Yusuf Ziya Karabıçak

Mainz University, Germany
yusufkarabicak@gmail.com

Expertise and Sedition: Perspectives from the Ottoman Army of 1769

Abstract

This paper examines the letters of the Ottoman Grand Vizier and commander-in-chief of the 1769 campaign, Yağlıkçızâde Mehmed Emin Pasha, in order to advance the understanding of Ottoman notions of expertise. Military expertise has always been seen as a fundamental part of discussions of Ottoman modernization, and its perceived absence prior to the Ottoman-Russian War of 1768–1774 is cited as one of the many reasons why the Ottomans 'lagged' behind. This article attempts to understand what constituted expertise for the Ottoman elite before the major catastrophes of the war and puts forward an intertwining relationship between perceptions of expertise and sedition.

Keywords: Ottoman-Russian War of 1768–1774, military expertise, Yağlıkçızâde Mehmed Emin Pasha, order and sedition

1. Introduction

In March 1769, the Ottoman army assembled in Davutpaşa, located to the west of the gates of the Ottoman capital, in preparation for a long march to the northern front to confront the Russian Empire. The army was led by Grand Vizier Yağlıkçızâde Mehmed Emin Pasha, whose appointment to this high command is frequently interpreted as a result of palace intrigue and political manoeuvring, often cited as emblematic of the Empire's lack of military preparedness.[1] Mehmed Emin Pasha, after all, was a former scribe with no prior military experience or background in campaigning. His repeated requests for the acceptance of his resignation further reinforce this view of his inadequacy. However, this perspective raises important questions about the nature of expertise – particularly military expertise – and the criteria by which it is judged. What can his experience reveal about the intersection of political authority, military command, and the perceived role of expertise in the Ottoman military system?

Eric Ash argued that experts 'facilitated the expansion and consolidation of powerful European states.'[2] Bringing to mind Pierre Bourdieu's conception of 'field,' Ash argued that to be an early modern expert required the possession and control of a 'body of specialized knowledge,' experience with the knowledge in question, a distinction from

1 Aksan 1993, 225–6; Beydilli 2003.
2 Ash 2010, 22.

ordinary practitioners and a sociopolitical context of legitimation.[3] In his view, expertise was a vital resource that enabled powerful European states to outmanoeuvre their rivals. In contrast, Summerson Carr emphasized the social dimensions of expertise, positing that 'expertise is something people do rather than something people have or hold.'[4] While she acknowledged the importance of learning and acquiring knowledge, Carr focused on the performative aspects of expertise, highlighting that it is not simply a matter of individual capability but requires validation within broader social contexts. According to Carr, expertise is a social construct that gains its legitimacy through recognition by larger societal structures.

Military expertise is a critical area in which the complexities of expertise are most evident, particularly in the context of what Ash identifies as its role in facilitating the expansion of powerful European states. The early modern period witnessed significant transformations in military capacity across Europe, with some states – such as the Ottoman Empire – beginning to fall behind in comparison to their European counterparts. Recent scholarship, however, reveals that notions of military expertise were not solely grounded in training and experience; they also involved the performance and demonstration of skill and competence.

In the early modern era, the concept of the soldier underwent a significant transformation, blending elements of both performance and professionalism. Although military service – particularly in leadership roles – was still largely associated with aristocratic status and lineage, there was growing dissatisfaction among common soldiers regarding the lack of experience and expertise among military commanders.[5] For both the nobility and the gentry, military service was increasingly seen as a means of demonstrating courage and loyalty, qualities they believed would safeguard their honor and enhance their social standing.[6] Simultaneously, the early modern period also saw the rise of more specialized military roles that became professionalized, such as the military engineer.[7] These developments reflect the broader evolution of military expertise, which moved beyond hereditary privilege and aristocratic ideals to encompass a growing emphasis on specialized knowledge and technical proficiency.

Recent scholarship on Ottoman military expertise has shifted focus from viewing the empire as merely imitative in its adoption of military technology to recognizing its distinct traditions, sustained through systems such as apprenticeships.[8] Scholars have highlighted the early adoption of gunpowder technologies and the involvement of both foreign and local technicians in the empire's military advancements.[9] Mustafa Kaçar and Darina Martykánová contend that the Ottoman Empire only began to

3 *ibid*., 5–10; Bourdieu 2013.
4 Carr 2010, 18.
5 Woodcock 2019a, 12.
6 Trim 2019.
7 Lenman 2013.
8 Şakul 2013.
9 Agoston 2008.

systematically institutionalize foreign military expertise in the 1770s.[10] While notable exceptions, such as the role of the Marquis de Bonneval (Humbaracı Ahmed Pasha) and the employment of *efrencî* technicians, underscore the presence of foreign experts, the notion of expertise in this context is primarily associated with non-Ottoman figures.[11] However, the concept of what constituted a military expert within the eighteenth-century Ottoman army remains inadequately understood.

Virginia Aksan has compared 'late eighteenth-century Ottoman camps … to disturbed beehives'[12] and noted that 'the campaign headquarters probably resembled a bazaar as much as a disciplined military machine.'[13] Perhaps it is fair to call the Ottoman army led by Yağlıkçızâde in 1769 a moving capital. The Ottoman sultans had long since ceased to lead the army, but the Mongol tradition of considering the army itself as the capital continued, albeit with significant changes. The highest-ranking Ottoman officials were all in the army, and the bureaucracy continued to function in the 'usual' way, in motion. Every major foreign embassy had a dragoman present in the army as they still had to continue dealing with the Grand Vizier and the Ottoman chief scribe. Two copies of most documents sent to the government were made: one for the army, and one for the capital. In this sense, Yağlıkçızâde needed expertise in both governing the people and in disciplining the corps.

But who exactly was Yağlıkçızâde Mehmed Pasha? Aksan described him as 'little more than a glorified secretary.'[14] In fact, he came from a scribal background and managed to be appointed as the secretary to the Grand Vizier (*sadâret mektûbcusu*) in 1761. In this service, he became involved in Ottoman-Russian diplomacy in Poland-Lithuania shortly after the controversial election of Stanisław August Poniatowski in 1763. He interviewed the Russian ambassador in Istanbul, Count Alexei Obreskov, and the Prussian resident Karl Adolf von Rexin about developments in the Commonwealth and had them both sign the minutes of the meeting, a document that the Ottomans interpreted as a guarantee that the Russian military presence in Poland-Lithuania would not be counter to Ottoman interests.[15] This act of service probably led to his appointment as Chief Scribe of the Empire in a little more than a week. The Ottoman declaration of war in 1768, delivered to the ambassadors in Istanbul, copied paragraphs verbatim from the minutes of Yağlıkçızâde's interview with the Russian and Prussian representative.[16] While he was in the army, Yağlıkçızâde asked for the document to be delivered to him in order to strengthen Ottoman claims in his negotiations with foreign representatives.[17] This episode challenges the common portrayal of Yağlıkçızâde's appointment as mere palace politics, often presented as evidence of Ottoman unpre-

