

ue chain to improve the working conditions of labor and to redistribute wealth allocations to the lower rungs of the chain. In chap. 8, Kate Raworth and Thalia Kidder go beyond the firms operating along global value chains to the workers located at different places along those chains. They study workers in the apparel and in the fresh produce (fruit and flowers) industries, interviewing over 1,300 workers (mostly women) and 95 managers/owners of factories as well as interviews with farm/planation owners and government officials, agents, suppliers, and importers across twelve countries. They document the pressures on workers as a result of these flexible processes of production and the need for multi-stakeholder coordination (government agencies, nonprofits, labor unions) to address these new realities of production. In chap. 9 Julie Guthman describes the politics of ethical food labels and the need to consider the political struggles happening within and between different links of the value chain. In the volume's final chapter, William A. Munro and Rachel A. Schurman compare activists in Britain with those in the United States who have organized against biotechnology firms producing genetically modified organisms (GMOs). When establishing what the vulnerable links are, amenable to political attack, one must also understand cultural factors and political interests that make different forms of engagement and mobilization appropriate and efficacious.

"Frontiers of Commodity Chain Research" provides an opening for political, cultural, and social concerns to be addressed using global value chain analysis. Previous works on commodity chains and value chains cultivated a strong core community, narrowly focused on interfirm relations, committed to the analysis of trade flows and interfirm networks. This volume brings in historical, qualitative, and ethnographic understandings of value chains and how meaningful iterations of buyer-supplier matches and mismatches generate outcomes not yet fully recognized by those engaged in them. The mastery with which the editor discusses the history of the concept and its potential for bringing power, social justice concerns, and culture out of the wilderness and into the core of the global value chains community is matched by the rigor of the studies contained herein. Frederick F. Wherry

Barnard, Alan: *Social Anthropology and Human Origins*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 182 pp. ISBN 978-0-521-74929-9. Price: £ 16.99

Barnard's "Social Anthropology and Human Origins" is a timely, welcome call for the introduction of socio-cultural anthropology to the study of human evolution. Inductive, qualitatively oriented social scientists focusing on human evolution regularly face a number of criticisms and challenges from a variety of sources. These range from accusations of producing functionalist "just so stories" to charges of falsely dichotomizing human nature and culture. Moreover, qualitative research faces the question of legitimacy if it dips into fields dominated by quantitatively oriented researchers employing hypothetico-deductive models of science. In many ways, Barnard's text gets around such concerns by illustrating where tradi-

tional anthropology sheds light on what strictly biological approaches cannot. However, it also leaves itself open to legitimate instances of these charges. Barnard masterfully weaves traditional anthropology throughout his text and for this it can serve its purpose well by stimulating discussion among sociocultural anthropologists. The many examples of cross-disciplinary concerns confirm that, as ever, there is plenty of work to be done and that we need to engage such concerns in order to make any progress. As such, the text is ideal for upper-level undergraduate and prerequisite courses for graduate programs in anthropology, perhaps in tandem with a counterpoint text in evolutionary psychology and human behavioral ecology.

Barnard suggests that there are two major ways in which social anthropology can "contribute to the study of human origins": it can add different "ways of thinking about data from other subjects" and its application of inferences, which is "no different from any other subject" (15). He echoes this proposal in chapters 2 and 3, which focus on primatology and human phylogeny. Barnard doesn't advocate unrestrained inference-making, however, as his well-reasoned and moderate stance on how much contemporary foragers and chimpanzees can actually tell us about human origins suggests. Social anthropologists, however, are limited by their methods. Discussing the (in)compatibility of primatology and the social anthropology of human origins, Barnard identifies one of the above-mentioned problems: primatologists are predominantly quantitatively oriented whereas "many anthropologists ... rely much more on intuition, and are either ignorant or very skeptical (or both) of statistical methods" (29). Barnard, then, sees social anthropology's role as "work[ing] out methodologically a way of introducing entry into normative behavior through observational means" (26). Other options not considered might be to cultivate understanding of quantitative methods and to minimize reliance on intuition, but human behavioral ecologists regularly do just this.

Many social scientists – including anthropologists – use insights derived from biology to make sense of "cultural" things (e.g., signaling theory and conspicuous consumption; social context, body type, and attractiveness, etc.). However, Barnard sees them – particularly human behavioral ecologists – as going "too far towards biology in seeking explanations for cultural behavior" (86). Many of the book's chapters delve into the classic divide between biology and culture. For instance, chapter 4 explores the relationships between brain size, population size, and tool and land use. Chapter 5 is a brief but rich introduction to how human sharing and exchange have been debated over the past few years and has direct implications for the evolution of human cooperation. While chapter 6 discusses the evolution of language, chapter 8 consists of Barnard's proposed alternative to sociobiology.

