

Citizenship regimes and diaspora politics: The case of politically involved Turkish migrants in Germany

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1. Introduction

It has been almost 60 years since workers from Turkey first moved to Germany as part of the labour recruitment agreement between both states. What was planned as a temporary stay of guest workers developed into a permanent settlement of foreigners and changed the country entirely. Whereas the economic integration of Turkish guest workers was successfully realised in a short space of time, their exclusion from political processes has raised questions about membership in political communities of democratic countries (Blatter 2009). Furthermore, the topic of citizenship, especially the expansion of political participation in host country processes, has caused new topics for investigation (Bauböck 2007).

More recently, in 2017, the attendance of Turkish migrants in the Turkish constitutional referendum has led to a considerable discussion about their loyalty to the free democratic basic order of Germany. On the other hand, the call of the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on Turks in Germany to not vote for »Turkey's enemies« in the German federal elections 2017 have caused a heated discussion about the political preferences of Turkish migrants and was perceived as an intervention in Germany's internal affairs. The right to vote depends directly on having the citizenship of the related country. However, as in the case of Turkish migrants residing in Germany, the concept of citizenship (and dual citizenship) has undergone a transformation. This evolution includes both opportunities and challenges (Schmid 2019: 1). In the case of Turkish migrants in Germany, their transnational linkages are perceived as a hindrance for their integration process in Germany. Although some stu-

dies show that transmigrants who are more involved in cross-border activities are more likely to participate in the host countries' societal processes (Glick-Schiller 2003; Guarnizo/Portes/Haller 2003; Waldinger 2008), the homeland-related ties of Turkish citizens – especially political ones – are perceived negatively in the German discourse (Faist 1994).

Against this background, our chapter explores the notion of dual citizenship in the context of political participation in more than one country. To accomplish this goal, we follow a qualitative research design based on a single-case study. By analysing the case of Turkish migrants living in Germany, we find that transnational political engagement of migrants is influenced both by the citizenship regime of the receiving country and the diaspora policy of the sending country. With the aim to illustrate the factors influencing the transnational political actions of Turkish diaspora members, a special emphasis is given will be given to institutional and legal regulations of home and host countries. Our main conclusion is that peoples' ties to their home country and interest in what is happening in their country of origin should not be dismissed as a refusal to integrate or as a sign of a lack of loyalty to their county of residence, but should be recognised as a genuine transnational orientation expressed by dual citizenship. The chapter is organised as follows: After a concise literature review in the next section, in section 3 we describe the citizenship regime and integration policy in Germany, before we turn to Turkey's policy towards its citizens abroad in section 4.

2. Dual citizenship and political participation: A short literature review

Citizenship used to be a unitary concept. Still in the nineteenth century, the idea that a person could be a citizen of two or more states was seen as »an offense to nature, an abomination on the order of bigamy« (Spiro 2016: 3). However, in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the view of citizenship as an expression of loyalty, identity, and territorial authority underwent a substantial change. This was especially the case on the European continent. Territorially, the peace treaties that brought the World Wars I and II to an end changed the borders of many countries. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the European landscape changed again. New states emerged and others disappeared. Millions of people were forced to emigrate and/or found themselves as minorities in the territories of new-

ly formed states. In many states, naturalisation was introduced for residents who were not born in the country and an increasing number of migrants could obtain dual citizenship. Others, however, were denied citizenship in their new countries of residence. These developments have promoted a remodelling of the classical concept of unitary citizenship, originated from the sovereign nation state with a well-mappable territory drawn by precisely defined borders (as outlined by Bayer/Schwarz/Stark 2020 in the introduction of this volume).