10 Kaçar 1996. Martykánová 2016–17, 159–82.
11 Aydüz 1998; Finkel 1992; Kaçar 1995; Murphey 1983; Şakul 2013.
12 Aksan 2013, 144.
13 Aksan 1998a, 117.
14 Aksan 2012, 334.
15 BOA, C.HR 63/3104, 13 Safer 1178 (12 August 1764).
16 Talbot 2017. See also: Karabıçak 2022.
17 BOA, TSMA.e 516/41, 11 Muharrem 1183 (17 May 1769).

paredness.[18] Instead, it highlights a deeper issue in the Ottoman military system – one that transcends common notions of military expertise. While Yağlıkçızâde's appointment was likely linked to his diplomatic work and pro-war stance rather than military competence, this does not mean that military expertise was irrelevant in Ottoman governance. In his letters the Grand Vizier claimed to have some kind of expertise. This means that the two most powerful men in the Ottoman Empire in 1769, Sultan Mustafa III and the Grand Vizier, were still talking about the best way to conduct a military campaign and the latter was still claiming that he knew what he was doing. Therefore, I will not assume a tension between court politics and expertise, because it seems to me to be informed by the knowledge that the Ottomans were ultimately defeated.

If we combine the army's composition to Yağlıkçızâde's career we may approach an answer. This paper aims to contribute to our understanding of how expertise was perceived in the Ottoman context by examining this intersection. It introduces a new aspect to the question of expertise: sedition. In the following pages I will argue that the claim to expertise initiated a negotiation between different parties. Even when it could be tested, expertise was accompanied by concerns about order and sedition. An expert was a potential troublemaker, and the prevention of trouble was expertise itself.

Thus, this study focuses on Ottoman perceptions of military expertise during a specific moment: the 1769 campaign against Russia. It draws on letters from Yağlıkçızâde Mehmed Emin Pasha, who commanded the imperial army and corresponded frequently with the Sultan from March to August 1769, found in the Topkapı Palace Archives. The Pasha wrote a letter to the Sultan almost every other day and kept him informed on the conditions of the army. His letters give us a glimpse into the mindset of an Ottoman bureaucrat-turned-general and highlights how he dealt with questions of expertise or lack thereof just before the disasters of the Ottoman-Russian War of 1768–1774, and therefore before the Ottomans began to accelerate their import of European military expertise. The paper will address three key issues from the 1769 campaign: first, Mehmed Emin Pasha's understanding of military command and expertise; second, the case of a Polish volunteer seeking to serve as an artillery expert in the Ottoman army, whose expertise was tested and ultimately rejected; and third, the execution of two Greek Venetian doctors who offered their services to the Grand Vizier. These episodes illustrate how questions of expertise were often intertwined with concerns about sedition, mutiny, and espionage. This paper, therefore, aims to explore the significance of military expertise in the Ottoman Empire and its role in the 1769 campaign.

2. Professionalization, Expertise, and the Importance of the 1769 Moment

Questions of professionalization and expertise have been central to the study of Ottoman military history in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For our purposes here, I take professionalization to entail a more or less clearly defined career path that

18 Aksan 1993, 225–26; Beydilli 2003.

requires its holders to have expertise in the field to which they belong, while expertise itself is not limited to those on professional paths.

Christine Isom-Verhaaren's study of the Ottoman navy up to the mid-eighteenth century shows how professionalization and expertise intermingled but were not sufficient on their own to gain positions or status in the hierarchical organization of the navy. In the early centuries, Ottoman admirals who could be considered as naval experts came from corsair backgrounds in the North African provinces, without a professional career path established by the Ottoman centre, but clearly with a lot of expertise. Even then, Isom-Verhaaren demonstrates, palace favourites could replace these experts, leading to major defeats for the Ottoman navy.[19]

The underlying tension revealed in Isom-Verhaaren's study is that between court politics and expertise. This approach takes expertise as unambiguous and easily demonstrable, while the appointment of grand admirals with no prior experience seems to be related only to power politics. Moreover, there is an unspoken assumption in this kind of approach that, in the right environment, expertise trumps court politics and factionalism, which is far from true. Factionalism is still evident in environments where expertise is institutionalized, which is perhaps what the Ottoman army lacked, for despite the janissary regiments that formed a significant part of the Ottoman forces, expertise was not necessarily institutionalized.

Yannis Spyropoulos argued that 'towards the end of its lifespan, the Janissary corps became an increasingly decentralised institution.'[20] This meant that the janissary corps began to establish local ties, become involved in, and eventually dominate local politics. It also meant that lower-ranking officers had more political power. In many provincial towns, these officers allowed outsiders to join the corps and take advantage of its social benefits and networks without being paid by the government or appearing in roll calls.[21] On the other hand, as Aysel Yıldız shows, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the commanders of the janissary corps (janissary *aghas*) were overwhelmingly appointed from within the corps itself.[22] As she points out, 'this signifies a professionalization (…); but at the same time it strongly suggests that the corps was falling from favor.'[23] Direct appointment from outside of the corps of someone with ties to the palace symbolically emphasized the ties between the corps and the Sultan. The fact that the Aghas now came from within the corps severed ties to the palace, but also attested to the influence of various groups within the corps as it 'began to lose its strictly military nature and turn into a para-military group.'[24]

The rivalries among the janissary factions would be one of the issues that the commander-in-chief would have to deal with in the spring and summer of 1769, but his army was not only composed of janissaries. The Ottoman military system began to rely

19 Isom-Verhaaren 2022, 5–6, 157–87.
20 Spyropoulos 2019, 449.
21 Spyropoulos and Yıldız 2022.
22 Yıldız 2018, 453–4.
23 *ibid*., 454.
24 *ibid*., 459.

more and more on the use of armed irregulars, the *levend*s, who could occasionally be combined with the janissary regiments.[25] One of the main problems that Yağlıkçızâde had to deal with was the maintenance of order and the prevention of insurrection among the soldiers who did not live a life of constant military discipline.

The army also included specialized branches, such as the artillery corps, which raised its own questions of expertise. The Ottoman use of gunpowder and cannons has always been at the centre of Ottoman military history.[26] The 1768–1774 war marked a turning point, as the Ottoman army needed to update its artillery inventory after the Seven Years' War, recruiting more European experts, notably Baron de Tott who entered Ottoman service before the war. Available studies of Ottoman artillery focus on the period after the disastrous defeat at Kartal (Kagul) in 1770, emphasize the modernization brought about by Baron de Tott's efforts, and ultimately tell stories about how Western officers modernized the Ottoman army.[27] In fact, by not participating in the Seven Years' War, the Ottomans had missed the developments in light, mobile field artillery, and the effort to create a dedicated mobile field artillery corps was the result of firsthand experience at Kartal.[28] However, this question did not exist in the mind of Yağlıkçızâde Mehmed Emin Pasha in 1769. Moreover, the example of a foreign expert who offered his services that will be presented below, had no bearing of the field artillery division that was created with the help of Baron de Tott. These examples offer insight into local understandings of expertise, unmediated by foreign influences, which provides valuable perspective on Ottoman perceptions of expertise prior to the empire's major defeat in the 1770s.

