

cial Bargain Rates.” Laufer wrote to Boas from Sakhalin: “... robberies and murders are daily occurrences.” One is reminded of A. Tschechov’s report “Sakhalin.” Stanley Freed is anthropologist and a wise man. He comments on a discussion about Laufer being a Jew or not. Boas just wanted to wipe off this discussion, since he found unjust the classification of an individual as a member of a particular group. But exactly this contradicts his doctrine of cultural relativism, where each way of a given community to live together would (at least initially) be considered of equal value. And Freed’s comment on this, after a long quotation from a text by L. Glick, is that “it seems that some cultures are more relative than others” (298). There are more comments on Boas and his rigid rules of doing fieldwork correctly. After Laufer published scanty field notes, Freed comments that this “was due chiefly to his close adherence to Boasian anthropology and not to a lack of qualifications ... The Boasian style constrained a fieldworker to a narrow research program with the endless recording of texts as the principal requirement. The brilliant people drawn to anthropology by Boas’s dynamic personality blossomed only when they abandoned the Boasian paradigm” (301).

The last chapter of volume I is entitled “Exhibition, Science, and Boas’s Resignation.” Concentrating for a moment on the first two concepts, the reader will find here arguments for and against collecting, and especially many differing views on what an exhibition should exhibit, and why and how it should be done. Holden Caulfield, from Salinger’s “The Catcher in the Rye” loved the Museum because it gave him the feeling of stability and security. He believed that exhibitions never changed.” Freed adds: “But they do.” Thinking of the decades when exhibitions in the AMNH did not change, this sounds a little over-active. But they do change. Chapter 8 (384–465) presents a good overview of ideas concerning museum work, which had already been discussed in the “Introduction” where the twofold character of museum anthropology is discussed, where a balance has to be achieved (rarely present within one person) of being a good scientist and a good promoter of what is thought of as valuable to be shown in an exhibition. “Valuable” is not meant in the pluralistic way but as a curtsy to human faculty and capacity.

Clark Wissler is at the center of interest in the second volume of this publication. It seems that this clear-minded, outspoken, yet modest person is much closer to the author than Boas ever may have been. Occasionally it reads like a restoration of Wissler. For people working at the museum, Wissler must have been much more influential than Boas. There was a concept of an area inhabited by people following closely the same ideas, values, attitudes. There was maybe a core area, and there was a culture concept applicable to exhibition work. Wissler had clear words, and to some people he appeared as “a very striking case of extreme impersonality” (Mead). Freed adds “People who do not wear their emotions on their sleeve are not necessarily unfeeling.” A very polite comment, indeed, which informs us better about Margaret Mead than about Wissler.

Wissler continued supporting fieldwork, be it in ar-

chaeology, be it in anthropology. He obviously favored solid archaeological work, as demonstrated in chapters 10 and 11, 13 and 14. Freed knew some of the people he is dealing with and precluded any work on the period when he entered the Museum and especially while he served as curator of the department. He did fieldwork in India, but he doesn’t mention it especially. And when it comes to Margaret Mead and Colin Turnbull and then to Shapiro as successor to Wissler one can note a wise calmness towards these people.

Stanley Freed wrote a book that I would have swallowed up as a young student, had it been available, and that I swallowed up now that I am a retired professor in anthropology. It’s a great intellectual excitement.

Wolfgang Marschall

**Geertz, Armin W., and Jeppe Sinding Jensen** (eds.): *Religious Narrative, Cognition, and Culture. Image and Word in the Mind of Narrative*. Sheffield: Equinox, 2011. 336 pp. ISBN 978-1-84553-295-6. Price: £ 24.99

This volume of essays is based on papers given at conferences held at the Department of the Study of Religion, Aarhus University. The initial research program entitled “Religious Narrative, Cognition, and Culture” gave place to another, broader project (entitled “Religion, Cognition, and Culture”) and in the past decade a number of important conferences took place at the department that largely contributed to the formation of the field of the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). The reader familiar with the history of this field will find traces of the developments of the past decade throughout the book: whereas the introductory chapters contain reflections on the state of the art of the field, some essays that apply insights from CSR are informed by its early stages. However, this should not be counted as a drawback: the book offers a survey of various CSR approaches and their applications to different materials, which especially readers less familiar with CSR might find helpful.

The first and second parts of the book contain a series of theoretical essays. The introductory chapters written by the editors present some strong theses. The first chapter declares the editors’ commitment to a particular model of human cognition: “cognition is neither solely nor perhaps even primarily located in individual brains, rather being distributed and situated in pragmatic social contexts” (1). As a consequence, the editors promise to focus on “what the social world brings to the mind, that is, the formative effects that various kinds of cultural knowledge ... may have on the ways in which minds are made and how they work” (1). It can be noted that the formulation of the latter sentence somewhat mitigates the unyieldingly programmatic start. While the idea that thinking is distributed across many minds and pragmatic contexts is fairly radical and much debated, few cognitive scientists would doubt that cultural knowledge (in the form of information originating in the social and material environment) shapes the mind. Armin W. Geertz’s chapter on “Religious Narrative, Cognition and Culture. Approaches and Definitions” emphasizes the pre-linguistic origins of narratives and its

