

6. Chapter: First Case – The United Kingdom

6.1. Introduction

To test the relevance and validity of the *Rings of Resilience Model* proposed in the previous chapter's conclusion, this work adopts a positivist deductive case study approach as posited by Yin (2001)⁶⁰⁹ examining and comparing the counter-terrorism policies and programmes enacted to counter *jihadi* terrorism threat in two different countries. Both countries assessed, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Singapore who have a reputation for their resilience- focussed-counter-terrorism approach, are otherwise dissimilar cases, on two extremes on the spectrum of parliamentary democracies.

Utilising a holistic multiple-case replication design as described by Yin (2001),⁶¹⁰ the new theory is tested by analysing two individual cases for convergent evidence as if they were a whole study in their own right.

This chapter first analyses in detail the United Kingdom's counter-terrorism strategies for the necessary context before assessing the deployed programmes against the nine variables established in the new *Strategic Resilience* framework individually.⁶¹¹

The same process is followed for the analysis of Singapore in the subsequent chapter.

6.2. The United Kingdom's Approach to Counter-Terrorism

The UK's current "Counter-Terrorism Strategy" *CONTEST* was formed from the lessons of 9/11 and the 2004 Madrid bombing, which showed to the Europeans and the British in particular, that they were not immune against suicide attacks.⁶¹² Since its public release in 2006 under this name, the strategy has undergone multiple reviews and has seen several updates (latest in 2018) to reflect developments in terrorist methodology, especially

609 Yin, 2001, 49–51.

610 See Yin 2001, 48–49.

611 See Yin, 2001, 13.

612 See Hewitt 2008, 98.

after the “7/7” attacks in London. But its key focus and its constituting components have remained the same.

The declared aim of the counter-terrorism strategy is “to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.”⁶¹³

To achieve this objective *CONTEST* has since its inception, taken a multi-faceted approach to the terror threat. This approach consists of four strands:

- *PREVENT* – focusses on identifying and reducing the risk of radicalisation and addressing the supportive factors of discrimination and inequality,
- *PURSUE* – focusses on the disruption of terrorist plots through intelligence and law enforcement measures,
- *PROTECT* – focusses on identifying and reducing the vulnerabilities,
- *PREPARE* – focusses on increasing the ability to respond to and recover from an attack.⁶¹⁴

The Government’s approach is two-fold: On the one hand, to try to fulfil society’s request for more security but on the other, also to communicate the countering concept of the uncertainty-acceptance, to avoid the pitfalls of the *Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox* where the held beliefs of an individual about his own safety and security are shattered by an attack that breaches his imagined security barrier.⁶¹⁵

This choice of a strategically resilient response to the *Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox* becomes especially clear in the inclusion of the *PREPARE* strand which presupposes that the complete elimination of the risk from terror is not possible, and prepares for mitigating its effects.⁶¹⁶ This choice is deliberately made and communicated by the Government, as underlined in the foreword by the Home Secretary, Rt Hon. Sajid Javid MP to the 2018 *CONTEST*: “The stark reality is that it will never be possible to stop every attack. We do not live in a surveillance state and nor do we want to.”⁶¹⁷

The understanding that it is necessary to include the population in the counter-terrorism effort, has been developed over decades: The more

613 HM Government 2018, 13.

614 See Hewitt 2008, 98–99 ; See HM Government 2018, 8.

615 See Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 91 ; See Gearson 2012, 191.

616 Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 93.

617 HM Government 2018, 5.

passive concept of coping in heroic-calmness in face of a looming threat “*Keep Calm and Carry-On*”, first famously coined in World War Two, has extended to the different strands of counter-terrorism:

During the years of the “*the troubles*” in Northern Ireland from 1968 to 1998, the population was asked for participation in the *preventive* efforts through vigilance in view of potential hidden bombs. Businesses were primed to actively monitor their customers for suspicious purchases of potential ingredients for explosives. In the same way, staff at grocery stores or other crowded premises was also asked to take *protective* measures and to be on the lookout for individuals who may try to plant a bomb on their premises, to create death, panic, and confusion in the population.⁶¹⁸

As a result of the shift of the *Irish Republican Army* (IRA) from targeting law enforcement-related targets to attacking general and critical infrastructure, the authorities undertook large efforts “*to identify over 400 vulnerable areas and work with people in this field to improve security through training and providing expert advice, including contingency plans designed by the Home Office.*”⁶¹⁹

Faced with new methods of attacks different from those of the IRA, i.e. after 9/11, the “7/7” London bombings in 2005 or the Mumbai and Paris attacks of 2015, the risk assessment for the population was also continually updated, and the counter-terrorism concepts were upgraded.⁶²⁰

The first suicide attacks on British soil, committed by British citizens in London on 7/7/2005 had a strong impact on the perception of the terrorism threat to the UK and led to permanent changes, including the introduction of major updates to the terrorism legislation.⁶²¹ In the eyes of the authorities, it also underlined the importance of social resilience and preparedness.⁶²²

Following the Manchester Terror attacks in 2017, the British Counter-Terrorism Police concluded that their delivery of protective security measures alone, were insufficient to address the threat from terrorism the UK was facing and that they needed to encourage the public, especially the business community to be more engaged and interested in their own secur-

618 See Hewitt 2008, 95.

619 *ibid.*, 94–95.

620 See Harris 2016 ; See Mayor's Office Greater London Authority 2017.

621 See Hall 2020 ; See Honeywood 2016.

622 Harris 2016.

ity and to become stronger co-creators of security⁶²³ or as Neil Basu, the National Lead for Counter-Terror Policing in the United Kingdom, put it:

*“The public including the business community have to be encouraged to be more interested in their own security. [...] As well as every cop becoming a counter- terrorism cop, we need every citizen to be a counter-terrorism citizen and [...] every responsible business also needs to be a counter-terrorism business”.*⁶²⁴

This conclusion has been included in the “PROTECT & PREPARE” strands of the 2018 Counter-Terrorism Strategy which is based on six beliefs.⁶²⁵

- *An isolated law enforcement effort alone is not enough to counter the terrorism threat.* A complex and developing threat environment requires a comprehensive approach from government and the inclusion of the civil society. Civil society should not be seen as a burden, but as an asset, a partner in the effort to fight terrorism. This requires a cooperative approach with consequences for information sharing, community relationships, policing, solidarity, the role of self-help capabilities, personal responsibility, and for trust.
- *Fighting terrorism is a protracted conflict that requires the ability to sustain a functioning “home front”.* To sustain the morale at the *home front*, authorities need to infuse the population with a shared meaning of the conflict, gain their trust in the effectiveness of prescribed measures and policy direction, show progress, meet minimum security needs and provide help in the response and coping.
- *Assuring business continuity is active counter-terrorism policy.* As terrorists are ultimately trying to target the civil society through their deeds, protecting businesses, as a major organising element and provider of essential services to the civil society, is necessary. By enabling and assuring a necessary level of preparedness of the business community, authorities can reduce the direct and indirect effect of attacks and can speed up the resumption of services after an attack. To be truly effective, closer cooperation with the business community, building trust through listening to and considering their needs, as well as information sharing are absolutely vital.

623 See Basu 2018.

624 *ibid.*

625 See HM Government 2018.

- *The infrastructure of an open society like the UK is vulnerable to attack.* While tremendous efforts can be undertaken to reduce the exposure of key installations like nuclear power plants and airports to potential attacks, hundreds of other potential infrastructure targets exist that cannot be secured in advance at a reasonable cost. Therefore, resilience to attacks and the ability to resume the provided service as soon as possible after an attack or to replace the services, need to be planned and prepared for in cooperation with all stakeholders.
- *The new type of marauding terrorist firearms or sharp-blade attacks in combination with vehicles attacks are difficult to prevent.* The response requires a multi-leg approach including the interdiction of firearms at the border, effective legislation against the ownership and carrying of such weapons, increased controls in the street, risk awareness training for truck/vehicle owners / rental companies and the mental and practical preparation of citizens for such methods of attack, to be able to properly deal with them.
- *Effective counter-terrorism legislation is necessary.* It must develop as the threat evolves, must serve the resilience objectives and take into account the citizens' perception of fairness and proportionality.

On the following pages, the author will analyse these different measures and programs under the *PROTECT & PREPARE* strands, currently enacted in the UK, for their impact on *Strategic Resilience*. Only unclassified open-source material is considered.

To provide a picture as comprehensive as possible, also measures and programmes which have only recently been introduced or have only just been announced, will be assessed against resilience-building factors identified in Chapter Four, based on the information which is available at the time of writing.

6.2.1. ACT: Action Counters Terrorism

Identify and Respond to Suspicious Behaviour or Items

ACT: Action Counters Terrorism is the name of the shared campaign platform used by UK Counter-Terror Policing (UKCTP) which brings together “*all counter-terrorism communications under a single overarching brand.*”⁶²⁶

As part of the *PROTECT* and *PREPARE* strand of *CONTEST*, it is aiming to improve the ability of members of the public to:

- Identify (a) and respond (b) to suspicious behaviour,
- Identify (a) and deal (b) with suspicious items,
- React to firearms or weapons attacks.

Through its different *ACT* activities, under the heading “communities *defeat terrorism campaign*”, *UKCTP* aims to raise the population’s vigilance, to enable the spotting of – and to encourage the reporting of suspicious behaviour and activity in their neighborhood or workplace, in order to help the security services tackle the terrorism threat. “*ACT includes branding, a [...] [dedicated] website on the Gov.UK portal, two podcasts available across a number of formats, posters [...] and films.*”⁶²⁷

While the *ACT* campaign is customised to target context-specific audiences (e.g. youth, holidaymakers, football fans etc.) with context-specific messages, the underlying objectives are identical and built on qualitative and quantitative research, conducted beforehand to explore how *UKCTP* could achieve its communications objectives, and what reasons had hindered more reporting by the public.⁶²⁸

As a result, the following proposals came out:

- “*Increase knowledge of what to look for,*
- *Emphasise that reporting without a clear link to terrorism is OK,*
- *Provide reassurances around anonymity and fair treatment by Police,*
- *Normalise reporting,*
- *Leverage collective responsibility and empowerment to prevent an attack,*
- *Make reporting frictionless,*

626 MEDIACOM 2017, 2 ; See James 2017.

627 *ibid.*

628 See MEDIACOM 2017, 2.

- Tap into online as a widely used source of information,
- Ensure a clear and consistent call to action.”⁶²⁹

According to reports from the *National Counter Terrorism Security Office*, “over a fifth of public reports to the Anti-Terrorist Hotline and online through *Gov.Uk/ACT*, result in useful intelligence for CT officers.”⁶³⁰

Figure 21: Screenshot from “Life Has No Rewind Button” /ACT cinema campaign running for eight weeks in UK cinemas “to deliver [...] messaging with fewer distractions, more impact, and to more hard-to-reach audiences such as young people.”⁶³¹



The other side of *ACT* focuses on improving the public's preparedness in case that they are caught up in an attack. At an official terrorism threat level of *SEVERE* which means that an attack is highly likely at any time, the *ACT* campaign shows different features which help strengthening the *Strategic Resilience* of the country. It puts the citizens in the driver's seat to decide about their own destiny and that of their community, allowing them to contribute to something bigger than themselves.

The campaign provides informational support and builds up problem-focused coping skills which give certainty to individuals of how to behave

629 *ibid.*, 5.

630 National Counter Terrorism Security Office 2019b.

631 *ibid.*

when faced with suspicious situations, and thereby also shows them a way how to deal with the overall threat.