Many researchers regularly struggle to overcome the false dichotomy of nature and nurture. Fewer get beyond what Barnard sees as a fundamental difference between evolutionary psychology and social anthropology: the former focuses on universals and relies on the idea that "there is a fundamental human nature which underlies all

human behaviour, in spite of the world's social and cultural diversity" whereas the latter emphasizes "dissimilarity" (56). Evolutionary psychology and human behavioral ecology endorse a synthetic approach to understanding the relationship between evolved strategies and the socioecological contexts in which they express themselves. In other words, understanding particulars is not possible without understanding universals and vice versa. This requires constant attention to the coordinated workings of biology and culture.

Barnard doesn't deny universals, nor does he deny the inextricable link between biology and culture (104). However, he suggests that the synthetic sociobiological view "was actually less a true synthesis of anything, and more a redefinition of social science in biological terms" (128). While the meeting point of biology and culture is precisely where Barnard rests, his sights are set toward the cultural end of this continuous relationship: while psychological explanations presently dominate the discourse, we still "require social explanation" to complete the picture (107f.). This is true, but these explanatory dimensions must be ultimately unified to the point where biopsychological explanations *are* social and why the coordination of the two makes sense in its various ecological contexts. Barnard, however, thinks a *disciplinary* unification is inadequate and that biology and sociocultural anthropology should maintain a respectful distance from each other (144). Anthropologists should contribute to the conversation, then, but not adopt anything "too biological". Whether this line is, this approach may lead to more problems than it will solve.

Compare, for instance, Barnard's discussion of the origins of religion and his critique of sociobiology. Citing a solitary source from the burgeoning evolutionary and cognitive sciences of religion, he states that the "claim" that there is a concentration of moralistic deities among larger populations is merely "true enough at one level" and that it ignores those found in foraging societies. He asserts that because some modern states have them "is irrelevant to the evolution of the belief systems of hunter-gatherers" (108). This "claim" has been statistically verified many times: the more anonymity, so the argument goes, the greater need to have a cosmic moral cop out there if this curbs antisocial behavior. This does not render this empirical fact "irrelevant to the evolution of belief systems of hunter-gatherers", however. Rather, it suggests that we need to explain these minority cases among hunter-gatherers: barring cultural borrowing and imperialism, what is it about their socioecological contexts which may have given rise to moralistic deities? This suggests a need for larger and more refined databases crafted with methodological rigor. In some cases, Barnard agrees (150). Elsewhere, he suggests that "hunter-gatherer societies should be understood in their own terms" (108). We are indeed at a time where traditional anthropological questions need to be reinvestigated, but by using models and methods designed to overcome the pitfalls of relying on intuition, not by dismissing apparent irrelevancies.

In chapter 8, Barnard criticizes kin selection on the basis of the presence of cross-cultural variation in the mea-

surement of kinship. Because of this variation, "Hamilton's hypothesis could only hold true in a minority of cases, those being typically in agricultural societies, not hunter-gatherer ones" (130). There is plenty of evidence that human institutions mediate, obfuscate, minimize, stimulate, and overcome evolved biases. The very case of fictive kin suggests this. If true, this reemphasizes – not minimizes – the significance of kin selection. What are the ecological pressures for such institutions to develop? These are also empirically testable hypotheses. However, social anthropology will likely not come any closer to answering such questions adequately if it relies exclusively on anecdotal evidence or if its "equivalent to methodology ... [is] *definition*" (88).

The text nevertheless remains a thorough primer on getting these much-needed conversations going among the next generation of anthropologists. Barnard's vision of a future evolutionary sociocultural anthropology deserves serious consideration.

Benjamin Grant Purzycki

Bernstein, Julia: Food for Thought. Transnational Contested Identities and Food Practices of Russian-Speaking Jewish Migrants in Israel and Germany. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2010, 451 pp. ISBN 978-3-593-39252-3. Price: € 39.90

This is an ambitious first book by a young social/cultural anthropologist Julia Bernstein that is based on her doctoral dissertation and adds to the growing literature on the global Russian-Jewish diaspora. Herself of Russian-Jewish origin, Julia came of age and started her academic studies in Israel and then spent several years in Germany as a doctoral researcher. This multicultural personal trajectory has both shaped her interest in fellow Russian Jewish immigrants and equipped her with proper cultural skills to conduct this research. In this study, Julia focused on the two sets of related questions, one more general and the other more specific. The general questions were: 1) How do immigrants create and perform their identities through transnational practices in their everyday lives and how do they differ in the two host countries – Germany and Israel? 2) How do immigrants create the image of "home", juxtaposing the old and new homelands, generally and via their consumption practices? 3) How do ex-Soviets experience the transition to the capitalist system with its abundance and the problem of choice? and 4) How do the different contexts of Israel and Germany shape the forms of social participation of the immigrants as well as their coping strategies with the challenges of integration? The more specific focus of Bernstein's study is on food consumption and the expansion of the network of Russian groceries in the two countries. Here the central questions are: 1) What are the driving forces behind this expansion and how do they meet the immigrants' needs in reconnection with former homes via food and culinary practices? 2) How do ethnic food stores help create and sustain Russian enclaves in Israel and Germany? and 3) What is the choice of groceries offered by these stores and what symbolic loads do they carry for the immigrant