This is not an argument for Ottoman isolation. Ottoman authors have long been writing about European military systems and recommending different perspectives in conversation with European developments.[29] 1769 is an important moment for understanding how these perceptions came together to shape the understanding of a commander-in-chief before the major defeat of the eighteenth century.

3. What Constituted the Commander-in-chief's Expertise?

A classic Ottoman manual for viziers written by Defterdâr Sarı Mehmed Pasha (d. 1717) argues that 'the man who is an eminent commander-in-chief or general has need first to be zealous and sagacious, one who has both campaigned and lived at home.'[30] According to Sarı Mehmed Pasha's advice, the commander-in-chief had to be experienced both in the battlefield and the capital, neither of which was more important

25 Aksan 1998b, 25–6.
26 Agoston 2008.
27 Gezer and Yeşil 2018; Yeşil 2017. Kahraman Şakul's MA thesis is an exception in this sense, as it covers a longer period of time and discusses the social context of the employment of foreign officers: Şakul 2001.
28 Aksan 2002b, 266.
29 Kaymakçı 2020; Theotokis and Yıldız 2018.
30 Wright 1935, 128.

than the other. Yağlıkçızâde may have excelled in diplomacy at home, but he had no experience of campaigning. I am inclined to argue that military expertise encompassed more than strictly military affairs. The Grand Viziers were responsible for running the Ottoman government as absolute deputies of the sultans, and leading the Ottoman army into war was only part of their responsibility as deputies of the sultan.

To understand what Yağlıkçızâde had to do as the commander-in-chief, we need a better understanding of the army and its constituents. Towards the conclusion of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman military had undergone significant decentralization, with its structure and funding primarily managed at the local level by governors, tax collectors, and the elites of town and village groups.[31] It was 'a federative military system that came to be dominated by semi-autonomous fighters, first as auxiliaries to the traditional janissary/*sipahi* organization and then as entrepreneurial ethnic bands.'[32] The commander's role (and necessary expertise) became that of a negotiator, rather than that of an active military problem solver. He had to reconcile different expectations and understandings of what it meant to be a soldier of the Sultan.

These expectations and understandings varied depending on the corps with which the soldier was associated and possibly his geographic background. As discussed above, by 1769 the janissary army had undergone major changes that allowed lower-ranking officers to control much of the corps and gave them enough power to negotiate with government-appointed officers. In this sense, Yağlıkçızâde could only negotiate with his janissaries and the larger army instead of expecting them to simply obey his orders. Studies of mutiny in the Ottoman army, especially in the late eighteenth century, illustrate the situation perfectly. Palmira Brummett argued that mutinies should be seen as movements 'that produced negotiation and compromise.'[33] 'Men mutinied to resist what they perceived as tyranny, to grab power, to enhance their reputations, and to better their economic positions.'[34] Moreover, the insistence of the Istanbulite Ottoman elites on preventing provincials and 'outsiders' from acquiring a status similar to their own added another dimension to the dispute.[35] In this environment, the late-eighteenth-century Ottoman commander-in-chief was less a military disciplinarian than a manager of political expectations.

A letter written by the Grand Vizier at the end of April from Provadia (*Pravadi*) in modern-day Bulgaria gives us a glimpse into his mind:

> What fun the higher or lower among the people of the campaign have in their tents is between them and God. Why should I talk about the affairs that they will have to deal with and for which they will be rebuked in the hereafter, and make them public? It is not fit for a commander (*ser'asker*) to talk about the vices of the soldiers, which are their own. According to your slave, the duty is to constantly investigate

31 Aksan 2012, 324.
32 Aksan 2014, 332.
33 Brummett 1998, 96.
34 *ibid*., 107.
35 Aksan 1998a.

> and act wisely in order to prevent, God forbid, sedition and the appearance of a problem that would harm the affair I have been appointed to carry out, and to make everyone obedient to my master like captives.[36]

Here, Yağlıkçızâde prioritizes the management of the army's morale and stability over harsh discipline. He explains to the Sultan that he did not say a word to those who behaved improperly and overlooked their offenses and disciplined (*terbiye*) those who knew proper behaviour by treating them kindly.[37] He emphasizes that controlling the atmosphere within the army, rather than focusing on strict enforcement of discipline, was central to preventing sedition. Even when he seemed to be fed up with the problems created by his soldiers, he did not think of disciplining them himself, but left it to the natural forces of warfare as we see in a letter written near Hantepesi in June:

> Would our soldiers really behave properly if their noses were not broken a little, if they did not see the sweet and the bitter, and if they did not see what a campaign and battle are? I pray to God that everything will find order according to your imperial wishes.[38]

None of this is to say that the Ottoman army did not discipline its soldiers or use force against transgressors. It certainly did, but the emphasis seems to have been on managing the different expectations of different groups in the army rather than turning them all into standardized soldiers who would do as they were ordered without question. To return to Defterdâr Sarı Mehmed Pasha's counsel, a good commander-in-chief was he 'who is acquainted with the condition of both great men and small, who knows how to treat [all ranks] with due consideration, in order that those under him may love him and gladly obey his orders.'[39] Obedience to orders was as much about the social relationship the commander had with his soldiers as it was about hierarchical relationships.

The same letter describes a dispute between the Grand Vizier and his soldiers. It seems that there were complaints in Istanbul against the Grand Vizier, especially regarding his prevention of soldiers from participating in raids:

> There is no limit to the number of those who petition every day, saying, 'I will go on a raid, grant me an allowance', or 'Grant me a horse' or 'My Agha does not allow me', and this slave of yours, I allow them as needed. Among these petitioners are men from all of the [janissary] companies, and from the servants of the officers, and scribes, and fief-holders (*zuemâ*) and vagabonds who came of their own free will, and *levend*s, and sheikhs, and madrasa students, and ruffians, and beggars, and Turks, Turcomans, Kurds, Chitaks, Albanians, and Bosnians, and other such peoples. How can they say that I did not give permission?[40]

36 BOA, TSMA.e 516/17, 23 Zilhicce 1182 (30 April 1769).
37 ibid.
38 BOA, TSMA.e 516/58, 20 Safer 1183 (25 June 1769).
39 Wright 1935, 128.
40 ibid.

