

production from which purists categorically disassociate themselves, with vocal and performative features that lead them to criticize it as incarnating an “intemperate or perverted modernization” (91), and even constituting a shorthand for *camorra*. Conscious of this stigmatizing view, members of the scene take part in a subculture that cultivates and thrives on an intense public intimacy amongst the various participants, as exemplified in the phenomenon of “narrowcasting” on local and regional pirate television stations. They display a melodramatic performativity and “mode of attention” (246) which yield an iconicity of style (in Feld’s expression) that is present and wholly homologous in the music and in “real life.” This little universe is saturated with affective-aesthetic effects shared by everyone in the community, whether or not they choose to be more or less entangled with the *camorra*.

One of the most powerful aspects of this ethnography is Pine’s own growing entanglement in this web of relations. He very much enters into a deep play that vividly renders the ethnographic scene for the reader, all the while introducing his own doubts as he documents his socialization into its languages and hermeneutics. This deep play also features the recurring problem of Pine’s own performance as the ethical anthropologist whose very being simultaneously stimulates a host of hopes and desires (as a bridge to all that “America” represents) and suspicions (as a potential police informant or investigative reporter). His presence is rationalized as that of a journalist and documentary filmmaker, until his play deepens further and he circulates as a producer of neomelodica music videos and even an aspiring neomelodica singer.

The book is well crafted and includes the author’s own photos, film stills and other images that enhance the ethnographic text. One wishes that there had been specific references for neomelodica performances available through Internet, or even a DVD with some of the author’s own copious material; the only example provided – a neomelodica music video by the author, referenced with a URL in YouTube – is unfortunately no longer available. A more careful final reading could have eliminated a few slight flaws, such as incongruent endnotes and the numerous Italianisms leaching into the body of the text. The most substantial deficit in this otherwise exemplary ethnography, however, is its failure to engage the writings of those Italian anthropologists who have produced relevant studies, such as the contributors to Amalia Signorelli’s edited volume (*Cultura Popolari a Napoli e in Campania nel Novecento*. 2002), or Stefano De Matteis, who has studied Neapolitan theatre extensively. Although they deal with an eastern Sicilian context, Bernardino Palumbo’s writings (for example, his monographs from 2006 and 2009) are also highly pertinent for a comparable use of a reflexive, embodied ethnography, an attention to questions of illegality, and an analysis of local hermeneutics and epistemology as constructed and revealed through specific communication codes and performance.

A more vigorous treatment of the anthropological literature, both Italian and non, might have brought Pine to deal more directly with an issue that figures only tangentially in the work: the status of culturological exege-

ses of Italy’s Southern Question and organized crime. His subjects are cognizant of the etic criteria by which they are judged, and do not hesitate to adopt the stigmatizing identity of “trash”; indeed, they proffer their own culturological explanations for Neapolitan and neomelodica deficiencies. In the end, Pine seems to suggest, the culturological issue is perhaps not so relevant as are the ways of being, knowing, and surviving by “making do” in this ethnoscape. “If you want to ‘make it,’ you have to leave Naples,” his informants repeatedly tell him. The portrait of child-singer Fulvio, updated as a young man in the “Epilogue,” suggests that an alternative affirmation of personal sovereignty is possible only when one disentangles him- or herself from the affective-aesthetic web of the neomelodica scene, choosing to play a different tune (literally) and a different role in a drama that is no longer *melodrama*. We are left wondering: at what cost? At the same time, like Roberto Saviano at certain points of his worldwide bestseller “*Gomorra*” (Milano 2006, but also as in some of the recent anthropological literature on corruption, such as the edited volume by Nuijten and Anders, *Corruption and the Secret of Law*. Farnham 2007), Pine hints at the legal-ethical ambivalences of the wider world beyond Naples, which, even as it performs chastity and rational superiority, casts off its own culpability on the usual “trash” suspects whom it judges with denigration.

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Rabinow, Paul, and Anthony Stavrianakis: *Demands of the Day. On the Logic of Anthropological Inquiry*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013. 127 pp. ISBN 978-0-226-03691-5. Price: \$ 22.50

This is a more troubling, possibly important, book than first appears. Easily dismissed as yet another of Rabinow’s unsatisfying or even failed fieldwork experiences (Morocco, Iceland, synthetic biology), despite its labored, irritated (indeed angry, *thumos*) and irritating style, it raises profound questions about the bad faith with which ethics has been incorporated in science policy. It should be read alongside the emerging literature on the chilling effects of IRBs (Institutional Review Boards) on the social sciences, threatening to domesticate them into protocols that only produce answers to prerecognized questions, and that, under the guise of protecting human subjects, primarily protect powerful institutions from liability (Zachary 2010, van den Hoonaard 2011). One wonders if this essay will communicate as clearly as did his classic “Making PCR. A Story of Biotechnology” (Chicago 1996).

The central problem addressed is getting beyond the limitations of the ELSI (ethical, legal, and social) framework that was established under the Human Genome Project. Bioscientists are disciplined by two metrics of success – commercial and amelioration of health; a third metric is excluded: flourishing. Unfortunately, Rabinow provides no access to what flourishing might mean or how it might be a “metric.” This is precisely where a genuine interest in the worlds of new discovery in biology might be of help, but Rabinow instead looks back to the philosophy of Aristotle. Living the good life, flourishing, having

time for family, is important; the rat race of competition in science constrains these, but many of us and scientists do live the good life.

