

marked as *axis mundi* (107, 117). While the first part of his argument is an interesting hypothesis that forces us to reconsider the current interpretation of holes as practice of ritual killing of dishes before their entombment, the second part of his reasoning weakens his initial argumentation. Why should there be a quincunx space (plate, vessel) being established within a quincunx space (grave)? His argument is further complicated as he then declares perforated vessels not only as quintessential symbols of rebirth and resurrection but also as a kind of tool to exchange heat from the head as a “seat of senses and the locus of vitality” and/or to establish “further communication with the dead” (121). Moreover, he points out that plates or vessels with holes are sometimes placed either over the abdomen or the head (126).

Another argument that lacks empirical foundation is to link the practice of child sacrifice (as a form of substitution or *k'ex* for someone's soul or body) to the myth of the so-called Baby-Jaguar as displaced on certain types of painted vessels from the Late Classic. Although Scherer himself remarks that the connection between them is in the case of one vessel out of four, his reference is unclear (145), he correlates the decline of child sacrifice in Tikal precisely at the start of the Late Classic with the decline of textual references to the baby-jaguar (153). Although he interprets other objects like pyrite mirrors in graves as tools to facilitate the soul journey (135), one misses a discussion of other objects or practices associated with human burials like frequently accompanying deer bones or the knotting or binding of dead kings and their veneration in buildings or temples (D. Grana-Behrens, *Death and Deer Riding among the Ancient Maya of Northwest Yucatán, Mexico*. In: T. Stanton [ed.], *The Archaeology of Yucatán*. New Directions and Data. Oxford 2014: 3–20).

Chapter 4, “The Mortuary Landscape” discusses the meaning and importance of dead bodies in ancient Maya society. In particular, Scherer challenges Patricia McAnany's (*Living with the Ancestors. Kinship and Kingship in Ancient Maya Society*. Austin 1995: 8) interpretation that ancient Maya ancestor veneration served to legitimize land claims because then they should have shrines in the fields like the ancient Chinese (175, 181). He also criticizes McAnany for centering too much on resource rights for which she claims that ancestor veneration was the control mechanism. To the contrary, Scherer provides here a new insight as he claims that domestic inhumation might be the instrument to facilitate “control over the rites of veneration” rather than to “map access to resources” (175). Hence, in his view, burying the dead within domestic complexes says more about claims to legitimize rights *within* the lineage rather than *among* lineages. But he also states that the practice of domestic inhumation was not so much important compared to other aspects of veneration, as it was abandoned shortly after the Spanish conquest (178).

Another aspect that Scherer discusses in chap. 4 is the orientation of dead among the Classic Maya. He provides evidences that Maya sites like Palenque, Piedras Negras, and Tikal oriented their dead towards north (between 12 and 120 degrees East of North) in the Late Classic, where-

as Yaxchilan preferred an east-west orientation. He tries to explain the northern orientation as something equivalent to the modern Tzeltal concept of maximum heat in the north (by sunset) and equates this region with the location of “flower mountain” in ancient times (197).

In sum, Scherer's book is worth to be read, as he challenges rusty and stuck-up pattern and interpretation of ancient Maya mortuary practices. His ethnographic approach applied to his empirical data sets of burials and his iconographic and epigraphic consideration opens up some new insights and hypothesis for future investigations.

Daniel Grana-Behrens

Schmitz, Michael, Beatrice Kobow, and Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.): *The Background of Social Reality. Selected Contributions from the Inaugural Meeting of ENSO*. Dordrecht: Springer, 2013. 251 pp. ISBN 978-94-007-5599-4. (Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, 1) Price: \$ 159.00

Since the very beginnings of philosophy, the problem of the social has been discussed, to recall, e.g., Plato's “Republic,” Aristotle's “Politeia,” and Cicero's “De re publica” – all of them have to consider social ontological questions like relations between social groups (state) and individuals (citizens) in context of political action and legal normativity. The debates were continued in the Middle Ages (status of communities) and in modernity (various readings of social contract) to reach its more scientific formulation at the dawn of sociology (Marks, Durkheim, Simmel, Weber). The main problem discussed might be spelled as: How is society possible? What human groups consist of? How are they composed? What are the emergent properties of individual actions which approach? Or may we reduce a group to its constituents? Which approach to social ontology is the right one? The individual, emergent, or collective one?

