

5. Urban Planning in Bahir Dar

This chapter reviews the literature available on urban development in Bahir Dar. Thereby, an earlier review of material (cf Appelhans 2011) is thoroughly revised and expanded, while the data is contrasted with insights from everyday practice in order to compile a comprehensive account on the topic. Bahir Dar's urban development history is described beginning with the earliest assumptions about the 14th century to give an impression of the context into which formal planning was established. The account of statutory urban development planning and practice continues until the present day and is described here to current knowledge. Thereby, the material has been organised into phases of urban development that are in line with the periods of national government. The phases of urban development identified in the chapter on urban development in Ethiopia (chapter 3) are, hence, utilised to structure the material on urban development in Bahir Dar, as they also coincide with local planning undertakings. The account spans the urban development of Bahir Dar from its beginning as a site of dwelling of the Wayto tribe and Orthodox monastic settlement on the lake shore, through the Italian occupation, the era of expansion under Emperor Haile Selassie, up to the recent decentralisation period, now making it the regional capital of Amhara National State. It ends with a description of the contemporary planning practice in Bahir Dar. The aim of the chapter is to establish the qualities of urban planning and contributions to local urbanity from a longitudinal perspective.

5.1 TRADITIONAL LAND-ADMINISTRATION AND SETTLING PRACTICES

The early history of Bahir Dar is not well documented. The size of the town before the 20th century can only be roughly estimated, as sources give varying figures but remain within a certain size category: Bahir Dar is listed as one of the Christian towns with a permanent population of at least 2,000 inhabitants in the 1810s to 1850s by Crummey (1987: 4). In 1891, a different population count estimated the city's size as between 1,200 and 1,600 residents (Seltene Seyoum 2003: 442). Un-

like what Seltene Seyoum (2000) proposes, the evidence reviewed in this thesis suggests that the town seems not only to have a monastic founding history, but to have multiple constituting origins: an ethnic tribe living on the resources of the river Nile, a monastery and its function as a trading hub. These three nuclei constitute the first forms of settlement in today's city location and the historical centre. The first accounts of the population, hence, describe a majority of Amhara, the indigenous Wayto and number of traders (Darmon 2010; Consociazione Turistica Italiana 1938: 383). The first buildings were the traditional "tukuls" made of reed from the lake shore (ibid). What is known about the origins will be described in the following, as it has to be understood that the founding period of settlement did not distinguish between urban and rural land and was subject to a single administration under which a variety of livelihoods were practised in a growing density of settlement.

The Wayto are an ethnic group that formed part of the original population living on the shores of Lake Tana. It is not documented since when they have been settling here. The Wayto had their own language, which was last documented in 1928 by Griaule before it disappeared and was replaced by Amharic (Darmon 2010). The traditional Wayto lifestyle was strongly dependent on the Lake, fishing and hunting of hippopotamus (Gamst 1979: 233-235, Freeman 2003: 316-317). They were organised autonomously and had egalitarian rules of dividing the kill (Freeman 2003: 316). Their religion was traditionally water related. They worshipped "Abinas", the God of the Blue Nile, from whom they believed to receive wealth, health and resources, and from whom they tried to ensure this by sacrificing animals in his name (Oestigaard 2011: 27). Only with the introduction of rifles and a demand for ivory tusks did the hippo population decrease to the extent that by the 1930s the Wayto had to turn to fishing and agriculture (Freeman 2003: 316-317). The diversification of income sources proceeded with picking up crafts such as stone grinding and reed boat production as well as small-scale trade, when the availability of fish decreased by the 1960s (ibid). However, these economic extensions to other population groups in the form of trade and land lease from the Amhara did not lead to bridging the social gap between the Wayto and other settlers (ibid). The Wayto are considered "fundamentally distinct" from all of their ethnic neighbours in various respects (Gamst 1979: 253). Their Amhara neighbours traditionally see the Wayto as impure, as their practices of eating hippopotamus meat and catfish do not comply with their food rites, leading the community itself to be considered impure (Freeman 2003: 316-317). This has marginalised the Wayto population ever since the Amhara first settled the area. According to Seltene Seyoum, the Wayto quarter appeared as new settlement patterns within the town along with the Italian military camp in the 1936 (Seltene Seyoum 2003: 443, Seltene Seyoum 2000: 237c), by which he contradicts all other evidence. His argumentation can be countered with the account from the "Guida Turistica", which describes the

indigenous village of Bahir Dar as consisting of “abyssinian” and “Uuito” (sic) huts, suggesting that the Wayto were well established there long before the time of publication in 1938 (Consociazione Turistica Italiana 1938: 383). In my opinion this scholarly disregard reflects the dismissal the Wayto culture faces from other ethnic groups in everyday culture. Although their surroundings have drastically changed through urbanisation in the past century, the indigenous Wayto population still remains as a community in Bahir Dar today. They continue to be marginalised on the basis of their traditional lifestyle, which is considered impure by the Ethiopian Orthodox Church’s rites (Darmon 2010: 2). The Wayto have converted to Islam, but because they continue worshipping the Nile, Bahir Dar’s Muslim community does not acknowledge them as true to the religion (Oestigaard 2011: 27, Interview Zeraï Mesfin 2013). The tribe members therefore still face strong marginalisation by the Christian Amhara and the Muslim population, and the majority of the population in Bahir Dar remains wary of the community members (Darmon 2010: 2; Interview Zufan Sodru 2010). This is why, in an attempt to destigmatise the community, it has now been re-named “Negede”, an Amharic term for “tribe”, by the government (*ibid*).

However, power relations in the early constitution of the Bahir Dar as a town have led to a situation in which the marginalisation of the Wayto was institutionalised. Access to the city’s facilities, including education and health care, remain out of reach based on stigmata. They are largely excluded from access to educational facilities, health facilities, transport, clean drinking water, electricity and modern communication (Interview Zufan Sodru 2010, Ajala 2008: 25). Beyond that they rely on the lake for drinking water, which due to its contamination has severe effects on the health of the community (Darmon 2010: 2). They are consequently described as still relying on their network of traditional and social capital to support each other in times of crisis and for larger efforts such as housing construction. They are settled in three different villages within the city boundaries (Interview Zufan Sodru 2010). Their buildings are still traditionally made of clay with grass roofs and have a lifespan of about five years before they have to be rebuilt (*ibid*). As in the past, they rely on the lake for fish, papyrus grass and small-scale agriculture on the flood plains. (Ajala 2008: 25) From this, the men produce Tankwa (reed) boats for sale, while women are engaged in basketry (Darmon 2010: 2). Apart from fishing and farming, petty trade is their only source of income (*ibid*: 25, Interview Zufan Sodru 2010).

Bahir Dar’s monasteries can be traced back to the 16th century, when Khidanemi-hret was the main church (Seltene Seyoum 2000: 235). The present name of the settlement originates from an Ethiopian Orthodox monastery named Bahir Dar Giyorgis (*ibid*). The time of the foundation of the monastery is attributed to the reign of the Gondarine King Iyasu I between 1682 and 1706 (*ibid*). With the strengthening of the Orthodox Church, the monastery gradually extended its administra-

tive reach over the surrounding farmlands (ibid). The administration at the time was a complex system composed of locally and periodically differing systems, which are difficult to outline in a comprehensive manner but in which the church is repeatedly emphasised to have played a key role. The dominant traditional land-holding systems in Amhara were based on communal ownership (ibid). According to traditional land-holding systems such as “rist”, all descendants of land-holders were entitled to a share in the use of the family plot (ibid: 235-236). The immediate use of the agricultural land secured and determined the landowners’ wealth and the management was entrusted to the elders of the community (ibid: 235). This land tenure system therefore determined a wide set of social relationships. Those foreign to the area or members of religious minorities (Muslim, Falasha, Wayto), could not gain land rights (Crummey 1987: 8, Seltene Seyoum 2000: 236). Occasionally, they rented from the local landowners (balabats), thus securing the land-holders an additional source of income (ibid: 235c). The land rented out to the tenants is called rim land and is said to have made up only around 2% of the holdings in the region (Ofcansky and Berry 1991). As a result of landlessness, non-Christians worked on much of the church-owned land (Crummey 1987: 8-9).

Although access to land is often claimed to be purely hereditary, research by Allen Hoben (1973) was able to prove that the size of landownership changes during the lifespans of Amharic landholders. Land sales or bartering must, therefore, have been possible under some circumstances (Hoben 1973: 7). The monastery was entitled to gather taxes from the local landowners on the surrounding farmlands (Seltene Seyoum 2000: 235). Land use was mainly for subsistence farming (ibid: 235-36). As described above, 10% of all production on rist land was granted to the Ethiopian imperial state through the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, while all taxes on land and from trade were due to the monastery itself (Seltene Seyoum 2000: 236). A distinction between rural and urban land within the administrative zone of the Bahir Dar Giyorgis monastery was not undertaken at the time (Seltene Seyoum 2000: 236).

The settlement was subject to Portuguese missionary activity from the early 17th century until the expulsion of the Jesuits from the country in 1634 (Meinardus 1965: 283). However, the only relict known of this time is an altar on the grounds of today’s Kidus Ghiorghis Church in the town centre (ibid) and the relevance for urban development is assumed to be negligible.

Bahir Dar has to be considered a market town as early as the 19th century (Crummey 1987: 4). It was located on a long-distance trading route, as well as converging local trading routes connected to the productive areas in the hinterland (Gebeyaw Walle 2003: 26). According to the descriptions of Grottanelli from 1935, the majority of market space in the towns in the Lake Tana basin was given over to

1 | For further reading on traditional land tenure, see Hoben 1973.

small-scale, local or regional level exchange of agrarian commodities and utensils (Crummey 1987: 4). This is the scene of reference one has to imagine for Bahir Dar at the time. The trading population is, thereby, said to have come from interior regions, as well as the ports around Lake Tana (Seltene Seyoum 2003: 443), while many artisans were members of religious minorities (Muslim, Falasha, Wayto), as these population groups could not gain land rights (Crummey 1987: 8). However, even landowners are said to have supplemented their income with short-distance trade across Lake Tana, and on land or by transporting goods on reed boats along the Nile (Seltene Seyoum 2000: 236).

Although Seltene Seyoum (2000: 236) claims that the market turned into a trading post for long-distance merchants arriving in caravans, based on other evidence, its significance to the region, however, has to be evaluated as modest. In the regional network of cities around Lake Tana of the time, Ifag as a slave market was a much more important centre for long-distance trade and played a predominant economic and institutional role in the area (Crummey 1987: 4). Crummey generally also concludes that the transit of caravans was occasional and seasonal and, accordingly, did not have a permanent impact on the towns' character (*ibid*: 5).

