

fektivität der Zwangsinstrumente.⁵⁵ Die politische Zielsetzung der UN-Resolutionen, eine Verhaltensänderung Teherans bei der Urananreicherung zu bewirken, ist in der Tat sehr weitgehend. Die Anreicherung wird inzwischen als ein Anliegen von zentraler nationaler Bedeutung gesehen; auch in der sonst in mehrere Fraktionen gespaltenen Elite im Iran ist sie unumstritten. Der zweite Aspekt betrifft die Frage, inwieweit die Sanktionen die Motivationen beeinflussen können, die hinter Teherans nuklearen Ambitionen stehen. Hierzu gehören hegemonialer Ehrgeiz, regionaler Status, das Prestige, eine komplexe Technologie zu meistern und Sicherheitsinteressen. Sie alle werden mit den wirtschaftlichen Zwangsmassnahmen nicht angesprochen. Und drittens verweist die Forschung auf die Relevanz von Sanktionen für die Machterhaltung des Regimes. Bislang hält der Druck von außen Elite und Bevölkerung (Regimekritiker eingeschlossen) zusammen. Ein nachhaltiger »rally-around-the-flag«-Effekt könnte sich aus heutiger Sicht also durchaus einstellen – und damit genau das Gegenteil von dem bewirken,

⁵⁵ Hufbauer/Schott/Elliott (1990: 38); siehe auch: Dies/Barbara Oegg, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3. Aufl., Washington, D.C. 2007, 159.

was die Sanktions-Allianz politisch beabsichtigt. Diese Auffassung teilen selbst führende Vertreter der Regierung Bush.⁵⁶

Zusammengefasst: Die Sanktions-Forschung kann weder eindeutige noch allgemeingültige Voraussagen für den Einsatz von wirtschafts- und finanzpolitischen Zwangsmassnahmen treffen.⁵⁷ Dennoch liegt mit den vier vergleichsweise gesicherten Ergebnissen ein analytisches Instrumentarium vor, das sich auf den »Fall Iran« produktiv anwenden lässt. Empirisch spricht derzeit wenig dafür, dass es gelingen wird, den Iran durch Sanktionen zu einem Verzicht auf die Urananreicherung zu drängen. Ein Erfolg setzt mindestens voraus, dass sowohl die Europäische Union als auch China, Russland und Indien ihre Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit der Islamischen Republik beträchtlich und nachhaltig einschränken. Die oben genannten drei Aspekte dürften nicht nur dazu dienen, die Entwicklungen in der Islamischen Republik zu beobachten und einzuschätzen. Diese systematische, vergleichende Analyse von Zielländern eröffnet der empirischen Sanktions-Forschung jenseits der einzelnen Fallstudien vielmehr ein weites Feld.

⁵⁶ So R. Nicholas Burns, in: 110/1 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs: Minimizing Potential Threats From Iran: Assessing the Effectiveness of Current U.S. Sanctions on Iran, Hearing, 21.3.2007 (unautorisiertes Transkript), 23.

⁵⁷ Rudolf (2006: 6).

Nuclear Non-Proliferation as a Learning Case for Civil Society Legitimacy

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Abstract: Recent years have seen growing scholarly interest in civil society legitimacy. The present article proposes four normative criteria, namely: independence, transparency, participation, and inclusion, that could be applied to start assessing civil society legitimacy empirically. It does so with reference to the non-proliferation regime, analysing three advocacy NGOs active during the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's review processes – the MPI, the *Friedenswerkstatt*, and the IPPNW. The results give a fairly good picture of CSO legitimacy, but show that what seems to matter most in this regard is organizational culture, rather than organizational structure.

Keywords: civil society, legitimacy, nuclear non-proliferation

1. Introduction

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have sparked a growing interest among scholars and practitioners over the last years (see e.g. Steffek, Kissling et al. 2007). After a period of favourable contemplation, however, civil society

actions meanwhile meet with increasing criticism. CSOs are perceived as the expression of an emancipatory, even resistant civil society (Cox 1999), or, from an opposite standpoint, as servants to (neo)liberal capitalism (for both, see Amoore and Langley 2004; Goonewardena and Rankin 2004), or even as a postmodern amalgam of various, including religious, groupings (Kaldor 2003; Courville 2006: 272). The more CSOs assume power, and the more successful they are in bringing the issues of democracy, accountability and legitimacy of global

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institutions onto the international agenda, the more they are questioned by those (governmental/business) actors who suspect that their own sovereignty or power is shrinking or under attack, and the more they are called upon to live up to the standards they themselves demand. Practitioners from all sides as well as scholars strongly criticize CSOs for not doing so (The Economist 2000; Slim 2002: 2) or structurally not being in a position to do so, given their lack of legitimate representativeness (The Economist 2000; Hirsch 2003) (overview in Reimann 2005). Scandals in the NGO sector severely exacerbate this image (Jordan 2005: 6).