Several things are particularly promising in Rabinow's effort to review why social scientists often have so much trouble engaging bioscientists. First is his triad of how to stage accounts of the biosciences: theatrical, curatorial, and cinematographic. Theatrical is the face-to-face passionate and affective engagements privileging the actors in a scene (62). Unfortunately, Rabinow says he has given up on the effort at dialogue, because he is received with indifference or hostility. That might be because he claims that his NSF mandate "demanded a change of habits on the part of the bioscientists." NSF (National Science Foundation) removes him instead because he has not sufficiently focused on biorisks though he blames his MIT colleagues. As collaboration is a "major site of breakdown," he retreats to the "haven" of his office to diagnose. Curation, the setting of things out in a way that they can be analyzed, is more distanced, less contentious, but it separates knowledge from care. The *Bildung* or training of scientists similarly focus on curation and separates things and scientists from social and affectual implications. So for Rabinow the most satisfying route out of his purgatory seems to be cinematographic, the auteur holding the camera, creating connections for the viewer, showing how social scientists are marginalized. This is perhaps not ideal given Rabinow's interventionist ambitions, but better than just feeling angry for being ignored, or submitting to Habermasian rational debate (too few people, too little efficacy) or to public relations on behalf of or against science.

The triad – theatrical-dialogic, curatorial-objective, and cinematographic-auteurial – aligns with two other triads. First is the effort to distinguish "present," "actual," and "contemporary." Rabinow claims that Michel Foucault "rigorously maintained at least a century's distance from the historical present it was seeking to render contingent" (8), and this "present" needs to be distinguished from the actual and ethics in the contemporary. The actual, an artifact of "reduction into warrantable objects" (11), or a "figured and conceptualized domain" (56), is analogous to the difference between transference and the transference neurosis as a secondary "text" or artifact that makes transference available for psychoanalysis. So, too, the present is a "swarming confusion" which constitutes "the background to experience and knowledge", and is present as medium for experience and observation (11, 56). The contemporary is "a moving ratio of modernity moving through the recent past and near future in a (non-linear) space that gauges modernity as an ethos already becoming historical" (11), to compare Derrida's postings among past, present, and future modernities.

A third triad also aligns: collaboration, *Bildung*, remediation. Collaboration (dialogue, theater) is a site of breakdown; *Bildung* separates the self from caring for others; leaving remediation as a possible way out. Although Rabinow does not mark the difference remediation is both, changes in media (the web) and pointing out what people are not seeing. No single website is suffi-

cient; an ecology of websites should be restricted, curated, moderated, targeted.

Rabinow ruefully admits, "despite our reflections on power relations ... [a]ttention to power would have entailed much more extensive networking." His theaters of intervention – studios with graduate students, his ARC website, and the nanotechnology project with Arizona State – "were too limited." "We were insufficiently attentive to the fact that our [scientist] colleagues were keenly aware of the need to do networking and publicity and to keep within the cycles of funding and credit" (27). Even if the naivete is a *Haltung*, a stance for dramatic effect, it is astonishing, and explains why the bioscientists were indifferent if not hostile to Rabinow's demands that they act otherwise: the next grant is due, lest the lights are turned off.

At the center of science and ethics questions is the nature of publics and the aporias of "preparedness" for non-calculable futures in non-anticipatable forms. How this differs from the precautionary principle (prudential at best, obstructionary at worst) might have been worth addressing. Like Latour before him, Rabinow has rediscovered John Dewey's understanding that publics come into being when the work of experts and planners goes awry. Publics are responsive, not preexisting. It is thus a profound misunderstanding to expect to be able to poll public opinion on something like nanotechnology, particularly, as Rabinow admits there have been no significant adverse events in nanotechnology or synthetic biology (63). Journalists try to find stories about corruption or danger. Despite claiming not to engage in such scandal mongering, Rabinow tells about Jay Keasling's potential conflicts of interest, Craig Venter's "Janus-faced" enterprises of non-profit on the West Coast and for-profit on the East Coast, how Obama's Presidential Commission on Synthetic Biology and Ethics framed its job to contain public debate, and how Drew Endy (a former friend and informant) marginalized Rabinow and other social scientists at the 2011 International Synthetic Biology meetings.

Rabinow ends with a call to reflect on a triad of figures: biopower, human dignity, and what he provisionally calls "synthetic anthropos." Perhaps the subject of a future book, for now biopower is only mentioned in passing as the hegemonic metrics of commerce and amelioration that we need to get past towards a "metric" of flourishing. Human dignity is not dealt with, despite its inscription in the German constitution with political consequences that Sheila Jasanoff (2005) has spelled out for the stem cell controversy. "Synthetic anthropos" is the most important. Derrida addressed it early in the Human Genome Project as the ethics of remaining as we were or becoming what we can be. Rabinow wants to engage, but it is not clear that he has the tools in large part, because he has tired of the basic ethnographic collaborative curiosity with bioscientists it would take. He seems to have no research agenda beyond diagnoses and laments that flourishing is not made metric. As he is painfully aware that is not sufficient. Still in person he is a much friendlier fellow than his writings make him out to be.

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