5.2 ITALIAN LEGACY

The Lake Tana Region was recognised as a water-rich and, therefore, strategically important area even before the First World War. A narrative of a fruitful and agriculturally rich region was developed and spread to Europe, which sparked the interest of the Italian regime in gaining power over this area (Abdussammad H. Ahmad 1994: 621–622). The control over the area was strongly contested, as other foreign political powers also developed their interests on the Lake Tana watershed, the main source of the Nile. So it came to pass that, at the beginning of the 20th century and throughout the First World War, the Lake Tana region was subject to a power struggle between the Italians and the British, in which the latter were interested in the water resources, while the former wanted to build their own colony at the location (Abdussammad H. Ahmad 1994: 622–624, Tvedt 2004: 122). The ambitions for this region, however, were of greater strategic relevance within the wider aim of establishing an Italian colonial empire, as by seizing control over the headwaters of the Nile, Italy speculated on a dominant role in North-East Africa (Tvedt 2004: 122). Meanwhile the Italians were not the only foreign party with interests in the Ethiopian territory on Lake Tana: “Great Britain had as well a grandiose project of building a storage dam at the mouth of Lake Tana. The dam idea in turn triggered Britain's interest in north-west Ethiopia and brought this part of Ethiopia within the imperialist geopolitics of the Middle East and North-Eastern Africa. [...] To ensure the prosperity of the Gezira (Sudan), Britain envisaged to build a storage dam at the mouth of Lake Tana. However, Britain unlike Italy had

an anti-annexionist policy which went along with her goal of exercising control over the waters of Lake Tana and the Blue Nile. The British felt that their interests were best served through diplomatic exchanges with the Ethiopian government” (Abdussammad H. Ahmad 1994: 621–622). Following the dispute of powers, the Italians invaded Ethiopia in 1936 (Haile M. Larebo 1994: 263). As part of the images created of a resourceful region with the idea of irrigation and hydropower projects, the rural areas around Lake Tana were designated as cotton-growing areas to supply the Italian textile industry in 1938 (*ibid*). The administration of the cotton-growing area was established in Gorgora (*ibid*), and large-scale expropriations of land were undertaken around Lake Tana (*ibid*: 81).

Situated within this cotton-growing district was the settlement of Bahir Dar, which was taken by the Italians on their advance southwards in April 1936 (Consociazione Turistica Italiana 1938: 383) and turned into a local garrison (Seltene Seyoum 2000: 237). In the contemporary travel guide, the settlement is described as a village made up of Abyssinian and Wayto huts, accommodating small-scale trade, a post-office, a clinic and a telegraph office (Consociazione Turistica Italiana 1938: 383). The Italians took to actively restructuring land holding and settlement organisation. In the occupation, the “Residenza del Tána Meridionale” was installed, replacing the traditional administration, and the settlement now served as an administrative sub-centre for the occupied region south of Lake Tana with approximately 25,000 inhabitants (*ibid*). These measures strongly raised its political importance in the region. Economic activities in the city were taxed by the Italian administration from this point (Seltene Seyoum 2000: 238). This resulted in a redirection of taxes from the imperial Ethiopian government and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church to the Italian regime, accompanied by the loss of administrative power to the occupiers. The act signified the establishment of a separate urban administration, rendering the surrounding area rural.

For new uses projected in the town, additional space was provided by draining surrounding swamp lands and making them fit for construction but also by forcefully removing local inhabitants from their dwellings (Seltene Seyoum 2000: 237). With the arrival of the Italians, the traditional land rights were overridden by the Italian planning advancements with far-reaching implications: the Italian occupation has left a legacy of divided rural-urban administration in Bahir Dar. The land was reallocated to new residential and commercial owners (*ibid*: 238). New residential and commercial zones were established for development (Seltene Seyoum 2003: 443, Seltene Seyoum 2000: 237c). Further, public land was allocated for administration, the military, an airfield near the centre and port facilities on Lake Tana (*ibid*). The connections to Gondar and Addis Ababa by aeroplane were first introduced, and the town was connected to Gorgora by motorboat via other ports on Lake Tana (*ibid*). The reorganisation of socio-economic configurations accompanied the physical changes and altered connectivity: The communal family ownership of land was abolished and individual landownership was instituted

instead. The balabats from the settlement faced a loss of income and wealth, as the tax formerly collected from the tenants by the landowners themselves was now also due directly to the Italian occupants (Seltene Seyoum 2000: 238). Nevertheless, there were no means of compensation for the former land-holders, neither for this loss of income, nor for the land expropriated in the construction process (*ibid*). By re-appropriating the land, a new class of urban land-holders arose (Seltene Seyoum 2003: 443, Seltene Seyoum 2000: 237c).

By the time the Italians had constructed a motor road including a wooden bridge across the Nile, to make the city accessible for car traffic from Gondar and Addis Ababa (Consociazione Turistica Italiana 1938: 379, Tvedt 2004: 178), a number of box-shaped chicka (mud) houses with corrugated iron-sheet roofing were erected along the road to contain a number of tiny shops (Boden 1962: 4a). According to Seltene Seyoum (2000: 237), a Muslim community appeared as a new settlement pattern within the town along with the Italian military camp. Meanwhile the existing tanners' quarter is described as having remained largely unchanged by the surrounding construction activities (Seltene Seyoum 2003: 443, Seltene Seyoum 2000: 237c). As the town's economy grew steadily, artisan, clerk, and labourer occupations evolved (Seltene Seyoum 2000: 237). A cultural mix of peoples is reported to have been observed in the town, and different kinds of shops, tea-rooms, tailors' shops, bars and restaurants, run by Italians, Arabs, Somalis, and Sudanese (*ibid*). The Ethiopian participation in these enterprises first appearing in the commercial zone is described as insignificant at the time (Seltene Seyoum 2003: 443, Seltene Seyoum 2000: 237 c).

The period of Italian occupation ended when the Italian troops fled from Bahir Dar after a battle with the Emperor's army in April 1941 (Haile Selassie et al. 1994: 156). Their legacy regarding urban development is, thereby, wide, although the Italian's architectural output in Bahir Dar was relatively small. Apparently, it consisted only of three single-storey masonry buildings (Boden 1962: 6). One was later occupied by Getachew Bekelle, the governor of the sub-region, the other by the harbour authority and a third was put into use as a hotel (*ibid*). Despite the ambitions regarding cotton production and the need for manufacturing centres, the Italians' exact intentions for Bahir Dar's future, beyond serving as a garrison in time of battle, remain unclear. The settlement is described as an emerging centre in the Italian tourist guide from 1938 (Consociazione Turistica Italiana 1938: 383), but in the region, Gorgora and Gondar have to be considered far more influential towns at the time.

Yet the assumption that the impact of colonialism on Ethiopia's towns is small and limited to the business district in Addis Ababa can be rendered false, based on the evidence from the case. In my opinion, the findings from Bahir Dar demonstrate that there is a colonial legacy even in Ethiopian cities without a large architectural colonial heritage or an implemented colonial master plan. The legacies of the Italian occupiers are visible in built structures, but can also be found in urbanisati-

on practice, including urban planning. The impacts of the revised land tenureship and the introduction of urban administrations, such as in Bahir Dar, are extensive.

The division between rural and urban administration, and, thus, the introduction of a dichotomy that is reflected in the division of rural and urban ministries to this day, is proving problematic in the current questions of rapid population growth and urban expansion. The implications of abolishing the traditional land-holding system have to be seen in the split of *de facto* land rights exercised in continuation of traditions by occupants who were never confronted with other claims and new *de jure* regulations installed by the occupiers, resulting in potentially competing land management systems (see chapter 2.2).


The Italians can also be said to have introduced the implementation of industrialised agriculture in their cotton-planting scheme. Although cotton planting was not overly successful and the district on Lake Tana remained the only productive cotton district after the occupation (Haile M. Larebo 1994: 282), the “regulating fiction” of a cotton industry was introduced so successfully that the Emperor Haile Selassie later appropriated the idea. When demanding reparations for the Italian damage, a textile mill was claimed by the Emperor and constructed with Italian funding and expertise in Bahir Dar (Guther [around 1962]: A5 and J3; see chapter 5.3). The Italian rhetoric claimed that industrialised cotton production would benefit the indigenous population, but it seems that, in effect, the crop was exported to the Italian cities, leaving no surplus in Ethiopia (Haile M. Larebo 1994: 263). However, the model was adopted and expanded to install a textile industry in Ethiopia itself, thus disregarding a “commercial colonisation” (Göckede 2010: 56), in which this step of the value chain would lie outside the country for a local production industry. It seems that the transfer of certain Italian urban practices like industrial labour division to the system of reinstated monarchy is due to its symbolism of modernity and development. This period, therefore, marks the beginning of project-related developmental interests on the water resources of the Lake Tana watershed basin, leading to the industrialisation policies described in the next sub-chapter.

5.3 THE MODERNIST LAYOUT

Emperor Haile Selassie’s government was reinstated after the Italian Occupation ended in 1941. At first, a temporary administration was set up to govern the town (Seltene Seyoum 2000: 238). In the early phase of the Emperor’s reinstatement, the Italian military legacies in the urban core of Bahir Dar as well as the colonialist land practice based on expropriation of traditional land holders, were transferred to the rule of the new administrative system and thus legitimised without compensation (Seltene Seyoum 2000: 239). As a result Bahir Dar’s urban land stayed in the hand of the sovereign. At the time, the settlement is described to have had

around 4,000 inhabitants, most of whom resided in round huts known as tukuls (Boden 1962: 4a, Guther [about 1962]). The mayor's office was accommodated in a stone house only in 1961 (Boden 1962: 6). The Italian legacy mixed with monastic and trading activities, plus the indigenous (Wayto) settling activities, formed the settlement pattern. The Orthodox Amhara formed the majority population and depended largely on farming, while the Muslim community was responsible for most of the trading activity in the location, making up about 40% of the population in 1960 (Guther [1962]). Despite an agreeable climate, the living conditions in Bahir Dar of the time are said to have been devastating, the average life-span being 35–40 years, due to a high rate of malaria, bilharzia, yellow fever, typhoid, leprosy and polio in absence of any sort of sanitary and medical facilities (Boden 1962: 4d). From 1945 on, Bahir Dar was officially considered a municipality (ibid: 239). The Italian institutions and administration were reformed, and various administrative offices, as well as public services, were set up during this period. The city's governor Aemiro proceeded with the construction of many new streets to house administrative offices, such as a courthouse, a police station, and a prison. Commercial facilities such as small shops, restaurants, and a hotel were newly constructed (Seltene Seyoum 2000: 238 c).

Fig. 5: Max Guther's Master Plan with the Built-Up Area in 1957 (red) and the Current Administrative Boundary (yellow).



Master Plan by Max Guther (Guther et al. 1961), with data from Haimanot (2009: 52) and RUPI [date unknown c].

In the course of his reign, however, Emperor Haile Selassie developed a strategy of industrialisation for the country, which eventually led to the initiation of expanding the settlement of Bahir Dar Giorgis on the banks of Lake Tana. In a continuation of the power struggles between the Italians and the British over the water resources of the Blue Nile, the British pressured the Emperor for an area on Lake Tana on which they were keen to establish hydropower works in the early 1940s (Bahru Zewde 1988: 279). As a result of this, and with the Italian irrigation plans having been devised, but not realised, the Emperor explicitly acknowledged the strategic importance of the resources in the Lake Tana Region. According to Terje Tvedt, it was at the beginning of the 1950s that Emperor Haile Selassie began developing an industrial development plan for Lake Tana (Tvedt 2004: 237). Following his quest for “development” (Haile Selassie et al. 1994), Haile Selassie decided to give the order to design a new city on the site of the rather modestly sized Bahir Dar, which would make use of the hydropower potentials of the location (Tvedt 2004: 255-57). Tvedt states that:

“Independent Ethiopia under the leadership of Haile Selassie gradually became, [...] more and more bent on using the Nile for generating hydropower. So committed was the Emperor to this idea at the beginning of the 1950s, that he thought of moving the capital from Addis Ababa to the new town of Bahir Dar, planned as a center for hydropower and development, on the shores of Lake Tana. But most of all he wanted Eritrea to be part of Ethiopia, and he hoped to use the plans for the dam as a leverage to achieve this regional, imperial dream.” (Tvedt, 2004: 237)

The Emperor received three different drafts from different European architects, before the plan finally executed was drafted by German architect Max Guthier from Darmstadt and his team (Guthier [around 1962], Boden 1962, Egli 1967).