CSOs, but also donors, governments and intergovernmental organizations have meanwhile reacted to this criticism and instigated the establishment of diverse types of accountability mechanisms for the not-for-profit sector, ranging from standards and codes of conduct, monitoring, and reporting obligations to certifications and ratings (Bendell 2006: 55 ff.; Blagescu and Lloyd 2006). However, they seem to have concentrated on expertise, effectiveness and good governance, rather than on democracy and legitimacy (Slim 2002). Nevertheless, legitimacy considerations become more and more vital for civil society success (see Beisheim and Dingwerth 2007). Moreover, legitimacy in general, and democratic legitimacy more particularly, have an intrinsic normative value. This is why academic responses meanwhile encompass normative catalogues and recommendations on democracy, legitimacy and accountability (e. g. Lehr-Lehnardt 2005; Jagadananda and Brown 2006). Elsewhere, I have proposed a normative concept of democratic legitimacy of advocacy CSOs, which builds on a deliberative democratic theory approach (Kissling 2007; see also Bogason and Musso 2006 10-11), and in this context I have developed criteria for empirically assessing civil society legitimacy (see also Collingwood and Logister 2005: 186). The present article constitutes the first empirical application of the proposed approach. It uses the non-proliferation regime as a field of inquiry and analyses different advocacy NGOs active during the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's (NPT) review processes. As a result, it intends to generate hypotheses for the fulfilment of legitimacy criteria of CSOs.

2. A Normative Concept Operating in Real-World Settings

In this article, I suggest operationalizing the deliberative democratic legitimacy model for CSOs by using a catalogue of four normative criteria, namely, (1) independence; (2) transparency; (3) participation; and (4) inclusion (see also Nanz and Steffek 2006)². These minimal criteria are deduced from research on the legitimacy and democracy of international organizations (IOs) (see Steffek, Kissling et al. 2007; Nanz 2002) and start from the premise that CSOs should be assessed alongside similar normative legitimacy criteria that deliberative democratic theory would apply to international organizations. The term 'democratic' refers to the downward dimension of legitimacy (members, supporters, beneficiaries), thus overlooking other (up-

ward/vertical) stakeholders such as donors, governments, other NGOs, or staff, to whom CSOs are also accountable when other dimensions of the concept of legitimacy are considered.

Independence means, first, that CSOs should not be set up by the state or by intergovernmental institutions. Second, beyond this observation, political independence can be measured to some extent by financial independence (see also Martens 2001). Yet, this should be understood in the sense that sponsoring and financing through state or intergovernmental entities and private business interests should not interfere with the free decision-making power of the organization itself. Only if a certain level of independence from state and business interests is secured can CSOs be perceived as the free, genuine expression of societal self-organization, and as immune to co-optation (see Hirsch 2003; Bichsel 1996: 236-238). *Transparency* is about disclosing information to anybody interested in the work of the organization in an uncomplicated, clear, comprehensible, and rapid way. Members, supporters, or beneficiaries of a CSO also have to be able to *participate* in the activities of an organization, though in a decreasing order. Participatory means encompass consultation procedures, partaking in negotiations and decision-making on programmatic and financial decisions, and involvement in policy implementation. Finally, *inclusion* is defined as the involvement of all downward stakeholder voices possibly affected by a policy decision. This criterion has an enabling, capacity-building and empowering component, *i.e.* all potentially disadvantaged groups should be empowered to participate. At the same time it should be pointed out that CSOs, which are all set up to pursue specific goals and purposes, can only be expected to include their clientele or direct constituents, *i.e.* their members, supporters, and beneficiaries, and not indirectly affected populations (for insufficient Southern involvement see Hudson 2000).