Yağlıkçızâde's account shows that the possibility of mutiny was taken quite seriously both in Istanbul and by the commander-in-chief. Preventing raiding could and did lead to mutiny. The Grand Vizier's insistence on his having given permission demonstrates how 'negotiation and compromise' begins long before the mutiny itself.[41] But it also shows what the job of a commander-in-chief entails. Keeping the soldiers in line required negotiations as well as punishments.

An episode involving janissaries, recounted in one of the Grand Vizier's letters from Edirne, underscores the issues that even military customs could cause and the commander's responsibility to keep rivalries in check:

> In previous campaigns, the janissaries of different divisions would take turns taking aim, and those who hit the target would receive two gold pieces, while those who missed would receive only one. The men of the regiment wanted to do the same this time, but after consulting with the Agha of the Janissaries, we found several objections. First of all, if they all want to shoot and we allow some and not others, it will cause an uprising. If we allow them, it will take more than a month and we will have to pay more than two hundred thousand gold pieces. Even if that were possible, they would fight over who shoots first. At a time like this, when the army is so overcrowded, allowing a shooting contest will only cause sedition.[42]

Perhaps here lies the essence of the Grand Vizier's problem. The army under his command, even the janissaries, were not necessarily his to command as such. They were social groups with private bases, with whom he had to negotiate at every turn. Interestingly, this was where his claim to expertise lay. His credentials as commander-in-chief were that he was an expert politician. But how did he acquire that expertise? He explains:

> Your slave has known since my childhood, thanks to my studies, how commandership (*ser'askerlik*) worked in the sublime Ottoman state and in the times of the ancient and modern states, which of their measures were successful and which led to rebellion, and the reasons for this. God knows that in 47 and 48 (1734–6) I studied the history of Naima and Raşid, although I was very young and these things were not important for merchants. I tried to understand world affairs with *Cihânnümâ*. It turned out that the Almighty was training (*terbiye*) your slave to be of such great service to my master after all this time.[43]

For the Grand Vizier, military expertise can be gained through the study of previous discourses. This is not as surprising as it may seem at first glance, since manuals and his-

41 Aksan 2002a, 68. Aksan examines a mutiny at Ochakov in 1769.

42 BOA, TSMA.e 516/5, 7 Zilhicce 1182 (14 April 1769).

43 BOA, TSMA.e 516/17. *Cihânnümâ* is a work of geography that combined Islamic geographical tradition with European discoveries. Written first by the Ottoman polymath Kâtib Çelebi in mid-17th century, it was extended and printed in 1732 by İbrâhim Müteferrika. For a modern translation see: Çelebi 2021.

torical works were and still are part of military training.[44] Defterdâr Sarı Mehmed Pasha had a similar idea when he wrote his manual and explicitly mentioned previous books as sources of knowledge for a Grand Vizier.[45] In an article on the Grand Vizier Koca Ragıp Pasha (in office: 1757–1763), Henning Sievert argued that 'the extensiveness of a bureaucrat's *adab* (…) manifested itself in ornate correspondence that was indispensable for the functioning of the state and for maintaining its authority.'[46] Yağlıkçızâde Mehmed Pasha categorized the expertise required for leading a campaign in a similar way. His readings of history and discourse were meant to help him 'maintain his authority.'

Another important aspect of the march, again related to the issue of sedition, was controlling the flow of information. The Grand Vizier talks about the news of a massive fire in Istanbul that reached the army while it was in Provadia: 'This kind of rumour appears from time to time, and it is an old custom to verify and prevent it. It is well known to your slave from the Hajj campaigns.'[47] Actually, Yağlıkçızâde was never appointed as the *surre emîni*, the organizer of the march of the Hajj caravan from Istanbul to Mecca. He was only a young participant, but he makes full use of his epithet *el-Hâc*, a pilgrim to Mecca. In his letter, he links the two marches and makes it a matter of controlling rumours and thus sedition. There is a long tradition going back at least to Evliya Çelebi whereby the commander of the Hajj caravan was portrayed as a heroic figure, and at least some of his duties were shared with the commander of the imperial army.[48] The comparison between the two marches deserves further attention. In both cases, a large march was organized with the participation of various social elements. In both cases, the sultan appointed the leader of the march to represent him. Both of these types of marches with their huge populations created similar organizational problems and required the balancing of different interests by the vizier appointed to lead it. The Hajj campaign was definitely not a military one, but it included large military guards and the possibility of armed conflict with some Bedouin tribes if their conditions were not met while passing through their territories. Yağlıkçızâde's allusion to his participation in a Hajj campaign suggests a parallel in his mind between these two marches.

All in all, Yağlıkçızâde Mehmed Emin Pasha's letters allow us to understand one Ottoman conception of military expertise. It is, of course, dangerous to generalize, but at least in Yağlıkçızâde's mind, it seems that the Ottoman commander is basically a governor who is expected to control the flow of information and prevent sedition. He is not a disciplinarian who makes soldiers out of the men in his hands.

44 In fact, Caesar's *Commentaries* were widely read in the early modern period: Woodcock 2019b.
45 Wright 1935, 62.
46 Sievert 2013, 164. See also: Ferguson 2018.
47 BOA, TSMA.e 516/17.
48 Faroqhi 1994, 58–9.

4. A Polish Adventurer Who Claimed to be an Artilleryman

In early 1769, a (presumably) Polish adventurer from the Habsburg Empire arrived in Istanbul and applied for a position in the Ottoman army. He brought with him a tale of military experience: Four years earlier, he had been employed as a captain by Count Branicki of Poland-Lithuania. When the count's forces were crushed by the Russian armies, he left and travelled in Italy, France, England and Russia, returning to Poland to serve Count Lubomirski, one of the Polish magnates allied with the Porte. However, Lubomirski was also defeated by Russian forces, and our unnamed hero left for a second time, travelling through Silesia, Austria, Italy, Venice, and Marseilles to the Ottoman capital. Although the Austrian ambassador wanted to send him back to Austria, he refused, claiming that 'he had only come to the imperial army to be employed in the arts of warfare (*fünûn-ı 'askeriye*).'[49]

The Ottomans questioned him to assess his expertise. Upon the question of 'how he acquired the arts of warfare (*fünûn-ı 'askeriye*)' he replied that he had gone to school (*mu'allimhâne*) in Austria and trained for years under people of knowledge (*erbâb-ı vukûf*). He was then asked in which battles he had practiced the aforementioned science that he had learned. He replied that he had practiced this science nine years previously in the war that Austria waged against Prussia, that is, the Seven Years' War. His age – twenty-eight – seemed to align with his account. However, the Ottomans were not convinced and decided to test him further: 'He was told that he would be accommodated in İsakçı under the protection of the Sultan and cannons would be fired by cannoneers under his control, and if he managed to hit the required target or demonstrate other arts, he would receive favour and praise.'[50]