For the individual following this behavioral guidance, the campaign promises to reduce (the potential) impact of the terror threat. In its messaging “*Communities Defeat Terrorism*” and “*Together we got it covered*”, the campaign also tries to reconfirm and strengthen societal cohesion. The media campaigns are only a small part of the UKCTP efforts to engage the public and business community. It is flanked by direct engagement efforts. The most prominent of them is *Project Servator*.⁶³²

What general lessons can authorities take away from the ACT campaign that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should utilise targeted public service announcement to increase vigilance and preparedness of society towards threat to society.
- Authorities should inform citizens about the threats and risks, while providing practical behavioural guidance on what citizens can do.
- Authorities should explain the responsibility of each citizen for the safety and security of the community.
- Authorities should reduce citizens’ reluctance to act in a suspicious situation, by addressing potential objections, and stress the significance of individual action for the overall community.

<i>ACT – Action Counters Terrorism</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

632 See chapter 6.2.3. Project Servator.

6.2.2. ACT: RUN, HIDE, TELL – How to respond to a Firearms or Weapons Attack

ACT is not only concerned with protective measures and vigilance, but also with the necessary preparations to assure that citizens and businesses know how to react if an attack should occur. The guidance given has been strongly shaped by the shift in terrorist attack patterns in the UK in recent times, especially the so-called *Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attacks* (MTFA), *bladed weapons-* and *Vehicle As a Weapon* (VAW) attacks.⁶³³

Run Hide Tell is a public UK Counter Terrorism Policing campaign (under the ACT- Action Counters Terrorism umbrella) which provides straight-forward guidance to members of the public on how to behave in case that they are caught-up in a knife or firearms attack in a crowded environment. The core message is to RUN, HIDE and TELL.

Figure 22: Campaign leaflet with core advice “RUN. HIDE. TELL”⁶³⁴



633 See Harris 2016.

634 Image taken from Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters 2015.

The message is delivered to the general public through different means including campaign poster (see Figure 22) and sophisticated short films⁶³⁵ which show the correct behaviour for individuals caught up in an attack and provides clear behavioural guidance under different circumstances. Authorities at first, were reluctant to start a communication about low probability – high impact events like terrorism because they were afraid of sounding alarmist.⁶³⁶ But the increasing death toll from the mentioned shift in methods of attack by terrorist groups, made it necessary to expand the previous messages promoting just vigilance, to the preparation of advice.

Contrary to general belief “*organisations tasked with communicating about terrorism, and (promoting) the need for public vigilance, often find that they struggle to get the public engaged enough*”.⁶³⁷ Accordingly, the message of the *RUN, HIDE, TELL* campaign is spread further through multiple channels – be they digital, social, print, through posters, flyers and cooperation with industry.

To reach its audiences the campaign’s message is adapted to the specific target segments, e.g. workplace, young people, holiday makers, commuters and others. Noteworthy are three adaptations of this public education campaign which *UK Counter Terror Policing* developed with stakeholders from the private sector, non-governmental organization, and concerned ministries.

Noteworthy Adaptation #1: The ABTA – Stay Safe Abroad Campaign:

Following the fatal *Daesh* attacks on British holiday makers at the tourist resort at Port El Kantaoui in Tunisia on 26 June 2015, and the attack at the Bardo National Museum in Tunis three months earlier, *UK Counter Terror Policing* and the *Association of British Travel Agents* (ABTA) launched the “The Stay Safe Abroad” Campaign. According to Scott Wilson, National Counter Terrorism Protect and Prepare Coordinator, it has been the

“most successful information campaign CT Policing has ever delivered, with potentially life-saving information being taught to tens of thousands

635 See YouTube Channel of the National Police Chiefs' Council 2017.

636 Rogers 2017, online.

637 Rogers 2017.

*of holiday reps working for the UK's major travel companies, via a series of training modules, specifically tailored to the travel industry.*⁶³⁸

Through several educational videos, the campaign gives practical advice to holiday reps as well as to holiday makers themselves on how to stay vigilant and how to respond in the case of attacks at a holiday destination.

Noteworthy Adaptation #2: The Sun Campaign:

To raise the consciousness of the harder-to-reach younger age groups of 11-16 year-olds about the 'Run, Hide, Tell' message, *UK Counter Terror Policing* has cooperated with the tabloid newspaper *The Sun*.⁶³⁹ Tailored to the young audience, the campaign features British celebrities from sports, and show business personalities who have a reputation of being tough, but despite of this image encourage teenagers to 'Run, Hide, Tell', should they be caught up in a terrorist attack.⁶⁴⁰ The campaign also "*created a three-fingered emoji to echo the simple police guidelines*" of "*RUN, HIDE, TELL*".⁶⁴¹

The videos and posters were disseminated by the British Counter Terrorism Police and ran across the Sun's print edition, including cut-out-and-keep posters, its digital edition, social media including "*the Sun's Snapchat profile, and via its network of influencers.*"⁶⁴²

638 CSM contributor 2018b.

639 See Cleeton 2017.

640 See *ibid.*

641 Boyle 2017.

642 Cleeton 2017.

Figure 23: “RUN, HIDE, TELL” cut-out in *The Sun*.⁶⁴³



Noteworthy Adaptation #3: *ACT for Youth: The story of NUR, EDIH, LET*

Under the guidance of the *Personal, Social, Health and Economic Education Association (PSHE Association)* and *Girlguiding*⁶⁴⁴ the UKCTP have developed education materials which are “designed to be used by schools and youth leaders to teach young people [in the age groups 11-16] what to do in the event of a terrorist attack.”⁶⁴⁵ It spreads the “RUN, HIDE, TELL” message in a sensitive and non-alarmist way through “a live action and graphic novel-style animation”⁶⁴⁶, appropriate for young people. The animation is accompanied by an elaborate guidance and by fully prepared lesson plans,

643 Image taken from The Front Row Partnership 2017.

644 Formerly known as *The Girl Guides Association*, Girlguiding is the UK’s national guiding organisation for girls aged 5–18 years with over 400,000 members; For more info see Girlguiding 2020.

645 Griggs 2017, 1.

646 *ibid.*

provided to teachers and youth groups through the PSHE association, to help in the messages' delivery.⁶⁴⁷

Figure 24: Screensgrabs from "ACT for Youth: The story of NUR, EDIH, LET" education film with simple advice for young people.⁶⁴⁸



The key message is adapted to the age groups:

"The advice for adults and advice for young people differs in one main area; whereas for adults the message is 'take charge' (for example insisting others go with you or trying to stop others from entering the area), the message for young people is 'take charge of yourself', thus ensuring their own personal safety."⁶⁴⁹

647 Mayor's Office Greater London Authority 2017, 56.

648 Counter Terrorism Policing UK 2017b.

649 PSHE Association and National Counter Terrorism Security Office November / 2017, 4.

6. Chapter: First Case – The United Kingdom

Like the ACT campaign targeting adults, the education material for young people also addresses the importance of vigilance and of reporting suspicious behaviour or such items for youths (see below).

Figure 25: ACT message adaptation for young people in NPCC's leaflet.⁶⁵⁰



COUNTER TERRORISM POLICING

**ACT for YOUTH:
Action Counters Terrorism**

Helpful Advice

This quick-check leaflet is here to help you remember the key messages from the *Story of Nur, Edih and Liet*:

- How to identify and report suspicious behaviour
- How to identify and report a suspicious item
- What to do in a gun or knife terror attack

For further information visit: gov.uk/nactso

IDENTIFYING SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOUR

Suspicious behaviour means any action that makes someone feel worried or anxious

Remember to focus on a person's behaviour, not their appearance

Suspicious behaviour might include:

- Hanging around in an area the public are not allowed to enter
- Paying too much attention to things like: entrances, exits, CCTV or security staff, or taking photos of these
- Trying to hide their face or identity
- Asking unusual questions, for example about security arrangements in a public place
- Deliberately trying to avoid security staff
- What the person is doing doesn't seem right for the place they're in
- Trust your instincts, if you see anything suspicious, take action!



REPORTING SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOUR

When reporting suspicious behaviour, either find a responsible adult, call 999 and ask for police, or use the online reporting tool: <https://www.met.police.uk/tell-us-about/possible-terrorist-activity/>

Reporting might include:

- Who did you see, what did they look like, what were they wearing?
- What have you seen, what has happened, what was it that made you suspicious?
- Where did the situation happen and where were you?
- When did it happen – what time?

Don't be afraid and don't worry about over-reacting. Your actions could help avert an attack and save lives.



IDENTIFYING SUSPICIOUS ITEMS

A suspicious item is any object that makes a person feel worried or anxious.

Some features of suspicious items might be:

Hidden:

- Has the item been hidden?
- Has any attempt been made to hide the item from view or place it where it probably wouldn't be found accidentally?
- Innocent items are not usually hidden deliberately!

Obvious:

- Is the item obviously suspicious?
- Can wiring or batteries be seen?
- Is it taped or does it contain liquids or powders?
- Has it been found after seeing someone behave suspiciously?

Typical:

- Is the item typical of what you might reasonably expect to find in that place?



RESPONDING TO SUSPICIOUS ITEMS

If you see anything that you think is suspicious, report it right away.

Different ways to report a suspicious item:

- Speak to a responsible adult or security staff
- Move to a safe distance and call the police on 999
- Use the online reporting tool: <https://www.met.police.uk/tell-us-about/possible-terrorist-activity/>

DO NOT:

- Ignore the suspicious item
- Move closer to look at it or pick it up
- Try to take charge of the situation yourself



WHAT TO DO IN A GUN OR KNIFE TERROR ATTACK

RUN

- If you are caught up in a gun or knife attack, **RUN** to safety
- Don't waste time taking photos or videos
- Tell others to go with you
- Don't let anyone or anything slow you down
- Just **RUN** to safety, this is your best option



HIDE

- If you can't run, **HIDE**
- Lock yourself in a room, with solid walls if possible
- Keep away from windows and doors
- Be very quiet, silence your phone
- Stay hidden until you are rescued, this may take some time



TELL

- Only when you are safe, phone 999 and ask for the police
- Tell them what has happened, who you are and where you are
- Answer all their questions as best you can



All of these tailored campaign adaptations are still in use and are regularly replayed through the social media channels of UKCTP and by local police forces wherever appropriate. Updated adaptations are created when the

650 National Police Chiefs' Council 2018.

need arises, based on developing requirements and circumstances, e.g. safety and security during summer festival season.

The effectiveness of “*RUN, HIDE, TELL*” leaflet and film was tested in a survey experiment in 2019 which examined the different behavioural intentions of 3003 UK and Danish participants.⁶⁵¹ The participants were split into three groups. Participants in the first group received the leaflet, the second group was shown the movie, while the third groups received no pre-event information.⁶⁵²

*This study demonstrated a number of important benefits of communicating with the public to prepare them to respond to terrorist attacks involving firearms. In particular, the potential for pre-event communications to enhance perceptions of security services' preparedness to respond and increase trust in official guidance during an incident. It also supports the contention that the assumption of public panic is empirically inaccurate. These results indicate that this type of communication campaign can positively influence intended behaviors in relation to encouraging actions that could save lives and discouraging nonprotective behaviors.*⁶⁵³

Due to the similarities of the measured impacts on participants in the United Kingdom and Denmark alike, Pearce et al. suggest that the *Run.Hide.Tell* guidance is suitable for roll-out in other countries.⁶⁵⁴

What general lessons can authorities take away from the “RUN-HIDE-TELL” campaign that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should communicate about terrorism risks in an open, transparent, and non-alarmist way.
- Authorities should provide clear and actionable guidance on how to react when caught up in a *Marauding Terrorist Firearms- or Bladed Weapons Attack*.
- Authorities should consider the special needs of vulnerable groups like children and young people and should amend the information/guidance to meet the needs of these groups respectively.

651 See Pearce *et al.* 2019.

652 See *ibid.*

653 *ibid.*, 1691.

