

jurisdiction. Aleksander Momirov has shown that some of the safeguards associated with the Mandates System are absent in transitional administrations, that is, accountability is less institutionalized within contemporary international administrations than in historical trusteeship.¹⁴⁸ He insinuates the fact that today's peacebuilding missions have an accountability deficit is also due to the mandate period: Colonial powers were actively involved in truncating petition mechanisms. In consequence, comparable accountability mechanisms are no longer to be found in contemporary peace- and state-building mission agreements.

These historic works suggest that by all contemporary standards of sovereignty and democratic principles, contemporary transitional administrations are a step backward. These authors certainly agree that colonial trusteeship and neo-trusteeships differ since the historical constellations in the era of decolonisation are different from international constellations of the last decades. Yet, they note that the latter encompass colonial continuities. Comparing the UN administrations of the post-Cold War era with the trusteeship administrations after World War II, it becomes apparent that both were subject to similar challenges: The former had to deliver a quick peace dividend and the latter was under pressure to accelerate decolonisation. Inherent in both were attempts of internationally mandated and monitored actors to establish state and security administrations, keep violence/riots at bay, and create" sovereign states in enormously complex and hierarchical settings of practices and discourses of statehood.¹⁴⁹ The self-evident distinction between trusteeship administrations for decolonisation and UN administrations is, therefore, too narrow. They are connected by a history of foreign rule, which ranges from colonial subjugation to the recent intervention.

2.1.5 The 4th Generation: The Local Turn

Since the early 2010s, criticism of the top-down approach and the legitimacy deficit of international statebuilding administrations led to the emergence of academic scholarship, which Oliver Richmond identified as peacebuilding's "fourth generation."¹⁵⁰ This generation is characterized by a "local turn,"¹⁵¹ which refocuses attention on grassroots

148 Aleksandar Momirov, "The Individual Right to Petition in Internationalized Territories," *Journal of the History of International Law* 9, no. 2 (2007): 227, <https://doi.org/10.1163/138819907X237174>; Momirov, *Accountability of International Territorial Administrations*.

149 Wilde, *International territorial administration*; Thorsten Bonacker, Werner Distler, and Maria Ketzmerick, "Securitisation and Desecuritisation of Violence in Trusteeship Statebuilding," *Civil Wars* 20, no. 4 (2018), <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2018.1525675>.

150 Oliver P. Richmond, *A post-liberal peace*, Routledge studies in peace and conflict resolution (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 15.

151 Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond, "The Local Turn in Peace Building," *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 5 (2013), <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.800750>.

actors, local resistances,¹⁵² and so-called hybrid,¹⁵³ post-liberal,¹⁵⁴ or post-Westphalian approaches.¹⁵⁵ Even conservative statebuilding scholars, such as Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, advocated this “citizen-based approach to state building.”¹⁵⁶

The local turn influenced academic debates on international intervention as much as on security and statehood. Tobias Hagmann and Didier Péclard contrast the technocratic approach to state formation in Africa with a framework that understands statehood as the subject of a negotiation process. In doing so, they bring to the fore the historicity of the state, the social embeddedness of its bureaucratic organisations, the symbolic and material dimensions of statehood and the significance of its legitimacy.¹⁵⁷ Similarly, Klaus Schlichte draws attention to contentious understandings of statehood and the hitherto under-researched “rule of the intermediary.”¹⁵⁸ Aning and Danso note that the North-South power imbalance has had implications for policy articulation and ownership in Africa. The security policy around issues, such as Security Sector Reform, disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and counter-insurgency, has often been informed by knowledge generated by scholars from the Global North.¹⁵⁹ They urge that *hybrid security approaches*, in particular African experiences, must be given greater consideration in theorizing about security,¹⁶⁰ championing the “episteme of alternativity that takes cognizance of the context of hybridity in which a vast array of state and non-state actors outside the formal arena interact to shape the security realities of people in Africa.”¹⁶¹ Bagayoko, Hutchful, and Luckham suggest that hybrid systems, that integrate ‘traditional’ and standard state-focused institutions of security, are similarly embedded

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- 152 Roger Mac Ginty, *International peacebuilding and local resistance: Hybrid forms of peace*, Rethinking peace and conflict studies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.action?docID=10481693>.
- 153 Oliver P. P. Richmond, *Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-Liberalism*, Rethinking peace and conflict studies (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), <http://gbv.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=931736>; Olivier Nay, “Fragile and Failed States: Critical Perspectives on Conceptual Hybrids,” *International Political Science Review* 34, no. 3 (2013), <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512113480054>.
- 154 Richmond, “A post-liberal peace.”
- 155 Mac Ginty, *International peacebuilding and local resistance*.
- 156 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing failed states: A framework for rebuilding a fractured world*, 1st ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 7.
- 157 Tobias Hagmann and Didier Péclard, eds., *Negotiating Statehood: Dynamics of Power and Domination in Africa* (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 2013).
- 158 Klaus Schlichte, *Der Staat in der Weltgesellschaft: Politische Herrschaft in Asien, Afrika und Lateinamerika* (Frankfurt/Main, New York: Campus, 2005), p. 292; For Ewe and Togoland nationalism, see also Benjamin N. Lawrance, Emily L. Osborn and Richard L. Roberts, eds., *Intermediaries, interpreters, and clerks: African employees in the making of colonial Africa*, Africa and the diaspora: history, politics, culture (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006).
- 159 Kwaku Danso and Kwesi Aning, “African Experiences and Alternativity in International Relations Theorizing About Security,” *International Affairs* 98, no. 1 (2022): 75, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iab204>.
- 160 Danso and Aning, “African experiences and alternativity in International Relations theorizing about security.”
- 161 Danso and Aning, “African experiences and alternativity in International Relations theorizing about security,” p. 68.