Although it cannot be established how serious the Emperor’s ambitions to relocate the capital were, various sources state that this was his plan and that the order Guthier received was to design a capital city (Guthier [around 1962], Egli 1967, Tvedt, 2004: 255). The contents of the plan were discussed between Guthier’s team and Haile Selassie, who designated his Minister of Public Works and Transport to be responsible for the project (Guthier [around 1962]: A1). The establishment of the new urban development project would drastically change the urban scenario in spite of its adverse implications for human habitation. The master plan Guthier set up in 1962 was based on a concept of industrialisation and consisted of various elements, which were organised on an infrastructural grid structure. The newly devised zoning of the plan included both banks of the Nile, linking them by a concrete bridge. The zoning suggested cultural and business areas, industrial zones, small-scale industry, administration, services, military and a definition of sub-centres with commerce (see image of the plan). The final stage of the master plan

projected up to 300,000 inhabitants (Egli 1967: 393). This meant a projected tenfold expansion of the figure of 25,000 inhabitants estimated in 1938 (see above). The plan included architectural designs for three model houses (Boden 1962: 1). When starting to devise the plan, certain building projects had already been decided on and had to be incorporated into the master plan. Among these projects was the textile factory that was in construction due to a reparations agreement the Emperor had settled on with the Italians (Guther [around 1962]: A5 and J3). Guther himself drafted and executed the Felege Hiwot hospital project (Guther [around 1962]).

Meanwhile, the master plan did not take into consideration the existing settlement nor did it look at social, cultural and economic structures in place. The tukuls were disregarded as not worthy of consideration in the progressing construction and were designated for removal (Guther [1962]: J1). Beyond that, no enquiries on local living were made, although Guther stated that he wanted the design to be of “Ethiopian-African nature” and model it on Gondar (Guther [around 1962]: A8). Guther, instead, applied the principles of universal modernisms in his plan, making references to Chandigarh and criticising the rigid formality of Brasilia’s urban layout. In terms of racial questions, Guther remained very neutral. The plan did not contain any kind of racial segregation, nor did it acknowledge the multi-ethnicity of Bahir Dar’s population (Guther [around 1962]). The abolition of traditional land rights in the urban location was not discussed and the Emperor’s landownership in Bahir Dar was not questioned. On the contrary, Guther expresses his relief that royal landownership meant easy implementation (Guther [around 1962]: E7).

The idea of establishing a new city on the site on the southern shore of Lake Tana was eventually put into practice. The estimated annual growth rates for the period from 1966 to 1979 and the period from 1970 to 1978 are given as 10.0% and 11.3% respectively (Habtemariam Tesfaghiorghis 1984: 163). From the start of implementation, the Ministry of Public Works and Communications was responsible for working on putting the master plan into practice on the part of the Ethiopians. This ministry sought municipal administration expertise from Germany, and at their request Hans Boden arrived in Ethiopia in March 1962 to function as an advisor to the Ethiopian government (Boden 1962: 3). Boden claims to have had a strong influence on keeping the order of the plan during his presence in Bahir Dar. He assumes his presence to have prevented building activities on sites not designated for construction as well as pointing out suited locations within the urban plan for building requests by a Shell petrol station, a large motel built by the oil company AGIP, a building for the State Bank of Ethiopia, student housing for the technical college and a commercial building for the Besse import-export company (Boden 1962: 10).

Initially the progress of implementation is described as good. Backed up by foreign development aid, a concrete bridge across the Nile (funded by the USA), a technical college (funded by the USSR), a hospital (funded by the Federal Republic of Germany), water provision (funded by the USA) and a school (also funded by

the USA) had already been constructed or were due for completion in 1962 (Boden 1962: 4c). Thereby construction seems to have started ahead of the master plan, as the final draft was only completed and presented that same year. In addition, the Italians had agreed to pay reparations in form of a textile factory on the bank of the Nile, which was in realisation, while the Ethiopian Electrical Association had built a hydro-power station at the Blue Nile Falls (Boden 1962: 4c). Boden heard of further plans, including the construction of an airport at a designated location for which the technical equipment had already been ordered. Meanwhile the improvement of the road from Addis to Gondar was due to reach Bahir Dar from both directions within one year. (Boden 1962: 10)

However, after the initial period of progress, financial difficulties arose, prohibiting further development (Boden 1962: 4d). Guthrie also expressed disappointment at the fact that the architecture filling his design did not sufficiently live up to his expected standard (Guthrie [around 1962]). The state budget of the year was E\$ 280 million (one E\$ being equivalent to DM 1,50 at the time), while the Governor only had E\$ 500 and the municipality no more than E\$ 30,000 to spend, overall (Boden 1962: 4d). According to Boden, who was present in Bahir Dar attempting to give advice on administrative issues, neither the state budget for the coming year (1963) nor the second five-year plan for the years 1962–67 included a budget for the further development of Bahir Dar (*ibid*). This lack of financial means for the project is a possible explanation why substantial elements of the plan, such as the sewerage system, were never executed.

There also seem to have been issues concerning the project being ordered from the highest instance of power in Addis Ababa. Boden describes how, on a return visit to Addis, he discovered that the responsible Minister had left his post and with him the knowledge of the experts present for the city project and possibly even the project itself (Boden 1962: 4b). He, further, describes an unwillingness on the part of the Governor and the Mayor to support the implementation of the plan. Boden speculates that they might have felt threatened by the plans and feared for their positions. As for the Governor, he assumes that a feud with the Emperor, resulting in degradation to this post from a former more responsible position, and personal resignation added to his suspicion towards the project (Boden 1962: 5-7).

The modernist ideas and ideology shaping the development of Bahir Dar through urban planning have been traced and need to be discussed. The material presented here reveals that today's city location was chosen on the basis of strategic international interests in its water-related potential, to which Ethiopia eventually made its own claim. By establishing a textile factory in Bahir Dar, the production was changed to overcome colonialist agricultural exploitation. Instead, an attempt was made to create a value chain and establish Bahir Dar as a site of industrial manufacturing. A link to the cotton plantations that were planned by the Italians but never materialised to the extent intended, can clearly be established. However, the manufacturing industry, from fashion design to final production and market

demand, did not have the equivalent features as the Italian set-up on which the colonial cotton production was modelled. The further expansion of the city was in fact the result of a developmental view of the country that the Emperor had adopted. The city plan he received from Guthrie followed a modernist approach, claiming universality for the standards it supplied. The positive side of this is the attempt to lift the living standards of the population. However, the focus on technical aspects and neglect of social, economic and cultural conditions, as well as the exclusion of the population from the planning procedure also prevented the rise of an urbanisation practice more rooted in the local culture. In this respect Bahir Dar is not a representative case for Ethiopian cities, being the centre of an international power discourse and designated site for a new capital. However, it shows the ideas to which the Emperor was open and the modernist mindset of the time. Unlike the colonialist Italian urban planning approach, Ethiopia's imperial modernism made no differentiation of development standards according to racial zoning. The basic attitude towards the project, however, was an assumed developmental gap between the Ethiopians and the Europeans. The point lies in the fact that there was no racial division but also no acknowledgement of ethnic and religious diversity within the city in Guthrie's master plan. Based on the construction of this developmental gap, the Europeans are, therefore, legitimised to come in as experts on behalf of the Emperor and subject the local Ethiopian population to the plans of settlement improvements, disregarding the existing settlement structures. A democratic ideal was not exercised in devising the master plan; a paternalistic planning approach was followed, instead, while the content serves to spatially support the royal power structures. The planning process was neither participatory nor considerate of local settlement culture, as described by Genet Alem (2011) in her book on traditional northern Ethiopian highland towns. The population was completely left out of the planning process on decisions concerning their own habitat. Bahir Dar's population was hence not conceptualised as responsible individuals to be considered in the planning process. Yet, the multi-directionality of flows needs to be addressed: What Guthrie interprets as architecture not suited to standards can also be viewed as an appropriation of the structures with locally available means. The plan was, therefore, flexible enough to allow filling-in and the street layouts practical enough to withstand being overwritten by other patterns.

5.4 INTRODUCING THE KEBELE ADMINISTRATION

In the time of the Derg, Bahir Dar and its surroundings formed an administrative unit called Awraja, which was between the provincial and the woreda levels (see map in Liyew Adamu 1994: 15). After the 1974 revolution and the coming to power of the socialist Derg regime, relatively little attention was paid to Bahir Dar's urban development. The political focus was on agricultural development and farming as

an industry, and there is a gap in academic literature of the period as far as Bahir Dar is concerned. It can only be assumed that the Master Plan by Guthrie continued to be the planning reference for the location, as no evidence for the existence of other plans was encountered in the review.

Since the urban land in Bahir Dar had been expropriated in the course of the construction of the projected capital (see 5.3), it, further, has to be assumed that the land reform put in place at the time was not as significant for Bahir Dar as it might have been for other towns. Land ownership was already in the hands of the state, leaving the former royal claims to the new socialist rulers. What has to be considered being of larger importance is the expropriation of rental housing. Despite the property reform, 61.1% of Bahir Dar's residents continued to live in owner-occupied housing in 1984 (Gebeyaw Walle 2003: 44).

Those houses expropriated fell to the newly established Kebele administrations, to rent out the acquired houses. The establishment of these administrative units has survived the socialist regime and still forms the smallest administrative basis within the city of Bahir Dar today. However, the data obtained for this thesis could not reveal whether the spatial boundaries of these units have remained unchanged since that time.

The attempts at establishing industries also continued under the socialist government. The textile mill gained the Derg's attention and industrial production was supported by the installation of sports facilities (a tennis court and a public swimming pool), as well as a library, a restaurant and a cafeteria in convenient reach for the housing and plots provided for a growing base of textile workers. It can, thereby, be said that the colonial schemes of production were appropriated not only by Emperor Haile Selassie but also by the socialist rule.

Despite the lack of evidence of further formal urbanisation efforts, the city continued to grow, even though the estimated average urban growth rate of 2.2% p.a. in the period from 1978 to 1984 was significantly slower than the double-digit growth under Haile Selassie's expansion plans (Habtemariam Tesfagiorgis 1984: 163).

Whether the (seeming) lack of urban policy signified a chance for everyday urbanisation, including informal and traditional building practices, cannot be established from the literature review. In policy terms, this change does signify a switch from inducing, forecasting and managing growth to a management of resources in place (see chapter 2).

5.5 CONTEMPORARY PLANNING

Fig. 6: Towns in Amhara Region




Image by the author with data from RUPI [date unknown].