With regard to the selection of CSOs for this research endeavour, I propose to analyse the advocacy work of CSOs participating in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review processes. Earlier research has revealed that in the security field the participation of civil society is still limited (Carroll 2002). When it happens, as in the case of the NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings and the NPT Review Conferences (Rev-Con), the contribution of CSOs to the democratic quality of international decision-making remains slight (Kissling 2008). Nevertheless, civil society has participated officially in nuclear non-proliferation review processes since 1994. For a case selection, I follow the approach taken by Dalferth (2007; see also Young 1992; Young, Koenig et al. 1999; Anheier and Themudo 2002). Arguing that the differing power relationships ensuing from various models of organizational structure might affect questions of independence, transparency, participation, and inclusion in different ways, Dalferth suggests differentiating between four types of CSOs with more or less centralized (strategic) decision-making powers: confederations, strong federations, corporate CSOs and centralized CSOs (see Figure 1).

I propose to look first into the work of three different CSOs with fairly distinct organizational structures which might be exemplary for different democratic legitimacy schemes of CSOs, namely, the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI, a confederation), the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

² In a more in-depth case study, a fifth criterion should be added, namely, responsiveness; see Nanz and Steffek (2006).

(IPPNW, a strong federation), and the *Friedenswerkstatt Mutlangen e.V.* in Germany (a national, centralized structure). In a first step, data will be collected through document analyses, including web pages and legal documents, participatory observation, and staff interviews.

3. How Legitimate are CSOs Participating in the NPT Review Processes? – First Empirical Findings


For the present inquiry, MPI was selected as an example of a loose network confederation whose decision-making core remains with the member organizations. Historically, MPI has developed from national CSOs. It is a coalition of eight international advocacy organizations which was set up in 1998 in order to influence and cooperate with the middle power governments united in the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) for nuclear disarmament purposes, but also with a number of NATO states and other like-minded countries. MPI is set up as a program of the Global Security Institute (GSI), one of its member organizations. The *International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War* is a strong federation of medical organizations from 59 countries. It was founded in 1980 to promote research, education, and advocacy relevant to the prevention of nuclear war, and was later expanded to include the prevention of all

wars. In 1985, it received the Nobel Peace Prize. Membership is formal by affiliation of national or regional medical organizations. In addition, there are individual supporters and 40 student chapters, both generally without any rights, however. IPPNW has observer status with ECOSOC and the WHO. Finally, the *Friedenswerkstatt Mutlangen e. V.* is a small German grassroots organization set up at national (local) level and therefore with a centralized organizational structure. The *Friedenswerkstatt* was selected because of its prominence in terms of the mobilization and inclusion of young people into lobbying work during NPT meetings. It was set up in 1992 in order to organize peace-related activities with regard to nuclear disarmament and non-violent conflict resolution as well as to perpetuate its sister organization's past as a peace movement in non-violent opposition to the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Mutlangen in the south of Germany. The organization is mainly active in Germany and has no formal status at the UN. Beside its formal membership of 20 individuals, it has about 60 volunteers (informal members) working for the organization and constituting the deliberate main pillar of its work.

3.1 Independence

How independent are these three organizations from the state, then, and in a sense also from market structures? In fact,

Figure 1: Types of CSO structures on a continuum from federated to centralized (source: Dalferth 2007: 12)



in the context of the NPT review processes, the dichotomy within civil society between arms controllers and abolitionists (Tyson 2004: 60; Johnson 2000), which also extends to nuclear energy (Schlupp-Hauck 2005; Küpker and Schlupp-Hauck 2006; WILPF 2006), has in the past led some representatives of the second camp and some non-aligned diplomats to accuse those of the first camp of being too close to governmental circles, at the expense of their own goals – and to question their legitimacy (Burroughs and Cabasso 1999: 465-467; Johnson 2000: 70, 77). In our example, the small, local organization *Friedenswerkstatt Mutlangen* seems to be least vulnerable to co-optation, immediately followed by IPPNW, while the confederated network of MPI has to be most careful to maintain independent stance. MPI was founded by seven NGOs. However, the initiative came from three individuals one of whom, Douglas Roche, was formerly a Canadian Senator and a Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament and is still close to governmental circles. Financial independence is hard to assess, since the MPI's budget and financial statements are not available to the public³. There are no membership fees, and sponsoring seems to happen exclusively through private donations, grants from foundations, etc. for specific projects, and some public funding for the so-called Art. 6 consultations. Apparently, UN funding and industry contribution do not play a role and there is no single large, dominant donor. Nevertheless, MPI's role and self-perception of its work brings it in a position in which effectiveness must to some extent be traded against a strong independent stance. It often acts in secrecy and behind closed doors in order to adapt to the typical diplomatic environment. In sum, MPI has to keep a vigilant eye on its independence and incorporate hurdles to co-optation in its working structures.