In 1998, a group of scholars started a conference on social action taken from the collective (team) point of view. The first organizers of a workshop on “Collective Intentionalities” were Wolfgang Balzer and Raimo Tuomela (Munich). Since that time every two years there have been conferences organized in Leipzig (2000), Rotterdam (2002), Siena (2004), Helsinki (2006), Berkeley (2008), Basel (2010), Manchester (2012), Bloomington (2014), and in The Hague (2016) to mention some of the hosts. The invited keynote speakers have been John R. Searle, Michael Bratman, Margaret Gilbert, Philip Pettit, Seumas Miller, Georg Meggle, Barry Smith, Kevin Mulligan, and Uskali Mäki among others, and they may be recognised as representatives of the first generation who has started and contributed to the debate in question. The conferences were of a significant interest and expanded in the numbers of participants from meeting to meeting by attracting new generations of younger scholars mostly from all over Europe and North America.

In autumn 2009, at the University of Konstanz there took place a two days conference and the inaugural meeting of the new research group European Network of Social Ontology (ENSO). The network groups the younger

generation of European scholars under the patronage of some senior “founding fathers” like Raimo Tuomela, who generously supports his younger colleagues by creating the new platform to exchange ideas and for mutual cooperation. The book gathered selected contributions presented during the conference, and it reflects the recent developments in social ontology, which tends to go beyond the research framework of received view, i.e., of collective intentionality, but also to allow and to embrace some other perspectives like neo-pragmatist, Hegelian, or critical ones, which characterise more continental approaches to the social.

The book under review originated from the inaugural ENSO conference, containing selections of reworked papers presented there, and consisting of three parts: 1. The Ontology of Groups. Their Minds, Intentions, Actions and Interactions; 2. Into the Background. Capacities and Cases; and 3. Social Reality. Its Essence and Constitution. The book starts with an introductory essay by Beatrice Kobow, “The Cultural Background of Acting Together,” who discusses the recent developments in the new approach to the social: “Three things are particular to the branch of philosophy of society that is called ‘new social ontology’ today: (1) the concern with the collective perspective, (2) the analysis of the sociological structure of reality, and (3) the aim of understanding the evolution of a cultural background” (5). She points out a historical path to the new approach and a landscape of current debates, and sketches the outline of the book.

The first part, “The Ontology of Groups,” consists of five essays which critically evaluate various aspects of the “theoretical framing of collective intentionality.” The first one by Raimo Tuomela, “Who Is Afraid of Group Agents and Group Minds?”, explains his “we-mode” approach to the group and traces some historical contributions of Lazarus, McDougall, Tönnies, and Vierkandt as relevant to the proposed view, and that junction makes this article particularly interesting as introduction for a new social ontology. Hans Bernhard Schmid in his contribution “Trying to Act Together,” focuses on the cognitive and normative views on expectations in cooperation, stressing the problem of trust as affective attitude, and he develops an alternative to contractarian account. Kendy Hess in her “Missing the Forest for the Trees” starts with a skeptical idea about the theoretical relevance of a shared intentions model for many large-scale actions conducted by corporate entities, and develops her thoughts into some more general ones, focusing on challenges to individualism and the possible answer a holist might give. Beatrice Kobow, “The Boys Carried the Piano Upstairs,” considers the notion of *akrasia* and the possibility whether group agents can be interpreted in that term. By claiming that there is no proper way to ascribe for group agents’ property of *akrasia*, she denies that group agents have the ability to be agents in the full sense of the word. Antonella Carassa and Marco Colombetti, “Creating Interpersonal Reality through Conversational Interactions,” discuss whether a (collective) interpersonal reality might be created by individual subjects in everyday life. They consider how joint commitment is a product of differentiating into varying

layers of communicative situations and conversational exchanges between the partners, and link their theoretical analysis with empirical research of joint commitment.