But here the story took a turn. The Sultan ordered the Austrian dragoman at the imperial camp to be questioned about him. The dragoman said that the adventurer had contacted the Austrian ambassador a few days before leaving the capital and asked for a document that would allow him to return to Poland. Confused, the Ottoman authorities handed him over to the Muhzır Agha (head of the Janissary Agha's guards and guardian of his prison) as a 'guest' until the matter was settled. We hear from the Grand Vizier a few days later:

> The artilleryman, who had come from Istanbul with a Polish claim, was given to the Muhzır Agha as a guest so that no one would harm him, as is the ancient custom. He was given food and some money and was completely forgotten. He will not be examined by the artillerymen and will not be mentioned from now on. He will be released after talking to the Poles, God willing. There is nothing to worry about, he even denied being an artilleryman. Apparently, he did not have the means to go to his country, the bastard goes this way. The world benefits from the Sultan's shadow. This one too will go to his country one way or another.[51]

49 KA 316, 55a, n. 119.
50 *ibid*., 120.
51 BOA, TSMA.e 145/18, 10 Muharrem 1183 (16 May 1769).

This episode adds a new layer to the question of military expertise. Experts in more specialized fields of the military, cannoneers being the most obvious, are recognized as such by the Ottomans. There is an education for this, which must be coupled with practice. This kind of expertise can be tested by other experts. But in the end our adventurer is never tested. He is made to deny his expertise. The Grand Vizier and possibly other Ottoman officials involved are apparently afraid of sedition. The cannoneer could be deceiving them; he could be a spy. Even after his repudiation of his expertise, he may be attacked by others, so it is necessary to keep him under guard. After all, expertise is negotiable and can itself be a bargaining chip. The Grand Vizier understands this.

This case also provides an interesting contrast to the more famous example of Baron de Tott, a European military expert who served the Ottomans during the same period. Unlike the Polish adventurer, Tott had strong credentials and was already attached to the French diplomatic mission in the Empire. There is no record of the Ottomans questioning or testing his expertise. However, his own narrative is full of his disregard for the Ottomans.[52] Notably, he criticized the Ottomans for casting brass cannons using an iron-making furnace, claiming that they needed his guidance to cast the cannons properly, based only on a manual.[53] A French consul, Louis Charles de Peysonnel, would later criticize Tott for being blind to the skill with which Ottoman brass cannons were being manufactured.[54] In his effort to constitute his own expertise in discourse for a different audience, Tott was dismissive of any local performance. This is one of the advantages of looking at lower-level foreign servants of the Sublime Porte. The balance of power is turned upside down, and without the full support of the representative of a foreign court, the Ottomans can take the initiative to judge and act on their own understanding of expertise without it becoming a diplomatic issue.

The difference between Tott and the Polish adventurer underscores a crucial point: expertise in the Ottoman Empire was not just about technical proficiency – it was deeply intertwined with political and power structures. As Virginia Aksan noted, European Enlightenment thinkers often misunderstood Ottoman resistance to change as mere hostility to modernization.[55] The case of Marquis de Bonneval (Humbaracı Ahmed Pasha) provides us with an interesting example of how this insight can be used to understand questions of expertise because expertise was always intertwined with power structures. Bonneval did not enter Ottoman service as a protégé of the embassy, but as a convert. He hoped to become a commander in the Ottoman army, he tells us, which did not happen precisely because of his inability to understand how the Ottoman power structure was intertwined with questions of expertise. Bonneval presents his credentials, beginning with his education: 'Since my childhood, I have spent my time in acquiring the arts of war.'[56] He then combines this with experience: 'I acquired the science of naval warfare by serving in the French Navy. Later I became a commander

52 Aksan 2002b, 260.
53 Baron de Tott 1786, 114–9.
54 Aksan 2001, 167.
55 *ibid*., 165.
56 Arif 1913a, 1153.

of land forces. Twenty-two fortified castles were conquered thanks to our efforts, and [I was] victorious in eleven battles.' He then lists his service to the Habsburg Emperor: 'I have repeatedly been commander-in-chief of the emperor's land forces, I was the commander of the right wing in Varadin and of the left wing in Belgrade, I was commander of the infantry in Timisoara.' His account goes on to list his many skills.[57] Did the Ottomans care?

On one level, they did, as they put him in charge of modernizing the mortar corps.[58] However, Bonneval was not given command in the Ottoman army. This fact points to a difference in understanding of the politics of the Ottoman army, and ultimately, of expertise. An order sent to the *kadı* of Gümülcine granting Bonneval a salary only finds his position and conversion worth mentioning: 'He abandoned the darkness of disbelief with divine guidance and sacrificed everything he had although he had everything.'[59] When Muhsinzâde Abdullah Pasha wanted to make use of his services, he was not interested in Bonneval's military expertise, but rather looked forward to benefiting from him in order to create 'a great revolution in the Habsburg lands' making use of Bonneval's connections and understanding, as he 'had knowledge of every development in the Habsburg lands.'[60] Not only was he an outsider and unconnected to Ottoman power circles, leading to his relative isolation, but his understanding of military expertise was fundamentally different from the Ottoman understanding. The Ottoman political elites were looking for commanders who could manage and negotiate with the various groups that made up the army. Yağlıkçızâde Mehmed Emin Pasha's appointment, too, might be seen in this light. For Istanbul, bureaucratic training or provincial experience could not have been an incidental consideration in appointments.

However, when it came to non-command positions, as the case of our Polish adventurer demonstrates, the Ottomans were quite willing to put experts to good use. Therefore, I think we should look for a distinction between two types of expertise: command and technical. The first one was deeply intertwined with power structures due to Ottoman recruiting patterns and ideas about what the army was. The second one was more practical. Distinguishing between the two will help us better understand the experiences and frustrations of figures like Bonneval and Baron de Tott and will help us to appreciate the experiences of many other experts who did not necessarily aspire to command positions.

5. Two Venetian Doctors

Not everyone who joined the Ottoman army on its march had a strictly military role to play. They still became part of the army and could attract the attention of the Grand Vizier. This was the case of two Venetian doctors who joined the army in Edirne and

57 Arif 1913a, 1153.
58 Kaçar 1995.
59 Arif 1913a, 1155.
60 Arif 1913b, 1224.

became a security problem. The chronicler of the army, Sadullah Enveri Efendi, tells how 'some Christians disguised as doctors' came to the Ottoman army in Edirne:

> They had criers announce to the people of the imperial army that they were doctors serving for free. In fact, everyone sent their sick to them and they did not fail to treat them. When they were investigated, some of them said that it was not true that they were doctors. They were sent to the commander with the suspicion that they were spies and helping the enemy of religion. The drugs they were carrying added to the suspicion surrounding them, and their claims were questionable. When they were investigated, it was found that they had been appointed by the Muscovites in the guise of doctors to give poisonous drugs and deadly ointments to the servants of God.[61]