Following the instalment of the current government in 1994, Bahir Dar was chosen as a seat of the Amhara National Regional State (Nigussie Haregeweyn et al. 2012: 150). Despite the city's high growth rates in its time of establishment under Emperor Haile Selassie and the Derg (see 4.2), Bahir Dar turned into a destination for a new type of population influx from the rural areas with the end of socialist rule (see 3.5). In 2003, the city was still dealing with growth rates of 4.8% per year and was expected to double in size between the years 2012 and 2014 (Nigussie Haregeweyn et al. 2012: 153-154; see 4.2). While development pressure increased on the land in this period and issues faced in the city are unserved settlement sites, overcrowding, food security and ecological issues (Interview Endegenä Ejigayehu 2011). Under the new government, urban development was put back on the political agenda in order to address the situation (see chapter 3.5). The EPRDF sought to decentralise the tasks formerly concentrated in the National Urban Planning Institute (NUPI) in various steps. So far, this process has reached down to the establishment of "Regional Urban Planning Institutes" (RUPI) in four of the "National Regional States" that form the Ethiopian Federation (Ministry of Works

and Urban Development 2008). The Amhara National Regional State's RUPI was established in 2008 and is responsible for setting up plans for all urban settlements in the region, including Bahir Dar (*ibid*). According to Tegegne Gebre-Egziabher (1997: 704), the sectoral planning approach stayed dominant in the overall planning framework. Since there was no adequate methodology for regional planning in place, inconsistencies across the zones allowed sectoral planning to pertain (*ibid*: 705). Often the planning offices stayed passive and did not take the initiative to devise development plans (*ibid*: 704). With the exception of the offices in Addis Ababa and Amhara, they were understaffed and not well equipped regarding logistics and budget (*ibid*: 705). As one of the more populous regions, Amhara has a relatively higher tax-base, but external sources are still needed for state expenditure (*ibid*: 706). Other monetary sources for the local administration are national government transactions and funds from donors (Tilahun 04.09.10). Despite this overall situation, Bahir Dar's master plan was first revised in 1996. Thereby, the revision incorporated the old plan's grid structure into an expanded radial one (see fig. 11 and 13). As a result of these planning efforts, Bahir Dar Municipality was awarded a "Peace Prize" by the UNESCO in 2002 for addressing the challenges of rapid urbanisation (United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation: 2002; Daniel Weldegebriel 2011: 13).

With the installation of the new government, the tenure situation in Bahir Dar did not substantially change policies on ownership and rental laws (Daniel Weldegebriel 2011: 5). The tenure system is regulated under federal law and cannot be changed by the Amhara National Regional State (*ibid*). The cities are encouraged to make proposals for the land use (*ibid*). However, plan making and land administration are operationally on the same administrative level in Amhara region. Different ownership models apply for the real estate on rural and urban land. In Bahir Dar, people interested in acquiring plots for residential or business purposes may do so by negotiation or by putting in a bid (*ibid*). Meanwhile the municipality's rates base relies on the land tax and the land-transaction tax, which go directly to the municipality. The taxation rate on land is at about 2\$ per plot, irrespective of the size (Interview Endegena Ejigayehu 2011). The land-use rights within the city of Bahir Dar are granted for a fixed period of five to 15 years (*ibid*). In case of demand, the municipality can then reclaim the plot.

The amount of owner occupied-housing, Kebele and housing rented-out by the administration fell in 1994 in comparison to 1984 (Gebeyaw Walle 2003: 44). In reverse, the quantity of rental housing from private owners rose, following permission for subletting and the new national policy on the right to ownership including rental relations (*ibid*). According to data from 2011, 30% of the city's approximate 30.000 housing units were located in informal settlements on state owned land or designated farm land (Daniel Weldegebriel 2011: 13).

Meanwhile, the overall living conditions in the city at the time have to be described as dire. In 1994, about 54.7% of dwellings were in good physical condition,

35.7% required maintenance and 6.6% were derelict (ibid: 37). Almost all of the building stock was single storey (99.16%, ibid: 43-44). In 1995, about 81% of all houses had floors of mud, 87% had mud and wood walls, 85.4% an iron sheet roof, while 86% of all buildings had no ceiling according to data from the Central Statistical Authority (ibid). Despite a percentage of 94.91% of the entire building stock considered to be permanent buildings with a life-span of more than ten years, the mud buildings are considered to be sub-standard housing by the government (ibid). Also due to the population growth, a severe shortage of housing was documented in Bahir Dar in the formal sector in 1998 (Gebeyaw Walle 2003: 34). Reasons for the shortage were stated as high-interest rates, low earnings, increasing prices in construction material and scarcity of rental houses (ibid). Between 1994 and 2002, about 5,365 housing units were constructed. However, this is only about 37.04% of the estimated housing need (ibid: 35). At stable construction speed, this backlog would be addressed only over a period of 15 years (ibid: 39).

Also, the provision of basic infrastructure did not meet minimal sanitary requirements. Until today no sewerage system has been installed in Bahir Dar. The city relies on a septic tank system, while there is an open disposal site for solid waste outside the city to which the septic waste is taken. An assignment to treat the solid waste has been made, but a plot of land on the outskirts of the city needs to be allocated for a treatment plant. Further, there is a problem of litter, as not all the households participate in waste collection. The municipality controls the waste collection system, but it has been outsourced to a private company since 2009 (Tilahun 04.09.10).

Bahir Dar's poverty levels remain high and further efforts to address the situation are being undertaken. A study on poverty incidence from the UNDP issued in 2003 in ten major Ethiopian towns is quoted by Philippa Bevan and Alula Pankhurst and shows higher than average percentages of poverty in Bahir Dar in 1995 (Bevan et al. 2008: 12). Due to this, the "informal sector" is considered an issue according to a survey by the Central Statistical Agency (2003) and has to be considered relevant to Bahir Dar's further urban development. Ethiopian government institutions currently still describe informal economy as a "sector", in which a large proportion of the population is economically active (CSA 2003: 15). The Central Statistical Agency survey states that all the informal sector establishments in Bahir Dar were found to be in sole-trader ownership, with only a few operators in a position to employ further workers. Of these most are found in the manufacturing sector and a few more in trade, hotels or restaurants. (CSA 2003: 33) Due to their informal nature, they are said in the survey to be "beyond social protection, labour legislation and protective measures at the workplace". (ibid: 9) The survey was, therefore, undertaken with the focus of identifying the scale of unregistered economic activities that are not paying licenses and tax, or are avoiding the labour regulations; the methodology by which the "sector" was monitored is questionable, as certain activities were not documented at all. Taking the absolute figures of the

CSA survey, calculations on the proportions show that, even together, the transport and construction sectors apparently only accommodate around 3% of individuals in informal labour. Instead, according to the state sources, the majority is active in manufacturing (63%), while a further 20% work in trade, hotels or restaurants and 14% deliver community and personal services (CSA 2003: 33). However, a survey by Woldie Assaw et al. (2010) among seasonal migrants in Bahir Dar revealed quite a different picture of the entering modes on the labour market for rural-urban migrants than the data from the Central Statistical Agency suggest. According to his survey, many of the migrants seeking short-term employment engage in informal, unskilled manual labour. Among seasonal migrants in Bahir Dar, 94.2% are stated to have worked in construction, 56.9% had dug wells, 30.4% engaged in cultivating chat, 10.1% in loading and unloading, 8.7% in domestic work and 4.3% in other activities (Woldie Assaw et al. 2010: 67). Considering the number of these seasonal migrants, their labour ought to have appeared in the CSA's statistics as informal activities. Overall, knowledge of the informal sector has, therefore, to be considered as fragmentary and hardly documents the role of informal employment for urbanisation practice. It, furthermore, does not serve to document the intertwining of formal and informal production in certain locations, legal work status or the dynamics of informal work practice. The investigation even excluded larger enterprises in advance. This lack of data points to the fact that informality is understood as a problem related to smallholder enterprises, subsistence and poverty by the governmental and administrative institutions. This gives an insight into the state's divisional understanding of formal and informal urbanism.

Against this background, the Ethiopian government decided to adopt the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) in the national "Urban Plan Proclamation 574/2008". The instrument was transferred from South Africa, where it was developed (Interview Berrisford 2012). Bahir Dar was one of the first sites in Ethiopia to go ahead with the implementation of an IDP, and the question of the extent to which the transfer requires the tool to be carefully adapted to the context will be explored.

5.5.1 The BDIDP

A number of pilot sites were chosen for IDP implementation. Bahir Dar was among the selected cities and an IDP was drafted, replacing the previous master plan (Ministry of Works and Urban Development 2008). Feasibility studies at a local level were not conducted before the implementation of the IDP in the pilot locations in Ethiopia (Interview Berrisford 2012). The federal government's Ministry of Works and Urban Development developed the general policy framework for the National Urban Planning Bureau (Ministry of Works and Urban Development 2007: 7). In 2012, the Amhara National Regional State was busy establishing a regional urban planning regulation to recognise "Structural Plans" and "Inte-

grated Development Plans” only (Genet GebreEgziabher 2011). Tourism sites are preferred in the upgrading through structural plans and are treated with priority in their set-up. The tourism sites are currently not serviced and there is a high government interest in promoting this economy. Urban planning, therefore, seeks to further expand tourism. However, the Regional Urban Planning Institute has no data on tourism-related issues (Tilahun 04.09.10).

Box: IDP SOUTH AFRICA

IDPs were first developed as a planning concept for municipalities in South Africa in the process of replacing the apartheid planning system with a democratic spatial policy (Harrison 2006). The IDP was a contextual response to challenges arising in the transition from apartheid planning to democracy. It reacted in particular to the issue of getting a new system of local government installed after apartheid had induced a fragmentation of local governing. The country hence faces the challenge of having to overcome strong socio-economic disparities, which were institutionalised by apartheid rule and spatially manifested in urban structures (Interview Gorgens 2012). A need for planning instruments became evident in the mid-1990s, which could direct the local authorities’ newly acquired governance responsibilities. (Harrison 2006:195). At the same time its early development was strongly circumscribed by international planning discourse and practice. (ibid: 186) Under the influence of the GIZ (formerly GTZ) and with the joint effort of various international institutions, such as the UN and the World Bank, the content determination for the IDPs got under way. Harrison therefore argues that the IDP is the outcome of a process of international policy convergence in the 1990s (ibid: 188).

The IDP was introduced with a legislative act in 1996. At the outset, it stood in direct competition with other planning instruments and its purpose as well as its contents had not been clearly drafted. Its objectives were only clarified in an accompanying “white paper” issued by the government in 1998 (Harrison 2006: 186). Consequently, the IDP in South Africa is more an instrument for directing and coordinating the municipality’s policies through spatialisation and serves the purpose of allocating legislative budgeting (ibid: 190). With this aim it integrates sectoral plans and promotes cross-disciplinary spatial planning. The IDP is prepared for the duration of the five-year legislature of the elected council. As a coordinating tool, rather than a programmatic plan, the underlying principles are part of a negotiation process for each location, which is guided and made transparent by the IDP, and meant to be cross-sectional, participatory and spatialised. For this purpose the IDP is accompanied by a Spatial Development Framework (SDF) (Interview Gorgens 2012).

Lately, a new emphasis was set on multi-level planning, in which the IDP is now no longer just local but joined up with higher-level provincial and national planning, modelled on the regional plans set-up by the European Union, in an attempt to align policy, planning and budgeting throughout the different governance levels (Harrison 2006: 200). It is the first time in the course of this post-apartheid restructuring process that substantial power has been devolved to the local level from the strong provincial level (Interview Gorgens 2012).