Legally, the European Convention on Nationality, adopted in 1997, was a major breakthrough for the acceptance of dual citizenship in the international community. The convention explicitly allows for dual or multiple nationality and leaves it to each individual state to grant such a status via national law (Pilgram 2011: 7). Given the importance of nationality as an anchor point for citizenship, this represents an important change in the view of dual citizenship: from strong rejection, via being conceived as an oddity, to general acceptance and even active legal encouragement of the status today (Midtbøen 2019: 296). According to Triadafilopoulos (2007: 35), the principal norm driving the convention is inclusion: »Whereas immigration drove the development of exclusionary citizenship laws at the turn of the twentieth century, it is helping drive the formation of more expansive membership regimes today.« Indeed, in several cases, the convention had a direct effect on the reform of domestic citizenship law. The 2001 Swedish Citizenship Act can be seen as an explicit response to the changing view on multiple nationalities in international law (Howard 2009: 74). Many other European countries also reformed and liberalised their citizenship laws in the late 1990s and early 2000s (de Hart/van Oers 2006: 336-340). According to Sejersen (2008: 553), 61 % of the countries in Europe tolerated dual citizenship in 2005. Since then, the numbers have increased further (Spiro 2016). By 2018, 75 % of all states in the world accept dual citizenship (Vink et al. 2019: 362-363). At the same time, the establishment of EU citizenship has fundamentally changed and contested the classical notion of citizenship (for a further exploration of the concept of EU citizenship, see Schwarz 2020 in this volume).

As often the case in social science, the findings in respect to the impact of dual citizenship on political participation are not clear-cut. Following Verba and Nie (1972), political participation covers four modes, namely voting, campaigning, community-related activities and individual contacts to a public official to achieve a personal goal. Yet, as introduced by Barnes and Kaase (1979), political participation also includes unconventional forms, namely participating in demonstrations, public sit-ins or discussions and the signing of peti-

tions (Stark 2019). In his study on democratic participation among first- and second-generation immigrants in the United States, Ramakrishnan (2005: 6) shows that »immigrants from countries that allow for dual citizenship actually have a higher level of participation than do immigrants from other countries.« However, according to an analysis by Cain and Doherty (2006), U.S. citizens with dual nationality are significantly less likely to register and to vote in comparison to their unitary citizenship counterparts. In accordance to this, the research by Staton, Jackson and Canache (2007a) suggests that dual nationality likely disconnects immigrants from the American political system. However, as the authors reveal in another study, this effect seems to be largely restricted to the first generation of immigrants (Staton/Jackson/Canache 2007b).

Literature on Canadian citizenship has come to different results. For example, Wong (2008) analysed civic participation of transnationals (most of whom are immigrants) and their civic participation in societal organisations. He sees no relationship between transnationalism and active citizenship and further suggests »that far from hindering adaptation to American society, dual citizenship may actually facilitate the cultural and political incorporation of new immigrants who would otherwise fail to naturalise and would remain politically and culturally isolated« (Wong 2008: 95). Mügge (2012) argues in the same way in her study on migrant groups in the Netherlands. She concludes that those migrants with dual nationality are more likely to participate in their host country's political life than those who only have Dutch nationality. An interesting insight is her conclusion that transnational political orientations are often responses to exclusionary citizenship regimes in sending countries – an aspect that has not gained considerable research. In this respect, Østergaard-Nielsen (2003a: 6) has already argued for a »re-consideration of the role of sending countries in international migration that includes but does not overestimate their role in creating transnational economic, social, and political spaces and in turning emigrants and diasporas into a part of national development and democratisation.« Her edited volume offers a comparative study of the policies of sending countries (and homelands) towards their nationals abroad and provides a pioneering study of Turkey's policy towards Turkish citizens abroad (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b). By using the Turkish and Kurdish communities in Germany as a case study, the author concludes: »Turkey wants its citizens abroad not to assimilate into their receiving countries, but to settle as *Turks*« (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b: 77). Among the reasons for this is that a settled community of »Euro-Turks«

constitutes an important economic and political resource for the Turkish state. In her case study, Østergaard-Nielsen elaborates a range of measures which are employed to strengthen the economic, political and cultural ties between Turkey and its citizens abroad.

Since then, the focus on diaspora policy has been significantly advanced (Cohen 2008). However, it is difficult to determine the real impact of these policies on the immigrants' political participation in their countries of settlement. In this respect, Østergaard-Nielsen (2016) notes in a more recent publication that diasporas may not automatically respond to the sending countries' outreach. According to her, immigrants are very much aware of the motives and credibility of these efforts and the extent to which they are sensitive to their specific needs. Moreover, she observes, their response depends on the extent to which the political actors of their residence countries »are moving away from the zero-sum debate and the securitization optic on migrant transnationality« (Østergaard-Nielsen 2016: 162).


