

Douglas R. McGaughey

David Friedrich Strauß: A Reading of His Gospel Criticism and Metaphysics

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Antonino Falduto
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Frontispiece

"Philosophy cannot be learned, because every philosopher erects his [*sic.*] own edifice on the ruins of another, and if I were really given a system so clear that it always contained irrefutable propositions, I would still not be a philosopher if I learned all its propositions by heart. I would not have learned to philosophize but only possess historical knowledge without knowing the wellsprings from which it was ladled."¹

Immanuel Kant, *Wiener Logik*
AA XXIV: 799

"One must distinguish between two types of study: There is ruminative (*grüblerische*) scholarship that is of no use to humanity, and there were once philosophers whose whole scholarship consisted in outdoing each other in brilliance. These are called *scholastici*. Their art was scholarship for the academy, but one could not gain enlightenment for common life from it. One can have a great reputation in the academy without the world benefiting from one's knowledge. A second kind of scholarship consists in not only gaining respect from one's fellow guildsmen in the academy but also in extending knowledge beyond the academy and seeking to spread one's knowledge for the common good. This is scholarship for the world. Proper scholarship for the academy is in accordance with academic standards. This is a perfection that should not be despised because all scholarship must be exemplary. Only then can it also be popularized in order to be accepted and used by mere amateurs. At first, student training should engage enough manual skills that we can see how knowledge can best be applied to ordinary people. A person who makes a scholastic use of her/his knowledge is a pedant; s/he knows only how to describe her/his concepts with the technical terms of the school and speaks only in learned phrases. S/he merely applies purely scholastic knowledge in worldly affairs, but here in worldly affairs one must always know how to apply one's knowledge in a popular way so that others, not just scholars by profession, can understand us.

Immanuel Kant, *Menschenkunde*
AA XXV,2: 853;
Olms ed. 1

1. The 'wellsprings' of philosophy are neither merely perceptible nature nor the writings of others but, above all, the imperceptible, transcendental conditions of finite consciousness that make any and all experience, understanding, and responsible agency in the world possible, in the first place. On the challenges and need to discern the 'well-springs' of humanity, see Kant, *The Study of Humanity or Philosophical Anthropology* (*Menschenkunde oder philosophische Anthropologie*) AA XXV,2: 857; Olms ed.: 6-7.

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Foreword: A *Con-figured* Narrative

Down to the 13th C., Platonism's Sun Simile (*Republic* 507b -509c) and Line Simile (*Republic* 509c-511e)¹ dominated particularly the *Logos* tradition of Christian theology's understanding of *reality*,² not as knowledge of the 'cause' but as knowledge of unchanging 'Being.'

At the end of the 12th C., a Latin translation of Aristotle's extant works of the day, accompanied with the Andalusian, Islamic scholar Averroes' Latin commentary, resulted in upending the card table with a new 'materialism.' With this materialism, the perceptible world was no longer taken to be 'copies and shadows' of eternal, divine Ideas (the *Logos* or divine Word) as suggested by Plato's similes combined with the account of the creation of the world in *Timaeus* (27d ff; 69b-70a). With this new 'Aristotelianism' in the Latin world, 'ideas' as *a posteriori* creations of finite abstraction

1. The Sun and Line Similes *describe what it means 'to know reality'* (eternal Being and above) according to Plato's Idealism. For drawings and detailed discussion of the *a priori* synthetic elements necessary to understand Plato's Similes of the Sun and Line, see McGaughey, *Strangers and Pilgrims: On the Role of Aporiai in Theology* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1997): 219–240. and McGaughey, *Religion Before Dogma: Groundwork in Practical Theology* (New York: T & T Clark International, 2006): 119–124. Permission has been granted by Walter de Gruyter as well as by T & T Clark International for these pages to be posted on the home page at <https://criticalidealism.org>. For a descriptive account without drawings of the Similes, see in Chapter 8: "Hegel's Reclined Plato and Kant as a 'Subjectivist':" 81l.

In contrast, Plato's Cave Allegory of Book VII (*Republic* 514 ff.), which immediately follows the Similes of the Sun and Line in Book VI, *describes 'how the soul learns to free itself'* from the senses (the realm of transient, unreal Becoming), to grasp knowledge, true Being (and above). Plato provides an 'introduction' to the Cave Allegory in the *Phaedo* (that begins with the last line of *Phaedo* 82d and goes to the first line of 83c).

However, unlike Aristotle for whom 'wisdom' is knowledge of the cause of the perceptible, for Plato 'wisdom' is grasping the imperceptible, 'unchangeable'. Furthermore, for Plato wisdom 'sets the soul free' from the 'confinement' of its 'own desires'. The 'eyes and ears are deceptive' because everything in the senses is 'subject to variation'. Unlike what one perceives in the senses, what the 'soul sees' is 'intelligible and invisible'. The soul's imprisonment is the result of its not experiencing 'reality' directly, but only indirectly through appearances. What is 'natural' is sensuous desire, but the soul *can learn* 'to trust only itself' by grasping what is always and already concealed, yet present, in the imperceptible mind.

2. In *Religion Before Dogma*: 120–121, I give my response to C.D.C. Reeve's revised 2nd edition of G.M.A. Grube's 1st ed. of the *Republic* (Indianapolis: Hacker Publishing Company, 1974) in which Reeve's turns 'upside down' (2nd ed., Hacker: 1992: 183, n 26) the original drawing of the line of Grube 1st ed. (see Hacker: 1974: 164, n. 16). Without any accounting for why, Reeve's drawing of the line has the shorter sections at the bottom and switches the labels for the top two segments of the mind in the realm of 'Being'. Reeve is implying that the Cave Allegory is to be superimposed on the Line Simile as if *learning to know* eternal Being (and above) involved the same, proportional structure of quantities as the *possession of knowledge* of eternal Being (and above).

(*Nominalist Occasionalism/Voluntarism*) based on *perceptible*, empirical particulars, combined with grasping the *cause* of events, threatened to shatter the *a priori* status of the *imperceptible*, divine, eternal Ideas of Platonic *Intellectualism*.³

3. Nominalism itself is a form of material subreption. (On 'subreption,' see the "Preface:" 64, n. 84) Nominalism is a form of subreption because it consists in the *a posteriori* claim that the natural 'order' is the ontological basis for the abstraction of concepts. It avoids Platonic Realism's *a priori* Idealist archetypes, but its Empiricist, ectypal constructions are no less metaphysical than Platonism. Nominalism's subreption is claiming to be a causal account of the origin of abstractions as ectypal on the basis of Materialism just as Platonism's subreption is claiming to be a causal account of ideas/concepts as archetypal on the basis of Idealism. In contrast to both a *a posteriori* Nominalism and a *a priori* Idealism, Kant's notion of an '*a priori*' concept employed by reflecting judgment is neither archetypal nor ectypal because it is *not a causal explanation* of the origin of ideas/concepts. Rather, it is an account of *assumption in the deductive, heuristic activity* of 'making sense' of given phenomena (not a causal account of ideas/concepts based on an imperceptible order of things-in-themselves either Idealist or Empiricist). Kant's concepts are thought 'relationalities' that must be *added to* appearances in reflecting judgment in order for there to be conscious experience, understanding, and responsible agency in the world.

Wit

In the *Menschenkunde*, Kant accounts for the deduction of universals by means of inspiration (Witz/ wit; imagination) and acumen (*Uteilskraft*/capacity of judgment to subsume a set of phenomena under a universal concept) through the symbiotic relationship between the positive (Witz) and the negative (*Urteilskraft*) capacities of the mind. Wit is '*positive*' in the sense that it constantly drives the mind to see similarities in perception whereas the capacity of judgment is '*negative*' in the sense that it reins in wit to focus on the 'proper' application of a universal. See Kant, *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 959–960; Olms ed.: 122–123. Kant says that the capacity to novelty in understanding ('genius') is nature itself 'giving the rule to art' in the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 307 and in the *Anweisung zur Menschen- und Weltkenntniß* (1790/1791) as appended to *Menschenkunde*, Olms ed.: 31. Kant explicitly states that 'wit' doesn't know from whence its 'cleverness' and 'inspirations' come (see *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 309 and Kant, *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 945–946, 962, and 990–991; Olms ed.: 108, 126, and 158,) and that everyone possesses the capacity of judgment 'because it is indispensable and a necessary talent' (see Kant, *Ibid.* AA XXV,2: 964; Olms ed.: 128) Kant applauds (attributes his indebtedness to?) Alexander Gerard for the insight that without imagination there is no novel judgment but without judgment imagination would be without guardrails. For Kant's reference to Gerard, see Kant, *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1055; Olms ed.: 233 and Kant's observation that genius is the master, not the slave of laws, which must be learned AA XXV,2: 1056; Olms ed.: 234 and Alexander Gerard, *An Essay on Genius* (London: W. Strahan, 1774): 38. Clearly this is not an embracing of Platonic/Hegelian Idealism! See the discussion of the role of 'association' in the deduction of concepts: 62, n. 2. [Reason 'deduces the concept' ...]

On 'Reflecting' (*Reflektierend*) and 'Re-Producing' (*Bestimmend*) Judgment'

Reflecting judgment is located between the 'wide' inspiration of wit/Witz and 'narrow', objective, reproductive judgment. Knowledge, Kant points out, requires not only the 'narrow', appropriate concept (*Zweckmäßigkeit*) for an object but also an *aesthetic quality* that precedes the discernment of the concept in the form of 'wide' pleasure (or displeasure) in the imagination. See *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 188–191. The 'gap' (no ontological, but epistemological 'gap') between 'wide' imagination's *aesthetic quality* and 'narrow', objective, re-productive judgment is 'bridged' by *reflecting*

Scholasticism's alternative *explanations* of the ultimate origin and ground of the human condition staggered like a drunken sailor between Intellectualism and Occasionalism. Either reality was governed by *divine Reason* (Intellectualism), which consisted of the imperceptible, eternal ideas (*Logos*) of God to which even God Himself (!) was accountable or reality was governed by *divine Will* (Occasionalism), which preceded the establishment even of divine Reason. Because creation required the exercising of God's will (even to create His ideas/*Logos*), His actions could even violate the necessary order of God's unchanging ideas because God, by definition, is Good. Whatever He does, even if it involves the violation of what humanity experiences as a Rational, eternal order, is ultimately good.

Aquinas' Scholasticism sought to maintain the complementarity of Plato and Aristotle by *privileging divine 'eternal' Intellectualism*. With the introduction of Nominalism by Occasionalism, Duns Scotus opened the door for taking *ideas to be merely the finite, individual abstractions of reductionist materialism*.

This development contributed, significantly, to the emergence of the 'new' physical sciences in the West, which, although made possible by Aristotle's emphasis on the

judgment that must seek out the appropriate concept for the imagination's 'wide' insights into the 'order' of appearances by means of the 'law of association'. See *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 188–189. Knowledge arises out of pleasure in the imagination that deduces 'wide order' (physical and moral) in experience. To be noted: The pleasure (*Lust*) associated with the categorical imperative is analogous to the reflecting judgment's deducing of the concepts present in the imagination's 'wide' play with the 'law of association'. Just as the imagination consists in the pleasure/displeasure of *aesthetic quality* of sense perception by the 'law of association' that leads to objective, re-productive *knowledge of the order of appearances* by means of reflecting judgment, so too, the satisfaction of invoking a 'wide', categorical imperative to govern the 'narrow', hypothetical imperatives of teleological agency is ultimately grounded in a moral order that governs agency. However, unlike the *a priori* lawful order and concepts deduced (not created) by the 'law of association' out of phenomena, the *a priori* lawfulness of categorical imperatives are deduced (not created!) by reflecting judgment as the necessary, causal 'order' required by the finite, eminent causality that is autonomous freedom. A 'wide' categorical imperative is empty enthusiasm without the 'narrowing' of reflecting judgment that arises when one gives oneself permission to do something. The invocation of a 'wide' categorical imperative in a decision to do something, though, can only occur within the framework of any and all experience. Experience, generally, is a combination of imagination (wit), the 'wide' perceptible content of the imagination's 'law of association', which sees similarity in differences, along with the 'narrow' restricting to the 'appropriate concept' by means of reflecting judgment that results in the objective knowledge that is re-productive judgment.

Concepts reach the status of re-producing judgments (objective 'certainties') as a kind of 'mechanical' reproduction (see Kant, *Anweisung* Olms ed.: 12 and 33) only according to the degree in which they fit together in an ever-expanding, coherent, architectonic of relationalities. In short, concepts don't causally explain anything. They are a capacity (condition of possibility) for finite transcendental consciousness to experience, understand, and exercise responsible agency to the degree that it is able. See the discussion of Kant's 'middle option' in Chapter 5: "Traces of an Intellectual Crisis:" 575, n. 54. On Kant's distinction between selection of the law/maxim (obligation/duty) by humanity whereas God, as creator of the law/duty is without selection (obligation/duty) in Chapter 7: 765. On the discussion of the hermeneutical circle of Absolute Knowledge, see in Chapter 6: 683 and in Chapter 7: 709, n. 204..

priority of perceptible experience for all (finite) knowledge,⁴ eventually resulted in the collapse of Aristotelian ‘science’. Rather than, as the case with Aristotle, view ‘science’ as discernment of *the causal relationships* among *perceptible*, material elements (earth, air, wind, and fire), the new ‘science’ took its task to be the discernment of the *imperceptible*, lawful order (ironically, a form of *Intellectualism*) that governed things and events. Nonetheless, the Aristotelian goal of human knowledge remained the same as defined by Aristotle in the opening lines of his *Metaphysics*: discernment of *the imperceptible, ultimate, causal order* of reality (truth). What became ambiguous with *Occasionalism* was the divine, ultimate purpose of that causal order, which only God could know and reveal.

Initially, the task of the ‘new’ science was viewed as ‘following the footsteps of God’ in His creation, whether or not He had created the material order according to a system of unchanging ideas to which even God was accountable (as the case of *Intellectualism*) or by divine, capricious choice (as the case of *Occasionalism*). To this day, scientists who seek to affirm God as a factor in experience continue to embrace or reject a religious ‘dimension’ to science to embrace Intellectualism (see the “Discovery Institute” in Seattle). However, one, conveniently, overlooks the implications of Occa-

4. There are two moments to Aristotelian science. First, All knowledge commences with sense perception (see *A posteriori Analytics* 99b15-100b15; especially 100a5: “[...] [W]e must get to know the primary premises by induction”). However, Aristotle insists that universals (primary Forms) are not reducible to sense perceptions (matter) and are indefinable (*Metaphysics* 1040a1-8) and indemonstrable (*A posteriori Analytics* 100b10-13), but necessary assumptions, independent of ‘matter’. Although ‘form’ has no being beyond particulars (*Metaphysics* 1033b20-1034a8), form is that actual that precedes potency as the ‘thing itself’ ((τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, to ti ēn einai, ‘quiddity’, ‘in itself’); (*Metaphysics* 1028b33 ff, espec. 1029b13-15), which ‘can’t be otherwise than what it is’ (*Posterior Analytics* 71b8-12, 74b5 f.; On the Heavens 279b22; and *Metaphysics* 1015a34). According to Heinz Happ (Hyle. *Studien zum Aristotelischen Materie Begriff* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971): 287: “[...] matter (ὕλη) is with respect to possibility (δυνάμει) what the ‘whatness’ (τόδε τι) is to actuality (ἐνεργεία).” Although form is the ‘actual’ that precedes ‘potentiality’, Aristotle says that in a sense form is also potency (*Metaphysics* 1049b5, 1071b12-25, 1072a8-10). This is because as Happ says: *ibid.*, 687: „All individual cases of ἐνεργεία are founded in the actus purus [Unmoved Mover] which stands opposite to the ‘primal opposition’ of dynamis/energy.” Today’s natural sciences share with Aristotle the claim that knowledge is derived from sense perception, and reductionist materialism takes ideas to be constructed abstractions (Nominalism) that are never independent of particulars (rejecting the Platonists). Today’s physicists at the Large Hadron Collider, who are searching for the Higgs boson (God) particle appear at least to entertain the notion of Aristotle’s actus purus when they suggest that the universe is “one kind of nothing [no-thing or potency/possibility] becoming another kind” of no-thing. See Andrew Crumey’s article “matter’: The Nothing at the Heart of Everything” in *Wall Street Journal* 17 January 2025.

Second, however, for Aristotle all wisdom involves ‘art’ and not merely ‘experience’, and ‘art’ is knowledge of the causes (formal, material, efficient, and final [*Metaphysics* 983a24-32) of things. Whereas today’s natural sciences seek causes, they do so on the basis of imperceptible ‘lawfulness’ (physical laws, statistical significance, and algorithms). Aristotle, though, has no grasp of imperceptible physical laws so that he accounted for ‘scientific knowledge’ (causality) on the basis of the empirical, primary premises (or elements) of air, fire, earth, and water, which can change into one another (*On the Heavens* 305a14-35). This form of causal explanation is what today’s natural sciences unequivocally reject in Aristotle.

sionalism. The task of science is discernment of the *unchanging, imperceptible, causal* (!) order that governs nature. As soon as one allows for Occasionalism/Voluntarism, though, one undermines all human attempts to achieve understanding in the sciences.

Crucial proposals for understanding divine causality came from Spinoza (17th C) and Leibniz (18th C). In contrast to the top-down causal order of Platonic Intellectualism (original ideas and perceptible copies), Spinoza suggested a bottom-up causal order that viewed God as the *universal, eternal substance* out of which all things/differences emerge.

Unaccounted for by Spinoza is the radical dualism between the physical and the intellectual. Leibniz proposed a divine, 'Pre-established Harmony' that eternally correlated the two dimension of the immaterial intellect and material world. In short, Leibniz remained squarely in the *Intellectualist* camp in defense of the ultimately, divine causal order.

Perpetuating that Intellectualist tradition, at the beginning of the 19th C, Hegel presented a 'reclined Plato.' He turned Plato's Simile of the Line on its side and added to the Platonic 'bottom-up,' influx logic of dialectic a 'top-down,' emanation logic to suggest that Spinoza's 'eternal substance' was merely the perceptible, actual representations (*wirkliche Form – Reelle*) of what in 'truth' is an imperceptible, dialectical content (*Inhalt – Ideelle*) of Absolute Spirit. By a logic of negation, Absolute Spirit conforms to a meta-narrative of Double Negation that commences with a First Negation of Its Absolute Oneness and results in a dialectically driven logic of *diairesis* (identities and differences) that brought about both intellectual and physical multiplicity. This same dialectical process eventually brought about the emergence of finite consciousness in, and out of, the finite conditions of the material order. Finite consciousness has the privileged role in Hegel's system. It is the location for the Second Negation: the nullification (*Aufhebung*) of all multiplicity to attain Absolute Knowledge (a return to Absolute Oneness and Absolute Freedom) *above sensuousness*. In other words, Hegel embraced a 'reclined' Platonic Intellectualism driven by a causal, (!) *Dialectical Logic*, not Traditional Christianity's Personal Theism driven by Intellectualism or Occasionalism.

Hegel's proposal is that the 'fact' of finite, conscious experience of physical multiplicity can be *causally explained* only by dialectical logic as the condition of possibility of his meta-narrative of Double Negation.⁵ Finite consciousness ('spirit') is capable of grasping that its experience of physical objects and events are *merely perceptual representations* (*Form*) of their 'true' content (*Inhalt*), which is their *imperceptible abstractions*. The 'true,' ultimate, content (*Inhalt*) of all abstractions, though, is Absolute Spirit. Its 'truth' is established by the very experience of finite consciousness. There can only be finite consciousness if there is Absolute Spirit, which is *the necessary cause* of finite consciousness.

5. On Kant's rejection of dialectic for grounding the ultimate, causal ground of 'what is,' see *Critique of Pure Reason* B 697 and Chapter 6: 670.].

Where Traditional Christian Platonism's Personal Theism placed humanity on the throne of God by means of an analogy based on finite, human creativity (thoughts precede agency as the 'shaping' of matter),⁶ Hegel's 'Pantheism' made humanity's finite 'spirit' the lynch pin (the 'point of indifference') for God's awareness of Itself. *In both cases, humanity displaces God on His throne.*

Nonetheless, whether by contemplation⁷ (*Intellectualism*) as the case of Christian Platonism or grace (*Occasionalism*) as the case of Supernaturalism or whether by Hegel's 'cunning of reason' (*Intellectualism*) of Double Negation, the core, 'true' content (*Inhalt*) of 'what is' results in the divinization (or spiritual perfection⁸) of

6. In agreement with Göschel, Hegel, too, "celebrates the Logos (Word of God) as the incarnate God who teaches us logic Hegel writes: "We have such confidence in God through Christ, not that we build on ourselves through ourselves ..., not that we are able to think something of ourselves as from ourselves, but that we are able to think and comprehend (*logisasthai*) something that is from God and from God and through Christ, who is the Logos [the Word of God] *who teaches us logic* and has humbled himself so that we may learn to recognize and comprehend him." (emphasis added) GW XI: 384–385

In contrast to Kant whom Hegel criticizes for not being 'logical' enough to appreciate the 'speculative' moment of the Concept. (GW 370–380), Kant's is only a philosophy of transient, sensuous, understanding (GW XI: 372), which grasps only the 'half' of speculative philosophy's reason. (GW XI: 376)

However, the similarity between Christian Platonism's Logos Theology and Hegel's Logos Theology involves a crucial difference. F.C. Baur points out the similarity between Christian Platonism's, 'purely postulated' two-step creation of the internal, thought Word of God (Logos endiathetos/λόγος ἐνδιάθετος) and the external, spoken Word of God (Logos prophorikos/λόγος προφορικός) and Hegel's proposed 'purely logical' development out of the Absolute One with its ideational system and external perceptual system whose goal is the creation of finite consciousness that is capable of logically negating its finitude to think the Infinite Concept/Spirit. Baur writes: "[...] gnostic systems are based on the assumption that God is only in this process a living God, Absolute Spirit or thinking reason, because life is not without movement, thinking not without mediating activity; [Hegelian] true knowledge is only the Concept itself, as far as It explicates Itself in the three moments as a Concept in itself, as a determined concept, and as the concept coming to itself from the determinateness and restoring itself from limitedness (*Phil. der Rel.* I: 32). Without the world, therefore, God is not God, either. At the same time, however, the great difference is already evident between the purely logically determined concept of the process [Hegel], and the purely posited, only postulated, Platonic-Gnostic idea of an apostasy from the Absolute, as it still has a very essential and profound meaning even in the earlier representations of Schelling's philosophy (cf. especially *Philos. u. Relig.* 1804. p. 34. F)." F.C. Baur, *Die christliche Gnosis oder die christliche Religionsphilosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung* (1835) (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967): 681–682.

7. Contemplation of the (amoral) Good is the ultimate aim of finite 'reason,' according to Plato's *Republic* 511c (θεωρία/θεωρούμενος). Christian mysticism from Origen, the Desert Fathers (*sic.*), to Pseudo-Dionysius and monasticism all owe their Intellectualist conception of reality to Plato's Similes of the Sun and Line in Book VI of the *Republic*.

8. Lest one be tempted to view Hegel's Absolute Spirit as a liberation from the pain and suffering of the world and the grounds for social solidarity, Hegel's Absolute Spirit is no consolation because it turns all historical particularities into 'meaninglessness', and it's 'peace' is an escape from history. As Absolute Unity/Oneness, Hegel's Absolute Spirit also is no champion of 'love' and social solidarity. 'Love' is an ambiguous term, and it is no more a source of peace and harmony (see the summary of Hegel's 'Göschel review in the next footnote) than it is of social solidarity. For example, as the (not only

the finite individual.⁹ One is left to quarrel over the ultimate, spiritual status of that divinization (or perfection) of humanity that, additionally to Intellectualism, anchors

sexual) abuse of women of men as well as the child abuse scandals (by no means limited to religious institutions) across the globe ought to have made clear, Absolute Unity/Spirit has been invoked to 'justify' multiple forms of exploitation and oppression in the name of 'what is good for others' is their 'harmony' with 'me'. In short, I will point out in Hegel's writings that, not only does Hegel replace the 'grace' of a Personal Deity with the 'cunning of reason', which works out its own agenda as the Absolute Unity of history by reducing particularities to meaninglessness, but he also cripples 'moral culture' by dismissing it as an illusion.

9. In his review of Karl Friedrich Göschel's *Aphorismen über Nichtwissen und absolutes Wissen* (1829), Hegel rejects the notion of 'self-divinization,' humanity's 'bottom-up' elevation by itself to the status of divinity through knowledge. "From the judgment 'knowing God = being God', this [erroneous] mind goes briefly to the conclusion 'therefore knowing God = being God' and from there to the final result 'If I claim to know God, I must claim to be God himself.'" (Göschel review GW XI: 371–372) Nonetheless, Hegel/Göschel acknowledge that with death humanity is 'in' God: "Humanity can only be in God through God and, once he has ceased to be, can only be placed in God through God when God first places Himself in him and becomes man himself and reveals Himself to him. (GW XI: 370) However, Hegel leaves unexamined this 'top-down' divinization of humanity although he clearly acknowledges a difference between the attempt of finite consciousness to 'rise up' to God and God's 'coming down' to humanity: "[The question 'What is a human being?'] [...] is considered in the interest of the more definite question of how man arrives at God. It is at once remarked [by Göschel] that this [...] question belongs only to the mind of ignorance, which [...] proceeds from the [individual] subject as the first, and thereby at once cuts off and stultifies the answer; whereas in *absolute knowledge*, which proceeds from the *absolute*, from the substance as the objective Word of God, the question is how God comes to man." (GW VI: 373)

Hegel distinguishes between God's substance and knowledge. "God Himself is not merely eternal Being (substance) but also His self-knowledge (subject)." (GW XI: 368) However, in agreement with Göschel he states that "God is real only in so far as He knows Himself. His existence [*Dasein*] becomes and disappears with His consciousness [...]. Second, God, as Being in Himself, is knowledge of Himself in Himself as God's self-consciousness. However, as the Being [substance] of the Other, He knows Himself outside Himself in the world (outside God's consciousness), in individual beings as creatures of God, whereby this being *outside of Himself* is just as much canceled [*aufgehoben*] out again, dissolved, in that *individual beings are in God according to their being and knowledge as preserved, in that they are not God Himself, rather God is only Himself in Himself. If God is truly in and with His creatures, as Scripture teaches, then the knowledge of God is also in them – because He is only to the extent that He knows Himself, and this knowledge of God in an individual is precisely general reason* [not particular understanding of the 'imagination'], which is not my reason, nor a common or general faculty, but *Being Itself, the identity of Being and knowledge*." (emphasis added) (GW XI: 368–369).

Referring to Jacobi's emphasis on unknowing when it comes to God, Göschel responds: "Instead of this ignorance [...] leading to the necessity and reality of the revelation of God hidden in Himself, it is limited to natural revelation given in conscience [*Gewissen*], however much it contradicts the naturalness of thought'. This so-called natural revelation in conscience [*Gewissen*] is direct knowledge, i.e. knowledge only of the abstract self-sameness of God. Natural revelation eludes thought and its realm, knowledge, which is rather driven towards the fullness of the divine essence and thus towards concrete knowledge." (GW XI: 360–361)

19th C authors in the Traditional Christian theology: Athanasian oneness with the 'Father' (Hegel and the Left-wing Hegelians) or Arian oneness with the created 'Son' (Schleiermacher, F.C. Baur and Strauß in 1835) and/or whether the whole material order is merely a docetic moment on the way, to establishing the ultimate priority of Absolute Spirit (Hegel) or Perfect God-consciousness (Schleiermacher).

However, the generation just prior to Hegel (and Schelling) had offered a radical alternative to the *ultimate, causal explanations* of the Intellectualist and Occasionalist, Scholastic options. In fact, this radical alternative contains a proleptic rejection of

"In the uttered Word, creation, God is the cause; He invented measure and form, law and finite being, space and time, days and years and places, language and languages, the Concept and humanity; He Himself is not the measure because He is above time and space, etc., He Himself does not speak. Among all these sayings, God's reality and independence dissolve only into infinite Being that underlies all actuality [Wirklichkeit], without being itself for itself, without being actual [wirklich]. 'Constantly repeated is the idea that it is in the interest of science to dissolve and destroy reality, ... in that the object must be abolished in order to be known.'" (GW XI: 361)

Hegel then discusses the 'the accusation' that knowledge of God means the self-divinization of humanity (GW XI: 369) that takes the form: "If I claim to know God, I must claim to be God Himself." (GW XI: 371–372) Hegel limits his examination of divinization to the '*negative*' moment of self-divinization, which, in his judgment, is divine knowledge that does not reach the level of divine substance. Nonetheless, Hegel overlooks the '*positive*' moment of divine knowledge that is the Incarnation, which is not limited to an individual, which Hegel/Göschel call the error of Christian doctrine (GW XI: 362) : Given that God can only know Himself through finite consciousness (GW XI: 368–369), knowledge of God on the part of finite consciousness is itself divine knowledge. Therefore, it is not inappropriate to speak of the knowledge of God (the Second Negation) to be divinization.

Hegel approvingly quotes Göschel: "[...] [D]ependence on God is freedom in God, just as being apart from God is being apart from freedom; if you believe, you will know the truth, and *the truth will make you free* [Hegel/Göschel invoke here John 8:32]. In no other way can philosophy make you free; only in God is freedom." (emphasis added) (GW XI: 388) This knowledge is beyond history and makes all suffering in the world bearable because "I know on whom I believe" [Hegel/Göschel invoke here 2 Timothy 1:12 which reads: "For this reason I also suffer things; but I am not ashamed, *for I know whom I believe*, and I am convinced that He is able to protect what I have entrusted to Him until that day."] who sets us free with the 'sunrise of peace' (*Morgenrote des Friedens*) (GW XI: 388). Clearly, here Hegel is acknowledging that the 'suffering' that is life in all its historical particularity is a matter of indifference (insignificance) when viewed from the perspective of Absolute Spirit's indifference (the non-difference of Universal Oneness). Hegel approvingly observes in Göschel: "After the immanence of the Concept has been determined from the proposition that the absolute is as much subject as substance, it is (p. 62) it is stated that Scripture, by teaching that *humanity cannot reach God and the knowledge of God from himself, from his subjectivity separated from God*, proves itself to be the knowledge which says nothing other than that *humanity can only reach God as the general truth through God, as the general knowledge (the special knowledge is man's own, accidental knowledge separated from God)*." (emphasis added) (GW XI: 368)

Hegel repeats his praise of Göschel in the *Encyclopedia of Science* (1830) §564 (GW X: 372–374. See as well, Heinz Kimmerle, „Zu Hegels Religionsphilosophie: Dimensionen und Möglichkeiten ihrer Auslegung, Kritik und Aneignung“ in *Philosophische Rundschau*, Vol. 15 1/2 (1968): 111–135.

Hegel's raptures¹⁰ (*Schwärmerei*) with respect to Absolute Spirit as well as Strauß' efforts at materialist reductionism in 1872. With Immanuel Kant, we are confronted with a dramatically different account of what it means to be human as well as a re-definition of humanity's goal. Both moments of humanity's experience of meaning and of its goal, according to Kant, are grounded in *finite creativity* (freedom as autonomy 'above' but never independent of nature).

The key and crucial distinction between Hegel's and Strauß' fantastic enthusiasms and Kant hinges on the meaning of *a priori* 'necessity' in experience. Kant talks about 'necessity' when it comes to *a priori* synthetic judgments. According to Hegel and Strauß, *a priori* synthetic judgment of dialectical synthesis is only required to establish the *ultimate* cause of all 'that is,' Absolute Spirit.

According to Kant, *a priori* synthetic judgment is no necessary, *a posteriori*, dialectical synthesis of Absolute Spirit as causal, *petitio principii* of finite consciousness. *A priori* 'necessity' (but not determining cause) for *finite*, transcendental consciousness is concerned with what is required, imperceptibly, for a finite consciousness to experience a world as it does. In short, consciousness *must add indirectly discernable, imperceptible* elements to its 'direct' perceptions in order to experience, understanding, and exercise responsible agency *in the world*. Hegel's and Strauß' *apodictic certainty consists in the a priori requirement of Absolute Knowledge of the causal origin of all 'that is.'* Kant's *apodictic certainty consists in the a priori requirements of finite, imperceptible, conditions and capacities demanded by finite experience in the world.*

A priori synthetic necessity, according to Kant, is not a causal category because causes are only indirectly experienced through their effects. Hence, they are always associated with a degree of conjecture. Kant's *a priori* synthetic judgments of finite, transcendental consciousness do not begin to claim to know their own cause much less the ultimate cause of all 'that is.' What we can know about finite *a priori* synthetic judgments are those 'pure metaphysical principles' not given in empirical perception directly in any fashion that make it possible for finite, transcendental consciousness to exercise its *a priori* synthetic judgment with *autonomous freedom*. Again, though, the *a priori* synthetic judgments of 'pure metaphysical principles' do not cause *autonomous, creative freedom*. They only *make it possible* for finite consciousness *intentionally* to cause events to happen that nature, on its own, can never cause.

10. Kant distinguishes between 'enthusiasm' (*Enthusiasmus*) and 'rapture' (*Schwärmerei*). An 'enthusiast' (*Enthusiast*) is a visionary (*Phantast*) according to principles (*Grundsätzen*) (*Menschenkunde oder philosophische Anthropologie* AA XXV,2: 1006 [Olms ed.: 175]) whereas a 'rapturist' (*Schwärmer*) is a visionary (*Phantast*) according to affections (*Neigungen*). An 'enthusiast' seeks the best for humanity, but s/he have not "[...] considered the difficulties that people would face in implementing their ideas" (*ibid.*, AA XXV,2: 1006–1007 [Olms ed.: 176]). Although related to 'enthusiasts,' 'rapturist' is one who 'wrongheadedly' confuses "[...] an object of faith to be an object of perception (*Anschaung*)" (*ibid.*, AA XXV,2: 1007 [Olms ed.: 177]). "The rapturist [e.g., Hegel and the early Strauß] comes very close to the delusional [...] Delusion is a perversity of reason, and in delusion the imagination deceives the senses; one believes to see what one can never see as an object of experience" (*ibid.*, AA XXV,2: 1007 [Olms ed.: 177]).

Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is concerned with the question 'how are *a priori* synthetic judgments that lead to apodicticity possible?' Kant's formulation of the question of his *Critique of Pure Reason* makes clear the apparent conundrum in need of investigation: *the 'necessity' a priori synthetic judgments concerned with their possibility leads to apodicticity but not to knowledge of their causal certainty! Necessity is bound up with possibility, not the certainties of Absolute Knowledge. How so?* Kant's investigation leads to the 'pure metaphysical principles' of 'God,' to autonomous freedom complementary to the natural order, and to the enduring identity of the individual (God, the 'soul,' and freedom). The *Critique of Pure Reason's* resolution of the question 'How so?' rests upon whether humanity is 'divine' or 'human.'

According to Kant, the goal of humanity is not (spiritual or physical) divinization or moral perfection¹¹ but understanding and responsible agency (however imperfect).

11. Although Kant speaks of moral perfection as a 'goal' of humanity, he explicitly points out that this is not the goal of an ideal, achievable status. In fact, he dismisses the notion that moral perfection is an attainable status.

Interestingly, he speaks not of the individual's attaining 'perfection' but of nature's having given humanity what Kant means by moral perfection as a capacity (*Anlage*). See *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 877; Olms ed.: 29–30.

'Perfection,' according to Kant, is with respect to possessed capacities ('rawness') (*Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 877 [Olms ed.: 29–30]) and 'control over oneself' (*Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 940 [Olms ed.: 100]) *at any point in time, not a consequence of agency* (i.e., external moral success or, especially, *happiness*). Seeking perfection is the encouragement to apply one's 'perfect' moral capacity in each new circumstance; not a matter of achievement but of striving. See *Religion*: VI: 67–68.

Furthermore, Kant insists that the elimination of even the 'appearance' of good and evil would mean the elimination of morality. To be sure, the *appearance* of goodness in humanity is laudable because it acknowledges the standard of moral principles. However, evil characters and illusion are no justification for cynicism with respect to virtue because illusion presupposes the virtuous: "Nature placed in us the capacity to generate illusion by which we can thwart the unruly impulses of our passions. *The artificial (Kunst) of behavior creates much good, conceals the bad side of man, and brings at least an analog of virtue.* People act in public as in a play, everyone is concerned only with good appearances. Such illusion is very advantageous and encourages people to do something good because others cannot always distinguish between what is true from the illusion. In our life, the greatest desire is always to appear and to pretend to others, so *there is no need to recommend the cynical life, because examples of goodness would be lost.* (emphasis added) *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 930–931; Olms ed.: 89; see *Anweisung zu Menschen- und Weltkenntnis* (Olms ed.: 50–52; and the significance of hope and disappointment for the exercising of humanity's transcendental capacities *Anweisung* Olms ed.: 100)

In short, Kant warns against moral 'purism.' Moral 'purism' either only counts the failures of humanity or, pessimistically, rejects virtue out of hand because it is externally incalculable and incapable of achievement. Moral purism is, then, a denial of virtue because it takes the appearances of immorality to be a denial of humanity's morality. "If one investigates the illusions of virtue too rigorously, s/he will lose all confidence as well as all encouragement to live virtuously." (*Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 932 [Olms ed.: 90]) However, Kant emphasizes in *On the Common Saying*: "That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice" AA VIII: 285: to favor lack of moral effort "[...] under the pretext that human nature does not permit such purity (which he also cannot assert with certainty): is the death of all morality, and he proposes in *Menschenkunde* that "were we ever to reach the point where we believed that there was no such thing as virtue, it would be as if we no longer believed in God." *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 931–932; Olms ed.: 90. Yet, Kant is even more explicit:

To be sure, both understanding (theoretical reason) and responsible agency (practical reason) are dependent upon non-literally anthropomorphic, non-dogmatic, and non-doctrinal religion as well as non-religious 'faith' in order to be(come) responsibly the extra-ordinary species individually and collectively that it is. This non-literally anthropomorphic, non-dogmatic, and non-doctrinal faith consists in the incontrovertible conviction that there are apodictic, 'pure metaphysical principles,' required by our own finite experience, that make our efforts at understanding and responsible agency worthwhile and not merely naïve illusions.

By their focus on *causal explanation*, Hegel and the later Strauß presuppose the dogmatic principle of sufficient reason (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*) and the dog-

"Human nature appears so trained by nature to conceal its internal weaknesses and externally to project a good image." *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 932; Olms ed.: 90

He adds, "[i]f in the next life one will dare to show her-/himself as s/he really is is not for us to know. Here [in this life], though, *we are not required to expose ourselves entirely as we really are*. One is not required to be transparent even when it comes to our best friend. (emphasis added) *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 932; Olms ed.: 91

This leads to his dismissal of moral 'purists on the part of those who only see humanity's faults or reject the notion of virtue because of the universality of faults:' "People who always investigate people's faults [as a general character of the human species] become misanthropes who shun people [...]. They believe that there is nothing lovable about humanity because they have taken off humanity's beautiful mask, where the discoveries are always very sad. *This is said in order that one may not become a moral purist*; for human virtue is not of such a kind that there are entirely pure virtues, just as gold of the 24th carat is only an idea; *one must, therefore, take human beings as they are*. (emphasis added) *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 932; Olms ed.: 91 To be sure, this does not mean to embrace with 'enthusiasm' everything that humanity actually does but to commit, unequivocally, to the universal capacities for morality that everyone possesses.

Furthermore, as Kant consistently maintains across his corpus, he emphasizes that here *there is no status of perfect happiness not only because happiness is concerned with hypothetical, not categorical imperatives* (see *Groundwork* AA IV: 418–419) and is *subjective* (See *Critique of Pure Reason* B 834; *Groundwork* AA IV: 418; *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 25, 28) and *capricious, but also because pain is necessary as a motivation to exercise our 'perfect' capacities* (see *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1075; Olms ed.: 256; and, especially, in the *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 378, Kant emphasizes: "[W]hen eudaimonia (the happiness principle) is established as precept rather than *eleutheronomy* (the principle of freedom and its internal legislation), the consequence is the *euthanasia* of all morality." (parentheses from Kant!)

On the other hand, when it comes to ourselves, we should seek the elimination [...] of all false appearance in order to treasure ourselves according to true value. *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 933; Olms ed.: 92) "The highest perfection in humanity is when it has itself under its own control so that nothing brings it to distraction because when impressions wipe out everything else [that is, awareness of one's moral capacity], humanity loses the Spirit of life [*Geist des Lebens*]." *Menschenkunde* AA XX, 2: 940; Olms ed.: 100 The very task of the philosopher is the encouragement of this form of perfection: "All metaphysicians, moralists, must therefore contribute to the enlightenment (*Aufklärung*) of the unilluminated ideas [see "On unilluminated reflections of which one is unaware" *Menschenkunde* AA XX, 2: 867–875; Olms ed.: 18–26] in people, because it depends on the concepts that people have with them." *Menschenkunde* AA XX, 2: 871; Olms ed.: 23–24 See, especially, Kant's distinguishing of the philosopher from the mere 'artists of reason' (who train their reason in view of "[...] particular purposes of use [...] in order to] produce products of reason." The logician, mathematician, and physicist. *Menschenkunde* AA XX, 2: 1042–1043; Olms ed.: 217.

matic denial of infinite regress. The principle of sufficient reason claims that every effect must have a cause that has at least as much ‘reality’ as the effect. Otherwise, ‘something would come from nothing,’ which, were that to be the case, would mean there is no rational order, only ultimate chaos.

From Kant’s perspective, causes are only experienced through their effects.¹² *The claim to know* them ‘absolutely’ results only in dogmatic conclusions. The claim to know the ultimate cause of all ‘that is’ does not lead one to absolute certainty but only conjectures and to the determinism and or ultimate meaninglessness of all finitude – as devastating to nature and humanity as the religious predestination in traditional Christian Personal Theism.

According to Kant, autonomy is the exclusive condition required for anything like the assumption of moral responsibility for agency. Kant’s account of finite (that is, limited) theoretical reason, practical reason, and the creativity of aesthetic judgment did an end run around the absolute, causal explanations that are Intellectualism and Occasionalism.¹³

Yet the 19th C commences with a powerful anti-Kantian and anti-Enlightenment movement reflected in Hegel and the Hegelians, Schelling, Schleiermacher, and F.C. Baur; all of whom profoundly shaped Strauß’ understanding of Kant. They did their best to force Kant into the old wine skins – a strategy for *dealing with* Kant down to today. It is neither inappropriate nor a triviality to mention already here that none of these anti-Kantians directly address, much less provide reasons for, their dismissal of Kant’s notion of freedom as *autonomy*.¹⁴ They simply assume that Kant means spontaneous, willful choice without any acknowledgement that, as a causal order,

12. Kant writes of efficient causality: “In all investigations of nature, reason rightly calls first for theory and only later for purpose. No teleology or practical expediency can make up for the lack of the former. We always remain ignorant of the causes at work, however plausible we may make the appropriateness of our presupposition to final causes, whether of nature or of our will. *On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy* AA VIII: 159. He adds explicitly that *a priori* synthetic judgments of causality are nothing that we invent, only deduce: “We can only trace the connection of certain present constitutions of natural things with their causes in earlier times according to laws of action, which we do not invent, but deduce from the forces of nature as it now presents itself to us, only as far back as analogy permits [...]” *On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy* AA VIII: 161–162. Thanks to Georg Geismann’s “Why Kant was not ‘Racist’ for calling these passages to my attention!

13. My ‘deep’ reading of Strauß’ *pre-figured* sources with respect to Kant demonstrates that Kant involves no collapse into ‘empty ideas,’ ‘subjectivism,’ and all-consuming self-interest, much less a call to escape sensualism, as claimed, for example by Hegel, Schelling, Carl Daub, and Schleiermacher.

14. They don’t address, again to my knowledge, even what one might want to take as Kant’s Achilles Heel: How does one reconcile God’s (the Noumenon’s) creative freedom as ultimate, eminent, causal origin of all that is with freedom as autonomy’s notion of finite, eminent, causality? Kant anticipated the issue: “[I] can still require the existence of another being [the Noumenon] in order to be able to be myself. This being can be the originator of my existence and continuation without at the same time becoming and being the originator of my actions. Therefore, one must carefully distinguish substance and accidents from cause and effect.” Kant *Vorlesungen über die philosophische Religionslehre* (Pöhlitz) AA PR: 198.

freedom as autonomy is as much governed by an imperceptible, ‘lawfulness’ (moral laws¹⁵) as nature is governed by an imperceptible, ‘lawfulness’ (physical laws), as Kant’s philosophy establishes. In short, they read Kant anachronistically. He *had to mean* by freedom what these anti-Kantians meant by freedom.