in their own power hierarchies.¹⁶² Kwaku Osei-Hwedie and Morena Rankopo, examined the conflict resolution process of the Akans in Ghana and the Tswana of Botswana and conclude that “most individuals, families and communities still prefer indigenous conflict resolution processes [...] because they are based on cultural concepts, values, and procedures that are understood and accepted.”¹⁶³

2.1.6 The 5th Generation? Decolonising State-Building

Since the emergence of postcolonial scholarship, there have also been efforts in International Relations to decolonise the subject and discipline in order to make research approaches more global.¹⁶⁴ This interest has led to researchers increasingly foregrounding experiences from the Global South. The fourth generation's local actor- and recipient-oriented perspective inevitably brought decolonial concerns to the forefront, indicating since the mid-2010s the emergence of a ‘fifth generation’ that aspires to live up to the trend of decolonisation in questions of peace and state-building as well. There are now several scholars working explicitly on decolonial approaches to research,¹⁶⁵ while work has also emerged that seeks to mediate between International Relations and post/decolonial concepts.¹⁶⁶

Robert Vitalis' *White World Order, Black Power Politics* revisits the arguments of a group of African-American professors at Howard University, including Ralph Bunche, who played a major role in shaping the UN Trusteeship System. Vitalis responds to Jeffrey Pugh, who interpreted that the originators of the UN Trusteeship System somewhat foresaw the administration of ‘failed states’ under the aegis of the UN, a great power state or group of states. In a tragically humorous way Vitalis commented that “Bunche would be rolling over in his grave if he saw that.”¹⁶⁷ Vitalis concludes that for some state-building scholars...

“refitting the trusteeship system is the answer to the problem of ‘rogue states’ and ‘state failures’ in Cambodia, East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere. For others, it is a humane alternative to the destruction the United States wrought in Iraq in 2003. All these advocates of ‘neo-trusteeship,’ though, conjure a past that never actually existed.”¹⁶⁸

162 Niagale Bagayoko, Eboe Hutchful, and Robin Luckham, “Hybrid Security Governance in Africa,” *Conflict, Security & Development* 16, no. 1 (2016), <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2016.1136137>.

163 Kwaku Osei-Hwedie, T. Galvin and H. Shinoda, eds., *Indigenous methods of peacebuilding* (Hiroshima: Institute for Peace Science Hiroshima University, 2012), p. 47.

164 Branwen Gruffydd Jones, ed., *Decolonizing International Relations* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010).

165 Sabaratnam, *Decolonising intervention*.

166 Robbie Shilliam, *International relations and non-Western thought: Imperialism, colonialism and investigations of global modernity* (London: Routledge, 2012); Geeta Chowdhry, “Edward Said and Contrapuntal Reading,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 36, no. 1 (2007), <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298070360010701>.

167 Vitalis, *White world order, black power politics*, p. 229.

168 Vitalis, *White world order, black power politics*, p. 172.

Another noteworthy contribution is Meera Sabaratnam's work on Mozambique and her concern to decolonise the intervention through three strategies: reappraising the historical conditions of the recipients, examining their political consciousness, and appreciating the material conditions under which they work. Sabaratnam, too, concludes that "we must think historically about statebuilding," because "dynamics of statebuilding are embedded substantially in particular dynamics that long pre-date the past 20 years."¹⁶⁹ Sabaratnam shows that it is analytically important to mark the continuities of colonial patterns in power and authority configurations in order to be able to recognise patterns of external domination.¹⁷⁰ Also, Dauda Abubakar argues that the 'failed state' debate and the resulting liberal interventionism, with its various security measures, has not traced Africa's historical encounter with Europe through colonial rule. It overlooked the unintended consequences, such as the displacement of people, the radicalisation of youth, and structural violence, which ultimately undermine state-building projects. In conclusion, Abubakar asserts that the African political space and economic sphere need to decolonise in order to ensure development and human security.¹⁷¹