Drawing on this concise literature review, we now turn to the case of politically involved Turkish migrants in Germany. Generally, case studies provide us with a deep understanding about specific instances (Mabry 2008: 216). Recalling that a single case study is analogue to a single experiment, a single case can be used to confirm, challenge, or extend the theory (Yin 2008: 40). In the following section, we exemplify the German-Turkish case as a critical case. According to Patton (2008: 236), critical cases are cases »that can make a point quite dramatically or are, for some reason, particularly important in the scheme of things«. In other words: »If it happens there, it will happen anywhere,« or, vice, versa, »if it doesn't happen there, it won't happen anywhere« (Patton 2008: 236). It is also important to note that our study only covers one particular form of political participation, namely the participation in elections.

3. The German-Turkish case: From guest workers to transnational diaspora members

Germany signed its first labour recruitment agreement with Italy in 1955. Later on, the German state authorities set up labour recruitment agreements with Greece (1960), Spain (1961) and Turkey (1961). Similar agreements would then be made with Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968). Only 10 years after the agreement with Turkey, the number of

Turkish workers in Germany was already well over half a million and exceeded the one million mark in 1974 (see Figure 1). Because of the law on the recruitment ban passed in 1973, which was intended to prevent the influx of further immigrants, many Turkish migrants brought their families to Germany. They feared that this would not be possible later on. This changed the social structure of the immigrants, which until then had been an almost pure working population. The Turkish resident population rose to just over two million in 1995. In 2000, 28.2 percent of all foreigners living in Germany were Turkish citizens. The proportion of Turks has since fallen by more than half, while the proportion of foreigners from Eastern Europe and the Arab world has risen. By the end of 2019, 13.1 percent (around 1.5 million) of all foreigners are Turkish citizens.

Figure 1: Number of foreigners in Germany




Source: Own compilation based on data from Statistical Office (Destatis 2020a).

However, a decreasing number of statistically recorded Turks is no proof of the decrease in the number of people of Turkish origin in Germany. It is therefore helpful to differentiate between people with and without a migration background. In general, the definition of migration background includes all immigrant foreigners, naturalised persons, (late) resettlers and the descendants of these groups born as Germans (Will 2019: 547). Since 2005, the German Microcensus also distinguishes between the population with and without a migrant background and currently defines this term as follows: »A person has a migrant background if he or she or at least one parent does not

possess German citizenship by birth« (Destatis 2019a: 4). According to this definition, 13.3 percent of all people with a migration background living in Germany belong to the Turkish community (see figure 2). Although the proportion of Turks among all migrants living in Germany has slightly fallen in the last few years, Turkish migrants are still representing the second largest group of people in Germany, after the ethnic Germans. Just over half of these people (1.5 million) were born in Germany. Today, the fourth generation of Turkish migrants is growing up in Germany. Despite this, »the integration of Turkish migrants« is still shaping the political discourse in Germany (Berlinghoff 2018).

Figure 2: Number of people with migration background in Germany



Source: Own compilation based on data from Statistical Office (Destatis 2020b).

From a scientific point of view, the transnational migration paradigm has challenged the concepts of immigration and assimilation (Glick-Schiller 2012: 32). Central to this development was the simple observation that more people are migrating from more places to more destinations. However, migrants do not automatically become »uprooted« from those they »left behind« (Toyota/Yeoh/Nguyen 2007). Transnationalism identifies a multiplicity of migrant networks and communities that transcend received national boundaries (Kivisto 2003). In this respect, the term »diaspora« is central to the study of transnationalism (Tölölyan 1991: 1). In articulating transnational diaspora members, it is no longer assumed that emigrants sever their ties with their countries of origin. Instead, they keep and reconstitute those ties, creating a political dynamic in which both the countries of origin and the countries

of residence are becoming mutually influential (Escobar 2004: 66). It is here where dual citizenship relates to the political participation of transnational diaspora members in both political communities, which sheds light not only on multiple memberships but also on multiple loyalties: to the country of residence, the homeland and the transnational community itself. As a consequence, and in the words of Kastoryano (2005: 694), »dual citizenship becomes the institutional expression of and the basis for transnationalism.«

Therefore, it is not surprising, that the issue of dual citizenship plays a major role in the discourse about the integration regime in Germany (Worbs 2008: 24). However, there are no reliable data on how many people in total hold two or more passports. The 2011 Census shows the number of persons with dual citizenship in Germany at 4.26 million (Destatis 2019b). In contrast, the 2018 Microcensus lists 1.87 million persons only. In a breakdown of persons with a migrant background by country of origin, Turkish citizens take the second place with 240.000 behind Poland with 244.000 (Destatis 2019a: 165-168).