654 See *ibid.*, 1692.

RUN HIDE TELL Campaign	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	✓
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	✓
Impact Prevention & Reduction	✓
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	
Management of Fear	✓
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	✓
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	

6.2.3. Project Servator

Project Servator is an unannounced show of force in or around crowded places by armed counter-terrorism police in cooperation with local forces.

*“Deployments are highly visible and made up of a range of police resources, including uniformed and plain-clothes officers, police dogs and horses, and firearms officers. They are supported by state-of-the-art CCTV monitored in real time and other less visible security measures. The deployments are planned, based on intelligence, but are designed to be unpredictable and can turn up anywhere at any time.”*⁶⁵⁵

The deployments of *Project Servator* officers are supported by an outreach and communication campaign across different media and touchpoints in the vicinity as shown in the figure below.⁶⁵⁶ Police may set up pavement signs in the street, distribute leaflets and place posters in nearby coffee shops, and may employ the *out-of-home* traditional posters and new digital advertisement spaces.⁶⁵⁷ The deployments are additionally supported by official twitter announcements by local police forces as well as *UK Counter Terrorism Policing*.⁶⁵⁸ The objective of this concerted and complimentary effort according to Superintendent Helen Isaac of the City of London

655 CSM contributor 2018a, 2.


656 See Baines *et al.* 2017, 2.

657 See *ibid.*, 3.

658 Countless examples for this can be found on *twitter* under the hashtag #ProjectServator <https://twitter.com/hashtag/ProjectServator>.

Police, is to ensure that “the message that the public gets is one of constant reassurance, of us [the police] needing their assistance in helping to keep the city safe.”⁶⁵⁹

Figure 26: *Project Servator* advertisement encouraging commuter vigilance & cooperation in the London underground.⁶⁶⁰



Through *Project Servator* the police aim to advance five key objectives:

- 1) *Community outreach*: By directly engaging with and informing the public about the terrorism threat, i.e., by providing information leaflets like in figure 28 and by answering questions and responding to citizens' concerns. By raising “awareness of how the public can help keep everyone safe”⁶⁶¹ through their own vigilance, police want to reduce the threshold for people to come forward with information now and in the future⁶⁶²
- 2) *Intelligence gathering*: According to the *National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NCTSO)* amplifying the message of national community vigilance campaigns at the local level through actions like *Project Ser-*

659 *ibid.*

660 Image adapted from Mitchell 2016.

661 CSM contributor 2018a, 2.

662 See Harris 2016, 57.

6. Chapter: First Case – The United Kingdom

vator deployments, “have helped increase intelligence reports by up to 50 percent.”⁶⁶³

Figure 27: Extract of Project Servator leaflet handed out by the Police asking the public for their support.⁶⁶⁴



The leaflet features a red header with the 'PROJECT SERVATOR' logo. It is divided into three columns of text and images. The first column, titled 'Project Servator', includes a photo of police officers talking to the public and text explaining the tactic. The second column, 'What you will see', includes a photo of officers in high-visibility gear and text about unpredictable deployments. The third column, 'How YOU can help', includes a photo of an officer at a desk and text about reporting suspicious activity. A bottom banner features a photo of officers and the slogan 'Together we'll help keep people safe'.

PROJECT SERVATOR

Project Servator
The City of London Police is dedicated to the protection of our communities. Project Servator is a very effective tactic used by the force to help deter and detect a wide range of criminality, from pickpockets through to terrorism, whilst providing a reassuring presence to the public.

It comprises unpredictable, intelligence-led visible police deployments involving uniform and plain clothes and other specially trained officers, supported by the full resources of the City of London Police such as horses and detection dogs.

Our deployments are also directly supported by our state-of-the-art CCTV control room and trained security officers, some of which you may see working with our City of London Police officers.

*These officers are trained licensed (SIA) security officers from private industry who volunteer their services to support the police.

What you will see
You will see a highly visible police presence that will turn up unannounced in locations across the City. These police deployments will be unpredictable in timing, duration and assets used. For example, they could appear in an area tomorrow morning for an hour and include dogs, vehicles and other measures, some of which may not be visible.

Some locations may not see a deployment for a week, while others might be visited more than once in a day yet will have a completely different look and feel.

The key to all of this is unpredictability.

You may encounter Project Servator deployments, so don't be surprised if you see one – they are there to help keep you safe. They are supported by officers who are there to help explain about the deployments and answer any questions you may have, so feel free to chat with them if you want to find out more.

How YOU can help
Your support and assistance with Project Servator is essential for its success. You have a vital role to play by being vigilant and reporting anything suspicious IMMEDIATELY by calling 101 or 999 if it's an emergency.

Don't assume others have reported it already or that because others are not reporting, that it is not suspicious. If it doesn't feel right, report it.

How YOUR BUSINESS or COMMUNITY can help
The success of these tactics rely upon support and vigilance from you as part of our community as well as the general public. It is really important that the public understand the nature of the operations and, crucially, feel reassured rather than alarmed.

That's where you come in.

Together we'll help keep people safe

- 3) *Public reassurance*: The visible presence of police officers' acts as a reassurance to the public that an armed response will be available, if the need arises as projected by authorised firearms officers in figure 29.⁶⁶⁵ By equally addressing non-terrorist-related crime and by the police's ability to question and engage, the officers further aid the building up of confidence and trust.

663 National Counter Terrorism Security Office 2019b.

664 City of London Police 2018d.

665 Baines *et al.* 2017, 4.

Figure 28: *Project Servator* – Authorised firearms officers deployed as reassurance and deterrence measure in the City of London.⁶⁶⁶



- 4) *Disrupt and deter hostile reconnaissance*: By deploying officers trained in the use of *behavioural detection methods*, by the encouragement of vigilance within the local business community and by support through CCVT monitoring, *Project Servator* deployment as shown in figure 30 increases the chance to spot tell-tale signs of suspicious or illegal activities and make it “*difficult for criminals to gather the information they need to carry out their plans successfully*”.⁶⁶⁷

666 Image taken from City of London Police 2018b.

667 CSM contributor 2018a, 2–3.

Figure 29: Project Servator deployment by North Yorkshire Police.⁶⁶⁸



5) *Strengthen police-business partnerships*: The police's deployments offer an opportunity for the police force to engage the businesses and organisations located in the area, to raise the level of vigilance of their private security teams and staff members. It is also not uncommon for private security staff and police to jointly operate during deployments in crowded places or venues like airports, large shopping complexes or stadia.⁶⁶⁹

The open police deployment also allows officers to refresh and update the counter-terrorism security awareness training which many private in-house security personnel and staff have received by the *Counter Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA)* as part of *ACT Awareness* (previously called "*Project Griffin*") trainings. It had been introduced to help them identify hostile reconnaissance of their business and its surroundings.⁶⁷⁰ Private front-line staff in crowded places has been the focus of counter-terrorism policing and bespoke programs exist to reach this clientele with the shared-vigilance message beyond *Project Servator* engagements.

By mounting successful *Project Servator* operations, the UKCTP aims to reassure the UK population that the authorities are prepared to successfully handle the threat of terrorism, thereby confirming the *Just-World-Beliefs* held in the public.

668 Image taken from North Yorkshire Police 2018.

669 See Mayor's Office Greater London Authority 2017, 45.

670 See CSM contributor 2018a, 2.

The visible police presence itself is said to have an anxiety-reducing effect on the population and as such improves their perceived resources to deal with the terror/crime threat.

What general lessons can authorities take away from Project Servator which may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

Authorities should utilise temporary large highly visible local deployments of police forces:

- To engage with the public about the threat and risks of terrorism and explain the important role each citizen and business can play for the safety and security in their community,
- To reduce the threshold for people to come forward with information in the instant and in the future,⁶⁷¹
- To reassure the public that armed response is available, if needed,⁶⁷²
- To disrupt and deter hostile reconnaissance,
- To strengthen police-business partnerships by engaging the businesses and organisations located in the area, to raise the level of vigilance of their private security teams and staff members.

<i>Project Servator</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	✓
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

6.2.4. ACT Awareness: Identify and Respond to Suspicious Behaviour or Items

ACT Awareness (previously known as *Project Griffin*) is one component of the awareness and education campaign to sensitize the operators of

671 See Harris 2016, 48.

672 See Baines *et al.* 2017, 4.

crowded venues of potential terrorist threats, and to encourage them to use protective and preparedness measures to protect their business, staff and visitors.

Historically, faced with bombing attacks on critical infrastructure and tourist landmarks as well as businesses and the transport network, the security services in cooperation with the *Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure* (CPNI) focused on establishing and improving protective measures to address this specific threat. This was done by target-hardening and by promoting public vigilance to deter would-be terrorists, probably best reflected by the “ring of steel”⁶⁷³ around the City of London and the recurring calls for “*public vigilance and participatory surveillance*” across London and the British public transport system.⁶⁷⁴

One of the bespoke programs is *ACT Awareness*, a counter-terrorism security awareness and training campaign, specifically offered to businesses of the retail and the commercial community, operating in or near crowded places.

The training is targeting in-house security personnel and all front-line staff and may last from 30 minutes to six hours, depending on the businesses’ needs and availability.

It focusses on teaching practical steps to help the audience to identify hostile reconnaissance of their business and its surroundings, and to make them sensitive to security precautions, according to the *Crowded Places Guidance*.

Trainings are delivered in a variety of ways to ensure a maximized reach and acceptability, from large corporations to the operators of small corner shops who do not have the time or resources to attend training sessions. But the latter may be open to receiving abridged advice through their local authorities or from their neighbourhood policing network or may make use of online training outside of their business hours.⁶⁷⁵

673 Following the Provisional IRA bombings of the Baltic Exchange in 1992 and on Bishopsgate in 1993, the traffic flow into the London’s financial centre was re-arranged and solidified to prevent and deter further vehicle-borne bomb attacks. The number of access roads into the financial centre of London were reduced and fortified through one-way systems, flower-planting, bollards, police sentry boxes and CCTV cameras for face and number plate recognition. See Dyckhoff 2011.

674 Larsen and Piché 2009.

675 See Harris 2016, 58.

The training content is delivered in several ways:

- CTSA In-house trainings offered at the company's site,
- Industry self-delivery in person or based on the company's own e-learning system,
- ACT Awareness E-learning tool.

The introduction of the *ACT Awareness e-learning tool* has allowed counter-terrorism policing to strongly increase the number of employees trained in counter-terrorism (compared to face-to-face training), and offers a simple way for continuous engagement with the businesses and their employees, where necessary.⁶⁷⁶

Through cooperation with major prominent British companies as part of the Governments' *StepChange Initiative*, the content is being delivered to the employees through the companies' particular internal digital training systems. For companies and single trainees without their own E-learning system, a browser-based version is available as well.

According to Neil Basu, by the end of 2018 more than 1800 businesses had registered under the scheme and more than 500,000 employees have signed on and have completed the awareness training.⁶⁷⁷

Since then, the Government has continuously widened the scope of organisations which are trained and has also encouraged religious communities to participate.⁶⁷⁸ Since 2020, it has eased access to the online course to the wider public and encouraged every citizen to take the course.⁶⁷⁹

The engagement between *UKCTP* and business does not end with the delivery of the training. The focus is on continued engagement where intelligence on changes to the threat environment, for example new terrorist *modi operandi* or attacks in other countries which may inspire copycat attacks, are continually shared with the security managers of relevant organisations or religious communities. For example, after the Christchurch Mosque attack Muslim faith groups received a security briefing.