The emphasis on integration and the multi-sector approach are strengths, while other aspects fall short. For South Africa, one can therefore say that the IDP has meanwhile developed into a comprehensive plan due to practical implications (Interview Berrisford 2012). Environmental aspects and the insufficient recognition of social, economic and political dynamics do not have enough emphasis (Harrison 2006: 202). This is reflected in the IDP's inherent incapacity to speak to informal contexts (Interview Gorgens 2012). The existing urban structures, participation of residents and integration of upgrading approaches remain to be addressed and solutions, such as the introduction of modified building regulations to incrementally upgrade housing areas in Cape Town, are being developed under the roof of the IDP. So, while the IDP has contributed to the shift in expenditure towards the historically disadvantaged communities, the shifted expenditure might not be reflected in the spatial and social patterns of inequality. The new spatial policy making involves responding to a paradigmatic shift in geographical imaginations and involves processes of dialogue and negotiation (Harrison 2006: 195). However, though the drafters might have found the plans coherent, the role of the IDP was not always understandable to all actors due to its complexity (ibid: 196). The tool, with its multi-level approach, was introduced to an administrative structure with an institutional memory of preventive apartheid planning. Considering the lack of data in many of the formerly systematically disadvantaged areas, the performance of the IDP is also limited to the extent of the material that can be fed into the process (Interview Gorgens 2012).

The Federal Government and the city administration jointly prepared the Integrated Development Plan that is in implementation now (FUPI 2008). At first the regional administrations were not involved in the process of setting up the IDP as an instrument in Ethiopia (Interview Yirsaw 2013). Following the pilot phase, the responsibility for setting up the IDPs was passed on from the national level to the regional planning institutes in about 2010 (ibid). The responsibility was then handed to the newly established regional planning bureaus (Ministry of Works and Urban Development 2007: 5). The regional administrations can either devise the plans themselves or initiate a bidding procedure, in which urban planning professionals with licences can put in their offers, with the lowest bidder then preparing the IDP (Interview Yirsaw 2013). After the general framework for Bahir Dar

had been drafted, it was the Amhara Regional Urban Development Bureau under the Ministry of Urban Development that then related the different sectoral policies to the IDP (ibid). With this concentrated responsibility and a non-obligation for the sectoral offices to participate, the IDP has a problem of reach across the sectoral institutions. An example of this is the drinking water provision managed by the Water Authority. Utility maps are prepared to avoid use conflict. However, the sectoral offices may implement their own plans and do not have to coordinate their action (Tilahun 04.09.10).

The regional “Industry and Development Bureau” supports the implementation process of the IDP and controls how the implementation is conducted. It acts as a consultant to the municipalities in the implementation and gives advice (Interview Yirsaw 2013). In the case of projects being of regional or national interest, the responsibility for implementation can be taken from the city. Implementation then goes ahead contrary to what has been agreed on in the plan. The responsibilities for urban development projects in the national interest thus leave the city administration and move to the regional or national administrative level. In these cases, construction goes ahead regardless of the zoning indicated in the plan. This procedure has been followed, for example, on the site of the new Amhara National Regional State Parliament building on the banks of the Nile. The site was originally zoned as a forest, while on the ground it had been in use as an informal settlement. With the choice of this site as the building ground, the settlement was cleared and the zoning will be changed in order to legitimise administrative use. At the time of conducting the fieldwork for this thesis, the parliament was being erected on the site of what, up to its clearance for the project, used to be an informal settlement. According to residents in the expansion areas on the eastern side of the Nile, they were moved there in the course of clearance of that site. In the immediate vicinity of the regional parliament building-site, another neighbourhood will be cleared), although it is marked as a residential area in the IDP. The neighbourhood is made up largely of single-storey clay buildings and seems to be inhabited by low-income families. The most common reason for using this mechanism, however, is the prospect of attracting “high investment”, thus serving as a legitimisation for transferring responsibility back to a higher administrative decision level. The environmental bureau, which is responsible for the environmental impact assessment, will be consulted, but has no statutory rights to reject construction. The Regional Development Bureau can revise and make zoning changes after the realisation of the projects in the national interest (Interview Yirsaw 2013) thereby not considering contrary local interests.

For the future revision of the IDP in Bahir Dar, the responsibility will be with the Amhara Regional Urban Planning Institute. The city administration will ask for this kind of service, if there is an interest in changing the zoning or land-use functions. In this case the Regional Urban Development Bureau will view the plan, send professionals to check the situation on the ground and conduct the zoning

change. A criterion for the evaluation of this would be the improvement of public services through the amendment of the zoning (Interview Yirsaw 2013). Bahir Dar's plan is soon to be revised (Interview Yirsaw 2013).

The BDIDP, thereby, contains a plan responsible for allocating the projects into the urban structure, called "Spatial Development Framework" (SDF). The SDF was developed on the basis of previous master plans (FUPI 2008: 398) and consists of a land-use plan and a set of strategic projects called "action area plans" (Genet GebreEgziabher 2011).

In contrast to the South African plans that are tied to the legislative period of five years, the Ethiopian IDPs are valid for a period of ten years. The planning practice in all towns in the region will be exclusively organised in projects conducted under the Integrated Development Plan (IDP). They will substitute all master plans or other forms of plan in place.

The BDIDP document states that the land-use plans were assessed and revised to suit the BDIDP's aims (FUPI 2008: 398). Consequently, the previous land-use plan has largely been adopted. Although fragmentation of the city structure has been reduced since the formulation of the last master plan, the SDF names this as its main objective (FUPI 2008: 398). This can be supported by a survey of the land-use/land-cover change in the city of Bahir Dar which exposes a mainly horizontal expansion of the city in the years between 1957 and 1994 (Nigussie Haregeweyn et al. 2012: 155). It, thereby, proposes that urban structures are growing in the form of sprawl and growth on the fringes rather than densification in the centre (ibid).

According to the RUPI, the urban design furthered by the IDP is intended for poverty alleviation (Tilahun 04.09.10). A further set of sub-aims is related to the land-use categories. Besides residential areas, commerce and trade, services, culture, cemeteries, manufacturing and storage, transport, recreation, agricultural use and forest, its land-use map also indicates areas designated for special functions (Genet GebreEgziabher 2011, FUPI 2008: 398):

- Residential areas: Housing is declared a priority issue. Therefore serviced land is provided, based on population projections. Although only 700 ha would be needed according to the figures, 1,381 ha of residential zoning is provided: nearly double the amount. Reasons given for this are difficulties with swamps and an anticipated increased investment in residences by the Amharic diaspora. (FUPI 2008: 398).
- Administration: The sole aim is the relocation of the prison from its current location to a peripheral site near the airport (FUPI 2008: 399).
- Commerce and trade: Active nodes and corridors are determined by this use in addition to the city centre reserved for this purpose. Market areas are newly devised outside the current central location, by which investment into the cleared inner-city space is meant to be furthered (FUPI 2008: 400).
- Services: Services, which are specified as education and health facilities, are

assumed to be largely provided by the private sector, and a portion of the residential area will be reserved for this purpose (FUPI 2008: 400).

- Culture: This is limited to the space needed by religious institutions (FUPI 2008: 401).
- Cemeteries: A redistribution of the use is planned and an expansion of the existing area size necessary (FUPI 2008: 401).
- Manufacturing and storage: Without giving evidence for demand in the BDIDP document, the development of this sector is assumed to be fast, therefore 339.4 ha of development space is proposed for manufacturing and storage purposes. Thereby, manufacturing, which is currently located in the centre of the city, is assigned land on the relocation sites, as it is considered unsuitable for its current location (FUPI 2008: 401).
- Transport: Two new freight terminals for road transport will be installed in addition to the existing bus-station. City and marine transport facilities will be expanded. (FUPI 2008: 401).
- Recreation: The land use will be determined in a two-stage plan preparation, as six large-scale areas are designated in addition to flexible neighbourhood public open spaces (FUPI 2008: 402).
- Agriculture: The wetlands in the city and vacant land in marginal locations are assigned for urban agriculture in the form of animal husbandry and horticulture. (FUPI 2008: 402). The SDF includes possibilities for organised associations to engage in urban agriculture as an acknowledgement of subsistence-based livelihoods in the city (Tilahun 04.09.10). The scale of this is unclear.
- Forest: 13% of the urban area is reserved for forests. The locations are on hills, the buffer area from the lake and hazardous areas. However, feasibility studies are to determine whether the locations can be converted into parks (FUPI 2008: 402).
- Special function: Anything that does not fit into any of the aforementioned land-use categories is subsumed under “special function”. The description itself lists water bodies, buffer and marshy areas (FUPI 2008: 402).

The mixed use of the informal and historic structures within small-scale structures is compensated for by single-use residences, as there is also no “mixed-use” designation in the land-use plans.

At the project level, the SDF proposes four major development directions in which the city is to expand in a time span of ten years (FUPI 2008: 398, Bahir Dar City Administration 2011). It is proposed that the road network should serve to reduce fragmentation in the urban morphology (FUPI 2008: 403). Therefore, “geometric standards” for a hierarchical road system are introduced (*ibid*). The expansions are to follow the direction of the major access roads to the city from Gondar, Mota and Debre Marcos. Additionally the document proposes a range of projects that are not explicitly located, plus a redevelopment of the inner city (FUPI

2008: 398, Bahir Dar City Administration 2011). The inner-city development is, thereby, composed of:

- an action plan for lakeshore development,
- upgrading projects for Kebeles 04, 05 and 06 and
- detail plans and designs for the market area, stadiums and the martyrdom monument

(FUPI 2008: 398, Bahir Dar Metropolitan City Administration 2011).

For this purpose, “action area plans” are devised for the projects that the SDF will incorporate as strategic components (FUPI 2008: 398). The implementation of the SDF projects is within the responsibility of the city administration. For this, it uses the lease system policy, which allows it to allocate land to the uses and projects that it feels suit the development plan. The decision on building permits for development projects is either undertaken by tender of the city administration on the grounds of the land-use function, the height of the buildings, the size and the lease period or by an investor proposal. The latter will then be negotiated between the developer and the city administration. If the site chosen for “development” has already been occupied, e.g. by informal settlers, or the existing housing is not deemed to suit the development aims, the settlers will be resettled on grounds of not fulfilling the building standards for the site. All residents are offered an alternative site for self-construction. Additionally, compensation is offered if the residents are the lawful owners of their buildings (Genet GebreEgziabher 2011).

The IDP is still a new approach, which, according to the regional administration, has an advantage over the two-sectioned approach of strategic plan and master plan. It is considered more participatory than former approaches. Stakeholders are invited to participate in an open discussion for the set-up of the plans. In the participation, different sectoral experts, government officials and kebele residents are invited to contribute; the form of approach differs according to each group in consultation (Interview Yirsaw 2013). The planning has been decentralised and is described as “close to the public” by the administration. However, problems are solved from case to case (Tilahun 04.09.10). This view of decentralisation being participatory is thus not supported by evidence.

