced, embodied: how we experience mobility influences the ways we give meaning to it. Equally, representations of mobility are based on ways in which mobility is practiced and embodied. Certainly, mobilities are products of history, signifying that the power relations and meanings change over time. They are at the mercy of social change as they gain meanings through relations. Cresswell, however, concedes that the social construction of mobility does not mean that mobility itself has somehow been invented and can be made to disappear (ibid.: 9-22). His conceptualization—as I see it—emphasizes the construction of (different) meanings of mobility, which is given through contexts and also through individuals, who give meaning to their own movements.

Canzler, Kaufmann, and Kesselring (2008) provide another conceptualization of mobility, proposing to define mobility as “a change of condition by targeting three dimensions: movements, networks, and motility.” (ibid.: 3) *Movements* strictly refer to a geographical dimension as they occur between an origin and one or several destinations. *Networks* are defined as the framework of movements, and technical networks, i.e., transportation, communications, are characterized by the quality of infrastructure, services and access to those services, while social networks are institutionalized relationships. *Motility*, however, is the capacity of an actor to move socially and spatially, reinforced by networks. It mirrors all forms of access obtainable both technologically and socially as well as the skills possessed to take advantage of this access. These dimensions deconstruct the synonymy between movement and mobility: (1) one can move without being mobile, (2) one can be mobile without moving, and (3) one can move and be mobile. As for (1) the movement in space does not change the state of the actor as it is in the case of the frequently travelling business person, who changes geographical spaces, but who is not necessarily in an environment that makes him or her socially mobile. For (2), the authors refer to heavy consumers of long-distance communication using internet, e-mails or skype, who then associate with different social universes. Point (3) makes the case for when crossing geographical spaces is accompanied by crossing social spaces, as it is well documented in sociological works. The conceptualization targets both the intention to be mobile (related to the concept of motility) and the potential of networks to the capabilities of actors. These networks, however, can be used potentially, yet not always factually. Mobility suggest capabilities that are unequally distributed. It assumes access to concerned spaces and money, and it addresses the aspira-

tions of the actors, which are not always focused on career goals. Thus, mobility both generates social inequality and is generated by it (Canzler et al. 2008: 5). I believe that this conceptualization is less constructivist than Cresswell's, but it is more concerned with the unequal access to mobility. Its strength is that it includes the concept of motility, which is—to my mind—crucial when examining mobility, particularly the mobility of humans.

Scholars in the field of mobility studies want to make sure that mobilities research does not only concern the “hyper-mobile” elite of global capitalism (Sheller 2014a: 48). The differences in capacities and potentials are usually analyzed via the concept of *motility*, defined as “how an individual or group takes possession of the realm of possibilities for mobility and builds on it to develop personal projects.” (Flamm/Kaufmann 2006: 168) It targets all factors of the potential to be mobile, whether these are physical capacities, aspirations, the accessibility to existing transportation and communication systems as well as acquired knowledge. Motility thus contains access (the conditions under which available options can be used), skills (required to use the options) and cognitive appropriation (the evaluation of the available options vis-a-vis one's project). It generally focuses on the logic of an actor's action, and the subsequent relations to structures and context (ibid.: 169). Other analytical concepts are Kaufmann et al's “mobility capital” (2004) and Urry's (related) notion of “network capital.” (2007) Mobility as capital can be mobilized and transformed into other types of capital, i.e., economic, cultural, and social capital (Bourdieu 1983). “Network capital” is the capacity to engender and sustain social relations with those people who are not necessarily proximate and it generates emotional, practical, and financial benefits. It also includes combinations of capacities to be mobile such as appropriate documents, money, and qualifications, social networks at-a-distance, physical capacities, location free information, access to communication devices and secure meeting places (ibid.: 197ff, Urry/Eliot 10f), ultimately making both concepts difficult to differentiate from one another.