Based on the theoretical literature, we expect an increasing political participation of Turkish migrants with dual citizenship both in their country of residence and in their country of origin. However, as our literature review has also revealed, transnational political participation of Turkish migrants seems to be influenced by the citizenship regime of the receiving country and the diaspora policy of the sending country. We therefore start our analysis by describing the citizenship regime and integration policy in Germany, before we turn to Turkey's policy towards its citizens abroad.

4. Citizenship regime and integration policy in Germany

From 1913 until January 2000, Germany attributed formal citizenship to the principle of *ius sanguinis*. This means German citizenship can be held through blood descent only (Klopp 2002: 41). Attributing citizenship holding to birth by descent illustrates the opposite of *ius soli*, which contains having the citizenship through birth in the country. Due to migration, the need for a legal re-orientation of the German citizenship regime was evident for decades, but the political arena was full of divergent opinions concerning how this reformulation should be realised (Brubaker 1992). In 1998, the formation of the German citizenship law gained support by the new red-green government coalition, but main parts of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) wanted to prevent a

reform for reasons of basic reservations. A heated debate was sparked by the intent of the red-green-coalition to introduce dual citizenship. The first draft of the reform of the German citizenship law envisaged the introduction of a dual citizenship, but this attempt failed due to the instrumentalisation of the citizenship issue and the use of this tactic for party-political success.

A prominent reason for this was the success of the signature campaign against the double citizenship of Roland Koch, the CDU's candidate for Minister President in Hessen (Schäfer 1999). At the end, a different version of the dual citizenship emerged, namely the so-called option model (*Optionsmodell*). The option-model allowed children born of foreign parents to hold dual citizenship until adulthood. However, before they reached the age of 23, they have to choose the one or the other citizenship (Ennigkeit 2008: 94-95). Ever since its introduction, the option-model has been a point of discussion, dividing the conservative CDU and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Therefore, when both parties came together in a grand coalition in the run-up of the parliamentary elections in 2013, the option model was largely abandoned. The result was a new law in 2014 which accepts dual citizenship only for those children, who either have lived in Germany for at least eight years prior the age of 21 and who have attended school in the country for six years or have a German school graduation or completed a vocational training in the country (Worbs 2014: 326-327).

Nevertheless, the year 2000 can be referred to as a fundamental turning point for the integration regime in Germany. This can be seen in the realignment of integration politics; for instance, the initiation of the German Islam Conference in 2006, the National Integration Summit 2007, or the National Integration Plan 2007. However, these positive developments experienced a setback when Thilo Sarrazin, a former SPD-politician, published the book »Germany Abolishes Itself« (*Deutschland schafft sich ab*). The book deals with the alleged negative effects on Germany which, according to Sarrazin, will result from the combination of declining birth rates, a growing underclass and immigration from predominantly Muslim countries. The book topped the German bestseller list for 21 weeks in 2010 and 2011. With his book, Sarrazin stimulated a huge political debate in Germany, targeting foreigners and Muslims (Kelek 2011). In the end, however, the integration of Turks and Muslims was on the public agenda again.

4.1. The Turkish diaspora in Germany: Politically excluded migrants?

As the foreign population with the highest proportion in Germany, the Turkish guest workers were the main group to be affected by the integration policies and the reformation of the German citizenship law. According to the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis 2020: 170–171), since the introduction of the new citizenship law in 2000, more than 2.2 million people have been naturalised in Germany as of the end of 2018. The most common country of origin for naturalisation is Turkey. Between 2000 and 2018, more than 388.000 Turks got the German citizenship, accounting for more than 17 percent of all naturalisations during that period. However, the number in this group has been falling sharply since 2000. Whereas the number of naturalisations was over 80.000 in the year 2000, it dropped to only 7.000 in 2018. In addition to this, current numbers show that 97.8 percent of Turkish citizens in Germany meet the requirement of becoming a German citizen (i.e. living in Germany for at least 10 years), but they do not apply for naturalisation (Deutsche Welle 2019).