By regularly sharing more information with the business community and other relevant stakeholders, also after a time, the police understand that after a training the business can better protect and prepare against attacks, and thereby deter attackers. And operating on the same "front-line",

676 See Counter Terrorism Policing UK and Highfield E-Learning 2018.

677 Basu 2018.

678 See National Police Chiefs' Council 2019.

679 See Counter Terrorism Policing UK 2020.

businesses will equally share security-relevant information with the police when they become aware of it. The continuous engagement and flow of security-related information is ensured through local (*London PROTECT*) or national news alerts (*UK PROTECT*) which is sent out to registered businesses through the “*Cross-Sector Security Communications*” initiative and a dedicated mobile app *PSO London Shield*, operated by *Counter Terrorism Protective Security Operations* in the Metropolitan Police for authorised businesses in London similar to a successful model by the New York Police Department for public-private information sharing.⁶⁸⁰

What general lessons can authorities take away from ACT Awareness that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

Authorities should engage with corporate security teams and private security companies with a view to increase vigilance and preparedness against the terrorist threat in the community.

Authorities should share counter-terrorism security advice and intelligence to allow companies to increase their level of preparedness and resilience.

Authorities should make use of existing hierarchical- and communication structures in companies and NGOs to achieve a wide reach of their calls for preparedness and of their training.

<i>ACT Awareness</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

680 See Amadeo 2020 ; Metropolitan Police Service 2019.

6.2.5. ACT Strategic (formerly known as Project Argus)

ACT Strategic (formerly known as Project Argus) is a training program, targeting company owners and managers at the board level who have responsibility to formulate response plans for their organisation covered by the *Crowded Places Guidance*, including offices and retail businesses, night time activities, hotels, education- and health care providers.⁶⁸¹

The training is delivered by a *Counter-Terrorism Security Advisor* and consists of a three hours tabletop simulation that “*poses questions and dilemmas for participants working in syndicates, and aims to raise awareness of the threat from terrorism, [to their business] providing practical advice on preventing, handling and recovering from an attack.*”⁶⁸²

What general lessons can authorities take away from ACT Strategic that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should sensitise company directors /management for the terrorism risk and should encourage the development of mitigation and business continuity strategies through direct engagement with CTSAs.

<i>ACT Strategic</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

6.2.6. Cross-Sectoral Security Communications (CSSC)

The Cross Sectoral Security Communications (CSSC) “*is an initiative where authoritative security information is cascaded from a central hub to regional*

681 See National Counter Terrorism Security Office 2017.

682 City of London Police 2018a.

hubs and then onward to businesses within the region.”⁶⁸³ Through the Cross-Sector Safety and Security Communications (CSSC) hub, authorities provide regular up-to-date counter-terrorism communication containing information and guidance specifically tailored to the needs of the small- and medium-sized business community. The PROTECT newsletter, tailored to the specific regions, allows for two-way communication with business associations, or directly with the companies’ heads of security.⁶⁸⁴

Originally formed to connect all stakeholders from security services, local government and the business community in preparation for and during the London Olympics in 2012, the tool has become the most important mean “*for the police and government to communicate with the wider private sector businesses of all sizes, with authoritative messages, alerts and information on safety and security, as well as to receive feedback from business on the security issues important to them.*”⁶⁸⁵ The CSSC is a registered charity formed in 2012, built on the lessons learned during the metastasising London riots in 2011, where police and security service were faced with a lack of a “*broad and robust communications and intelligence infrastructure[...] which would bridge and bring together police, security agencies and the private sector*”; to adequately address the security challenges.”⁶⁸⁶

The voluntary organisation follows a hierarchical-structured hub model where information is shared by the security services in a bridge call with the central hub. The members are selected representatives of the different industry sectors who would then process and cascade the information to regional hubs and into their industry sectors, down to individual organization and their employees.⁶⁸⁷ “*The regional operational teams of each hub include members who are seconded from both the public and private sectors*”.⁶⁸⁸

By 2016, even before the national roll-out, the CSSC already represented 35 industry sectors, with a reach of 14 million recipients for their messages.⁶⁸⁹ The stand-up time to send an alert to all members is said to be less than 20 minutes.⁶⁹⁰ This rapidly available informational support and advice

683 Randall, MBE 2018b.

684 See Harris 2016, 56.

685 Cross-Sector Safety and Security Communications (CSSC) 2019, 1.

686 Randall, MBE 2018a.

687 See *ibid.*

688 Randall, MBE 2018b.

689 See Randall, MBE 2018a.

690 See *ibid.*

reduces uncertainty in a crisis scenario and allows businesses a better and earlier appraisal of an event and to select appropriate measures to be taken which then can prevent or reduce the impact of an attack.

The implementation of information-sharing protocols “*with required departments, agencies and bodies, enables the provision of information and advice for communicating to the public*” across different threat categories.⁶⁹¹ While there is only limited staff provided by member organizations on a day-to-day basis, there is a team of senior security experts available to rapidly start operations, if an incident like a terrorist attack should occur.⁶⁹² They can then function as “*the interface between those who have information and those who need to receive it.*”⁶⁹³ The national roll-out of the CCSC system is currently ongoing and is synced with the *Step-Change Initiative* with the objective to reach all business sectors and all members of the public with security-related messages that are timely, accurate and authoritative.⁶⁹⁴

While the hub ensures that member organisations will receive an alert or regular security advice, Randall points out, more needs to be done to “*ensure that everyone within an organisation receives the CSSC messages, where appropriate, and the original recipient knows how and when to pass on the different types of messages.*”⁶⁹⁵

What general lessons can authorities take away from CSSC that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should establish means “*for the police and government to communicate with the wider private sector, businesses of all sizes, with authoritative messages, alerts and information on safety and security, as well as to receive feedback from businesses on the security issues important to them.*”⁶⁹⁶
- Authorities should establish a “*broad and robust communications and intelligence infrastructure*” which connects the security services and private sector, to be able to share information and deal with ongoing security threats.⁶⁹⁷

691 *ibid.*

692 *ibid.*

693 *ibid.*

694 See Randall, MBE 2018b.

695 *ibid.*

696 Cross-Sector Safety and Security Communications (CSSC) 2019, 1.

697 Randall, MBE 2018a.

6. Chapter: First Case – The United Kingdom

- Authorities should ensure that organisations will receive urgent alerts as well as regular security advice.
- Authorities should ensure that this informational support and advice is rapidly available, to reduce uncertainty in a crisis scenario and to allow businesses to do a better and earlier appraisal of an event and of appropriate measures to be taken, which can prevent or reduce the impact of an attack.

<i>Cross Sectoral Security Communications (CSSC)</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	✓
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

6.2.7. Step-Change Initiative

With more than 700 ongoing terrorism-related investigations in May 2019 and 3,000 subjects of interest (SOI) and an existing pool of 20,000 former SOIs, the intelligence services are hoping to free their particular resources to be able to focus on the most pressing cases.⁶⁹⁸

To mobilise the potential in the private sector and in the wider population, the *National Counter Terrorism Security Office* set up a joint initiative named the “*National Counter Terrorism Step-Change Programme*” between police, the government and the private sector in 2018.⁶⁹⁹

Through several joint conferences and workshops with business leaders and through the creation of an overseeing board (*Step-Change Programme Board (SCPB)*) the industry partners agreed on a total of 25 projects across five different work streams that are driven forward as a priority, with

698 See Gardner 2019.

699 See Aldworth 2018.

all costs lying where they fall.⁷⁰⁰ The work streams are “*Crowded Places, Security and Resilience, Transport, Cyber (incl. Banking) as well as Travel and Tourism*”⁷⁰¹

This new effort under the *Step-Change* label to “*create a truly mobilised society to protect against and prepare for terrorist incidents*”⁷⁰² is in many parts a continuation or rather an acceleration and expansion of an existing effort by the security services to “*hand over more responsibility to [the] private sector, to private security and the public – in an exchange for more training, more intelligence*” as Neil Basu puts it.⁷⁰³ According to UKCTP In many parts of the private sector, this new role is welcomed, and the uptake of terrorism vigilance and awareness trainings continues to be strong.⁷⁰⁴

While the intensified outreach to the public and the private sector through new awareness initiatives and trainings appears hardly revolutionary, the announced intention to allow more “*intelligence-derived knowledge to be shared more widely beyond intelligence circles marks a significant cultural change*.”⁷⁰⁵ This meets a demand from the private sector, especially from large corporations with their own security arrangements that have requested “*comprehensive, unclassified threat intelligence, ranging from post-incident analysis to incident alerts and shifts in hostile actors’ tactics*” to allow them to deter, detect and disrupt attacks themselves, while working hand-in-hand with the police.⁷⁰⁶

As a first step, the government has announced the creation of a *Step-Change online-hub*, an information sharing online platform, that should streamline and centralise the information sharing in one place and enable continuous connection – between police and businesses as well as from business to business.

Besides ever-closer cooperation with the private sector, *stronger* multi-agency engagement is key element of the *Step-change* initiative. By getting better at acquiring, analyzing and especially at sharing data, the British domestic intelligence service MI5 hopes that this will also “*allow local police and other agencies to be alerted to threats of which they are currently*

700 See *ibid.* ; see also CSM contributor 2018c.

701 Aldworth 2018.

702 CSM contributor 2018c.

703 Basu 2018.

704 See *ibid.*

705 Anderson 2017, 42.

706 Pool Re July/2018, 11.

*unaware*⁷⁰⁷ enabling them to make better judgements based on their better knowledge of the national security risk, and to respond appropriately at the local level.⁷⁰⁸ How this will pan out in practice and in detail will have to be seen as at the time of writing this is still an ongoing initiative.

There are already exemplary islands of cooperation where this concept of ever-closer-cooperation has been put into action. One example of such an arrangement is the *Hammersmith Business Improvement District (BID)*, a business-led not-for-profit partnership to manage and improve the attractiveness of the Hammersmith town centre in London.⁷⁰⁹ The organisation funded through its member businesses, has undertaken a variety of actions to create a safer and more secure environment.

Their CCTV system, funded and operated by the *BID* that serves the town centre, including the inside of the large shopping centre which is linked directly to the police control room, providing access 24/7.⁷¹⁰ The private security operating in the centre and in the surrounding areas is connected via town link radio system (*SafetyNet*) to the CCTV control room, to the police and all *BID* member businesses.⁷¹¹

The *BID* security and its members are also able to report and share criminal incidents in a database in the area as they happen. They also receive security alerts through a crime reduction scheme operating it, accessible through a mobile application and a secure website which is also directly linked to the police.⁷¹²

BID members additionally receive regular counter-terrorism awareness trainings and security updates as necessary and have access to complimentary risk assessment and business continuity planning.⁷¹³

What general lessons can authorities take away from the Step-Change Initiative that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should explore ways to activate more resources from private sector and the public in the fight against terrorism through more training and intelligence sharing.

707 Anderson 2017, 42.

708 See *ibid.*, 33.

709 See Hammersmith BID 2019.

710 See National Business Crime Centre 2019.

711 See Hammersmith BID 2019.

712 See *ibid.*

713 See *ibid.*

- Authorities should explore ways for the national intelligence and counter-terrorism branches to cooperate with local police forces through more intelligence sharing.
- Authorities should explore opportunities to deepen and widen existing local cooperative business and police crime-prevention initiatives to equally improve preparedness for terrorism attack and responses.