### **Methodology, Mobile Methods, and the “Mobilities Perspective”**

Certainly, a new “mobilities paradigm” not only requires theoretical frameworks and conceptual tools, but it also needs to propose methods. Scholars in this field are increasingly developing so-called “mobile methods” (Sheller/Urry 2006, Urry 2007, Büscher/Urry 2009) to approach the interlocking of mobility and immobility. These methods draw considerably on Marcus' proposal of a multi-sided ethnography (1995), encompassing the observation of people's movements, a “mobile ethnography” which involves being mobile while conducting participant observation or ethnographic research. This may include “being mo-

bile with others” and conducting interviews or focus groups afterward, video ethnography, but also following, shadowing, or sociological stalking (Büscher/Urry 2009: 104). Further “mobile methods” may be the analysis of “time-space diaries” in which the respondents would record what they were doing and where, and how they moved. Methods of “cyber-research” explore the imaginative and virtual mobilities of people via their websites, discussion groups, listserves or other multimedia methods. Examining “multiple transfer points” that are involved in “being mobile” but are “immobilised” such as cafés, waiting rooms, parks, hotels, airports, etc. may also be new empirical realms to be researched (Büscher/Urry 2009: 99, 105ff, Sheller 2011: 7).

While “mobile methods” are increasingly developed in empirical research, D’Andrea, Ciolfi, and Gray (2011) observed that these advancements have not been equally matched by efforts on the methodological front, not least because intellectual formulations of research practices often arise as an afterthought. Methodological positions have thus remained underdeveloped in this field (D’Andrea et al. 2011: 156). Targeting this lack, scholars have slowly begun to reflect on the analytical value of mobility studies when examining migration or other fields of interests. Salazar and Smart (2011) advocate the analysis of mobilities as socio-cultural constructs rather than as brute facts, because they see the danger that mobility studies might replicate one of the problems affecting the comparable field of transnationalism. The latter was criticized for “sampling on the dependent variable: paying most attention to those who maintained transnational social fields rather than assimilating into local cultures.” (Salazar/Smart 2011: 5) They subsequently propose to “take on” mobility while studying other processes and thus extending both the utility of the mobilities approach and insisting on attending to other dynamics that would not be considered if the focus is first and last on (im)mobility as such (ibid.: 7). After all, much work remains on the methodological level of mobility studies and Salazar and Smart (2011) give good advice as how to conduct research without falling into a methodological bias.

Accordingly, I use the “mobilities paradigm” as my analytical perspective to investigate migration and transnational phenomena in order to probe migration through the “mobilities perspective.” (Wieczorek 2016) Following Sheller, the mobilities paradigm is especially suitable as a new perspective on “old things”:

“The point is that mobilities research is not simply about a topic (e.g., things that move, or the governance of mobility regimes, or the idea of an increasingly mobile world), but is even more pointedly a new way of approaching social research, social theory, and social agency.” (Sheller 2014b: 13)

As a new way of approaching migration, the „mobilities perspective” promotes a relational and constructivist understanding of (im)mobility, acknowledging the various meanings we attach to it, as advanced by scholars in the field. Additionally, I argue that we conceive of it as processual because mobility and immobility are dialectic and symbiotic, meaning that either “state” is fixed, nor is one possible without the other. Mobilities are always in the making, re-making, and unmaking so that the condition continuously changes. Shifting to the “mobilities perspective” means understanding (im)mobility as *relational*, *constructed* through meanings, and *processual*. This, I believe, benefits the aim of the study: to shed light on and increase the scholarly awareness of how (im)mobility is constructed within migration phenomena, and what empirical, theoretical, and political implications it may have. This has not been done before, despite the very recent increase of a few (empirical) scholarly works, tentatively entering into dialogue with both mobility studies and migration studies.

## **The Relation of Migration Studies and Mobility Studies**

While the advocates of the “mobilities paradigm” repeatedly state that migration phenomena are a potential object to study (im)mobility, migration scholars seem to be more cautious. Sheller, for instance, argues that the study of mobilities offers a “far more nuanced view of migration, border-crossing and various other kinds of travel including tourism [...]” (2014a: 51), but—truth to be told—there are relatively few studies on migration that draw upon the “mobilities turn.” A positive relationship between both research fields is not yet achieved as becomes clear in two (programmatically) accounts on this issue (Fortier 2014, Faist 2013). Anne-Marie Fortier, for instance, engages with the question of what migration scholarship can tell us about “mobile worlds.” (2014: 65) Even though both scholarly traditions have a common interest, there are differences in the research perspectives:

“For if mobilities research forces us to think about migration in relation to the ways in which ‘mobility’ has been variously established (institutionally, legally, technologically, materially, idealistically) as a universal condition if not a universal ‘right,’ migration studies force a reconsideration of the fluidity, accessibility and desirability of the assumed mobile world, as well as the conditions under which people are ‘mobile’ (or not).” (Fortier 2014: 65)