Getachew's *Worldmaking after Empire* critiques that scholars have typically viewed the post-1945 decolonisation movement as a history of nation-building, according to which postcolonial leaders in Africa and Asia adopted Western norms of nationhood, sovereignty, and self-determination seemingly without question. Allegedly, colonised peoples did not overthrow European ideas of tutelage and trusteeship, but rather fulfilled them.¹⁷² Pushing for a research programme of "decolonizing decolonization,"¹⁷³ Getachew looks in depth at political figures such as W.E.B. DuBois, George Padmore, but especially Kwame Nkrumah, in whose ideas she identifies a more revolutionary project to steer the world in a more egalitarian and anti-imperial direction. Adopting the term of "worldmaking," which Mazower used to describe the emergence of the development-paradigm,¹⁷⁴ Getachew considers that decolonisation meant more than just the full participation of post-colonial nations in the world system of European imperialism because they were already fully integrated into that system as colonies. Getachew identifies several pushes for self-determination at the United Nations (focusing on the *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*),¹⁷⁵ the building of post-colonial regional federations, such as Kwame Nkrumah's Pan-Africanism, and the calls for the adoption of a New International Economic Order. However, as Cristopher Lee has noted, Getachew's approach to *worldmaking* leaves open thorny questions about aspects

169 Sabaratnam, "History repeating?," p. 115.

170 Sabaratnam, "History repeating?."

171 Dauda Abubakar, "The Role of Foreign Actors in African Security," in *African Security in the Anthropocene*, ed. Hussein Solomon and Jude Cocodia, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science (Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2023).

172 Getachew, *Worldmaking after empire*.

173 Andrew Zimmerman, "Decolonizing Decolonization," accessed 08 November 2021, available from <https://www.boundary2.org/2020/06/zimmerman-decolonizing-decolonization-review-of-adom-getachews-worldmaking-after-empire/>.

174 Mark Mazower, *Governing the world: The history of an idea* (London: Lane, 2012), Chapter 10.

175 General Assembly Resolution 1514, *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*, A/RES/1514(XV) (14 December 1960).

that could be described as the dark side of postcolonial worldmaking. These include, for example, Nkrumah's authoritarian measures at the height of the decolonisation wave, such as the imprisonment of political opponents, who positioned themselves against his call for Pan-Africanism. In fact, what Getachew calls "worldmaking" often has been portrayed by the Ewe and Togoland unificationists as a Nkrumah's continuation of "black imperialism,"¹⁷⁶ which is discussed here and elsewhere.¹⁷⁷

These research approaches unite the conceptual inclusion of different historical experiences, including colonial experiences so as to narrow the dividing line between North and South. According to Julian Go, in doing so, they unite the following insight: "[F]or it to be truly postcolonial, it must move beyond colonial knowledge structures entirely, hence it must strive to transcend the very opposition between Europe and the Rest, or the West and the Rest, which colonialism inscribed in our theories."¹⁷⁸ Postcolonial-inspired historical research must not stop at a mere description of the subject matter but must engage with its object on an analytical level. Therefore, this present thesis endeavours to undertake a theory-driven analysis.

2.1.7 Postcolonial Security Studies

International Relations has been criticised for being overly ahistorical, especially from post- and decolonial scholars.¹⁷⁹ Much of this criticism draws from Dipesh Chakrabarty, who first claimed that the very idea of historicization, which invokes 'disenchanted spaces,' 'secular time' or 'sovereignty,' implies fundamentally Eurocentric assumptions that Europe is the principal subject of world history and therefore needs to be provincialized.¹⁸⁰ More recently, Meera Sabaratnam contended that International Relations "has been trying to transcend its imperial, colonial and racist roots,"¹⁸¹ yet she noted that it fails to do so since it is "constructed around the exclusionary premise of an imagined Western subject of world politics."¹⁸² Therefore, Sabaratnam champions "to challenge the exceptionalist presumption of the West as the primary subject of modern world

176 TNA (London), CO 554/667, *Togoland Administration*, 1953, W.A.C. Mathieson to British UN delegation.

177 Kate Skinner, *The Fruits of Freedom in British Togoland: Literacy, Politics and Nationalism, 1914–2014*, African Studies 132 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 168–207.

178 Julian Go, "Introduction," in *Postcolonial sociology*, ed. Julian Go, 1st ed., Political power and social theory (Bingley: Emerald, 2013), p. 9.

179 Shilliam, *International relations and non-Western thought*; Gruffydd Jones, *Decolonizing International Relations*; John M. Hobson, *The Eurocentric conception of world politics: Western international theory, 1760–2010* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); John M. Hobson, "Unmasking the Racism of Orthodox International Relations/international Political Economy Theory," *Security Dialogue* 53, no. 1 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.1177/09670106211061084>; Gurinder K. Bhabra et al., "Why Is Mainstream International Relations Blind to Racism?," *Foreign Policy*, 03 July 2020.

180 Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: postcolonial thought and historical difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

181 Sabaratnam, *Decolonising intervention*, p. 4.

182 Sabaratnam, "IR in Dialogue ... but Can We Change the Subjects?," p. 785.