These figures raise the question regarding the identification of the Turkish diaspora in Germany. There are some studies which show that the majority of people with a Turkish migration background feel attached to both their country of residence and origin. Based on structured interviews with 1,065 Turkish migrants in Germany, Kaya and Kentel (2005: 42) show that the so-called »Euro-Turks« see various advantages and disadvantages both in their country of origin and in their country of residence. When asked to which country they feel more affiliated, approximatively 49 % affiliate more with Turkey, 22 % with Germany and 27 % with both countries. In the authors' interpretation, the last number indicates that »Turks no longer essentialise their homeland and they actually challenge the *gurbetçi* discourse common among the Turks in Turkey. They are no longer *gurbetçi*; they have already become active social agents in their new countries. They have actually accommodated themselves in the transnational space bridging the two countries, homeland and hostland« (Kaya/Kertel 2005: 42). A more recent study by the Centre for Studies on Turkey and Integration Research (ZfTI) based on computer assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) comes to similar results. The representative data show that more than 35 % of the Turkish migrants in North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW), where nearly 500.000 people with Turkish citizenship live, find the German and Turkish way of life easy to reconcile (Sauer 2018: 38). However, an earlier study by Özcan (2004), building on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the Microcensus for NRW, has revealed that

a majority of both the first and second generation of Turks orient themselves towards permanent residence in Germany. These results have been confirmed by the representative survey »Selected Migrant Groups in Germany 2015« (RAM) of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF). The attachment of Turkish migrants to Germany was higher than the attachment to Turkey in all groups of the survey (Schührer 2018: 6).

However, while the empirical knowledge on the political attachment of the Turkish diaspora in Germany is relatively well-developed, its political participation remains largely under-explored (Schönwälder 2009: 832). One of the first studies that deals with this issue comes from Wüst (2004). For his analysis of the 2002 parliamentary elections in Germany, he took advantage of the monthly Politbarometer surveys. The study shows a slightly lower electoral participation of naturalised Turks (78 %) in comparison to their German-born counterparts (87 %). Formerly Turkish citizens also prefer the SPD more frequently than any other naturalised citizen's group (Wüst 2004: 348-351). A comprehensive study on migrants' political participation has been published by Müssig and Worbs (2012) on behalf of the BAMF. The study's data on the 2002 and 2005 parliamentary elections stem from the European Social Survey (ESS). In addition, the authors use data from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) for the 2009 parliamentary elections. Müssig and Worbs (2012) reveal only minor differences in electoral form of participation between persons without and with a migration background of the first generation. However, these differences could no longer be observed for the second generation born in Germany if they were migrants with German citizenship. The extent of their participation in political life in Germany is comparable to that of persons without a migration background (Müssig/Worbs 2012: 41). Other survey projects allow at least an analysis of partial aspects of migrants' political participation (Wüst/Faas 2018: 10). However, due to the small number of cases, these studies could hardly make reliable statements about the voting behaviour of Turkish migrants in Germany.

Thankfully, this situation has changed with the Immigrant German Election Study (IMGES). For the study, nearly 500 Germans of Turkish origin were randomly selected and interviewed to explain immigrant voter turnout in the 2017 German parliamentary elections. The study shows the voter turnout among Turkish migrants (61 %) was lower than among Germans without a migrant background (76.2 %). 35 % of the Turkish migrants voted for the SPD. Interestingly, in the first generation of Turkish migrants there is a significant correlation between their length of stay in Germany (in years) and their

participation in elections: For every ten years of stay, the probability of voting increases by about 10 percentage points. In addition, the study reveals that the voter turnout is almost four percentage points higher for persons with dual citizenship (Goerres/Spies/Mayer 2018: 5). In other words, dual citizenship seems to be beneficial for the increase of the political participation of people with a Turkish migration background in Germany, but how about the political participation of the Turkish diaspora in Turkish elections? Before we turn to this question, we will have a look at the bilateral relations of the home and the host country of Turkish migrants.