IPPNW, on the other hand, was founded by two cardiologists from the US and the USSR and an Australian paediatrician without any proximity to power and governments. Its constitution stipulates non-partisanship towards all national and other governments and prohibits participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office. Today, about 85 to 95 per cent of its budget consists of private donations and subscriptions paid by affiliates. Very little is raised additionally through grants and special events. Principally, with very few exceptions, the IPPNW receives no government funding. Additionally, the constitution sets a limit for donations from major contributors, be they individuals, affiliates, or organizations, of not more than 30 per cent of the IPPNW's preceding year's total income to IPPNW without Board approval. As a result, there is no single major donor. IPPNW favours, besides the provision of expertise, personal links with high-level decision-makers in order to reach its goals. However, the reason for this is not a strategy of secrecy, but rather IPPNW's goal of professionalism. This approach also extends to the means it uses for contacts, which capitalize on social skills. Since the late 1990s it has used the dialogue method as proposed by the Oxford Research Group in its 'Guide to Achieving Change' (2007 (1999)). This method is an approach towards true deliberation in practical work. It favours dialogue over lobbying or mutual monologue and is understood to facilitate changes in attitudes and perceptions

on both sides. Altogether, IPPNW's focus on its own members and the public at large as well as its rules of conduct keep it at least at some distance to governments.

The *Friedenswerkstatt Mutlangen* was founded in opposition to state interests. The organization was established in 1992 because its sister organization, set up in 1984 to campaign for the removal of the Pershing II missiles, the *Friedens- und Begegnungsstätte Mutlangen*, could not obtain charitable status due to its civil disobedience practice. When the missiles were removed in 1988, the income situation of the *Friedens- und Begegnungsstätte* changed significantly, forcing the organizers to found another organization with charity, but law-abiding status. However, the strong oppositional stance of this new NGO, the Friedenswerkstatt, remained. In the organization's small budget, membership fees account for only about 0.5 to 1.5 per cent of the revenues, while the main bulk comes from private donations (about 35 to 55 per cent) and grants (more than 40 per cent). Other income is generated through participation fees for events or the sale of material, etc. There is one major donor, namely, the *Aktionsgemeinschaft Dienste für den Frieden* (Action Committee Service for Peace, AGDF), an umbrella federation of Christian peace organizations. However, there is no perception of pressure from the AGDF. The organization's only rule of conduct is a common understanding of what the term 'non-violence' means to the organization and its operations – which is obviously very important in order to draw a distinction between oppositional civil disobedience and anti-state violence. Here, a sense of true deliberation comes in, i.e. dialogue procedures based on an understanding of the other's view and solutions to the benefit of all. Altogether, the *Friedenswerkstatt's* strong membership and supporters' appraisal, together with an organizational culture rooted in the peace movement and in oppositional operations, seems to suffice to keep governments or businesses at bay and to forestall any danger whatsoever of co-optation. A common understanding of non-violent dialogue professionalizes those actions which require direct contact with governments.

3.2 Transparency

With regard to transparency, among the three organizations IPPNW fares best, followed by the *Friedenswerkstatt*, while MPI comes last. MPI publishes information in English on its mission, projects, events, news, publications, its political and management structure, and the type and number of its membership on its website. The homepage is clearly structured. The statutes as well as evaluation reports, social audit reports, and specific complaint mechanisms are not published, but probably also do not exist. Likewise, according to comments received, annual reports do not exist either, and financial statements as well as minutes of meetings are not made available to the public. The absence of annual reports is justified by a 'lack of public interest and the amount of time required of our staff since 2002'⁴. This might suggest that the need for transparency is seen, but is conditional on a clear demand from outside the organization. The secrecy about financial statements and minutes can pro-

3 Email response of 20 September 2007.

4 Email response of 20 September 2007.

bably be traced back to MPI's working strategies. Reportedly, the members are better informed than the general public, but not as well as diplomats and governments.