As important as I propose that his gospel criticism and grasp of the sweep of Christian doctrinal history has yet to be adequately appreciated, then, David Friedrich Strauß can be viewed as the neck of an hour glass through which the tangled threads that are theology and philosophy in the first half of the 19th C. eventually lead to reductionist materialism. Furthermore, Strauß’ gospel criticism as well as theological and metaphysical odyssey provide a rich framework for evaluating subsequent gospel criticism, theology, and metaphysics that includes 20th C post-metaphysics, Postmodernism, Deconstructionism, and unbridled pluralism.

Strauß’ 1872, *The Old and the New Faith* is a prescient description of this ‘new land’ of reductionist materialism. Nonetheless, even Strauß did not enter the promised land. His accounting for the emergence of the organic out of the inorganic on the basis of his insistence on an is/ought fallacy (in this case, on an *objective, causal* explanation of what can only be a *subjective, causal description of effects*, which is the ‘fact’ that the organic is inseparable from the inorganic) involves a dogmatic dictum (*Machtspruch*) analogous to Christian Personal Theism.

Having never actually engaged Kant’s radical alternative, which commences with, and always returns to the finite conditions of human, transcendental consciousness *in the world*, the Kantian alternative to Intellectualism (Platonism) and Occasionalism (both Supernaturalist Theism and Nominalism) remains only a possibility. An engagement of Strauß, then, provides an opportunity to retrieve the transformational power of Kant’s alternative to Personal Theism (*Occasionalism*), Absolute Idealism (Platonic *Intellectualism*), and mere Materialism (*Nominalism*) that is anchored in ‘pure’ (but not perfect) religion.

15. Kant distinguishes a ‘maxim’ from a ‘practical(moral) law’: “The principle (*Grundsatz*) that makes certain actions obligatory is a practical law. The rule of the agent, which s/he makes into a principle for subjective reasons, is called her/his maxim. Consequently, with the same laws, the maxims of the agent can be very different.” Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 225 (CUP [6:225]).

Preface

On the 150th anniversary of David Friedrich Strauß' death (February 8, 1874) and the 300th anniversary of Immanuel Kant's birth (April 22, 1724), this project aims: 1) to demonstrate that Gospel scholarship has by no means left Strauß on the scrapheap of history; and 2) to demonstrate that Strauß' significance is equally, if not more, what his metaphysical odyssey can teach us about empirical science and the importance of personal, responsible agency embedded in an encouraging and sustaining community with both science's theoretical reason (understanding) and individual practical reason (morality) requiring the presence in individuals of a creative open-endedness in the closed, causal system of nature.

The reader does not have to be her-/himself a gospel scholar or theologian¹ to grasp Strauß' key insights. Rather, his scholarship by its rigor and detail both in gospel studies and theology can save valuable time not because one must know their details but because he has identified the core issues at issue in both gospel studies and theology. Those issues at issue are reducible to two themes at the heart of the gospels and theology: 'myth' and 'the capacities of *finite*, transcendental consciousness.'

Strauß' crucial conclusions about the gospels are twofold: 1) Just as one does not have to believe in a literal Santa Claus to recognize that there is a 'truth' (the truth of self-less giving) at the core of the Santa 'story'/'myth,' so too, the 'truth' of religion, generally, and Christianity in particular, is not that 'the text tells me so.' The 'truth' of scriptures is the ideas and moral principles that are at the core of their 'stories'/'myths' that one can 'see' only when one looks beyond the literal story. 2) Even more important, though, is Strauß' adaptation to the 'Second' Testament of the *genetic mythical principle* of the 'First' Testament. The stories in the 'Second' Testament in the text have *pre-figured prototypes* in the 'First' Testament that have been employed by the gospel writers to communicate theological convictions. In short, the writers of the scriptures are creative authors, not objective reporters of history. Strauß demonstrates exhaustively that, particularly when it comes to the miracle stories in the gospels, every

1. One does not have to be a Kant scholar to grasp his key elements, either. Kant himself points out that even children as of a certain age understand full well what he is talking about when it comes to individual creativity, which requires a universe but is not reducible to nature, and the assumption of moral responsibility for one's agency, which is a kind of agency that in degree we find nowhere else in nature. See Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 410*[2], and *Religion* AA VI: 48–49.

In fact, the goal of gospel scholarship, theology, and philosophy is to make the scholar irrelevant, not to elevate egos in a system of status and prestige (what Kant calls 'humanity'). See Kant's discussion of the capacities (*Anlagen*) of 'animality,' 'humanity,' and 'personality' in *Religion* AA VI: 26–28.

story (with the exception of the demon stories²) have their *pre-figured prototypes* in 'First' Testament narratives. The key insight here is that the writers of the gospels are 'creative authors' who, like all authors, shape their narratives according to a guiding understanding that they employed to generate their stories.

In short, the 'truth' of the gospels is not the truth of factual accounts but a theological 'truth' that the evangelist author possessed already in advance of writing. The crucial insight is that 'truth' of the text, then, is not a matter of *exegesis* (reading out of) but *eisegesis* (reading into) the texts. Already with their authorship, the preconceived theologies of the evangelists are a re-shaping of inherited narratives out of the tradition.

Strauß' crucial conclusion when it comes to the history of Church Doctrine is similar. One does not have to employ any 'external philosophical perspective' to recognize the internal inconsistencies that result in the collapse of objective truth claims for Christian teaching. In other words, the frequently repeated assertion that 'philosophy places human reason on the throne of God' (that is, that 'worldly philosophy' is innately in conflict with 'true revelation as in I Corinthians 1:18–25) is as ridiculous as it is misleading. It is misleading because theology placed humanity on the throne of God from its very beginning with its employment of anthropomorphism to describe 'God.' Across the spectrum of religions, from Animism, to Polytheism, to Henotheism, and Monotheism in all (!) variations (with one exception³) that include, for example, Mysticism, Scholastic Occasionalism/Intellectualism, and 20th C Dipolar Theism, literal, anthropomorphic analogies are employed to describe 'God' or 'Nirvana'/'Emptiness.'

To be sure, recognition of the ubiquitousness of anthropomorphism across religious traditions does not mean that religions are 'false.' However, certain about anthropomorphic analogies is their hubris, as David Hume pointed out,⁴ but also certain is that the ubiquitousness of anthropomorphism in religion signals that it is probable that humanity is worshiping itself. With the exception of Kant's approach to religion, all religious traditions are based upon *literal*, attribution of human predicates onto ultimate reality. To be sure, there is no proof that such literal attributions are false, but it is also the case that there is no proof that they are true. In light of the fact that the predicates are only experienced by us as finite, the weight of likelihood is that they are found nowhere but in humanity. At the least, the dependence upon literal,

2. Strauß points out that 'demon possession' was a 'new' disease in the Intertestamental Period. See Strauß, *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People* (1864) (*Das Leben Jesu für das deutsche Volk bearbeitet*) (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1874): 426, 446, and 454–455. Available at: <https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=uqYPAAAAQAAJ&pg=GBS.PR2.23> (February 2023).

3. The one exception is Immanuel Kant's Critical Idealism that recognizes that anthropomorphic language is inescapable when it comes to speaking about God but that one needs to always (!) recognize that it is symbolic, not literal. See Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* AA IV: 356–357. See as well, Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 353.

4. See David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1982): 14–15.

anthropomorphic analogies without the slightest recognition that they are, in fact, symbolic, undermines all claims for absolute certainty. Positively, anthropomorphic analogies place all religions under the methodological status of skepticism in search for the necessary *a priori* synthetic judgments upon which they depend.⁵

However, rather than Strauß' conclusion with respect to the internal inconsistencies of Christian teaching leading to the judgment that the history of Church Doctrine is useless, the more appropriate conclusion with respect to Church Doctrine is the same as with gospel criticism: *Strauß provides a rich resource for the reader's reflections on theology, and he profiles succinctly the key issues at issue to facilitate those reflections.*

My investigation of Strauß follows Paul Ricoeur's 'hermeneutical arc'⁶ that extends from the linguistically *pre*-figured material of others that an author employs to *con*-figure her/his own text and results in the reader's *re*-figuring the author's narrative in application to the reader's world. This 'hermeneutical arc' justifies both a 'close' and a 'deep' reading of an author, and Strauß is no exception. However, I maintain that an author is worthy of the reader's time not for her/his clever conclusions but for the care and the extensiveness of her/his corpus. One can discern the degree of 'care' taken by an author when s/he has rigorously documented in her/his own texts the trajectory of her/his own intellectual development. Such discernment requires a 'close reading' of an author's *con*-figuration of her/his *pre*-figured sources. However, one can discern the 'extensiveness' of her/his engagement only by undertaking one's own 'deep reading' of those *pre*-figured sources. Whereas the reader is unequivocally rewarded by a 'close reading' of Strauß' rigorous reflections in the *con*-figuration of his texts given his careful examination and formulation of the 'issues at issue,' a 'deep reading' that includes his sources illuminates both the brilliance *and the flaws* of his engagement of his *pre*-figured sources.

Volume I looks at Strauß, the gospel critic. At the very least, Strauß was misunderstood by those who took to be Strauß' conclusion in his *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined (LJ)* (1835) that the Christian gospels are historically false and only a collection

5. In his posthumously published *Anweisung*, Kant writes of the importance of skepticism: „You can't do anything with some people because they have too limited an understanding of what they have learned. They do not accept any idea that does not fit in with the concepts they have absorbed and, therefore, cannot grasp them. The best opportunity for broadening concepts is a kind of scepticism (doubt), which shakes and rattles everything accepted in order to arouse doubt about it, with the goal that one judge from higher principles than those of conventional thought (*Schulwissenschaft*).” Kant, *Anweisung* Olms, ed.: 100.

6. In the spring of 1970, Paul Ricoeur taught a course, “Hermeneutical Problems in Contemporary Philosophy and Theology,” at the Divinity School on Sections 29 to 34 (‘state of mind,’ ‘understanding,’ ‘interpretation,’ and ‘discourse’) from Martin Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. A core thesis of the course was the notion of ‘hermeneutical arc’ from the author’s world, over the author’s text, to the reader’s application to her/his own ‘world of meaning’ drawn out of the text. The Divinity School recorded Ricoeur’s lectures. I have an unpublished paper, “Heidegger and the Problem of Hermeneutics: A Path of Thought” (December 23, 1970), that summarizes key elements of the course that I submitted to Ricoeur as my seminar paper.

of non-factual ‘myths’ with the aim of undermining the validity of the Christian faith. Yet, more important than how he was misunderstood, this ‘close’ reading of his work and ‘deep’ reading of his sources emphasizes the profundity of his gospel criticism, which anticipates much in ‘Second’ Testament scholarship in our day, that includes, as well, the criteria for discerning ‘historical’ elements in the text even as he himself overlooked the full significance of the ‘*genetic mythical principle*’ for understanding the significance of the ‘evangelist as author.’⁷

Part II of Volume I is a ‘A Historical Reader for the 1839 Zurich Revolution’ that was sparked by Strauß’ appointment to the University of Zurich. It contains background material and summaries of the events of September 6, 1839. These include official documents, newspaper and other eyewitness reports, as well as letters of recommendation and street pamphlets that address Strauß’ appointment both pro

7. Ferdinand Christian Baur may have contributed to Strauß’ avoidance of the full significance of the ‘*genetic mythical principle*’ for theology. Not only does the ‘*genetic, mythical principle*’ account for the development of Second Testament narratives by gleaning the First (‘Old’) Testament texts for any- and everything that the gospel authors could use to portray their understanding of Jesus, but also the ‘*genetic, mythical principle*’ confirms that the gospel authors were driven by their different theological agendas in the selection and arrangement of their narratives about Jesus and/or the Christ. As indicative of his focus on the ‘subjective’ nature of Kant and the Rationalists (including Schleiermacher) to be characteristic of the Enlightenment age, Baur claims that the ‘subjectivist, relativizing of the gospels shattered the ancient, ‘objective’ teaching of the Church. (See Baur, *The Christian Doctrine of Atonement and its Historical Development from Its Most Ancient Time down to the Present* [*Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung und ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung von der ältesten Zeit bis auf die neueste*], Vol. II (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2004): 606–607).

Baur’s, the early Strauß’, and Hegel’s commitment to ‘science’ was fueled by their conviction that humanity can achieve Absolute Knowledge. Given the enduring influence of the anti-Kantian and anti-Enlightenment Movement in the first half of the 19th C, Strauß had no alternative but his version of ‘materialism’ in his final work, *The Old and the New Faith* in 1872, because of Strauß’ insistence on ‘objective’ knowledge. Having misunderstood the meaning of ‘necessity’ in Kant’s Copernican Turn, a term which Strauß, Baur, and Hegel/the Hegelians took ‘necessity’ to mean the ‘necessity’ of the Principle of Sufficient Reason to account for absolute causality (see: 702), they judged Kant to have remained limited to ‘subjectivity’ with no awareness of the true significance of Absolute Knowledge although Kant nowhere claims that ‘God’ doesn’t exist. Rather, he called ‘God’ a ‘necessary’ idea of reason as one of the three ideas of reason that are required in order for finite, transcendental consciousness to be what it is. (See Kant’s list of the three ideas of reason in the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 700 and their heuristic value in *ibid.*, B 671–672). However, Strauß, Baur, and Hegel/the Hegelians had no grasp of the significance of ‘necessity’ as did Kant to mean ‘required’ in the sense of an assumption in order to experience, understand, and exercise responsible agency in the world, which is possible only for finite, transcendental consciousness. Therefore, they turned Kant’s ‘faith’ in God into a capricious, subjective strategy that both denied Absolute Knowledge and limited all understanding to subjective consciousness – overlooking that the Principle of Sufficient Reason itself is an assumption of subreption, not an absolute certainty.

Kant is no ‘mere subjectivist’. His reflections always begin with empirical phenomena and turn to the discernment of the transcendental conditions of finite consciousness required to experience empirical phenomena. See, for example, the “Introduction” to Kant’s *Logic* AA IX: 11–16 and *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 181–186. He takes the position, then, between empiricism and Absolute Idealism, which he calls Critical Idealism.

and con. Among the materials is Strauß' letter to the Zurich government in which he defends his work against his adversaries in the Canton as well as a letter to the Central Committee of the populist movement written by the Superintendent of Schools, Ignaz Thomas Scherr. It concludes with the official report of the "Aid Society for the Good of the Victims of 6 September 1839" that documents the tragic, enduring effects of the revolution.

In Volume II with its 'close' reading of the 'intellectual crises' that are reflected in Strauß' writings, I propose that a 'deep' reading of his sources adds breadth to the expansive understanding of his corpus as it illuminates the influence of his sources on his reflections and failed opportunities, especially when it came to Immanuel Kant.

Strauß, the gospel critic, was read by many, including his beloved professor, Ferdinand Christian Baur, to have ignored 'history' in the gospels, which is taken to mean that he was intent on destroying Christian doctrine.⁸

However, while acknowledging that 'criticism' of the gospels, especially the miracles, leads to the collapse of the naïve, literal reading and the calling into question of the historical 'truth' of Christian narrative found in the gospels, the primary *constructive aspect of criticism*, according to Strauß in the *LJ*, is to restore the 'scientific truth' (that is, the 'Concept') of the Christian doctrine of incarnation.⁹ Strauß emphasized that discernment of the historical was an important aspect for identifying this 'scientific truth'. To be sure, establishment of the 'historical' elements in the gospels is no easy task. In fact, Strauß invoked four criteria for identifying the 'historical' material in the gospels:

The account must be compatible with universal, physical laws and 'objective' science.¹⁰

8. F.C. Baur was not defending Traditional Christian Theology, but he did defend a 'Hegelianized' Christology that he believed was the 'true' Christology of the gospels. The 'historical' God/Man refers not to a single individual or limited set of philosophers (e.g., Hegelians) but to that growing number of those who grasp the significance of Absolute Spirit in finite spirit over the entire course of history that is the Christian Church (*Gemeinde*) as the 'body of Christ'. See Baur, *Gnosis*: especially, 721 but also 685, 696, and 734–736. To the 'left' of Baur, though, is Strauß with his universally, inclusive Christology that is not limited to the Christian community (*Gemeinde*).

9. See Strauß' account of what he understood to be the aim of his *LJ* in "1. Allgemeines Verhältniß der Hegel'schen Philosophie zur theologischen Kritik" in *Streitschriften* III: 58–59.

10. Strauß, *LJ*: 88. In his *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*, Strauß summarized Schleiermacher's take on miracles to be: where we reach the limits of rational understanding, anything is possible. In dramatic contrast, according to Strauß, the limits of rational understanding are established by physical laws. Where Schleiermacher was willing to leave open the possibility of miracles, Strauß maintains that lack of understanding can never trump the necessary untruth of an event that violates the laws of nature. See Strauß summary of Schleiermacher's *The Christian Faith*, par. 47, sec. 3 in *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 86–87. Schleiermacher insists that "[...] our judgment concerning miracles must be such that through it the credibility of the Gospels is not injured; for otherwise our faith in the person of Christ would be ruined, and he would become for us a mythical person!" (*Ibid.*, 97) [Keck's text emphasized 'mythical'] In other words, according to Schleiermacher there are no absolute miracles; but all miracles are possible: "miracles as such, as something absolute" are

The account must neither be inconsistent with itself nor in contradiction with other acknowledged historical material.

The account cannot be historical if the representation is poetical, the actors converse in hymns, and their communications are of a 'diffuse and elevated strain' from their actors' training and situation.

The account cannot be historical if it 'strikingly accords with ideas prevailing within the circle from which the narrative was generated and the ideas appear to be the product of preconceived opinions. In such cases 'it is more or less probable' that such narratives are of mythical origin.¹¹

These criteria are anticipatory of the three criteria for historical authenticity summarized in the 20th C.¹² However, Strauß remains a valuable resource for gospel scholarship not only with respect to his establishment of criteria for identifying 'history' in the gospels, but, more significantly, *for his robust defense of their 'myths' as a conveyance of 'scientific truth.'*

In other words, Strauß' understanding of myth is crucial, paradoxically, to his defense of what he presented in the *LJ* as the 'scientific truth' of the gospels although the miracle stories in the gospels were factually impossible. In the post-Copernican world of Strauß' day, the choice was limited either to *rejection of 'science'* (as the case for biblical literalists) or to preserve 'science' (as the case of the 'Rationalists') with the latter required to distort the text. The Rationalists' 'Accommodation Theory' claimed that the gospels were factual, historical accounts written with the non-scientific under-

impossible; "but [...] the gospel miracle stories, insofar as they can be viewed relatively, he provisionally acknowledges as all possible." (*Ibid.*, 87) To be sure, Schleiermacher wrote that "In the interest of piety *there can never arise a necessity of understanding a fact in such a way that its dependence on God destroys its contingency on the continuity of nature.*" (*Ibid.*, 84) Schleiermacher wrote: "If in time an explanation of the basis of these [miracle] narratives were to be found in which the miraculous were to disappear, [...] than that would be no disturbance of faith; to the contrary, it would be the most desirable outcome of our investigation' [...]" (*Ibid.*, 93) However, Schleiermacher leaves open a loophole: *it is never 'necessary' for faith to understand an event as a disruption of the continuity of nature, but it is, nonetheless, possible because of human ignorance.* This is profoundly opposite to Strauß' claim that the limits to reason require that we recognize the universality of physical laws – otherwise, we cannot understand anything!

11. See Strauß, *LJ*: 88–89. This latter criterion, positively formulated, is the 'criterion of dissimilarity' of 20th C. gospel scholarship. Note, however, that here Strauß is cautious with his 'more or less probable.' The criterion is no guarantee of the historical content of the account. Strauß applies the criterion of dissimilarity, for example, to justify belief in Peter's having denied Jesus – although he points out that the cock's crow and three-fold repetition of the denial are "[...] legendary is not to be denied." Strauß, *Life of Jesus Examined for the German People*: 546–547.

12. Norman Perrin summarizes the criteria from Bultmann and Käsemann: 1) the criterion of dissimilarity; 2) the criterion of coherence; 3) and the criterion of multiple attestation. See Norman Perrin, *Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus* (New York: Harper and Row, Pub., 1967): 39–48. For an analysis of these 20th C. criteria see Chapter 1, "On the Function of the Historical Jesus in Theological Reflection: The Question of Authority" in Douglas R McGaughey, *On the Soteriological Significance of the Symbol of the Kingdom of God in the language of the Historical Jesus* (Ph.D. Dissertation, The Divinity School of The University of Chicago, 1983): 51–52.

standing of physical events of the day, but that it is the task of the biblical scholar to demonstrate that those reported events have a 'scientific' explanation according to the 19th C understanding of empirical science. *The Rationalists, then, either turned Jesus and the disciples into deceivers or they had to dramatically distort the text in order to account for the miracles on the basis of empirical science.*

Strauß' 'scientific' alternative to Traditional Christian Theology and the Rationalists cut the Gordian knot by distinguishing between a story and its 'truth.' This option employed Hegel's understanding of 'science'¹³ that is based on the epistemological structure of perceptible form (representations) and 'true' content (idea). The 'true' content is the abstract idea that makes both possible, and is at the core of, the 'actual,' form or perceptible representations of experience.¹⁴ When it comes to the gospels, the 'actual' consists of the reported 'events' in the life and teaching of Jesus of Nazareth. The 'true content,' according to the Hegelian perspective, is the Absolute Knowledge that is the incarnation of the God/Man.

Although not grounded in the hypothetico-deductive method of empirical science, Hegel took Copernicus as an example of the 'scientific' conclusion of the Hegelians. Copernicus had demonstrated that, whereas the 'actual,' perceptible representations 'prove' that the sun circles the earth, scientific 'truth' is only grasped by an imperceptible, mathematical model (Copernicus' true 'idea') that understands that the earth is moving around the sun although we cannot 'see' it doing so. In other words, Copernican science acknowledges a difference between 'perception' (form) and 'truth' (content) with perception in the sensible realm requiring the 'scientific correction' of the true content (Idealism) that one can acquire only in the intelligible realm.

Strauß applies to the gospel stories (myths) Hegel's notion of 'science' that distinguishes between perceived 'form' (husk) and 'true' content (the kernel). In the *LJ*, he thought that Hegelian 'science' allowed him to 'scientifically restore' the Christian doctrine of incarnation even though many of the stories themselves were literally false. *No more than the 'truth' of the heliocentric system can be established by the 'false' perception of the sun's movement, the 'truth' of the narratives was not their literal representations as factual accounts of events as maintained by Traditional Christian Theology and the Rationalists.*

13. This is not the science of the hypothetico-deductive method with which we are familiar today.

14. 'Objective' means in Hegelian philosophy the grounds of the distinction between 'representations' (*sinnliche Anschauung*) and 'ideal content' (*intellektuelle Anschauung*). See Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen oder die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjektivität in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen als Kantische, Jacobische und Fichtesche Philosophie" GW II: 305–306; „A representation [*Form*] is [...] present as exactly the same both in the subject and the object" ["Die Form A ist [...] dieselbe im Subjekt und Objekt vorhanden."] – *ibid.*: 312; "The 'real'/'actual' [*Reale*] is the absolute identity of the universal and the particular;" abstraction 'needs' the positive of the particular – "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 521; reason = highest abstraction (Unity, Knowledge, Freedom) but without the particular it is empty abstraction" – *ibid.*: 525; see as well, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 78–79!!; 97–98; 103–104.

Rather, gospel narratives can have as their kernel a historical event, a theological/philosophical idea, or a 'symbol.' The first task of the exegete is a) to determine what element at the core of the story (myth) is, followed by b) an explanation of the 'true' meaning of that core element and c) an account of how the 'false,' literal myth was generated (penultimately, without addressing the genetic origin of the 'First' Testament prototypes) in order to communicate the 'truth' of the individual, gospel pericopes. However, the 'truth' of the gospels was their abstract ideas (established as the 'truth' at the core of a fanciful account of an historical event, a 'true' philosophical idea, or a 'true' symbol) that are *the real kernels of the stories*. The 'truth' of the gospels is not literally what one 'sees' when one reads the text. For the 'scientific' reading of the gospels, the text is to the 'truth' what the 'movement of the sun' is to the 'truth' of the heliocentric solar system.

Strauß claimed in the *LJ* that the scientifically 'true' meaning of Church Doctrine, the 'kernel' of the gospel narratives, is that '*God has become man*.' He took this to mean that the mythic narratives of the gospels are a perceptible account of what cannot be perceptibly portrayed: *Spirit coming to conscious awareness of Itself*. What distinguished him from Traditional Christian Theology was his rejection of the *exclusive* limiting of the Spirit's incarnation to a particular historical individual in Palestine at the beginning of the Common Era. Strauß' rigorous reflections on Hegelianism, though, led him to see that Absolute Spirit's incarnation is neither limited to one individual (Hegel's Christology) nor applicable only to a group of individuals who alone 'know' its truth as the 'escape from materialism' (Right-Wing Hegelians). Rather, he defended a radically *inclusive* understanding of Christology that applied, universally, to *all finite consciousness* past, present, and future *in history*.¹⁵

Yet, in addition to his gospel criticism, whose aim was to demonstrate the non-historical nature (particularly, of the miracles as obvious violation of 'science'), he took the task of the gospel exegete not only to be discernment of the 'truths' or kernels of the gospel narratives (the meaning at their core) but also *to account for the generation of their non-historical stories*. Strauß especially drew on the work of Wilhelm Krug, who explained the development of myths as the consequence of the '*genetic mythical principle*.'¹⁶ This principle maintains that the stories in the gospels are *pre-figured* through inherited narrative prototypes from the 'First' Testament. Strauß

15. F.C. Baur limited his inclusive, historical Christ by employing the Apostle Paul's notion of the Christian church as the 'body of Christ' to mean that the incarnation (the God/Man) is all those who understand (confess) that Christ's Spirit is the spirit of finite consciousness. In other words, the Christian is one who takes her/his spirit to be inseparable from Christ's Spirit because all Christians share the same body, which is the meaning and purpose of the Eucharist.

16. See Wilhelm Krug, „Versuch über die genetische oder formelle Erklärungsart der Wunder“ in *Museum für Religionswissenschaft*, I (1803): 395–413. From Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 267. Strauß cites Krug in the first edition of the *LJ*: 35–36. In the fourth edition, Strauß maintained the paragraph of the first edition (56), but the explicit citation of Krug occurs first on page 59.

demonstrates that all of the miracle stories in the gospels with the crucial exception of the stories involving demons,¹⁷ have *pre-figured* parallels in the 'First' Testament.¹⁸ Given the significance of Jesus for the early Church, these authors believed he 'had to' have performed the miracles in the 'First' Testament in a superior fashion. *In the Gospel of Luke 24:27; 24:44; 22:37, the gospel author anchored the 'genetic mythical principle,' in the teaching of the 'historical' Jesus.*

The gospel exegete, then, has the task of identifying the *pre-figured* elements in the First Testament that were drawn upon by the early Christian community and the gospel writers in order to *formulate their narratives understanding* (their *con-figurations*) of the significance of what they had experienced in the ministry of Jesus of Nazareth. I provide in Appendix I to Volume II a list of what Strauß took to be 'historical' material in the gospels.¹⁹

This second aspect of the *genetic mythical principle* in Strauß' mythic reading of the text also remains significant for today's gospel exegetes. If the texts are not actual accounts of factual events but generated out of a deep reading of the 'First' Testament on the part of the early Church to identify the *pre-figured* prototypes that they *con-figured* to tell their 'story' about Jesus of Nazareth, then *the key to the 'truth' of the gospels is not the certainties of historical claims but the theology of the author and her/his community that shaped their con-figuration of the prototypes.* In short, in light of the theological options present in the gospels and other texts of the 'Second' Testament for understanding the significance of Jesus of Nazareth for faith, the text doesn't give the reader 'the' absolute, objective truth. Rather, the text challenges the reader to take responsibility for her/his theological truth.²⁰

17. Although demon possession was a 'new' disease in the Intertestamental Period so that there are no miracles involving demons in the First Testament, even when it came to miracles involving demons, the plethora of First Testament miracles provided the explanatory framework for the 'new' demon miracles: Jesus had to have demonstrated his sovereignty over demons because of the theological status he came to possess for the early Church.

18. See "Appendix II: Annotated 'First' Testament **Concordance**:" 993 ff.

19. See Appendix I: „Likely ‚Historical‘ Elements of Jesus' Life" 985 ff.

20. One can take this to be the challenge of 'classical mythology,' as well. Ernst Cassirer proposes that myths have a 'perceptual' and a 'conceptual' structure. See Cassirer, *An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977): 76.

The 'perceptual' structure treats 'nature' as the literal face of the parent that the child must 'read' in order to respond in ways that its needs can be met by the parent (nature). It takes myth to be accounts of humanity's satisfying its self-interest in its interaction with 'powers' greater than the individual. Classic examples would be found not only in 'pagan' mythology but also in the key 'covenantal' narratives of the 'First' and 'Second' Testaments. Strauß comments on the centrality of God for success (or failure) in achieving 'self-interest' that is at the foundation of all religion and questions its baseness. See Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus und seine Schutzschrift (Herman Samuel Reimarus and his Protected Writing)* (1862), Vol. 5 in the *Gesammelte Schriften von David Friedrich Strauß* (Bonn: Verlag von Emil Strauß, 1877): 281–282.

The 'conceptual' structure views myths as a 'fictional account' (the husk) of their kernels, which are a portrayal of the 'first' time that the 'eternal prototypes' occurred and which agency can subsequently

The ‘truth’ of the gospels is a theological understanding that the gospel authors (and today’s readers) already bring with them to the text. The gospels are, thereby, transformed into a rich source of theological reflection already in the early Church. Only the individual can think for her-/himself, and only the individual can give her-/himself permission to exercise her/his agency. This turns the purported perceptible ‘Kingdom of God’ into an imperceptible Commonweal of God²¹ that rejects all heteronomous, moral finger-wagging and encourages the individual to cultivate the capacities to think and assume personal responsibility for her-/his own theology and agency. Strauß’ presentation of Church History in his *Glaubenslehre* of 1841 is valuable, as well, *not as a set of theologically, objective ‘truths’ but as the valuable stimulation of one’s own reflections. Both the gospels and the Christian tradition, then, become resources for the reader today to sort out her/his own theological understanding.*

For example, the gospels themselves present various readings of Jesus: He can be taken to be a Jewish reformer or a Jewish Socrates, an Ebionite (a human being infused with God’s will), or the opposite, a Docetic vision (only an appearance of God’s Spirit in flesh), a vehicle for Stoic/Cynic wisdom; later, of course, Jesus was portrayed as Hercules (particularly in the Roman catacombs) as well as the ‘solution’ to Augustine of Hippo’s novel teaching of Original Sin at the end of the 4th C based on a misreading of Romans 5:12, along with many more options. However, once the shift occurs from the gospels as historical truth to the gospels as theological reflection, the gospel exegete has to step down from the throne of divine certainties to acknowledge the role of relative, human understanding (that is, faith) shaping the text. This shift can enable the individual to seek certainty neither in ‘objective,’ empirical claims that are historical events nor in capricious, ‘subjective’ opinion but in the ‘necessary,’²²

only ‘copy,’ as with what Thomas Kuhn calls ‘exemplary past achievements’ in the “Postscript” of his *Structure of Scientific Revolutions: Foundations of the Unity of Science*, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970): 175. Contrary to early Christianity’s dismissal of Greek mythology because of its ‘immorality,’ then, Greek mythology is confronting the hearer with the inescapable, personal choice whether or not the individual will ‘copy’ the action of the gods. The ‘eternal prototype’ itself at the ‘kernel’ of the myth is amoral. It becomes an issue for morality only when the individual chooses to act according to it. The same can be said of the gospel ‘myths’. The ‘kernel’ of a pericope is a theological claim that must be adjudicated by the reader. The gospels, then, serve along with the history of Church Doctrine as a resource that aids the reader with its rich theological options. The task of the theologian is not to establish objective ‘truth’ but to save the time of others by clarifying the issues at issue in a theological claim so that the ‘other’ can decide for her-/himself the ‘truth’ to guide her/his agency.

21. Kant stresses that the ‘Kingdom of God’ has nothing to do with a particular covenant but a ‘moral’ Kingdom “available to cognition through mere reason.” *Religion* AA VI: 137* In order to avoid the metaphor interference that accompanies the notion of a ‘Kingdom’ of God and to emphasize its universality as a capacity of reason, I prefer the notion Commonweal of God.

22. The term ‘necessary’ appears to be problematic for some readers. Instead of reading it simply as ‘required,’ it is read to mean ‘causally determining,’ as if the conditions of possibility and capacities of transcendental consciousness pre-determined what transcendental consciousness actually *does* with those *a priori* conditions and capacities. For example, to drive a car, it is *necessary* that one has a car. However, the fact that one has a car does not determine how one is going to drive it.

finite, transcendental conditions that are universally required for consciousness to experience and understand anything whatsoever.

However, Strauß himself did not grasp the significance of the author's creativity when it comes to the '*genetic mythical principle*.' If the author is intentionally employing prototypes from the 'First' Testament in the writing of her/his gospel, then the author's theology is driving her/his writing. The written text is not what establishes or confirms the 'truth' of the author's theology. However, Strauß' failure to appreciate the 'evangelist as author'²³ when it came to the '*genetic mythical principle*' is not out of stubborn insistence against his opponents that he rejected history in the gospels but because of his epistemological assumptions and moral consequentialism.

Strauß' concern was not with 'theological pluralism' in the text but, contrary to the opinion of many, on *historical certainties established by the text*. He anticipated 'liberal' 20th C biblical scholars who remained committed to the value of the gospels only to the extent that one can establish factual history in them. Post-Kähler 20th C theology even insists that what matters is not the 'Jesus of history' but the 'historic, biblical Christ' of faith.²⁴ However, by 1864 Strauß had concluded that the historical evidence of the gospels is incapable of carrying the weight of a biography of Jesus, and by 1872 he questioned the historical foundation for conclusions with respect to his actual teaching.²⁵ Whatever history is in the text, he had concluded in 1864, it is only an aggregate of unconnected, fragmentary elements. This conclusion contributed to his turn to Feuerbachian materialism at the end of his career.

The conditions of possibility and capacities (*Anlagen*) of transcendental consciousness *are not uncovered by means of the casual assumption of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (Satz vom zureichenden Grund)*: that the cause of an effect must have at least as much 'reality' as the effect; otherwise, something would come from nothing. They are *a priori* elements 'deduced' from the experience of appearances that are required if a consciousness is to be capable of experiencing the appearances – *not create the appearances!*

23. Even Norman Perrin, author of "The Evangelist as Author" failed to articulate the theological significance of the 'evangelist as author'. However, in the last paragraph of his article he adds the caveat: "I have limited myself quite deliberately to the critical method involved in interpreting the text historically, and I am very well aware that this is only the beginning and not the end of the hermeneutical task." Perrin, "The Evangelist as Author: Reflections on the Study and Interpretation of the Synoptic Gospels and Acts" in *Biblical Research*. 17 (1972): 18.

24. See Martin Kähler, *The So-called Historical Jesus and the Historic, Biblical Christ*. Carl E. Braaten trans. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970. This theological trajectory includes the 'hermeneutical' theology of Gerhard Ebeling's 'Word event' and Ernst Fuchs' 'Kerygma event'. See Gerhard Ebeling, "Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus und das Problem der Christologie" in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 56 Jahrgang (Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1959), Beiheft 1: 14–30. Ernst Fuchs, Ernst Fuchs, D. Ernst. "Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus" in *Zur Frage nach dem historischen Jesus* (Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1965): 377–404.

25. Strauß writes in 1872: "I only wanted to give an indication [...] how [...] little we are sure [...] on any point in the speeches and teachings of Jesus that we have words and thoughts from him, or only such before us, which [...] were] put into His mouth in later times." Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube. Ein Bekenntnis* [*The Old and the New Faith: A Confession*] (Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1872): 58; see as well 53.

As insightful as Strauß' solution to the problem of 'science' in the gospels was, the *LJ* was only the first step in his fascinating metaphysical odyssey. Volume II of this work focuses not only on the changes in his understanding of metaphysics alone but also on the constantly present, but mis-represented, ghostly image of Immanuel Kant, which shaped Strauß across his career.

In his battles with the Hegelians over his portrayal of the incarnation (collected in his *Streitschriften* [*Polemical Writings*] of 1837)²⁶, he lamented his rejection by even the so-called 'Left-Wing' Hegelians. However, with the publication of "On the Transient and the Permanent in Christianity" of 1838, the Hegelian meta-narrative of the dialectic of Double Negation is entirely absent. This is not simply a consequence of his attempt to 'break the lance' of his opponents who viewed him as an 'elitist' Hegelian. Rather, here he explicitly rejects any theology whose ultimate goal is a 'one-sided, *theoretical* reason.'²⁷ He sought a different philosophical framework for the grounding of Christianity than an escape from history. He now speaks of the ground of faith in terms of the '*religious genius*' who achieved the highest form of '*internal harmony*' with '*reason*' (in the tradition of Scholastic 'Intellectualists' in contrast to the 'Occasionalists'/'Voluntarists') reconciled with external, moral teaching. Importantly, the crucial conviction that drives this attribution of the label 'religious genius' to Jesus is that the text is taken to provide enough factual, historical evidence (!) to support it.

Furthermore, in January of 1839, precisely at that point when the government of the Canton of Zurich named Strauß to the professorship for Biblical Theology, Church History, and Dogmatics at their new university in Zurich (1833), which led to the political revolution in Zurich in September and the termination of any chance for an academic career, Strauß began publishing, serially, a devastatingly critical manuscript on Schleiermacher and the 'Right-Wing' Hegelian, Carl Daub. In Chapter 4, I present a detailed analysis of why Schleiermacher was not an option for Strauß. As rector of the university in Heidelberg, Daub played a vital role in Hegel's joining him in Heidelberg for two years before Hegel went on to Berlin. Significantly, as well, Daub was Ludwig Feuerbach's professor in Heidelberg. In Chapter 8, I look at Strauß' blistering attack of Daub.

Despite his disdain for Daub, Daub's reading of Kant was formative for Strauß because it reinforced what he had learned about Kant from F.C. Baur, Hegel, and Schleiermacher. A careful examination of the warped elements of Kant in his writings illuminates what were/are, unfortunately, common misunderstandings of Kant, which, when corrected, allow recognition of Kant as an option to Strauß' Feuerbachian

26. The three pamphlets are reprinted in the single volume: Strauß, *Streitschriften zur Verteidigung meiner Schrift über das Leben Jesu und zur Charakteristik der gegenwärtigen Theologie*. (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1980).

27. See Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum" (1838) ("On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity") in *Zwei friedliche Blätter* (Altona; Verlag von J.F. Hammerich, 1839): 108.

materialism that itself only slowly emerged for Strauß over the last thirty years of his life and is solidified in *The Old and the New Faith* of 1872.

A key barrier to Strauß' embracing of Kant's notion of *a priori* synthetic judgment is not merely the false reading of synthesis to mean the *a posteriori* synthesis of dialectic, but also because, since Aristotle, the dominant trope for 'knowledge' is 'causal explanation' and, already with Aristotle, ethics is measured by the consequences of one's agency.

Aristotle's *Metaphysics* begins: "All men (*sic.*) by nature want to know." (980a 21) He adds: "[...] [M]en (*sic.*) of experience know that the thing is so, but do not know why, while the others know the 'why' and the cause." (981a 29–31) Aristotle concludes that wisdom has to do with first causes and the first principles of explanation:

28. This is Aristotle's formulation of the difference between 'theoretical' and 'practical' reason. Theoretical reason is abstract knowledge whereas practical reason is concerned with teleological agency. This is what Kant means by theoretical and practical reason. Hegel, though, defined theoretical reason as the realm of the intelligible whereas practical reason is the realm of the sensible. Aristotle and Kant take theoretical and practical reason to be concerned with the question, "How is one in the world 'in the right way'?" Hegel separates theoretical and practical reason to answer the question, "How does finite consciousness escape from the pain and suffering of the world?" He views Absolute Spirit as an escape from the world of pain and suffering.

Kant's 'Negative Method'

Kant's 'right way' is no external, heteronomous imposition of moral principles on the individual measurable by moral consequences. In addition to emphasizing the positive 'passion' (*Lust*) for the imperceptible, universal order (physical and moral) in phenomena of theoretical and practical reason, in the face of the ennui, pain, suffering, and injustice of the world, Kant rejected Stoic indifference (*Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 891–892; Olms ed.: 45); rejected Epicurean concupiscence (*Anweisung*, Olms ed.: 34); rejected Cynic viewing of pain as a lesson to toughen oneself (*Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 891–892; Olms ed.: 45); rejected 'melancholy' (belief that 'pain' is the fundamental condition of all life that makes suicide attractive) (*Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1071; Olms ed.: 251); rejected Sophist indifference to truth and the reduction of life to 'winning' (*Logik* AA IX: 26); rejected mystical escapism from the world (*Conflict of the Faculties* AA VII: 54–58, *End of All Things* AA VIII: 335–336, *Metaphysic Mrongovius* AA XXIX: 950); rejected drunkenness as illusory hope (*Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1072–1073; Olms ed.: 253: 253); and proleptically rejects the Hegelian desire for divinization that escapes the pain and suffering in the world, as well as gave warning against passive waiting for divine grace (*The Conflict of the Faculties* AA VII: 43.44 and *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* AA VI: 190). Rather, Kant offers a 'negative method' echoing his distinction within autonomous freedom's degree of 'freedom-from' nature's determinism serving as the condition for 'freedom-for' creativity (*Critique of Pure Reason* B 580). His 'negative method' (*Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 891–892; Olms ed.: 45) responds to the negative (ennui, pain, suffering, and injustice in the world) not by calling for a stiff upper lip or escape but as the thorn in the flesh that generates the 'passion' (*Lust*) for the positive: intentional creativity that holds itself responsible to universal principles (*Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1070–1072, 1092; Olms ed.: 250–252 and 275–276), which achieves the highest satisfaction in life (*Anweisung* Olms ed.: 36–37). In short, when it comes to agency for which "[e]rror is always accompanied with the appearance of truth and deliciousness (*Ergötzlichkeit*)" (*Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 891; Olms ed.: 44), Kant proposes: "[O]ur teaching of what is right (*Rechtsgelehrsamkeit*) is so overloaded with restrictions and subtleties that of the many people, often the one who has the most just cause is deprived of justice. The negative method simplifies and cuts much learning" (*Menschenkunde* AA

so that [...] the man (*sic.*) of experience is deemed to be wiser than those who merely sense things, the artist more than men (*sic.*) of experience, and the master worker more than the manual workers. Thus, *wisdom is thought to consist in theoretical rather than in productive kinds of knowledge*.²⁸ Clearly, then, wisdom is rational knowledge concerning certain basic factors and causes.²⁹ (emphasis added)

Furthermore, Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* begins: "Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason, the good rightly has been declared to be that at which all things aim."³⁰

In short, *for Aristotle the highest wisdom is to know the causes of things, and the good is defined by the ethical quality of the 'consequences' of one's actions*. For Hegel and Strauß, as well, the highest wisdom is to know the ultimate causes of things, which according to Hegel is Absolute Spirit, whereas moral goodness is a cause made clear by the consequences of one's actions. That is, the good is defined in terms of virtuous 'consequences' caused by agency.

Hegel's distinction between theoretical and practical reason, though, is different from Aristotle's. According to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, theoretical reason is abstract contemplation (Book 10) of ideas (Aristotle's Platonism) whereas practical reason is *productive agency/creativity with the rationale of both being 'proper' living in the world!*

Hegel drives a wedge between theoretical and practical reason. According to Hegel, 'theoretical reason' is the Absolute Unity of a '*divisible I*' (Absolute Spirit) that is mental ideality (*Ideelle*) over against 'practical reason,' which for Hegel is the 'unreasonable many' of the '*divisible non-I*' that is empirical actuality (*Realität*).³¹ Theoretical reason (or pure thought) for Hegel is 'contemplation' of the 'true content' (*Inhalt*)

XXV,2: 892; Olms ed. 46). Even the most powerless (including children and 'handicapped') can make a creative and responsible difference. Kant's reference to the injustice of a judicial system 'overloaded with restrictions and subtleties' might be a reference to the struggle between the saddle makers and the harness makers by which, apparently, Kant's father lost his business. See August Schreiner, *Immanuel Kant, der Königsberger Weltweise* (Königsberg: von Emil Rautenberg, 1861): 3.

29. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 981b 27 – 128a 1.

30. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1094a 1–3.

31. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 455–456. According to Hegel, *Realität*, *Reale*, *Reelle* refer to-concrete actuality [*Wirklichkeit*] as a negation within Absolute Spirit. Abstract ideas are the *Ideelle*, which, in turn, is a negation of concrete determination. *Realität/Reelle* is the 'empirical.' Hegel contrasts the idea as the 'true' content/*Inhalt* from the 'actual' form (representations) with the latter the *Reale/Reelle*. In his *Logik*, Hegel writes: "In relation to reality [*Realität*] and ideality [*Idealität*] (...), the opposition of the finite and the infinite is conceived in such a way that the finite applies to the real [*Reale*], the infinite applies to the ideal [*Ideelle*], just as furthermore the concept is regarded as an ideal [*Ideelles*] and indeed as an only ideal [*Ideelles*], concrete existence in general, however, as the real [*Reale*]. GW V: 165–166.

See, as well, Hegel, Review of "Aphorismen über Nichtwissen und absolutes Wissen im Verhältnisse zur christlichen Glaubenserkenntnis.—Ein Beitrag zum Verständnisse der Philosophie unserer Zeit. Von Carl Friederich G[öschel]" in *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, Bd. 1 (Mai/Juni) (1829): 810–811.

of consciousness with Absolute Spirit as ultimate cause and explanation of all ‘that is.’ Practical reason, in contrast, is concerned with the ‘lower appetites’ driven by ‘actual representations’ (self-interest, imagination, and wishful thinking).³² Aristotle’s productive agency is reduced by Hegel to being driven exclusively by appetites in the sensuous world – *in opposition to theoretical reason*! For Hegel, the goal of reason is not ‘proper’ living in the world but escaping the seductions of sensuousness. This is accomplished, Hegel claims, by the individual recognizing that s/he is the ‘point to indifference’ beyond history, that is the Second Negation of Absolute Spirit.

Hegel’s ‘Absolute Knowledge’ claims to know the ultimate cause of all ‘that is’ to be a historically horizontal, non-personal, Absolute Spirit that creates not like Plato’s vertical, top-down ‘artisan’ who must first internally think an idea before externalizing it in matter. Rather, for Hegel, *history is the product of emanation out of Absolute Spirit* that occurs by means of a historical, logical, dialectical process of Double Negation.³³

Hegel’s meta-narrative is an account of causal necessity based on the *petitio principii* of Absolute Oneness that, when combined with the Principle of Sufficient Reason (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*) and the logic of dialectic, is taken to be a causal account for the ‘creation’ (horizontally, not vertically) of all ‘that is’.³⁴

Although a first impression might lead one to take his account of causal necessity to be justified by Kant’s Copernican Turn³⁵ to identify the conditions of possibility for

32. On Hegel’s understanding of theoretical and practical spirit, see his “Zusatz“ („Addendum“) *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaft* GW X: 237. See as well, in “Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten” Hegel’s portrayal of practical reason’s laws as analytical’ (GW II: 460) and governed by the ‘negative’ of physical necessity rather than the ‘absolute freedom’ of Absolute Spirit (GW II: 457–458, see as well, *ibid.*: 463, 466). See as well, Strauß, [Glaubenslehre] *Die christliche Glaubenslehre in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und im Kampfe mit der modernen Wissenschaft* (*Christian Doctrine in its Historical Development and in Conflict with Modern Science*) (1841) 2 Vols. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2009) I: 17.

33. See Hegel’s „Einteilung“ of „II Teil. Die subjektive Logik“ in *Wissenschaft der Logik* II (1832) GW VI: 269–279.

34. On Kant’s rejection of dialectic for grounding the ultimate, causal ground of ‘what is,’ see *Critique of Pure Reason* B 697 and in Chapter 6: 670.

35. Kant articulated in 1770 the ‘metaphysical principle’ that he later explicitly applied to Copernicus in the *Critique of Pure Reason* of 1781/1787 and is referred to as the Kantian ‘Copernican Turn’. In his “Inaugural Dissertation: On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World” of 1770, Kant wrote: “§24 The method of all metaphysics [...] is reducible [...] to this all-important principle: *carefully prevent the principles proper to sensitive cognition* [sensible perception/*sinnliche Erkenntnis*] from passing their boundaries and affecting the knowledge of understanding [*Verstandeserkenntnisse* of theoretical reason] [for to ignore this ‘metaphysical principle’ is what Kant calls ‘subreption’]. Because the predicate in every judgment of understanding [*Urteil des Verstandes*, i.e., theoretical judgment] is the condition without which the subject is said to be inconceivable, and consequently the predicate is a principle of cognition, the predicate will, *in the case of a sensuous concept* [*sinnlicher Begriff*], *be only the condition of possible sensuous understanding* [*sinnliches Erkenntnis*] [...] However, if the predicate be applied to a concept of understanding [*Verstandsbegriff*], the judgment so constituted will be valid *only according to subjective laws*; it will not be predicable, nor capable of being objectively stated, of the intellectual notion itself. *It can be asserted only as a condition without which there is no sensitive*

experience, understanding, and responsible agency, that initial impression overlooks that Kant is not concerned with the necessity of infinite, eminent causality that *explains* 'what is' but with the necessity of those required elements of *finite* transcendental consciousness that make possible any limited experience, understanding, and responsible agency possible *in the world*. Included in those required necessary elements, especially, is the assumption (not a proof) of *finite*, creative, eminent causality. Hegel's

knowledge [sensible perception/*sinnliche Erkenntnis*] of the given concept." (emphasis added) Kant, "Inaugural Dissertation" AA II: 411–412 NOTE: 1) Kant is not saying that the intellectual judgment can apply capriciously *a priori* to just any predicate that it wishes. The intellectual judgment of theoretical reason is one that is *necessary* or else there would be no experience or judgment regarding an object of cognition on the part of theoretical reason! This necessity, however, is not the necessity of ultimate cause, but the required elements needed for present, immediate experience and understanding. 2) As a 'subjective law' the intellectual judgment cannot be stated objectively. It is, however, a judgment that is *necessary*, again, not as ultimate causality but, rather, as the immediate conditions for us to have the sense experience and understanding that we have.

Kant, in the next §25, gives the example of space and time. Objectively, we do not experience space and time themselves. We experience things 'in space' and events 'in time,' but space and time themselves are not immediately given in perception: "Here now is such a principle for the examination of every sentence resulting from such confusion [of subreption]: *if there be universally predicated of any concept of understanding [Verstandsbegriff] anything belonging to the relations of space and time, it must not be enunciated as objective: it [the universal predication of space and time] denotes only the conditions without which [!] the given concept is not perceptibly knowable.*" Kant, "Inaugural Dissertation" AA II: 412.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant expands further: "We should then be proceeding [with our theoretical reason] precisely on the lines of Copernicus' primary hypothesis. Absent satisfactory progress in explaining the movements of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that they all revolved round the spectator, he tried whether he might not have better success if he made the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest. A similar experiment can be tried in metaphysics [theoretical reason], as regards the *perception [sinnliche Anschauung]* of objects. If perception [*sinnliche Anschauung*] must conform to the constitution of the objects, I do not see how we could know anything of the latter *a priori*; but if the object (as object of the senses) must conform to the constitution of our faculty of perception [*intellektuelle Anschauung*], I have no difficulty in conceiving such a possibility [of conceiving something *a priori*]." *Critique of Pure Reason* B xvi–xvii

"[...] [E]xperience is itself a species of knowledge [of theoretical reason] which involves understanding; and *understanding has rules which I must presuppose as being in me prior to objects being given to me, and therefore as being a priori*. They find expression in *a priori concepts to which all objects of experience necessarily conform*, and with which they must agree. As regards objects which are thought solely through reason, and indeed as necessary, but which can never – at least not in the manner in which reason thinks them – be given in experience, the attempts at thinking them (for they must admit of being thought) will furnish an excellent touchstone of what we are adopting as our new method of thought, namely, that we can know *a priori* of things only what we ourselves put into them." (emphasis added) *Critique of Pure Reason* B xvii–xviii. However, Kant points out that 'metaphysical principles' are *apodictic* because without them there can be no experience, understanding, or responsible agency. This is not because the 'metaphysical principles' necessarily *cause* experience, understanding, or responsible agency. They are merely the conditions required for there to be finite, experience, understanding, and responsible agency.

Importantly, *a priori* elements are not merely *hypotheses*: "See *Critique of Pure Reason* B xxii⁴. Furthermore, *a priori* hypotheticals are not *capricious constructions*. In fact, they constitute a coherent architectonic of all such *a priori* apodictic (lawful) elements. See *Ibid.*: B xxiii.

Absolute Knowledge of *infinite*, eminent, causal necessity places him squarely in the metaphysical tradition of Aristotle³⁶ and leaves him clueless about Kant's Copernican

In the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant proposes the metaphysical principle of the Copernican Turn as a third alternative to verification and falsification as well as extends its application to practical reason: "If someone cannot prove that a thing is, he may try to prove that it is not. If he does not succeed with either (a case which often occurs), he may still ask whether he is interested in assuming the one or the other (by a hypothesis), either from a theoretical or from a practical point of view, that is, either merely to explain a certain phenomenon (as, e.g., for the astronomer, that of the retrograde motion and standstill of the planets). An assumption is adopted from a practical point of view in order to achieve a certain end, which may be either a pragmatic (merely technical end) or a moral end, that is, an end such that the maxim of adopting it is itself a duty [...] What is incumbent upon us as a duty is [...] to act in conformity with the idea of that end, even if there is not the slightest theoretical likelihood that it can be realized, as long as its impossibility cannot be demonstrated either." (emphasis added) *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 354. Like the universal hypotheses/apodictic certainties of theoretical reason, the *hypotheses/lawfulness* of practical reason (morality) are not capricious constructions by the individual but constitute a coherent architectonic of universal principles that are *necessary* for the responsible functioning of autonomous freedom.

36. Hegel's metaphysics is a logical canon without an organon of practical principles, which alone govern what 'ought to be'. In his *Logic* AA IX: 12–14, Kant already anticipated the vacuity of Hegel's logical necessity when he refers to logic as a canon (rules) without an organon (the five senses and, in addition to the *a priori* elements of theoretical reason, the moral principles of practical reason). See, especially, Kant, *Menschenkunde*: AA XXV,2: 905–907; Olms ed.: 60–62

A 'canon' is a set of rules that requires no causal agency. An 'organon' is an organ of sense with a set of rules that requires causal agency, which extends understanding, not merely guides it. On the basis of this distinction, Kant distinguishes between 'logic' and 'mathematics'. "By an organon we understand an instruction as to how a certain knowledge is to be brought about. However, this implies that I already know the object of the knowledge to be produced according to certain rules. An organon of the sciences is therefore not merely logic because it presupposes a precise knowledge of the sciences objects and sources. *Mathematics*, for example, is an excellent example of the need for an organon, as a science that contains the ground of the extension of our knowledge with regard to a certain use of reason, which we possess only because we experience physical sensations. *Logic*, on the other hand, as a general propaedeutic of all uses of understanding and reason in general, does not anticipate scientific conclusions but is only a general art of reason (*canonica epicuri*), of understanding in general." (emphasis added) *Logic* AA IX: 13. In his *Menschenkunde*, Kant distinguishes between mathematics and philosophy: „If mathematics and philosophy are eminently suited to the attainment of the ends of reason, they are nevertheless so heterogeneous that one cannot be completed by the other. The philosopher recognizes everything by concepts, the mathematician by the representation of the concepts in perception. The latter cannot establish the matter from concepts, as the former can, but must present the concept in perception. The philosopher cannot represent his concepts in the perceptible world; and because he lacks this means, the mathematician, when he begins to philosophize, cannot move from the spot, and the most astute mathematician makes mistakes in philosophizing that would not be forgiven in mathematics. The mathematician is aided by the juggling of figures, and so he differs from philosophers, even if they agree that both are engaged in the exercise of reason. The philosopher requires more wit and attention when he comes to the speculative; the mathematician can project his notions by figures, but the philosopher must keep his notions floating before him, and thus all his reflections become much deeper and more tedious. *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1053–1054; Olms ed. 231

Hegel insists that ideas/content (*Inhalt*) without representations (*Form*) are merely empty abstractions. However, Hegel overlooks Kant's observation that logic is merely a 'canon,' not an 'organon'. Not only is the role of representations for Hegel merely a logical 'point of indifference' that overcomes sensuality to embrace Absolute Spirit, Absolute Oneness, and Absolute Knowledge, but also Hegel claims that

Turn. Succinctly, Hegel's notion of 'necessity' is an ultimate, causal determination of 'what is' whereas Kant's notion of 'necessity' is a finite, set of limited epistemological conditions for 'free' (in the sense of non-determined) responsible agency *in the world*.

According to Hegel's meta-narrative, Absolute Oneness negates itself (the First Negation) into multiplicity, which initiates a sequence of subsequent dialectical negations (a 'this' distinct from a 'that' which leads, *a posteriori*, to a new synthesis) that first produces the spiritual realm of the 'divisible-I' and, eventually, material realm of the 'divisible non-I'.³⁷ After eons, the dialectical process has generated the material conditions for the emergence of finite consciousness that eventually leads to what Hegel calls the 'Christ event' or the 'point of indifference':³⁸ the negation of multiplicity (the Second Negation) as the *influx* back to Absolute Unity. This is a negation that for Hegel occurs beyond, not in, history because it overcomes all history³⁹ as the Good Friday that brings spiritual divinization to finitude.⁴⁰ In short Hegel's meta-narrative of Double Negation is a classic, but now 'horizontal,' not 'vertical,' Gnostic account of emanation and influx.

Hegel's epistemology claims that knowledge is a mental grasping of an objective 'idea' or 'true content' (*Inhalt*) of the individual's subjective, 'actual representations' (*Form*) of perception.⁴¹ The ultimate cause of all 'actual' representations is their 'true' content because ideas precede representations in the dialectical process of the First Negation that produces the representations. Hegel claims that when there is a 'content' (*Inhalt*) without actual representations (*Form*), the idea is an 'empty abstraction',⁴² not

the logic of Double Negation is the causal explanation of 'all that is'. On Hegel's 'point of indifference,' see Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" (1802) GW II: 456. Therefore, anticipating Hegel, Kant dismisses those metaphysicians who are like a flying dove dreaming that it would be easier to fly in a vacuum where speculative philosophy leaves behind all particularities (representations) to claim to grasp Absolute Truth/Absolute Spirit. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 8–9. See as well, *Groundwork* AA IV: 462–463.

37. On Hegel's non-divisible-I, divisible-I, and divisible non-I, see: 160.

38. Hegel calls this event in finite consciousness the 'point of indifference.' On 'the point of indifference' as both a turn to non-difference and affectless equanimity, see Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 456, 465–7, 484, 487–8, 496–97, 499–500.

39. On Hegel's post-resurrection Christology see: 152, n. 156.

40. See Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen:" GW II: 432–433.

41. The alternative to Hegel's Absolute epistemology is Kant's system of *a priori* synthetic judgment within the limits of finite, transcendental consciousness.

42. Hegel could well have his notion of an 'empty abstraction' from Kant's aphorism in the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 75 that 'thoughts without content are empty.' On the notion of 'empty abstraction' and Kant's aphorism in the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 75, see: 158.

The Hegelian (and F.C. Baur's) charge that Kant's philosophy, generally, is a system of 'empty abstractions', by its failure to grasp the metaphysical unity of Absolute Spirit, has as its corollary that concepts and moral norms are subjectively, relative constructions. Given that Hegel views Kant as limited to what Plato calls 'understanding' in his Simile of the Line in the *Republic* 509c ff., Kant's epistemology *must be* subjective construction because it ignores what Plato calls 'reason'. Furthermore, Hegel describes Kant's moral theory as subjectively 'constructivist' precisely in this manner in the "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" (1803). See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten:" GW

objective knowledge. In other words, empty abstractions are ideas that do not occur in actual representations. However, the representations themselves can be ‘false’ but, nonetheless, convey their ‘true’ content because the idea is the same both as ‘true content’ and as the imperceptible in ‘actual representation’:⁴³ “[...]in spite of the fact that the ideal (*Ideelle*) [content] and the actual (*Reelle*) [form] are identical in practical reason [as concrete experience in the world], the actual (*Reelle*) nevertheless remains absolutely opposed [to the ideal].”⁴⁴ Hegel’s account of ‘truth,’ then, is an imperceptible, causal emanation of nature, the world, and finite consciousness as the product of a meta-narrative driven by a dialectical logic of Double Negation whose aim is Absolute Knowledge, Absolute Freedom, and Absolute Spirit.⁴⁵

Furthermore, in “The Moral View of the World” of the *Phenomenology*,⁴⁶ Hegel, like Aristotle, takes ethics (the application of moral principles) to be consequentialist. In conformity with his epistemology of ‘idea’ and perceptible ‘representations,’ he distinguishes between ‘moral duty’ (abstract principles) and ‘ethics’ (the concrete achievement of sovereignty over sensuousness). However, moral duty is an ‘empty abstraction’ because finite consciousness is incapable of attaining the goal of perfect sovereignty over the sensuous world demanded by moral duty.⁴⁷ Finite consciousness

II: 459–461. However, in his *Phenomenology* (1807), he gives an account of morality in “The Moral View of the World” that is based on a heteronomous, divinely imposed *moral duty*. Given the limits placed on humanity by ‘nature’s freedom,’ humanity is incapable of ethical fulfilment of its moral duty. See Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 442 ff. (Baillie trans: 615 ff.). Strauß consistently reads Kant’s notion of heteronomous, ‘moral duty’ through Hegel’s narrative of „The Moral View of the World” although in the *LJ* as I point out momentarily, he describes Kant’s moral principles as ‘derived from the self’ and ‘the cultivation of an epoch’. In his post-*LJ* writings, Strauß stresses humanity’s inability to live up to ‘moral duty’ just as Hegel describes in “The Moral View of the World.” Moral principles, though, cannot be both a matter of subjective ‘construction’ and heteronomously, externally imposed ‘moral duty’.

43. See Hegel, „Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten“ GW II: 511.

44. Hegel, „Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten“ GW II: 456.

45. In his Göschel review, Hegel calls this the ‘supernatural’ (*übernatürliche*). See Hegel, “Aphorismen über Nichtwissen und absolutes Wissen im Verhältnisse zur christlichen Glaubenserkenntnis” GW XI: 383–384.

46. See Hegel, “The Moral View of the World” in the *Phänomenologie* GW III: 442–452 (Baillie trans.: 615–627). For a summary of Hegel’s “The Moral View of the World,” see Vol. II “Introduction:” “Hegel on ‘I should, but I can’t’ in Contrast to Kant’s ‘If I should, I can’t.’” 550 ff. and Chapter 7: “Practical Reason Elevates Theoretical Reason” the section “Hegel’s Account of ‘The Moral View of the World’ is not Kant’s Morality.” 727 ff.

47. See Hegel, „Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten” GW II: 481, 507–8. See as well, „The Moral View of the World“ in the *Phänomenologie* GW III: 442–452. The logic of ‘empty abstraction’ and the unachievability of moral perfection is Ferdinand Christian Baur’s logic for dismissing Kant’s moral theory as ‘empty ideas’ and ‘subjective’. See Baur’s *The Christian Doctrine of Atonement*: 581–582. Baur’s criticism of Kant, however, is based on the assumptions 1) that God and Christ are objective *causes* of any and all atonement with God (*Versöhnung*) rather than *a priori* synthetic judgments; 2) that reconciliation with God is grounded in the objective actions by God (either of ‘paying a ransom’ to the devil [e.g., Matthew 20:28] or the ‘substitution’ of the perfect God/Man to pay the debt owed to God for past sins [Colossians 2:14 and Anselm’s *Cur deus homo*]); 3) that turns Kant’s moral theory of

is a moral failure. However, although 'sin' is the problem for Traditional Personal Theism, it is not the 'true' 'problem' for Hegel. For him, the overcoming of moral failure does not require grace granted by a Personal God. It requires attainment of Absolute Knowledge. In his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, Hegel rejects the role of 'grace' from a Personal God as formulated in "The Moral View of the World." His replacement for 'grace' is the 'cunning of reason'⁴⁸ that silently works in the background to bring about the 'point of indifference' of the Second Negation that nullifies sensuousness. In other words, for Hegel morality is an "I should, but I can't" that doesn't ultimately matter. *Just as the suffering and pain of history is only a meaningless, logical 'place holder' that the 'Idea' that claims to insure that Absolute Spirit is not 'empty,' so too, the ethical failures of humanity are ultimately meaningless because they are only a logical 'place holder' for reason achieve Absolute Knowledge.*

The formative element of Strauß' initial intellectual training was Hegel. He encountered Hegel in Matthias Schneckenburger's classroom in Tübingen, but for four semesters he met twice a week with fellow students (Binder, Märklin, Gauß, and Seeger), first to read Kant but mostly to read Hegel. Strauß' biographer, Theobald Ziegler, reports that Strauß was the leader of the group and the real interpreter. Their encounter with Kant was limited to his *Prolegomena* whereas their study of Hegel focused on the *Phenomenology*.⁴⁹ Prior to his writing of the *LJ* in 1835, though, Strauß read Ferdinand Christian Baur's *Christian Gnosis or the Historical Development of Christian Philosophy of Religion* (*Die christliche Gnosis oder die christliche Religionsphilosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*), which included an extensive and detailed examination of Hegel and Schleiermacher, the two figures who had the most influence on Strauß, along with Baur's own quasi-Hegelian, historically anchored Christology as the development of the Church as the 'body of Christ' in the world.

internal, moral sentiment (*Gesinnung*) into a 'consequentialist' theory of external, objective, quantified moral achievement/failure (*Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: discussion of past 'sins' 567 and discussion of the logic of Anselm's *Cur deus homo*: 568–569; 4) that the heart of Kant's Theory of Atonement is the notion of 'worthiness' that refers to a proportioning of morality and happiness (*Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 567, 569); 5) that Kant ignored the moral past (the 'debt' owed to God by sinful humanity as a totality) and only focused on future, moral effort which can only attain an ever closer, yet always imperfect, approximation of moral perfection (*Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 567); all of which results 6) in Baur's dismissal of Kant as a defender of 'empty abstractions' (the inability of actual attainment of moral perfection) and radically 'subjective' (all moral achievement is based solely on the individual's revolution of moral sentiment to embrace the internal moral law and achieve 'worthiness' before God solely by individual effort) (*Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 581–582).

48. See Hegel, "Introduction" to *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* (*Lectures on the Philosophy of History*): GW XII: 49 (Sibree trans.: 34). See Strauß' reading of the 'cunning of reason' in the "Preface:" 89, n. 35 as well as the discussion of the notion in Chapter 1: "Methodology:" 168, n. 210 and Chapter 5: "Traces of an Intellectual Crisis:" 608, n. 182.

49. See Ziegler, I: 51.

As a lecturer himself in Tübingen, Strauß' first clash with the faculty was over the popularity of his lectures on Hegel, which drew large numbers of students and enflamed the jealousy of, particularly, the Philosophy Faculty.⁵⁰ Ziegler reports that the issue of the 'mediation between the speculative, 'real' content [*Inhalt*] that is the 'Idea'/Concept and the historical representation [*Form*] from Hegel's *Phenomenology* is what Strauß in the 1830s „placed at the center of his thought [...]: ,*what religion has in the form of representation philosophy has in the form of the Concept*.”⁵¹ (emphasis added) However, Strauß' reaction to the pushback from the faculty in Tübingen over the popularity of his courses on Hegel was to stop teaching Hegel in order to concentrate on the writing of the *LJ*.

Above all, though, it is clear in the *LJ* that Strauß thoroughly embraced Hegel's criticism of Kant's philosophy as 'non-scientific' because of its failure to make objective, Absolute Spirit the only *a priori* synthetic judgment as ultimate cause of all of reality. Rather, Strauß under the additional influence of F. C. Baur,⁵² took Kant to be a mere 'subjectivist' who spurned Absolute Reason to attend exclusively to the finite, subjective understanding in the world.⁵³ Hegel called this the 'weakness' and 'barbarism' of Kant's understanding of reason.⁵⁴ In addition and equally erroneously, Strauß took Kant, not Martin Luther, to be the paradigmatic representative of Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" in the *Phenomenology* although Hegel elsewhere described Kant's 'practical' reason (morality) as a form of 'analytical' constructivism, not as 'empty abstraction.'⁵⁵ Strauß insisted, obviously without having carefully studied Kant and by limiting his reading of Hegel up to that point to the *Phenomenology*, that Kant not only took morality to be the struggle to overcome sensuousness, but also to constitute a confirmation of the 'empty abstraction' of Kant's philosophy because humanity is incapable of fulfilling the expectations of moral duty in the sensuous world as Hegel had described in "The Moral View of the World" of the *Phenomenology*. According to Strauß, morality (including Kant's) consists of 'I should, but I can't.' This shaped his understanding of 'moral improvement' in his later writings as an issue of the human species rather than an achievement of the individual.

Within two years of the publication of the *LJ*, though, Strauß was only left with a sour taste: First, over the failure of even the Left-Wing Hegelians to accept his

50. See Ziegler, I: 119.

51. Ziegler, I: 131.

52. On 'empty abstraction' and Baur's reading of Kant as 'subjectivist,' see footnote 47 above.

53. I map Hegel's meta-narrative of Double Negation on top of a 'reclined' version of Plato's Similes of the Sun and Line from Book VI of the *Republic* in Chapter 8: "Strauß' Kant Reading Across His Career" in the section "Hegel's Reclined Plato/Hegel, G.W.F.A reclined Plato and Kant as a 'Subjectivist'" 811 ff. and in Chapter 9: "Missing Aesthetic Judgment" in the section "Hegel on Beauty:" 868 ff.

54. See Hegel, „Glauben und Wissen“ GW II: 287–288.

55. See Hegel, „Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten“ GW II: 460, 463, 466. See as well Hegel's statement on Kant's 'origin' of categories in subjectivity, which makes them merely 'empty abstractions' in Chapter 9: "Missing Aesthetic Judgment:" 866, n. 4.

inclusive Christology as Hegelian; second, over the ‘obvious’ historical indifference of the Hegelian meta-narrative of Double Negation that only viewed the particularities of history to be an in-itself meaningless ‘place holder’ required for ‘grounding’ the ‘reality’ of Absolute Spirit in ‘actual’ representations only in order to assure that Absolute Spirit Itself was no merely ‘empty abstraction.’ Rather than reject ‘history’ in the gospels, Strauß couldn’t accept that the historical ‘falsehood’ of representations (e.g., the gospel events) had no influence on the ‘truth’ of Christianity.

However, already before the publication of the *LJ*, Strauß had articulated his intent to write a history of Church Doctrine with the same aim as the *LJ*: to ‘retore’ with Hegelian philosophy what a ‘critical’ history of Church Doctrine had destroyed.⁵⁶ By the time he undertook that project in 1841, though, his Hegelianism had disintegrated with the exception of his retaining of “The Moral View of the World.” His aim was not to restore the ‘truth’ of Christian doctrine but solely: to demonstrate that the ‘critical’ analysis of the history of Church Doctrine demonstrates its inconsistencies and internal collapse without any need to appeal to ‘external philosophy,’ Hegelian or otherwise.

By the time of writing of his *Glaubenslehre* (1841), though, Feuerbach’s criticism of the use of anthropomorphic analogies whatsoever in religion (and chiefly, analogies based on ‘reason’) had shattered Strauß’ efforts at the restauration of Christian doctrine both within the framework of Hegelianism and with his version of ‘harmonious, eternal’ reason articulated in “On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity.”

Strauß’ failure to find a philosophical framework for his theological understanding clearly contributed to his twenty-year theological silence after the publication of the *Glaubenslehre*. Yet, the issue was not that there was no history in the gospels, having established the mythic elements of the text in the *LJ*. Rather, without an alternative to the Idealist epistemology of ‘true’ content and, ultimately, irrelevant ‘actual’ representations, which reduced factual history to irrelevance, and no longer embracing the Hegelian meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit’s Double Negation, he had no way to ensure the grounding of religious claims in ‘factual’ data.

Although his ‘return’ to theology is announced by his work on Reimarus in 1862,⁵⁷ his *Life of Jesus Examined for the German People* of 1864 articulates what he sees as the internal collapse of theology based on the scriptures, but he does not articulate a constructive, theological/philosophical option until 1872 with the materialism of *The Old and the New Faith*. Here in 1862, he explicitly rejects the Hegelian ‘Spirit’ theology of the 19th C that took itself to be superior to Second Testament theology. Strauß writes:

56. See Strauß, “Allgemeines Verhältniß der Hegel’schen Philosophie zur theologischen Kritik,” *Streitschriften* III: 58–59.

57. See the discussion of Strauß’ *Hermann Sanuel Reimarus*: 55, n. 58; in this project’s sections “1864: *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People*,” 617–627; “On Kant’s ‘Pure’ Religion,” 968, n. 158; and “Appendix II: Annotated ‘First’ Testament Concordance,” 985, n. 1; and 968, n. 158.

We in the nineteenth century take a different view of this point [on the relationship between revealed and natural religion]; [speaking ironically Strauß writes] from our side it would be the last reproach we would make to the Old Testament that it lacked the doctrine of immortality. It is true that, because the New Testament contains this doctrine, we take the New Testament to be superior [over the Old Testament] because we know that the path from the external to the internal, from the sensual to the spiritual, passes through the beyond. Man first necessarily becomes aware of the *Spirit as the power over matter in the form that his soul continues after the dissolution of the body*; of the mind as that which determines the value and destiny of man independently of the course of the world only in such a way that he promises himself a reward in the hereafter.⁵⁸

Strauß proceeds to clearly and strongly distance himself from this 19th C ‘Spirit’ theology:

The Old Testament is just as far behind this [19th C] point of view on the New Testament as we are beyond it: we know that *one only begins to think about all questions concerning human destiny and human skill when one has renounced the fantasy of a continuation after death*; that *morality only stands on solid ground when it no longer needs a future retribution because it finds its reward in itself*. And [sic.] we see with satisfaction how even a man of so high a spirit and so noble a disposition as Reimarus falls into the inevitable fate of all those who seek to prove immortality from the standpoint of a future retribution: namely, to contradict themselves and to speak vulgarities. The tenth of his treatises on the noblest truths of natural religion, so far as it is devoted to this point of view, is in direct contrast with the ninth, in which he refutes the doubts against divine providence, and had resolved with much subtlety all those alleged contradictions between worthiness and happiness in this life, from which he now seeks to extract proofs of retribution in another. However, when Reimarus even says in the *Schutzschrift* that without a future life animals would be happier than man; when he exclaims: “If we are born only for this life, what good is the knowledge of the highest being, from whose perfections we are completely cut off? What good are the moral precepts which restrain our sensual pleasures, and yet are not connected with any certain but long-lasting reward? What the foresight of an inevitable death, the mere idea of which makes our whole life bitter?” – With such commonplaces and vulgarities, Reimarus sinks even deeper below himself than the apostle Paul in the well-known passage 1 Cor. 15, 19 [“If our hope in Christ has been for this life only, we are the most unfortunate of all people”]. 32 [“If my motives were only human ones, what good would it do me to fight the wild animals at Ephesus?”].

Incidentally, Reimarus is completely right here in his opposition to church doctrine. If [...] the doctrine of future rewards and punishments is such an important part of revealed religion, such a powerful motivation for piety, then it is not clear why God, given that it is so easy to understand once it is made known, should have waited so long to make it known and should have left so many thousands of sincere and pious people without this support from Christ.⁵⁹

With his 1864 *Life of Jesus Examined for the German People*, he maintained his conviction expressed in “On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity” of 1838 that

58. David Friedrich Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 333.

59. Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 333–334.

the gospels provide enough factual, historical evidence regarding Jesus of Nazareth to draw conclusions about elements of his moral teaching sufficient to place Jesus among the 'religious geniuses' of history. However, the historical evidence was not sufficient to carry the claims of a biography or Christology as maintained by Traditional Christian Theology and Hegelianism. On the basis of the historical record, one could speak of a 'religion of humanity' but no longer of a 'religion of Jesus' person.

At the beginning of the 1860s, his friends called for a 'Return to Kant,' and this 'return' provided Strauß with a new philosophical, yet religious, framework for his increasingly 'materialistic' worldview. Not only is all of the Hegelian terminology completely absent here, but also bracketed out is his dismissal of Kant as a 'subjectivist' that profiled his understanding of Kant in the first *LJ*. However, now, Jesus is not so much the 'religious genius' of internal 'rational harmony' and moral teacher unsurpassable by others, but he is a moral teacher who represents the highest achievement of moral understanding *of his age*! Notably, in a non-Kantian fashion and without explicit reference to Hegel's „Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten,“ Strauß understands morality in terms of socially constructed, 'hypothetical' imperatives⁶⁰ manifest by external, ethical achievement (not internal moral mindset [*Gesinnung*] of commitment to 'wide,' universal moral principles⁶¹). Socially constructed norms constitute the ethical values of a community demanded by the circumstances of its historical situatedness. Hence, although Jesus reached a pinnacle of moral understanding *for his age*, he could not have anticipated the occurrence of the industrial revolution. Even his political awareness, not to speak of the absence of a personal family life, left great room for subsequent 'improvement' of his ethical teaching.⁶²

60. Hegel writes in his “Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts” GW II: 460 [...] [W]hat Kant recognizes very well [...] is that practical reason lacks all the material of law, and that it can do nothing more than make its supreme law a maxim of arbitrariness in the form [representation] of appropriateness [*Tauglichkeit*]. A maxim of arbitrariness has a content [*Inhalt*] of abstraction, and includes a determinateness in itself; pure will, on the other hand, is free of the determinations of particularities.”

61. In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant provides three criteria for discernment of a categorical imperative: 1) The maxim upon which one chooses to act ought to be 'universal' like a law of nature (AA IV: 421); 2) always treat oneself and the other as an 'end' and not mere 'means' (AA IV: 429); and 3) acknowledge every 'rational being' (transcendental consciousness) as a self-imposing agent of moral principles capable of acting consistently with the system of universal (moral) laws (AA IV: 434). In addition to these three criteria, *Kant distinguishes between narrow, 'hypothetical' imperatives demanded by particular, teleological tasks from 'wide,' moral categorical imperatives in the Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals* AA IV: 414–421. In short, not all imperatives are 'categorical.' Already in his *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie* (1774–1775), Werner Stark and Manfred Kühn, eds. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004): 39, 55, 106–107, he stressed that it is not the measurable success or failure external action and the judgments of others (and especially God) that determine one's moral status, but internal conviction and commitment to the moral order that is required for the exercising of creative, autonomous freedom – regardless of self- or communal-interest.

62. See Strauß, *LJEGP*: 626.

In 1865, Strauß examines, once more, Schleiermacher's theology in *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*. Much of what he says here he covered in the 1839 "Schleiermacher und Daub" manuscript, but a significant, new theme is the issue of *absolute, eminent* causality, a causality that has 'more reality than any and all finite effects.' Schleiermacher takes Christianity to be the promise of 'perfect God-consciousness' made possible for imperfect, finite consciousness by the Christ event as a new, absolutely eminent, causal act of creation by God. Schleiermacher's claim is based on the Principle of Sufficient Reason (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*), which maintains that a cause must have as much 'reality' as its effect or else 'something could come from nothing.' Echoing Anselm of Canterbury's *Cur Deus homo* and Descartes' *Meditations*, Schleiermacher proposes that a 'perfect God-consciousness' cannot arise out of an imperfect God-consciousness because the difference between imperfection and perfection 'would have to come from nothing.' Given that humanity is without exception imperfect, Schleiermacher argues that God had to exercise His absolutely, eminent causality in a new act of creation at a particular point in historical time by 'sending His perfect Son' into creation. Logically, though, Strauß points out that, again, given that humanity is without exception imperfect and remains so, there is no basis but enthusiastic, wishful thinking for justifying a perfect cause of God-consciousness. An imperfect effect not only does not require a perfect cause⁶³ but also the delay in the introduction of the 'new perfect cause' until the Christ is extremely problematic for a perfect Creator.

Given Strauß' rejection of the Hegelian meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit and underappreciation of Kant's Copernican Turn, his commitment to the value of history led him to Feuerbachian 'materialism' in his final work, *The Old and the New Faith*. Although he readily acknowledges that there are huge gaps in grasping causal explanations generally and material causality in particular, he now proclaims his allegiance to hylozoism that all 'that is,' including life and consciousness, is the product of bottom-up, physical causality, exclusive of any other causality. Consciousness is nature 'turning inward on itself' in order to continue its advancement.⁶⁴ The empirical sciences are 'on the right track' and will surely fill in the gaps.⁶⁵ At the end of his career, Strauß was yet a 'religious seeker' who was as much, if not more, a product of his own age than a shaper of it. His 'new' faith was a new 'religion of nature.'

63. See Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History: A Critique of Schleiermacher's Life of Jesus* Leander Keck, trans. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977): 29–31. Strauß leaves it up to the reader to recognize that this is as much a criticism of Anselm's, Descartes' and Hegel's 'ontological arguments' so that here Strauß is flagging his 'materialism.'

64. See Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 145, 240, and 365. It is as if Strauß' materialism is as much a parody of Hegel's Spirit metaphysics as it is an embracing of the empirical sciences. Instead of finite consciousness constituting the location where Absolute Spirit 'returns' in awareness to Itself, finite consciousness is where nature 'turns inward' to continue its material advancement. See 627, n. 256.

65. See Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 216: „Let us remember here the Kantian: 'give me matter, I will show you how a world shall arise from it,' an enterprise of which he judged that it could be carried out on the inorganic mass world but must fail already on 'a caterpillar.' Today's science, not

I, particularly, examine Strauß' misreading of Kant in Strauß' defense of his own hylozoism argument.⁶⁶ Kant by no means dismisses the important work of explaining the origin of life and consciousness! The generating of causal explanations is a crucial task of finite, transcendental consciousness, undertaken by no other consciousness of which we are aware. However, Kant stresses 'finitude.' Causes are not given directly in perception. We can only perceive the effects of causes. Finite, transcendental consciousness has to *add to the phenomena a priori* synthetic elements not given in the phenomena in order to 'explain' them. What Kant rejects with respect to hylozoism is only that, given the limits to finite consciousness, whatever causal explanation proposed will not be able to avoid an element of 'top-down,' teleological causality.⁶⁷ To be sure, Kant acknowledges teleological causality only as a heuristic strategy for finite understanding, not as an argument for a Personal God!

Kant explicitly rejects all *literal*, anthropomorphic God-talk (e.g., teleology), which means that he *brackets the notion of a Personal Deity*. However, he recognizes that it is impossible to avoid *symbolic*, anthropomorphic God-talk. "God' as a Noumenal X is a *required assumption* for finite, transcendental consciousness to be able to experience, understand, and exercise responsible agency in the world, which our finite, transcendental capacities make possible but do not necessitate.⁶⁸ Such responsible agency, in addition to the Noumenal cause of the lawful order of nature and morality, requires acknowledgment that all experience is anchored in nature, whose 'explanation' always requires starting with the natural phenomena,⁶⁹ and depends upon the supporting role of a community that is committed to this imperceptible 'divine commonweal' of lawfulness (physical and moral). *The notion of 'required, but not necessitating, assumptions' that are demanded by the capacities (not the accomplishments) of finite, transcendental consciousness is a crucial indicator of Kant's novel philosophical project.*

Strauß' emphasis exclusively on bottom-up causality in *The Old and the New Faith* sharply profiles Strauß' understanding of 'knowledge' as causal explanation. True knowledge for Strauß consists in causal explanation of events, whether it be Hegel's causality of Absolute Spirit, Schleiermacher's perfect God-consciousness, or empirical science's 'natural,' bottom-up causality. As the case with Hegel, Strauß also took *the two pillars of knowledge to be the same as for Aristotle: seeking 'wisdom' as causal explanation and taking the 'good' to mean a consequentialist ethic.*

only including the caterpillar, but even man, has not yet accomplished it, but has found the sure way, on which it can accomplish it in the future."

66. 150 years after Strauß, there has still been no contradiction of Kant's claims with respect to the limits of hylozoism as a bottom-up, causal explanation of life.

67. See Kant's discussion of the antinomy of 'mechanical laws' in the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 386–395.

68. Equally, though, when he comes to discussing nature, Kant employs – to speak of what 'nature wants'. See Kant, „Third Proposition“ in *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* AA VIII: 19.

69. On the 'deduction' of concepts out of the experience of associations among appearances, see "On Imagination, the Law of association, and Reflecting Judgment" at: 86, n. 26.

Both pillars were profoundly placed in an entirely different intellectual framework by Kant. However, neither Hegel nor Strauß understood the Kantian framework as I demonstrate in Volume II.

A clear indicator of the difference between Kant and Hegel/Strauß is the notion of ‘critique.’ In Kant, it is not to be confused for the objective, analytical ‘criticism’ of diairesis (διαίρεσις)⁷⁰ that depends upon distinguishing between and among phenomena as with Hegel and Strauß. Kant already clearly understood that empirical analysis is incapable of establishing absolute truth for two reasons: 1) reason cannot grasp directly things (substances) as they are in-themselves, and 2) reason itself must contribute elements, which are not directly given with appearances, but which make it possible, for transcendental consciousness to arrive at adequate and appropriate judgments/understanding.

Philosophical ‘critique,’ according to Kant, involves a profound shift from knowledge consisting exclusively of perceptible, empirical data to knowledge of imperceptible capacities that make it possible to experience and to understand perceptible phenomena on the basis of which one can initiate, and take responsibility for, one’s agency in the world. However, Kant explicitly rejected the notion of a subject-object dualism.⁷¹ It is Fichte who speaks of the ‘I’ and the ‘Not-I’ as if they were ontologically distinct, not Kant. For Kant there is only one world, and it is a world experienced only as appearances that we understand and in which we act by means of finite, transcendental capacities. Reality is an architectonic, not a mere aggregate (see Section 3: “The Architectonic of Pure Reason” of “The Transcendental Method” in the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 860–879) either of things or an aggregate of two ontological dimensions next to one another. The same goes for theoretical and practical reason: No more are they dualistic than the inorganic and organic or the host of dyadic elements (river & its banks, light & darkness, protons & neutrons) of experience. These dyadic elements are not excluding contrasts but complementarities that are understood (bridged) by reflecting judgment that grasps relationalities. Knowledge cannot consist of absolute,

70. On diairesis (διαίρεσις), see Chapter 3: “Academic Controversy Based on Criticism:” 219 ff.

71. Having bracketed ‘top-down’ explanations of experience and understanding from the perspective of God (*Critique of Pure Reason* B 862), Kant reminds us that “We [...] begin only at that point where the common root of our faculty of knowledge divides and *throws out two stems*, [...] the rational and the empirical.” (*Ibid.*, B 863) (emphasis added) In other words, *understanding can only begin where there is a deeper, common root of phenomena (rational and empirical) upon which it depends*, not on a dualism, in and of itself, between the rational and the empirical. See, as well, *Über eine Entdeckung nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll* (1790) AA VIII: 249–251 wherein Kant finds the claim that Leibniz defended a soul-body dualism ridiculous (lauter Unsinn). In the footnote of *Critique of Pure Reason* B xxxix* Kant writes: “I am just as surely conscious that there are external things which refer to my senses as I am conscious that I myself unequivocally exist in time.” See as well, the *Prolegomena* (AA IV: 293): “My idealism concerns not the existence of things (the doubting of which, however, constitutes idealism in the ordinary sense) because it never occurred to me to doubt the existence of things, only the mere perceptible representation of things [...]” (McGaughey translation).

causal explanations because finite, transcendental consciousness has no direct access to causes. It is in this respect that Kant emphasizes that ‘critique’ is ‘subjective,’ “according to human understanding” (κατ’ ἀνθρώπου), not dogmatic, “according to absolute truth” (κατ’ ἀλήθειαν).⁷²

The world of perception is not merely a random aggregation of elements but ‘ordered.’ However, the order (for example, of ‘substances’ and ‘causes’) is never a matter of direct perception but only of indirect deduction stimulated by perception because we only can perceive the effects of imperceptible order. For finite, transcendental consciousness to comprehend the imperceptible causal order that governs imperceptible ‘substances,’ it must introduce elements, then, not directly given in perception. These elements that are *added* to the phenomena by finite, transcendental consciousness are *a priori* synthetic judgments.⁷³ Although finite, transcendental consciousness ‘legislates’ them (*ist gesetzgebend*),⁷⁴ the *a priori* synthetic elements that it adds to perception and ‘legislates’ to give itself moral permission to do what it does, are not subjectively *created* – any more than the individual *creates* the physical laws that order nature.⁷⁵

Hegel misunderstood Kant’s account of *a priori* synthetic judgment in two crucial respects: 1) he takes ‘synthesis’ to mean dialectical synthesis, which seeks *something in common* to a ‘thesis’ and a ‘synthesis’ based on the analytic of diairesis (διαίρεσις) – ‘synthesis’ can only be *a posteriori* for Hegel; and 2) he takes Kant’s account of *a priori* synthetic judgment to be *a causal explanation* of the origin of the ‘categories of the understanding’.⁷⁶

However, for Kant, an *a priori* synthetic judgment is a *supplementary not an elucidating analytic judgment*.⁷⁷ Kant’s notion of synthesis, therefore, is not, as Hegel

72. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 767–768.