4.2. German-Turkish relations

Since the year 2016, several developments generated political and diplomatic tensions between Germany and Turkey (Eppel 2017). One can say that the first incident was in March 2016, when the German NDR television aired a video with heavy criticism of the Turkish President Erdoğan. As a direct consequence, Ankara summoned the German Ambassador in Turkey, Martin Erdmann, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Shortly afterwards, a second crisis came up because Martin Erdmann attended the first hearing of Cumhuriyet Newspaper's Editor-in-Chief Can Dündar at the Istanbul courthouse, from where he shared posts with the accused on social media. Dündar was arrested on charges of espionage and was found guilty of publishing state secrets. However, Dündar lodged an appeal and the judgement was not final. When the exit ban against Dündar was lifted, he left Turkey for Germany in July 2016, where he has lived and worked in exile ever since. Another major breaking point occurred when the German Bundestag passed a resolution in June 2016, recognizing the Armenian genocide. Shortly afterwards, Turkey denied a German delegation access to the airbase İncirlik, where German troops were stationed as a contribution to the fight against ISIS. The tensions between Ankara and Berlin were taken to a new stage in the run-up to the Turkish constitutional referendum in April 2017. Initially, some campaign rallies by Turkish officials in Germany were allowed. However, German authorities banned Erdoğan from addressing a rally in Cologne via video call with reference to health and safety concerns. The meeting was organized with the aim to protest the coup attempt in July 15.

While the German government initially condemned the coup attempt and expressed its support for democracy in Turkey, these declarations were quickly overlaid by articulated concern and criticism due to the Turkish go-

vernment's post-coup crackdown. In this context, Ankara criticized Germany for granting asylum to two high-ranking Turkish generals who were wanted by Turkey for their alleged involvement in the coup attempt. In the aftermath of the coup attempt, the Turkish government declared a state of emergency and jailed, dismissed and/or suspended thousands of soldiers, public officials, police officers, teachers, judges and prosecutors. However, the crackdown was also extended to the pro-Kurdish opposition Peoples' Democratic Party's (HDP) and critical media and journalists (HRW 2017: 600). When Ayşenur Bahçekapılı, the AK Party deputy and Parliament Speaker, went to Germany for a visit in December 2016 and was detained at Cologne Airport because she had lost her passport and could only submit a temporary one, further tension came up. This was followed by another crisis. This time, in February 2017, imams of the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB) in Germany were in the focus of the tension. German authorities claimed that Turkish imams spied on opponents of Turkish President Erdoğan in Germany. This caused a stir about the influence of Ankara on Germany's internal affairs (Maritato 2018: 10). Finally, the crisis reached its peak when German authorities banned the election campaigns of Turkish politicians on German territory during the Turkish constitutional referendum in 2017 and presidential or general elections in 2018. Although a normalisation process started in 2019, the past three years in the German-Turkish relations can be referred to as a period marked by several crises which, in the end, had a pronounced impact on the situation of Turkish migrants in Germany (Baser/Ozturk 2019).

5. Turkey's policy towards citizens abroad

According to the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB 2018), the number of the Turkish diaspora currently exceeds 6.5 million people worldwide. In the first 20 years of the migration of guest workers, most of the activities which were realised through the Turkish state were about consulting activities. Here, social attaches in the Turkish consulates gave advice for guest workers, especially focusing on issues like social rights. At that time, the economic perspective and its advantages for the state were in the foreground of attention. Moreover, this was also the time when Turkish politicians realised that these guest workers would stay abroad since most of them got their families through the family unification process. Additionally, politicians also realised that through the transfer of foreign currency into the Turkish eco-

nomy, these guest workers would contribute to the Turkish prosperity. Their stay abroad was more beneficial for Turkey than their return (Aydin 2014: 8). As a consequence of the mentioned perception of Turkish politicians, one of the most important steps to influence the Turks living abroad was taken in 1982. In the new constitution of 1982, the nationality legislation was amended and dual citizenship was facilitated for Turkish citizens. Furthermore, the 1982 constitution emphasized the duties of the Turkish state to guarantee that Turkish migrants foster stronger ties to their homeland (Ünver 2013: 184).