connection to playing roles, relying on Merlin Donald's ideas. The chapter surveys various psychological aspects of narratives and concludes by an extensive definition of narrative, proposing, among others, that it is "a speech act between narrator and listener" and "a story about a protagonist causally involved in a sequence of events" (23). The distinguishing feature of a religious narrative is that it is "in reference to postulated transempirical powers or being" (23). Jeppe Sinding Jensen's chapter tackles the issue of religion in more detail and suggests that religious "world-making" is not limited to "what there is" in a physical and material sense but about whatever humans may imagine" (38). The proposal that religious narrative is a kind of mental travel into the unknown as well as the insight that religion is a prime example of others' idea governing our perception (46) are promising attempts at conceptualizing the difference between religious narratives and other stories.

Two essays by Terrence W. Deacon and Merlin Donald, respectively, open the second part of the book, where the authors present their influential models of human language and cognition. Deacon's chapter describes how language production can be modeled starting from situational and embodied constraints and proceeding toward linguistic levels – instead of starting with syntax, as in generative grammars. Donald's chapter explores the evolution of embedded and embodied cognition, elaborating on the concept of the hybrid mind. It is appreciated that these important theories are brought to the attention of scholars of religious studies. One cannot help, however, seeing a certain discontinuity between the program of the opening chapters, on one hand, including the editors' contributions (dedicated to the perspective of distributed and situated cognition) and the methods used by most of the other chapters, on the other hand, analyzing religious phenomena (where distributed and situated perspectives are less pronounced). Another critical remark might be made about the absence of religion from almost the entire second part of the book – even though the chapters by Chris Sinha and Rukmini Bhaya Nair examine intriguing cultural and narratological dimensions. In this section, Ilkka Pyysiäinen's essay is the only one strictly focusing on religion, describing how motoric action and sensory stimulation in rituals shape religious beliefs. Whereas for the authors of the book the potential of cognitive science approaches for studying religion might be self-evident, a more integrated, didactic approach would have worked better for scholars of religion who are not particularly familiar with the emerging interdisciplinary research field presented in the volume.

Among the essays in the third part of the book, some address classical problems in the study of various religious traditions. For example, Douglas L. Gragg discusses the parables of the New Testament and concludes that they create "shock" by violating readers' expectations shaped by human evolution (213). While the element of surprise has been emphasized by previous scholarship of the parables, analyzing the nature of these expectations and their possible hierarchy (e.g., some being cross-cultural and others more culture-specific) can add new di-

mensions to their interpretation. Anders Nielsen tests various cognitive theories to understand the use of icons in the Georgian Orthodox Church, showing how an old research problem can be studied from a new, cognitive perspective. These essays might prove to be especially attractive and useful for scholars of religion who want to be informed about cognitive theory and its potential: they do not engage in grand theorizing but instead use some easily approachable examples to demonstrate the promise of CSR.

Anders Lisdorf's contribution exemplifies embodied and embedded cognitive theory in action. Lisdorf first scrutinizes the problem of whether religious narratives provide cognitive maps (as suggested by previous scholarship), taking the Australian Arrernte myth of Numbakulla as an example. Lisdorf relies especially on Andy Clark's work on embedded cognition and Ruth Millikan's model of "Pushmi-Pullyu Representations" to argue that neither narratives nor the human mind make use of comprehensive and abstract "charts." Instead, the mind collects representations through interactions with local features of the physical, social, and symbolic environment in search of "attractive affordances" (256). In this sense, it is proper to think of religious narratives as maps, inasmuch as they help humans navigate their environment in search for a better life.

Kenneth Hansen's essay shows how cognitive theories of religion can be used to analyze cultural phenomena in a different domain, that is, 3D virtual realities implemented in the "Active Worlds" system. In particular, Hansen relies on Lawson and McCauley's ritual form theory to describe a typology of rituals where the participants are avatars (such as weddings or inaugurations in virtual reality) and ask about the rules that underlie ritual action in this world. This experiment is particularly interesting as it applies the Lawson-McCauley model in an environment that offers ritual participants a limited set of modes of interaction.

Although it is not possible to discuss each and every essay in the volume in detail, it has to be noted that the remaining contributions also cover a variety of intriguing topics and traditions, including early Irish religion (Tom Sjöblom), Hebrew Bible narratives (Hans J. Lundager Jensen and Laura Feldt), Indian epic literature (James M. Hegarty), syncretism (Anita Maria Leopold), neo-pagan Icelandic religion (Gudmundur Ingi Markússon), and astrology (Kirstine Munk). Indeed, the book leaves the reader with a pervasive impression of diversity of texts and methods, perhaps held together a bit too loosely by the overall concept of the editors, despite their best efforts. Yet this is probably the very reason scholar interested in new directions in religious studies should read the book. Instead of merely introducing one or two of the by now relatively well-known models of CSR, the volume presents the ongoing quest and diverse efforts to integrate cognitive approaches into the study of religion.

István Czachesz