<i>Step-Change Initiative</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

6.2.8. CTP Information Sharing Platform

As part of the Step-Change-Initiative an *Information Sharing Platform* (ISP) (formerly referred to as *ACT online hub*) to engage with public and private sector companies, is under development.⁷¹⁴ The funding for the project of 9,6 million British Pounds over five years is provided to the Mayor of London Office for Policing And Crime by *Pool re*, the UK'S national terrorism risk re-insurance body.⁷¹⁵

This information sharing platform is promoted as an “ecosystem that aims to design, promote and share protective security best-practice.”⁷¹⁶ Beyond replacing the present PROTECT newsletters and “*Cross-Sectoral Security Communication*”, its purpose is to streamline and centralise the information sharing in one place, and to enable and foster a continuous dialogue between police and businesses as well as from business to business.⁷¹⁷

714 See Mayor of London Office For Policing And Crime 2020.

715 McGrath 2019.

716 Basu 2018.

717 See Counter Terrorism Policing UK 2019.

According to official documents the platform “*will provide to Counter Terrorism Specialists, Security Industry Professionals, Business and Industry:*

- a. *Product Library,*
- b. *Knowledge Hub,*
- c. *E-Learning,*
- d. *Webinars,*
- e. *Discussion forums,*
- f. *Targeted Messaging,*
- g. *What works Centre,*
- h. *Action Counter Terrorism (ACT) online reporting,*
- i. *Prevent referral*⁷¹⁸.

While the audience focus for the platform are professionals from business and industry, through a layered access protocol, certain sections of the platform will also be accessible to specialists from the security industry and the public.⁷¹⁹

What general lessons can authorities take away from ACT online hub that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should create an ecosystem and nurture a community which streamlines and centralises the security-related information sharing in one place and which enables a continuous connection – between police and businesses as well as from business to business – thus fostering dialogue and fast information exchange between all community members.

<i>ACT Online Hub</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	✓
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

718 McGrath 2019, 2.

719 See *ibid.*, 3.

6.2.9. Crowded Places Programme

Owners or operators of crowded places, for example shopping centres, railway stations, cinemas, schools, hotels or bars and clubs, carry a special responsibility beyond that for their staff, customers and business tenants, namely for any people who pass through or congregate at their sites. As the shift in the terrorists' target selection and methods of execution has shown, the responsibility of the operators goes beyond ensuring adequate health and safety standards; it must include mitigating the terrorist threat.

Businesses are not left to their own devices to deal with this challenge. Independent of registering for an *ACT-Awareness* training, operators of venues and events of, in or near crowded places in the UK, can refer to the *Crowded Places Guidance*, published by NaCTSO which provides sector-specific recommendations for action that can be taken up by venue operators, to increase the security from malicious attacks at their site.⁷²⁰ This is complimentary to existing general industry guidance how to prepare for and manage any type of major incidents.⁷²¹

To ensure businesses are adequately prepared, the NaCTSO offers sector-specific counter-terrorism protective security guidance for crowded places, to help the sites to “*detect, deter or reduce the impacts of a terrorist attack.*”⁷²² Through its “*Crowded Places Programme [...] NaCTSO promotes broader consideration of terrorist attack methodologies and outlines a wide range of risk management options.*”⁷²³

Attack methodologies include:

5. “*Non-penetrative vehicle attack,*
6. *Penetrative vehicle attack,*
7. *PBIED – Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (suicide) attack,*
8. *Firearms/Weapons attack – (Marauding Terrorist Attack)*
9. *Postal device attack, including courier and hand deliveries,*
10. *Placed IED.*⁷²⁴

This guidance is offered as a publication and directly through the local *Counter Terrorism Security Advisors* (CTSA). It can be requested by busi-

720 National Counter Terrorism Security Office 2017.

721 See Revo 2017, 8.

722 National Police Chiefs' Council 2015 ; See also UK Home Office 2012, 4.

723 Rigby and Norris 2015, online.

724 National Counter Terrorism Security Office 2018, 4.

nesses free of charge, to provide advice on making the business more secure. Based on the specific sector, the NaCTSO guidance advises on the most appropriate tactics to respond to the different types of threats.⁷²⁵

Beside the printed guide and personal instructions by the CTAs, the information is shared through sector specific leaflets, short movies, and a dedicated website.⁷²⁶

Through the help of an assessment tool called ‘*Protective Security Improvement Activity*’ (PSIA) provided by the NaCTSO, participating businesses in the *Crowded Places Programme* are enabled to independently review and improve their security measures in a “*consistent, nationally comparable and auditable way*”.⁷²⁷

What general lessons can authorities take away from Crowded Places Programme that may be transferred and or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should provide owners or operators of crowded venues with sector-specific protective counter-terrorist security guidance to help the sites to “*detect, deter or reduce the impacts of a terrorist attack*.”⁷²⁸
- Authorities should enable operators, through providing appropriate self-assessment tools, to independently review and improve their security measures in a consistent, nationally comparable and auditable way.⁷²⁹

<i>Crowded Places Programme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

725 See *ibid.*, 4.

726 See *ibid.*

727 Rigby and Norris 2015.

728 National Police Chiefs' Council 2015.

729 See Rigby and Norris 2015.

6.2.10. Loss Mitigation Credit (LMC)

As a tangible incentive to participate in the *Crowded Places Programme* and to implement the necessary protective security measures and preparedness activities, the NaCTSO has formed a joint initiative with *Pool Re*, the U.K. Government-backed provider of terrorism re-insurance. Together they offer participating businesses a *Loss Mitigation Credit (LMC)*, which may translate into a reduction of the premiums for their terrorism damage insurance cover by 2.5%.⁷³⁰

The calculable financial benefit from LMC makes protective security measures a relevant item for the balance sheet. Therefore, it puts LMC on to the agenda of the business management team. The possible financial “punishment” of losing the *LMC*, if companies do not continue to adhere to the regulations of the *Crowded Places Programmes*, is a strong incentive for continuous efforts in this matter. The *LMC* makes terrorism insurance more affordable. Thus, it would allow more businesses to take out such a policy. With more businesses being taken care of, due to the mitigation of the potential impact of an attack through the insurance, less public resources and focus the businesses will require for their protection in and after a crisis.

What general lessons can authorities take away from Loss Mitigation Credit (LMC) that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should undertake effective measures to bring preventive actions to mitigate terrorism risk on to the companies' agendas.
- Authorities should provide tangible incentives for companies to invest in protective security measures and preparedness activities.

730 See *ibid.*

6. Chapter: First Case – The United Kingdom

<i>Loss Mitigation Credit</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	✓

6.2.11. National Stakeholder Menu of Tactical Options

Apart from the sector-specific *Crowded Places Guidance*, the NaCTSO also provides general advice to the private sector and the security industry on how to appropriately adjust their security posture in response to official UK Government's threat level changes, or in response to terrorist attacks.⁷³¹ For some industries regulated by the *Centre for The Protection of National Infrastructure* (CPNI) the enhanced security measures may “be deployed at the request by police following an extraordinary Security Review Committee (SRC).”⁷³²

*“To ensure a consistent approach, the Response Levels replaced all other forms of escalation, and indicate how government departments and agencies and their staff should react to each threat. This system serves to inform and prompt businesses to consider their own security arrangements in light of any changes to the threat level.”*⁷³³

731 See National Counter Terrorism Security Office 2018, 1.

732 *ibid.*, 1.

733 *ibid.*, 2.

Figure 30: *The five UK threat levels and the appropriate protective security response levels for businesses.*⁷³⁴

Threat level and definition	Response level	Description
Critical An attack is expected imminently	Exceptional	Maximum protective security. Critical measures to meet specific threats and to minimise vulnerability and risk
Severe An attack is highly likely	Heightened	Additional and sustainable Substantial and Severe protective security measures reflecting the broad nature of the threat combined with specific business and geographical vulnerabilities and judgements on acceptable risk
Substantial An attack is a strong possibility		
Moderate An attack is possible but not likely	Normal	Routine protective security. Low and Moderate measures appropriate to the business concerned
Low An attack is unlikely		

The advice is updated by the *NaCTSO* as new intelligence becomes available, through guidance notes, for example on developing procedures for dynamic lock-down methods in response to an evolving fast-moving firearms attack in the vicinity of a business site.⁷³⁵ This guidance is then disseminated through the *Cross Sectoral Security Communications (CSSC)* community or the *CTSA* or police forces. To businesses this solution-focused threat communication is very valuable, as it qualifies the significance of the threat levels. In this way, the advice enhances the perception of resources available to respond to a threat. It provides clear guidance to organisations on how they can appropriately enhance their own security posture. Through the multiplied enhanced ability to detect and delay attacks, the risk of imminent copycat attacks is reduced by deterrence, and potential loss of critical resource through an attack is prevented.

What general lessons can authorities take away from the National Stakeholder Menu of Tactical Options that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

Authorities should provide solution-focused threat information to private sector companies, which gives clear guidance to them on how they can appropriately enhance their own security posture in accordance to the risk levels.

734 Image taken from National Counter Terrorism Security Office June / 2017, 2.

735 National Counter Terrorism Security Office 2015, 1.

<i>National Stakeholder Menu of Tactical Options</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

6.2.12. The City Security Council

The *Security Industry Authority (SIA)* is a government-independent organisation that takes responsibility of the training standards and of the licensing of individual security operatives as well as of accrediting security contractors who want to operate in the UK, to assure their meeting of the necessary standards. The organisation is also responsible for the control of those standards and for the observance of the licensing and accreditation requirements. The SIA reports that there are over 350.000 SIA-certified security operatives in the UK.⁷³⁶

UKCTP and *CPNI* have been in touch with these certified security operatives for several years (especially in the City of London) to generate additional “eyes and ears” through awareness trainings and have provided regular advice on how to react in a terror incident, through their *Crowded Places Guidance* and *London PROTECT* newsletters.

In 2019, major SIA-approved security contractors operating in London, have set up the *City Security Council* in cooperation with the *City of London Police* and the *CPNI*, in line with the recommendations from the *Harris Report*⁷³⁷ to give certified security operatives a more prominent role in protecting security in the City of London.⁷³⁸

736 Security Industry Authority 2019.

737 Independent report that was compiled by Lord Toby Harris in 2016 to assess London’s preparedness to deal with a major terrorist incident. See Harris 2016.

738 See CSM contributor 2019.

The expressed objectives of the Council are:

- Improving standards of training for security personnel to enable them to assist with their response at times of crisis and emergency,
- Providing support to the police in times of crisis and emergency,
- Standardising effective and efficient responses, including media, physical reaction, and online messaging in support of clients/the public in times of crisis and emergency,
- Promoting shared values, common principles and Best Practice, including research on and reviews of current practices.

At this moment of writing, it is not yet clear if and how the roles of private security operatives could change in the event of a marauding terrorist firearms or bladed weapons attack as suggested in the *Harris Report*.⁷³⁹ The details are still missing. But it is certain that the Home Office in line with its *Step-change Initiative* will have pushed for even greater involvement of the private security sector in the provision of cooperative security.⁷⁴⁰

What general lessons can authorities take away from the City Security Council that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should evaluate with private security providers if and how these could provide support to the police, in times of crisis and emergency.
- Authorities should cooperate with private security providers to improve standards of their training for security personnel to enable them to assist with their response in times of crisis and emergency.
- Authorities should encourage the private security providers to cooperate with them to standardise effective and efficient responses in times of crisis and emergency.

739 Harris 2016, 56.

740 See Mayor's Office Greater London Authority 2017, 44–45.

<i>The City Security Council</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

6.2.13. Secured-by-Design

Beyond raising vigilance and the encouragement of preparedness at the time of a potential attack, UK counter-terrorism policing is also undertaking efforts to more profoundly strengthen the resilience of the society by designing its environment in such a way as to help to deter, detect, and to delay any potential terrorist perpetrator.