The juxtaposition in this statement is intensive: mobilities scholarship calls for an acknowledgement of “mobility” as a universal condition, while migration scholarship criticizes the notion, as well as its desirability. Fortier nevertheless proposes fields for fruitful collaboration like “citizenship studies” in which transnational scholarship could shed light on how individuals are constituted as “integrated” or “citizens,” but also under what conditions the same or other individuals might not be recognized as such, inviting thought about normative notions of “good citizenship” and “worthy mobility.” The political scientist and transnational scholar Thomas Faist (2013) is more reluctant to endorse a potential cooperation. He examines mobility from the point of view of social inequalities and focuses on how the border-crossing movement comes to be defined as mobility. Both scholars criticize the normative implications of the terms “migration” and “mobility.” Within neoliberal economic and governance strategies, the mobility of the “highly-skilled” is supported while the mobility of the less skilled or less-moneyed (“immigrant”) is monitored and regulated (Fortier 2014: 70). Labour migrants are thus “wanted but not welcome,” while those called highly-skilled are “wanted and welcome.” (Faist 2013: 1642) Such a categorization nourishes—as Faist calls it—the transnational social question, which contains different evaluations of mobilities. Labour migrants are immigrants and need to integrate, while highly skilled are mobiles who do not face issues of integration. Their mobility is celebrated under a neo-liberalist banner:

“The discursive juxtaposition of category one vs category two in itself is an outcome of upholding and reproducing social inequalities on a national and global scale, in this case the social mechanism of hierarchization of migrants and highly-skilled mobiles. First, in public debates it seems as if mobility is a phenomenon of the market, which is regulated by Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’, that is, social order is emerging spontaneously out of aggregated individually rational acts. [...] Secondly, mobility supposedly reflects the necessities of global economic competition and suggests how spatial and social mobility act in tandem to the best of all involved, whereas migration is connoted with problematic outcomes with respect to the social integration of immigrants into national policies and national welfare states.” (Faist 2013: 1643)

In a neo-liberal world-order the public and political use of “mobility” is privileged to that of “migration.” Therefore, the concept of “mobility” reproduces hierarchization and further social inequalities, which makes an evaluation of “movement” as positive (as in the case of “mobility”) deeply problematic for Faist. Fortier, too, points to this problematization, which produces social images that concern the “social distribution of bad.” The term “migrant” is a way to des-

ignite someone as a threat to the core values of a country (Bigo 2002), and has no longer to do with the legal terminology of foreigners. She suggests adding “imaginaries and affect” to the conceptual toolkit of migration research within mobility studies (Fortier 2014: 70). Fortier, generally, welcomes the interrogation by migration research on the “mobile world” and points out that migration studies, especially transnational and diaspora studies, have a lot to offer the “mobilities paradigm,” but calls for a rethinking of prevalent classificatory schemes of race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, class, and generations. On the contrary, Faist concludes that “mobility” cannot be usefully employed in migration and transnational studies unless mobility scholars reflect critically about political assumptions of immobility and mobility or spatial mobility and social mobility (2013: 1644). I have to object to the fact that while he calls upon mobility scholars to analyze the boundary work that mobility does, he is doing boundary work against a cross-fertilization between migration and mobility studies. Whether the negative connotation of migration is more desirable than a positive connotation of mobility is debatable, because the politicized, negative connotation of “migration” may continue to worsen the social stereotypification and hierarchization—a development that both mobility and migration scholars wish to avoid, notwithstanding the disagreements.

## Mobilities and Migrations

We have seen that the relationship between the two research agendas is a difficult one. There are, nevertheless, a few studies that employ the “mobilities turn” in their research on migration.<sup>17</sup> There are certainly many works in the realm of migration that deal with the category of mobility, but do not necessarily inscribe themselves as part of a “new mobilities paradigm.” I will, however, focus on those that do.

