Etienne Balibar

IS THERE SUCH A THING AS EUROPEAN RACISM?

Translated by Chris Turner

Note from the editors: The following article was first delivered at the congress Fremd ist der Fremde nur in der Fremde *in Frankfurt am Main (11th–13th December 1992), organised by Friedrich Balke, Rebekka Habermas, Patrizia Nanz, Peter Sillem and Fischer Verlag.*[1] *It sheds light on a topic that is – despite its references to political and social developments of the 90s – neither bound to this historical angle, nor obsolete in the topic it addresses. Furthermore, the question the author raises is still vital if not essential in this first decade of the 21st century.*

The ideas I offer for discussion here arise in a particular place (the great financial and intellectual metropolis of the German Federal Republic) and at a particular time: in the aftermath of the atrocious attacks on the community of Turkish immigrant workers, but also following the first great demonstrations of a rejection of fascist, xenophobic violence in German cities. While keeping these conditions in mind, I shall pitch my thoughts at a more general level: not only because I do not want to treat superficially a situation which other, better-informed speakers will have presented from the inside, but because I am convinced that the present German situation, despite its historical specificity, in reality represents one component element of the European conjuncture. It seems to me that it is at this level that it can be understood and, in the last instance, dealt with.

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I shall argue as follows:

- First, that the racism we are seeing intensify and spread throughout the European continent – East as well as West – is deeply rooted in our history, even if we should never present this history in terms of a linear determinism. The connections being established between the popular forms of this neo-racism and the activities of organised ultra-nationalist minorities[2] give us just concern to fear the emergence of neo-fascism in Europe. The virtual hegemony of these movements within a sector of youth desocialised by unemployment is particularly serious;
- Second, the question arises whether this dynamic is an autonomous phenomenon or whether it represents a reaction to a situation of suspended social development and political impotence. This second hypothesis seems to me to be the right one: racism and fascism in Europe today are the conjunctural effects of the insoluble contradictions into which, despite their apparent triumph, the neoliberal economy and, in particular, the so-called representative political system (which in reality 'represents' fewer and fewer electors) have sunk. Admittedly, the more these contradictions intensity, the more a self-destructive spiral arises, with unpredictable effects;
- Third, I do not believe that this development, albeit very far advanced, is beyond the control of democratic forces, provided that they face up fully to the initiatives which have urgently to be developed at local and transnational levels. It seems to me realistic to argue that internal obstacles, which are for the moment insurmountable, currently prevent the pure and simple reproduction across Europe of a process akin to that which led to the political triumph of fascism and Nazism in the early years of the 20th century. There is a 'window' for collective action, and we can and should strive to take advantage of it.

Let us examine the first point. The circumstances in which we find ourselves three years after what some have called the 'revolution of 1989' (Dahrendorf 1990) call for an unvarnished political diagnosis. In this we must be brutally honest, both about the society in which we live and about ourselves, as those who – or so we fondly believe at ties – represent our society's critical awareness. I say a political diagnosis, but a moral diagnosis is involved as

2 Note from the editors: This connotation of the term 'minority' here is different to the one used in the context of this publication. We use minority in this book not primarily in terms of numbers but following the definition of the ICTM Study Group Music and Minorities: "groups of people distinguishable from the dominant group for cultural, ethnic, social, religious, or economic reasons" (see Svanibor Pettan in this publication).

well; not in the sense of passing moral judgements on reality, but in the sense that we need also to assess moral capacities, and that a moral crisis is part of the present historical situation. At the centre of that crisis stand feelings of complacency, but also of horror and impotence – if not, indeed, fascination – in the face of European racism. Now, the more urgent the circumstances become, the more it is necessary coolly to assess their reality and conceptualise them.