Secured-by-Design (SBD) is a national police initiative which stems from the field of classic crime prevention work and in addition to terrorism, deals in particular with topics such as burglary protection and vandalism prevention.⁷⁴¹

The initiative, which is managed by an independent police unit, wants to ensure that potential risks to building structures or places through terrorist attacks, are taken into account in the planning and approval phase of construction projects, and that appropriate measures are incorporated in the design of such projects.⁷⁴²

The initiative does this by providing training and advice on

*“counter-terrorism protective security design to anyone involved in the planning, design and development of the built environment from the preparation of local planning policy to the commissioning, planning, design and management of new development schemes through to detailed building design.”*⁷⁴³

741 Police Crime Prevention Initiatives Limited without yearc.

742 See Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (UK) 2017.

743 UK Home Office *et al.* 2014, 4.

By raising awareness for risk early, *Secure-By-Design* allows for security to be designed into buildings for minimal obstruction. This results in little change to normal operations which increases the level of acceptance and eases adoption which then leads to improved deterrence and a reduced impact of attacks.

In order to ensure that this advice is received and understood, a dedicated how-to-guide, the *Resilient Design Tool*, a collaborative work between the CPNI, NaCTSO and multiple research organisations, is prescribed.⁷⁴⁴ This guide sets out both, the different security measures and the appropriate processes in the blueprint, approval and implementation phase to incorporate in a building project.⁷⁴⁵ The responsible local administration staffs who decide on construction projects, as well as architects, designers and developers, are sensitized through the guide and are offered bespoke trainings.⁷⁴⁶ Local planners are encouraged to reject approval of project applications unless due diligence on terrorism risk mitigation has been undertaken, as prescribed in the *Resilient Design Tool*.⁷⁴⁷ In building zones with a higher risk of terrorism, like Central London, this due diligence is mandatory.

Public as well as private project developers can request support and advice from their respective *Counter Terrorism Security Advisor* (or specialized *Architectural Liaison Officer* for Central London) to help them to include the appropriate counter-terrorism measures in their development.⁷⁴⁸ Which measures are appropriate is determined by the risk of terrorism in the specific area and project. This situation is assessed based on a general national standard, available to local authorities.

744 See Police Crime Prevention Initiatives Limited without year.

745 See *ibid.*

746 See UK Home Office 2012, 5.

747 See Police Crime Prevention Initiatives Limited without year.

748 City of London Police 2016.

Figure 31: The four levels of risk of terrorist attacks.⁷⁴⁹

High	The risk is the one which generates the highest concern. Comprehensive action is required as a high-priority to reduce vulnerability, wherever possible and proportionate.
Medium-High	The consequences of the risk materialising would be substantial. Action required as a priority to mitigate the risk, wherever possible and proportionate.
Medium	The risk is not substantial and can be managed via contingency plans. Status of risk should be monitored regularly.
Low	The risk should be addressed if possible, and contingency plans are required. The risk should be managed at local level.

Based on the level of risk for a project, different interlocking measures are proposed, usually focusing on three objectives:

- 1) *“Deter a would-be terrorist – by providing physical and electronic security measures, coupled with good management practices;*
- 2) *Detect intrusion – by providing alarm and visual detection systems with verification;*
- 3) *Delay of intrusion for a sufficient period of time to allow a [timely] response to attend – by putting in place physical security measures”.*⁷⁵⁰

Developers who can demonstrate expertise with and consistent adherence to designed-in security principles in their projects, can upon application, receive a certification which allows them to benefit from accelerated approval procedures for their projects. In addition, they can use the certification *“as evidence of compliance with building regulations, to discharge a planning condition or in [...] [their] own media and marketing campaigns.”*⁷⁵¹

Even after the development and or construction phase, the *Secure-by-Design* team is at hand for site operators or owners to help them improve the security of their premises.⁷⁵² For a low nominal fee the team offers to audit the operator’s physical and non-physical security measures, fitting the risk environment. Involving both people and processes at the sites to ensure

749 Adopted from UK Home Office 2012, 6.

750 *ibid.*, 6.

751 Police Crime Prevention Initiatives Limited without yearb.

752 See Police Crime Prevention Initiatives Limited and Perpetuity Research and Consultancy International Limited without year.

overall security, play an important role in this audit.⁷⁵³ After implementing appropriate recommendations from such an audit, operators can receive the seal of the *Secured Environment* for three years.⁷⁵⁴

What general lessons can authorities take away from Secure by Design that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should ensure that potential risks to building structures or built-up places through terrorist attacks are taken into account in the planning and approval phase of construction projects, and that appropriate measures are incorporated in the design of such a project.⁷⁵⁵
- Authorities should provide necessary support and guidance for helping building developers to include preventive counter-terrorism measures into their planning.
- Authorities should incentivise the auditing of building security.
- Authorities should establish a reliable visible seal of approval that publicly identifies building projects where appropriate /recommended security measures have been designed and built in.

<i>Secure-By-Design</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

6.2.14. Protective Security Management Systems

The *Centre for The Protection of National Infrastructure* (CPNI), provides UK companies with a comprehensive range of materials to prepare their businesses including their employees for different security threats, including terrorism.

753 See *ibid.*

754 See *ibid.*

755 See Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (UK) 2017.

Through the guidance of its “Protective Security Management System” (PseMS) the CPNI

“provides a suite of materials to help businesses create an assurance system for security. By using a self-assessment check list, organisations can assess gaps in their protective security and better understand weaknesses in their own security systems.”⁷⁵⁶

Figure 32: PseMS: Organisational security assurance through tangible business practices and controls.⁷⁵⁷



The CPNI additionally publishes up-to-date security recommendations in cooperation with NACTSO, following terrorist incidents, as e.g. the Manchester Arena attack.⁷⁵⁸

These recommendations cover guidance for increased deterrence through target hardening and through countering hostile reconnaissance. They also include guidance for improved detection through heightened employee vigilance and more effective CCTV operations as well as recommendations for impact reduction through physical protective security measures, effective screening measures and blast mitigation.⁷⁵⁹

756 Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (UK) 2018, 9.

757 Image taken from *ibid.*, 9.

758 See Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (UK) 2017, 2.

759 See *ibid.*, 3–4.

What general lessons can authorities take away from the Protective Security Management Systems (PseMS) that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should support providers of national infrastructure to assess their particular protective security arrangements and to deploy the necessary processes and controls which are appropriate to the terrorism risk, they face.
- Authorities should share up-to-date security recommendations with critical infrastructure providers if the threat picture changes, for example following a terrorist incident.

Protective Security Management Systems (PseMS)	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	
Impact Prevention & Reduction	✓
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	
Management of Fear	
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	✓
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	

6.2.15. 'Increasing Crowd Resilience' (ICR) Programme


In a response to the 2017 terror attacks, the *Home Office* set up and funded the “*Defence and Security Accelerator ‘Increasing Crowd Resilience’ (ICR) Programme*” in order to “*accelerate crowd safety innovations and technologies.*”⁷⁶⁰ The “*first market exploitation*” under this programme is “*Krowd Safe*”, a mobile application which enables employing crowd vigilance inside a specified venue or location, by establishing a direct connection between crowd members and the security management of the location.⁷⁶¹

760 Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA) 2019.

761 See *ibid.*

When installed and logged into the WiFi, the application offers the crowd members a swift and easy reporting of (potential) threats in real-time to the site /event security team.⁷⁶²

Figure 33: KrowdSafe mobile application screenshot.⁷⁶³



Easy access and efficiency are supported using pre-programmed issue-types to select from, a picture upload function and an automatic localisation of the sender, including a 3D venue mapping ability.⁷⁶⁴ The venue's security managers are then able to instantly reply and advise via chat where necessary, while taking appropriate security measures on their end at the same time. In case of an identified security situation, the application allows the

762 See UK Home Office and Defence and Security Accelerator 2019.

763 Image taken from Krowdthink 2019.

764 See *ibid.*

What general lessons can authorities take away from the *KrowdSafe Mobile Application* that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should urge operators of popular venues to employ crowd members in the early warning of (potential) threats. A swift and simple reporting should be made possible through the use of apps in real-time, directed at the site /event security team. This could potentially help to reduce the impact of a subsequent attack or could even prevent it due to an earlier alert of the security team.

<i>KrowdSafe Mobile Application</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

6.2.16. citizenAID RUN-HIDE-TELL-TREAT

Another application which is meant to make use of the intelligence of the crowd is an application called *citizenAID*. The app is a free-to-use mobile app and an accompanying pocket book which explains to people what to do in case of a terror attack or when faced with unattended or suspicious items. It builds on the *RUN-HIDE-TELL* concept and expands it by „*Treat* when safe to do so“, to culminate in “*RUN-HIDE-TELL-TREAT*”.⁷⁶⁸

In a step-by-step process the app guides the citizens in their response and in the treatment of different injuries, inflicted by terrorist through sharp

768 Herron *et al.* 2019.

blades, gunshots, bomb blasts or vehicle-as-a-weapon attacks before the emergency services arrive on the scene.

Figure 35: Screenshots of citizenAID's straight-forward user interface.⁷⁶⁹



Taking the lessons from field surgery, its key objective is to increase the number of patients capable of surviving immediately after an attack, before professional medical help arrives, and which cannot be provided in a *hot zone* at once.⁷⁷⁰

As common in field surgery, the application puts a special focus on stopping bleeding through the right application of tourniquets, and even recommends and explains the application of the triage system when faced with multiple casualties.⁷⁷¹

Apart from the phone app and the pocket book which can be carried around and which are meant to be consulted in the case of an attack,

769 Images adapted from Thurgood 2018.

770 See Herron *et al.* 2019.

771 See *ibid.*

citizenAID is addressing the members of the public with its message of „Be prepared-not scared“ through multiple channels.⁷⁷²

Figure 36: *citizenAID* public outreach example⁷⁷³

**citizen
AID**

**Be Prepared,
Not Scared**

**Would you know what to do in the
event of a terrorist attack?
Join the citizenAID team at
Oxted School on Tuesday 10th July
1900 - 2030**

If you are interested in attending, please email
info@citizenaid.org to register.

YOU Can Save Lives

www.citizenaid.org
+44 (0)121 794 2456
info@citizenaid.org

The *citizenAID* runs a dedicated website with learning materials and training videos, provided free of charge for non-commercial use as well as

772 See citizenAID 2018b.

773 Image taken from *ibid.*

tuition material for use in schools and universities.⁷⁷⁴ It also organises live training sessions at schools and universities in cooperation with emergency services and the *National Counter Terrorism Security Office* and sends out demonstration teams to attend diverse community events as shown in the figures below.⁷⁷⁵

Figure 37: citizenAID volunteers at community events.⁷⁷⁶



Through different textbooks supporting the teacher in the classroom, *citizenAID* has adapted the *RUN, HIDE, TELL, TREAT* message to the specific age cohorts. For primary school pupils aged 5-7, the comic, “*Moggy’s Coming*” features the story of the “*Mulberry School Mice*” in emergency situations, enabling parents and teachers to help children understand and prepare for acts of terrorism in a non-threatening way.⁷⁷⁷ The stories are supported by easy singing and other classroom activities.⁷⁷⁸

Through the clear step-by-step guidance on how to respond to a terror attack, the individuals’ problem-focused coping skills increase and their self-efficacy and confidence level to be able to deal with the situation, are raised. Understanding what to expect in the situation after an attack, as realistically displayed in the instruction video, increases the perceived informational support and cognitive clarity. Reducing uncertainty of and having an idea about what to expect and how to respond in an emergency, also limit the psychological impact and the anxiety experienced before and during an attack.

774 Herron *et al.* 2019.

775 See citizenAID 2018a.

776 Left image taken from *ibid.* ; right image taken from citizenAID 2018c.

777 Packham 2017.

778 See Hodgetts *et al.* 2017.

Empowering the citizens to help each other in the critical time of an attack increases the chances of survival and thereby reduces the potential impact of an attack. Especially, children can gain more confidence when an emergency situation arises. Finally, the expectation among the public of being able to help themselves, and the completed training to be able to help others, strengthens societal cohesion.