73. On Kant’s distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* judgment, see below, 60, n. 77.

74. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 195 ff.

75. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 185–186: “Judgment [...] prescribes a law, not to nature (as autonomy) but to itself (as heautonomy) for reflection on nature, which one could call the law of the specification of nature with regard to its empirical laws, which it does not cognize in nature *a priori* but rather assumes on behalf of an order of nature cognizable for our understanding [...]”

76. On Kant’s rejection of dialectic for grounding the ultimate, causal ground of ‘what is,’ see *Critique of Pure Reason* B 697 and Chapter 6: 670.

77. On Kant’s distinction between *a priori* synthetic judgments that are ‘supplementary’ (*erweitern*) to phenomena and *a posteriori* analytic judgments that are not concerned with merely making distinctions among ‘representations’ (*diariesis*) but elucidating [*erläuternd*] that which is already contained in a judgment’s ‘subject’ (e.g., ‘all men are bachelors’), see Kant, *Metaphysik Mrongovius* (1783) AA XXIX: 968, 970. In order for there to be knowledge, Kant points out in the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 104 (see B 194) that there, first, must be a manifold of perception; second, the synthesis (unity) of the manifold by means of the imagination; however, for knowledge, third, concepts must be applied to the first two, and “they rest on the understanding” (not on speculative metaphysics). In the third *Critique*, Kant accounts for how concepts are ‘added to’ perception and imagination by the heuristic strategy of reflecting judgment, not the grasp of innate metaphysical ideas.

erroneously claims, the elucidating, *a posteriori* synthesis of dialectic. Dialectic seeks something in common, the synthesis, that is (imperceptibly) shared by distinctly different elements, the thesis and antithesis. For Hegel, a synthesis' can only be an *a posteriori* judgment with one exception. That one exception is Absolute Spirit, which Hegel claims is a sole, *a priori*, dialectical synthesis. Hegel's sole, *a priori* synthetic judgment is the claim that everything originates from an Absolute Unity that negates Itself into multiplicity.⁷⁸ In other words, Hegel's single, *a priori* synthetic judgment is a *causal claim* (!) of *ultimate origin* for all 'that is,' not an epistemological claim with respect to the conditions required for theoretical reason and with respect to the conditions required for practical reason in the world.

Especially when it comes to the notion of 'synthesis,' Hegel is, unlike Kant, not concerned to illuminate how it is possible for a *finite*, transcendental consciousness to experience, understand, and exercise responsible agency in the world. Rather, Hegel's concern, again unlike Kant's, is with Absolute Knowledge that is the *causal explanation* for how there can be a *finite*, transcendental consciousness in a world. A *priori* synthesis for Kant is not a *causal explanation* of knowledge accounted for by dialectic. In short, Kant's understanding of 'synthesis' does not occur as the consequence of an analytical 'differentiation' by diairesis (διαίρεσις) between external phenomena to arrive at their common, synthetic unity.

Rather, *a priori* synthesis for Kant is, precisely, a *supplement* to phenomena. Without the *supplement* of a *priori* synthetic judgment, there can be no experience, understanding, or responsible agency. However, Kant's *a priori* synthetic judgment is *no causal explanation for the 'existence' of a world!* Critique for Kant means pursuing the Copernican Turn that identifies the *a priori* elements and capacities of finite, transcendental consciousness in order to experience, understand, and exercise responsible agency *in the world*, not to escape from the world into Absolute Spirit.

78. Hegel has one, single *a priori* synthetic judgment that is a dogmatic claim for the existence of Absolute Spirit as the objective, ultimate, causal source of all that is. Hegel claims that „[...] the Concept [...], without the variety of perception, is empty and without content, although it is *a priori* a synthesis. Because it is this, it has determination and difference in itself. As the determinateness of the Concept, absolute determinateness, the uniqueness, the Concept is *the basis and source of all finite determinateness and multiplicity*” (*Wissenschaft der Logik* II (1832) GW VI: 261; and Hegel claims that the I and the Concept (One) are an *a priori* unity: “That I am the One and that I am active as thinking, setting unity, is, however, not so precisely stated in Kant. That which thinking produces is unity; thus, it produces itself, for it is the One [the Concept]. (The unity can also be called relation; insofar as a manifold is presupposed and this remains on one side as manifold, it is called related). This is transcendental apperception; *the pure apperception of self-consciousness is the synthesizing function.*” *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* GW XX: 344. Hegel's ‚I‘ here is not the ‚I‘ of finite consciousness. It is Absolute Spirit. Absolute Spirit is the Absolute Unity of the ‘divisible I’ that is mental ideality (*Idee*) over against perceptible phenomena’. Perceptible phenomena are the ‘unreasonable many’ of the ‘divisible non-I’ that is empirical actuality (*Realität*). See Hegel, “Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten” GW II: 455–456.

The difference between Hegel and Kant could not be greater, and that difference is not because Kant is limited to a weak, barbarous, 'subjective reason' and Hegel is concerned with an 'objective Absolute' Truth as Hegel claimed already in "*Glauben und Wissen*" (1802) ("Faith and Knowledge or the Subjective Reflection's Philosophy in its Most Complete Form as Kantian, Jacobian, and Fichtean Philosophy"/"Glauben und Wissen oder die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjektivität in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen als Kantische, Jacobische und Fichtesche Philosophie"). Whereas Hegel does, Kant does not succumb to the hubris of Absolute Knowledge that claims that the sole, ultimate, objective truth that is Absolute Spirit generates a material world in order to experience Itself.⁷⁹ Furthermore, as I present, the difference between them is not because Hegel's reason is 'strong' whereas Kant's is 'weak.' To the contrary, there is a strength to Kant's 'reason' that can, literally, destroy the world.

Hegel illuminatingly formulates the differences between Kant and himself on the meaning of 'synthesis' as follows in the *Wissenschaft der Logik*. As a so-called 'psychological idealist,' Hegel maintains:

Kant has introduced [...] the most important thought that there are synthetic judgments *a priori*. This original synthesis of apperception⁸⁰ [McG: note the 'singular'] is one of the deepest principles for speculative development; it contains the beginning of the true apprehension of the nature of the Concept and is completely opposed to that empty identity or abstract generality, which is no synthesis in itself.⁸¹ – However, [... *Kant's*]

79. Hume had written a quarter century before Hegel that, given our "limited and imperfect experience," we have never experienced matter being generated by "reason" [spirit]. See David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1982): 47.

80. Hegel's understanding of the 'synthesis of apperception' is not Kant's notion of apperception. According to Hegel, apperception is the synthetic unity of perception: "*the 'I' is the unity which connects the empirical substrate of representations. This unity of self-consciousness is the transcendental unity of apperception*;" and the particular way in which this [empirical] substrate is connected in self-consciousness is a particular category [...] Kant says, these [categories] do not appear in perception [...] *The thinking mind is thus the source of the categories*, of the quite general determinations of thought [*Denkbestimmungen*]. In themselves these [categories] are empty, unrealized, and belong to thinking. [Categories] require a substrate in order that they may be realized. [According to Kant], [t]hey have a content [*Inhalt*] only through the given manifold substrate of perception; they are the relation, the bringing into unity of the manifold substrates, and have meaning only through their connection with these substrates. This realization comes to us from sensuality, from perception, from contemplation, from feeling, and so on." Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* GW XX: 346. Hegel takes Kant's 'apperception' to mean a dialectical synthesis of perceptible 'apprehension' (*apprehensio*). However, Kant distinguishes limited perception (*Anschauung*) *apprehension* from illimitable 'apperception' (*comprehensio aesthetica*), the sublime, to emphasize the extraordinariness of finite, transcendental consciousness as *comprehensio aesthetica* of the sublime. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 251–252.

81. Hegel's point here is his claim that ideas (and the Concept) are 'merely empty' without their 'grounding' in actual representations. Kant, of course, agrees. However, the conclusion from this point is exactly the opposite: For Hegel, the conclusion focuses on Absolute Spirit, not on phenomena *per se*. Phenomena arise only as a meaningless place holder for the 'point of indifference.' The indifference here is twofold. It is both 1) the non-difference of Absolute Unity and 2) the non-essentialness of

*further execution corresponds little to this beginning [McG: that is Absolute Spirit]. Already the term synthesis easily suggests the idea of an external unity and mere connection among things that are separate in and of themselves [McG: = the a posteriori synthesis of dialectic]. Kant's philosophy stopped only at the psychological reflection of the concept and went back to the assertion of the permanent conditionality on the concept on the basis of a manifold of perception. It did not pronounce understanding and experience as an appearing content [McG: as *Inhalt* that is Absolute Spirit], given that the categories themselves are only finite, but for the purpose of a *psychological idealism*, because they [the categories] are only determinations that come from self-consciousness. It belongs here that *the Concept, again, without the variety of perception, is empty and without content, although it is a priori a synthesis. Because it is this, it has determination and difference in itself. As the determinateness of the concept, absolute determinateness, the uniqueness, the Concept is the basis and source of all finite determinateness and multiplicity* [McG: Absolute Cause].⁸² (emphasis added)*

The description of Kant's philosophy as '*psychological idealism*' and the categories as 'only determinations that come from self-consciousness' are expressions of Hegel's insistence that Kant's philosophy is 'merely subjective' and concerned with 'mere empty abstractions' of human construction. At a minimum, Hegel's description suggests that Kant's *a priori* synthetic judgments are a Nominalist creation of categories/ideas (Hegel doesn't distinguish between categories and ideas, although Kant does) because they consist of the subject's determination of a synthetic unity of external phenomena 'that *are separate in and of themselves*.' However, it is not infrequent that Hegel is read to be claiming that Kant is a 'solipsistic,' 'constructivist,' that is, the subject creates the categories/ideas/laws that it imposes upon phenomena.⁸³

Kant's emphasis on the subjective capacities of finite, transcendental consciousness and rejection of absolute truth is a defense neither of Nominalism nor of Solipsism, and it is by no means an embracing either of merely 'empty abstractions or an inadequate defense of the 'weakness' of reason, as Hegel claimed.

multiplicity. That is, Hegel is an Absolute Idealist who claims Absolute Knowledge. In contrast, for Kant the conclusion focuses on the experience of phenomena. There can be no finite, transcendental consciousness without a world. That is, Kant is a Critical Idealist who only claims to know the conditions of possibility for finite experience and understanding – as beneficial and dangerous as it is. It is beneficial because it is the only place in the order of nature that is open-ended (that is, not blindly driven by mechanical causality), and it is dangerous because its causal agency of autonomous freedom can destroy nature. Succinctly, Hegel is calling finite consciousness out of the world. Kant is anchoring finite consciousness in the world in possession of finite capacities alone for which it can hold itself responsible.

82. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik* II (1832) GW VI: 260–261.

83. To the extent that Hegel insists that Kant claimed the subjective 'construction' of ideas and laws that it imposes upon nature and moral agency (see Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen:" GW II: 322–323 and *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* GW XX: 346), for whom identity "[...] which is true and exclusive reason applies [...] not to 'reason' [in the Hegelian sense of Absolute Reason] but only to reflecting judgment," Hegel is claiming that Kant is a solipsist who has chosen to ignore the 'objective' truths of Absolute Reason, Absolute Freedom, and Absolute Spirit 'beyond,' which are the 'ultimate cause' of, reality.

A Nominalist claims that the individual grasps the imperceptible ‘thing-in-itself’ as its ‘idea’ by means of an intelligible abstraction stimulated by sensible perception. However, to claim that Kant is a Nominalist would be to ignore his rejection of objective ‘subreption’ that he asserts in his earliest writings and retains consistently across his corpus. In 1770 he defined subreption as:

[...] the tricks (*praestigiae*) of the intellect in decking out sensitive concepts [perceptual representations] as intellectual [...], the interchange of the intellectual and the sensitive, will be the metaphysical fallacy of subreption (the fallacy of intellectualizing the phenomena [...]). An axiom thus hybrid [...] in that it proffers what is sensitive as being necessarily bound up with an intellectual concept) I call a subreptive axiom.⁸⁴

Equally, the suggestion that Kant’s categories of the understanding constitute a solipsistic ‘construction’ imposed upon nature/the world ignores his explicit rejection of such a claim.⁸⁵

With respect to Hegel’s assertion that for Kant reason is ‘weak’⁸⁶ Hegel does so without anywhere, to my knowledge, engaging Kant’s notion of freedom as autonomy. The same, unfortunately, must be said of Strauß and the other anti-Kantians addressed in this study.

Kant pointed out already in 1775 that not only is transcendental consciousness the one location in the natural order that is open-ended and not exclusively governed by blind, physical causality,⁸⁷ but also Kant emphasized in 1775 that autonomous freedom, in principle, possesses the power to destroy nature itself.⁸⁸ This is because autonomous freedom is a finite, eminent causality that is capable of initiating se-

84. Kant, “On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World (Inaugural Dissertation):” AA II: 412 in *Kant’s Latin Writings: Translations, Commentaries, and Notes*. Lewis White Beck ed. New York: Peter Lang, 1986): 179.). Kant expands AA II: 412–413: “The principle [...] of any subreptive axiom is this: if there be universally predicated of any intellectual concept anything belonging to the relations of space and time, it must not be enunciated as objective: it denotes only the conditions without which the given concept is not sensitively knowable [...] [T]he subject of the judgment, being intellectually conceived, pertains to the object, whereas the predicate containing determinations of space and time pertains only to the conditions of human sensitive knowledge.” (Trans. John Handyside, revised by Lewis White Beck). See as well, the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 257; see also the *Critique of Pure Reason* A 389, A 402; B 53, B 537, B 647 and *Metaphysik Mrongovius* AA XXIX: 771. However, note what Kant says in the *Prolegomena* AA IV: 293: “My idealism concerns not the existence of things (the doubting of which, however, constitutes idealism in the ordinary sense) because *it never occurred to me to doubt the existence of things, only the mere perceptible representation of things [...]*” (emphasis added).

85. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 185–186 quoted above in footnote 75.

86. For Hegel’s claim that Kant’s understanding is that reason is ‘weak’ and ‘barbarous,’ see Hegel, „Glauben und Wissen.” GW II: 287–288.

87. Kant, *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie*: 176 ff.

88. Kant, *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie*: 177.

quences of events that nature, left on its own, could never accomplish.⁸⁹ This is an *autonomous freedom* because it is the only causality that can give itself permission to act by ascribing a law to itself (literally, αὐτόνομος/autonomos means ‘to give oneself the law’). No one else can either think for another or give one permission to do what the individual must grant solely by her-/himself.⁹⁰ Succinctly, autonomy, for Kant, clearly does not mean simply independence from one’s tradition or social institutions.

Hegel and Strauß, in agreement with Aristotle, take knowledge to consist of ultimate, causal explanation. Respectively, Hegel and Strauß are reductionists. For Hegel, the ultimate cause of all ‘that is’ is Absolute Spirit, and historical phenomena are merely an indifferent place holder of finitude in order that Absolute Spirit not be ‘merely and empty abstraction.’ Although he was a convinced Hegelian at the beginning of his career, by 1872 and *The Old and the New Faith* Strauß takes the ultimate cause of all ‘that is’ to be ‘matter,’ not Spirit.

However, for Kant, given that humanity has no access to ultimate causal explanations, to claim to possess them is like a dove dreaming that it can fly in a vacuum.⁹¹ The limits to reason are the key to its illimitable strength.

In other words, according to Kant, the ‘pure’ ideas of reason are neither subjectively nor socially constructed, nor mere ‘empty abstractions’ independent of, and incapable of manifestation in phenomena.⁹² They arise in consciousness only because they are required by the experience of phenomena in order for finite consciousness to experience, understand, and exercise agency in phenomena, as it does. The notion that they are somehow independent of sensuousness turns thought into the wishful thinking of the dove. Nonetheless, not only are even ‘pure’ ideas not empty abstractions, but they also inappropriately taken to be causal explanations. Causes are understood only through their effects because they can never be directly experienced in phenomena. Causal explanations, therefore, are *a priori* synthetic judgments (not subjective creations) supplementing the perception of phenomena because we only experience the effects of causality, not causes themselves, directly.

As prophetic as Strauß is with respect to the emerging predominance of the materialist worldview in *The Old and the New Faith*, he himself never entered the promised land but could only assure that it was yet to come. However, it is a misleading promise.

89. Furthermore, in Hegel’s presentation of Kant’s aesthetics in his *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik* and *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, he completely ignores Kant’s distinction between the ‘mathematical’ and the ‘dynamical’ sublime, which indicate the profound ‘strength’ of reason. See Chapter 9, “Missing Aesthetic Judgment:” “Hegel on the Sublime” 870 ff.

90. This is precisely what Kant means by ‘enlightenment:’ “Have the courage to use your own mind!” Kant, *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?* AA VIII: 35. Hegel ridiculed Kant’s understanding of ‘enlightenment’ for its ‘vain posturing’ by elevating finite understanding above Absolute Reason. See Hegel, “Glauben und Wissen:” GW II: 288–289.

91. See *Critique of Pure Reason* B 8–9. See as well, *Groundwork* AA IV: 462–463.

92. See “Vol. II Introduction,” “Kant’s Defense of Metaphysics:” 542 ff.

This deep reading of Strauß that follows his metaphysical odyssey exposes the alternative understanding of humanity that is the un-examined elephant in the room across Strauß' entire career. This alternative takes humanity to be an instance of transcendental consciousness capable of adding elements to its perceptions. Humanity can do so because its transcendental consciousness exercises *an eminent, but finite* causality that makes possible understanding of phenomena in an intelligible dimension of experience not directly given in the sensible realm. This *theoretical* reason that is able to understand 'what is' as the basis for *practical* reason's exercising of the same *eminent, but finite* causality to discern 'what ought to be.' In conformity with its autonomous freedom that can initiate sequences of events that physical causality on its own cannot, this freedom is the condition that makes possible, but does not require the individual to assume responsibility for its creative agency in an otherwise closed, materialistic system of determining, physical causality.

This alternative understanding of humanity from Kant was present right at the beginning of Strauß' career, but I am able to document both in his sources and his own writing that it was present only in a distorted form, and its distortion played a role in his metaphysics and understanding of 'religion' right up to the end of his life. Strauß inherited a narrative about Kant through the *pre*-figurations of his mentors and friends. My aim is to de-mythologize the narrative that is this distorted, un-examined elephant in Strauß' corpus.⁹³ Kant remains a viable, supplementing alternative to the quest for absolute, causal explanations for experience and life to this day.

In other words, Kant is not 'correct' because he possesses the right causal explanations of experience. Rather, his project is and will remain beneficial because he identifies the *apodictic, a priori* synthetic elements to finite, transcendental consciousness and *the crucial significance of the community of finite, transcendental consciousness* that encourages one another to think for oneself and encourages one to act on the basis of 'wide,' moral principles regardless of one's self-interest.

Strauß' gospel criticism confirms that the 'true' reading of the scriptures requires distinguishing between the 'husks' and 'kernels' of its narratives as well as an understanding that the evangelists are creative authors, not historians. The text presupposes the theology of the author that shaped the text just as it presupposes the theology of its reader.

Strauß' metaphysical odyssey confirms that the aim of theological reflection is not the 'correct,' objective account of Jesus, the Christ, or God derived from the text. Rather, theology is the illuminating of the imperceptible, universal conditions and capacities (not yet developed capabilities) that make all experience, understanding, and responsible agency possible, in the first place. Theology is the foundation for the moral community that grasps the significance of the imperceptible Commonweal of God

93. See, especially, the "Conclusion" "John Dewey and the Enduring Need to De-Mythologize the Hegelian/Straußian Reading of Kant."

as the set of universal elements of both theoretical and practical reason for guiding human creativity. Higher than technical culture is moral culture that empowers the individual to think, understand, and act for her-/himself in light of not only ‘what is’ and ‘what can be’ but ‘what ought to be.’⁹⁴

COMMENT ON TRANSLATIONS: Unless otherwise marked, all of the translated material is from McGaughey. When I have used the ‘standard’ Cambridge University Press translation of Kant’s works, I have directly checked with the German text. Where I disagree with the terminology used by CUP, I have explained why and provided in Kant’s text the justification. When I used DeepL translating software, which is a terrific tool as a time saver with the mundane, I, nonetheless *always* checked the German original carefully and revised the translation *often* dramatically because of the technical vocabulary of this material.

COMMENT ON INDICES AND CROSS REFERENCES: The text is thoroughly indexed, and, in the body of the text, themes are cross referenced to a section heading, a footnote, or a page bookmark in order that the text can serve as a reference work.

TWO SPECIAL THANKS: This project would not have been possible without the Nota Bene software package. I measure my career analogously to ‘BCE’ and ‘CE’ as ‘BNB’ and ‘NB’. Nota Bene was developed by Steve Siebert as a grad student in theology at Yale in the 1980s as I completed my PhD at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago. In my first teaching position, I had hit the wall of research and writing time constraint because of family and other career obligations. Nota Bene opened a window of personal growth for me. IBIDEM (originally Ibid) organized my library and made footnotes and bibliographic lists easy to generate in more style sheets than one would ever need. For my first book, I even generated with Nota Bene the unique style sheet required by Walter de Gruyter as well as created the index. I already had cultivated the practice of typing up my reading notes ‘BNB’. However, Orbis (originally Textbase) became my reading memory bank by turning my text-based documents into an indexed and searchable totality for immediate retrieval of search terms across the entire database. Orbis makes possible accessible retention of one’s notes so that one has access to not only what and where an author said something but also to one’s samples of exactly what s/he said. Over more than 50 years of computerized note taking and because of Orbis, I have literally thousands of pages (3,000+ from Kant alone) of immediately accessible, personal notes to consult ‘in the blink of an eye’ when I am writing. Thanks, a million, Steve!

The project has also profited from the assistance of librarians all across the globe. I mention just two of many debts that I owe to them. First, were it not for the library at the University of Zurich in 1993 placing in my hand a cardboard box of disorganized, loose documents surrounding the 1839 Revolution in Zurich, this project would never have been written. These materials are the ‘Historical Reader’ of Volume I. Second,

94. See Kant’s formulation of the difference between the ‘culture of skills’ and the ‘culture that promotes the (moral) will,’ in the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* A V: 431–432.

without the assistance of the Interlibrary Loan staff at Willamette University in Salem, Oregon, this project would not be what it has become. I want to acknowledge my deep debt to Liz Butterfield, Bill Kelm, Doreen Simonson, Shanel Parette, and Melissa Trichel (I hope that I haven't left anyone out), who all 'dug up' material for me to which, otherwise, I would never have achieved access. "Thanks, so much, for what you (and all reference librarians) do!"

Introduction

Why bother to look at Strauß today? If there is one thing shared by both his conservative critics who see in him the anti-Christ Himself and his liberal defenders who see in him a martyr for critical scholarship, it is the conviction that he is no 'divine oracle.' Nonetheless, he is a quintessential scholar, rigorously seeking understanding. One benefits from those insights and claims that he does well. These include his presentation of the Supernaturalist, the Rationalist, and the Mythic readings of the gospel stories of his *Life of Jesus Critically Examined*. However, it is equally the case with his two volume study of Church Doctrine and his attempts to find an epistemological and metaphysical alternative to his original Hegelianism that shapes the last ten years of his life. Just as importantly, though, one is stimulated to search beyond his personal conclusions for clarity and resolution for those things which he failed to grasp 'adequately.' In other words, even where he 'fails,' he contributes to his reader's formulation of the questions that drive understanding forward.

Strauß was at the very heart of one of the most fruitful intellectual periods on the European continent. The century-and-a-half prior to him was an age in which 'science' knew no nationalistic boundaries even if there were rivalries between a Leibniz and a Newton. Both wrote in the intellectual *lingua franca* of Latin as did Kant in his earliest writings. Furthermore, the continent was flooded with the reflections of England and Scotland, for example, with respect to moral theory. Thanks to his mentors, Strauß came to intellectual awareness in the anti-Enlightenment and anti-Kantian currents at the beginning of the 19th C, and he followed a trajectory across the intellectual schools of his day to arrive at a 'materialism' that he acknowledged has serious gaps. However, as is the coin of the realm today, he was confident that materialism contained the key to all further advancement in any and all understanding.

This project seeks to profile Strauß' achievements, but it does not shy away for a moment from his limits. Both underscore his humanness with its strengths and weaknesses.

History or Falsehood?

If Strauß is remembered at all, it is because of his *Life of Jesus Critically Examined* of 1835 in which he underscored the 'mythic' nature of the Christian gospels. Unfortunately for Strauß, few even among his defenders grasped what all is involved when it

comes to his 'mythic' reading of the gospels much less that his real aim was a new defense of the traditional Church Doctrine of the Incarnation.¹

His text shook the Christian world not for what he said but because of what people mistakenly thought he said. If they read the *LJ* at all, people 'read out' of his work (*exegesis*) what they 'read into' (*eisegesis*) it. In short, an engagement of the writings of those who responded to him paradigmatically illustrates the distortions of the all too common *vicious hermeneutical circle* that, unfortunately, drives 'understanding' – although it is possible to curtail the circle's damage. Tragically, though, in Strauß' case, the distortions led to a political revolution in Zurich. Yet, all that was new to his 'mythic' reading of the text was the thoroughness of his documentation of the 'mythic' in the gospels in contrast to those alternative readings of his day that frequently referred to the 'mythic' stories absent an exhaustive study of their pervasiveness in the texts. Even his suggestion of a 'higher,' philosophical defense of traditional Church Doctrine was by no means novel although his own philosophical defense is no exception to the

1. A paradigmatic example of a 'liberal' defender of Strauß is the American Unitarian, Theodore Parker, who published in 1840. Theodore Parker, "Strauss's Life of Jesus" in the *Christian Examiner* for April, 1840. Reprinted from *The Critical and Miscellaneous Writings of Theodore Parker* (Boston: James Munroe and Company, 1843): 248–308 (available at <http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/etas/7> [20 December 2024]). Parker based his review on the third edition of the *LJ* in which Strauß tried to repair bridges with the Schleiermachers and those who defended the Gospel of John as the most trustworthy source for the Christian faith.

Five themes are raised in Parker's review that demonstrate the unfortunate shallowness on the part of Strauß' 'defenders'. 1) The sole intellectual issue in Strauß' work that interests Parker is the question of history in the gospels. 2) The Gospel of John remains for Parker the most trustworthy source for information about the historical Jesus. 3) Strauß cannot destroy the hopes and meaning contained in Christianity. 4) Strauß is no Hegelian, according to Parker. 5) Religion is not reducible to Kantian morality.

Re. 1) History in the gospels: "Mr. Strauß has plainly asked the question, 'What are the historical facts that lie at the basis of the Christian movement?'" Parker takes Strauß to have "push[ed] his mythical hypothesis too far." (305): Parker concludes that Strauß leaves the reader with three options: 1) biblical literalism (the Supernaturalists); 2) there is little or no historical ground in the text and what historical element is there is "wrapped in legends and myth;" or 3) "the Bible, and in particular the New Testament, 'always rests on historical ground, though it is not common historical ground, *nor is it so rigidly historical that no legendary or mythical elements have entered it.*'" (Parker's emphasis) (298) As I explain below, it turns out that the difference between Strauß (Parker's 2nd option) and Parker's own 3rd option is a matter of epistemology, not historical evidence.

Re. 2) Having read the third edition (and not checked the 4th), Parker is pleased that Strauß had come to doubt his earlier rejection of the authority of John's Gospel under the influence of Neander and de Wette. (263) Clearly, though, even Parker does not take the Gospel of John to come from a disciple: "It seems [...] that the fourth Gospel was written not by John, but from someone who drew from the Christian tradition as received by the more refined Hellenists." (287) John commends itself because it is "the most modern" (283) although Parker admits that elements in the Gospel are difficult to accept as true. (e.g., on pre-existent Christ: 279; the discourses attributed to Jesus present "difficulties" 282 although Parker addresses the 'metaphysical question' only with respect to God's enduring agency, not as an identification of Jesus and God 283–284). Parker concludes with respect to the Gospel of John: "[...] [T]his evangelist treated the authentic tradition in the freest manner, and in the tone and spirit of the Alexandrians, or Hellenists." (284)

silent anthropomorphic elevation of humanity to the throne of God that lurks in all religious understanding, conservative or liberal.

Re. 3) Strauß can't destroy Christian hope and meaning: Parker writes, no book can displace "[...] an institution, cherished and clung to by the choicest hopes, the deepest desires of the human race.." (307) He concludes his review saying: That even Jesus of Nazareth "is fruitful only for a time," but that "[i]t has been his earnest desire to render the world entirely free; it must, therefore, be his wish to make it free also from himself, that God may be all in all. Then men (*sic.*) will not only know that they have power enough in themselves to obey perfectly the will of God; but in the perfect knowledge of this, they can go beyond its requisitions, if they only will! Yea, when the Christian name is forgotten, then for the first time shall a universal kingdom of Love and Truth arise, in which there shall lie no more any seen of enmity, that from the beginning has been continually sown between such as believe in Jesus, and the children of men. But (*sic.*) this fable can never be true. Even if the letter [the bible or the fable?] should perish, – which is holy, only because it preserves to us this image, – the image itself would remain forever. It is stamped so deep in the heart of man, that it never can be effaced, and the ward of the Apostle will ever be true, 'Lord, whither shall we go? thou only hast the words of eternal life.'" (307–308) From whence comes Parker's confidence? *Parker's confidence is grounded not in a text, a fable, or metaphysical claims for the Christ but in the epistemological 'certainty' that 'history' precedes the 'idea'.* "Mr. Strauß [...] reverses the order of things; makes the effect precede the cause; the Idea appear in the mass [Strauß' universal Christology of the species], before it was seen in an individual." (298) "If there was not an historical Christ to idealize, there could be no ideal Christ to seek in history." (299) "Mr. Strauß takes the idea, which forms the subject, as he thinks, of a Christian myth, out of the air, and then tells us how the myth itself grew out of that idea. But (*sic.*) he does not always prove from history or the nature of things, that the idea existed before the story or the fact was invented." (299) Parker claims that, as a consequence, Strauß' mythic strategy can turn everything into fiction (e.g., 299–300). Facts must precede ideas! A remarkable claim for a New England 'Transcendentalist'. However, to generate the story (*Erzählung*/myth) of a messiah, one needs no factual messiah. One needs only the anthropomorphic assumptions of Occasionalism that there is a Personal Deity, who possesses eminent causality, to 'anoint' (= messiah) a charismatic personality with supernatural capacities to achieve the aim of the Personal Deity. Parker's fanciful reading of American history illustrates the epistemological conundrum. Finite consciousness does not have direct access to the phenomena themselves and must *deduce* (not *create*!) the conceptual/lawful order out of the relationalities of appearances. Hence, the temptation of mythic amplifications, historical fancies, and delusional conspiracy theories. When the 'idea' of the anthropomorphic, Personal Deity is grafted onto Hellenistic notions of Spirit (νοῦς) (as was the case with Philo of Alexandria at the time of Jesus), the notion of the 'messiah' takes on a cosmic dimension all of which were subsequently applied to a remarkable teacher, Jesus of Nazareth. Rather than claiming, though, that facts must precede ideas, Parker is surely making an epistemological, not a metaphysical claim. Whereas metaphysically a New England 'Transcendentalist' would claim that 'ideas' precede 'facts', epistemologically (for finite consciousness) 'facts' must precede 'ideas'. However, Parker has not understood Kant's notion of '*deduction*' of concepts (and 'laws') out of the relationalities that are appearances.

Re. 4) Strauß is no Hegelian: [Although in transient and permanent, Parker appears to embrace Strauß' notion of the species, rather than the individual, as the ultimate object of religion.] Parker tells us that Strauß "[...] is by no means the representative of the followers of Hegel, many of whom are opposed to him." He footnotes to the Right-wing Hegelian, Bruno Bauer's review of Strauß' *LJ*. This is equivalent to saying that because one is not an extreme Supernaturalist, one is not a Christian. Bauer's Hegelianism is the epitome of what Kant calls the 'melancholy' view of the world. See Kant, *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1160–1163; Olms ed.: 340–342 and *Anweisung* Olms ed.: 44–45.

For Bauer finite experience is only pain and suffering (negation). The 'proper' understanding of 'myth' is its dialectical antithesis to 'laws of nature', whose ultimate truth is Absolute Spirit 'above' both. The pain and suffering of the world is overcome by itself being negated by the great Second Negation

In light of the conservative to liberal, theological spectrum of his day that stretched from Personal Theism to the theologies of the Rationalists and Schleiermacher, as well as the Hegelian spectrum from conservative to liberal, Right-, Center-, and Left-wings, Strauß was rejected even by the Left-wing Hegelians by whom he, initially, personally felt at home. It is no wonder, then, that his theological audience was very small. In short, he was known by 'reputation,' not by the careful study of his work that it deserves and rewards.

imaged in the incarnation of the God/Man but ultimately the promised unification of humanity with God beyond history (the 'scientific' meaning of repentance of Matthew 11:21 is 'negation'). See Bruno Bauer, „Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet von David Fr. Strauss, Dr. der Philos. Zweiter Band. P. XII, 750. Tübingen, 1836.“ In *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, 86 (Mai 1836): 688, 691. See especially, Bauer's criticism of Schleiermacher's 'perfect God-consciousness' Christology in *ibid.*: 703–704. Given that this meta-narrative is based on the assumption of the necessity of a logic of negation that requires the sole *a priori* synthetic judgment of Absolute Spirit, it is a meta-narrative of rapture (*Schwärmerei*) that takes a mystical, anthropomorphic element of humanity (consciousness) to be the ultimate explanation of all that is. Rather than a meta-narrative of human perfection overcoming 'sin', Right-wing Hegelianism is a meta-narrative of human spirit overcoming the pain and suffering in the material world. Both meta-narratives are humanity worshipping itself. Hence, Strauß' exasperated cry in the *Glaubenslehre* I: "Where is the *Symbolum Quicunque* [the 'Athanasian Creed': "God became man that man might become God"]? Give it to me! I want to swear it twice, before I call the sentences of our philosopher only once differently than superstitions." However, this is not Strauß' Hegelianism as I demonstrate throughout these present two volumes. Parker, as many of Strauß' readers, has invoked superficial reasons for distancing Strauß from Hegel. Although Strauß rejected the Hegelian meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit, but he retained the Hegelian 'scientific' epistemology of form (*Vorstellungen*) and content (*Inhalt*) as well as the Hegelian "Moral View of the World."

Re. 5) Religion is not reducible to Kantian morality, but it also is not an internal, eternal order as Parker wishes to believe: Parker writes of Kant: Kant "[...] did not concern himself with the history, but only with the *idea* the history unfolded; this idea he considered not as theoretical and practical, but only the latter [...]. [T]he Christian writings must be explained, so as to make them harmonize with the universal laws of a pure moral Religion," (258) Just what 'pure religion' means is left unclear with such statements as: "We still believe our real enemies are 'the Flesh and the Devil,' and that neither the philosophy of Hegel, nor the Biblical Criticism of the Germans will ever weaken the popular faith in God or man (*sic.*), or the pure religion that mediates between the two." (305–306) Parker describes this 'pure moral religion' in his "Transient and Permanent in Christianity" of 1841 (three years after Strauß' text with this title) by calling on God to "[...] send us a real religious life, which shall pluck blindness out of the heart, and make us better fathers, mothers, and children; a religious life, that shall go with us where we go, and make every home the house of God, every act acceptable as a prayer. We would work for this, and pray for it, though we wept tears of blood while we prayed." Theodore Parker, "The Transient and Permanent in Christianity" in *Three Prophets of Religious Liberalism: Channing-Enerson-Parker* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961): 146. Just how it is possible for there to be such a 'pure moral religion' and how it is to be able to strive for it is left inexplicable by Parker. On Kant's notion of 'pure' with respect to epistemology and religion, see: 558, n. 109 and 928, n. 189. According to Kant, religion is far more than 'merely' morality (see 727), and it is also more than empty promises and blind hope based on literal, anthropomorphic projections of forgiveness or ultimate escape from pain and suffering by attaining a permanent status of moral perfection in the afterlife, which characterizes most of Christian dogmatics despite Parker's narrow emphasis on Christian clinging to "[...] the choicest hopes [...] and] the deepest desires of the human race." (307)

With such superficial and distorting 'defenders', Strauß and Kant don't need enemies.

However, it was not the limited, theological audience that led him to question Hegelianism and commence a journey in search of an alternative 'foundation' for faith. Contrary to those who 'read' Strauß to be denying all 'historical facts' in the gospels, what drove him was his thirst for metaphysical understanding that grounds knowledge in 'facts'. Consequently, his focus was not on the theological implications of the 'evangelists as authors' but on the centrality of 'facts' for the understanding of 'ideas.'

It was this focus which led him to question, almost immediately after (if not already brewing in) the *LJ*, the Hegelian meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit and, eventually, the Idealist epistemology itself. Above all, his engagement of Ludwig Feuerbach at the end of the 1830s deepened his conviction of the significance of finite, historical experience not only for understanding humanity but also for understanding 'ultimate reality.'

Before following Strauß on his metaphysical peregrinations, it is important to draw up an assessment of his starting point, the *LJ* of 1835, which is the focus of Volume I of this present work. At the age of 27, this 1,500 page tome was received with limited applause and great misunderstanding, when not horror,² across the spectrum of Christian dogmatics.

If there was nothing new about either its methodology of textual criticism or its metaphysical defense of Christian doctrine, why was it taken to be such a threat to the Christian faith? The answer is not simple. On the one hand, it is certain that no one had so exhaustively applied the 'mythic' reading to the Christian gospels as did Strauß in his *LJ*. On the other hand, Strauß provided a) a careful, as it was thorough, criticism of the inconsistencies and incoherence of the Supernaturalists' literal reading of the text as well as b) a careful, as it was thorough, criticism of the so-called Rationalists, who had to introduce foreign elements into the text in order to give a 'scientific' explanation for what they viewed as the mis-apprehensions that resulted in the early Church's account of miracles in the gospels.

2. Karl Barth quotes Albert Schweitzer: „In order to understand Strauß, one must love him' (Gesch. der Leben-Jesu-Forschung 1926 S. 69).“ Barth, *Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert. Ihre Vorgeschichte und ihre Geschichte* (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1981): 491 Barth concludes his evaluation of Strauß by amending Albert Schweitzer's observation: „In order to understand Strauß, one must love the question he raised. His question is loved only by a few and from most feared.“ Barth, *Ibid.*: 515. Barth derisively dismisses the Schleiermacher disciple, Alexander Schweizer, who opposed Strauß' appointment in Zurich for not understanding where 'true' theology arises. Proper theology begins with Strauß' question. Barth was not threatened by the sharpness of Strauß' historical question. When it comes to the historical questions of biblical scholarship and the 'historical Jesus,' Barth as well as Pannenberg agree with Hegel that the theological answer comes from beyond history with a post-resurrected Christology. See Chapter 1: "Methodology:" 152, n. 156. However, I propose that the question for Strauß was not myth versus history, but which epistemology and metaphysics ground the truths of empirical history?

When the criticism of the Supernaturalists and Rationalists is combined with the claim that the gospel narratives are foremost ‘myths,’ the doors were thrown wide open, at the least, to historical ambiguity and, at the most, to the conclusion that the gospels were riddled with subjective relativity if not outright falsehoods. Leaving it to the reader to decide which narrative had as its core an historical event, a philosophical/theological idea, or a theological symbol, *threatened the Church’s authority* (as well as the salaries and pensions of pastors and professors who defend it). Justifying the proclamation of the literal teaching even though not the conviction of the pastor/priest because that’s what the laity wishes to hear is hypocrisy.³

The fact that Strauß’ philosophical ‘restauration’ of the shattered Church Doctrine of the God/Man, which Strauß, at the time, took to be based on the ‘scientific’ study of the gospels, involved invoking Hegel’s Philosophy of religion. However, this ‘restauration’ was no solace to the Church. Who understands Hegel other than those elitist philosophers trained in the *a priori* synthetic world of the Hegelians? It is in the self-interest of institutional authority to stand by *the* (?) ‘simple’ story that ‘everyone,’ supposedly, can easily understand, while ignoring that it must be *brought to the text as the case with every understanding of the text*. Yet, it is also misanthropic because it encourages ‘blind’ faith instead of aiding the ‘overcoming of self-imposed immaturity’.⁴

A further ingredient that drove the explosive reception of Strauß’ book was its timing. It appeared some 60 years after Herman Samuel Reimarus and the controversy over the historical status of the gospels sparked by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s publication of his anonymous Reimarus Fragments. At the end of the 19th C a group

3. Kant writes in *Menschenkunde* (1778/1779 or 1787/1788), which was published in 1831 so that it could have been available to Strauß: „No one is permitted by means of false pretenses (*Vorwand*) and vain hopes to lead others astray. Humanity has a right to investigate the truth above all else [...]. [By dogmatically claiming that enlightenment is harmful], one cries out just ‘A’ as much against the improvement of the church [just as one defends the despotic ruler], and yet it has subsequently become clear that enlightenment has by no means produced the harm that ignorance caused. It was believed that the abolition of ceremonies [ritual] would cause people to lose their attachment to religion, but experience has proved that people have just the sooner strayed to the other side, and have become all the greater unfettered fanatics (*Schwärmer*). Nothing worse can therefore be thought of than when men (*sic.*) on the basis of such [anti-enlightenment] principles seek to keep others in error and are careful not to disturb anyone in her/his deep sleep of ignorance or even go so far as to take it upon themselves to plunge others into new errors, when they, left to themselves, would probably have wriggled out of ignorance alone. No one is entitled by any intention of supposed benefit to do such a thing; because it can fail, and it is a degradation of mankind to want to treat a free creature in such a way that [... a free individual] should be encouraged to follow the mere opinions of another’s rationalizations. People must be free in regard to concepts [...] Even the government gains by general enlightenment; the ruler himself (*sic.*) may be deluded [sounds all too familiar!], and imagine advantages that are absurd.

If we block the source of improvement, all hope is gone. These are unforgivable sins; they destroy the whole plan of ‘providence’ [the given conditions/capacities possessed by all persons] with respect to the human race, so that no one can progress to perfection [Note: there is no expectation to achieve perfection!]. (*Menschenkunde* XXV,2: 1048–1049; Olms Verlag: 224–225)

4. See Kant, *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?* AA VIII: 35.

of 'First' Testament scholars in Göttingen had developed the understanding of myth as a narrative 'husk' in which a historical fact, an idea, or a symbol can be found at its 'kernel.' Strauß, however, was the first to apply the insights of this 'Mythic School' so thoroughly to the Christian gospels. The dry underbrush of historical scholarship on the scriptures had been accumulating over two generations by the time Strauß published his exhaustive study. Are the gospels fact or fiction; history or myth? Strauß was the one who, unintentionally, struck the match. The accumulation of dry tinder was sufficient to generate a conflagration *without the reader having to be confused by actually reading Strauß*. Strauß' text became an 'icon' not for what he said but for what his opponents wanted him to have said. One could hold the two massive volumes of his *Life of Jesus Critically Examined* in one's hands as evidence of the size of the threat to the historical veracity of the text.

Two Aspects to Myth: 'Husks' and 'Kernels' and The *Genetic Mythical Principle*

Strauß employed two hermeneutical strategies when it came to the issue of 'mythic' material in the gospels. The first, and for Strauß the foremost, was the epistemological strategy that took stories to be narrative 'representations' that have at their core a historical fact, a philosophical/theological idea, and/or a symbol. The second strategy, the *genetic mythical principle*, Strauß learned from Wilhelm Krug. It is a theory of narrative formation. It suggests that narratives are the shaping of inherited stories (what Paul Ricoeur calls the *pre-figured*) to generate a new story (what Paul Ricoeur calls the *con-figured*, creative process of an author).