It is important, in particular, to ask ourselves what exactly is new, and what in reality is the continuation or reproduction of a situation which goes back a very long way. What is indisputably new is the intensification of violent and collective manifestations of racism; the 'acting out' which is, collectively and publicly, transgressing the taboo on murder, and thereby affording itself, even in forms which seem vulgar and primitive to us, the terrible good conscience of a historical right. The crossing of that threshold – or rather, of a series of successive thresholds in that direction – has occurred in one European country after another, the target always being generically the populations of 'immigrant workers' and 'refugees', in particular those from southern Europe and Africa, but also – and I shall come back to this – a part of the foreign European population – if not, indeed, of the national population – sharing the same social characteristics (essentially the status of displaced, de-territorialised persons). Over the past ten years or so, it has seemed as though the baton has passed from one country to another in a sort of process of negative emulation; the result is that no European country can claim immunity from this process: from east to west, from Britain and France to Italy, Germany, Hungary and Poland (I hardly dare mention the Yugoslav 'case' here). And on each occasion this intensification has been accompanied, with more or less close and confirmed links, by an advance on the part of organised ultra-nationalist groups and a resurgence of anti-Semitism – an essentially symbolic anti-Semitism, as Dan Diner stressed (Diner 1993). This is not, however, to downplay the seriousness of this anti-Semitism, since this proves that it is indeed the model to which xenophobic thinking refers, haunted as it is by the dream of a "Final solution to the question of immigration".[3] On each occasion, opinion polls have revealed, to all who harboured the contrary illusion, that the arguments legitimating racism as a kind of defensive reaction to 'threats' to national identity and the security of society are accepted by broad strata in all social classes, even if their extreme forms do not (or not yet?) meet with general approval. Particularly strong is the idea that the presence of a large number

3 In the recent attitudes of certain groups which have carried out pogroms, this regression becomes explicit, but it is also explicit in the German government's attitude towards gypsies.

of foreigners or immigrants threatens standards of living, employment or public order, and the idea that some cultural differences – often, in reality, very small ones – constitute insurmountable obstacles to living alongside each other, and might even be in danger of 'denaturing' our traditional identities.

It is this entire picture that gives cause for concern, or even fear (above all, let us remember, the fear of those personally targeted) and prompts comparisons with the situation in which fascist movements emerged in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. Here, there is doubtless a challenge of comparable seriousness, but not necessarily the challenge of the same historical processes. In order to establish precisely what we are dealing with, we should seek, in my view, not to relativise this picture, but to qualify it more precisely – and we should do this in two ways.

On the one hand, we should stress that racism, in so far as first and foremost targets populations of workers from the 'underdeveloped' – generally ex-colonial or semi-colonial – world (even potential workers, the category to which refugees belong), is a phenomenon that goes back a very long way in Europe, and this includes its violent forms. Immigrants in Europe have long been the 'lowest of the low'.[4] The phenomenon has merely become more visible since it emerged from the main arena to which it was previously confined – the workplace, that is to say, the site of exploitation – and its more or less ghettoised immediate environment. But we must say right away that the visibility or spread of the phenomenon is in itself an aggravating factor, in particular when it contributes to sustaining a sense of mass insecurity, and to making criminal acts seem banal and commonplace – something it does with at least the passive assistance of the major media.

Furthermore (the second qualification), we have to stress that this highly ideologised racism remains, for all that, historically complex, if not indeed contradictory. It is directed both against groups of 'external' origins (extra-European groups, groups from outside the European Community, some of which, however, have long belonged to the European social space, and in this sense are, with their cultural differences, completely 'integrated' into it) and against groups of 'internal' origins (sometimes groups within the nation, such as the *terroni* of the Italian South, who are victims of racism in the north), who are typically lumped in with the confused or wilfully confusing category of immigrants or migrants. And it projects itself simultaneously into mutually incompatible mythical narratives – including chiefly those of anti-Semitism (which might better be described once again

4 *Lowest of the Low* is the title of the English translation by Martin Chalmers (London: Methuen, 1988) of Günther Wallraff's *Ganz Unten*.

as 'anti-Jewishness') and anti-Islamism or anti-Africanism, or anti-Third-Worldism. This shows that, though European identity is undoubtedly one of the imaginary factors in this mass intolerance, it is in no sense the major underlying premise. Clearly, within the ideological horizon of current 'European racism', there is as much a rejection of Europe in a whole series of its historical components (it therefore represents a way for Europeans to reject each other mutually) as an appeal to, or defence of, 'European identity'. Or – to take this hypothesis to its logical conclusion – we have here not just a 'rejection of the Other', stigmatised racially and culturally, but equally an exacerbation of the perception of intra European differences and, in a sense, a 'self-racisation' of Europe in a new sense – directed against itself.