Hygiene and disease were among the main concerns of the eighteenth-century armies, which made physicians all the more valuable in the eyes of the soldiers and their commanders. Yağlıkçızâde himself frequently mentions his health in his correspondence with the Sultan. In a letter written in Hantepesi in June 1769, the Grand Vizier informed the Sultan that

> I was quite ill when we left İsakçı. The chief physician of the army gave me the wrong prescription because he did not know your slave's constitution. I had to turn myself to the doctor from Chios who knows your slave's constitution. My illness was cured with a three-day prescription of bitter boiled rhubarb.[62]

Physicians had easy access to high-ranking Ottoman officials; Yağlıkçızâde's letter makes it clear that they were welcome and needed in the army. In fact, Harun Küçük's work showed not only how Ottoman perspectives of medicine as a field changed and influenced Ottoman attitudes toward natural philosophy, but also how physicians practicing new/chemical medicine were able to pose as experts and defend their positions by asserting their expertise. Süleyman I had already organized medicine as a field, creating a medical *medrese* system whose graduates were considered part of the *ulama* class.[63] In 1703, when Ahmed III and his chief physician Nuh, a convert of Cretan Greek origin, banned the practice of chemical medicine in the Ottoman capital, they demanded expertise and certification: 'Those whose skill [*hazakat*] and virtue are clear are to report to the most felicitous scholar among scholars, Nuh, who is serving as the chief physician at a level of authority equivalent to that of the chief judge of Rumelia [Ottoman Europe], for a sealed certificate.'[64] The rebuttal was also based on arguments about expertise: 'The chemical works that the authors had the audacity to present to the Sultan invoked expertise (*hazakat*) and natural-philosophical (*hikmet-i tabiyye*) and medical training as proper qualifications for a physician – which, the authors implied,

61 Enveri 2000, 21–2.
62 BOA, TSMA.e 516/52, 9 Safer 1183 (14 June 1769, catalogue date).
63 Küçük 2020, 66–9.
64 *ibid*., 274, footnote 1. In his thesis Küçük translated *hazakat* as expertise: Küçük, 2012, 120.

could be judged only by other physicians, not by the ruler or his Chief Physician.'[65] In the end, Ahmed III issued a decree that allowed physicians of different theoretical persuasions to practice in the capital. In Küçük's words, 'the edict refers to the marketplace physician, who may or may not have any formal training, as someone whose main occupation is prescribing drugs.'[66] A physician was supposed to prove himself by his experience and practice, not by formal education. Perhaps, the Grand Vizier's choice of doctor can also be read along these lines; the fact that the chief physician could not cure him did not make him less of an expert, but Yağlıkçızâde still chose to find another practitioner who proved his expertise to him by curing him.

In another letter, the Grand Vizier thanks the Sultan for the delivery of a medical paste.[67] However, his illness was not cured, as he explains in a letter in August:

> [the illness] has subsided in the last few days, thanks to the benefit of my master's blessing. The weak body of your slave has seen some comfort after the doctors were sent away. Your well-wisher, the army judge, is also quite ill, and haemorrhoids have made everyone weak, and many have gone to the plane of permanence because of this illness.[68]

Apart from the ambiguous attitudes towards the expertise of physicians in the letter of this sick and tired man, he gives us only one elite's perception of what a physician was. On the contrary, Enveri's account above reflects the perceptions of the common soldiers, and other accounts add more flair to the story of the Venetian physicians.

Athanasios Ypsilantis, another observer in the army, mentions the same physicians and notes that they were from Corfu. He notes that the Grand Vizier was suspicious of them, so they were tortured; to save themselves, they made up a story about their connections with Šćepan Mali, the de facto ruler of Montenegro whom the Ottomans considered a Russian agent. Ypsilantis also notes that the Grand Vizier saw this story as proof of the Orthodox Patriarch's connection to the rebellion in Montenegro and ordered a search of the Patriarchate.[69] Thus, what initially appeared to be a question of expertise and credentials quickly became a question of security, linking actors as diverse as the Russian empress, the rebel king of Montenegro, and the Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople.

The Grand Vizier's letters to the Sultan show how much closer Ypsilantis' account was to reality than that of the army's official chronicler. Yağlıkçızâde mentions that the dragoman of the imperial council found a letter from Šćepan Mali among the doctors' belongings, and it was the dragoman who interrogated them and made them talk. Then they made up the story about the Patriarch's connection with the Montenegrins while they were held in the Edirne dungeons, possibly under torture. Four days later, the Grand Vizier wrote another letter to the Sultan, explaining how nicely he had treated

65 *ibid*., 122.
66 Küçük 2020, 162.
67 BOA, TSMA.e 516/58.
68 BOA, TSMA.e 145/19, 3 Rebiülahir 1183 (6 August 1769).
69 Ypsilantis 1870, 439.

one of the doctors named Corci, telling him that despite his claims, Šćepan Mali was not found in the Patriarchate. The doctor continued to insist on the truth of his assertions, and even claimed that he would find Šćepan himself if he were sent to the Ottoman capital. Four days later, the Grand Vizier reported that the doctors were still insisting on their claims. He told the Sultan that they would be sent from İsakçı to the capital and advised that they be brought face to face with the Patriarch, that he might distinguish friend from foe.[70]

Interestingly, the Grand Vizier never stops referring to the Venetians as doctors. He does not even question their credibility. These doctors were most likely Venetians of Greek origin, hence the interest shown in them by Ypsilantis and also their entanglement in a controversy involving the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople. It is quite likely that they were educated in Padua, a popular destination for Greeks in the Venetian and Ottoman domains. It is therefore not very surprising that the dragoman of the imperial council, Nikolaos Soutsos, goes through their papers, possibly looking for diplomas. However, the nature of the letter that Yağlıkçızâde claims that Soutsos found among them is unclear. It seems that the problem was not the credentials of these doctors at all.

The Grand Vizier and the grand dragoman were concerned about possible links to a rebel leader. Ypsilantis, himself a mid-ranking dragoman and a physician, had a take that was much closer to reality than that of the official chronicler of the army, Enveri Efendi. The latter immediately turned the question into one of medical credentials. His version must have been closer to the rumours circulating in the army itself. As far as the common people of the army were concerned, two foreigners who claimed to be doctors appeared and disappeared shortly thereafter. The explanation that the common members of the army for the disappearance was a challenge to the doctors' claim to be experts. Moreover, to the common soldier, the doctors turned out to be Russian spies. Even worse, they had come to poison and kill Ottoman soldiers. Experts in wartime had to walk a fine line between relying on their credentials and navigating elite and popular expectations of what their expertise entailed and where their loyalties lay.

Unfortunately, we have no information as to whether the Grand Vizier found a way to test these doctors. The fact that the grand dragoman found papers on them that started a whole new line of investigation may point to the existence of diplomas, letters of reference, and the like. However, there is not much evidence that would allow us to pursue this line of thought. What we do know is that two Venetian doctors of Greek origin appeared in the army camp in Edirne and that their appearance raised rumours and questions about their expertise and allegiances. They were treated as possible sources of sedition.