What general lessons can authorities take away from citizenAID – RUN-HIDE-TELL-TREAT that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should provide clear step-by-step guidance on how to respond in a terror attack, to increase the problem-focused coping skills and raise individuals’ self-efficacy and confidence level to be able to deal with the situation.
- Authorities should help citizens in understanding what to expect in the situation after an attack as realistically as possible, to increase the perceived informational support and cognitive clarity. Reducing uncertainty and giving people an idea of what to expect and how to respond, also limit the psychological impact and the anxiety, experienced before and during an attack.
- Authorities should provide training opportunities for citizens which empower them to help each other in the critical time directly after an attack, to increase the chances of survival and thereby reduce the potential impact of an attack. Especially, children can gain more confidence when an emergency situation arises.
- Authorities should emphasize the social cohesion and solidarity aspect when promoting the idea of self-help among the public.

<i>citizenAid – Run.Hide.Tell.Treat</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	✓
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	✓

6.2.17. Local Resilience Forum

Resilience-building measures are not limited to the private sector or the wider public, but necessarily also involve the first responders. Based on the third and fourth strand of the United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism – *PROTECT and PREPARE* – the UK has since 2004, the year of the Madrid bombing, undertaken concerted efforts to formulate a resilient response to terror. The effects of attacks are to be mitigated by strengthening the country's protection and by enhancing its emergency preparedness.

These efforts include:

- Providing “a coherent approach across different agencies to issues of resilience”,⁷⁷⁹
- Ensuring “the most effective use of the partnerships’ combined resources”,⁷⁸⁰
- Promoting collaboration across and within sectors.

The *Civil Contingency Act (CCA)* established the UK's single framework for generic civil protection, based on the principles of *Integrated Emergency Management (IEM)*.⁷⁸¹

*“The [Civil Contingency] Act and supporting Regulations and statutory guidance ‘Emergency Preparedness’ establish a clear set of roles and responsibilities for those involved in emergency preparation and response at the local level.”*⁷⁸²

Local responders are divided into two categories and specific statutory duties are assigned to each of them:

*“Those in Category 1 are organisations at the core of the response to most emergencies (the emergency services, local authorities, NHS bodies). Category 1 responders are subject to the full set of civil protection duties.”*⁷⁸³

The statutory duties of Category 1 responders encompass:

- “Risk assessment; (which, supported by a collective process, provides the grounding for delivering the substantive elements of the CCA),

779 London Resilience Forum 2016, 5.

780 *ibid.*, 5.

781 See Pengelly 2011, 1.

782 Cabinet Office 2013.

783 *ibid.*, online.

- *Emergency planning,*
- *Business continuity management,*
- *Maintaining public awareness and arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public if an emergency is likely to occur or has occurred, [...]*
- *“Provision of advice and assistance to the commercial sector and voluntary organisations in the event of an emergency (business continuity promotion). [local authorities only]”*⁷⁸⁴

Category 2 organisations are defined by the CCA as “*bodies in the public and private sectors who are less likely to be involved in general resilience planning and front-line response work, but who may be heavily involved in incidents that affect their sectors*”.⁷⁸⁵ This includes utilities providers like, water, gas, electricity, as well as communication and transport companies. All of these are required to perform more of a supportive role of *co-operation* and *information sharing* under the “*Contingency Planning Regulations (2005)*”.⁷⁸⁶

These duties of co-operation and information sharing equally apply to the Category 1 organisations.⁷⁸⁷

To “*cement the local-level partnership*” of Category 2, the regulation has established the format of the *Local Resilience Forum [LRF]* as a “*the principal mechanism for local multi-agency co-operation*”.⁷⁸⁸

It is built around:

- *“Coordinating Forums to ensure effective delivery of shared responsibilities,*
- *Structures to develop capabilities to respond [to] and recover from risks. This includes planning, testing and exercising”*⁷⁸⁹

In the *Local Resilience Forum (based on police districts)* responders from both categories come together at least twice per year.⁷⁹⁰

“While the LRF does not have a legal personality, nor powers to direct its members, the LRF must meet at least every six months. The main purpose of the LRF is to ensure effective delivery of the duties under the CCA and

784 Pengelly 2011, 1–2.

785 *ibid.*, 2.

786 *ibid.*, 2.

787 See Cabinet Office 2013, online.

788 Pengelly 2011, 2.

789 London Resilience Forum 2016, 7.

790 See Pengelly 2011, 2.

the associated Regulations that need to be delivered in a multi-agency environment, such as the production and update of the Community Risk Register (CRR), the production of multi-agency plans and arrangements to warn and inform the public during emergencies”⁷⁹¹

Figure 38: London Resilience Forum “resilience through collective activity”⁷⁹²



The *London Resilience Forum* is the largest and most elaborated resilience forum in the United Kingdom. It is the core organising and coordinating element of the resilient response to terrorism in London.

791 *ibid.*, 2.

792 Graphic taken from the London Resilience Forum 2016, 6.

As the image below shows, the activities undertaken by the *London Resilience Forum* to achieve a resilient response are diverse. The organisation summarises them as follows:

- Assess risks to London’s resilience,
- Enhance London’s resilience through prevention and adaptation,
- Prepare, respond, recover and learn from exercises and emergencies,
- Help Londoners to be prepared.

Beside the above-mentioned responders of the different agencies and services providers from category 1 and 2, the *London Resilience Forum* brings together a diverse range of stakeholders/partners from a variety of sectors to assure the reach and relevance of measures and strategies, to help minimise any impact to the civil society, as shown in the figure below.

Figure 39: *London Resilience Forum stakeholders*.⁷⁹³



As can be seen in the figure above, the *London Resilience Forum* also includes representation from the *Faiths Forum for London*, representing

793 Imager taken from Miller 2014, 11.

the *Faith Sector Panel*, to ensure that communities of faith may swiftly respond after a terror attack with messages of condemnation and unity⁷⁹⁴ as happened in the aftermath to the *Westminster Bridge Attack*.⁷⁹⁵

What general lessons can authorities take away from the Local Resilience Forum that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities need to take a coherent whole-of-government approach across different agencies and stakeholders to issues of resilience at the local and regional level.⁷⁹⁶ Authorities need to build dependable relationships with all stakeholders before the crisis arises, to ensure interoperability between responders and the most effective use of the partnership's combined resources when needed.⁷⁹⁷
- Authorities need to promote collaboration across and within stakeholders' sectors.
- Authorities should ensure that faiths representatives are included in the resilience forum who may swiftly respond after a religiously motivated terror attack.

<i>Local Resilience Forum</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

6.2.18. Non-Damage Business Interruption Coverage

The 2015/16 terrorist attacks in Europe and at the Borough Market in London in 2017, which had focused on soft targets with comparatively very

794 Mayor's Office Greater London Authority 2017, 49.

795 See ITV News 2017 ; See Polianskaya 2017.

796 See London Resilience Forum 2016, 5.

797 See *ibid.*, 5.

little damage done to buildings or infrastructure, made a “Terrorism Insurance Gap” evident.⁷⁹⁸ Post-incident disaster management and the necessary forensics prevented many businesses in proximity to the attack site from operating for days, despite no direct physical damages to their businesses. Some of these businesses did not recover from these indirect consequences and uninsurable losses.⁷⁹⁹

By passing the “*Counter Terrorism and Border Security Bill 2018*”, the British Parliament closed this “terrorism insurance gap” in early 2019. It allowed the U.K. Government-backed provider of terrorism re-insurance *Pool Re* to extend its coverage for its members for *Non-Damage Business Interruption* (NDBI) for the first time.⁸⁰⁰

The NDBI coverage saves insured large corporations and especially small traders from bankruptcy out of income loss, following impaired or prevented access to their commercial premises after an attack, and saves the community from loss of services/business.⁸⁰¹ The extension of insurance cover also expands the pool of insured businesses. Now it has also gained relevance for small traders who before did not feel directly targeted, or who are just small tenants. Getting cover now has an advantage for them. Getting insurance and paying the premium is also likely to prompt better awareness for business continuity planning among SMEs.

What general lessons can authorities take away from the Non-Damage Business Interruption Coverage that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should assure that terrorism insurance also covers non-damage-related business interruptions, especially for SMEs.

798 See *Pool Re* July 2018.

799 See *ibid.*, 5.

800 See *ibid.*, 5.

801 See *ibid.*, 5.

<i>Non-Damage Business Interruption (NDBI) Coverage</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	✓

6.2.19. Unduly Lenient Sentence Scheme

Under this scheme introduced in 1989, any member of the public has the right to ask the Attorney General to review a Crown Court sentence for a certain range of offences within 28 days, if he thinks that the sentence is unduly lenient.⁸⁰² If the request passes the Attorney General's "test", the case will be referred to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration. While originally introduced to mainly deal with criminal cases like rape, murder or robbery, different terrorism-related offences have been included over the years, with 19 new types of terror-related offences included in 2017 alone.⁸⁰³

As any citizen can easily submit a request for review to the Attorney General's Office the scheme ensures that especially victims of terrorism are in the position to request that sentences are revised, if and when their *Just-World-Beliefs* are further threatened by a feeling that these have been unduly lenient.⁸⁰⁴

The scheme can be seen as an empowerment of victims. It gives them a voice and allows them to influence their future which is forever linked with the terrorist perpetrators. It may also satisfy their quest for revenge and to express their hate, which is psychologically not necessarily a bad thing compared to a permanent feeling of fear, as studies have found.⁸⁰⁵

What general lessons can authorities take away from the Unduly Lenient Sentence scheme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

802 See The Crown Prosecution Service 2019.

803 See UK Ministry Of Justice 2017.

804 See Day 2018.

805 See Lerner *et al.* 2003 ; See Day 2018, online.

6. Chapter: First Case – The United Kingdom

- Authorities should ensure through appropriate legislation that sentencing for terrorism takes adequate consideration of direct victims’ and the public’s need for justice and final closure.

<i>Unduly Lenient Sentence Scheme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	✓

6.2.20. Victim Support

The help and care for victims of terror attacks in the UK has significantly improved over the years, and authorities have learned from past attacks, and they are constantly re-evaluating their response.⁸⁰⁶ Since the 2017 London Bridge attack for example, the City of London Police has placed over 100 emergency trauma packs at strategic locations in and around “the square mile” at company premises to improve the initial pre-hospital medical emergency response in the crucial first minutes after an attack before the emergency medical personnel arrive.⁸⁰⁷

Each emergency trauma pack “*offers effective medical capability containing a range of kit for initial medical management including items that can be used for major trauma, hostile attack or natural disasters.*”⁸⁰⁸

These packs which are held and paid for by the private sector, can be called upon 24/7 by the police and be delivered by an advanced first aid-trained security officer. London’s Police officers are also being trained in providing advanced first aid through these packs.⁸⁰⁹ While this is just

806 See Survivors Against Terror 2018, 3.

807 See City of London Police 2017 ; See City of London Police 2018c.

808 Prometheus Medical Ltd. 2017.

809 See City of London Police 2018c.


one example, the response by law enforcement and emergency services to terror attacks is rated highly successful:

Survivors of terror attacks rate the support they received highly, with most services being rated by 80% of respondents as good, very good or exceptional. Services such as NHS emergency provision were rated as exceptional by a full 65% of people and very good by a further 15%. The help provided by police and paramedics scored similarly highly.⁸¹⁰

Also, the immediate bereavement support offered to grieving family members of terror attack victims in the 72 hours after an attack, has shown to be a strength in the aftermath of the Manchester Arena suicide attack in June 2017.⁸¹¹ It included “having a Bereavement Nurse in the Coroner’s Office who can respond if there is a sudden, unexpected death.”⁸¹²

However, victims of terrorism find that longer-term support like mental health services, financial and legal support need improvement.⁸¹³ This mixed picture of the support offered through the government, is reflected in the findings by the “Survivors against Terror” charity.⁸¹⁴

Figure 40: The provision of mental health services, financial- and legal support in the UK for terrorism victims are lacking, according to study.⁸¹⁵



810 Survivors Against Terror 2018, 3.

811 See Berkhoff 2019, 18.

812 *ibid.*18.