This point seems important, particularly insofar as our analyses have to steer a careful course between, on the one hand, the rejection of certain massive Eurocentric legacies, certain persistent traces of European domination, beginning with the trace of slavery, conquest, colonisation and imperialism; and, on the other hand, the adoption of simplistic Third-Worldist schemas. The object (the target) of current European racism is not by any means just the 'black', the 'Arab' or the 'Muslim', though they doubtless bear the main brunt. This point is also important because it forces us once again to go beyond abstract interpretations in terms of conflicts of identity, or rejection of the other and of 'otherness' as such as though otherness were something constituted a priori: explanations which, in reality, merely reproduce part of the racist discourse itself.

Having outlined these qualifications or complexifications, we must however return to the elements of the overall picture that justify the fear of a development of neo-fascism, and lead us to think that we are going to have to face up to a long-term crisis that is as much moral as it is social. Without going at length here into the structural elements which relate to the economy and state intervention, and without denying the importance of what Uli Bielefeld termed in a recent article a "popular extremism of the centre" (Bielefeld 1992), I should like to mention two such elements which call for detailed analysis. And they may perhaps be indirectly linked.

The first lies in the spread which might be described as potentially hegemonic (in the sense that it is capable of giving rise to a social movement) – of the spectre of the collective attitudes and ideological formations grouped around the theme (and sometimes the slogan) of rejection of the foreigner. More deeply yet – and more precisely – what we have here are the themes of the rejection of foreignness, of the passionate, hysterical denial of its cultural and historical function (in this case, in the sense of both *Bildung* and *Zivilisation*). This expresses itself mainly, in both popular and academic discourse, in the downright projective obsession with a tide of

foreigners and foreignness that is supposed to be assailing 'us' in the name of 'multiculturalism' and 'interbreeding'. It would seem essential to understand concretely, from genuine field studies, how this pure phantasm can become a mass phenomenon, and provide a discourse – and hence an awareness – for all manner of displaced social conflicts.

The other element to which I wish to refer here relates to the growing involvement of youth in manifestations of racism (mainly of 'marginal' youth, but this is a mass marginality which is tending towards becoming constitutive of the 'condition of youth' for entire social groups). We are going to have to wonder once again what youth is – we who are no longer young – and the first thing we have to do, no doubt, is confess that we have no idea, despite the countless batteries of statistics at our disposal.[5] It would be dangerous to believe that what we have here is merely an isolated group (once again, it would be to take at face value the sense of marginality and exclusion expressed in the youth movements, including in the crucial, but complex, phenomenon of local gangs, which are not all inspired by the aping of Nazism, even though they all rummage through the lumber room of European history for symbols of social exclusion and infamy). But it would be equally dangerous to deny that, whether we like it or not, racist actions, or actions relating only indirectly to identity claims, are perhaps the only actions today that bring about political 'gatherings' of youth as such. In Europe, liberal youth movements have never been organised; there are no more communist nor socialist nor pacifist youth movements; apart from a few exceptional cases, there are very few ecological or Christian youth movements. On the other hand, there are virtually neo-fascist youth organisations, and this is politically very worrying. History is not made by middle-aged people.

This observation brings us to my second point, which I shall deal with much less length: what are the historical trends indicated in these social phenomena, in which, of course, we fully include the ideological phenomena of collective contagion? In simple terms, since I have felt compelled to speak of potential hegemony, is this a movement or a convergence of movements with 'grass roots' of its own, or is it 'merely' (though this does not necessarily make things any easier) a reactive movement, a riposte to certain apparently insoluble contradictions? As I have said, I opt for this latter hypothesis – or, rather, wish to submit it for discussion here; not because I want to adhere at all costs to a classic Marxist schema, but for two precise reasons.

5 The presence of François Dubet here is – for me, at least – a guarantee that some people are asking the question: see Dubet 1987.

First, the phenomenon of 'exclusion' (and the awareness of being 'excluded' or the fear of becoming so, or merely the refusal to live together with those who are excluded) clearly occupies a central place in the current racist syndrome. And whether we like it or not, this stands in direct relation to a massive economic base (which includes the state, consisting not so much of lasting 'structures' as of a determinate economic policy). Who is excluded, and what are the 'excluded' excluded from? To answer these questions is both to unpack the concrete conditions for all the confusion and ambivalence we have identified in the targets of neo-racism (including the part that may be played by a process of self-racisation) and to point, in the last analysis, to the principal contradiction in the current conjuncture, which I shall term 'the regressive expansion of the market' in our society. Let us understand by this that the slogan and project of the universalisation of market relations and of the corresponding social norms (in certain cases, we can go so far as to speak, paradoxically, of a plan systematically to eliminate all obstacles to the market) leads not to a real growth of the capitalist economy, but to growing deindustrialisation and structural unemployment. This, we should note, is in no sense a phenomenon which solely characterises the *Abwicklung* of the countries of the former Soviet Union.