70 TSMA.e, 516/17.

6. Conclusions

In this paper, I have presented several images of the Ottoman army of 1769 in which questions of expertise came to the fore. Expertise is generally portrayed as an asset that can help states advance their interests. Moments like 1769 present an alternative picture in which expertise can be a problem in itself. It functions, or wants to function, as a passport that opens the doors to a military structure. The casesof the Marquis de Bonneval, the Polish adventurer who offered his services, or the Venetian Greek doctors who set up shop in Edirne, underline how a claim to expertise initiates a negotiation. In all of these cases, the claims are taken at different levels of seriousness. The Ottoman elite is anxious to protect the proper power structure; therefore, they do not allow Bonneval a command position; but they are fine with entertaining the employment of the Polish adventurer and the Venetian Greeks.

The reactions of the Grand Vizier show how the claim is almost always challenged based on a real concern about the emergence of sedition that might emanate from the person of the expert. This concern also seems to have been at the heart of how the Ottomans themselves, at least the Grand Vizier who commanded the army, perceived expertise. The commander of the Ottoman army was the one who had to prevent sedition, either from disgruntled groups of soldiers, or from unfounded news that arrived in the army, or from people who joined the army claiming to be some kind of expert. Military expertise was thus closely tied to ideas of power structures and order, and it had to be performed within a structure and culture that dictated political expectations.

Yağlıkçızâde Mehmed Emin Pasha's campaign in 1769 is an important moment to study to understand Ottoman perceptions of military expertise. His reports to the Sultan give us a rare insight into the mind of a Grand Vizier in action. Not only is he a firsthand witness at the top of the army's hierarchy, but he is also standing at a peculiar moment in Ottoman history. The Ottoman Empire had not waged war for almost three decades, and neither the Ottomans nor their rivals were expecting the complete collapse of the Ottoman military system in 1770 on land and at sea. His account, unlike many others that we have in our hands, is not written from the perspective of already having suffered defeat. His letters are written in the moment and perhaps in a hurry in the commander-in-chief's tent in the middle of the Ottoman army. He does not look back at the events trying to make sense of what went wrong, but reflects on the day's events, trying to make his sultan happy with his service. They reflect a conversation about proper conduct as commander-in-chief between the two most powerful men in the empire.

Their uniqueness is also their weakness. These reports reflect the opinions of only one man, regardless of his rank. They are written in a defensive manner; they can be read as the testimony of a person justifying himself. After all, Yağlıkçızâde was far away from the Sultan, and even if one accepts my account of the Ottoman army as a capital on the move, it is still clear that Mustafa III had the final say. Political factions in Istanbul were working against the Grand Vizier, and he had to defend himself. The sultan could and did dismiss the commander-in-chief; the sultan could and did execute Yağlıkçızâde. So, these letters are far from objective. But his perspective is still useful

because one of the underlying arguments of this paper is just that: expertise is highly contextual.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the editors of this volume, Barbara Henning, Taisiya Leber and Ani Sargsyan as well as Aysel Yıldız for their invaluable comments. The final opinions and errors in this paper are, of course, those of the author.

Bibliography

Unpublished Primary Sources

T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri (Osmanlı Arşivi), Istanbul

Cevdet Hariciye (C.HR) 63/3104
Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi Evrak (TSMA.e) 145/18, 145/19, 516/5, 516/17, 516/41, 516/52, 516/58

ISAM Kütüphanesi, Istanbul

Kısmet-i Askeriye Şeriye Sicilleri (KA), 316.

Secondary Sources

Agoston, Gabor. 2008. *Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Aksan, Virginia. 1993. 'The One-Eyed Fighting the Blind: Mobilization, Supply, and Command in the Russo- Turkish War of 1768–1774'. *The International History Review* 15.2. 221–238.
– 1998a. 'Mutiny in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Army'. *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 22.1. 116–125.
– 1998b. 'Whatever Happened to the Janissaries? Mobilization for the 1768–1774 Russo-Ottoman War'. *War in History* 5.1. 23–36.
– 2001. 'Enlightening the Ottomans: Tott & Mustafa III'. In Çaksu, Ali (ed.). *International Congress on Learning and Education in the Ottoman World* Istanbul: IRCICA. 163–174.
– 2002a. 'Manning a Black Sea Garrison in the 18th Century: Ochakov and Concepts of Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Context'. *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 8. 63–72.
– 2002b. 'Breaking the Spell of the Baron de Tott: Reframing the Question of Military Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1760–1830'. *The International History Review*, 14.2. 253–277.
– 2012. 'Ottoman Military Power in the Eighteenth Century'. In Davies, Brian (ed.). *Warfare in Eastern Europe, 1500–1800*. Leiden: Brill. 315–347.
– 2013. *Ottoman Wars, 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged*. New York: Routledge.

Lenman, Bruce P (ed.). 2013. *Military Engineers: The Development of the Early Modern European State*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Martykánová, Darina. 2016–17. 'Les ingénieurs entre la France et l'empire ottoman (XVIIIe XXe siècles) : un regard mosaïque pour une histoire croisée'. *Quaderns d'Història de l'Enginyeria* 15. 159–182.

– 2020. 'Science and Technology in the Ottoman Language of Power (1790s–1910s). Rethinking the State, the Economy, and the Elites'. *European Journal of Turkish Studies* [Online] 31. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ejts/6937 ; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/ejts.6937 (last accessed 26 October 2023).

Murphey, Rhoads. 1983. 'The Ottoman attitude towards the adoption of Western technology: the role of the *efrenci* technicians in civil and military applications'. In Dumont, P. and Bacque-Grammont, JP. (eds.). *Contributions à l 'histoire économique et sociale de l'empire ottoman*. Louvain: Editions Peeters. 287–298.

Sievert, Henning. 2013. 'Eavesdropping on the Pasha's Salon: Usual and Unusual Readings of an Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Bureaucrat'. *Osmanlı Araştırmaları / The Journal of Ottoman Studies* XLI. 159–195.

Spyropoulos, Yannis. 2019. 'Janissary Politics on the Ottoman Periphery (18th–Early 19th c.)'. In Sariyannis, Marinos (ed.). *Political Thought and Practice in the Ottoman Empire. Halcyon Days in Crete IX: A Symposium Held in Rethymno, 9–11 January 2015*. Rethymno: Crete University Press. 449–481.

Spyropoulos, Yannis and Yıldız, Aysel. 2022. 'Pseudo-Janissarism (*Yeniçerilik İddiası*) in the Ottoman Provinces (with Special Reference to Adana): Its Emergence and Its Geographic and Socio-Economic Aspects'. *Cihannüma Tarih ve Coğrafya Araştırmaları Dergisi* 8.1. 9–54.