Changes in the IDP’s concept were undertaken in the transfer process of the IDP from the South African framework into an Ethiopian adaptation. Overall, the IDP can, hence, be deemed not to be a one-on-one copy of the South African version. In the course of the policy transfer, conscious, implicit and practical changes have shaped a contingent Bahir Dar version of the IDP as a policy instrument. It has largely lost its character of being an instrument of participatory budgeting, but rather turned into a revision of the last master plan with additional strategic elements represented by the included projects. One of the changes is the extended period of validity from five to ten years, benefiting the strategic components. In my

opinion, this comes much closer to the concept of comprehensive planning than that of participatory budgeting. This might be called a simplification of an overly sophisticated tool that has been made operable while retaining its potential to be elaborated. The four main projects of the SDF will be reviewed in the following, in order to describe how planning relates to its own plan in practice.

5.5.2 Urban Development Practice

By introducing the IDP, Bahir Dar has opened up an experimental approach to urban development, due to the promising potential of the instrument. In the regional administration there is an acknowledgement of the ongoing urbanisation process and a general notion that there is a need to act on this. The IDP as an instrument is intended to serve as a tool to coordinate the competing interests on spatial use, regarding formal solutions. The “action area plans” are geared towards formalisation of urban structures, which is the scope the IDP is actually drafted to address. The strengths, therefore, lie in housing-provision for the middle-income groups, construction of institutions and provision of standardised infrastructure. In the following it will be described how the projects included in the IDPs strategic document are put into place.

Action plan for lakeshore development

In the original master plan from 1962, the northern waterfront area of Bahir Dar, stretching right from the western side over to the eastern edge of the city, was intended as a public green area for recreational purposes. A public walkway was planned, which has been realised and is still maintained today. Large trees house a wide variety of bird life. The eastern part of the area is a landing site for the timber trade and provides working and living space for tanners. Large parts of the land on this shore are in the hands of the church. Towards the centre, the area with its walkway is currently strongly frequented by the city youth for various purposes. The cafés are meeting points (consumption is usually not obligatory), it is a hide-out for young couples, petty trade and tourist boats run their business. Access to the lake is important to a large number of people washing laundry and doing their personal hygiene in the lake, despite the inlet of sewage. In the very centre of the city the commercial port with its ferry jetties and warehouses is functional. The western area between the city centre and the mouth of the Nile is very swampy and therefore remains untouched. Large parts of the shore are used for subsistence agriculture.

In recent years, the waterfront has become a focal point of building activities in the city. The area on the lakeshore faces high land-use competition between development and public open space interests. There has been a paradigm shift in planning, away from industrialisation towards building up a tourism sector. With

this shift, commercial pressure on the lakeshore has risen. The 1996 land-use plan allowed the allocation by designating the area as “special use”, leaving space for interpretation. Under the aim of encouraging tourism, land use on the waterfront is, thus, privatised and handed over for the development of hotels, while representative administrative buildings are also placed in these prestigious locations.

The IDP declares the waterfront a “special planning area”. From 2011 on, the further planning and implementation process for the waterfront is guided by a “Sustainable Vision and Waterfront Plan”. The elements of its vision are formulated as: “public access to the waterfront and its natural areas”, “green, beautified and sanitary infrastructure and design”, “mixed use corridors”, “appropriate housing and jobs for all”, as well as “access to rural-urban linkages” (Canadian Urban Institute 2011). The City Administration, the RUPI and the NGO “Canadian Urban Institute” set up this plan in a joint effort. It will be valid for a period of ten years and will be accompanied by stakeholder participation.

Beyond these intentions for participative development however, the site is especially popular among investors, and the city administration and the regional government have been pressured by private developers to allow construction in the area. The regional government and the national government have taken decision control and are overseeing the implementation for this site because of its investment potential. Projects that have been realised in recent years are the redesign of the ferry jetties and the building of international-standard hotels, such as the “Kuriftu Resort”. According to the RUPI, hotels are now seen as having employ potential and are foreigner oriented. They have major importance for Bahir Dar City, as foreign currencies can be taken advantage of. It is seen as a driving force of the city’s development and there is a high political interest in promoting it. The area on the lakeshore is being actively promoted as an investment opportunity to foreign and national investors and has received positive response from both (Tilahun 2010). Political pressure has also been passed on to the Port Authority, which occupies and administers the central area of the lake shore, including the operation of the ferry, the landing, sand extraction, boat tours and hotel enterprises. On the demand of generating higher profits from its ventures, investment and “development” on the central spot was demanded. A project plan was developed to construct a building with further hotel accommodation, a kindergarten and further tourist facilities for recreation, while maintaining the port operations such as the ferry service and logistics. The plans were discussed in a closed meeting with experts in the Taitu Café in October 2009. They were already executed in the following year.

By the time the “Sustainable Vision and Waterfront Plan” started its participation scheme in 2012, many important decisions on the land-use of the lakeshore had therefore already been taken outside of the plan. Nevertheless, the plan proceeded with a number of public hearings to address different stake-holder groups. The participants were invited to give their opinion on the future development of

the lakeshore. How these actually influenced the further planning decisions could not be established during research. Interests conflicting with the development priorities however did not get a chance to enter an open-ended negotiation.

Kebele upgrading projects

The implementation of the IDP is facilitating the “development” of the inner-city land by encouraging financial investment and business activities. Within the frame of the IDP, the Canadian Urban Institute is developing an “upgrading and urban design strategy” for the downtown area (Canadian Urban Institute 24.02.2011; Interview Yirsaw 2013). The plan is intended for setting up commercial areas and residential areas for different income levels. The aims of this upgrading initiative are based on the aspirations of the city administration. They are focused on giving the impression of modernity and renewal. At the outset, a detailed socio-economic survey was conducted, including all existing houses in the area. Data on housing typology, household income, and personal experiences were retrieved. These data were handed to private consultants who are now devising an “upgrading plan”, which at the time of data collection was still being prepared. In the face of this upgrading aim, the residents were asked about their relocation needs. However, according to the regional planning administration, this plan is also still in preparation. The planning initiative, though, is expected to have a leverage effect in the sense that a number of residents is assumed to abide by the new regulations and to voluntarily upgrade their dwellings within this larger process, making resettlement unnecessary (Interview Yirsaw 2013). In effect, the modernisation scheme forces the residents to leave the area by declaring their houses unsuitable to the building standard. The modernisation vision is dependent on attracting investment and does not consider incremental upgrading strategies based on existing structures. Single-storey buildings are to be replaced by multi-storey buildings. The current occupants can bid and propose enlarged structures in order to secure their plots. The uses of the new buildings will be partly the same as at present, as apartments and bars are established, but the price range and target groups will clearly differ. If the land-holding residents or shopkeepers do not have the financial means to rebuild and comply with the new standard, they will have to move from the location. Details of refunding for displacement were not available at the time of observation.

Fig. 7: Street Corner in Downtown Bahir Dar with Kebele Housing in 2009



Image by the author.

Fig. 8: The Same Street Corner with Commercial Development in the year 2013



Image by the author.

Detail plan for shifting the market

The market will be decentralised and moved indoors to two new sites, so that its current inner-city site can be cleared and developed. Market activities incompatible with the modernisation are to be shifted from the city centre to the two new market areas in the east and the southwest of the city (Bahir Dar Metropolitan City Administration 2011). The proposal for the shift is made in the development plan, where most of the area has been qualified as commercial zones (Interview Yirsaw 2013). The new market areas are situated in less central situations and are both surrounded by residential areas. Market halls and defined market stalls are already provided in the new locations. In the southwest, a lot of trading activity is currently taking place outside the provided structure, as the smallest stalls have continued their sales on canvas sheets on the ground. Yet the two new markets will provide mainly roofed vending space, thus replacing current informally accessible vending space for small-scale agricultural producers in the near future (Interview Yirsaw 2013). This leaves the question of how long these decentralised market structures might remain as open farmers' markets before being turned into shop spaces. The idea behind this is that farmers will no longer trade themselves, but sell their produce to whole-sellers, who will take over the distribution (Interview Yirsaw 2013).

Expansion areas

On behalf of governmental urbanisation practise, the city's growth is being addressed by designating expansion areas in the IDP. These areas are located in a ring-shaped structure around the existing built up area in the south, east and west of Bahir Dar. All in all, the expansion-sites offer accommodation for all uses driven outside of the centre and the additional growth. The expansion on the eastern shore of the Nile forms a new sub-centre. The formal expansions of the city are undertaken on land parcels provided with basic infrastructure. While all types of land-use are included in these expansions to cater for a variety of demands, residential use is most dominant in the peripheral areas (Gebeyaw Walle 2003: 48-49).

The expansions cater for a variety of uses and the housing standard and typology is varied. It includes privately erected housing, many of them using the standard designs, which are available from the municipality. Thereby, the size of plots provided by the Land Registration Office for single-unit residence has decreased from 250m² in the 1990s to currently 100m² (Nigussie Haregeweyn et al. 2012: 154). Further government housing is provided in the shape densely built up condominiums, private and public education facilities, trade and all scale industries.

The usual approach to find a plot for construction, involves fulfilling certain criteria of residence, which the town administration validates. Together 20-30 people apply for a development parcel. They already have to be residents in Bahir Dar and not owners of a house, yet. The town will then find a location to build. This procedure was the norm from the previous socialist regime, to the introduction of the condominiums in 2008 eth. calendar (Daniel Weldegebriel 2011: 5). Now, the

condominiums housing programme in Bahir Dar offers an alternative access to housing (Zelalem Yirga 2012). However, with the housing provision through plots and condominiums, the expansion areas do not target recent migrants, as plots can only be requested from the municipality if there has been a two-year period of residence in the city (*ibid*).

Industrial investment has priority over agricultural use in the expansion areas. Two industrial sites were allotted, in which more than 100 investors received plots, sized between a half and one ha. The municipality prepared and serviced more than 100ha of land, but at the time there was no further investment interest. The expansion sites for industrial investment have faced difficulty in realisation. According to the RUPI, , more than 100 investors gained plots on two industrial sites that were provided in the municipality of Bahir Dar, but many investments failed. In these cases there was no progress in the construction for more than three or four years. (Tilahun 04.09.10)

Nigusie Haregeweyn et al. (2012: 150) describe the urban expansion as posing a serious threat to the livelihoods of small-scale farmers on the urban fringe, who earn their living by farming the productive agricultural lands under urbanisation pressure. The expansion of Bahir Dar's urban area follows the conversion model of Addis Ababa, where a strategy for the conversion of rural to urban land has been piloted. This involves the relocation of farmers around Bahir Dar for urban expansion. The urban expansion is described as having serious threats on the livelihoods of the surrounding small scale farmers in subsistence agriculture. (*ibid*). Farmers practising subsistence agriculture are, thus, facing a decrease in agricultural land in the region around Bahir Dar, as it is consumed by urban expansion and other non-agricultural uses (*ibid*). The urban expansion and substitution of rural land specifications are decided by the government (Genet GebreEgziabher 18.02.2011). In the progress of expansion, 2878 households were compensated for having to move due to development projects between the years 2004 and 2009 alone (Nigusie Haregeweyn et al. 2012: 154). Some 12% of these farmers lost all of their land in the course of the expropriation (*ibid*). The compensation is most often delivered in monetary form. Other offers, such as access to credit or access to training and advisory services were promised to the dispossessed farmers, instead, but had a very low rate of delivery. The study, further, describes how the majority of recipients store this monetary compensation in the bank, because they lack ideas for investment (*ibid*: 155). Smaller proportions use it for home consumption, another small fraction for renting land or draught animals and another fraction has invested in houses in the urban areas (*ibid*). A major problem in putting the monetary compensation to use is the illiteracy of the farmers losing their land (*ibid*) and, therefore, the failure to integrate them into the changing circumstances of income generation in the face of urbanisation in their settlement areas.