Is the development of productivity really the essential cause of this, as we are so often told? Should we not, rather, seek its origins in the economic contradiction which consists in attempting to build a monetary and financial fortress in an isolated European space, the intention being to transform that space into a protected market and a reserve for highly remunerative capital (a kind of large-scale Switzerland)? And also – perhaps most importantly – in the fact that the expansion of capitalist production and commodity consumption cannot be achieved today by reaching back beyond the forms of social representation and collective participation which were won over a period of a century and more by the workers' movement? Growth (whatever its qualitative and qualitatively new modalities) could be said, rather, to require a widening of those forms of representation and participation, which in practice means a more balanced social compromise, an increase in the collective power and individual initiative of the workers in the broad sense of the term. But this is precisely what the current 'power elites' refuse even to contemplate – for reasons which are more political than technical. And it is what the old labour-movement organisations were incapable of conceiving, demanding, and organising.[6] To put it plainly, exclusion has a meaning only in relation to the suspended development and regression of the

6 See Moynot 1982 sur le CGT, syndicalisme et démocratie de masse. At the time Moynot was member of the national Board of the French CGT union.

national social state (I use this term as a realist equivalent of the mythical notion of the welfare state).

But this brings me to a second reason which is, in reality, merely the corollary of the first. If the national social state is torn between the world financial market and the regressive management of domestic social conflict, its own political crisis is developing in a relatively autonomous way. The paradox of this crisis is that it presents itself both as a crisis of existing states (crisis of effectiveness, crisis of legitimacy) and as a crisis of that nonexistent state which is the ideal end-goal of the construction of Europe (Balibar 1991). It is towards that nonexistent state (or rather, towards the bureaucracy which stands in for it, a bureaucracy subject to the fluctuations of local political interests yet free from any real public control) that an increasing number of institutional and economic decisions have shifted. But that state, which is in reality a non-state, is clearly incapable of defining for itself (and, quite simply, of contemplating) a social base, founded upon a representation and a mediation of collective conflicts, comparable to the representation and mediation which had gradually come to bestow legitimacy upon democratic nation states.

Failure to analyse this paradox, which generates the grotesque ongoing spectacle of an antisocial social state, of anti-national national states (in spite of periodic symbolic manifestations of sovereignty which, like French participation in the Gulf War, rebound on themselves) and, finally, the spectacle of a 'supra-national' state dead set against any form of popular or collective internationalism, would, as I see it, prevent us from understanding the way the themes of exclusion, corruption, and also political impotence combine today in the perception of the crisis of the state.

I have attempted elsewhere to point out the paradoxical psychological effects of the phenomenon of the political and social impotence of a state which is proliferating administratively, and over equipped with security apparatuses which play a role at all levels in the way questions of collective insecurity, the integration of migrants or the reception of refugees fuel popular racism (Balibar 1992). But I also stress this point to highlight the limits of the analogy with the rise of fascism. European fascism, particularly Nazism, arose in part as a reaction against the collapse of the state under the impact of defeat and civil war, not against a generalised sense of its impotence. On the contrary, it was, in its way, a component part of a phase of apotheosis of the state, to which all regimes and political ideologies contributed at the time, and to which it brutally subjected its own 'totalitarian mass movement'. The existing state may perhaps collapse in some parts of (Eastern) Europe, but what we see more generally is the manifestation of its impotence (first and foremost, the state's impotence to transform, reform and regenerate itself). The difference from historical

fascism, even if there are fascist tendencies and movements today, is that no force can build up a political discourse of hegemonic pretensions around a programme of strengthening the state, or increased centralisation of the state. Similarly, I think I am able to argue that no force can pull together identity-based demands in Europe around a univocal nationalism.