The next major development within the policies towards citizens abroad was the establishment of the Turkish-Islamic Union of the Religious Affairs (DITIB) in Germany in 1985. DITIB was under the auspices of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Ünver 2013: 185). The establishment of a religious organisation was an important step to show that the presence of its citizens abroad was appreciated by the Turkish authorities in the long run. One other significant step was taken at the end of the 1990s. In 1998, two institutions engaging in the topic of Turks abroad, namely the Advisory Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad and the High Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad were founded by the Prime Ministry (Aksel 2013).

5.1. The new diaspora policy under the AKP era

With the takeover of the conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, Turkey's outreach to its citizens abroad was further intensified. Moreover, the political language towards its citizens changed from *gurbetçi/yurtdışı işçi* (guest worker/worker abroad) to *yurtdışı vatandaşlar* (citizens living abroad) and finally to »Turkish diaspora«. According to Ünver, until the AKP period, Turkish migrants living outside Turkey had never been referred to as diaspora (Ünver 2013: 185). The major policy transformation implemented by the AKP government and targeting the Turkish diaspora can be dissected under two different categories. Firstly, the institutional setting, consisting of new state-led coordination mechanisms for its diaspora and, secondly, the electoral setting, like external voting rights. Aydin underlines that three developments are showing this »new« diaspora policy of Turkey. These are: (1) the explicit designation of people abroad who originated from Turkey as a diaspora; (2) that a policy relating to them is embedded in a strategy of public diplomacy being a core element of the present proactive foreign policy; and (3) the connection of this policy with a new view of the nation, compatible with multiple Muslim identities (Aydin 2014: 13).

Although some state-led initiatives and coordination mechanisms dealing with the issues of the Turkish diaspora had been founded in the past, they reached a peak with the creation of the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities in 2010 (Öktem 2014: 6). After its establishment, Turkey's relations with its citizens living in different parts of the world were firmly based on a more institutional foundation. YTB's responsibilities include defining strategies to meet the needs of the Turkish diaspora and implementing steps in accordance with the planned strategies (Yurtnağ 2012: 4-5). At its foundation, YTB was affiliated to the Turkish Prime Minister. Since Turkey's controversial transition into a presidential government system, the institution is located under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. Since 2010 it has initiated various activities, mostly with the aim to improve political consciousness, which in turn will enhance political participation, simultaneously contributing to the political, cultural, economic and social life. Finally, the initiatives' goal was to foster closer relations between the diaspora and Turkey on the one hand and between Turkey and the host countries on the other (Ünver 2013: 186).

Another institutional innovation followed with the foundation of the Yunus Emre Institute for Turkish Cultural Diplomacy. The institute is a public institution founded by law in 2007. Its goal is to preserve the Turkish cultural heritage, to promote cultural exchange, to provide educational services on Turkish language and culture and on the country's arts (Aydin 2014: 16). The Yunus Emre Institute can be regarded as an equivalent to the German Goethe Institute or the British Council. Whereas teaching Turkish to the coming generations of Turkish diaspora members seems to be one of the most important priorities, it also aims to build bridges to the Turkish diasporic formations in the receiving countries (Ünver 2013: 187). Whereas the institutional regulations lead to a structural renewal, the AKP has also used several strategies for supporting and strengthening Turkish civil society organisations in Europe and especially in Germany, for example, like the Union of European Turkish Democrats UETD (new name: UID). The reason for these activities is the formation of a pro-government lobby in EU member-states in general and in Germany in particular (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b: 91). Indeed, mobilizing Turkish migrants through civil society organisations turns out to be successful. UID was one of the main actors in organizing and managing the electoral campaigns abroad (Kuru 2019: 194).

5.2. External voting rights for the Turkish diaspora

One, if not the most decisive, innovation, which was initiated by the AKP government, was the voting right for non-resident Turkish citizens. Turkish nationals living abroad gained the right to vote for the first time in 1987 through amendments to the law on elections and voter registers (Resmî Gazete 1979). However, according to these amendments, citizens were only allowed to cast their votes at border gates and therefore had to enter Turkish territory in order to vote. Thus, it cannot be referred to as an external voting right. In 2008, the election and registration act was once again amended and finally allowed Turkish citizens living abroad the access to voting rights in the country's general elections, presidential elections and referendums (Resmî Gazete 2008). Within this scope, four different options were granted to external voters. These were: (1) by post, (2) border gates, (3) embassies/consulates, and (4) electronically. However, due to the fact that the method of voting by post was perceived as a threat to election security, the Turkish Constitutional Court annulled it. Following this development, the electoral board adopted a resolution in 2011, stating that because of the lack of sufficient infrastructure for voting abroad, non-residents were excluded from the elections in Turkey. Finally, in May 2012, the election law was amended again. This amendment paved the way for the political participation of diaspora members in those countries which are their place of residence (Abadan-Unat et al. 2014).