The second part of the book, “Into the Background,” covers various responses to John Searle’s conception of the background, which is one of the key concepts in his social ontological framework. Michael Schmitz, “Social Rules and the Social Background,” claims that the background might be grasped as nonconceptual (against non-representational view) in context of normative aspects, which characterise social practices independently of rules (like in children’s play with a ball). Titus Stahl, “Sharing the Background,” approaches the background in context of the problem of rule following, in particular rule following in institutional contexts. He discusses some shortcomings of Searle’s account against competing conceptions of the background in the writings of Heidegger and Wittgenstein. His claim is that the background of explaining institutional rule-following can only be successful if it includes the actions and intersubjective structures of a shared lifeworld. Ulla Schmid, “From Sharing a Background to Sharing One’s Presence,” presents the phenomenon of joint attention, which appeals to recent research in developmental psychology. Based on the results of that research on Searle’s notion of the background, and some philosophical accounts of joint attention, Schmid tries to elaborate an interactionist understanding of joint attention that sees it as a basic, nonconceptual, and nonrepresentational form of embodied sharing of attitudes. The final background contribution by Werner Binder, “Social Ontology, Cultural Sociology, and the War on Terror,” provides “detailed sociological case studies from the war on terror to show how the collective cultural background is shaped by certain narratives (the ‘ticking bomb scenario’) as well as certain images (the photographs from Abu Ghraib)” (8). The examination might be treated as an empirical test of representational understanding of the background.

The third part of the book, “Social Reality,” discusses the question of the ontological status of social reality in general and of institutions in particular. Olivier Morin, “Three Ways of Misunderstanding the Power of Rules,” contests the accepted distinction between constitutive and regulative rules by suggesting that all rules are constitutive in relation to the practices they regulate. Emanuele Bottazzi and Roberta Ferrario, “Arbitral Functions and Constitutive Rules,” discuss the two concepts in contexts of collective decision-making (discursive dilemma), focusing their attention on overcoming situations of impasses by referring to elements which are “partially extra-contextual with respect to the system itself” (202) and according to the “spirit of the game” (214). The two last contributions by Alessandro Salice, “Social Ontology as Embedded in the Tradition of Phenomenological Realism,” and by Francesca De Vecchi, “Ontological Dependence and Essential Laws of Social Reality the Case of Promising,” relate to the classics of the social and legal philosophy (realistic phenomenology). Both Alessandro Salice and Francesca De Vecchi stress the significance of one of Edmund Husserl’s early students, Adolf Reinach and his “Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law,” for the

modern social ontology, especially that of John Searle. They discuss writings of Reinach by following some ideas of the Polish legal philosopher Czesław Znamierowski's (who applied for the first time the term "social ontology") in context of John Searle's conventionalist account of deontic validity of enactments and rules and the circularity quest. Salice takes a more general approach to the two traditions in social ontology, focusing his attention on historical dependencies and uncovered dependencies between two of them, while De Vecchi focuses her attention on the very concept of promising. The two contributions might be read as examples of a possible fruitful dialogue (in historical dimension) between different traditions in social ontology, which might cooperate, complement each other, and coordinate further investigations.

The book might be an interesting companion to social ontology, not only for professional philosophers or sociologists but also for all who are interested in a variety of aspects of the social. It presents contributions of the younger generation interested in the philosophy of society, in most cases grown in the tradition of collective intentionality, and from the spatial point of view, a significant part of contributors come from European (partially continental) traditions, which may significantly complement analytic/atlantic tradition.

Rafał Paweł Wierzchoślowski

Schütz, Albert J.: *Fijian Reference Grammar*. Honolulu: Pacific Voices, 2014. 454 pp. ISBN 978-1-4992-5788-5. Price: \$ 25.00

In der "Fijian Reference Grammar" von A. J. Schütz ist dem eigentlichen Grammatikteil mit Phonetik, Morphologie und Syntax ein zweiseitiges "Acknowledgement"-Kapitel vorausgeschickt mit den üblichen Verweisen und Danksagungen. Im Anschluss daran folgt eine zehnteilige "Introduction", in der der Autor seine "Reference Grammar" in den allgemeinen historischen Kontext der Arbeiten zum Fiji stellt und dabei besonders das zeitweise unter seiner Leitung stehende "Fijian Dictionary Project" sowie sein Buch "The Fijian Language" von 1985 hervorhebt. Beide können als Vorläufer der vorliegenden Grammatik gelten, oder anders formuliert: die neuerliche Grammatik bildet den Höhepunkt der langjährigen Beschäftigung des Autors mit dem "Fiji". Die Grammatik selbst besteht aus 41 Unterkapiteln, wobei das erste Kapitel der Phonetik und, in einer großen Klammer, die Kapitel 32 bis 40 der Phonologie gewidmet sind.