IPPNW presents information in English on its mission, projects, events, news, publications, its political and management structure, and its type and number of membership, i.e. its 59 affiliates, on its website. The Constitution and other rules as well as the annual reports are not published on the website, but can be received upon request. Annual reports are only published irregularly, the last one dating from 2006, and the previous one from 2003. Evaluation reports, social audit reports, and specific complaint mechanisms do not exist. For financial reports, I was referred to the public financial information from GuideStar⁵ which makes accessible the typical US Form 990 for tax exempt status organizations. Here, as well as in the annual report of 2006, revenues and expenses are only stated in general categories. Apart from the detailed budget and audited accounts, I received all information requested fast in a straightforward, clear and comprehensible way. Members, however, are provided with more information than the public.

Finally, the *Friedenswerkstatt Mutlangen* presents information in German and English about its mission, projects, events, news, publications, and cooperating partners on its website. The type and number of the NGO's membership as well as its political and management structure are not made public on the homepage. This is not due to a policy of secrecy, but rather to a highly decentralized project responsibility for website publicity, which sometimes has the disadvantage of some information omitted. Most of the remaining information, such as statutes, activity reports, and the accounts, can be received on request. A budget is not prepared, and evaluation reports, social audits, and specific complaint mechanisms do not exist. The sources of financing can only be traced back according to general categories in the accounts. However, the disclosure of information to the public is fairly straightforward, open, and comprehensible. Volunteers and members receive more information than the public.

3.3 Participation

In the category of participation, we observe that IPPNW fares best, immediately followed by the *Friedenswerkstatt*, whereas MPI performs lowest by far. MPI, in its intra-organizational relations, relies heavily on self-sufficiency. Theoretically, strategic decisions are taken by the Board of MPI, the International Steering Committee. However, in practice, they are mainly the choice of one or two persons who are also in charge of the day-to-day decisions. Apart from this, there seem to be no procedures explicitly serving consultation with members. Interaction with individual members takes place *ad hoc*, but on a regular basis. Yet, the implementation of MPI's policy is not members' business; and an evaluation of MPI's policy does not take place. Clearly, there is an *>elite<* core within MPI which is decisive for policy-making and which also remains responsible for policy implementation. In contrast to member interaction,

consultation with beneficiaries is structured proactively. Yet, beneficiaries are considered to be upward beneficiaries, namely, diplomats and governments. Thus, there is an imbalance between downward membership and upward beneficiary consultation and participation. This was recently felt clearly by members and has led to an internal discussion between them and the network core of individuals driving the actions of MPI about the question whether member access – as perceived by the core – would really weaken effectiveness or whether MPI – as perceived by some members – would be more effective if it followed its own agenda more rather than diplomats' lines of thought.

IPPNW, by contrast, gives privilege and highest authority to its members, as is clearly laid out in its constitution. Thus, the International Council, composed of representatives of the affiliates, is the governing body of IPPNW. Here, members (affiliates) have voting rights, nomination (and nominee) rights for Board positions, and they can submit resolutions. Strategic decisions are taken by the International Council. Day-to-day decisions are determined by the IPPNW Central Office, partly also by the Executive Committee. Yet, according to the rules, member consultation on Central Office activities is considered essential in three specific instances: first, when the Central Office approaches a national government, second, when fundraising is done in an affiliate's area, and third, when a statement affecting an affiliate is to be issued on behalf of IPPNW. Beyond this, communication with affiliates takes place on a frequent basis, although it sometimes remains a one-way flow without the necessary feedback coming from members. Yet, no provisions are made for an evaluation of the activities by members. The importance given to internal discourse is reflected in many paragraphs in the constitution and other IPPNW rules which also stipulate specific communication patterns. There clearly exists an awareness of a trade-off between effectiveness and member access within the organization, but priority is given to member access. For example, the IPPNW Dialogues With Decision-Makers are carried out by doctors (members), even though they are less trained in dialogue techniques than the staff. Nevertheless, sometimes members are unhappy with the way the organization is run. Recently, dissatisfaction with the operation of the Board and a perceived lack of strategy at the international level led to a review process and the *>renewal<* of IPPNW. The discussion was probably sparked off by different views about the organizational type of IPPNW: was it a loose confederation of national affiliate members, or a global campaigning organization? The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), proposed by one affiliate, now serves as a means to strengthen the latter view. In terms of beneficiaries of its policy, ICAN serves as a means to give some voice to victims of radioactive contamination.