Turkish diaspora members practiced the out-of-the-country voting for the first time in 2014 during the presidential elections (Köşer-Akçapınar/Bayraktar-Aksel 2017: 148). A look at the numbers and voting preferences of Turkish diaspora members shows a continuous increase of electoral participation since that point of time. Furthermore, their votes were cast mainly in favour of the governing AKP (see Table 1). While it was initially mandatory to arrange an appointment with a consulate or embassy in the country of residence to vote, such appointments were no longer necessary in the 2015 parliamentary elections. However, Turkish citizens abroad still had to travel to a consulate or an embassy closest to their registered international address in order to vote. By 2017, registered expatriates could vote at any embassy or consulate as well as at border polling stations (Sevi et al. 2020: 2). Accordingly, more than 660,000 expatriate voters took part in the referendum, a participation that was achieved again in the 2018 elections.

Table 1: Turkish election results in Germany

Date	Type	Voters	Turnout in %	Winner in %
24.06.2018	Parliamentary	659.132	45,7	55,7 (AKP)
24.06.2018	Presidential	660.341	45,7	64,8 (Erdoğan)
16.04.2017	Referendum	660.666	46,2	63,1 (YES)
01.11.2015	Parliamentary	575.564	40,8	59,7 (AKP)
07.06.2015	Parliamentary	482.753	34,4	53,7 (AKP)
10.08.2014	Presidential	112.705	8,2	68,6 (Erdoğan)

Source: Own compilation based on data from HaberTurk (2014) and Yeni Şafak (2018).

To sum it up, initiating external voting rights to a huge number of non-resident citizens appears to be a success story for the AKP. However, it should not be overlooked that voting patterns in Germany remain diverse (Adar 2019: 19). The numbers of the Turkish authorities do not differ between Turks with single and dual citizenship, or Alevis and Kurds. In the IMGES, for example, less than 42 % of the interviewees with dual citizenship said they had voted. Of these, 78 % percent said they had voted against the constitutional reform. Among those who only had the German citizenship, the overall proportion was just 16 percent in favour of the constitutional reform. The lowest approval was 3 % among the group of Alevis, while still 12 % of the Kurds were in favour of the reform (Goerres/Spies/Mayer 2018: 8).

6. Conclusion

This chapter used the case of Turkish migrants in Germany to illustrate that transnational political engagement of migrants is influenced both by the citizenship regime of the receiving country and the diaspora policy of the sending country. Although the migration process of Turks cannot only be reduced to sending guest workers to foreign countries, the labour migration beginning with the 1960s can be designated as the main factor influencing the creation of the Turkish diaspora today. With more than 6 million diaspora members abroad, the Turkish state began to actively mobilise these people, especially since 2002 with the coming into power of the AKP government. The most decisive change in Turkey's outreach to its diaspora was the granting of voting rights to non-resident citizens. Whereas Germany's opportunity structures for po-

litical participation had been closed for Turkish migrants for a long time, the introduction of the option-model represented a fundamental turning point. However, the discussion about dual citizenship and transnational participation still continues today. Moreover, since 2016, there have been several bilateral crises between Germany and Turkey which obviously gave the Turkish diaspora policy an additional impetus. Our study has contributed to the discussion of dual citizenship and the political participation of Turkish migrants by demonstrating that persons who have strong ties to their homeland do not necessarily have to be perceived as having lower ties to their country of residence. It should be highlighted that members of the Turkish diaspora can also have dual loyalties feeding each other. In contrast to the often-negative connotations that go along with a homeland-orientated diaspora, this paints a far more positive picture of the future political involvement of Turkish migrants in Germany. Moreover, the case of Turkish migrants in Germany also suggests that rather than debating the »trouble« of transnational bonds, creating and adjusting the opportunity structures of migrant-receiving societies seems to be a more plausible strategy.

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