The fact remains that nationalism(s), racism(s) and fascism(s) represent a spectrum of ideological formations which, in a sense, presuppose each other. But this leads only to the phantom of an integral, integrative nationalism. Just as the social crisis is crystallising around a nonexistent state – I would suggest: around the absence of a state or of the idea of a state – so European racism is forming for itself multiple identity-based reactions which occupy the place of an impossible nationalism (and, as a consequence, obsessionally mimic its symbols at different levels).

I shall now close with an interpretative hypothesis and a proposal for intervention – not, of course, a programme, but a suggested approach. If I am at least partially right in the description I have presented so far, this means that the current European conjuncture, worrying as it is, is not an expression of an unambiguous trend or, even less, of a catastrophic determinism. It is simply the expression – though this in itself is a very serious matter – of the demand for a radical refoundation and a renewal of the (necessarily collective) democratic practices that are capable of breaking the vicious circle of European construction from below, and hence procuring for the political institution as such the possibility of a new stage – necessarily in the direction of its democratisation or, to put it another way, in the direction of a limitation of the privileges and extension of the rights which constitute citizenship.

The European conjuncture will, for a certain time, remain in suspense, even if the situation is becoming increasingly tense. I am prompted to propose this relatively optimistic, but conditional hypothesis by the fact that it seems to me that one can identify a considerable gap between the exacerbation of the phenomena of exclusion and political demoralisation which fuel the European expansion of racism, and the capacities of any political movement generally to group social and identity-based demands around the rejection of foreigners. Such a movement of rejection is, therefore, condemned to remain internally divided, and in this sense to neutralise itself, as it were, both within each country and at the European level, which is increasingly the horizon of our political practice. Unfortunately, this in no way diminishes its destructive capacities. And we know, or ought to know – unless we cover our eyes, we can see it at our gates – that 'barbarism' is always a possible alternative. But in this gap, this political 'window', the possibility for an intellectual and moral alternative based on anti-racism – that is to say, on 'the rejection of the rejection of the other' – is undoubtedly still possible.

After the very interesting contributions we have heard, in spite of their divergences (or thanks to those very divergences), I should like to make the following point, and connect it to the themes of the multicultural society and citizenship. I have said that what seemed to me most worrying in the present situation – as a European situation tending to spread to all countries (each country having reached this point by different routes) – was the potential hegemony of a neo-fascist ideology among young people who are objectively victims of exclusion, whether it be exclusion from work and consumption (pauperisation), the exclusion from status and recognition which always goes with it, or, quite simply, exclusion from any future prospects. For young people in that position, 'citizenship' is an empty word and, as a consequence, 'democracy' is in danger of becoming so too, not to mention 'human rights'. Forgive me for employing rather old-fashioned language here, though I mean this in militant rather than military terms: I am convinced that this is the main terrain on which we must do battle. Young people with no prospects are, beyond any doubt, looking for solidarity, for community: they are, therefore, in search of an identity – or, rather, they are in search of ways and forms in which to identify themselves.

This means they are in no way seeking to preserve, reconstruct or recover a culture in the quasi-ethnographic sense of the term – in the sense of a way of life, a set of rites and customs which make up a *Lebenswelt*. In actual fact, they hate their Lebenswelt and their culture in this sense. Or, alternatively, we should understand *Kultur* [culture] in the sense in which Freud spoke of *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*,[7] in the sense of civilisation. The excluded youth of today, objects of potential manipulation by neo-fascism or, rather, potential objects of self-manipulation – including the exacerbated forms of English, Scottish, German (or, rather, 'West German' and 'East German'), northern Italian or southern Italian nationalism, and so on – are not, fundamentally, in search of cultures; they are looking for ideals – and they naturally seek these in symbols, which may at times take the form of fetish-objects. Old Marxist, old materialist that I am, I am convinced on this point: the main way of being a materialist, a realist, in politics today is to be 'idealistic' or, more precisely, to raise the question of ideals and the choices to be made between ideals. These ideals will necessarily be new expressions of very old ideas to which democracy appeals, but of which democracy, in its current manifestations, provides a very sad spectacle – ideas which are translatable both at the economic level and at that of symbolic recognition. I am thinking above all here, initially, of the idea of the equality of citizens; secondly, of the idea of the truth of political discourse; and, thirdly, of the

7 Freud's work of this title was, of course, translated into English as *Civilisation and its Discontents.*

idea of security, understood as the reduction of violence and the 'role of violence' in politics – by which I obviously do not mean repression or, in other words, counter-violence (see Balibar 1995). These are probably the three things most seriously lacking in our current constitutional states.