The process is described to have created a shortage of farmland and is accused of having brought social problems such as increasing territorial conflicts among farmers and migration of people from their rural homesteads to communities living on the urban fringe. The young population on the urban fringe is described as being increasingly without occupation due to a lack of access to land (ibid). Additionally, environmental impacts are identified, but these were described as of lesser importance to the residents. However, positive effects of the urban expansion are also described: Access to education, health services and infrastructure, electricity and clean water were facilitated due to the approximation of urban services (ibid). These have led to the development of a strategic settlement in hope of receiving either income opportunities or compensation. Since compensating plots are also offered to informal settlers under certain conditions, building and development sites, such as the new “Legal Campus” of Bahir Dar University, trigger the informal sub-division and undocumented sale of land by the resident farmers to newly arriving settlers, who self-construct on the site in the hope of making a business or even in direct expectation of compensation (Achamyale Gashu 2014). This issue can only be tackled partly, as the responsibilities for rural and urban are divided between different ministries.

In practice, the implementation of the IDP in Bahir Dar does not differ distinctly from operating with a comprehensive plan. Its intention to integrate sectoral planning is countered by the fact that there are no means of coordinating the sectoral responsibilities across the regional ministries. Processes of dialogue and negotiation are part of the IDPs concept and have been initiated. For participatory budgeting as a form of decision-making, however, a high level of data input would be necessary. However, experience with participatory formats in Ethiopia is rare, data for Bahir Dar are scarce and the processes have to be viewed as a first step to establish participation in planning. Current decision-making comes in form of public hearings, serves to inform the population and does not include decision-making on public budgets. The IDP in Bahir Dar has, hence, developed into a comprehensive plan for practical reasons.

Being a planning instrument developed for the transition to democracy, the processes designed for the IDP originally have an impetus of transparency and are meant to visualise political priority setting. The democratic decision making of the planning process which is guided by the regional planning office, however, is countered by a proviso enabling the national state to intervene to benefit national interest, which has been used for administrative use and business investment. This national state intervention undermines the power of the IDP, as the plan is not binding, while criteria for the exceptions are unclear (see 5.5). The devolution of power in urban planning has, thereby, been undertaken with substantial subtractions. The possibility to override lower-level decisions also questions the plan’s original purpose, by which planning is to be aligned throughout the different governance

levels. It is due to this that there are occasions in which the plan is changed to suit the construction projects already realised through higher interest legitimisation.

An original intention of the IDP from its background in South Africa was the integration of spatially fragmented and economically and racially segregated structures to overcome disparities and distributive injustice. The situation encountered in Bahir Dar is different from the context in South African cities, as the income levels are low overall, and the income disparities are not as large (Ministry of Works and Urban Development 2007: 12). The aim in development in the city, therefore, needs to be to maintain equality while raising the overall standard of living. Currently Amhara's tax-base does not cover its expenditures (see 5.5), and so financing is reliant on external funding. For the IDP, which was originally conceptualised for redistribution through participatory budgeting, this proves problematic, as there is high political pressure to draw investment into the region's cities. Laying the development priority on the tourism sites (see 5.5), which do not benefit the underserved residential areas and does not address population influx, reflects this. Further, resettlement practices continue to benefit business development and are favoured over upgrading strategies. The impact of this on those affected by resettlement will be looked into in the following chapter (see chapter 6.1.1 and chapter 6.1.3).

Beyond the topics actually addressed by the plan, the IDP as a planning instrument does not address the informal practices of urbanisation in Bahir Dar, which make up a large part of the city's development. Planning, therefore, regularly comes into conflict with traditional and informal settlement practices, which are considered neither in existing land use, nor in the projected zoning.

5.6 RUPTURES, CONTINUITIES AND PARALLELS IN BAHIR DAR'S URBAN PLANNING

The urban development of Bahir Dar has been shaped by a number of principles over time. Urban planning in Ethiopia has colonial and modernist elements, while also the planning discipline itself is rooted in modernism. Planning in Bahir Dar is influenced by a multitude of sources, reaching from the Italian introduction of an urban administration via the first master plan for the city by Max Guther, through influences of socialist industrialisation policies to the current conceptions introduced by multi-lateral aid-agreements. All of these have, thereby, left their distinctive spatial marks on the city. From this perspective, Ethiopia has not been isolated but has been subject to receiving urban development plans and has been a site of urban construction on the basis of non-Ethiopian theories, named as "models-in-circulation" (Roy 2011b: 410). The findings suggest that, in Bahir Dar, urban development history shapes the setting for current planning practice. However, the data indicates that the relation of the guiding principles is not one of succession but

rather one of ruptures, continuities and parallels that can still be traced in today's city. The phenomenon of changing guiding principles is hence not a historical sequence, but rather one of an accumulation that is legible in today's urban fabric. The paradigms brought into this context can be linked to five periods of political influence at a national level in Ethiopia, which acted as sovereign powers also over the local development of Bahir Dar. However, due to its strategic location on the source of the Nile, Bahir Dar became politically relevant over the international dispute on the use of water resources.

The first phase is that of traditional land practice. Bahir Dar can be considered one of the fairly young cities. Practices of everyday urbanisation, leading to the establishment of an early dense settlement on the site of today's city of Bahir Dar, began before "planning" as a professional concept arrived. In contrast to other Ethiopian cities that were long-standing royal residences such as Addis or Gondar, urban planning as a statutory task arrived in Bahir Dar much later, for instance. It was introduced into what had already been a fishing village, trading post and monastic centre, where the land administration was in the hands of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and followed a hereditary system. However, there is little evidence on life in the settlement from the founding period of Bahir Dar, and the development of a larger city was apparently prevented by malaria.

The second phase is that of the five-year occupation of the Ethiopian territory by the Italians with colonial spatial policies. With the arrival of the occupiers in 1936, a military camp was installed and the first permanent buildings erected. The colonial interests that determined spatial use were rooted in the Italian textile industry, which was to be provided with cotton from the region (Consociazione Turistica Italiana 1938: 383). The Italians and their installation of a military garrison subjected Bahir Dar to restructuring measures during the occupation. An urban administration and land taxation levied by the occupiers were introduced. Modern urban planning was, hence, introduced to Bahir Dar later than other Ethiopian cities such as the capital Addis Ababa and Gondar. Compared to other cities, the Italian impact on the urban layout of Bahir Dar was relatively minor, and segregated living areas such as in Gondar were not introduced. Consequently, the occupiers did not systematically reshape the local building tradition. However, their presence impacted on the building standards. It also stands against the traditional land-administration of the area and induced the parallel existence of land-administration systems that endure to this day.

With the reinstitution of Haile Selassie as Emperor in 1941, the third phase of development for Bahir Dar commenced. Bahir Dar was, thereby, one of many locations that were subjected to master planning under Emperor Haile Selassie after his return from exile. Before the establishment of the master plan, urban development

in Bahir Dar was largely an issue of local negotiation. From then on, however, urban planning for Bahir Dar was a centralistic task. However, its speculative status as future capital put it in a particular position among the other 46 cities with restructuring activities. To decide disputes over the water resources in the region, the Emperor gave the order for a master plan to be devised, designing a city for more than 200,000 inhabitants. The continuities between the periods of Italian rule and the modernist master plan for the city based on industrialisation, including cotton production, need to be made the subject of further academic discussion.

Structurally, whatever had existed as a settlement was dismissed by a new modernist vision of what a city is and was projected to be a centre of power over water resources. With the introduction of modernist planning and its technocratic belief system, the expansion of a settlement into a town was decided on, laying the foundations of the transformation from a small-scale settlement to a larger city structure. The master plan not only intended to reshape all existing structures, it also marked a fundamental change in how everyday urbanisation is viewed. In relation to the plan's modernist proposals, traditional building and local practice was now considered backwards and inadequate. New building standards were introduced to which local building practice henceforth had to comply. This is, thus, a turning point after which administrative aims and local interests developed in significantly different directions, as existing settlement structures were no longer regarded as a reference or even an asset.

The urban expansion triggered by the plans for industry and use of hydro-power guided by the master plan were the start of a rapid phase of urban growth in Bahir Dar that has continued to this day. The movement of individuals from the surrounding countryside into the newly expanded urban area was triggered by their search for work in the newly installed textile mill and large construction projects. Bahir Dar can, thereby, be considered one of a number of rather recently established small industrial centres that had especially high rates of urban growth during the past decades. The loss of regional typicality in the course of urbanisation might have been triggered by the Italians in some locations, but the evidence from Bahir Dar shows that modern principles of planning were only introduced to certain Ethiopian cities long after the occupation. Emperor Haile Selassie favoured stone and square clay buildings for construction, and these structures increasingly replaced the local tukul. Introducing the Guthier plan thus means a division into formal and informal urban structures. However, there is not only a traditionalist movement that was forced to modernise, but also an Ethiopian progressive movement that believed in the merits of the modern standards and introduced them voluntarily. Implementation of the general layout proposed by Guthier began in 1962 (Egli 1967, Tvedt 2004). Nevertheless, here was no comprehensive modernisation of the city due to lack of funds. Bahir Dar was never able to systematically supply water and sanitation to the inhabitants, as grid service was not established alongside the expansion of streets, industry and housing. Today's water and sanita-

tion crisis can also be seen as the result of a failure to install the 1962 master plan's infrastructure components.

Although Guthrie's master plan was not underpinned by sufficient political and legal support and could never be implemented to its full intention, from now on it coexisted with the local urbanisation practice. While it marks the introduction of urban administration to Bahir Dar in the modernist understanding, existing building structures were only partly replaced and many remained, building techniques with local material persisted and traditional practices of land-distribution continued. As generally described by Berrisford (2011) for former colonial states, this introduction of tenure, taxation and building technology on the premises of Italian intervention and by German development aid resulted in the installation of parallel institutional and traditional systems of land-administration, settling and building practice also in Bahir Dar.

The phase of master planning is followed by the fourth period of socialist doctrine, in which urban development was virtually abandoned in favour of rural development by the government (Gebeyaw Walle 2003: 31) but still experienced population growth and a number of influential administrative changes. While the socialists displayed a negligent attitude towards housing and quality of infrastructure on a larger scale, their instalment of infrastructure for the textile production site emphasised their idea of building an industrial labour force, thereby shaping spatial configurations into the present. Although socialism did not develop plans for individual cities, their general (anti-urban) policies, and also their buildings and industrial projects, have left significant structures in the city and triggered the establishment of urban neighbourhoods. The impact of socialist policies on urban development in Bahir Dar is substantial and cannot be dismissed as inactivity. The impacts of administrative reform and nationalisation of land are felt to this day, but they are overshadowed by the rule's arbitrary violence against the population. What this has done to the population's trust in state institutions – also those of urban planning – is not discussed openly in Ethiopian society. The cost of these policies could, thus, not be established, but there are still population groups that have lost from resisting or following socialist policy as well as others that have profited.