Als Basis des Grammatikteils figuriert das Kapitel zu den Satztypen (Kap. 2). Es folgt ein Kapitel zur Klassifikation von Wörtern und Morphemen, gefolgt von einer Diskussion des Subjektstatus. Die Kapitel 5 bis 9 beziehen sich vornehmlich auf freie und gebundene Elemente im Verbalbereich. Dazu könnte man auch die Kap. 14 und 18 rechnen. Die Abschnitte 10 bis 12 haben die Verbklassifikation zum Thema. Das Kapitel 13 beschreibt Strategien des Verbklassenwechsels. Die Kap. 19 bis 24 gehen detailliert auf die Nominal-Phrase ein, während die Kap. 26 bis 28, sei es im verbalen oder nominalen Bereich, komplexere Strukturen erfassen wie adverbiale Mo-

difikation und Attribution. Kap. 29 behandelt die Aspekte der Subordination, Kap. 30 ausführlich die Possession.

Als besonders informativ erweisen sich die im Anschluss an einzelne Kapitel angefügten Diskussions-Abschnitte, in denen die Forschungsgeschichte und die Gesamtproblematik der vorausgegangenen Thematik ausführlich erörtert werden. So werden im Unterkapitel 4.10, als Addition zum Thema "Subject", die traditionellen Analysen aus Sicht des Autors zusammengefasst und kommentiert. In ähnlicher Weise – um nur ein weiteres Beispiel von mehreren folgenden zu nennen – sei Unterkapitel 16.6. genannt, wo das in der Austronesistik seit langem akute Problem der Transitivität diskutiert wird. Alle diese sogenannten Diskussions-Kapitel sind wertvolle Beiträge, die auch aus typologischer Sicht willkommen sind.

In diesem typologischen Kontext ist die Präsentation der sogenannten root vs. marker-Distinktion (mit den Extremen root = vale (Haus) vs. marker = i (Präposition für Objekt, cause, etc.) in Gestalt eines Kontinuums zu erwähnen, bei dem zwischen den genannten Polen Morpheme angesiedelt werden, die wegen ihrer Multifunktionalität nicht eindeutig festgelegt werden können. So oszilliert das Lexem *tiko* (stay) zwischen einer Leistung als einfachem Prädikat, und in marker-Funktion als auxiliarem Bestandteil einer komplexen Verbform zum Ausdruck der progressiven Aktionsart. Andererseits ist bei den roots (den "content words") die auch im austronesischen Kontext sehr wichtige Problematik der Nomen-Verb-Distinktion sowie Adjektiv-Verb-Distinktion zu nennen oder gar die einer Nomen-Adjektiv-Unterscheidung. Letztendlich entscheidet der morphosyntaktische Kontext, in welcher Funktion ein morphologisch unveränderliches oder auch sekundär mit Affixen ausgestattetes Wort auftritt. Schütz nennt für den ersteren Fall das Lexem *katakata* "(be) hot", das z. B. in *E katakata na gone* (The child is hot) als Verb die Zuschreibung einer Eigenschaft zu einem Nomen bewerkstelligt, und, versehen mit dem definiten Artikel *na*, in der Funktion eines Nominalisierers in *Sa dua tani na katakata* (The heat is exceptional) das Phänomen "Hitze" bezeichnet (24).

Als Herzstücke der Grammatik erweisen sich die Kapitel 10, 11, 12, 13, 16 und 26, letzteres quasi als deren Quintessenz. Im Gegensatz zu manch anderen Grammatiken wird hier als Basis des gesamten Verbsystems das Thema "Verbklassen" explizit entwickelt. Zugrunde liegt allem eine aktiv-stativ-Unterscheidung, die unter dem Aspekt der Valenz in A1 Verben (aktiv mit einem Aktanten), A2 (aktiv mit zwei Aktanten) vs. S1 (stativ mit einem Aktanten) und S2 (stativ mit zwei Aktanten) weiter gegliedert wird. Auf dieser Basis werden sodann in Kap. 13 orientierungsverändernde Mechanismen erläutert, also z. B. eine Derivation von A2 auf S2.

Man könnte zu dieser Verbklassenthematik möglicherweise die im Diskussionskapitel 16.4.2.1 etwas "versteckten" Fälle mit Ambiguität hinzufügen. Im dortigen Kapitel werden Beispiele wie *E tavo na waga* mit den Lesarten "He drew the canoe" vs. "The canoe was drawn" angeführt. Grundsätzlich werden Lexeme wie *tavo* als S2 eingeordnet, aber es wäre zu fragen, ob nicht doch im Fiji