813 See Survivors Against Terror 2018.

814 See Bardsley 2018.

815 Image taken from survey report Survivors Against Terror 2018, 8.

Charitable organisations play an important part in the recovery process of victims in the UK, financially, socially, emotionally and politically. The *Survivors' Assistance Network* is the first port of call for those affected by an attack and helps assess their needs and provides the necessary information, contacts and referrals. The group *Survivors Against Terror* provides a voice for survivors and organises activities to bring change into government policies, to better combat terrorism and better care for survivors.⁸¹⁶ They support survivors in finding purpose and meaning, in experiencing community and in taking back control of their lives.⁸¹⁷ They also help provide opportunities for recently injured survivors to speak with other people like wounded veterans or victims from previous attacks, who had gone through the same experience and could understand them, and have since recovered.⁸¹⁸ This helps survivors to gain confidence and hope for themselves, and offers access to a new community.

To the survivors of previous terrorist attacks who are helping later victims of terrorism to move forward, it provides purpose, meaning and gives them control of their own lives. As terrorists often choose iconic targets in major cities, the victims of the same attack may frequently come from many countries. Therefore, also the victim support organizations cooperate across borders (e.g. with <https://www.oneworldstrong.org> or <http://semperfund.org/>. and the charities (as well as the government) also provide support for foreign victims of terrorism in the UK.⁸¹⁹

What general lessons can authorities take away from the Victim Support that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should ensure close cooperation between the coroners, the police force, the security and the nursing teams to ensure that bereaved families may be safely shepherded through the first 72 hours after an incident.
- Authorities should ensure that the needs of the bereaved are placed at the centre of the process and ensure that this is reflected in the information policy of the police and the Coroner's Office towards the relatives.

816 Bardsley 2018.

817 *ibid.*

818 Bainbridge 2018.

819 *ibid.*

- Authorities should consider to having a “bereavement nurse” directly in the coroner’s office who is able to quickly respond to sudden fatalities like from a terror attack.⁸²⁰
- Authorities must ensure an adequate level of long-term support of survivors with mental health services, financial and legal support.
- Authorities should ensure that NGOs who help and support victims and terror survivors to gain new confidence, purpose and meaning, receive adequate funding.


<i>Victim Support</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	✓

6.3. UK Case Study Conclusion

The result of the analysis of the different programmes conducted under the *PROTECT & PREPARE* strand of the *UK’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism* reflects the *nine critical tasks* for building, strengthening and preserving *Strategic Resilience*, that *are at the core of the Rings-of Resilience Model* proposed in Chapter Five, emphasizing its relevance.

⁸²⁰ See Berkhoff 2019, 18.

Figure 41: *Nine critical tasks are reflected in the analysed UK counter-terrorism activities.*⁸²¹



Many of the programmes' activities fall into more than one category, suggesting that the programmes are efficient. The results of the analysis by themselves have to be taken with a pinch of salt though and do not allow to jump to a conclusion about the level of resilience and preparedness in the British society as a whole. This analysis has focused on government driven counter-terrorism programmes and did not include independently run activities by civil society and institutions. It is also leaving out existing national peculiarities and strengths which may make a number of government-run programmes unnecessary in certain areas.

The analysis does however give practitioners an idea where the UK government's focus is currently placed and where there may be areas necessitating additional efforts or requiring additional assessment to improve *Strategic Resilience*.

Simply judging by the number of activities in each task category, the analysis shows a strong focus on protective security measures that are concerned with *impact prevention and reduction* in combination with effective risk and crisis communication which assure adequate *informational support*. These measures are reflected in detailed counter-terrorism guidelines, and in up-to-date threat alerts and intelligence sharing that allows exposed

821 Author's own work.

businesses to adopt suitable mitigation measures. Last but not least, they show in the clear, concise and practical advice for the wider public what to do if caught up in an attack, and how to respond when coming across suspicious items or behaviours.

Corresponding with the authorities' effective risk communication is their emphasis on the need for *social cohesion* by calling on “*every citizen to be a counter-terrorism citizen and [...] every responsible business [...] to be a counter-terrorism business*”⁸²² who can complement or back-up the government's protective security measures through their own vigilance and *preparedness*. Today, businesses are already cooperating with UKCTP in an unprecedented way. The level of cooperation to help to detect, deny and to deter terrorist attacks is likely to further increase through the *step-change* initiatives.⁸²³ Increased focus is now placed on boosting the vigilance and preparedness of the wider community by opening up ACT awareness trainings to the general public, and continuing support for public training initiatives for advanced first aid skills.⁸²⁴

The ability to limit the *indirect psychological impact* of jihadist terrorist attacks on the society and to *manage the potential fear*, is helped by the British people's long experience with terrorist attacks and the shared understanding that – as total security is not possible – keeping calm and carrying-on is the best public response. The very rapid response of police to end marauding terrorist firearms or bladed weapons attacks since Lee Rigby's murder in Woolwich in 2013, and the exemplary heroism and courage shown by individuals caught up in the attacks as portrayed in the press, has further helped to bolster confidence.

The ability of the authorities to *limit the indirect psychological impact* is also influenced by the strength of the “yellow press”. Depending on the circumstances including financial considerations, increase of circulation, and political partisanship, the tabloids' reporting of jihadi attacks and government response to them, may at certain times support clarity, unity and resolve. But it may also help to stir up fear, discord and distrust that are conducive for co-radicalisation⁸²⁵ which has been strongly criticized by ter-

822 Basu 2018.

823 See National Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters 2019.

824 See Counter Terrorism Policing UK 2020 ; See National Counter Terrorism Security Office and St John Ambulance 2018.

825 See Sumpter 2017.

rorism survivors and the *Counter Terrorism Police* following the reporting on the Christchurch attack in March 2019.⁸²⁶

The necessary legislation and body for auditing effective government- and industry-independent self-regulators of the press, that could make above-mentioned transgressions less likely by introducing adequate code with accountability and recourse, had been established by Royal Charter in 2013.⁸²⁷ But the commencement of *section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013*, that would create the conditions for significant numbers of publishers to be incentivised to join or set up an audited regulator (who is independent and would meet the 29 criteria defined in the Charter), has been held up by *Conservative* governments since and the promise to repeal section 40 has been part of the *Conservative* government's manifesto in October 2019.⁸²⁸ The alternative press complaint handling body, the *Independent Press Standards Organisation* (IPSO) set up by the major tabloids as a response has been repeatedly judged the *Media Standards Trust* seen as failing to provide a “genuinely independent and effective system of self-regulation” as envisioned in the creation of the Royal Charter.⁸²⁹

In contrast to the apparent *laissez-faire* approach of the current government towards the tabloids, despite the virality of their online pages, it does intend to bring social media platforms and online service providers under the oversight of the independent regulatory body *Ofcom*, which already oversees broadcast media.⁸³⁰ Its new *Online-Harms Act* is expected to come into law this year and is said to require the platforms to adopt transparent self-regulatory community standards and effective “Incident Content Protocols”.⁸³¹ These should ensure the swift removal from and denial of distribution of violent extremist content through online service

826 After the horrendous attack on two mosques in Christchurch, three UK tabloids (The Sun, The Mirror and The Daily Mail) were found to have been instrumental for the wider dissemination of the attacker video and terrorist manifesto by reposting and amplifying it on to their sites, after the New Zealand police had asked not to publish it. At the same time, social media platforms like *Facebook* were undertaking all efforts to remove the same content and blocking its re-upload to their platforms over 1.5 million times.

See Cox 2019 ; See Basu 2019 ; Hacked Off 2019.

827 See Press Recognition Panel 2020, 30–31.

828 See *Conservative and Unionist Party* 2019, 48.

829 See *Media Standards Trust* 2019, 3.

830 See UK Home Office and UK Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport 2020.

831 *ibid.*

platforms as advocated in the *Christchurch Call to Action*, the UK joined in May 2019.⁸³²

Based on the tradition of the British debating culture, society may be thought to be rather tolerant towards dissenting views and opinions. This openness may be considered as helpful for the *emotion-focused coping*, necessary after an attack. However, since the “7/7” suicide attacks by British-born Muslims, the government found it necessary to re-emphasise the promotion of “*fundamental British values*” in schools to “*regard people of all faiths, races and cultures with respect and tolerance*”, and to respect the rule of British law taking precedence over religious laws.⁸³³

This is indicative of a disagreement about *meaning* and identity in the British society regarding Britishness and the role of British Muslims within the society, and about Britain’s relationship with the Muslim world, brought to light after the British participation in the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan.⁸³⁴

This is pointing to a general failure by consecutive British governments in the past “*to identify a distinct national notion of belonging*,”⁸³⁵ an umbrella of an inclusive British civic national identity which can integrate the different and diverse ethnic groups that make up today’s multi-cultural Britain.⁸³⁶

This unresolved identity conflict is a source of friction in the authorities’ fight against jihadi terrorism or “*International Terrorism*”, as it is referred to.⁸³⁷ This leads to disagreement in the society what this fight is about and against who it should fight.

The lack of shared understanding easily lends itself to the exploitation of connected or underlying social-cultural grievances. On the one side there is especially the victimisation, claimed by Islamist firebrands.⁸³⁸ On the other side one has the far-right extremists harping on the otherness and the perceived threat of the Muslim ‘suspect community’.⁸³⁹

832 The *Christchurch Call to Action* is international initiative between governments and a number of large online service providers to eradicate violent terrorist content online. See New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade 2019.

833 Department for Education 2014 ; See Kabir 2010, 11 ; See Asari *et al.* 2008, 1–2.

834 See Nesser 2011; See Verkaik 2014.

835 Hampshire 2005, 181.

836 See Asari *et al.* 2008.

837 See *ibid.*

838 See Nesser 2011.

839 See Abbas and Awan 2015.

While new research into British Muslims' views on government and counter-terrorism efforts suggest a sizable majority of Muslims have trust in the government and support their counter-terrorism efforts,⁸⁴⁰ the remaining non-negligible-sized group may be receptive for influence operations that amplify existing grievances. Exemplary avenues are foreign-funded TV networks, online disinformation or covert funding and false-flag activism as practiced by Russia to increase of racial divisions in the United States.⁸⁴¹ The success of similar efforts in the UK, as part of the Brexit campaign, is highly likely, but cannot be verifiably assessed⁸⁴²: The intelligence report on the matter which was signed off by the *Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security* (PJCIS) on 17 October 2019 and whose publication has been delayed until July 2020, after the UK election, reveals “*the UK government’s failure to examine Russian attempts to influence the course of the Brexit vote and describes Russian interference in the country as “the new normal.”*”⁸⁴³

Shifting the attention from to those *directly affected* by an attack, the Government’s *provision of emergency and initial medical support* has been rated highly by the population. However, more resources are said to be needed for socio-psychological reintegration, with a focus on financial and psychological support. These assessments have been made before the Covid-19 response, which has brought to light serious fault lines in the British health care system, which many Brits had been accustomed to referring to as the envy of the rest of the world. If the negative comparison of the NHS with the better coping health care system in other countries will have lasting impact on the British perception and their demands of the system is still unknown at this moment, but not implausible.

840 See Shanaah 2019.

841 See Ewing 2017.

842 See Wolchover and Robinson 2020.

843 Mackinnon 2020.