Legally, the *Friedenswerkstatt Mutlangen*'s highest authority also accrues to members through the Members' Assembly which takes place every two years and in which members have voting rights. Strategic decisions are taken by the Board, however. Apart from this basic authority of Assembly and Board, decision-making power is delegated on a decentralized basis to projects and the wider community of volunteers. Internal communication takes place without any prescribed patterns.

⁵ www.guidestar.org. (Limited) financial information about MPI can also be found here.

It is perceived to be satisfactory, given the high level of mutual trust and respect between the different groups (Board, project collaborators, members). Yet, there is definitely a trade-off between this high level of constituency access and delegated responsibility on the one hand and the CSO's effectiveness on the other hand. This is visible in a lack of evaluations, such as simple follow-up meetings, which are called for, but usually not conducted. The *Friedenswerkstatt* therefore puts an emphasis on working with committed volunteers for project implementation, rather than increasing its membership base. Nevertheless, there have been occasions when members, supporters, or volunteers were dissatisfied with the decisions taken. In such cases, full discussions take place. Other beneficiaries or affected populations are not consulted.

3.4 Inclusion

In terms of this last criterion, the most disadvantaged downward stakeholders in decision-making in the context of the NPT are certainly representatives from developing countries (see Atwood 2002: 7), but also, secondly, ill or disabled persons, *i.e.* victims of nuclear contamination, especially the atomic survivors (the Hibakusha) suffering from the long-term consequences of the two nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, and in third place, women, indigenous peoples, young people, and other groups. In sum, there seems to be decreasing inclusiveness from the *Friedenswerkstatt* to IPPNW and MPI. MPI does not devote special attention to disenfranchised groups among its members or beyond its membership. Beneficiaries are mainly understood to encompass diplomats and governments, who, however, are not downward stakeholders and are rarely underprivileged.

IPPNW is especially considerate of its members (affiliates) when it comes to contact between the Central Office and national governments, statements on behalf of IPPNW, or fundraising in an affiliate's area. Other positive discrimination and empowerment mechanisms are applied to certain disadvantaged groups among members, for instance young people. Thus, according to the rules, in addition to individual membership rights in affiliates, medical students have the right to be represented on the Board, the Executive Committee and on each affiliate's delegation to the International Council, with the same rights as others, including voting rights. Furthermore, an International Student Fund was set up whose funds are distributed as part of the international IPPNW budget, with a strong emphasis on aiding activity and supporting students from the Global South. At the moment, 3,000 USD per year are allocated for this purpose. Moreover, medical students conduct and take the lead in joint student/IPPNW projects such as the Nuclear Weapons Inheritance Project. In addition, discussions take place with students from different countries in order to incorporate them into the IPPNW doctors' 'Dialogue With Decision Makers' programme. Besides this commitment to youth, the IPPNW rules emphasize a commitment to gender, age, and geographical balance and diversity. In order to ensure the involvement of its geographically diverse membership, the regions are represented by Vice-Presidents on the Board. Moreover, there is a

strong impulse within IPPNW to bring the South in. A debate is currently taking place over whether to set up a fund for travel grants for Southern participants to the Board and international meetings. From time to time beneficiaries, such as patients and other victims (indigenous non-members), are given travel grants by affiliates or the International IPPNW in order to let them speak out and give testimony to their situation. Victims are given a voice in the ICAN Campaign.

Finally, the *Friedenswerkstatt Mutlangen* has a broad policy of including members, but especially also supporters. Inclusion takes place in day-to-day work. Thus, responsibility for project implementation is delegated completely to project collaborators and volunteers. As a grassroots organization, the *Friedenswerkstatt* is the only one of the three NGOs examined with such a strong non-member supporter-empowerment approach, which progresses smoothly onto beneficiaries' empowerment. Thus, young people, as self-responsible participants of projects and voluntary supporters of the *Friedenswerkstatt*, are also seen as the ones who would benefit most from the abolition of nuclear weapons. For this disadvantaged group, many projects are organized, and grants are sought and disbursed in support of young people. But beneficiaries' empowerment sometimes also goes beyond the circle of people who in some way or the other can still be associated with a supporters' circle. For example, when international delegations were put together in the past, travel grants were sought to include other persons such as, more recently, two young women from Belarus, a country with whom the *Friedenswerkstatt* has a youth encounter program.