Strauß' own, *re-figuration* of the gospel narratives in the *LJ* was based on the Hegelian philosophy of religion that provided him with a *pre-figured* epistemology for understanding the 'husk'/'kernel' character of the narratives as examples of the Hegelian distinction between 'representations' (the actual stories) and the 'idea' that is the 'true,' core meaning of the stories. This *re-figuration* allowed Strauß to apply his understanding of the Hegelian philosophy of religion to gospel narratives as a way of criticizing the *con-figured* reading made by Traditional Theology that insisted that the gospel stories had to be literal, historical accounts as a reporter would present in Strauß' and our world today.

In addition to providing him with a hermeneutical strategy of reading the gospel stories as external husk (representations) with an imperceptible kernel (their true content), Strauß' Hegelian *re-figuration* was his way of 'restoring' the 'true' meaning of Christian dogmatics, which appears to be devastated by the acknowledgment of how little factual history there is in the scriptures. The Christ is not an historical individual who existed at a specific point in time. Rather, for Hegel he is the resurrected Lord beyond history who represents human consciousness as the location where Absolute Spirit becomes aware of Itself by negating its finitude.

Although he had already presented a revision of Hegel's Christology in the *LJ*, as his Hegelian convictions faded immediately in the years following its publication, Strauß looked for alternatives that allowed him, ever more strenuously, to emphasize the significance of factual history for humanity rather than emphasize the implied subjective, theological relativism of the evangelists as authors.

However even in the *LJ*, Immanuel Kant is present as the unexamined elephant in the room. Taking as accurate the anti-Kantian and anti-Enlightenment reading of Kant by those who influenced Strauß' early development, Strauß never undertook anything close to a serious study of Kant as I demonstrate in Volume II – although he invoked Kant all along the trajectory of his intellectual odyssey.

Rather than pursuing the implications for the gospel narratives in light of the *genetic mythical principle*, which would appear to emphasize only the subjective relativity of the gospels, Strauß viewed the *genetic mythical principle* merely as confirming that the miracle stories in the gospels were not 'factually' true. Had he appreciated the *re-figuring*, creative dynamic of the *genetic mythical principle* of the gospel authors, he could have viewed the gospels as paradigmatic examples of what Kant calls humanity's creative, *autonomous freedom that is guided by moral principles*, which provide humanity with options of understanding and guide (as well as challenge) humanity's agency in the world.

Kant had placed *autonomous freedom* at the very core of his Critical Idealism. Critical Idealism points out not only that humanity possesses 'transcendental consciousness,' which is the non-material, imperceptible dimension of the mind (of course, embraced by the Hegelians), but also that humanity's 'transcendental consciousness' is what makes it possible for humanity *intentionally* to initiate sequences of events, which nature cannot accomplish on its own! It is only to the degree that humanity possesses *autonomous freedom* that it is able to *add elements* to its perceptions that are not directly given in them to understand (theoretical reason) and to assume responsibility for its agency (practical reason). Without *autonomous freedom*, humanity is a mechanical toy completely determined by nature's causality. Of course, this raises the question: which imperceptible elements are appropriately applied to perceptions? This question was formulated by Kant as: How are *a priori* synthetic judgments possible? This is a far more profound formulation than simply the question: Which *a priori* synthetic judgments are correct? By asking the question 'how' rather than 'which,' Kant is simultaneously emphasizing the capacities of all finite, transcendental consciousness, which in turn establish which *a priori* synthetic judgments are appropriate.

In other words, Strauß could have viewed the mythic aspect of the gospels as more than merely a confirmation that the form of the narratives was not factual history mired in subjective relativity. To be sure, he recognized that at least some of the stories had a historical event at their core, but he stressed that discernment of the historical in the stories was the most difficult aspect of biblical hermeneutics because the stories were a mixture of fact and myth. Consequently, *Strauß focused on the issue of 'what*

is historical' in the scriptures, not on the genetic formation of the gospels as an example of creative, autonomous freedom. I explore in Volume II the significance of Strauß' drawing only on the anti-Kantian and anti-Enlightenment *pre-figurations* that are Hegel's Idealism and, after 1841, on the *pre-figurations* of Feuerbach's Materialism. I will point out that the *con-figured* presentation of Kant's Critical Idealism through the lenses of Hegelian anti-Enlightenment and anti-Kantian reading remained a massive blind spot in Strauß' reflections, whose discernment leaves open a profound, 'third' option for today's reader.

The Erosion of Hegel's Philosophy of Religion

Hegel's epistemology of 'actual representations' (*sensible Anschauung*) of sense perception and their 'true content' of intellectual perception (*intelligible Anschauung*) initially offered more to Strauß than a way for understanding the stories in the gospels as 'mythic' husks of philosophical truth. Hegel's epistemology was embedded in a meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit as the truth of all of history and, especially, of finite spirit.

However, already in the *LJ* with his version of a universally inclusive Christology, Strauß grabbed a red-hot iron of Hegelianism. *Strauß' interest from the get-go was on historical truth. The key to historical truth is 'science.' The paradox of science, though, is that sense perception in and of itself is no guarantee of truth.* In order to embrace the Copernican Revolution, one must unequivocally deny the 'clarity and distinctness' of sense perception. If clear and distinct perception doesn't guarantee truth, what does?

Truth requires ideas, not merely clear and distinct perception. Truth depends not only upon ideas but also upon one having 'correct' ideas for one's perceptions. This is the point where a huge bifurcation occurs in the theory of knowledge (epistemology). Whereas perceptions are, obviously, transient, our 'ideas' remain the same yesterday, today, and tomorrow. I constantly perceive different chairs, but the idea 'chair' that I must employ to understand that these objects, as different as they can be, must be, and remain, 'the same.' At the least, our ideas are the closest that finite consciousness comes to experiencing 'the eternal.' Whether or not ideas, in fact, are 'eternal,' of course, is a question that finite consciousness can never determine. Their proof as 'eternal' would require an 'eternal consciousness,' and the only form of eternal consciousness that finite consciousness can ever experience is grounded 'figuratively' in an analogy to human finite consciousness. That is, 'eternal consciousness' is a leap of understanding grounded not in experience but in an analogy to finite consciousness. If there is anything certain about an analogy, it is that it cannot be proven to be literally

true, and, as David Hume pointed out, there is no greater hubris than a finite mind claiming that the entire universe is explained as functioning like a finite mind.⁵

Nonetheless, the metaphysical paths of Absolute Idealism and Reductionist Materialism diverge in this wood. The divergence is a matter of ‘metaphysics’ in the sense that the alternative paths require non-physical commitments; otherwise expressed, they both involve convictions that are ‘meta-’ (‘above’ or ‘in addition to’ the) physical. Without any additional criteria, the path one chooses to follow (Absolute Idealism or Reductionist Materialism) is a capricious wager of ‘faith.’ Nonetheless, when it comes to their starting points (not their concrete claims, of course), there is nothing different from the ‘faith’ of traditional, Christianity and the ‘faith’ of empirical materialism. Both depend upon communities that share the same convictions about the nature of ‘reality.’

According to Absolute Idealism (and *in contrast to Kantian Critical Idealism*), ‘truth’ is an eternal, ‘spiritual’ realm independent of physical nature because physical nature, ‘obviously,’ requires that this ‘spiritual’ realm must be, at the least, equally enduring (e.g., Leibniz’ ‘Preestablished Harmony’ theory⁶) or ‘spiritual’ ideas must *precede* the material order, which can only be ‘copies and shadows’ of ‘eternal’ ideas (e.g., Platonism⁷ and Christian Platonism⁸). Succinctly, according to Absolute Idealism, ‘ideas’ must precede the objects that are their ‘copies.’ The material copies come by means of a conscious agent having, first, thought the idea and, second, shaping matter according to the original idea. For Absolute Idealism, then, knowledge consists in grasping the eternal, *a priori*, archetypal idea whereas particular objects only serve to ‘trigger,’ *a posteriori* mental awareness of the ‘truth,’ which is the *a priori*, archetypal idea.

In diametrical contrast, Reductionist Materialism claims that the physical universe is ‘eternal’ and that ideas are merely transient abstractions created by each individual, finite consciousness *after having experienced* a set of objects, that is ideas are *a posteriori* constructions by the individual. Ideas here are ectypal, *a posteriori*. They are abstractions drawn out of experience by the individual by, first, recognition of similarity, then, identity among a set of phenomena. In short, ideas are human abstractions, not archetypal, *a priori* ‘eternal,’ mental objects.

Strauß cut his philosophical teeth on Hegel’s philosophy. Unfortunately, Hegel’s “Glauben und Wissen” was explicitly anti-Enlightenment and anti-Kantian, and Strauß never developed any independent understanding of Kant by his own study.

5. See David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1982): 14–15.

6. Leibniz Preestablished Harmony maintains that ‘God’ prescribes that the ‘spiritual’ side and the ‘material’ side of experience are ‘eternally’ coordinated.

7. Platonism claims that ‘ideas’ are the eternal thoughts of an eternal deity with ‘creation’ a ‘two-step’ process of God first having thought His (!) ideas and then copied them in matter with the latter being only ‘copies and shadows’ of God’s ‘eternal’ ideas.

8. Christian Platonism is the Logos theology that maintains that the Christ is the incarnated Word (eternal system of ideas) of God.

He had no sympathy for Kant, whom he consistently portrayed, as did Hegel, as a dualistic, 'subjective constructivist'⁹ rather than Hegel's and the early Strauß' preferred, monistic, 'objective rationalism.' He shared Hegel's judgment¹⁰ with respect to the 'weakness' and 'barbarism' of Kantian reason that 'had no grasp of the significance of Absolute Knowledge,' as well as Hegel's ridiculing of Kant for encouraging the individual to 'think for her-/himself rather than engage in fealty to Absolute Reason. Furthermore, he shared with Baur, Hegel, and Daub the dismissal of Kant's notion of 'freedom', which they took to mean only a championing of merely self-interest driven by sensuousness.¹¹ Strauß did embrace aspects of Kant's work as of 1864, but, again, only indirectly through the influence of his circle of friends who called for a 'return to Kant.'¹²

Especially as a 'child' of Hegelian Idealism, the early Strauß was no Christian Platonist who defended a Personal Deity beyond history. Rather, 'God' in Hegelian Idealism is not 'outside' creation. Following Spinoza, the Hegelians viewed God as immanent to the process that is history. Hegel is a 'pan-en-theist' for whom God is inseparable from the finite processes He (!) creates. Rather than describe that divine, creative process, though, in terms of Platonism's two step, anthropomorphic 'thinker' who first thinks His idea and then creates an external copy (*Timaeus* 27d ff; 69b-70a), Hegel took creation to be governed by a 'necessary' logic of dialectic,¹³ that is, negation of (or distinguishing between) a 'this' from a 'that.'

Absolute Oneness is, logically, incapable of experiencing anything, much less Itself, because experience requires at least 'two-ness.' In order to experience Itself, Absolute Spirit 'had to have' (according to Hegel) employed the logic of Double Negation. By means of a First Negation, Absolute Spirit *had to* negate Its own Oneness to generate multiplicity that eventually led by further negations of multiplicity to the

9. Both Hegel and Strauß ignore Kant's explicit rejection of 'constructivism' (*Erdichtung*) in the *Critique of Pure Reason* B xxxix*.

10. See Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen" GW II: 287–288.

11. F.C. Baur writes: Kant "[...] agreed with [...] the ecclesiastical doctrine of forgiveness] in the serious endeavor to address the need for restoration and reconciliation in its entire depth [unlike Kant, Baur takes this to mean the attainment of moral perfection]. This is what Kant's doctrine of radical evil refers to, which, according to [Baur's reading of] Kant, consists not merely in sensuality [explicitly contradicted by Kant, see 833], but in the subordination of the moral law to sensuality, and is called radical because, although it can have its ultimate cause only in an act of freedom, [Baur erroneously claims for Kant that] [...] radical evil] nevertheless precedes every use of freedom given in experience, and is ingrained in man as a natural inclination which itself corrupts the root of all particular evil principles and actions, the supreme subjective cause of all principles." *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung* II: 575–576 (emphasis added) Baur is reading Kant's notion of 'radical' evil to mean 'original sin,' which Kant emphatically rejected. See *Metaphysik Mrongovius* (AA XXIX: 771), *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (AA VIII: 1–22), and *Religion* (AA VI: 19–20, 22, 35, 42–43). Kant explicitly says that the origin of evil remains inexplicable for us (*ibid.*, AA VI: 43).

12. See Ziegler, II: 700.

13. On Kant's rejection of dialectic for grounding the ultimate, causal ground of 'what is,' see *Critique of Pure Reason* B 697 in Chapter 6: 670.

establishment of the material conditions for the emergence of finite consciousness. By means of a Second Negation, finite consciousness 'has to' negate, mentally, its own experience of multiplicity in order to experience the original and originating Absolute Oneness that is Absolute Spirit, Absolute Knowledge, and Absolute Freedom.

Although the early Strauß shared with the Hegelians this 'meta-narrative' of Absolute Spirit's logic of Double Negation, already in the *LJ* Strauß *flagged his resolute commitment to history* in contrast with the Hegelians. However, this time, the diverging pathways were not Absolute Idealism versus Reductionist Materialism because Strauß was committed in the *LJ* to the Hegelian, Absolute Idealist meta-narrative of Double Negation. Rather, Strauß parted ways with the Hegelians with respect to Christology or the meaning of the God/Man incarnation as the paradigm of the Second Negation.

For Strauß, the issue of Christology was not simply a metaphysical quarrel. It had to do with the very nature of historical 'science.' For the Hegelians, 'science' was not concerned with the investigation of empirical phenomena by means of the hypothetico-deductive method, *per se*. Rather, 'science' (knowledge, *scientia*) was Absolute Idealism itself.

Copernicus was not 'right' because he grasped the raw, empirical data, properly. There can be no 'correct' empirical data for heliocentrism. Rather, Copernicus had discovered the 'right' idea for understanding the empirical data. The 'content' (*Inhalt*) of knowledge is the imperceptible idea, not the perceptible 'representations' (*Form, Vorstellungen*) that are perceptible, empirical phenomena. For Strauß, this epistemological structure of true 'content' and ambiguous 'representations' is grounded in the issue: how are ideas related to particulars?

The Hegelians and early Strauß shared the conviction that the heart of Christian dogmatics was the teaching of the incarnated God/Man. Their paths parted, though, not over 'what' the God/Man was but over 'who' He was.

In other words, the Hegelians and Strauß parted ways over the issue of how ideas are related to particulars. Strauß insisted that no idea is exhausted in a single particular or any finite set of particulars. Specifically, the idea of the God/Man cannot be exclusively limited either to one individual or even a group of individuals. This is not a historical issue for Strauß. It is an epistemological issue: Ideas (the God/Man is *the* Idea incarnate) by definition are universal, and they apply to all of their instantiations in particulars. It was Strauß' epistemological convictions with their giving equal weight to particularities, not the metaphysics of the Hegelian meta-narrative of Double Negation, that led Strauß in the *LJ* to his universally, *inclusive* Christology in contrast to the Hegelians. The Incarnation occurs in the totality of finite consciousness, even when not understood by the individual.

Hegel rejected Traditional Christian Theism's God/Man as the historical Jesus. However, he took the God/Man to be an event necessarily 'beyond' history experi-

enced in faith as the resurrection claimed for Jesus as the God/Man.¹⁴ The God/Man is the event in finite consciousness where the Second Negation occurred. As a 'spiritual' (mental) event, this Second Negation is nothing physical (historical) but purely mental (spiritual). Consequently, it is a claim, according to Hegel's ambiguous formulation, that the Christ event (the incarnation of the God/Man) is not about a historical individual who lived in Palestine. Rather, it is a spiritual conviction of those who take the Christ to be the God/Man unity achieved in Spirit beyond history. Within two years of the publication of the *LJ*, Strauß criticized Hegel for not being interested in 'biblical criticism' because the historical status of the gospel narratives was not important to him.¹⁵

The Right- and Left-wings of Hegelianism clarified Hegel's ambiguity. Right-wing Hegelians (e.g., Carl Daub) insisted that the God/Man is, *exclusively*, the Jesus of history as claimed by Personal Theism. However, the exclusiveness of Christology is not with respect to an historical, material individual. Rather, the reconciliation of God with humanity is represented by the Second Negation as a spiritual reconciliation, not a material atonement for humanity's sins. Left-wing Hegelians (e.g., Philipp Marheineke) took the God/Man as, *partially inclusive* in that all who 'think' the Second Negation are the God/Man. Consequently, the God/Man for both the Right- and Left-wing Hegelianism was an 'elitist' event either limited *exclusively* to Jesus or *inclusive* of those philosophers who grasp the meaning of the Double Negation. In either case, the Incarnation meant *escape from the particularities of historical life and spiritual divinization of finite consciousness*.

In his *LJ*, Strauß took the Christological claim of his professor, Ferdinand Christian Baur, to its extreme. He agreed with Baur, who had criticized Hegel's Christology as an event beyond history. According to Baur, the God/Man was an *inclusive* event, but Baur identified the God/Man with the narrow inclusiveness that is limited to the Christian community, which consists of the historical community that makes up the 'body' of Christ in history. In contrast to Baur's *limited, inclusive* Christology, though, Strauß' Christological formulation in the *LJ* is emphatically a *universally, inclusive* Christology that includes all of humanity for all time, not just those who live in ritual conformity as a self-conscious community.

Strauß was shocked that the Hegelians wanted nothing to do with his *universally, inclusive* Christology,¹⁶ whereas the Right- and Left-wing Hegelians viewed Strauß as a threat to Christian uniqueness and exceptionalism. Down to 1837, Strauß tried to convince them otherwise, but, in the meantime, other conundrums of Hegelianism resulted in his looking for an option other than Hegelian epistemology's 'husk'/'ker-

14. See Strauß, „Hegel's Ansicht über den historischen Werth der evangelischen Geschichte“ in *Streitschriften* III: 80–81; see as well, 83, 84, 86, 92, and 93.

15. See Strauß, *ibid.* in *Streitschriften* III: 90–91.

16. See Strauß, „Verschiedene Richtungen innerhalb der Hegel'schen Schule in Betreff der Christologie“ in *Streitschriften* III: 126.

nel' and meta-narrative of Double Negation for 'restoring' the Christian dogmatics destroyed by criticism of the historical status of the gospel narratives.

Those other Hegelian conundrums were related to its historical 'Indifferentism' that eliminated any contribution on the part of particular, historical events to the 'truth' of Absolute Spirit. To be sure, Hegel insisted that, without the struggles, suffering, and pain of history, all of history is only the playing of God's self-absorbed love with Himself.¹⁷ For Hegel, the Owl of Minerva only flies at the end of history¹⁸ (i.e., with the achievement of the highest point of history, the God/Man). Yet, even Hegel insisted that the 'truth' of events was decided by their 'Idea,' not by the empirical facts themselves, which are 'opposed to the idea.'¹⁹ Furthermore, having rejected the notion of a Personal Deity who dispense grace to atone for human sins, Hegel spoke of the 'cunning of reason' (*List der Vernunft*) that, like a predetermining, 'hidden hand of God,' silently, inscrutably, yet persistently ensures that the 'truth' of Absolute Spirit achieves its goal for history of achieving Absolute Knowledge and Absolute Freedom in Absolute Spirit Itself.²⁰

Strauß' Historical Convictions

In Volume II, I trace Strauß' attempts to formulate an option to Hegelianism that began even before his engagement of Feuerbach. In his "Transient and Permanent in Christianity" of 1838, which makes no mention of Feuerbach, he even more emphatically than in the *LJ* articulates his understanding of 'religion' in terms of empirical history, no longer in terms of Hegelian Idealist escapism from the sensuousness, ignorance, and un-freedom of finite consciousness.

He retains his focus on Jesus as the founder of a 'new' religion, but Jesus is no longer portrayed as the God/Man of Christology. In fact, Jesus is explicitly 'removed from the throne of God' and is now a historical teacher among other historical teachers of religion, if *unsurpassable* by others. Though not a 'genius' of technical skill, Jesus is a 'religious genius' who represents the 'internal harmony' of God-consciousness, that is, an intimate and lively harmony between the ideational and physical lawfulness that governs the world.²¹ He defines immortality not as a metaphysical liberation from the world but as the experience 'eternal in the present.' However, neither his notion of reason nor his notion of God-consciousness is indebted to Hegel's meta-narrative of reason. Equally important, Strauß perhaps shares the same metaphors notions of reason and God-consciousness with him, he is also not indebted to Schleiermacher's

17. See Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 24 (Baillie trans. 80–81).

18. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* GW VII: 28.

19. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 456.

20. See Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* (1837) "B" GW XII: 49.

21. See Strauß, "Vergängliches und Bleibendes im Christenthum:" 116.

Christology of ‘Perfect God-consciousness.’ At the most, he derives his metaphor for immortality as the experience of the ‘eternal in the present’ from Schleiermacher’s earliest writing, *On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers*, but, as with his reading of Hegel, Strauß emphasizes ‘history’ over Hegelian Knowledge and Schleiermachian Perfection.

Nonetheless, this attempt at articulating a non-Hegelian and non-Schleiermachian understanding of religion grounded in ‘reason’ was shattered by Ludwig Feuerbach. There was no other, more vociferous critic of Hegel than Feuerbach, who not only challenged the Hegel anthropomorphic character of Hegel’s theism but also challenged Hegelian Absolute Idealism.

The *Glaubenslehre* that Wasn’t

Even before writing the *LJ*, Strauß shared with his friends the intent of writing a history of Church Doctrine that would restore by means of the Hegelian philosophy of religion what was destroyed by a critical study of Church Doctrine.²² By the time Strauß was able to devote his attention to the project, however, he had given up on the Hegelian meta-narrative and even his own inclusive Christology based on Hegel. His two volume, 1,500 page *Glaubenslehre* of 1841 consists of a brilliant demonstration of the legitimacy of his aphorism that “the criticism of Church Doctrine is its history” without any need to invoke an ‘external’ philosophy. However, the *Glaubenslehre* contains no attempt at doctrinal restauration and ends with a perplexingly formulated comment accompanying his citation of Schleiermacher’s notion of immortality as the ‘experiencing of the eternal in the present.’

In fact, Strauß’ own wrestling with his Hegelian conundrums, Feuerbach’s criticism of equating religion and reason, along with Feuerbach’s defense of ideas as ectypal not archetypal, and Strauß’ own dismissal of Schleiermacher as a genuine option in his essay “Schleiermacher und Daub” of 1839, all contributed to Strauß’ twenty-year theological silence following the publication of his *Glaubenslehre*.

Breaking the Theological Silence: Religion as Morality

Following up on his *Hermann Sanuel Reimarus* of 1862, in 1864 Strauß dramatically articulated his theological convictions at the time with *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People*. The shifts here are subtle but profound. Gone is the theme of

22. See Strauß, “Allgemeines Verhältniß der Hegel’schen Philosophie zur theologischen Kritik” (1837) in *Streitschriften* III: 58–59.

religion as grounded in 'reason.' Dramatically, the 'religion of the Christ' is replaced by the 'religion of humanity.' Jesus is no longer the 'object' of faith either in terms of the 'true' content of faith as the God/Man or as the 'unsurpassable' religious genius who achieved the pinnacle of God-consciousness of internal harmony that consists of an intimate and lively harmony between the ideational and physical lawfulness that governs the world. Rather, religion is concerned with the moral 'improvement' of humanity as a species as a consequence of its changing historical context demanding, and the community's generation of, ever new moral principles applicable to ethical achievement in life. What can be established 'historically,' according to Strauß, is that Jesus is a 'surpassable' teacher and model of morality because the ever-changing familial, social, economic, and political context of humanity in history requires the discernment of new 'moral principles.' In short, Strauß has given up on *a priori* archetypal ideas both in epistemology and in morality.

The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History: Rejection of Perfect, Eminent Causality

In 1865, Strauß turned his attention, once again, to a rigorous engagement of Schleiermacher. In contrast to his "Schleiermacher und Daub" of 1839, though, what is strikingly new here is his focus on Schleiermacher's Christology of 'Perfect God-consciousness' that Schleiermacher claimed was a new metaphysical causality introduced with Jesus of Nazareth into history as a novel, historical ontological condition. Jesus' 'Perfect God-consciousness' is taken by Schleiermacher, analogous to Anselm's argument for the sacrifice of the Perfect Christ to 'save' humanity from its sin, to be an infinite, *eminent* causality (greater than any other finite, efficient causality prior to Jesus) to 'save' humanity from its imperfect God-consciousness.²³ Jesus' 'Perfect God-consciousness' is the changed ontological condition that makes it possible for humanity's 'imperfect God-consciousness' to overcome its sensuousness and to transform its self-understanding on the basis of the 'feeling of absolute dependence' upon God.

23. All events (effects) occur as the consequence of an 'efficient' causal sequence. However, we experience two kinds of 'efficient' causality: 'formal' and 'eminent'. 'Formal,' efficient causality 'adds nothing' to the natural steps that lead to the effect (e.g., a seed of corn 'duplicating itself'). 'Formal,' efficient causality is a 'closed circle' causal sequence. In contrast, 'eminent,' efficient causality involves 'more' than merely the 'natural steps' to achieve ends that the 'natural steps' alone cannot achieve. In our experience, this is the finite, eminent efficient causality of human creativity. Human beings can initiate efficient causal sequences of events to achieve ends that, left on its own, the natural sequence of events could never achieve (e.g., build an automobile engine). It is only because humanity exercises such a *finite*, 'eminent,' efficient causality that it occurs to us that there is a divine, *infinite*, 'eminent,' efficient causality to the universe that, unlike finite, 'eminent,' efficient causality can ignore the 'natural sequence' of 'formal,' efficient causality to achieve its 'higher,' 'perfect' ends.

Prior to Jesus' 'Perfect God-consciousness,' humanity neither could understand nor accomplish 'Perfect God-consciousness' because, according to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, an effect must have at least as much reality as its cause. In light of the obvious fact that human beings do not possess 'Perfect God-consciousness' but must strive for it, they can do so only if the perfect cause of 'Perfect God-consciousness' actually exists. In short, echoing Anselm of Canterbury's logic of why the incarnation was necessary and Descartes' argument for God as perfect, humanity's imperfection cannot be the cause of perfection because that would mean that 'something could come from nothing' in violation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

Strauß devastatingly rejects Schleiermacher's infinite, eminent causality by pointing out that a finite effect, which is always the case when it comes to finite consciousness, does not require a 'perfect,' infinite cause. Once again, Strauß removes any temptation to treat Schleiermacher as a viable, theological option.

The Old and the New Faith: Nature 'Turning In-ward'

For those not paying attention (e.g., Nietzsche²⁴), Strauß' *The Old and the New Faith* appears to be a radical break with his earlier theological reflections. Even the 'liberal' theologian appointed by the Liberal government in Zurich some ten years after the Zurich revolution prohibited Strauß' appointment to the University of Zurich, Alois Emanuel Biedermann, wrote to a friend that he would give up a finger on his right hand, were Strauß not to have published this work.²⁵

In his *Critique of Capacity of Judgement*, Kant defines the capacity of judgment (*Urteilkraft*) as the *subordination of a set of phenomena under a concept* and distin-

24. For example, Nietzsche criticized Strauß for the "lack of anything offensive" in his writing. See Nietzsche, "David Strauß. Der Bekenner und der Schriftsteller" in *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen* [Untimely Meditations] in *Friedrich Nietzsche. Werke I*. Karl Schlechta, ed. (Frankfurt/M: Verlag Ullstein GmbH, 1980): 191. Given that Nietzsche did not recognize the theological and philosophical fire storm generated by Strauß, not to speak of Strauß as having sparked a political revolution in Zürich, it cannot be a surprise that Nietzsche criticizes Strauß for his arrogant, nationalist elitism by calling him a *Bildungsphilister* (Educational Philistine). See "David Strauß. Der Bekenner und der Schriftsteller:" 142, 176. Nietzsche failed to see (derives the label Philistine from?) that Strauß himself called Wolfgang Menzel a 'Bursch-Philister' (a Fraternity Philistine) as stiffly wooden as his walking cane (*Streitschriften* I: 139, s. Strauß' recommendation (*ibid.*, 141) that Menzel read Hegel's "Wer denkt abstrakt?" [Jaener Schriften GW II: 575–581] because Menzel had said Hegel was so stiffly wooden as his lectern). In other words, Strauß rejects what Nietzsche accuses Strauß of being: a nationalistic (see Strauß' searing dismissal of Menzel's ad hominem attack on Johannes von Müller as national traitor: *Streitschriften* I: 100–123, 132) and dogmatic moralist (*ibid.*, 124, 127, 190), who takes truth to be apodictic and criticism to mean subjective opinion (*ibid.*, 190).

25. See Ziegler, II: 722.

guished between two kinds of judgment: *reflecting and re-producing judgment*.²⁶ He also points out that reflecting (*reflektierende*) judgment precedes all re-producing

26. Reason ‘deduces the concept’ out of the imperceptible relationalities among appearances. It does not ‘create’ or ‘prescribe the concept’. Given that it is a deduction and not a prescription or creation *ex nihilo*, it is not Nominalism, which for its part overlooks that the relationalities in appearances are already structured by the imperceptible order of ‘things-in-themselves’ on the basis of which Nominalism then claims that consciousness creates its abstractions. Whereas Nominalism ignores the conundrum of order always and already in phenomena, Kant consciously presupposes it as an imperceptible limit to reason.

On Imagination, the Law of Association, and Reflecting Judgment

On the difference between *reflecting* and *re-producing* judgment, see Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 179–180: “Judgment in general is the faculty (*Vermögen*) for thinking of the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, be the principle, the law) is given, then the capacity of judgment, which subsumes the particular under it [...] [has been previously deduced]. If, however, only the particular is given, for which the universal is to be found, then the capacity of judgment is merely reflecting [and the concept is yet to be deduced].” See as well, *ibid.*: AA V: 185–186 and: 878.

To avoid any suggestion that Kant is a ‘constructive idealist,’ I prefer the translation ‘*the capacity of re-producing judgment*’ for ‘*die bestimmende Urteilskraft*’ and ‘*the capacity of reflecting judgment*’ for ‘*die reflektierende Urteilskraft*’. Kant doesn’t claim that transcendental consciousness *prescribes* laws (or concepts) to govern nature or perceives them directly in phenomena. Rather, it *dis-covers* them by an heuristic, deductive strategy and applies them to what for the individual is novel phenomena by means of *reflecting* judgment.

CUP translates ‘*bestimmend*’ as ‘determining’. One could mistakenly take ‘determining judgment,’ then, to mean the individual’s subjective creating *in advance (a priori) what the concept must be* and imposing the concept to a set of phenomena as if Kant was claiming that concepts were an individual and/or social construction imposed upon phenomena or directly given as the thing-in-itself of objective, sense perception (*sinnliche Anschauung*).

Kant denies both options. In his posthumous *Menschenkunde*, Kant gives his account of concepts as relationalities in perception deduced by the mind by means of ‘association’ (*Vergesellschaftung*) (AA XXV,2: 946–948; Olms ed.: 108–110), which are evoked through sense perception (AA XXV,2: 944; Olms ed.: 106). He distinguishes between the ‘productive’ and ‘reproductive’ imagination (AA XXV,2: 945; Olms ed.: 107). The ‘productive’ imagination ‘generates things that were not directly in our senses’. The ‘reproductive’ imagination ‘is the capacity to recall representations that one had in the past’. In Kant’s *Anweisung* Olms ed.: 12 (see as well 33), he speaks of the reproductive imagination as involving ‘something mechanical’ because it is the ‘mere knowledge’ of rules (*Anweisung*, Olms ed.: 31). Kant proceeds in his *Menschenkunde* to distinguish between the ‘voluntary’ and the ‘involuntary’ imagination (AA XXV,2: 945–946; Olms ed.: 108). Fantasy is ‘involuntary’ whereas the ‘voluntary’ imagination is creative. The origin of the involuntary imagination is a capricious event, but reason channels it ‘according to the laws of the soul [...] so that it can be precisely conceived’. (AA XXV,2: 946; Olms ed.: 108) ‘This law, according to which the mind orders everything, is called the law of association (*Vergesellschaftung*)’. (AA XXV,2: 946; Olms ed.: 109) Kant calls it a ‘natural law,’ which is graspable by reason. (AA XXV,2: 946; Olms ed.: 109) “Representations are associated when there is a ground of connection by which they are related, or at least neighboring, to other representations, so that they can be connected by the unity of place and time. – Concepts [*Begriffe*] arise by kinship when they are related to each other in understanding ; they are linked by neighborhood when they are linked to each other by nothing other than the unity of place and time.” (AA XXV,2: 946; Olms ed.: 109) With kinship and neighborhood, “[i]n both cases it is as follows: representations may be related or neighboring by similarity, as cause and effect; so our mind has the property of associating such representations. One representation attracts the other, and so the representations come together.

(*bestimmende*) judgment.²⁷ Kant did not claim, though, that transcendental consciousness *creates* or *prescribes* the concept or law for nature for that, of course, would be solipsism (or social relativism). Kant clearly states the opposite. He writes later in the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*: As an activity of *reflecting* judgment, the business of *finding a universal* for a manifold “[...] is [...] *neither prescribing* (vorschreiben) *a law to nature nor learning one from it by means of observation* (although that principle can be confirmed by the latter).”²⁸ To invoke Philip Wheelwright’s distinctions,²⁹ reflecting judgment is the ‘tensive,’ ‘living’ role of metaphor in all consciousness. *Bestimmende Urtheilskraft* is more appropriately translated ‘*re-producing* judgment’ to emphasize that this kind of judgment is a ‘steno,’ ‘dead metaphor’ (Paul Ricoeur prefers the notion ‘worn out’ metaphor rather than dead because a concept can be metaphorically rejuvenated.³⁰) that *attributes* a concept or law to a set of phenomena

Since all representations, however dissimilar they may be, can nevertheless have some similarity, our imagination can also reduce thousands to hundreds. For our imagination is so extravagant that even the slightest resemblance brings representations together. (AA XXV,2: 946–947; Olms ed.:109) The ‘law of association’ is invoked by reason in order that fantasy can be brought into order. (AA XXV,2: 947; Olms ed.:110)

In the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*, Kant explicitly writes: As an activity of *reflecting* judgment, the business of *finding a universal* for a manifold “[...] is [...] *neither prescribing* (vorschreiben) *a law to nature nor learning one from it by means of observation* (although that principle can be confirmed by the latter).” Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 186 Kant wrote a page earlier: “Understanding [...] possesses] *a priori* universal laws of nature without which nature could not be an object of experience at all; but still it requires in addition a certain order of nature [...], which can only be known to it empirically and which from its point of view are contingent. These rules [...] it must think as laws (i.e., as necessary [Kant’s parentheses]), because otherwise they would not constitute an order of nature, even if he did not recognize their necessity or could not ever see it.” (emphasis added) Kant, *Critique of Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 184. On Kant’s distinction between reason (*Witz*) as deducing a rule/concept and the capacity of judgment (*Urtheilskraft*) as distinguishing the species included under the genus as concerned with the details of reflection, as well as the capacity of judgment as a universal capacity possessed by all finite, transcendental consciousness, see Kant’s the section “On the Ability of our Soul to Make Comparisons” in *Menschenkunde* (AA XXV,2: 959–974; Olms ed.: 122–138).

27. See *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 187.

28. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity Judgment* AA V: 186. Kant’s *What does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?* begins: “However high we may set our concepts, and however much we may abstract them from sensuality, they are still attached to figurative ideas whose real purpose is to make them, which are not derived from experience, suitable for use in experience. For how do we want to give sense and meaning to our concepts if they are not underpinned by some kind of conception (which ultimately must always be an example from some possible experience)?” AA VIII: 133. See as well, in *Reflexionen aus dem Nachlaß, Reflexionen zur Anthropologie* at AA XV: 379, 859: “Reason can only serve to explain phenomena [...] and certain laws and characteristics of the ‘Sch’(ema)], but *not to prescribe laws* [*nicht die Gesetze vorschreiben*] to it, because *true reason does not consist in the objective at all, but in the form of the inner affection*.” (emphasis added).

29. For Wheelwright’s distinction between ‘tensive’ and ‘steno’ metaphors, see below, 122 n. 57.

30. See Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor: Multidisciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language*, Robert Czerny, Kathleen McLaughlin, and John Costello trans. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977): 294.

as if the concept was absolute when, in fact, it conceals the originally 'tensive,' 'living' metaphorical process of reflecting judgment (*reflektierende Urtheilskraft*) that allows for the identification of 'sameness' in the midst of 'difference, in the first place.³¹

The surprised reader is the reader who took Strauß' texts to be merely presenting conclusions of re-producing judgments that they expect him to 'have to draw' given such a reader's assumption that Strauß is merely confirming the reader's own conclusions. If one reads Strauß as an odyssey in reflecting judgment that is sorting its way through confusing phenomena and conundrums, the flags and signposts are clear. If one reflects along with Strauß over the course of his corpus, one cannot be surprised at the outcome because, as far as Strauß' reflections allowed him to see, there was no limb other than Feuerbachian Materialism to crawl onto once one had sawed off the limbs of Hegelian Absolute Idealism and Schleiermacher's religion of feeling.

Although Strauß invokes Kant as of *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People* for his 'moral,' 'religion of humanity,' Strauß did so under the influence of his circle of friends who called for a 'return to Kant' at the beginning of the 1860s. Yet, it is clear to the most superficial reader (the one thing that Nietzsche got right about Strauß³²) that Strauß did not even remotely engage in a serious study of Kant analogous to his study of Hegel and Schleiermacher. When it comes to Kant, Strauß is, as always, dependent on the analysis and judgments of others.

Having recognized that the gospels not only do not provide sufficient historical evidence for a biography of Jesus or even to identify the content of his teaching, Strauß now no longer invokes the distinction between the 'genius of skills' and the 'religious genius' of God-consciousness as the 'internal harmony of reason' as he had in "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity." He also no longer invokes the moral improvement of humanity in an attempt to pump new life into the 'old' faith. Rather, the 'religion of nature' and the eternal 'human species' as material and historical progress replace the 'religion of the Christ' and the 'religion of humanity' that had earlier replaced Hegel's meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit.³³

The individual, to be sure, is an ambiguous moment in that trajectory of optimistic, moral progress because of her/his limits. Nevertheless, the species as a whole (!) is what allows for retention of 'hope' in improvement, technically and morally. Technical improvement is *driven by humanity's self-interest*. Moral improvement is *demande by history* because moral principles can emerge only out of the changing social, political, and economic context of communities as they identify the rules that should govern the new circumstance of the community.

31. Kant points out that bestimmende Urteile were at their conception reflektierende Urteile in *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 187.

32. See Friedrich Nietzsche, "David Strauß. Der Bekenner und der Schriftsteller:" 164.

33. See Strauß' conclusion to Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 408–409 and "On Kant's 'Pure' Religion:" 968, n. 158.

Strauß retains Jakob Böhme's theodicy, which he embraced in his *Glaubenslehre*, that 'evil' is the motor that drives progress.³⁴ Without 'evil,' there can only be stagnation. In short, 'what is' 'ought to be' (which, of course, is a blatant violation of the 'is'/'ought' fallacy!) because the overwhelming trajectory of the human species is 'improvement.' Although the individual is an ambiguous moment in that trajectory of optimistic progress, the species as a whole is what allows for retention of 'hope' in improvement: technically and morally: technically, because humanity is, obviously, gaining ever more 'sovereignty' over nature; morally, because moral principles can emerge out of the changing social, political, and economic context of communities as they identify the rules that should govern the new circumstance of the community.

In other words, the human species here replaces Hegel's 'cunning of reason.' It is no longer 'reason' in any form that is governing the trajectory of history.³⁵ Rather, it is nature itself and the 'natural' species as a product of nature that confirms that history is improving thanks to the negations that are 'evil'.

Embracing Böhme's 'is'/'ought' fallacy, the 'ought'/'is' fallacy of Hegelian metaphysics (Absolute Spirit 'ought' to be the starting point of the logic of negation, so it 'is') is replaced by the later Strauß with another 'ought'/'is' fallacy. In this case, it is that nature 'ought' to have the capacity to bring about living things and consciousness. Consequently, what 'is' demonstrates that nature has chosen life and consciousness as the vehicle for its inward turn to continue its technical and moral progress.³⁶ The later Strauß remains trapped in both an 'is'/'ought' as well as an 'ought'/'is' fallacy. In both cases, Strauß engages in a μετὰβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος in that he turned a description into an absolute causal explanation.

In terms of 'popular' consciousness, though, Strauß' 'new' faith is thriving today: Materialism has replaced Absolute Idealism, and morality is an issue of the social construction of moral norms and confidence that the species 'will eventually get it right.' Strauß is the 'Moses' who viewed the 'Promised Land' of technical and intellectual cleverness, but he himself didn't enter it. He bridged the trajectory between Absolute Idealism (Hegelianism) to Reductionist Materialism (Feuerbach), but the gaps in

34. Böhme's theodicy is not to be confused for Kant's 'method of negation'. On Kant's 'method of negation', see "Kant's 'Negative Method' in 45, n. 28. Böhme takes 'evil' to be an ontologically determining, constitutive reality whereas Kant's 'method of negation' presupposes the creative, self-determination of autonomous freedom without which there can be no choice between 'good' and 'evil' principles to give oneself permission to act.

35. Strauß criticizes Hegel's notion of the 'cunning of reason,' which Strauß calls humanity's "dark urge [...] aware of the right way," which would mean that theological quarrels are merely conflicts over the 'husks' of truth, not truth itself, but which leaves truth in the hands of the philosophers, which would mean that theological quarrels were a matter of human folly. Strauß' conclusion of this dialectic: "How from this point of view a satisfying philosophical view of history would be possible, is not to be foreseen." Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 23–24. See the "Preface:" 52, n. 48.

36. On Strauß' view of nature as 'turning inward on itself' to continue its advance, see Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 145, 240, and 365. See as well the suggestion that it is as much a parody of Hegel as it is a commitment to the empirical sciences: 57, n. 64.

that materialistic account (e.g., hylozoism and the emergence of consciousness out of matter) remain gaps to this day.

What remains is Ralph Waldo Emerson's irritating thorn claim in "The Transcendentalist" that "[e]very materialist will be an idealist; but once an idealist s/he can never go back to be a materialist."³⁷ Strauß *appears* to contradict Emerson. The ambiguity over the appearance of Strauß' Reductionist Materialism led his biographer, Theobald Ziegler, to draw the speculative conclusion, even, that Strauß always remained a 'Hegelian.' This is because Strauß' materialism is dripping with major gaps both in understanding and explanation. For example, just what causes 'life'? What causes nature 'to turn inward on itself' to continue its progress? Such questions indicate that Strauß' Reductionist Materialism is not as materialist as it might seem. Yet, the claim that 'nature is perfect' turns Strauß' new faith into a materialistic version of Hegel's indifferentism over against history. If nature is perfect, then effort at learning of skills and gaining understanding/wisdom as well as the pain, suffering, exploitation, persecution, terror, and wanton destructiveness of humanity are all ultimately of no significance.

Strauß was no more or less an Idealist than he ended up more or less a Materialist. In other words, he was always both. His universal, inclusive Christology based on the 'relationship' between an 'idea' and its particulars indicates that he valued particulars as much as the 'idea.' His entire intellectual career sought to find an epistemology and metaphysics that fit with his materialist convictions. Rather than portray Strauß as an Idealist who turned into a Materialist, I take him to have been trapped in two systems of causal explanation with neither satisfactory as a causal account of the other. Simply because something looks like, walks like, and quacks like a duck does not mean that it is a duck. *Judgment regarding a set of particular appearances in perception depends upon the application of an imperceptible, universal concept to the phenomena that is not given directly with the appearances. In short, judgment is both empirical and a priori synthetic, and judgment itself is no causal explanation of how the empirical and a priori elements are related to one another.* Specifically, Strauß' 'ought'/'is' fallacy of hylozoism does not 'prove' that nature causes life and consciousness. Rather, as a causal explanation, it is a dictum based on effects. Hylozoism is a heuristic description that perhaps to a certain degree constructively assists understanding, but it is no causal explanation.

The 'broader' and 'deeper' understanding of the human conditions as finite, transcendental consciousness is that the conditions that make possible transcendental consciousness' theoretical and practical reason are a 'given' (a 'faith of reason:' openly communicable although their cause is not clear to us³⁸). Theoretical reason is subordi-

37. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "The Transcendentalist" in *The Complete Essays and Other Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson* (New York: Random House, 1940): 87.

38. Kant, *Religion*: AA VI: 138.

nate to practical reason, and the individual requires a community that understands that responsible creativity requires the encouragement and support of a community (a 'culture' that promotes the will in contrast to a 'culture' of technical skill³⁹).