In the fifth phase under current EPRDF rule, Ethiopia set up its first official Urban Policy in 2005. The framework to guide urban development and, hence, address the process of urbanisation is conducted with the instrument of the IDP, which was largely developed in South Africa for the redistribution of land and assets in a highly racially and economically segregated country. The BDBIDP has, since, replaced the master plan as a planning instrument. In order to introduce this planning instrument to Bahir Dar's context, it has been adapted from its original form. The planning document consists of a Spatial Development Framework, and a set of "action area plans". By allocating the responsibility for the IDP to the RUPI,

the power for setting up the plan is centralised on the regional level and the municipality is, in fact, not in charge of setting up the plan (even if it is consulted in the process). Paradoxically, for this critical moment in time, the municipality has lost formal authority over its urban development to the RUPI as the higher regional authority, under the process of devolution in “decentralisation”. Instead of developing local solutions this set-up can be criticised as creating new political power structures that reach beyond the capital and are in line with what has been criticised as “governability” (see 2.2.4).

While the RUPI has the authority to set up the plan, it faces difficulties in the sectoral participation. Issues widely acknowledged as fundamental tasks in need of systematic planning, such as providing for basic infrastructure, have not been considered in the BDIDPs content. Not only is there no leverage to bind the other offices to participate in the set-up and implementation of the BDIDP, the institutional set-up in Ethiopia also differs strongly from the fragmented and strongly sectoral background the IDP was developed for in South Africa. South African cities come from a history of self-governed provinces with a weak national directory, while Ethiopian cities face a history of a centralistic socialist system. The IDP cannot foot on a sectoral planning tradition in Ethiopia, which are the institutional grounds of colonial and apartheid legacy, on which the instrument was developed on in South Africa. In Bahir Dar, infrastructure plans, rural development, economic development, cadastres etc. are now set up under the responsibility of their own regional offices and are mostly still in the beginning stages. Here it is not mainly the question to overcome rifts of non-cooperation of a fragmented institutional landscape but rather the reverse general question of decentralisation and responsibility for sectoral planning issues that have to be addressed in feeding the decision-making tools for urban development. In order to function as an integrated plan and negotiate planning and trade-offs, the IDP will have to be equipped with systematic contributions from all sectoral offices.

At the outset, it seems that the transfer of the IDP from the South African context to Ethiopia implies a congruency or at least a convergence of the underlying realities of South African and Ethiopian cities, or even an underlying typology of “African City”, which has no empirical proof. However, while the instrument has been introduced into the statutory planning structures and serves as an instrument, the guiding principles were not transferred unquestioned. The assumptions, ideals and underlying guiding principles of urban development in South Africa were partly transferred as they are inscribed in the aim of avoiding fragmentation but do not function as a larger guiding principle for the urban strategies for Bahir Dar. Yet, unlike the instrument originally requested, the local negotiation of norms by which the IDP as an instrument is meant to spatialise budget allocation and design interventions, has not been undertaken transparently and in public consultation but rather in a tacit endeavour as they were implicitly replaced by the Ethiopian government rhetoric of “development”. Priorities are set on tourism

and government development projects, while the IDP does not cater for informal, agricultural and ethnic urban structures and processes in practice. Placed within the government strategy of development, the BDIDP continues to operate on a strong technical planning ideal. Here, past paradigms continue and persist in the administrative practice that has appropriated the idea of the IDP and assimilated it to its own mode of operation. As illustrated, the instrument currently faces a lack of sufficient data and information on internal migration, housing needs formulated by the population and analyses of emerging livelihood structures to base its decisions on. A key-problem is that, due to lack of data and adequate local problem descriptions (Tilahun 04.09.10), the IDP as a “data hungry” instrument can not be fed with the information it needs for the decision making processes to allocate budgets. On issues of migration, e.g. sample data and field observations are used for planning purposes due to lack of more specific figures (ibid). To fill this gap, the planners look at conventional understandings of urbanisation and conceptualise the dynamic as growth that will lead the inhabitants to adopt middle-income life-styles. This adoption of ideas bears dangers, as the underpinning rationales of urban development do not find sufficient recognition in the transfer process. As for Bahir Dar, it has to be assumed that a diversification of urbanisation rationales was induced. While there is not much data available on population movement, it should be assumed that the rural-urban migration patterns include circular and temporary movements like in other African states. However, no accounts of this non-governmental practice of rapid urbanisation were established, as research has largely limited its accounts to the evaluation and description of policy documents. This sets predispositions for false assumptions: Based on speculations, the actual needs of the population are, hence, difficult to target with urban planning measures. While the plan includes explicit anti-discriminatory passages regarding the rights of ethnic minorities, the informal practices of the poorest, the recent arrivals, those outside of traditional family structures and those unable to find rental accommodation (for example for religious reasons), are not tolerated by administrative practice, despite its claim to contribute to poverty-reduction. Instead, the plan aims at formalising, based on implicit assumptions of fordistic lifestyles that are assumed to gradually be embraced by increasing numbers of the local population in the course of urbanisation. These assumptions are reflected in the zoning proposals that know no mixed-use and differentiate between residential areas and commercial and industrial zones. It is also indicated by the building regulations, perpetually changed to increase density and determine the building materials allowed in favour of imported goods, just as the building typologies and standard designs available from the administration, that are drafted to meet these building regulations. In favour of these, the aforementioned settlement types (traditional, historical and informal) are declared slum areas or are not mapped as a result of their informal status. The inhabitants are dislocated and subjected to “re-settlement” schemes. The plan’s contents are, therefore, in effect exclusionary and

demand a high level of conformity from the urban population to standards that were not developed from the local situation. It, hence, appears that the BDIDP has to be seen in continuation of a master-plan tradition, which has been transformed into a new shape of document to suit the categories proposed by the IDP manual.

The original idea of the IDP in South Africa was to further socio-democratic outcomes in a liberal economy by establishing an incentive system of participation (Interview Gorgens 2012). To make it perform, the original proposal of the IDP requires a high level of data input for decision-making. In Ethiopia however, the overall data base on which planning is executed is very thin due to lack of empirical material. To facilitate decision making, the BDIDP has, hence, largely been stripped of the function of participative budgeting and moved public discussion to the end of the planning process, at which the projects (see chapter 5.5.2) have already been decided. In Bahir Dar the decision making process on priority land-use, infrastructure provision and action areas in the BDIDP is intransparent.

Beyond that, the decision short-cuts from national level further undermine the IDP's purpose of introducing transparency into the decision process of determining spatial use. The plan's contents are devised mainly in a supposed public interest, but since the plan can be overridden easily, it is not considered all that important by actors with diverging interest. Projects of national interest can override the plan's contents that were negotiated with stake-holder participation and might rely on consistent obedience (nature reserves as protected areas etc.). These negotiations of the state and third party interests, are based on opportunities in the economic realm. As a general rule, economic value of a development will give the lead on priority changes with any other interests (Interview Yirsaw 2013). National government, thereby, even supports commercial development against the regionally set-up plan. And as changes to the plan can be decided on negotiation of investors and the administration, with questioning coming only from experts, there is no public eye on the keeping of the plan. Here, the government acts informally and the different levels of administration can intervene against each other. In this case, the plan as devised has little power to be enforced on the implementation level, where another sort of negotiation between higher policy officials and investors can evade the intentions of the region and the municipal level in favour of national interest. Here, statutory planning can therefore not be seen as forecasting, but rather as a practise of ad-hoc negotiation.

Despite operating on the normative of "development" and in the tradition of master-planning, the IDP does expand the range of instruments to statutory planning in Bahir Dar by including public hearings for the action plans. Although participation might actually stand in competition with other political interests and is therefore limited under the political pre-conditions, it was not granted in the negotiation of the planning paradigm nor is the public involved in budget-allocation, the action plans do, however, involve some sort of public hearings. These hearings are devised to address various stake-holder groups and can be assumed

to address a wide range of interests. While the BDIDP guides the spatialisation of investments, a negotiation of trade-offs and the setting of aims, as the original purpose of the IDP intends, takes place in this limited realm. Yet, taking the IDP's intention of generating transparency in the decision making processes seriously, it needs to be analysed carefully, which of the actors and stake-holders are actually in a position to negotiate, due to the existing power-balances among sectoral inputs, participation thresholds and the confusion around the relationship of the IDP to other planning practices (sectoral and higher level planning as well as traditional settling regimes). Despite these first efforts, transparency in decision-making on urban development issues in Bahir Dar can well be improved.

The IDP is described as a good planning tool by the local administrative officers but, referring to the urban structures visible and obviously not conforming to the modern standards inherent in the regulations, an "implementation problem" was deplored repeatedly. The plan is, thereby, not considered powerful enough by urban planners of the Regional Urban Planning Institute. This mismatch between aspirational planning and reality on the ground needs to be acknowledged, but should be questioned regarding the adequacy of the planning instrument towards its context of implementation. Transferring the IDP from foreign context and political aspirations of development have lead the plan to function on outside experience, not on local realities. The ideas Bahir Dar has about its own urban development are very limited and developed from images, rather than local needs, available assets and experience. Lack in research on existing social, economic and built structures renders the existing to be non-conformant to plan and thus marginalises urban elements that do not suit the developmental interests. In an attempt to formalise, these outside influences have gradually taken a stance against local practices and have taken on local practice as adverse to their own endeavours. Instead of addressing and cooperating with local practices of settling, the IDP is called to deregulate former interventions of the state and render existing housing and commercial structures on the micro-scale illegal on the grounds of new standards. The arising disputes on building regulation and land-use issues between regional and municipal planning level and stake-holders are even furthered by the fact that a non-compliance with the agreements reached within the planning process and depicted in the plan currently has no sanctions. The municipality is not penalised, if it does not implement the ideas provided in the plan by the RUPI, which has lead planning officials to call for more power to the plan. Yet, the IDP and its measures insufficiently question the land-use and building structures proposed by development and technical standardisation. The example of failed industrial allocation shows, that the implementation of the plan's set priorities is not geared towards a factually existing demand. The Ethiopian condition of a strong dependency on subsistence farming by an overwhelming 85% of the population is meanwhile only poorly considered as a relevant context for urbanisation.

While there might be a problem of implementation of the plan due to an in-transparent political agenda, which is not publicly and openly discussed in the set-up of the planning instrument, there are further issues with the IDP. It has to be questioned, whether its implementation should actually be furthered in its current form. What is perceived here as an implementation problem of urban policies by the regional administration, might actually be related to the negotiation of the underlying planning paradigms, which was conducted in lack of data on local urbanisation processes. The needs of the population have not been analysed sufficiently. The planning approaches claim to be inclusive regarding the low economic status of the majority of population, but none of them has actually made a conceptual study of the urbanisation process and the needs emerging in it. Instead, the dualistic understandings of formal and informal as well as urban-rural that are inherent in the current urban policies become evident in the implementation practise and have to be considered obstacles for guiding urbanisation. Against its own assumptions, planning is, thus, not a coherent effort through the scales and intervention levels and has many loopholes leading to inconsistencies, tactical and informal practices, that go along with the formal set-up of plans and administration of resources. It, therefore, has to be questioned to what extent the plan's paradigms have been subjected to professional and public discussion (see chapter 2.3) and in whose interest the BDIDP functions.