4. Discussion of Results

If we now summarize the results of all four criteria, the three CSOs perform as follows:

	Independence	Transparency	Participation	Inclusion
Best	Friedenswerkstatt	IPPNW	IPPNW	Friedenswerkstatt
Second	IPPNW	Friedenswerkstatt	Friedenswerkstatt	IPPNW
Last	MPI	MPI	MPI	MPI

With regard to independence, the small, local but centralized *Friedenswerkstatt* fares best. This can probably be attributed less to its centralized structure than to its local grassroots anchorage. Moreover, the *Friedenswerkstatt* has diverse resources at its disposal and an organizational culture which, by virtue of its oppositional stance, is not prone to governmental appropriation. The confederated MPI, by contrast, does not rely on numerous resources. MPI's example in fact offers an indication of the kind of source that would render CSOs most independent from governmental and other influences, namely, through membership contributions. MPI has decided not to draw on membership contributions, but nevertheless to organize costly high-level consultations and journeys, which makes it most vulnerable. IPPNW, on the other hand, mainly relies on mem-

bership dues. While membership fees admittedly constitute a negligible share of the *Friedenswerkstatt's* budget, it does have a large supportership. It can be argued that a CSO whose costs for projects and activities outweigh its membership and supportership income (that is, including donations), and which carries out global programmes perceptible to a high-level global leadership, does and must attract public and/or business sponsoring, and is thus most prone to dependency on public or business interference. A strong grassroots approach, including sponsoring through members and supporters, local organization, and an oppositional positioning, works in the other direction. Thus, the vital components in this respect are the financial and activity structures and organizational culture.

As to the transparency criterion, neither the most federated NGO, namely, MPI, nor the most centralized, i.e. the *Friedenswerkstatt*, are very transparent, though for different reasons. MPI has chosen a secretive policy on strategic grounds, and to make transparency contingent on demand, while the *Friedenswerkstatt* suffers from the trade-off between policy decentralization and effectiveness. To some extent, transparency also depends on personalities. By contrast, size and networking do not seem to be an obstacle with regard to transparency. IPPNW, as a pretty large organization that is highly involved in networking, performed best on the transparency scale. Hence, organizational culture and personalities appear to be decisive for transparency.

In terms of the third criterion, namely, participation, the first two organizations were very close, while MPI lagged far behind. MPI, the most confederated CSO, definitely has an *«elite»* core of policy-makers. Here, decisions are taken without in-depth consultations with the autonomous units of the confederation. Only IPPNW shows a high level of proactive member inclusion which is to a large extent legally anchored, whereas the *Friedenswerkstatt* gives preference to supporter involvement. External, downward stakeholder consultation (victims) is only practised by IPPNW. Yet, all this seems to be a result of working structures and the individuals populating the organization, i.e. a result of organizational culture, rather than of organizational structure. Nor does size seem to be crucial to participation. The large MPI fared much worse than the small *Friedenswerkstatt*, while IPPNW came off best. Finally, decentralization of work (not of structure) to the local level (Lansley 1997: 223, 236-237) definitely appears to play a role to some extent. Thus, the grassroots approach of the *Friedenswerkstatt* has a decentralizing and at the same time empowering component. This probably has to be coupled with a proactive, at best even legally anchored, participatory approach, rooted in within the organizational culture.

Finally, regarding inclusion, the small grassroots organization, the *Friedenswerkstatt*, fares best, while MPI takes the last position in this fourth category too, demonstrating no inclusiveness at all. Nevertheless, even the *Friedenswerkstatt*, with its unique supporter-beneficiary outreach, could improve on inclusiveness by giving more attention to its own members. IPPNW could consult more extensively and could further facilitate participation from the South. None of the three CSOs carries out evaluations. Altogether, inclusiveness seems to depend less on structures or legalization, and more on actual day-to-day

practice as part of the organizational culture, which is best represented by a grassroots approach here.

5. Conclusion

From the empirical evaluation of our criteria, which has taken three different CSOs active in the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a reference point, we were able to draw several important conclusions. First, the overall picture of CSO legitimacy is fairly positive in our case, with one exception, namely MPI. Transparency, followed by inclusion and participation are the criteria most in need of improvement. Second, federated structures are not necessarily an advantage in terms of democratic legitimacy criteria. Third, structure does not seem to have decisive influence on legitimacy, but organizational culture does. Thus, a grassroots approach is especially well suited to compliance with respect to three out of the four criteria, namely, independence, participation, and inclusion. Proactive behaviour seems to be particularly favourable for participation and inclusion, but legal anchorage is needed for the former. Independence is best secured by an oppositional standing, by funding primarily through contributions by members and supporters, and by the local organization of projects. A preliminary working hypothesis for further research could therefore be the following: Organizational culture (see Schein 2001 (1993): 373-374) and working patterns, including in some instances financial and activity structures, as well as personalities are what matters most for the legitimacy of CSOs.