Religion is concerned, then, not with how life ends but with the inexplicable conditions of possibility both perceptible and imperceptible that make possible anything like conscious experience, understanding, *and* responsible agency in the world possible, from the get go. Religion is not, as a matter of merely self-interest, a condemnation of imperfection nor a call to perfection (material or spiritual) either in the sensuous world or as a siren call out of the sensuous world. The afterlife is no substitute for this life and surely no crippling of the capacities that discourage experience, understanding, and *responsible* agency in this life. Religion is *non-epistemic faith*, not Absolute Knowledge, and it is not reducible to any element or domain of transcendental consciousness, especially not 'merely morality.' Religion is the hope by no means for merely, external 'success' but comes from confidence in, and internal satisfaction from, the thrilling and responsible, inquisitive, *creative* search for the not yet understood lawfulness of 'territory'⁴⁰ under guidance of a moral compass. Although *necessarily* internal and individual, religion depends upon that community, past, present, and future, that understands, supports, and sustains the efforts of the imperceptible orders of theoretical and practical reason especially when those efforts appear to be contrary to personal or social self-interest. In short, religion is no absolute choice between good and evil. Religion is a choice for life as creative, responsible, self-determining agency on the basis of imperceptible capacities and *autonomously embraced* (not heteronomously imposed) lawfulness that make possible perceptible experience, understanding, and responsible agency a reality. We have experienced no other transcendental consciousness, which doesn't mean that there isn't one somewhere else, with such capacities. Why would we want to be anything less than what we can be? I know of no other definition of religion that is more adequate.

An Unrealized Kantian Option:

Strauß never really gave Kant a chance! As I have indicated, Strauß' mentors and friends shaped his understanding of Kant, not Strauß' own serious study of Kant. One can learn from Strauß what happens when a rigorous scholar only is able to 'see' a contrast between Absolute Idealism and Reductionist Materialism without consideration of the 'middle way' of Critical Idealism. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 of Volume II use the rubric of Theoretical Reason (Chapter 6), Practical Reason (Chapter 7), and

39. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 431–432.

40. On Kant's distinctions among 'field,' 'territory,' and 'domain,' see See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 174 ff and Chapter 1: 116.

Aesthetics (Chapter 8) to present Hegel's and Strauß' reading of Kant. These chapters aim to demonstrate, then, not only what Strauß actually said, but also it explores, especially, his philosophical sources that shaped what he understood (or, as in the case of Kant, didn't understand).

In each of these three Chapters I demonstrate that, given the collapse of Absolute Idealism and Reductionist Materialism, there is another limb, ignored by Strauß, on which to crawl that recognizes the limits to reason while focusing on those conditions and capacities (*Anlagen*) that are required for finite, transcendental consciousness to experience, understand, and exercise responsible agency in the world. This option avoids both the *μετάβασις εις ἄλλο γένος* of both the 'ought'/'is' and the 'is'/'ought' fallacies without succumbing to the illusion, as did Hegel, that the Owl of Minerva is actually and ridiculously trying to fly in a vacuum and sleep soundly because nature is perfect.

Critical Idealism does not simply describe the world. It claims that transcendental consciousness is the one, certain (!), place where we experience the natural world as an 'open' system, not a 'closed' system of 'blind,' mechanical, physical causality. The strength of the limits to reason is that transcendental consciousness involves more than a capacity to know. Transcendental consciousness is the condition for us to recognize that what we can't know offers us confidence that there is enough order (both rational and moral) to the cosmos for us to seek understanding and assume responsibility for our agency. Every other epistemological system constructs an illusion of knowledge to convince us that we ought to seek knowledge. To be sure, Critical Idealism finds us in a 'precarious position:'

Here ... we see philosophy [i.e., philosophical theology, Kant's label⁴¹] put in fact in a precarious position, which is to be firm even though there is nothing in heaven or on earth from which it depends, or on which it is based. Here philosophy is to manifest its purity as sustainer of its own laws, not as herald of laws that an implanted sense or who knows what tutelary nature whispers to it, all of which — though they may always be better than nothing at all — can still never yield basic principles that reason dictates and that must have their source entirely and completely *a priori* and, at the same time, must have their commanding authority from this: that *they expect nothing from the inclination of human beings but everything from the supremacy of the law and the respect owed to it* or, failing this, condemn the human being to contempt for himself and inner abhorrence.⁴² (emphasis added)

Finally, the turn to Critical Idealism re-enforces my use of Ricoeur's three-fold, mimetic theory of narratives as structured by the *pre-figured*, *con-figured*, and *re-figured*. The task is not to tell the reader what s/he must think – as if an author's *con-figuration*

41. Kant calls his philosophy 'philosophical theology'. See the "Preface to the First Edition" of *Religion* AA VI: 9.

42. Kant, *Groundwork*: AA IV: 425–426.

of language, themes, and issues was some ‘final word’ of objective truth. Rather, even when it comes to ‘factual accounts’ (*logoi*) in distinction from merely ‘narrative accounts’ (stories/*mythoi*), there is an inescapable influence of authorial construction of textual claims.⁴³ Kant emphasized in *What is Enlightenment?*, as well, that the task is for the reader to think for her-/himself. Whether consciously or not, the reader is *re-figuring* the text that s/he is reading. A serious reader assumes conscious responsibility for her/his *re-figuration* and does depend lazily on the conclusions of the text that s/he is reading.

When one combines these insights, one does not arrive at the end of Strauß’ corpus with simply the question: Does he have the right take on the ‘new faith’? Rather, one arrives at the end of his corpus, literally, back at the beginning with the ‘*genetic mythical principle*’ of the *LJ*. By his restricting his own attention to the historical claims of Christianity, Strauß never appreciated the full significance of the *genetic mythical principle*, which he applied to the gospels only to conclude that the gospel narratives were by no means literal historical accounts of the life and ministry of Jesus. By the writing of *The Old and the New Faith*, Strauß was aware that the determination of the historical kernel of the so-called ‘historical myths’ was not adequate to construct a biography of Jesus or to distill out his actual teaching.⁴⁴

Rather than focus on the content claims of the gospel stories, though, he could have emphasized the significance of the unique storytelling capacity of a species that possesses transcendental consciousness and the capacity of creative, *autonomous freedom*. Had he focused on *capacities (Anlagen) rather than story content*, he would have been not only more receptive to Kant’s Critical Idealism, but he could also have illuminated the conditions and capacities that make humanity, quintessentially, ‘religious.’ Far more than metaphysical, ontological, dogmatic, and even moral claims, *religion is the best label for humanity’s storytelling capacities of both theoretical (technical skills) and practical reason (responsible agency)*. The question addressed by religion, Kant proposes, is neither ‘what can we know?’ (theoretical reason) nor ‘what ought I to do?’ (practical reason). Rather, the question of religion is: ‘*What can I hope for?*’ Along with the others, this question is, in fact, *none other than the question: ‘What is autonomous freedom?’*⁴⁵

43. See Ricoeur, Paul, *Time and Narrative*, Vol. 3, by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988): 148–156 and, especially, Chapter 8, as well as, Ricoeur, “History as Narrative and Practice” in *Philosophy Today*, XXIX (3/4): 213–221.

44. In *The Old and the New Faith*, Strauß of 1872, Strauß has given up on the attempt to identify the teaching of Jesus much less the writing of a biography of him based on the gospels. See Strauß, *The Old and the New Faith*: 58 (as well, 53) and the “Epilogue”: 33–34.

45. Kant formulated four questions for humanity: The first three questions are found in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (B 832–833); all four are found in the *Logic* (AA IX: 24–5). Humanity’s hope consists of confidence in the indelible, conditions of possibility of humanity’s moral agency because the conditions of possibility of its practical reason can never be eradicated as long as one is living. There can be no proof (or disproof) of autonomous freedom that makes it possible for

As superficial as Nietzsche's assertion that David Friedrich Strauß in his *The Old and the New Faith* was a 'want-to-be genius' by serving as founder of a new religion as well as an elitist, 'educational Philistine' (*Bildungsphilister*) whose self-inflation is expressed by the imperial 'we,' Nietzsche, nonetheless, shares with Strauß the accurate prognostication of a coming 'materialism.' Strauß was by no means the 'founder' of a 'new religion' with respect to anything recognizably 'institutionally religious.' Yet, he accurately described the 'new faith' that has swept over humanity in the 150 years since his death: *reality is exclusively material and values are relative to the 'level' of political, economic, and cultural achievement of a people.*

Nietzsche, however, has also proven to be accurate in that he established the, now beloved, paradigm of the 'oracle genius.' Yet Nietzsche's 'genius' is one who makes a lot of noise with 'clever, yet, ultimately insignificant and ridiculous, metaphors for whom what is 'valued' as 'culture' is that one's 'music' (and the 'music' of one's tribe) be performed by other tribes across the globe.

In turn, 'meaning' in life is acquired for all 'non-geniuses' by having the 'honor' of getting close to 'fame' in the classroom, the concert hall, the museum, etc. In other words, with both Strauß and Nietzsche, we are confronted with an impoverishment of humanity, whereby the individual is discouraged from 'thinking for her-/himself' and taking responsibility for her/his own creative agency much less for encouraging and sustaining others to do the same, especially when 'doing the right thing' appears to be contrary to their, and the community's self-interest.

Nonetheless, if we employ Paul Ricoeur's notion of the three-fold, mimetic thesis of human narratives (the pre-figure, con-figured, and re-figured character of texts and ever-new text formation), it is worthwhile to engage Strauß. not because of the enduring 'success' of his personal music, obviously, but in order to understand those pre-figured intellectual narratives that initially formed him, as well as to witness his various attempts to con-figure an alternative, non-institutional, 'new faith.' Strauß illustrates the Western world as an inebriated drunk, metaphysically staggering from one side of the street (Absolute Idealism) to the other side (Reductionist Materialism) with erudition but limited acuity. A 're-figuration' by today's readers of the pre-figured alternative of Kant's Critical Idealism, available to, but only partially and, then, inadequately con-figured by Strauß offers an alternative to reductionist materialism that can shake up

transcendental consciousness intentionally to do things that nature on its own cannot, which is the ground or condition of moral responsibility. There can only be a transcendental defense of autonomous freedom as the required condition for us to be able to exercise this capacity so central to what it means to be human. See *Groundwork*: (AA IV: 459), see as well, "A New Exposition of the First Principles of Metaphysical Knowledge" (1755) (AA I: 403): Although the ground for morality is not the good or bad ontological status of our soul (see *Religion* AA VI: 39–44) or the consequences of our actions (see *Groundwork*: AA IV: 399–400, Kant does suggest in the "First Preface" to *Religion* that our hope is that there is a connection between the categorical and the contingent. It is precisely this connection, which, among other elements to be sure, requires belief in (but no proof of!) God (see *Religion* AA IV: 6*). Explicitly though, Kant speaks of religious hope not (!) in terms of receiving divine assistance (grace) but in terms of maintaining our moral attitude (see *Religion* AA VI: 68–69).

humanity's priorities, which focus merely on the 'genius' of skills and measure 'success' by conspicuous consumption. This new set of priorities places practical reason's 'what ought to be?' above theoretical reason. Furthermore, Critical Idealism establishes the liberating role of 'pure' religion's hope that finite, transcendental consciousness can understand the physical world and can govern its creative freedom on the basis of physical and moral lawfulness, not speculative, dreams of flying in a vacuum. Critical Idealism does so adequately only when there is a 'culture that promotes the moral will not by external finger-wagging but on the basis of encouraging and sustaining adherence to the imperceptible Commonweal of 'God's imperceptible universal order of ends that embraces learning, research, and ever-expanding understanding even absent perfection and exclusive concern for one's own and one's tribe's self-interest.

Volume I

David Friedrich Strauß: Gospel Critic Who Sparked a Populist Revolution

Part I:

On the Explosive Mix of History and Myth in the Gospels

Chapter 1: Methodology:

Walter Jens on Tübingen: Tübingen is "[...] young town; young because here every fourth person is a student but young also because of those many deceased whose work – incomplete, open, and provocative, as it is – wants to be completed."¹

Chapter Overview

Three themes structure this chapter: 1) the 'Methodology' of the project: Threefold Mimesis structures a 'close' reading of Strauß' texts and a 'deep' reading of his sources, 2) Strauß' 'Unrealized Paradigm Revolution' in gospel scholarship and metaphysics, and 3) themes of 'Metaphor Interference and Anachronisms' that provide a segue into his work.

David Friedrich Strauß is no fossil from a past geological age. As different as the epoch and the pace of life is between Strauß and us today, the real difference is that Strauß is not a fossil dependent upon the 'voice' of a paleontologist. Rather, Strauß speaks for himself. Understanding him, though, requires more than just listening; just as understanding a fossil requires more than keeping one's eyes open. Strauß' language is no longer ours, the issues of his day that drove him to speak are not only, at least in part, strange to us, but also they are as opaque to him as the issues of our day to us. In other words, we can no more 'hear' Strauß' voice merely by having the luck of encountering his texts than the paleontologist gives a voice to a fossil simply by having the luck of stumbling onto it.

Yet, there is a further, asymmetrical, difference between the fossil, which needs a voice, and a text, which is a voice. Those voices worthy of our time are voices who understand their 'debt' to those who have gone before them. However, they do not express the debt simply by parroting voices from the past. It is not simply by being repeated that a thought is valuable. A thought is valuable that gives its thinker illuminating insight into the thinker's own world, physically and socially, and (!) empowers the thinker to assume personal responsibility for the reader's own thoughts. Thinking is not the mere polishing of a brand name.

Strauß can be important for us, but he doesn't deserve our attention because he was a leading member of the 'genius promotion' out of the Protestant Gymnasium in Blaubeuren, Germany. or 'Prius' in his class at the Protestant Seminary in Tübingen.

1. Andreas Rumler, *Literarische Spaziergänge durch Tübingen. Auf den Spuren von Hölderlin bis Härting* (Stuttgart: Konrad Theiss Verlag GmbH, 2013): 8.

Strauß acknowledged that, although 'genius' is the inexplicable gift of a (technical) skill set, it *must be cultivated*.² Once it is on the way to fruitful achievement, though, it cannot be ignored (although it can be suppressed by oneself and/or one's community). Furthermore, 'genius' can be a burden as much as a blessing, and it certainly does not mean 'always getting everything right.' Although not a child of 'privilege,' Strauß knew that the opportunities available to him made him 'privileged.' If there's anything extraordinary about his ordinariness, it is that he 'took advantage creatively' of the opportunities available to him, and he sought, across his career, to improve his understanding.

Strauß is also not 'important' simply because by the age of 32 he had produced two two volume works (together some 3,000 pages) on the Christian gospels (the *LJ*) and the history of Church Doctrine (*Die christliche Glaubenslehre in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und im Kampfe mit der modernen Wissenschaft; Christian Doctrine in its Historical Development and in Conflict with Modern Science*). Literally gallons of ink have been spilled on the gospels and Church Doctrine, which aren't worth one's time. In Strauß' case, even the key insights that guided his scholarship, unsurprisingly, if we're honest, did not come only from him. *What distinguishes this now silent voice from so many other silent voices is the insight, acuity, and faithfulness by which he listened to others while meticulously connecting dots across themes, texts, and ages.* He rewards his reader in that he has done the groundwork, which saves his reader valuable time!

Given, though, that, if at all, the meaning of his work is limited for the most part to the issue of 'myth' in the gospels and his ground breaking work in gospel criticism. However, his criticism of 'liberal' Rationalism, his criticism of the history of Church Doctrine, and his criticism of the dominant metaphysics (Hegelianism) of his age was and remains so good as entirely ignored.

2. On 'genius', see Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 307–319, *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1055–1066; Olms ed.: 233–245, especially Starke's footnote *Menschenkunde* in the Olms ed.: 246*, and *Anweisung* Olms ed.: 20, 30–31. In dramatic contrast, Strauß' definition of genius is far more 'consequentialist' than Kant's. "The harmony of the powers of the soul, which, each strong and active in its own right, never interfere with the other in the most lively interplay or thwart its effectiveness, but unsearched, without anxious choice or arduous struggle, harmonize in the accomplishment of what is appropriate in every case.

[... One recognizes] the genius by a great idea which forms the keynote of his life, from which all his thinking, speaking and acting proceeds and towards which it strives, for the sake of which he disregards everything else, even his own external well-being [...]

[...] [G]enius shows itself further in the force with which it acts on its surroundings, in the magnetic attraction, as it were, with which it knows how to bind to itself all those who feed on it ingenuously; yes, it shows itself no less on the other side in the strong contradiction which it arouses against itself, the black storm clouds of passion and hostility which it draws up against itself, like a powerfully shining sun from damp ground.

[...] [T]he surest test of true genius lies in the effects it succeeds in exerting on posterity" Strauß, "Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum. Selbstgespräche." 102–103.

Beginning in 1837 when the liberal government of the Canton of Zurich, Switzerland, first attempted to appoint him to the chair for Biblical Theology, Church History, and Dogmatics at their new university founded in 1831, Conservative Christians over the course of two years were in uproar in the Canton. The ever escalating rage among conservative Christians against Strauß reached fever pitch when the government in its second attempt succeeded in appointing him to the faculty in January of 1839. Six months of red hot, *ad hominem* rhetoric and misrepresentations of Strauß' work, the *LJ*, culminated in September 5/6, 1839, in Conservative Christians under the leadership of their pastors succeeding in a bloody political coup in Zurich. The replacement government pensioned Strauß before he had ever entered the classroom.³

Nonetheless, Strauß remains significant not solely for biblical scholars interested in the history of the crucial mileposts in gospel criticism that now are deemed irrelevant. Yet, even 'liberal' scholars recognize Strauß as merely an interesting case of intellectual martyrdom whose gospel criticism has been supplanted by 'form,' 'redaction,' more sophisticated 'literary,' and 'sociological' criticism of the text.⁴

Rather than having been left on the trash heap of biblical exegesis, though, Strauß both silently shapes 'critical,' exegetical scholarship, clearly in Rudolf Bultmann's program of 'de-mythologization' of the gospels,⁵ as well as provides untapped resources

3. He donated his pension to the poor. See Jörg F. Sandberger, "David Friedrich Strauß (1808–1874)" in *Theologen des Protestantismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, 2 Vols., Martin Greschat ed (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1978) I: 94.

4. 'Form' criticism arises out of 'source' criticism, which sought to establish the historical sequence of gospel authorship. In the search for the original, historical accounts of the ministry of Jesus, the gospels were evaluated with respect to the sources that they had and/or shared in common. At the end of the 18th C, Johann Jakob Griesbach proposed the 'two-gospel' hypothesis (indebted to Henry Owen and Friedrich Andreas Stroth) (1783) that Matthew was the original gospel, followed by Luke, with Mark employing both for the composition of his gospel. In 1786, Gottlob Christian Storr had proposed that Mark was the first gospel to be written, which both Matthew and Luke possessed when writing their gospels. At the end of the 19th C First Testament scholars developed 'form criticism' that identified pericopes in the text that existed and were circulated prior to their appearance in the scriptures. Rudolf Bultmann most famously applied 'form' criticism to the gospels. Identification of these earlier pericopes shared among the gospels (particularly, the synoptic gospels) allowed scholars to identify the redaction activity (called 'redaction' criticism) of the individual gospel authors, which, in turn, led to recognition of the specific theological agendas or voices of the gospel authors. 'Literary' criticism, already proposed by G. Henry Ewing in 1890, focuses on each individual gospel as a theological whole. Redaction criticism's identification of the individual voices of the gospel authors to speak of the theological claims of the authors enhanced the insights of literary criticism. Since the 1970s, 'sociological criticism' has employed the social sciences to identify the social world in which the gospel texts are embedded.

5. Bultmann's reading of Heidegger can be viewed as the futile continuation of Strauß' search for an 'existential theology' that is 'historically based' in light of the inadequacies of Strauß' reductionist materialism. Yet, Heidegger's acknowledged ambiguity with respect to the notion of 'authenticity' leaves the individual trapped in the expectations of her/his social world. See especially, Heidegger, *Being and Time*, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson trans. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962): H 43 and 167. Granted, those who took the alternative route from that taken by Bultmann out of Martin Kähler emphasized the 'Christ of faith' over the 'Jesus of history' by turning to Heideggerian 'Word event' theologies of 'faith' (e.g., Gerhard Ebeling and D. Ernst Fuchs), which would appear to Strauß as having

for moving both scriptural criticism and theology off their comfortable complacency grounded in pluralistic ‘tolerance’ rather than identification of the required, universal conditions for experience, understanding, and responsible agency.

In addition, as with the case with his two volume study of the gospels in the *LJ*, his two volume criticism of the history of Christian doctrine remains an incredibly detailed source book for the issues at issue in the gospels and in the history of Church Doctrine. Not only the two volume *LJ* can yet save the reader valuable time but also the two volume *Glaubenslehre*, as well.

Finally, Strauß’ criticism of Hegelian Absolute Idealism and his embracing of Feuerbachian, Reductionist Materialism and Nominalism make him a crucial resource for understanding the history of metaphysics that shapes understanding (for good or ill) today. Strauß’ *The Old and the New Faith* is a remarkable prediction of social development. However, despite all that he ‘accomplished,’ Strauß’ significance rests as much, if not more, on what he didn’t achieve than in what he claimed to be ‘objective truths.’

On Understanding as Three-fold Mimesis: A ‘Method’ for a Close and Deep Reading of Strauß

Strauß anticipates (explicitly, with the *genetic mythical principle* and, implicitly, with his rigorous reading of the history of Church Doctrine) the hermeneutical perspective of Paul Ricoeur and Hans Georg Gadamer in the 20th C that takes texts to contain seeds of *ever expanding understanding and generative creative agency* that is summarized by Ricoeur’s notion of the ‘hermeneutical arc.’⁶ This ‘arc’ always commences with *pre-figured* ‘language’ already present in one’s social and intellectual context, which is then *con-figured* in a new form by an author/artist and, then, must be *re-figured* by the ‘reader’/audience.

The ‘intentional fallacy’ maintains that the reading of a text is governed by the ‘intention of the author.’ In *The Aims of Interpretation*, E.D. Hirsch, Jr., defended precisely the notion, though, that the ‘intention of the author is the governing principle of moral obligation that a reader owes to the author of a text.’⁷ Yet, if there is anything that is inaccessible to a reader, it is access to the ‘intention’ of an author. Paul Ricoeur

returned to an unhinged, speculative, ‘gnostic’ escapism from the historical world analogous to Hegel. See Heidegger’s own suggestion of the possible compatibility of his notion of the Being-of beings (*Sein der Seienden*) with Negative Theology (i.e., the ‘influx’ of Gnostic teaching) in *Being and Time*: 499, n. xiii (German: 427, n. 1).

6. On Ricoeur’s ‘hermeneutical arc,’ see: 35, n. 6

7. See E. D., Hirsch, Jr., *The Aims of Interpretation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976): 89 ff.

contrasts the "romantic conception of hermeneutics in which interpretation aimed at recovering the intention of the author behind the text" with focusing on "the sort of world which the work opens up *in front of* the text."⁸ As Hans-Georg Gadamer wrote in *Truth and Method* (1960): "Neither is the mind of the interpreter in control of what words of tradition reach him [*sic.*], nor can one suitably describe what happens here [in the process of understanding a text] as the progressive knowledge of what exists, so that an infinite intellect would contain everything that could ever speak out of the whole tradition."⁹ Not only is reading not reducible to the determination of the author's intention that a reader can establish through reading of the text, but also, Gadamer points out,

[...] always, the meaning of a text goes beyond its author. That is why understanding is not merely a reproductive, but always a productive attitude as well. Perhaps it is not correct to refer to this productive element in understanding as "superior understanding" [...]. Understanding is not, in fact, superior understanding, neither in the sense of superior knowledge of the subject because of clearer ideas, nor in the sense of fundamental superiority that the conscious has over the unconscious nature of creation. It is enough to say that we understand in a different way, if we understand at all [*Es genügt zu sagen, daß man anders versteht, wenn man überhaupt versteht*].¹⁰ (emphasis added)

To be sure, one must be equally wary of the 'affective fallacy' that allows the text to say whatever the reader wishes that the text says. Gadamer insisted that the "strangeness" of the text holds the interpreter accountable to it.

If we examine [...] more closely [...] we find that *meanings cannot be understood in an arbitrary way*. Just as we cannot continually misunderstand the use of a word without its affecting the meaning of the whole, so *we cannot hold blindly to our own fore-meaning of the thing if we would understand the meaning of another*. Of course, this does not mean that when we listen to someone or read a book we must forget all our fore-meanings concerning the content, and all our own ideas. *All that is asked is that we remain open to the meaning of the other person or of the text [...]* [It is the case that meanings represent a fluid variety of possibilities [...], but *it is still not the case that within this variety of what can be thought [...]* everything is possible, and if a person fails to hear what the other person is really saying, he (*sic.*) will not be able to place correctly what he has misunderstood within the range of his own various expectations of meaning.¹¹ (emphasis added)

8. Paul Ricoeur, "Biblical Hermeneutics" *Semeia* 4 (*Paul Ricoeur on Biblical Hermeneutics*), John Dominic Crossan, ed. (Missoula: University of Montana, 1975): 82.

9. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, Garret Barden und John Cumming, trans. (New York: Seabury Press/Continuum, 1975): 419.

10. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*: 264.

11. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*: 238.

Ricoeur takes a similar position expanding Monroe Beardsley's criteria for deciding if one has made a "good" reading of a text.¹² A good reading, according to Beardsley, involves "congruence and plenitude," i.e., coherent accountability to the text and insightful suggestiveness. Ricoeur adds that a "poor" reading of a text as one that is "narrow and far-fetched."¹³

Ricoeur speaks of the '*hermeneutical arc*' of understanding that stretches from the author's world over a text to the reader's world. With the metaphor of a '*hermeneutical arc*,' Ricoeur draws on the analogy of the living dialogue to claim that the reader's understanding, in fact, occurs as a consequence of the entire arc leading from the author's world to the reader's world (even if s/he is unaware of the arc).

Truly adequate understanding, though, has a responsibility incapable of exhaustive achievement because one must seek to understand the author *to the extent possible*, not merely duplicate her/his words. However, the need to seek understanding involves more than grasping the author's vocabulary and themes. Understanding recognizes that the author's intention in its totality is beyond the reach of the reader as are most of the motivations and possibilities of the author because they were not even clear to the author her-/himself at the time of writing. In addition, however, one must seek to understand the original world of the text as well as those linguistic and structural meanings immanent to the text. Equally, one must be sensitive to what has happened to the text in the interval between writing and reading which requires that the reader engage in a quest for awareness of her/his presuppositions or prejudices inherited as a consequence of the temporal gap between the author and the text's original world/audience and the reader's world. Finally, the reader must rigorously examine the influence of, and possibilities in, the new world of reference and application that the text now has in its new "present," the present 'now' of reading.¹⁴ Rather than 'simplifying' the task of interpretation by merely focusing on the author's words or intention, the recognition of the presence and demands of the elements of this '*hermeneutical arc*,' functioning whenever one is reading a text (or hearing an address, looking at a work of art, attempting to make sense of an event) *increases one's awareness of both the complexity of the event of meaning (not to speak of truth claims) as well as the responsibilities challenging the reader. In short, one must avoid the "intentional fallacy" as well as the "affective fallacy" that allows the text to say anything that the reader wants it to say.*

A proper reading of the text, then, is one that is accountable to the text, i.e., congruent, but also is generative of "imaginative variations," that is, evocative of a

12. See William K. Wimsatt, Jr., and Monroe C. Beardsley, *The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1954).

13. See Paul Ricoeur, "Metaphor and the Main Problem of Hermeneutics" in *New Literary History*, VI/1 (1974): 104.

14. Gadamer speaks of this process of understanding across the "hermeneutical arc" as a process of "fusion of horizons." See Gadamer, *Truth and Method*: 258, 271–274.

plenitude, informing the reader's possibilities for living in a space made possible by the acting and suffering of Others to whom a debt on our part is owed.

In *Time and Narrative*, Ricoeur formulated this hermeneutical arc in terms of what he calls 'three-fold mimesis' of the *pre-figured*, *con-figured*, and *re-figured*. The three moments describe the process of the production of meaning by the author's authorship by *con-figuring* for her-/himself the already *pre-figured* mediations of language inherited by the author. Nonetheless, understanding of the text is a creative activity on the part of reader, who *re-figures* that which was initially *con-figured* by the author. This *refiguration* consists of the reader's application of the text being read to her/his world of actualities and possibilities. Note, however, how the three mimetic moments are always and already linguistic (embedded in symbol systems), that is, they are concerned with mediated ("figured") experience and understanding. Furthermore, the author is no more in control of the meaning of her/his text than is the reader for there is no primary, un-mediated or non-figured experience or language to which either can appeal. An author encounters an already "pre-figured"¹⁵ world, which s/he then has "con-figured" by the writing of the work, which is completed only when a reader "re-figures" the text through application to her/his world.¹⁶

The three-fold mimesis of Ricoeur's hermeneutical arc can be viewed as a core element of 20th C hermeneutics in a *post-metaphysical world* that acknowledges that there is no direct access to external 'reality' (either subjective or objective) that absolutely grounds the 'truth.' If there is legitimacy to this dynamic of historical understanding, though, then it should not be surprising that the insight can be found pre-figured in earlier time periods. This is the case already with the acknowledgement that 'reality' is mediated only by appearances, which is the starting point of Immanuel Kant's epistemology. There is no direct access to things-in-themselves.

David Friedrich Strauß' groundbreaking *Life of Jesus Critically Examined* of 1835 is also an example of the 'hermeneutical arc' when it comes to its central theme of 'myth' in the gospels. Strauß' account of the generation of the gospel myths by means of the 'genetic mythical principle' is a profound illustration of his own *configuration* of themes *pre-figured* in earlier writings (in the case of the gospels, the earlier First Testament documents).

However, the requirement of *re-figuration* by the reader as s/he attempts to apply the *con-figured* text of a prior author emphasizes the reader's existential investment in reading. A text is cherished to the extent that it opens up possibilities in the life-world of the reader. Given the metaphor interference as a consequence of the polyvalence of meaning, myth can mean not only 'non-factual' in the sense of non-historical but also merely 'story' in contrast to a 'rational' account of an event. When one adds the

15. See Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, Vol. 1, Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985): 53, 182.

16. See Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, Vol. 1: 53 and *Time and Narrative*, Vol. 2: 10, 20, 27, and 164, n. 20.

degree of the reader's self-interest, which wants the gospel stories to be literal accounts of events in the life and ministry of Jesus because it is the lynch pin of one's personal salvation, one can readily recognize why such a reader reacted so powerfully (and violently) to Strauß' labeling the gospels 'myths.' Populist conservatives are blinded by 'metaphor interference' that takes myth to mean 'mere story' rather than literal facts. Their *re-figuration* of the text is concerned with their personal, eternal self-interest. Strauß' usage of the term 'myth' clearly indicated, for them, that Strauß was denying the 'truth' of Christianity.

It is no surprise that the focus of that rage was directed into an *ad hominem* attack on its author, whom conservatives concluded must have been 'deranged' or 'morally pernicious' to aim to destroy 'the faith' of Christianity. This is what happened with Strauß, and its destructiveness is manifest in the political revolution that Strauß' work sparked in Zurich, Switzerland, in 1839.¹⁷ The populist Christians of the Canton of Zurich revolted against the Canton government as a consequence of its reform efforts in education, generally, with the straw that broke the camel's back for the populist Christians being the Liberal government's appointment in January of 1839 of the 'anti-Christ,' Strauß, to the crucial chair for Biblical Theology, Church History, and Dogmatics at the new University of Zurich established in 1833 by the 'radical liberal' government. This government had come to power in the first elections under the first democratic constitution of the Canton held in 1831.

The populists were not alone in drawing the conclusion that reading the gospels is a question of 'fact' or 'fiction.' In fact, it is not Strauß who stresses this simplistic alternative between 'fact' and 'fiction' but, rather, the 'liberal' Friedrich Schleiermacher took the core issue of gospel studies to hinge on whether the narratives of the 'Second' Testament are 'history' or 'myth' with the latter term meaning the denial of their historical status.¹⁸ Even Strauß' beloved professor from the Gymnasium in Maulbronn

17. See the "Historical Reader" of materials related to the 1839 Zurich revolution in Vol. I Part II!

18. See the opening sentence to § 152 "Relation of the Critical and Speculative Theology to the Church" in Strauß, *LJ*: 781. Strauß quotes from Schleiermacher's lectures on the life of Jesus in *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*, Leander E. Keck, trans. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977): 97: "[...] our judgment concerning miracles must be such that through it the credibility of the Gospels is not injured; for otherwise our faith in the person of Christ would be ruined, and he would become for us a *mythical* person!" [Keck's text emphasized 'mythical']. Edgar Quinet in his Quinet "Review of Strauss's 'Life of Jesus' in *Voices of the Church, in reply to Dr. D.F. Strauss, Author of "Das Leben Jesu," comprising Essays in Defence [sic.] of Christianity, by Divines of Various Communions*, J.R. Beard, ed. (London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Co., 1845): 59, quotes Schleiermacher's letter to his student, Gottfried Christian Friedrich Lücke, wherein Schleiermacher asks: "[...] how much longer will this idea [the idea itself of 'creation' not the 'seven days' of the Genesis account] prevail against the strength of theories, founded on scientific combinations [...]? And our gospel miracles [...] – how long will it be before they again fall in their turn, through better-founded and more honourable reasons than those of the French Encyclopedists? For they will be reduced to this dilemma – either the entire history to which they belong, is a fable in which it is impossible to discern truth from fiction; and in this case Christianity no longer appears to proceed from God, but from nothingness itself, or on the other hand, if these miracles be real facts, we must agree, that, since they have been naturally produced, they must still have analogies in

and the Tübingen Protestant Seminary (the 'Stift') in Tübingen, the 'liberal' Ferdinand Christian Baur, who initially charged Strauß with shattering the history of the gospels, according to his son-in-law Eduard Zeller,¹⁹ defined myth as the substitution of 'images' for ideas²⁰ without grasping the 'Mythic School's' husk/kernel structure to myth that can have a historical event, an idea, or a symbol at its core. Zeller presents Baur's criticism of Strauß under the rubric of 'destructive criticism' with 'insufficient constructive criticism' 'especially when it came to the importance of the 'person of Jesus.' I point out in Part I, Chapter 3 "Academic Controversy and Reaction to Strauß' *Life of Jesus* of 1835, though, that Baur's charge that Strauß destroyed the historical foundation of Christianity is not because of Strauß' emphasis upon the mythic character of the gospels. Rather, for Baur, the historical foundation of Christianity is the Christian community itself, which Paul called the 'body of Christ' (for example, I Corinthians 12:12 ff.: Ephesians 2:15–16 [to create a New Humanity], 3:3–6 [pagans included in the new body], 4:9–16, and 5:30; and Colossians 1:15–18; and which is precisely the key to the Eucharist for Paul in I Corinthians 10:16–17). Baur invoked the 'body of Christ' metaphor to mean that the Christian community was the historical incarnation of the God/Man.²¹ The history of the God/Man is not limited, in Baur's reading, to the issue of an objective conviction that the God/Man was exclusively limited to the individual, Jesus of Nazareth.

By *re-figuring* in new understanding of inherited narratives as well as the *con-figuring* of new insights and narratives, the reader demonstrates her/his ability to 'see things that aren't there' (possibilities) in the phenomena that, in turn, drive the individual's own (intentional) transformation of her/his world. This process is the very condition that makes it possible and necessary for us to assume personal accountability for our reading. Not only does understanding and creative agency require the 'hermeneutical arc,' but it is the origin of the two forms of 'meaning' in life: 1) the 'making sense' of phenomena and 2) the 'sense of life being worthwhile.'

Each of us 'makes sense' of our experience, and each of us, regardless of limitations, is capable of creating things (e.g., write texts) that nature on its own could

nature, and then the very idea of a miracle will be destroyed. What, then, my dear friend, will be the result? [...] Will history be divided into two parts, – on the one side, Christianity leagued with barbarism on the other, science hand-in-hand with impiety?" (emphasis added).

19. Eduard Zeller reports this from a letter of Baur's of February 10, 1836, in "Ferdinand Christian Baur" in *Vorträgen und Abhandlungen geschichtlichen Inhalts* (Leipzig: Fues's Verlag [R. Reisland], 1875): 464.

20. See F.C. Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung* (1838), Vol. I (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2004): 143.

21. See Baur, "Die Hegel'sche Religions-Philosophie" in F.C. Baur, *Gnosis*: 721, See as well, *ibid.*, 685, 696, 706, n. 30 (actually 709–710), and 734–735. Identification of the 'Church' with the 'body of Christ,' was taken by Ignatius of Antioch to be achieved through partaking of the Eucharist. The ritual for him was a literal consumption of Christ's flesh and blood that one's own flesh and blood be transformed into Christ's so that one be united with Christ in Spirit.

never accomplish. Nonetheless, only when the individual's *awareness* of the effort and rigor with which s/he has exercised her/his creative agency is combined with her/his intentional commit to the universal lawfulness of theoretical and practical reason, *is it possible for her/him to know whether s/he is worthy of the trust s/he owes, to, and asks of, her/his 'readers.'*²² This worthiness of trust, not the claim to possess absolute truth, is more important than any applause or remuneration, and, because of it, the individual is driven to apply the highest standards upon her-/himself as criteria for adjudicating her/his creative efforts.

The 'hermeneutical arc' of three-fold mimesis is, unquestionably, methodologically valuable for illuminating Strauß' relationship to his sources and the production of his own texts. Nonetheless, it has serious limitations when it comes to 'blind pluralism' and a 'blind' eye to the problem of systematic distortion given the limits to human reason. These limitations are at the core of anti-metaphysics addressed in section "A Call for a Re-engagement of 'Metaphysics'" in the "Introduction" to Volume II. as well as in the "Conclusion: John Dewey and the Enduring Need to De-mythologize." Given the profound limits to objective truth claims, the emphasis on particularities to the eclipse of universalities has led to an un-reflective embrace of all difference at the expense of 'necessary/required' identity. By acknowledging only 'differences', one fails to grasp the significance of universal, human capacities that are the condition for the differences in and among human beings. Differences (particular identities) are the consequence of the 'articulation' of those universal capacities as a result of the differences in objective contexts. In addition, the profound limits to objective truth claims has led to the surrendering of any genuine strategy for confronting systematic distortion in understanding other than to depend upon the capricious recognition of anomalies in perception. With only an alternative between Idealism and Empiricism,

22. If Kant's use of the 'lie' along with 'be consistent with humanity as an end in itself,' 'develop one's talents,' and 'respond to the suffering of others' as examples of the categorical imperative (see for example, *Groundwork*: AA IV: 429–430) is not sufficient to remind the author of her/his accountability to her-/himself as well as her/his reader, Paul Ricoeur emphasizes the significance of *trust* in the other when he writes: "I expect that each will *mean what he [sic.] says*. This confidence establishes public discourse on a basis of trust where the other appears as a third party and not just as a 'you'. In truth, this fiduciary base is more than an interpersonal relation, it is the institutional condition for every interpersonal relation." Paul Ricoeur, *The Just*, David Pellauer, trans. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000): 6. Ricoeur stressed this obligation of verisimilitude even more forcefully as a 'debt owed' not just to one's readers but also to the past: "[...] [D]oes not the difficult law of creation, which is 'to render' in the most perfect way the vision of the world that animates the narrative voice, simulate, to the point of being indistinguishable from it, history's debt to the people of the past, to the dead?" Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*. Vol. 3, Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer trans. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988): 192. Without the 'Copernican Turn' to the necessary (1) *a priori conditions of possibility* of experience, understanding, and agency, there are no criteria for discerning between a 'mis-informed,' an intention distortion, and a 'trustworthy' reading. Absent a 'passion' for imperceptible, universal lawfulness there are only relative, social constructions that can only engage in criticism but have no authority of critique.

there was no 'ear' for Kant's 'middle way' of Critical Idealism whose 'ground' is not 'objective content' (neither as ideas or 'things,' content or form, in terms of substance or cause; nor even general, concealed possibilities) but *a priori* conditions of possibility and universal capacities of finite, transcendental consciousness that are 'required' for there to be any experience of 'content' and 'representations' in the first place. Ricoeur's 'hermeneutical arc' and Gadamer's 'fusion of horizons' are no exception as is also the case with Deconstruction's attack on philosophies of 'presence.' In a word, they are all trapped in 'traces' with no investigation of the universal conditions that are required for there to be *an experience of a 'trace.'*

Critical Idealism emphasizes finite, transcendental consciousness' responsible agency, grounded in the absolute worth of each individual as a unique location of creative openness in nature's 'blind' determinism, regardless of 'skill sets' and 'skills.' I document in Volume II the trajectory across his career of Strauß' metaphysical 'crisis.' However, he overlooked Critical Idealism's 'middle way,' which stands in dramatic contrast to what Strauß came to view as the meaninglessness 'indifference' that constitutes the particularities of history for Hegelian Idealism and in dramatic contrast to the Empiricism that Strauß embraced at the end of his life.

Strauß from the Perspective of Subsequent Gospel Criticism

It is particularly beneficial to examine the response (more accurately, the lack of response) on the part of gospel criticism to Strauß' work because it aids in understanding why he was so hated by conservatives and reduced to the mere status of a martyr by liberals.

The reaction of conservative Christians to Strauß' work comes as no surprise, of course. The "Historical Reader" on the 1839 revolution in Zurich, Switzerland, in this volume documents their reaction, and I leave it to the reader to decide its accuracy and value other than to point out that the "Historical Reader" documents what can happen when one acts in the belief that one (or one's mentors) has understood one's 'opponent' without having read her/him.

Already with Strauß' Hegelian understanding of myth as 'husk'/'kernel' in the *LJ*, even 'liberal' scholars recoiled in the face of the 'aridity' and 'abstractions' of Strauß' work. Liberal Christian gospel criticism of the day (the Rationalists) believed it could find sufficient evidence of history to justify identification of a 'historical' Jesus capable of grounding Christian faith without having to invoke Hegel's mystery of the 'Double Negation' on the part of Absolute Spirit. Hegel's meta-narrative has Absolute Spirit 'emptying itself' (Kenosis of '*emanation*') by a First Negation of its Absolute Oneness by means of a process that begins with an 'indivisible two' that initiates a logical process of division that results in the material world and the establishment of the

conditions for emergence of consciousness. With the 'logically necessary' finite consciousness eventually came the 'logically necessary' understanding that only in finite consciousness can Absolute Spirit/Oneness 'return' to Itself by a Second Negation of all multiplicity to think One-ness (a Gnostic return '*influx*'). This 'Second Negation' Hegel referred to as the 'absolute point of indifference'²³ consists of the 'formal Idea of identity' between the ideal (*Ideellen*) and the actual (*Reellen*)²⁴ at which the difference that arose out of indifference is nullified.²⁵ This nullification 'destroys' (*vernichtet*) the actual (*das Reelle*)²⁶ in which consciousness of individual autonomy (*Selbstständigkeit*) is a 'dream.'²⁷ This 'point of indifference' is 'positive' in two respects: because it confirms the establishment of specificity (*Bestimmtheit*) both subjectively by God and objectively with the creation of particularity, but the 'point of indifference' is, ultimately, 'purely negative' in that the multiplicity of particularity 'returns' to indifferent unity.²⁸ This 'point of indifference' for individual consciousness, then, is 'death,' which is beneficial in two respects: it liberates the individual from nature's 'necessity' (pain and suffering) and constitutes the individual's Absolute Freedom from sensuousness.²⁹ "Oh, death, where is thy sting?" Although Strauß was an enthusiastic defender of this Hegelian Christology in the *LJ*, by 1838 and "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity" he abandoned his use of the Hegelian meta-narrative for understanding religion.

Religion in "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity" is manifest in the 'religious genius'³⁰ no longer defined by Hegelian 'Absolute Reason' of Double Negation, but as contemplation (*θεωρία*, *theoria*).

[...] neither the statesman nor the ruler of the field, neither the philosopher nor the poet, neither the painter nor the musician, neither the inventor of the plow nor of the printing press, [have] rendered so essential a service to mankind as those who have turned the gaze of people upward and taught them to feel, to recognize, and to revere ever more deeply and ever more correctly the power, wisdom, and love which rules over all existence. Neither by his [*sic.*] ear, which is open to harmony, nor by his eye, which is receptive to beauty, neither by the sociability which founds states, nor by the ability to produce and assimilate

23. Hegel employed both meanings of the term 'indifference:' 'non-difference' (or unity) and 'affectless' (or meaningless). See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: (unity) 456, 501, (affectless) 496–497, 499–500.

24. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 456.

25. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 501.

26. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 487–488.

27. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 496–497.

28. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 479.

29. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 479.

30. Strauß defines the 'religious genius' as one in possession of the "harmony of mental powers," "[...] which, each for itself strong and active, in the most lively interplay never disturbs the other or thwarts its effectiveness, but unsearched, without anxious choice or laborious struggle, unite in the accomplishment of that which is each time appropriate." Strauß. "Vergängliches und Bleibendes im Christenthum" (1838): 102–103.

thoughtful entities, neither by agriculture nor by book printing, is man human, but by that of which all these different faculties are only as many emanations: by reason. The philosopher is formed by [... reason] [...] not insofar as it is trained to one-sided theoretical virtuosity,³¹ but insofar as it [reason] is the drive and the faculty of the finite subject to relate itself and everything given to a higher and highest, to make this relationship as intimate and lively as possible, and out of it to determine harmoniously all its feeling, thinking, and willing.³²

Nonetheless, although Strauß leaves the Hegelian circle, his analytical criticism of the gospels remains valid independent of his Hegelian dogmatic conclusions in the *LJ* Strauß and his subsequent distancing himself from Hegel's meta-narrative as of "On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity."

It is important to note that Strauß examined the pericopes of the gospels as isolated elements. He did not engage the pericopes as sets of material employed by the evangelist to make a theological point. For example, Strauß compares and contrasts the 'miracle of the loaves and fishes' in Matthew 14:13 ff., 15:32 ff.; Mark 6:30 ff., 8:1 ff.; Luke 9:10 ff.; and John :1 ff., paying attention to the double accounts in Matthew and Mark (see "§ 102. The Miraculous Multiplication of the Loaves and Fishes,"³³). However, he doesn't examine the duplicate accounts in Matthew and Mark as a composition of their respective evangelists that serve a particular, theological purpose for the early Church's relationship to non-Jews.

For example, one can view the first account of the miraculous feeding of the 5,000 with its 12 baskets as a reference to 'feeding' the 12 tribes of Israel and the second account of the miraculous feeding of the 4,000 with its 7 baskets referring to 'feeding' the 7 'Greek churches' at the time of the author of Mark. When one does so, a theological agenda on the part of the evangelist who, between the two accounts, presents Jesus saying that "Nothing that goes into a man from outside can make him unclean; it is the things that come out of a man that make him unclean," followed with Mark's account of Jesus traveling through the 'Gentile/Greek' Decapolis region on a route geographically impossible, and concluding with the second feeding as anchoring in the ministry and teaching of Jesus the rejection of the Jewish food laws for Gentile Christians.³⁴

Although Perrin's 'literary' criticism of the gospels in the 20th C emphasized the arrangement of pericopes as indicative of the redaction of the pre-figured 'texts' (oral and written) on the part of the author's agenda *as a theologian*, not historian, the so-called 'advance' in gospel criticism by 'historical science' that resulted in form,

31. A clear rejection of Hegelianism!

32. Strauß, "Vergängliches und Bleibendes:" 107–108.

33. Strauß, *LJ*: 507–519).

34. I encountered this reading of Mark's stories while a grad student at The Chicago Theological Seminary, but I can no longer find from whom it comes.

redaction, literary, and sociological criticism leaves us no closer to a 'historical' Jesus³⁵ than the ambiguities of the multitudinous, internally inconsistent claims that Strauß already clearly had identified in the text.

In other words, as Strauß had previously understood, whatever legitimacy there is to historical criticism, it is primarily 'negative,' not 'positive.' Historical evidence credibly allows judgments about what Jesus of Nazareth wasn't (a wealthy landlord, a member of the Priestly class, a Roman collaborator, etc.). However, just who Jesus of Nazareth was or taught will always remain ambiguous because we can't establish certainties on the basis of even so-called 'clear and distinct,' empirical evidence alone much less empirical evidence that has been translated across multiple linguistic frontiers and intentionally shaped by figurative language of texts, as in the case of the gospels.

Although there is sufficient evidence for the claim that Jesus of Nazareth existed, each of the gospels portrays a different Jesus according to its author's theological orientation.³⁶

35. Especially, 'literary' criticism took a turn to pseudo-linguistic theories (especially Ferdinand de Saussure) that distinguished between 'synchronic' and 'diachronic' readings which led to 'reader-response' criticism focused not on the 'origin' of the text but the reader's discovery of themes in the text that meet her/his theological and existential needs. See for example, Lamulani B Ngwenya's "Literary Critics Call Their Approach To Texts as 'Synchronic' Rather than 'Diachronic' with Examples Demonstrate How This Is True in Regard To Genre Criticism and Reader Response Criticism of the Bible?" https://www.academia.edu/101986532/LITERARY_CRITICS_CALL_THEIR_APPROACH_TO_TEXTS_AS_SYNCHRONIC_RATHER_THAN_DIACHRONIC_WITH_EXAMPLES_DEMONSTRATE_HOW_THIS_IS_TRUE_IN_REGARD_TO_GENRE_CRITICISM_AND_READER_RESPONSE_CRITICISM_OF_THE_BIBLE?sm=a (5 May 2024). The consequence is a 'you say,' 'I say' exegesis that fits well into the climate of unbridled pluralism (reading the text is a love fest of different perspectives), but it leaves off the screen the 'historical' nature of the text as itself the product of an author's theological shaping of *pre-figured* narrative material. On post-Perrin 'literary criticism' and an embracing of the love feast of pluralism, see Koog P. Hong, "Synchrony and Diachrony in Contemporary Biblical Interpretation" in *The Catholic Biblical Quarterly*, 75 (2013): 521–539. Merely substituting a 'liberal pluralism' for a 'conservative doctrinalism' doesn't justify reading the 'received' text in a vacuum. All it does is perpetuate the embracing of the 'affective fallacy,' which takes the text to mean what the reader wants it to mean. Strauß observed that already in the mid-17th C Reimarus three classes of people with inadequate reflection on their religious convictions: 1) The largest are those who don't, and don't want to, think, only believe. 2) Others are reflective about other aspects of their experience/understanding, but not when it comes to religion. To examine their religious convictions with the same rigor would lead to a disturbance of their 'peace of mind'. 3) Others begin to question and quickly encounter issues. They simply wish that the conclusion of the textual investigation will always, in the end, confirm the truth of with what they leaned in Sunday School (Catechism) – [either as conservative or liberal doctrine]. See Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 263. What is needed is a strategy, which avoids this 'third rail' of 20th C hermeneutics, that is, all forms (conservative or liberal) of 'systematic' distortions. See in the "Conclusion" the section "A Blind Spot in Dewey's Hermeneutics: The Unrecognized and Dangerous Third Rail:" 818 ff.

36. See Norman Perrin's *The New Testament: An Introduction – Proclamation and Parenthesis, Myth and History* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1974). One can read the gospel of Mark as an 'apocalyptic drama' that 'corrects' the disciples (particularly, Peter) with respect to the destruction of the temple inaugurating the New Age to view Christianity as the individual's being 'delivered up' to

Furthermore, when one attempts to establish who Jesus himself was, as portrayed in the gospels, he can be (and was) taken to be a political messiah, a Cynic, an Ebionite, a Docetic mirage adopted by God for a special, spiritual task, the second person of the Trinity as the two-fold Logos: 1) as the internal thought of God (Logos endiathetos/λόγος ἐνδιάθετος) and 2) as the external, spoken Word of God (Logos prophorikos/λόγος προφορικὸς) incarnated as the Christ, a Gnostic redeemer, etc.

Even were we to focus merely on the ‘teaching’ of Jesus, not the historical details of his activities, Strauß pointed out in *The Old and the New Faith* of 1872 that we are incapable of determining with any certainty what that teaching was.³⁷ First, everything that the gospels give us as Jesus’ teaching is in Greek. However, there is no ‘objective’ evidence what-so-ever that Jesus of Nazareth spoke Greek, and his audience of ‘common folk’ surely didn’t speak Greek, but Aramaic, just as he did. Consequently, the very language of the teaching establishes an inescapable limit to our certainty about what Jesus ‘actually taught.’ Anyone who has even limited experience of working across a ‘linguistic’ frontier between two or more languages, knows that translation is never ‘literal’ but an ‘interpretive construction.’

German theologians, following Martin Kähler and gospel scholars at the end of the 19th C, attempted to avoid the ‘problem of history’ in the gospels by making the simplistic distinction between ‘fact’ and ‘meaning.’ They accused attempts to ground the Christian gospel in elusive ‘facts’ as ‘dogmatic speculations’ and substitutions of ‘philosophy’ for the ‘clear,’ coherent ‘meaning’ of salvation inescapable in the text (encouraged, of course, by Paul’s dismissal of all philosophy of this world in I Corinthians 2:18–21). Absent F.C. Baur’s work on ‘vertical’ Gnosticism and Hegel’s ‘horizontal’ meta-narrative ‘Gnosticism’ of Absolute Spirit, one would miss entirely the *pre-figured* discussion that stands behind, for example, Martin Kähler’s equating of ‘Byzantine theology’ and ‘modern philosophical speculations.’³⁸ What one encounters in the gospels, according to Kähler, is not factual history but a call to ‘faith’ in the Christ as

martyrdom as their Lord; the gospel of Matthew as a ‘new revelation of divine law’ (in the sense of Jeremiah’s prophecy 31:33 that the external law is to be written on the heart); the gospel of Luke and Acts of the Apostles as a ‘salvation history’ that shifts its center from Jerusalem to Rome to convert ‘the world;’ and the gospel of John and the letters associated with it as the teaching of a ‘school’ of ‘Greek Christians’ based on the Stoic teaching of the Logos. All of these readings consists of theological framing of a story about Jesus of Nazareth. The respective gospels are not concerned with historical facts but with theological meaning.

37. Strauß writes in 1872 that we know too little about the teaching of Jesus of Nazareth to say with certainty what it was. See: 93, n. 44.

38. See Martin Kähler, *The So-called Historical* [historische, factual] *Jesus and the Historic* [geschichtliche], *Biblical Christ* [of meaning], Carl E. Braaten trans. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970): 43: “[...] the historical Jesus of modern authors conceals from us the living Christ [italics from Braaten]. The Jesus of the ‘Life-of-Jesus movement’ is merely a modern example of human creativity, and not an iota better than the notorious dogmatic Christ of Byzantine Christology. One is as far removed from the real Christ as is the other. In this respect historicism is just as arbitrary, just as humanly arrogant, just as impertinent and ‘faithlessly gnostic’ as that dogmatism which in its day was also considered modern.”

the savior of humanity. In short, this theological strategy over against Schleiermacher and Hegel was to place one's head in the sand of 'faith,' which is the epitome of irony in light of the meaning of Strauß' name in German, Ostrich. The consequence is a startling, classic example of a vicious hermeneutical circle out of which it is impossible to escape as long as one holds onto its assumptions.

Without 'historical criticism' of the gospels, not to mention the transcendental critique of Kant's Critical Idealism, the focus on 'meaning' rather than 'facts' is trapped not only in the capriciousness of its dogmatic slumbers but in its own, inescapable anthropomorphic projections and rapturous dogmatism. The defense of one's meaning is simply: "the bible tells me so."

Martin Kähler, Karl Barth (faith 'beyond' history), Rudolf Bultmann (faith 'over' nature), and 'Word event' theologians for whom the 'Word' alone contained the challenge and call of 'faith (Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst Fuchs) performed an end-run maneuver around the theological issues raised by Spinoza's and Böhme's *objective Immanentism* that sought to replace 'Personal Theism.' In other words, Kähler et al. silently passed over Schleiermacher's *subjective* mysticism as well as Hegel's (and the early Strauß') *objective* meta-narrative, which were meant to provide an alternative to Personal Theism. Kähler et al.'s theological strategy was simply a claim to have drained the swamp without any concern for the crucial theological conundrums that the 'feeling of absolute dependence' and Immanent Indifferentism had attempted to 'solve.'

With Martin Kähler, gospel theology took a remarkable turn away from history, and this turn has shaped Traditional Christian Theology since. Historical facts alone cannot ground theological meaning. However, Kant had distinguished among 'field' (*Feld*), 'territory' (*territorium*), and 'domain' (*ditio*) in the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* (1790). A 'field' consists of clarity and distinctness of perception without any hope of causal explanation (e.g., nocturnal dreams).³⁹ A 'territory' consists of clarity and distinctness of perception where one has not yet grasped the causal explanation appropriate for the perception. A 'domain' consists of both clarity and distinctness of perception as well as causal explanation based upon the grasp of imperceptible 'lawfulness' governing the causal system. Facts are the domain of the natural sciences to the extent that the empirical data can be 'seen' to conform to imperceptible 'lawfulness.' 'Meaning' alone that ignores causal explanation for the sake of 'redeeming faith' is

39. Kant explicitly discusses nocturnal dreams in this manner. The events in the dream are not governed by physical causality (*Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 995 [Olms ed.: 163]) because they have no direct connection to the waking state (*ibid.*, AA XXV,2: 996 [Olms ed.: 164]). In contrast, agency in the waking state requires the conscious determination of aims in a coherent world. (*ibid.*, AA XXV,2: 996 [Olms ed.: 164]). "When someone says that s/he didn't dream, it is because the sequence of her/his representations are so intertwined that they have no [causal or teleological] coherence" (*ibid.*, AA XXV,2: 1003–1004 [Olms ed.: 173]). As with Rousseau's *Emil*, Kant proposes that the purpose of dreams is "[...] to recognize what capacities [*Keime*] lie in human nature in order to distinguish them from what man has become accustomed to through art (*ibid.*, AA XXV,2: 1005 [Olms ed., 175]).

not even a territory but is merely a field of dreams. Kähler and those who insist that religion singularly addresses 'life meaning' in the sense of 'what makes life subjectively worthwhile' to the neglect of the 'lawfulness of causal systems' are trapped in fanciful dreams.

To be sure, the follies on the part of the Rationalists demonstrated that in a one-on-one between scientific materialism and religion based on scriptures, religion has no defense for its miraculous claims. However, rather than engage the issues at issue of 'history' and 'nature' that were starkly formulated in Strauß' *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History* and *The Old and the New Faith* and, foremost by Critical Idealism, authors such as Kähler, Barth, Bultmann, Ebeling, and Fuchs elevated 'faith' above history in a manner that, ironically, echoed Hegel. Kähler's response to Strauß' *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History* completely ignored the theological issue raised by Schleiermacher's Christology that views the Christ event as a new, absolute, eminent causality. Rather, Kähler, unawares (?), embraced 'historical indifference' because 'facts don't matter' in a strategy analogous to Hegel's Christology that views the Christ event as having occurred with the experienced resurrection as *an event of faith beyond history*.⁴⁰ However, Kähler's 'historical indifference' wanted nothing to do with Hegel's meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit. Kähler focused on subjective, redeeming 'faith' as the exclusive significance of the gospels *rather than* seek a direct, 'historical' foundation for the Christian *kerygma* (Proclamation of the 'Good News' as the forgiveness of sins and resurrection) rather than a final cause that is the Second Negation of Absolute Spirit's narrative logic of Double Negation (Hegel), and rather than, even less, Schleiermacher's new, eminent causality in history of perfect God-consciousness.

Kähler's vicious hermeneutical circle is the result of making lemonade out of lemons. If there is not enough history in the gospels to prove one's faith, nothing in the text can prevent one from dogmatic commitment to one's faith given that it can neither be proved nor disproved by the text. The fly in the ointment, though, is what, then, guarantees the 'truth' of one's faith? Furthermore, Kähler's problem is complicated when the pseudo-facts in the gospels are patently false. One is left

40. For Hegel's Christology, see Strauß, "Hegel's Ansicht über den historischen Werth der evangelischen Geschichte" in *Streitschriften* III: 76–94, especially 80–86, 92–94.

Kähler writes in his *The So-called Historical Jesus and the Historic Biblical Christ*: 74–75: "If historical research is meant to 'lay the foundation' – the one and only foundation [footnote to I Cor. 3: 10–11] – it will soon become clear that such a foundation [in historical facts] will provide no real support [for faith]. For historical facts which first have to be established by science cannot *as such* become experiences of faith. Therefore, Christian faith and a history of Jesus repel each other like oil and water [...]"

[...] [W]hen it finally comes to making a distinction [between history and faith], it will be clear to the Christian that 'we do not believe in Christ for the sake of the Bible but in the Bible for the sake of Christ [...]' [W]e put our trust in the Bible as the Word of our God for the sake of its Christ."

The vicious hermeneutical circle of 'faith's' confirmation of itself can't be more trenchantly formulated.

with 'empty faith' floating in some fantasy land, and, when it comes to the false pseudo-facts, one leaves them to 'blind perception' without reflection.

Whereas Kähler focused on faith over against 'historical facts,' Bultmann viewed the theological issue to be 'faith over against materialism.' Especially Bultmann viewed the gospels *not 'historically' but 'theologically':*

One is able to say, that at some point it had to come to a connected representation of the life of Jesus on the basis of the available tradition from individual pieces and small collections [...] and that one apprehended the tradition, in whose center stood a historical person, in the form of a connected, historical, biographical story. This does not suffice, however, as an explanation of the uniqueness of the synoptic gospels. Of course, their deficiency in terms of an actual biography and their gaps in the life story of Jesus are already explained due to the fact that their representation had to be created on the basis of the available tradition. However, their distinctive (and by Mark created) character permits itself to be understood only out of the character of the Christian kerygma, to whose supplementation and demonstration the gospel had to serve [...] *The Christ, who is proclaimed, is not the historical Jesus, but the Christ of faith* and of the cult. In the foreground of the Christian proclamation, therefore, stand the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ as the redemptive facts, which in faith are confessed and in baptism and communion are operative for the believer. The Christ-kerygma is Cult-legend as well, and the gospels are expanded Cultlegends [...] This all means: that in the Cult-kerygma is the one who speaks, that in it from him is spoken, who as God's Son on earth lived, suffered, died, rose, and was elevated to heavenly power. In addition, of course, the weight had to fall on the end of the representation, on the passion and resurrection. Mark created this kind of gospel. The Christmyth gives his book, the book of the secret epiphany, of course, no biographical but an established unity in the myth of the kerygma.⁴¹ (emphasis added).

As is well-known, Bultmann employed Martin Heidegger's philosophy to formulate the meaning of the *kerygma* for modern humanity:

Above all *Heidegger's existentialist analysis* of the ontological structure of being *would seem to be no more than a secularized, philosophical version of the 'Second' Testament view of human life.* For him the chief characteristic of man's Being in history is anxiety. Man exists in a permanent tension between the past and the future. At every moment he is confronted with an alternative. Either he must immerse himself in the concrete world of nature, and thus inevitably lose his individuality, or he must abandon all security and commit himself unreservedly to the future, and thus alone achieve his authentic Being. Is that not exactly the 'Second' Testament understanding of human life? Some critics have objected that I am borrowing Heidegger's categories and forcing them upon the 'Second' Testament. I am afraid this only shows that they are blinding their eyes to the real problem, which is that the philosophers are saying the same thing as the New Testament and saying it quite independently.⁴² (emphasis added)

41. Rudolf Bultmann, *Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition*, 9. Auflage (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979): 395–397.

42. Rudolf Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology" in *Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate*, Hans Werner Bartsch ed., Reginald H. Fuller trans. (London: S.P.C.K., 1953): 24–25.

Yet, according to Bultmann, both theology and philosophy acknowledge humanity's 'fallen state.' However, only the gospels give an answer to humanity's 'fallen state' whereas philosophy, erroneously, only can claim, 'self-confidently,' that humanity can free itself from its 'fallen state' merely by its own efforts.⁴³

The question is not whether the nature of man can be discovered apart from the New Testament [...] No; the question is whether the 'nature' of man is realizable. Is it enough simply to show man what he ought to be? Can he achieve his authentic Being by a mere act of reflection? It is clear that philosophy, no less than theology, has always taken it for granted that man has to a greater or lesser degree erred and gone astray, or at least that he is always in danger of so doing [...] At the same time, however, these philosophers are convinced that all we need is to be told about the 'nature' of man in order to realize it [...] Is this self-confidence of the philosophers justified? Whatever the answer may be, it is at least clear that this is the point where they part company with the New Testament. For the latter affirms the total incapacity of man to release himself from his fallen state. That deliverance can come only by an act of God. The New Testament does not give us a doctrine of 'nature,' a doctrine of the authentic nature of man; it proclaims the event of redemption which was wrought in Christ. That is why the New Testament says that without this saving act of God our plight is desperate, an assertion which existentialism repudiates.⁴⁴ (emphasis added)

Faith generates faith in the *kerygma* without consideration of any subjectively psychological (Schleiermacher) or objectively historical (Hegel and the early Strauß), much less metaphysical, accounting for the 'origin' of 'faith' itself. Having focused on the 'arrogant' speck in the eye of 'historicism' and 'modern dogmatism,' Kähler et al., including Bultmann, failed to see the log in their own eye: It turns out that, for them, Christian theology is a 'love feast' of arrogant (!), anthropomorphic projection that firmly establishes humanity on the throne of God. 'God' is re-established, once again, as a 'Personal Deity' (anthropomorphic) who offers the salvation that humanity believes is 'best,' that is, the anthropomorphic God fulfils human self-interest with the gift of eternal salvation that alone liberates humanity from its 'fallen state.' Anthropomorphic projections are not in-and-of-themselves false.⁴⁵ Yet they are no solid foundation for constructing a system of Absolute Dogma or Absolute Knowledge, and they involve not only a limitless hubris on the part of humanity that its experience

43. This is clearly not Heidegger's conviction. Although he emphasized the 'anxiety' of 'authentic' decision that rejected the pressures of 'public they' to conform to its wishes, Heidegger points out that 'inauthenticity' always precedes authenticity. See Heidegger, *Being and Time*: 168 (German: 130): "Authentic Being-one's-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the 'they'; it is rather an existentiell modification of the 'they' – of the 'they' as an essential existentielle."

44. Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology:" 26–27.

45. See the discussion of anthropomorphism as not necessarily false in the "Preface:" 34, n. 4

provides the key for explaining the origin and the goal of the entire universe but also involve the high probability that humanity is only worshipping itself.⁴⁶

For D. Ernst Fuchs and Gerhard Ebeling, the Christ of faith and the historical Jesus are one and the same not because that can be determined historically in the text but because of theological consistency (logic). Christ himself is the originator of the biblical picture of the Christ. Fuchs writes:

The so-called Christ of faith is in fact no other than the historical Jesus. However, much more important is the statement that God himself wants [McG: anthropomorphic] to encounter us in the historical Jesus. The question of the historical Jesus converts itself now appropriately into the question concerning the reality of an encounter with God in preaching.⁴⁷

‘Preaching’ is equivalent to Heidegger’s ‘Word-event,’ which, for Fuchs requires embracing a ‘pre-understanding,’ which he fails to recognize as a vicious hermeneutical circle: “I am in agreement with Bultmann, that the exegete must have a relationship to the thing that he investigates as the content of the text. He [*sic.*] will have to bring with him a stirring ‘pre-understanding’ of faith because the text concerns itself with faith.”⁴⁸

In this I am also in agreement with Bultmann. I proceeded like him from the What and insisted immediately on the How so that the Pauline theology took on an especially important meaning, as it did for Bultmann, for the entire procedure. Beyond that, I asked explicitly about the existential place of thinking faith, that is, I asked where something like believing thinking occurred, will be, as an event. Therefore, I hit upon the event-character of language in my own manner, as the Word of love and thereby upon the linguistic character of human existence.⁴⁹

For there is, obviously, only one unique proper relationship to God: Jesus as the certitude of God. That is faith,⁵⁰ for that conforms to the will of God [McG: anthropomorphic], so that we not only have the right, but also the duty, to call God with the name of God; thereby showing our praise. We are then thinking in the manner that we exist. That is

46. For example, F.C. Baur points out in his *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung* that the notion of God’s justice can be and was taken to mean: 1) that God was concerned to provide a just strategy to ‘save’ humanity from sin or 2) that God was concerned to protect His (!) own honor by removing the blight of human sin. The first notion of God’s justice, of course, is Traditional Christian doctrine. For his discussion of the second notion of God’s justice, see Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 157, 170!, and 173. Romans 3:25–26 takes on a radically different meaning when read from the anthropomorphic assumptions of God’s justice is concerned with His own honor. See Baur, *ibid.*: 61, n. 1; 241, n. 1; and 545–546.

47. D. Ernst Fuchs, “Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus” in *Zur Frage nach dem historischen Jesus* (Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1965): 166.

48. Fuchs, “Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus.” 400.

49. Fuchs, “Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus.” 402.

50. Note: ‘faith’ here means ‘epistemic’ faith, a ‘certain knowledge’ that one can acquire only by ‘faith’ ‘in conformity with the will of God – ‘as soon as we no longer simply reconstruct but allow ourselves to be led by the text’.

the domain in which the 'Second' Testament interpretation is attained, i.e., as soon as we no longer simply reconstruct but allow ourselves to be led by the text. Here Jesus speaks, because God calls to faith through Jesus.⁵¹

Ebeling takes a similar position when it comes to the relationship between the historical Jesus and faith:

Christology is nothing other than the interpretive passing on of what came to language in Jesus. The historical Jesus would then be properly understood as nothing other than Jesus himself. And the propriety of belief in Jesus – and that is what Christology is all about – would then necessarily be that faith is such a relationship to Jesus, which is in conformity with the historical Jesus, because it then accords with what has come to language in Jesus.⁵²

The encounter with Jesus as the witness of faith is [...] without restriction an encounter with Himself as He was. For the concentration on what comes-to-language in faith — and only that — establishes the unity of 'person' and 'work,' but for that reason as well, the totality of the encounter.⁵³

The historical Jesus is the Jesus of faith. The Jesusunderstanding of faith must for that reason be made valid as the furthering of the historical understanding of Jesus. For faith itself is the realizing-of-the-goal which came to language in Jesus. Whoever believes, is in the presence of the historical Jesus.⁵⁴ (emphasis added).

The circularity of this attempt to escape into 'faith' in order to avoid the conundrums of 'history' (and material 'nature') is complete. For Kähler, faith is not 'history.' For Bultmann, faith is not 'nature.' For Fuchs and Ebeling, the 'Word event of faith' is the 'historical Jesus.' The only startling thing here, though, is the anthropomorphic blindness that drives this vicious hermeneutical circle.

North American gospel criticism, especially in the Westar Institute, emphasized history over against 'faith.' Nonetheless, only to the extent that one can employ the 'criterion of dissimilarity' (that is, material that could not have come either from Judaism or from the Early Church 'in all likelihood' comes from Jesus⁵⁵) can one attribute, *probably*, the parables to Jesus. This apparent 'uniqueness' of the parables, though, are

51. Fuchs, "Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus:" 404.

52. Gerhard Ebeling, "Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus und das Problem der Christologie" in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 56 Jahrgang (Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1959), Beiheft 1: 21.

53. Ebeling, "Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus:" 23.

54. Ebeling, "Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus:" 24.

55. Rudolf Bultmann suggested that we can deny the origin of the saying as the early Christian community, "[...] the less it is possible to perceive a relationship to the person of Jesus or to the fate and interest of the church, and on the other hand, the more it shows a characteristic, individual spirit." Bultmann, *Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition*: 135. The 'criterion of dissimilarity' is more clearly formulated by Ernst Käsemann. See "Das Problem des historischen Jesus" in *Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen*. Erster Band. 2. Auflage (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1960): 205: "We have to a certain extent security [*Einigermaßen sicheren Boden haben wir*] in one case namely when the tradition for whatever reason neither is traceable to Judaism nor can be attributed to the early Christian

no guarantee that they are from Jesus, and their figurative structure forbids any literal, singular conclusions with respect to their meaning. The parables are concerned with the 'Kingdom of God'⁵⁶ in the form of what Phillip Wheelwright calls a 'tensive' rather than a literal, 'steno'⁵⁷ symbol with the consequence that the meaning of the symbol is by no means fixed but open-ended.⁵⁸

In other words, even were we to wish to ground our judgments about Jesus of Nazareth in historical 'facts' of either or both his life and teaching, we run up against the wall of the limits to human reason. We don't have direct access to the 'facts,' especially when they are reports of the experience of others and any 'teaching' based upon figurative language eliminates univocal meaning. Conclusions about just who the 'historical' Jesus was and what he taught will always remain merely 'empty abstractions' driven by the (dogmatic and anthropomorphic) assumptions of the interpreter claiming to draw historical conclusions.

The theme of faith versus history dominated Strauß' corpus to the end of his career. As I present the dynamic of this theme in his work in Volume II, it is clear that, in the end, Strauß chose history over theology. His '*genetic mythical principle*' of the *LJ* functioned for him only within the framework of the search for the 'factual,' not as the indicator of the motor of creative, literary production on the part of the gospel writers.⁵⁹ His focus on 'history,' though, led to his seeing that the gospel texts do not provide sufficient material to draw more than an aggregate of fragmentary, factual conclusions. This aggregate was inadequate to ground Traditional Christian doctrine. Furthermore, the Hegelian meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit left over little more than a shadow of history, and *Schleiermacher's understanding of religion as the 'feeling of absolute dependence' not only reduced religion to feeling but also contradicted its own dependence upon reason's Principle of Sufficient Reason that is required to achieve perfect God-consciousness on the part of imperfect, human God-consciousness.* In light of the alternatives that Strauß acknowledged, the ground of all experience increasingly

community; especially then, when the Jewish-Christian community either mitigated or reversed the meaning of their received material because it was too audacious."

56. The 'Kingdom of God' is an ambiguous symbol as Norman Perrin emphasizes in *Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom: Symbol and Metaphor in New Testament Interpretation* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976). Perrin employs Philip Wheelwright's distinction between 'steno' and 'tensive' symbols in his investigation of this central symbol in the gospels. See *Ibid.*, 29–30.

57. See for example, Philip Wheelwright, *Metaphor and Reality* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press):16–17 where Wheelwright distinguishes between 'tensive aliveness' or fluidity and 'steno block' language.

58. This is the central thesis of my PhD Dissertation at the University of Chicago (1983): "On the Soteriological Significance of the Symbol of the Kingdom of God in the Language of the Historical Jesus" available at <https://criticalidealism.org/phd-dissertation-2/>.

59. As I pointed out above, Strauß examined the pericopes of the gospels as isolated elements. He did not engage the pericopes as sets of material employed by the evangelist to present a theological conviction on the part of the author and her/his community rather than a mere description of historical events.

was viewed by him as material history and religion became the ‘mystery’ of nature’s turning inward on itself to continue its ‘progress’ by means of finite spirit.

In other words, although the *genetic mythical principle* proved to be a prescient recognition of the evangelist as author that arises in 20th C gospel, literary criticism,⁶⁰ both Strauß and 20th C literary criticism overlooked the most earth shaking insight of the ‘evangelist as author.’ theology.⁶¹ The gospels do not ground faith. The reader brings her/his faith to the text/gospels. This is as true of the evangelist as author, who employed a set of theological convictions to determine the choice out of the pre-figured pericopes used to con-figure her/his gospel composition, as it is true of the reader who re-figures the gospel narrative in terms of her/his understanding today. *The text is a vehicle that transports the theological understanding of the reader.*

Only a dogmatist claims that the text creates faith in the sense of objective truth claims as *epistemic* faith (knowledge about objective things beyond rationally grounded experiential claims). In other words, dogmatism is in play even before one undertakes to demonstrate that the text proves or disproves ‘the’ objective content of faith. It is not the text that is decisive. Rather, theology is decisive for the understanding of the text. ‘Theology’⁶² (philosophy and metaphysic included) plays the decisive role in determining one’s faith. This unspoken consequence of Strauß’ and 20th C gospel literary criticism is what makes both uncomfortable if not threatening for many. The easiest path to take is to believe that simply by reading the text one can arrive at faith. *The notion that one is already underway with faith before one even begins to read the text threatens the authority of the text and the confidence of convictions based on the text.* The question that governed Strauß’ reflections over the remainder of his career was which theological understanding?

I will demonstrate in Volume II that there is a theological, middle way, for the most part silently unexamined in the background in Strauß’ work, between spiritualism and empiricism. That middle way is Critical Idealism’s theology of history that remains within the ‘limits of reason’ not to elevate humanity to the throne of God – that was accomplished by the earliest stirrings of humanity’s attempts to establish ultimate causes. Rather, Critical Idealism avoids literal, anthropomorphic projections onto ‘God’ by restricting itself to identifying the finite (!),⁶³ required elements (physical and

60. See, especially, Norman Perrin’s. “The Evangelist as Author:” 5–18.

61. Perrin’s conclusion of “The Evangelist as Author” coyly acknowledges “[...] that I have limited myself quite deliberately to the critical method involved in interpreting the text historically, and I am very well aware that this is only the beginning and not the end of the hermeneutical task.” (18) He doesn’t state explicitly that the method he proposes is anchored in the theology of the evangelist/reader, not read out of the text as objective truth.

62. Theology is placed in inverted commas because it is a metaphor, not a label for God as am excusive, divine Person, an eternal substance, a dipolar entity, a mystical Oneness, but a required, but assumed, Noumenon.

63. The qualification ‘finite’ distinguishes Critical Idealism from all attempts to define theology by means of an ultimately, infinite set of pseudo-‘required’ conditions and capacities. I know of no other

mental/spiritual) that make any and all experience, understanding, and responsible agency possible, in the first place. 'God' is a 'required' presupposition for Critical Idealism only to the extent that there is a fundamental 'givenness' to any and all experience, understanding, and responsible agency. Even when speaking of that fundamental 'givenness,' however, Critical Idealism reminds us that it is at best only figuratively anthropomorphic.⁶⁴

The strength of Critical Idealism is the term 'required.' The finite, 'required' elements spoken of here are not capricious, arbitrary, or merely relative. They are demanded by our experience itself. However, this is a command that leaves it up to the individual/community to decide whether or not it is going to embrace the imperceptible, required elements of experience to govern its understanding and enable its responsible agency. Nonetheless, we risk catastrophe when we choose to ignore the lawfulness of nature and/or the lawfulness of morality.

Critical Idealism's philosophical theology does not have its ground in the 'text' itself, but its 'grounding' is in the required conditions and capacities of transcendental consciousness that make it possible to experience a 'text' in the first place. Having failed to view the '*genetic mythical principle*' as the driving force of human creativity as a manifestation of Kant's autonomous, freedom-for intentional, creative novelty (and not merely freedom-from the determinism of nature), Strauß closed off from the beginning the pathway into the 'metaphysical' understanding that is *Critical Idealism's 'theology of history.'* *Here theology rises 'above' matter, although inseparable from history, with transcendental consciousness and its universal conditions of possibility allowing for a species that breaks the determinism of nature and is capable not only of understanding 'what is' but also of holding its agency accountable according to universal, categorical imperatives of 'what ought to be,' which constitute a set of imperatives that guides transcendental consciousness' cultivation of technical and personal skills that, themselves, are dependent upon relative, hypothetical imperatives of 'how to do' things.*⁶⁵

A valuable element in the understanding of Strauß is that Kant's paradigm revolution in theology was eclipsed by 'faith' in materialism's history because Strauß

theological project that insists on limiting its conclusions with respect to finite conditions of possibility and finite capacities other than Critical Idealism. All other 'theologies' involve a vicious, hermeneutical circle of anthropomorphic projections whether Animism, Polytheism, Henotheism, Monotheism, Pantheism, Panlogism, Immanentism, Gnosticism, the Personal Theism of Christian Platonism ('Intellectualism') and Aristotelianism, 'Occasionalism'/'Voluntarism,' Mysticism, Hegel's meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit, Schleiermacher's perfect God-consciousness, 20th C Process Theology of Dipolar Theism with its Pan-en-theism, etc.

64. See Kant, *Prolegomena* AA IV: 356, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 353, and the warnings against anthropomorphic projections onto God in *Religion* AA VI: 64*, 141–142, and 168–169.

65. On the difference between 'categorical' and 'hypothetical' imperatives in Kant, *Groundwork* IV: 414–421. On the difference between 'wide' and 'narrow' obligation, see Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 390–391 and: 791. See as well, the discussion of 'categorical' and 'hypothetical' imperatives in Chapter 7: 738 and a response to the charge that Kant turns all subjective wishes into categorical imperatives: 790, n. 265, as well as Chapter 8: "Strauß' Reading of Kant Over His Career:" 817, n. 32.

never broke out of the pre-figured Kantian narrative of those who influenced him. Understanding all that prohibited his breakout is among his important contributions to posterity.

Whereas Personal Theism fetishizes the ‘text’ as literal; Rationalists manipulate and distort the ‘text’ to make it compatible with the natural sciences; Hegel spiritualizes the ‘text’ by insisting that its ‘truth’ is not limited by the representations that are the ‘text;’ Schleiermacher subordinates the ‘text’ to a new event of ultimate, eminent causality of Christ’s perfect God-consciousness; and Kähler/Hartlich⁶⁶ claim that one can ignore the ‘text’ and cling to one’s faith, Strauß *laid the foundation* for seeing *the inescapable dependence of the text on ‘theology.’* The ‘husk’/‘kernel’ nature of myth eliminates the ‘scientific’ embarrassment of the text by emphasizing the ‘kernels’ of the gospel narratives, and the *genetic mythical principle* acknowledges the evangelist as author gathering, selecting, sorting, and structuring the text *guided by a presupposed theological understanding.*

Terminology Clarification as Segue into D.F. Strauß’ Work

Unfortunately, Strauß has too frequently been read anachronistically. His understanding of ‘myth,’ ‘science,’ ‘metaphysics,’ as well as ‘criticism’/‘critique’ were and continue to be shaped by the assumptions of their meaning by the reader without careful attention to Strauß’ own work. Of course, the assumption that an author in the past means (at least to a degree) with her/his terminology what we mean by that terminology ‘today’ is necessary for any and all understanding, but a danger of misunderstanding occurs with such an assumption, as well. Strauß’ vocabulary, especially, readily generates anachronistic readings by today’s reader so that it is no surprise that his contemporary readers succumbed to anachronistic understanding of him. Even Strauß’ own work, for example his reading of Immanuel Kant, demonstrates the dangers that lurk beneath the surface of the text when one simply takes the prevailing reading of the text’s metaphors from one’s peers.

66. See the discussion of Christian Hartlich’s ‘Kählerism’ below: 147.

What follows flags the frequent ‘metaphor interference’⁶⁷ of terminology that, especially with Strauß, hinders a serious engagement of him. By explicitly focusing

67. ‘Metaphor interference’ occurs precisely because of the virtue of language that it is not merely a system of ‘steno’ signs. Nonetheless, ‘tensive’ metaphors both facilitate and inhibit understanding.

At some point, everything ‘literal’ in language was metaphorical, or, one may say, literal language consists of ‘dead’ (or ‘dormant’) metaphors. For example, the ‘leg’ of a table or, in ‘British’ English, one speaks of the ‘bonnet’ or ‘boot’ but in ‘American’ English of the ‘hood’ or ‘trunk’ of a car, etc. Pointing out the different actual uses of a metaphor, though, is not merely an empirical observation about language. Rather, the metaphorical nature of consciousness itself illuminates the very limits of our capacity to understand anything.

Other than immediate self-consciousness, which itself is a conundrum (for example, is consciousness an enduring ‘substance’ or simply a ‘presupposed identity?’), there is nothing that we experience directly or ‘absolutely’. Consciousness is the remarkable capacity to ‘see’ ‘identities’ in ‘differences’ in the incessant ‘flow’ of phenomena. In other words, ‘given’ the flow of appearances (perhaps the ultimate conundrum), consciousness experiences a range of ‘clarity of perception’ (itself, incapable of perception because I can’t ‘see’ my or your ‘clarity of perception’) that always commences by re-cognizing (re-membering) from appearances earlier in the flow that, although ‘different’ from one another, some of the differences in appearances, at first, are taken to be ‘similar,’ but, then, over time (repetition of the appearances that are similar to one another) consciousness is able to *dis*-cover ‘identities’ among the similarities. For example, although one set of phenomena has ‘leaves’ (already, a metaphorical judgment) and this other set of phenomena has ‘needles,’ one can conclude that both sets are ‘trees’.

This example of leaf and needle phenomena leading to ‘tree-ness’ illustrates how metaphors build upon metaphors, which can lead to mis-judgment if the metaphors employed in the making of a subsequent judgment are incorrect. An example would be the case of ‘binary’ stars. Here, metaphor helps us to understand what was originally distinguished from other phenomena to be a ‘single set’ (binary stars) turns out with improved technology to be a multiplicity, not an identity. Binary stars are not really ‘binary’ but complex systems of stars (not to speak of the role of ‘dark matter’ in our being able to experience anything like a ‘star’). For millennia, consciousness could ‘see’ only such stars as consisting of ‘two’ stars rather than a ‘single’ star – if it saw anything more than a ‘single’ star. ‘Metaphor interference’ occurs when there is a flaw in the system of metaphors upon which a judgment is dependent. As with the case of ‘binary’ stars, such flaws can occur because the ‘technology’ (or skill) didn’t exist that allows perception the ‘multiplicity’ in this ‘sameness’. However, employment of metaphors is necessary for any and all understanding so that the choice when it comes to understanding whether one employs a ‘steno’ or ‘dead’/‘dormant’ metaphor that is taken to be a ‘fact’ (and possibly distort understanding) or a ‘tensive’ or ‘living’ metaphor that stimulates new understanding.

A ‘living’ metaphor employs misunderstanding, productively. It is that cognitive process that acknowledges an incorrect association (tables don’t have legs; two is not one) to stimulate new insights that can occur when one recognizes ‘difference’. The metaphor exploits the polyvalent nature of terms to enhance understanding by allowing us to substitute one meaning for another that only a ‘tensive’ (not a ‘dead’) metaphor is capable of expressing. Just as we can misunderstand when the substituted meaning is inappropriate, we can also increase our understanding of something new about the phenomena because of a set of ‘insightful’ associations contained in the metaphor itself. For example, ‘spring’ can mean a water source, a bodily movement, a metal coil, as well as a season of the year. We can enhance our understanding by combining ‘water source’ with ‘an annual season’ to evoke an understanding of ‘re-birth’ or ‘re-generation’. Alternatively, if one applies the metaphor ‘metal coil’ to a season of the year, one has to make more of a stretch to grasp any similarity between them.

An inappropriate understanding occurs when one takes a metaphor employed in the past to mean literally the same in any and all circumstances. For example, if one takes the metaphor ‘myth’ to mean ‘false’ or ‘unhistorical’ in contrast to ‘scientific fact,’ one can only ‘hear’ the judgment in Strauß’ claim that the Christian gospels are a set of ‘myths’ that the Christian gospels are false and contain no history.

on the ‘metaphor interference’ in Strauß’ work with respect to the meaning of ‘myth,’ Hegelian ‘metaphysics’ and ‘epistemology,’ ‘science,’ and ‘criticism,’ I believe one acquires a productive segue, as well, for entering his intellectual universe as well as for appreciating what he could have acquired from Kant.

History or Myth?: On the Role of Hegelianism in the *Life of Jesus*

David Friedrich Strauß is known almost exclusively for his work on the Christian gospels in which he declares them to be mythical. The anachronistic assumption is that his concern was to demonstrate the unhistorical nature of the gospel accounts in order to dismiss Christianity. This conclusion is incorrect on both counts, that is, it is incorrect with respect to his understanding of ‘myth’ as well as with respect to his understanding of the ‘truth’ of the Christian faith in 1835.

Strauß did employ Georg Lorenz Bauer’s definition of mythical narratives from Bauer’s *Hebräische Mythologie des alten und neuen Testaments* (1802), which points to the non-historical character of mythic narratives. Readers in the 19th C and today readily and anachronistically takes Strauß’ focus on ‘myth’ in the gospels to intend either to undermine the claim for historical elements in the text, whatsoever, or to serve the purpose of an exclusively historical agenda that seeks to bracket out the unhistorical, hence, untrue miraculous elements in the text. Strauß writes:

[...] following Gabler and Schelling, G.L. Bauer explains a myth] to be recognizable [...], first, when it proceeds from an age in which no written records existed, but in which facts were transmitted through the medium of oral tradition alone; secondly, when it presents an historical account of events which are either absolutely or relatively beyond the reach of experience, such as occurrences connected with the spiritual world, and incidents to which, from the nature of the circumstances, no one could have been witness; or thirdly, when it deals in the marvelous and is couched in symbolical language.⁶⁸

It takes additional effort and vigilance to ‘see’ that he meant by the metaphor ‘myth’ something very different than simply ‘false’ and ‘unhistorical’. The ‘dead’/‘dormant’ metaphor has to obtain new ‘life’.