Şakul, Kahraman. 2001. 'Ottoman Artillery and Warfare in the Eighteenth Century'. MA thesis, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul.

– 2013. 'Military Engineering in the Ottoman Empire'. In Lenman, Bruce P. (ed.). *Military Engineers: The Development of the Early Modern European State*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 179–201.

Talbot, Michael. 2017. 'A Legal and Diplomatic Justification of the Ottoman Declaration of War against Russia, 1768: Legitimizing War within the Ottoman Empire'. *Sharia Source at Harvard Law School*. URL: https://beta.shariasource.com/documents/2924 (accessed 26 October 2023).

Theotoki, Georgios and Yıldız, Aysel. 2018. 'Diffusion of military knowledge in the 17th century Ottoman Empire: the case of Esirî Hasan Ağa's "Advices to Commanders and Soldiers"'. *Mediterranean Chronicles* 8. 105–142.

Trim, D.J.B. 2019. '"Warlike prowesse and manly courage": Martial Conduct and Masculine Identity in Late Tudor and Early Stuart England'. In Woodcock, Matthew and O'Mahoney, Cian (eds.). *Early Modern Military Identities 1560–1639 Reality and Representation*. Cambridge: D.S. Brewer. 25–55.

Woodcock, Matthew. 2019a. 'Introduction'. In Woodcock, Matthew and O'Mahoney Cian (eds.). *Early Modern Military Identities 1560–1639 Reality and Representation*. Cambridge: D.S. Brewer. 1–22.

– 2019b. '"The Breviarie of Soldiers": Julius Caesar's Commentaries and the Fashioning of Early Modern Military Identity'. In Woodcock, Matthew and O'Mahoney, Cian (eds.). *Early Modern Military Identities 1560–1639 Reality and Representation*. Cambridge: D.S. Brewer. 56–78.

Wright, Walter Livingston Jr. 1935. *Ottoman Statecraft: The Book of Counsel for Vezirs and Governors*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

– 2014. 'Mobilization of warrior populations in the Ottoman context, 1750–1850'. In Zürcher, Eric-Jan (ed.). *Fighting for a Living A Comparative Study of Military Labour 1500–2000*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 331–351.
Arif, Mehmed. 1913a. 'Humbaracıbaşı Ahmed Paşa [Bonneval]'. *Tarih-i Osmani Encimeni Mecmuası* 18. 1153–1157.
– 1913b. 'Humbaracıbaşı Ahmed Paşa [Bonneval]'. *Tarih-i Osmani Encimeni Mecmuası* 19. 1220–1224.
Ash, Eric H. 2010. 'Introduction: Expertise and the Early Modern State'. *Osiris* 25.1. 1–24.
Baron de Tott. 1786. *Memoirs of Baron de Tott*. London: G. G. J. and J. Robinson.
Aydüz, Salim. 1998. 'XIV–XVI. Asırlarda Avrupa Ateşli, Silah Teknolojisinin Osmanlılara Aktarılmasında Rol Oynayan Avrupalı Teknisyenler (Taife-i Efrenciyan)'. *Belleten* 62.235. 779–830.
Beydilli, Kemal. 2003. 'MEHMED EMİN PAŞA, Yağlıkçızâde'. *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* 28. 464–465.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 2013. 'Séminaires sur le concept de Champ, 1972–1975'. *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* n. 200. 4–37.
Brummett, Palmira. 1998. 'Classifying Ottoman Mutiny: The Act and Vision of Rebellion'. *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 22.1. 91–107.
Carr, E. Summerson. 2010. 'Enactments of Expertise'. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 39. 18–32.
Çelebi, Kâtib. 2021. *An Ottoman Cosmography*. Edited by Gottfried Hagen and Robert Dankoff. Translated by Ferenc Csirkés, John Curry, and Gary Leiser. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill.
Enveri Efendi. 2000. 'Vekâyinüvis Enverî Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihinin I. Cildi'nin Metin ve Tahlili (1182–1188 / 1768–1774)'. Edited by Muharrem Saffet Çalışkan. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Marmara Uniersity.
Faroqhi, Suraiya. 1994. *Pilgrims and Sultans: The Hajj under the Ottomans 1517–1683*. London/New York: I. B. Tauris.
Ferguson, Heather L. 2018. *The Proper Order of Things: Language, Power, and Law in Ottoman Administrative Discourses*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Finkel, Caroline. 1992. 'French Mercenaries in the Habsburg- Ottoman War of 1593–1606: The Desertion of Papa Garrison to the Ottomans in 1600'. *Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies* 55.3. 451–471.
Gezer, Ömer and Yeşil, Fatih. 2018. 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda "Sürat" Topçuluğu I (1773–1788): Top Döküm Teknolojisi, Bürokratik Yapı ve Konuşlanma'. *Osmanlı Araştırmaları/The Journal of Ottoman Studies* 52. 135–180.
Isom-Verhaaren, Christine. 2022. *The Sultan's Fleet: Seafarers of the Ottoman Empire*. London/New York: I. B. Tauris.
Kaçar, Mustafa. 1995. 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Askeri Sahada Yenileşme Döneminin Başlangıcı'. *Osmanlı Bilimi Araştırmaları* 1. 209–225.
– 1996. 'Osmanlı Devleti'nde Bilim ve Eğitim Anlayışındaki Değişmeler ve Mühendishanelerin Kuruluşu'. Phd Dissertation, Istanbul University.
Karabıçak, Yusuf Ziya. 2022. 'Defending Polish Liberties: A Conceptual and Diplomatic History of the Ottoman Declaration of War on Russia in 1768'. *Ab Imperio* 165–133 .2022.1.
Kaymakçı, Said Salih 2020. 'The Constitutional Limits of Military Reform: Ottoman Political Writing During the Times of Revolutionary Change, 1592–1807'. PhD Dissertation, Georgetown University, Washington, DC.
Küçük, Harun. 2012. 'Early Enlightenment in Istanbul'. PhD Dissertation, University of California, San Diego.
– 2020. *Science without Leisure: Practical Naturalism in Istanbul, 1660–1732*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Yeşil, Fatih. 2017. 'Kara Kuvvetlerinde Avrupalı Danışmanlar'. In Yıldız, Gültekin (ed.). *Osmanlı askerî tarihi: kara, deniz ve hava kuvvetleri, 1792–1918*. Istanbul: Timaş. 113–139.
Yıldız, Aysel. 2018. 'Commanders of the Janissary Army: The Janissary Agas, Their Career and Promotion Patterns'. In Theotokis, Georgios and Yıldız, Aysel (eds.). *A Military History of the Mediterranean Sea*. Leiden: Brill. 397–462.
Ypsilantis, Athanasios Komninos. 1870. *Ta meta tin alosin [After the Fall]*. Constantinople.