With this, however, we can attempt to shift a bit the debate on multiculturalism. This seems to me to be currently locked into an absurd alternative. Let me say, more modestly, that I fear it may be locked into an absurd alternative. And this is so, once again, on account of the intrinsic ambivalence of the very idea of culture. I can well understand how useful it may be to speak of a multicultural or multiethnic society (as Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Claus Leggewie do)[8] in a country like Germany, where the idea of cultural homogeneity, of the *Kulturnation* has official status, and is incorporated into the institutions and the law of the *Staatsnation* – for example into the conditions for naturalisation. Contrary to a legend deeply entrenched on both sides of the Rhine, it is not certain that France represents an absolutely opposite case. But, however that may be, this ought to lead us to deconstruct this notion, to demonstrate that there is, in Europe, no 'homogeneous' national culture, particularly no so-called 'German culture'. The aim cannot be, then, to induce a particular 'national culture' more or less peacefully to regard itself, on its own, imaginarily closed-off territory, as one culture among others – or, in other words, to pass, as it were, from cultural monism to cultural pluralism.

Once again, what is in play here are not customs or traditions, but symbolic demarcation lines, and these demarcation lines are registered in institutions, in the architecture and practice of massive state apparatuses; while they are also over determined by rifts in social and economic conditions. The order of the day, then, in my view, is to disrupt the dialogue between 'civil society' and the 'state', which has been for some time now – at least at the level of public consciousness and discourse – a dialogue between cultural communities and the state in which politics disappears, and to reintroduce a third term: the political movement (I use this term advisedly, rather than party or organisation).

We must aim for a recognition by institutions – by the state at its different levels – of existing 'cultural difference', both individual and communal (and the state runs from the level of a local authority, a housing authority or a school right up to supra-national administrative bodies). In France, for example, we must demand an end to discrimination against the Islamic religion in the name of official 'laicity' (which Edgar Morin has quite rightly dubbed 'Catholaicity'). But we must at the same time – and this, I

8 See Leggewie 1993 and also his paper to the Frankfurt Congress (Leggewie 1993).

believe, is the precondition for everything else – reconstitute a demos for democracy: *das Volk*, not *ein Volk*, as the Leipzig demonstrators initially proclaimed five years ago. In simple terms, this means creating democratic, civic (but not state) movements, and in particular transcultural movements (and even transcultural cultural movements) – both movements that cut across cultural borders and reach beyond the viewpoint of cultural identities, that is to say, make possible and embody other forms of identification.

The question I ask, then, is whether this twofold objective of enshrining a recognition of the 'right to difference' in state institutions, and of developing political and civic movements facing the state (which does not mean against it) can be achieved today within the national (or purely national) framework. I do not have the time to fully justify my position here, but I think it is, in fact, impossible, and that the only level at which there is a chance (I do not say a certainty) of succeeding in this is the European level: the level of an open, transnational European citizenship, which is to be discussed and defined as it develops its social bases, its ideology. The question of a European culture does not even arise (except in the nostalgic dreams of Pope John Paul II), and the culture of a European nation or super-nation has no meaning; this includes culture on the American model – indeed, particularly, such a model. On the other hand, the task which does lie before us today is the construction of a European public space. And we are precisely deploying our intellectual resources here to develop such a thing.

This construction of a public space or a space of European citizenship is on the agenda because, pace Dahrendorf, there was no revolution in Europe in 1989; because the European project of central banks and bureaucracies is politically dead; but also because it is impossible and unbearable to allow ourselves to be locked into a choice between this corpse or a return to 19th century nationalisms – indeed, medieval nationalisms, if it is true that in a few years there may no longer be a British or an Italian nation state.

In this long march towards the European public space – a march which is also a race – we can clearly see that the intervention of the members of the Turkish communities or pseudo communities in Germany, of Indians and Pakistanis in Britain, of Arabs or Africans in France, and so forth, is an essential moment. These groups, who are today objects of demagoguery and obsessional fixation, will tomorrow be fully fledged political actors. But this will be so only if they do not remain 'among their own kind', and we do not remain 'among our own kind'. When something like a march, a congress, a demonstration or a network of European youth for democratic rights and equality emerges, then at that point we shall be able to say that a door has opened.

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