One of the earliest contributions is Kesselring’s work (2006) on mobility pioneers: freelance journalists in Germany, with whom Kesselring conducted in-depth interviews. He conceptualized his empirical findings in three ideal types of “mobility management.” The first ideal type is that of “centered mobility management,” characterized by a strong relation between physical and social mobility. Individuals categorized under this type use movement in space—travel—to realize individual plans and projects. The second ideal type is “decentered mobility management,” demonstrating how physical and social mobility is uncoupled. It is rather (communication and information) technology driven, enabling

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17 Some of them I have already mentioned in my discussion about the mobility in studies dealing with (migrant) transnationalism, diaspora, and cosmopolitanism (ch. 1.2).

individuals to decenter themselves in complex networks of mediated and face-to-face interactions. The last ideal type is that of “virtual mobility management,” in which spatial movement is not an essential part of the mobility practice. Complex virtual networks are substituted for physical presence and spatial mobility (ibid.: 270). Kesselring’s results show that there are new ways to be mobile and to realize social belonging without being bound to place. In a similar fashion, Elliott and Urry explore the *Mobile Lives* (2010) of some individuals, which they describe as the “global elite.” Based on in-depth interviews, the authors bring case studies into their analysis and discuss main issues of “mobile lives,” such as personal and professional networking, intimate relationships at-a-distance, as well as consumption and environmental impacts. This study emphasizes the changes in how people live their lives in contemporary times which are affected by and reflect (global) mobility. By the same token, it points out that living a mobile life is not always a “blessing.”

In addition, anthropological work convincingly demonstrates the importance of imagination in structuring (im)mobility in relation to migration (Salazar 2010). Based on long-term fieldwork in Tanzania, Noel Salazar analyses how imaginaries and social relations concerning mobility are materialized, enacted, and inculcated. Mobilities—whether across internal or international boundaries—are more than just mere movements as they are infused with cultural meaning, leading to a construction of “mobility imaginaries.” (2010: 55) Large parts of the Tanzanian population incorporate “mobility imaginaries,” especially of the “West,” despite the low rate of emigration. What is at stake here is merely the dream of migration (ibid.: 57ff). The study emphasizes the differences between border-crossing migration and mobility. Interpreted in this context, mobility is manifested in metacultural discourses and imaginaries. Even if only a few Tanzanians go “West,” the fantasy to migrate remains popular.

Above all, there are two very recent studies that deal with diverse mobility experiences in the context of migration. Joëlle Moret examines post-migration mobility practices by “former migrants from the country in which they have settled.” (2015: 1) These former migrants are first generation Somali women and men. Based on narrative and semi-structured interviews and drawing on transnational and mobility studies, she develops three ideal types of post-migration mobility practices: (1) the “star-shaped” mobility, (2) pendular movements, and (3) secondary movements (ibid.: 3). As for (1), Moret points out that geographical movements are practiced regularly, but always for short periods of time, departing from the place of residence to different locations. The ideal type (2) describes rather short-term geographical movements between two locations: the place of residence and another destination. In the case of (3), secondary move-

ments are characterized by on-going movements from one place of residence to another. Moret's main results show that the three ideal types are three ways through which social actors gain different forms of capital and exchange them in places where they are valued, most often ethnic environments in different places, which serve to improve the individual's social and economic conditions. Apart from Moret, Schrooten et al. (2015) have examined experiences that are marked by ongoing mobility and a variety of potential routes. Based on ethnographic work and interviews with Brazilians, who are currently residing in Belgium and the United Kingdom, the authors point out that the majority of their respondents have passed through other locations before arriving in their current places of residence, spending between one and five years working in foreign countries. For them, being mobile becomes a way of staying at home, because the focus to go abroad is to build up a better life "back home" eventually (ibid.: 13).

This short review illustrates the existence of many different forms of movement. We have seen that first, mobility does not necessarily imply physical movement, and second, when physical movement is implied, it is diverse. Most importantly though, this review clearly shows the gap in the literature in both migration and mobility studies about how *geographical (im)mobility* is constructed within migration phenomena and what social implications it raises. While the reviewed studies "kick off" a discussion to fill this gap, they solely focus on geographical mobility, thereby leaving immobility often unexplored. However, my research has more of a focus on immobile as well as mobile practices in space and time. More specifically, I examine the life-courses of young adults of Polish heritage in Germany and Canada, and hence, the inherent mobility experiences that are situated in migration and transnational contexts. I believe that constructing an integrative perspective is indispensable for a fruitful study of migration and mobility phenomena and for creating a dialogue between these two scholarly fields.