Certainly, the present investigation is a limited one, not only regarding the organizations under scrutiny, but also concerning the elements examined. Thus, issues such as the structure of individual member organizations, organizational culture in practice, e.g. the quality of management, including the use of conflict mechanisms and sanctions in cases of mismanagement, but also questions of political opportunity or common custom should be the subject of deeper analysis. Staff interviews should be complemented e.g. by member interviews. Nevertheless, organizational culture seems to influence compliance with legitimacy standards even in those instances which at first glance appear to be mere factual decisions, such as finances, activities, or legal rules. Its effects work at group level, but, as Chambers (1996: 241) acknowledges, *«[p]olicies, procedures, and organizational cultures are determined by individuals, especially those in positions of power.»* Democratic legitimacy hence also has a psychological dimension which is usually overlooked. Deliberative democracy theory generally concentrates on procedures and procedural justice (see Habermas 1996). It has a tendency to ignore interactional justice, or does not concede a separate quality to it (see Schminke, Ambrose et al. 2000). However, procedures do not work without people. In order to make them work, individual willingness is needed to listen, to learn, and to change perspectives. Thus, a second working hypothesis could be that the democratic legitimacy of CSOs can be enhanced by improving the observable action and the social skills of individuals, including, where necessary, personal change.

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Frieden hören. Über Friedensphantasien und die Angebote von Komponisten und Komponistinnen¹

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Abstract: How does peace resound in music? Neither peace research nor musicology have done much to answer this question. This contrasts strikingly with the fine arts, where there exists a considerable iconography of peace. Setting out from this astonishing state of affairs, a broad survey of the contribution of composers to the ›peace problematique‹ is presented, ranging from the late Middle Ages to the present day. The wide range of pieces considered include some that can be considered early works of warning, battle music, which was quite prominent for several centuries. There are also pieces that illustrate well the antagonism of war and peace. As much music has been written in the anticipation of peace as to celebrate the end of war. In the 20th century, antimilitary music of a high standard was written alongside works mourning the devastation caused by violence and war. Ultimately, peace itself calls for a positive message and a matching aesthetic. Composers have very often made use of literary texts such as poetry to avoid the risk of Arcadian banalization of the subject matter.

Keywords: Friedensphantasien, Musikangebote über Krieg und Frieden, Klassische Musik

Kriegswirklichkeit und Friedenshoffnung haben seit jeher Komponisten zu Werken inspiriert, denen man jenes Motto voranstellen könnte, das Ludwig van Beethoven über seine *Missä solemnis* (1819-23), einen der Höhepunkte in der musikalischen Friedensfürbitte, setzte: »Von Herzen - möge es zu Herzen gehen«. Das Motto unterstellt die Möglichkeit einer Gleichgestimmtheit bzw. Seelenverwandtschaft zwischen Komponist und Hörer. Kompositionen sind in

solchem Verständnis ein Angebot; der Hörer figuriert dann als Empfänger, als Resonanzboden. Die Vermittlung kommt über ein »Musikereignis« - eine Sinfonie, eine Oper, Kammermusik, ein Kunstlied usf. - zustande.

Aber es gibt nicht nur solche Angebote von außen, die entsprechende Stimmungslagen provozieren wollen. Denn alle verbinden mit Krieg und Frieden, aber insbesondere mit der Idee des Friedens und mit Friedenshoffnung eigene Gedanken und Gefühle. Das jeweilige persönliche Friedensverständnis wird von solchem »Alltagsbewusstsein« - Assoziationen und Emotionen - tiefgründig geprägt. Es ließe sich in diesem Zusammenhang von subjektiven »Friedensphantasien« sprechen.

1 Zitate und genaue Angaben über Werke, auf die verwiesen wird, finden sich - ergänzt um eine Vielzahl weiterer einschlägiger Kompositionen - belegt in Dieter Senghaas: *Klänge des Friedens. Ein Hörbericht*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag 2001 (edition suhrkamp 2214).

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