I call ‘metaphor interference,’ then, any determination of the meaning of a term that substitutes incorrectly what is, otherwise to be sure, a ‘legitimate’ meaning of the metaphor that, nonetheless, blocks appropriate understanding of the metaphor from the perspective of a different context. As Paul Ricoeur points out in “Study 7” of *The Rule of Metaphor*: 247–248; see as well in “Study 6:” 196, 198–199 and in “Erzählung, Metapher und Interpretationstheorie” in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 84/2 (1987): 232–254, the ‘truth’ of the metaphor is not that it simply says ‘what is’ but that it is able to simultaneously say *both* ‘what is AND ‘what is not’.

In Kant’s language, ‘metaphor interference’ would be the assumption that one’s ‘re-producing judgment’ (*bestimmende Urteilskraft*) is absolute, which cuts the tap-root of creativity that is ‘reflecting judgment’ (*reflektierende Urteilskraft*) when, in fact, reflecting judgment precedes all re-producing judgment. See Kant, *The Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 179–180. On the capacities of reflecting and re-producing judgment, see the “Introduction:” 8686, n. 26.

68. Strauß, *LJ*: 52.

However, Strauß did not employ this definition of 'myth' in order to dismiss myth. Not only did he acknowledge that an historical event can be identified at the core of a mythic narrative, but his Hegelian epistemology enabled him to view mythic narratives as 'representations' of 'true' content. The seduction of myths, though, is that they invite their readers to take the 'representations' to be literally true rather than a call to the reader to look more deeply for the truth of their core content.

Horton Harris observes⁶⁹ that the most comprehensive account of the application of the notion of 'myth' to the bible at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th Centuries is Christian Hartlich and Walter Sachs *Der Ursprung des Mythosbegriffes in der modernen Bibelwissenschaft*.⁷⁰ Despite its serious limitation, unfortunately, this judgment remains valid. Following in the footsteps of most of Strauß' 19th C readers, Hartlich/Sachs claim that Strauß' understanding of myth aimed only to eliminate the unhistorical in the text.⁷¹

In fact, Strauß himself claims that the aim of his 'critical' reflections on the text was to defend traditional Christian doctrine on the basis of Hegelian 'science.' In the *LJ*, Strauß' 'critical' examination of the gospels is thoroughly Hegelian, and Strauß' ultimate aim⁷² is to restore doctrinally the Christian doctrine that is actually undermined when one reads mythic elements in the texts (e.g., the miracles, especially) as literally true accounts of historical events. its 'truth' depends upon the literal reading of the gospel narratives.

In section "1. The Independence of the Critical Position of the *Life of Jesus* from the Specific Assumptions of Hegelian Philosophy,"⁷³ Hartlich/Sachs, maintain that

69. See Horton Harris, "The Origin of Strauß' Mythical Interpretation" in *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973): 259, n. 2.

70. Christian Hartlich and Walter Sachs, *Der Ursprung des Mythosbegriffes in der modernen Bibelwissenschaft* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1952).

71. Karl Barth agrees. He writes of Strauß' *LJ*: "There is no historical core of Jesus' life and neither is claimed nor proven. Strauss has no interest in history. His work is purely critical. He is only interested in proving the existence and origin of myth [...]" Barth, *Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert*: 507. This is simply inaccurate. Barth along with Harris, Hartlich/Sachs, and Hobson all overlook that the heart of Strauß' 'mythic' reading of the text is Hegelian 'science'. To be sure, *this is not the 'science' of the hypothetico-deductive sciences but of Idealism for which the 'true' content is independent of perceptual representations. However, Hegelian science is convinced that 'content' and 'form' share the same 'truth'.* Strauß was defending 'truth' in the gospels, not merely demonstrating, 'critically,' the 'mythic' formation of the scriptures. Within three years of the *LJ*, Strauß had given up on the Hegelian meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit *precisely because of its inadequate appreciation of history*, as I demonstrate. As I said above in the "Introduction:" (73), Strauß' question is not with respect to critical 'myth' versus 'factual' history but, rather: What epistemology and metaphysics grounds the 'truths' of empirical history? In 1872, he had no alternative to 'materialism' because he had avoided a serious engagement of Kant across his career.

72. See David Friedrich Strauß, "I. Allgemeines Verhältniß der Hegel'schen Philosophie zur theologischen Kritik" ["On the General Relationship of Hegelian Philosophy to Theological Criticism"] in *Streitschriften* III: 59.

73. See Hartlich/Sachs, *Der Ursprung des Mythosbegriffes*: 122 ff.

Hegelianism privileges ideas over facts. They claim that, as a consequence, Hegel's philosophy could not perform the 'historical critical' task of establishing the historical elements of the text. They cite to Ferdinand Christian Baur's fifth volume on Church history, *Kirchengeschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* that appeared posthumously in 1862 (under the editorship of Eduard Zeller) for the claim that: "[...] Strauß did not get from the Hegelian school, which had existed for a long time without developing a critical element of this kind, the critical spirit that drives [... the *LJ*]." ⁷⁴ There is no question that Strauß engaged in a 'critical' reading of the text, but that did not mean a devastatingly destructive reading of Church Doctrine. However, Strauß' distancing of himself from Hegel is only clear with *The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity* of 1838, three years after the publication of the *LJ*. ⁷⁵ According to Hartlich/Sachs, Strauß' concern in the *LJ* was merely to determine the historical facts to be found in the gospels so that Hegel 'could not have played a central role' in his project. ⁷⁶

The crux of his departure from Hegel, according to Hartlich/Sachs, is to demonstrate that no presupposition of Hegelian 'speculative' philosophy can provide the means to adjudicate the historical facticity of what is reported in the Gospels as having

74. Hartlich/Sachs, *Der Ursprung des Mythosbegriffes*: 124 (citation by Hartlich/Sachs to F.C. Baur's *Kirchengeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (1862): 359. See Hartlich/Sachs, *Der Ursprung des Mythosbegriffes*: 125

75. One might want to read *The Transient and the Permanent* as part of Strauß' shift in the third edition of the *LJ* to placate his opponents who found his Hegelianism off-putting and elitist. As I stated above, I believe, to the contrary, that Strauß is formulating an alternative understanding of 'religion' than an escape into an exclusive theoretical reason beyond sensuousness. However, if he were merely throttling down his Hegelian Idealism in the name of 'harmonious reason,' he only would be making the debt of Hegelianism to Scholastic 'Intellectualism' all the more transparent. 'Reason' in *The Transient and the Permanent* perhaps dampens the Hegelian meta-narrative, but it screams Strauß' commitment to the Idealist tradition of Christian Platonism (*via antiqua*'s 'Intellectualism') that stood in contrast to the Christian Aristotelianism (*via moderna*'s 'Occasionalism'/'Voluntarism') with the former stressing God's inability to contradict 'His' own eternal ideas and the latter stressing the ultimate origin of God's 'ideas' to be 'His' will, which 'He' always exercises for 'good' even when 'He' might violate the laws of nature. It is clear with Strauß' references to Feuerbach in the *Glaubenslehre* three years later that Strauß by then is reading Feuerbach, and Feuerbach's incapacitation of all forms of 'idealism' as anthropomorphic projection was not lost on Strauß. Strauß never returned to his religion of reason or the 'religious genius' of *The Transient and the Permanent*. Twenty years after the *Glaubenslehre*, he returned to theology with a modified Kantianism that is profoundly 'natural' in the sense of historical, and where even moral development consists in humanity's discernment of 'new' moral principles to govern its agency in an ever-changing world, not in the individual's ability to overcome 'sensuousness,' which defines Strauß' understanding of 'The Moral World View' of Hegel's *Phänomenologie* since the earliest days of his career. See my discussion of Strauß' "1838 'On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity'" – Religion as 'Rational Order' but a 'Relativized Christ' in Chapter 5: "Traces of an Intellectual Crisis:" 216 ff.

76. See Hartlich/Sachs, "1. Die Unabhängigkeit der kritischen Position des 'Leben Jesu' von spezifischen Voraussetzungen der Hegelschen Philosophie" in Christian Hartlich and Walter Sachs, *Der Ursprung des Mythosbegriffes* in der modernen Bibelwissenschaft (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1952: 122–134 and 135. Horton Harris agrees. See Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 270–271. However, without the 'husk'/'kernel' structure of Hegel's epistemology, Strauß would have only understood myth to be false, which he didn't.

happened historically. What led Strauss to reject Hegel and his school from the get-go, again according to Hartlich/Sachs, is that only the criteria of the historical-critical method can decide on the historicity of the text.

This result [of rejecting Hegel] is the product of Strauss's understanding of the relationship between idea and historical reality in Hegel. Strauß agrees with Hegel that the idea must be realized in history and not only in the mere ideality of the ought vis-à-vis reality – contrary to the Kantian point of view [McG: the erroneous Hegelian claim that Kant's ideas' are 'empty' or 'pure' because they are either merely subjective constructions or entirely abstract from sensuousness]. Strauss, however, denies that starting from the fact that the idea must be realized in history means that one can factually establish how this realization happens. [...] [H]e denies that a certain historical fact or a certain course of history can be proved as necessarily real from the fact that in them the idea finds its realization [...] Granted that in Hegel's philosophy it can be deduced that the idea must be realized in history; granted also that a certain course of history, already secured in its factuality, can be understood with Hegel as the realization of the idea, yet the means of proof of this philosophy fail when the course of history in question is problematic in terms of its factuality.⁷⁷ This is precisely the case which it comes to history in the gospels [...]. In order to answer the question that Strauss addressed to Hegel, it is decisive to know whether and to what extent the gospel history occurred as it is reported to us [...]. [The answer to this question requires] other criteria than Hegel's philosophy can provide.⁷⁸

According to Hartlich/Sachs then, Strauß' 'critical' question in the *LJ* was: 'What factually happened?' By concluding that the gospels are non-factual myths, Strauß was demonstrating that Church Doctrine, which is dependent upon their factuality, consists of 'merely empty ideas.'⁷⁹

Strauß' agendas of identifying the 'mythic' in the gospels and restoring of Christian doctrine once the literal reading of the text is exposed as distorting are both rooted in Hegelianism, according to Strauß! One can properly distinguish between the 'husk' and 'kernel' that is myth to identify the historical event, philosophical/theological idea, and/or symbol as the true kernel of the myth when one applies Hegel's epistemology of 'representation' (*Form*) and 'content' (*Inhalt*). Furthermore, Strauß' aim of restauration of Christian Doctrine is itself a version of Hegel's meta-narrative of Dou-

77. Hartlich/Sachs' account here is correct for the post-*LJ* Strauß. By 1838, Strauß' concern over Hegelian 'Indifferentism,' I point out below, was a key contributor to Strauß' metaphysical crisis that emerged in the second half of the 1830s.

78. Hartlich/Sachs, *Der Ursprung des Mythosbegriffes*: 125–126.

79. Hartlich/Sachs are not alone with this conclusion, unfortunately. Perhaps the most frequent criticism of Strauß' *LJ* was that his claim that the gospels are 'mythic' meant that he denied any history in the gospels. Representative of such criticism is the assertion by Carl August Eschenmayer that "Strauss is particularly unstable in his use of the term and word myth [...]. [H]e puts it on the same line with fairy tales, fables and lies [...]." "Die Herren [Carl August von] Eschenmayer und [Wolfgang] Menzel" (1837). In *Streitschriften* II: 17. More succinctly, Eschenmayer claims: "[...] if the evangelical story was not absolutely historical truth, it would have to be based on deliberate lies [...]." Strauß, *Ibid.*: 58.

ble Negation. Whereas historical, *objective* factuality is epistemologically important in Strauß' understanding of this meta-narrative, what is essential is what Hegel called the *subjective* event that is the Second Negation's 'point of indifference' within consciousness, which is where the Incarnation occurred.⁸⁰ In the *LJ* Strauß distanced himself from the Hegelians not with respect to the content (*Inhalt*) of the spiritual divinization of the Christian but, rather, with respect to the significance of *the narrative of Double Negation including the entire human species throughout all of history*.⁸¹

In 1835, then, both Strauß' understanding of the 'husk'/'kernel' character of the mythic and his understanding of Christian salvation is inseparable from Hegelianism. Strauß' agenda is not Hartlich/Sachs' 'Historical Critical Method,' which has the sole task of establishing the factual truth of the gospels on the basis of merely empirical

80. See Hegel's "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten 110–111, where Hegel speaks of the 'point of Indifference' (*Indifferenzpunkt*) as the external point at which Absolute Unity negates multiplicity and returns to Itself. See 112, n. 23.

81. This is the significance of Strauß' *universal*, historical, inclusive Christology as he formulates it in *LJ* (see *LJ*: 778 & § 151 "The Last Dilemma") and his defense of his Christology over against the Hegelians in "Verschiedene Richtungen innerhalb der Hegel'schen Schule in Betreff der Christologie" in his *Streitschriften* III: 118–119 and 125–126, where he repeats his observation from the *LJ* that an 'idea' does not exhaust itself in a single, particular exemplar.

Strauß doesn't refer to Fichte, but in his *Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters* (1805), August Messer, ed. (Berlin: Volksverband der Bücherfreude Wegewiser-Verlag, GmbH, 1924), Fichte takes the role of religion "[...] not to be concerned with [external] acting and deeds but a notion: religion is light, the sole, true light that permeates the inner core of all life and all life formations" (307) (a reference to Plato's Simile of the Sun in Book VI of the *Republic*!). However, as with Strauß, religion is not the divinization of merely the individual but the divinization of the species (*Gattung*) that is able to grasp the imperceptible. See the "Third Lecture" of *Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters*: 58–74, 94–95, and 310. 127. A year later in his *Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben* (1806), Hansjürgen Verwey, ed. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2012) Fichte writes: "The [...] One 'free-I,' which, as reflection, also remains eternally One, is split, as object, i.e. as the reflecting substance occurring only in appearances; [...] into an infinity; [...] into a system of I's, or individuals, to be completed. (This division [...] thus belongs to the absolute basic form of existence, which cannot be abolished by the Godhead itself: As in it Being originally fractured, so it remains split in all eternity; therefore, no individual, which is set by this division, i.e. no really ordered individual, can ever perish) [...]. In [...] these individuals [...], the whole divine being is divided and distributed for the infinite further development out of themselves in time, as it were, according to the absolute rule of such distribution, which is founded in divine Being itself. Whereas, furthermore, every single one of these individuals is determined by its own form freely and independently sustained as a division of the 'One I' and necessarily carries this latter form entirely [...] Each individual, therefore, has in its free power, which cannot be suspended by the Godhead itself, the possibility of viewing and the enjoyment [...] of its sharing in absolute Being, which characterizes it as a real individual. Thus, every individual has first of all his certain share in the sensual life, and its love; which life will appear to him as the absolute, and as the last purpose, as long as freedom, which is in real use, is absorbed in it. However, should it rise through the sphere of rationality to higher morality, then that sensuous life will become to it a mere means; and its share in the higher, supersensuous and immediately divine life will be absorbed by its love." Note, though: for Fichte, the connection to the 'eternally One' is not Absolute Spirit per se but the imperceptible, lawful order of morality that anchors humanity in the one, true Light – a remarkably Platonic claim.

evidence in order that, at least according to Hartlich, the Christian faith, which cannot be established by facts, is not misled by erroneous factual claims, as I point out below.

In fact, though, the 'historical critical' method promises more than it can deliver. According to Strauß, the text includes 'historical' elements alongside and mixed with 'mythic constructions.' However, neither the 'historical' nor the 'mythic' are capable of establishing either the 'historical truth' or the 'mythic lies' of Christianity. They are both employed in the service of the gospel author's aim of communicating her/his theological understanding of Jesus of Nazareth that drove the individual gospel author's shaping of inherited textual materials from the Septuagint and the Christian community.

In other words, the Historical Critical Method is both objectively and subjectively an illusion. Objectively, the historical elements in the text are insufficient to carry the weight not only of a biography but also of the teaching of Jesus. Subjectively, emphasis on the historical elements conceals the historian's theological commitments that drive her/his 'historical' conclusions (e.g., Hartlich's own emphasis of 'faith' over history).⁸²

In contrast to Hartlich/Sachs claim that Hegel played little if any role in the *LJ*, Strauß' employment of the category 'myth' in gospel studies depends on Hegelian epistemology. Hegel distinguishes between 'content' (*Inhalt*) and 'representations' (*Form*), precisely the key to Strauß' understanding of myth. Furthermore, only by Strauß' conviction that Hegel's meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit's Double Negation was 'correct' could he achieve his 'critical' aim of the *LJ* to 'restore' Church Doctrine. To be sure, with his radically *inclusive* Christology, Strauß modifies Hegel's (and the Left-Wing Hegelians') Christology, but without Hegelian philosophy Strauß could not have written the *LJ*.

His quarrel in the *LJ* with Hegel and the Hegelians was not that their meta-narrative was incapable of grounding the incarnation in factual history⁸³ but that the

82. See below 54 ff. the discussion of Hartlich's Theses 7 and 8 from his "Historisch-kritische Methode in Ihrer Anwendung auf Geschehnisaussagen der Hl. Schrift" in *Zeitschrift Für Theologie und Kirche*, 75/4 (1978).

83. In the *LJ*, Strauß could have claimed (but he didn't) that Hegel's meta-narrative is incapable of grounding the true 'content' (*Inhalt*) of the incarnation in 'actual' 'representations' (*Form*) because Hegel's meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit itself is an 'empty' logical 'canon' without an 'organon' of experience because Hegel's entire epistemology is caught in a vicious hermeneutical circle of Absolute Spirit's externalization of Itself in order to experience Itself. According to this meta-narrative, *the particularities of history, while 'necessary' as the condition for Absolute Spirit to become aware of Itself, are a matter of meaningless 'indifference'*. Historical particularities are merely the logical place-holders for a dialectical logic of Double Negation. In Kantian language (of which Strauß was unaware), the entire dialectical logic of Hegel's meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit is an 'empty', logical 'canon' without any grounding in an 'organon' of experience. On Kant's notions of canon and organon, see: 49S. Hegel and Strauß overlook that Kant had already rejected the adequacy of dialectic to establish the ultimate ground of all 'that is'. On Kant's rejection of dialectic for grounding the ultimate, causal ground of 'what is,' see *Critique of Pure Reason* B 697 and Chapter 6: 670.

Strauß, though, is unaware of Kant's distinction between 'canon' and 'organon'. Only in the course of the second half of the 1830s did Strauß come to question the limitations of Hegel's meta-narrative

Hegelian meta-narrative either restricted the incarnation to a single individual (most likely Hegel's position as 'faith' 'on the other side' of the resurrection⁸⁴) or to those few individuals (Right-wing Hegelians) who were consciously aware of the role of finite consciousness for the Second Negation that is 'the point of indifference' from multiplicity 'back to' Absolute Oneness. Both options Strauß rejected not because the 'incarnation' is an 'empty idea' incapable of 'factual proof' but, rather, because of the 'logic of an idea:' an 'idea' is never exhausted in a single 'particular.'⁸⁵ Strauß defended vigorously in the *LJ* a *universally inclusive* Christology that included all human consciousness as the location of the Second Negation whether consciously recognized or not.⁸⁶

In short, Strauß' understanding of 'myth' as 'husk' and 'kernel' as well as of his *universal inclusive* Christology in the *LJ* (!) were anchored in, and inseparable from, 'Hegelian' philosophy. His issues with Hegel emerge only after the *LJ* although, according to Ziegler, the seeds of doubt had been planted already by Gustav Binder in their 2x weekly discussions of Hegel during their student days in the 'Stift' (the Protestant Seminary) in Tübingen.⁸⁷

Strauß' Understanding of Myth

To be sure, Strauß' understanding of the nature of 'myth' does not come from him, personally. It was *pre-figured* in the work of many before him. Hartlich/Sachs attribute the origin of the understanding of myth that functioned in biblical scholarship at the time of Strauß to the Englishman Robert Lowth's *De Sacra Poesi Hebraeorum* (1753), which were lectures Lowth held at Oxford between 1738–1748,⁸⁸ and Christian Gottlob Heyne's writings as of 1763. It was Heyne's work, though, whose "[...] investigations of Greek mythology gave a decisively new and influential conception of the essence of

in terms of the status of 'factual history' (representations in the imagination). However, even here, Strauß did so not with respect to the Absolute Concept is merely an 'empty' idea but with respect to the status of an historical fact (as true or false representations in the imagination) for determining the 'truth' (*Inhalt*) of ideas. The issue was focused for Strauß on the observation: An 'idea' as a universal is inseparable from all of its particularities.

84. See Strauß' *Streitschriften* III: 80–81 83–85, 86, 92–93.

85. See Strauß, *LJ*: 779–780. See as well, Strauß' *Streitschriften* III: 97, 118–119, and 125–126. In his *Glaubenslehre* II, Strauß writes as the conclusion of his account of "Speculative Christology:" "After all this, it may be a lack of understanding, but it is certainly not self-deception when I express the conviction here in conclusion that the first intelligible word still has to be spoken that takes Christology beyond the point of view of my 'Concluding Dissertation' on the *LJ*." Strauß is not embracing his inclusive Christology from the *LJ* here. This is merely a criticism of Hegelian denseness.

86. See Strauß, *LJ*: 778, 179–180.

87. See Ziegler, Vol. I: 51.

88. Hartlich/Sachs, *Der Ursprung des Mythosbegriffes*: 6.

myth [...].”⁸⁹ Heyne proposed a three-fold classification of myths: 1) historical myths, which have at their core an actual event; 2) philosophical myths, which offer ethical or physical, speculative explanations on the part of the myth’s author; and 3) poetical myths, which either creatively ‘correct’ a historical and/or philosophical myth or are free creations by their author.⁹⁰

Strauß adopted this three-fold classification of myths.⁹¹ He points out that there were many authors who distinguished between the ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ in the biblical texts, but Strauß calls the Rationalist, Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob Paulus,⁹² the first ‘Christian Euhemerus’⁹³ for his insistence on the distinction between the ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ elements consisting of the difference between ‘fact’ and ‘opinion.’⁹⁴

Furthermore, Strauß distinguished a philosophical myth from the allegorical precisely on the grounds that the allegorical attributes the narrative to ‘a supernatural source’ whereas the mythical ascribes it to *that natural process by which legends are originated and developed controlled by regard to conformity with the spirit and modes of thought of the people [...] of the age:*

The mythical and the allegorical view (as also the moral) equally allow that the historian [an author in the past] apparently relates that which is historical, but they [the mythical and allegorical both] suppose him [*sic.*], under the influence of a higher inspiration known or unknown to himself, to have made use of this historical semblance merely as the shell of an *idea*—of a religious conception. The only essential distinction [...] is [...] that [...] *the allegorical view attributes the narrative to a supernatural source whilst the mythical view ascribes it to that natural process by which legends are originated and developed* [McG: this is the *genetic mythical principle*]. To which should be added, that the allegorical interpreter (as well as the moral) may with the most unrestrained arbitrariness separate from the history every thought he deems to be worthy of God, as constituting its inherent meaning; whilst *the mythical interpreter, on the contrary, in searching out the ideas which are embodied in the narrative, is controlled by regard to conformity with the spirit and modes of thought of the people and of the age.*⁹⁵ (emphasis added)

Strauß’ emphasis on myth, then, involves the rejection of the capriciousness of allegory to insist on viewing the myth with ‘regard to conformity with the spirit and modes of thought of the people and of the age’ in which the narrative arose. This is a tip that Strauß views myths to be governed by ‘the *genetic mythical principle*’ (or the

89. Hartlich/Sachs, *Der Ursprung des Mythosbegriffes*: 11.

90. Hartlich/Sachs, *Der Ursprung des Mythosbegriffes*: 18–19.

91. See David Friedrich Strauß, *LJ*: 53.

92. This is the same Rationalist ‘Paulus’ whom Strauß makes the focus of his ridicule throughout the *LJ*. Amazingly, Paulus wrote a powerful letter in support of Strauß’ appointment to the university chair in Zurich in 1839. The letter is included in Part II, ‘The Historical Reader,’ of the first volume of the present work.

93. Euhemerus was the late 4th C Greek author who claimed that many myths were the consequence of historical events about persons being transformed into exalted events and agents of divinity.

94. See Strauß, *LJ*: 49.

95. Strauß, *LJ*: 65

product of a historical process) and not exclusively by means of the 'husk'/'kernel' structure developed by Heyne. Clearly, if only by the acknowledgement that myths are grounded in the spirit and thought of a particular age, Strauß' commitment to the role of history in myths is confirmed. However, Strauß will emphasize that the texts themselves are the product of a historical process, not merely a literary construction by the gospel author(s). The gospel authors drew, especially, on the ritual practices of the Early Church that gleaned any and every possible hint that Jesus of Nazareth was the fulfilment of divine purposes and promises in the 'scriptures' (the Greek Septuagint).

Nonetheless, Strauß insists that when it comes to discerning the 'kernel' from the 'husk,' *a mythic narrative confronts the reader with the task of determining in each case what the 'kernel' of the mythic husk is*. Strauß stresses that this is a difficult task because "[...] the myth which is purely symbolical wears the semblance of history equally with the myth which represents an actual occurrence."⁹⁶ Strauß offers the following strategies for determining the status of the myth's kernel:

1. The first step is to determine whether the narrative is meant to serve a specific aim [*Zweck*] and just what that aim is.
2. Where no aim of the narrative could have been invented by its author, the myth can be taken to be historical. Furthermore, it is possible that the kernel is a historical myth because there is independent testimony with respect to the particulars in the myth that clearly are connected to known genuine history "or bear in themselves undeniable and inherent characteristics of probability."⁹⁷
3. However, if the narrative symbolizes a particular truth, that truth is the aim of the narrative, which makes the myth philosophical.
4. A blending of historical and philosophical myths can be recognized when the narrative derives events from their causes.
5. The poetical myth "[...] is the most difficult to distinguish, and [G.L.] Bauer [in his *Hebräische Mythologie des alten und neuen Testaments* (1802)] gives only a negative criterion. If, on the one hand, the story sounds so wonderful that the event could not possibly have happened in this way, but, on the other hand, there is no discernible purpose to symbolize a certain thought, then it must be assumed that the entire story owes its origin to the imagination of a poet."⁹⁸

Contrary to the frequent claim that Strauß denied all history to the gospels or Hartlich/Sachs' claim that Strauß was only interested in myths as demonstrating the non-historical character of the gospels,⁹⁹ this classification of myths clearly acknowl-

96. Strauß, *LJ*: 53.

97. Strauß, *LJ*: 53.

98. These five points are a summary of Strauß, *LJ* (first edition): 30–31 (McG translation); George Elliot trans.: 53.

99. Hartlich/Sachs distinguish between "the objective historical facts" and myth. See *Der Ursprung des Mythosbegriffes*: 128.

edges that there may be historical elements even in the 'mythic' text. The task, according to Strauß, is to determine just which narratives have a historical 'kernel' rather than reject the myth simply because, by definition, it is assumed to be unhistorical.¹⁰⁰

In "§ 15. Definition of the Evangelical Mythos and its Distinctive Characteristics" added in the third edition of *The Life of Jesus* and retained in the fourth,¹⁰¹ even those narratives that Strauß calls an 'evangelical myth' can have an historical element:

[...] [A] narrative relating directly or indirectly to Jesus, which may be considered not as the expression of a fact, but as the product of an idea of his earliest followers: such a narrative [...] is mythical in proportion as it exhibits this character. [An evangelical myth] [...] meets us, in the Gospels [...], sometimes in the pure form [of a 'philosophical' myth], [as] constituting the substance of the narrative, and sometimes as an accidental adjunct to the actual history."¹⁰²

On the very next page, Strauß states explicitly that the conclusion is not that the gospels contain no history but, on the contrary, this analysis "[...] does not involve the renunciation of the *historical* which they may likewise contain."¹⁰³

In other words, *even were we to focus solely on the 'husk'/'kernel' character of myth and the classification of myths as 'historical,' 'philosophical,' and 'poetic,' it is simply incorrect to conclude that Strauß employs the notion of myth with respect to the gospels merely to dismiss them as unhistorical.*

Surprisingly, even Peter C. Hodgson proposes in the "Editor's Introduction" to the *Life of Jesus* that Strauß "[...] is basically uninterested in the historical credibility of the writings. His [Strauß'] true delight and skill is in a dialectical critique of the isolated units of synoptic tradition."¹⁰⁴ This conclusion is incorrect, though, not only because Strauß does not limit his gospel analysis to the synoptic gospels (Matthew, Mark, and Luke) but is equally, if not more (not only in the third edition), concerned with John's gospel.

Even more significantly, in addition to requiring the reader to be vigilant about acknowledging what is 'history' and what is 'story' (myth) in the text, Strauß' interest in myth in the gospels in the *LJ* was driven not by the aim of destroying Traditional Church Doctrine. Leaving aside his aim of 'doctrinal restauration,' Strauß' criticism of the factual in the gospels is not that there is nothing historical in them but, rather, that it is crucial that one distinguish the factual elements from what the church embellished and exaggerated with its historical literalism *in order to understand the 'true' doctrine of Christianity!*

100. For a list of 'historical elements' that Strauß acknowledged in light of all the ambiguities, see Appendix I: "Likely 'Historical' Elements of Jesus' Life" 985 ff.

101. See Peter Hodgson's note ,86' to § 15 in Strauß, *LJ*: 786.

102. Strauß, *LJ*: 86.

103. Strauß, *LJ*: 87.

104. Strauß, *LJ*: xxx.

In 1835, Strauß viewed the ‘true content’ of the mythic elements in the gospels to be most adequately grasped by means of Hegelian speculative metaphysics (what Strauß calls ‘objective’ science – see below). In order to grasp his ‘dogmatic restoration,’ then, one has to understand the Hegelian speculative metaphysics that governed his theological understanding at the time of the *LJ*, contrary to the insistence of Horton Harris and Hartlich/Sachs that Hegel’s philosophy placed no substantive role in Strauß’s understanding of myth in the gospels.

The claim that Strauß is concerned only with ‘critical,’ historical claims (or, more accurately, the non-historical character) of the gospels is the origin of the most central ‘metaphor interference’ in Strauß scholarship. *Strauß not only did not take the three-fold classification of myth to be valuable solely for the mere purpose of demonstrating the non-historical nature of the gospels, but rather he is as concerned in 1835 far more with understanding how’ the gospel myths were generated by the early Church and the gospel writers.* This latter concern is as central, if not more central, to understanding the history of the gospels as is the issue of the degree of factual, historical content preserved in the gospels. He described the generation of myths as occurring in accordance with a historical process that Strauß called the ‘genetic mythical principle.’ Nevertheless, even when it comes to the content (!) of myths, Strauß was far more concerned in 1835 with *the dogmatic significance of mythic elements* than he was with the question of the historical or non-historical ‘representations’ of the mythic narratives.

The ‘Genetic Mythical Principle’

Strauß spoke of ‘myth’ in two respects. One aspect of the ‘mythic’ viewed narratives as ‘husks’ that contain at their ‘kernel’ either a historical fact, a philosophical/theological idea, or a poetic symbol. The ‘husk’/‘kernel’ structure of myth when combined with Hegelian epistemology and meta-narrative provided him with a radically new perspective on the Incarnation of the God/Man, which he took to be the core of the Christian faith at the time of his writing of the *LJ* of 1835. The second aspect of myth he called ‘*the genetic mythical principle*.’¹⁰⁵ which is an accounting for the formation of the gospels as a dynamic of the experiences of Jesus of Nazareth on the part of the gospel authors and their communities informed by their careful gleaning of ‘First’ Testament writings for any possible hint of the nature and aims of God for Jesus of Nazareth as the ‘Messiah’ (the strategy is reflected explicitly, for example, in Luke 24:27 as a strategy employed by Jesus himself).

With the understanding of myth as ‘husks’ and ‘kernels’ in the *LJ*, Strauß was convinced on the basis of his Hegelian epistemology that the truth encountered in

105. For an examination of the historical roots of the *genetic mythical principle*, see in Chapter 2: “Strauß Who? What? Why does it Matter?,” the section “Strauß’ Sources for Application of the Concept ‘Myth’ to the Bible:” 173 ff.

the gospels was the claim of the universally, *inclusive*, *spiritual* divinization of the human species as the location in which (finite spirit) experiences Absolute, Free Spirit. However, according to Strauß, this divinization does not occur *beyond history* as the case with Hegel but is the universal condition of humanity *in history*. In other words, God-consciousness can occur only in finite consciousness, and it literally consists of God's consciousness of Himself. Strauß claimed in 1835 that finite consciousness of the Absolute Concept fulfils the same religious function of the Incarnation, but 'far more adequately' in his judgment, than is accomplished by reading the gospels as a historical portrayal of the individual, historical Jesus to be the *exclusive* God/Man. Strauß wrote in the *LJ*:

The phenomenal history of the individual [Jesus of Nazareth], says Hegel, is only a starting point for the mind. *Faith, in her early stages, is governed by the senses*, and therefore contemplates a temporal history; what she holds to be true is the external, ordinary event, the evidence for which is the historical, forensic kind—a fact to be proved by the testimony of the senses, and the moral confidence inspired by the witnesses. However, *mind having once taken occasion by this external fact, to bring under its consciousness the idea of humanity as one with God* [as the union of finite spirit and Absolute Spirit in the mind], *such a mind sees in this history only the* [vehicle for the] *presentation of that idea*. [Consequently], the object of faith is completely changed; instead of a sensible, empirical fact, it has become a spiritual and divine idea, which has its confirmation no longer in history but in philosophy. When the mind has thus gone beyond the sensible history, and entered into the domain of the absolute [mind], the former ceases to be essential; it takes a subordinate place, above which the spiritual [mental] truths suggested by the history stand self-supported. It [the history] becomes as the faint image of a dream which belongs only to the past, and does not as is the case of the idea, share the permanence of the spirit which is absolutely present to itself.¹⁰⁶

Strauß' Christology, though, pulled the Christ event back down into history although in his early writings he shared with Hegel the spiritual, divinization of the God/Man as the key to the doctrinal truth of Christianity. Consequently, Strauß' original plan for the *LJ* was to have had three parts:

[...] *The first, positive or traditional*, [part] should contain an [historical] objective presentation of the life of Jesus according to the Gospels, furthermore a presentation of the way Jesus lives subjectively in believers, and finally the mediation of both sides in the second article of the Apostolic Confession. *The second, negative or critical* part should largely dissolve the life story of Jesus as history. *The third part dogmatically restores what has been destroyed*. [As it turned out, he says:] [...] The projected first part fell away, the third

106. David Friedrich Strauß, *LJ*: 780–781 (see as well, 782–783). Strauß footnotes here to Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion II* [*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*], the Marheineke ed. of 1832: 263 ff.

became a mere appendix [the "Concluding Dissertation"], and the second grew into the actual body of the book.¹⁰⁷ (emphasis added)

Strauß has the notion of the '*genetic mythical principle*' from Wilhelm Krug's article "Versuch über die genetische oder formelle Erklärungsart der Wunder" ("An Experiment with the Genetic or Formal Manner of Explaining Miracles").¹⁰⁸ This principle is not concerned with the content or 'kernels' of the specific narratives themselves but is proposing how the gospels came to be written. Krug's principle is an anticipation of Ricoeur's notion of three-fold mimesis that takes narratives to be constructed on the basis of the three moments of the *pre-configured*, the *con-configured*, and the *re-configured*.¹⁰⁹

In other words, *rather than treat the historical significance of the texts to consist of their objective claims about Jesus of Nazareth, the texts themselves are viewed as the product of a historical, developmental process within the Early Church.* The narratives about Jesus of Nazareth are demonstrated to be the consequence of gleaning from the 'First' Testament any and all possible references (of the miraculous power of God's chosen agents as well as the prophecies made for a coming 'Messiah') as the basis for reflection on the significance of their experience of this extraordinary individual from Galilee.¹¹⁰

Even when there were no explicit prototypes in the scriptures (Septuagint) (for example, addressing demons) Jesus of Nazareth must have (of course, this is a dictum/*Machtspruch*, not anything provable) performed miracles in a superior fashion than any previous miracle worker, and he fulfilled all prophecies applicable to a Messiah, not matter how remote they might be from the usual expectations of Messiahship.

As in the case of the 'metaphor interference' that occurs with Strauß' crucial distinction between 'husk' and 'kernel,' so, too, there is 'metaphor interference' with the second key notion of Strauß' understanding of myth: the *genetic mythical principle*.

Hartlich/Sachs even view Strauß as embracing Heyne's "psychological-genetic" (read, subjectively-generating) account of myth, not (!) the '*genetic mythical principle*' from Wilhelm Krug. Heyne's 'psychological-genetic' understanding views myths as characteristic of the 'childhood' and 'rawness' of humanity with its deficient knowledge and capacity of expression and attachment to direct sense experience, *incapable of abstract thought*.¹¹¹ According to Georg Lorenz Bauer as well as Heyne, one can identify a myth

107. David Friedrich Strauß, "I. Allgemeines Verhältniß der Hegel'schen Philosophie zur theologischen Kritik" ["On the General Relationship of Hegelian Philosophy to Theological Criticism"] in *Streitschriften* III: 59.

108. See the discussion of Krug: 75

109. Ricoeur's *three-fold mimesis* is not limited to 'stories' (*mythoi*) but extended to apply to 'factual' or 'rational' accounts (*logoi*). See above: 93, n. 43.

110. See the "Annotated 'First' Testament Concordance to and Classical Legend References in the 'Second Testament' Gospels" in the Appendix of Volume I of this project.

111. See Hartlich and Sachs, *Der Ursprung des Mythosbegriffes*: 14–15.

First: when the report is of the origin of the world and the earth for which there are no witnesses; – second: when, instead of natural causes are taken to be what underlie events, everything is traced back to the effects of the gods or heavenly beings who appear as persons and direct agents; – third: when everything is portrayed as occurring in the senses, and people speak and act where they only had thought; – fourth: what is reported to have been created in a manner neither as things now occur nor according to the orderly manner of nature, but all exceeds all [reasonable] faith.¹¹²

Hartlich/Sachs claim that Strauß agreed with Georg Lorenz Bauer's¹¹³ understanding of the role of mythic criticism in the gospels.¹¹⁴ Crucial for gospel criticism, according to Heyne, Bauer, and Hartlich/Sachs, then, is the determination of 'real possibilities' or 'real actuality,' not fanciful, subjective (psychological), mythic constructions grounded in supernatural causality.¹¹⁵

As I indicated above, the anachronistic reader today draws the same conclusion as many, if not most, of Strauß' contemporaries. 'Myth' is automatically taken to be the opposite of 'science.' Knowledge consists of shattering (popular) myths to discern the 'real possibilities' and 'real actuality' behind or that resulted in the mythic account.

However, here in Hartlich/Sachs we have a classic example not only of 'metaphor interference' but also of the 'affective fallacy' that takes the text to mean what the reader believes the text to mean without attempting to grasp the meaning of the terminology for the text's author (in this case, Strauß).¹¹⁶

Hartlich/Sachs not only ignore what Strauß means by 'myth' and ignore that Strauß sought to restore the very Christian doctrine that 'criticism' had 'destroyed.'

112. From G.L. Bauer, *Entwurf einer Hermeneutik des alten und neuen Testaments* (Leipzig: Weygand, 1799) in Hartlich and Sachs, *Der Ursprung des Mythosbegriffes*: 77. Hartlich and Sachs add at this point: It is clear that here we have "[...] the point of view of critical rationality according to which nothing is able to be claimed to be actually or really possible that does not conform to the rules concerning the determination of actuality and real possibility as such. Rather the interpreter must not reconstruct any assertion of reality present in the texts unless it can be verified according to such rules."

113. Not to be confused for Ferdinand Christian Baur!

114. See Hartlich and Sachs, *Der Ursprung des Mythosbegriffes*: 86.

115. Hartlich and Sachs, *Der Ursprung des Mythosbegriffes*: 78

116. The point is not that we can know what Strauß intended to say, which would be the error of the 'intentional fallacy,' but that the language that he used was embedded in a pre-figured world of thought that he needed in order to share his reflections with others. The reader of Strauß is as obligated to situate his con-figured texts in his acknowledged, pre-figured sources. In other words, the pre-figured linguistic world for Strauß that he, in turn, con-figured with his account of the shaping of the gospel texts was shaped by the 'Mythic School' in Göttingen, Germany, and his 'scientific' Theology was pre-figured by Hegelian epistemology. Strauß' readers, then, re-figured his con-figured reflections out of very different pre-figured traditions. That is the error of the 'affective fallacy'. The pre-figured for populist Christians was the language of Personal Theism. The pre-figured for Schleiermacher was the writings of Rationalist Theologians, and the pre-figured for F.C. Baur was his work on Gnosticism and the Pauline and pseudo-Pauline letters in the Second Testament. The pre-figured for Hegelian epistemology was the Hegelian corpus, particularly, his attack on the 'Enlightenment' and 'Kant' in "Glauben und Wissen" (1802) in *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie* GW II: 287–433 as well as the *Phenomenology* (1807).

They also overlook the fundamental theme of the '*genetic mythical principle*' in Strauß' work.

Strauß wrote of the *genetic mythical principle* in the first edition of the *LJ*: "The richest materials for this mythical ornamentation were provided by the Old Testament ..."117 By the fourth edition that George Elliott used to complete the translation (her translation begins at page 166), Strauß has added an extensive list of materials "ready-made" for the mythic imagination of the early Christian community:

[...] [W]here the whole story is invented, and not any historical nucleus is to be found, [...] unconscious fiction is impossible [...] [I]t is easy to show with regard to the New Testament, that there was the greatest antecedent probability of this very kind of fiction having arisen respecting Jesus *without any fraudulent intention*. The expectation of a Messiah had grown up amongst the Israelitish people long before the time of Jesus, and just then had ripened to full maturity. And from its beginning this expectation was not indefinite, but determined, and characterized by many important particulars. Moses was said to have promised his people a prophet like unto himself (Deut. xviii. 15), and this passage was in the time of Jesus applied to the Messiah (Acts iii. 22; vii. 37). Hence the rabbinical principle: as the first redeemer (*Goël*), so shall be the second; which principle was carried out into many particulars to be expected in the Messiah after his prototype Moses. Again, the Messiah was to come of the race of David, and as a second David take possession of his throne (Matt. xxii. 42; Luke i. 32; Acts ii. 30): and therefore in the time of Jesus it was expected that he, like David, should be born in the little village of Bethlehem (John vii. 42; Matt. xx. 5 f.). In the above passage Moses describes the supposed Messiah as a prophet; so in his own idea, Jesus was the greatest and last of the prophetic race. But in the old national legends the prophets were made illustrious by the most wonderful actions and destiny. How could less be expected of the Messiah? Was it not necessary beforehand, that his life should be adorned with that which was most glorious and important in the lives of the prophets? Must not the popular expectation give him a share in the bright portion of their history, as subsequently the sufferings of himself and his disciples were attributed by Jesus, when he appeared as the Messiah, to a participation in the dark side of the fate of the prophets (Matt. xxiii. 29 ff.; Luke xiii. 33 ff.; comp. Matt. v. 12)? Believing that Moses and all the prophets had prophesied of the Messiah (John v. 46; Luke 14. 21; xxiv. 27), it was as natural for the Jews, with their allegorizing tendency, to consider their actions and destiny as types of the Messiah, as to take their sayings for predictions. In general the whole Messianic era was expected to be full of signs and wonders. The eyes of the blind should be opened, the ears of the deaf should be unclosed, the lame should leap, and the tongue of the dumb praise God (Isa. Xxxv. 5 f.; xlii. 7; comp. xxxii. E, 4). These merely figurative expressions soon came to be understood literally (Matt. xi. 5; Luke vii. 21 f.), and thus the idea of the Messiah was continually filled up with new details, even before the appearance of Jesus [Strauß footnotes to the Midrash Tanchuma]. Thus many of the legends respecting him had not to be newly invented; they already existed in the popular hope of the Messiah, having been mostly derived with various modifications [see Strauß' footnote 11 here] from the Old Testament, and had merely to be transferred to Jesus

117. Strauß, *LJ* (First Edition): "Den reichsten Stoff zu dieser mythischen Verzierung lieferte das alte Testament ..." (72).

[Strauß footnotes to George, *Mythus und Sage*¹¹⁸], and accommodated to his character and doctrines. In no case could it be easier for the person who first added any new feature to the description of Jesus, to believe himself its genuineness, since his argument would be: Such and such things must have happened to the Messiah; Jesus was the Messiah; therefore such and such things happened to him.¹¹⁹ (emphasis added)

Nonetheless, Strauß draws clear distinctions *among the uses* of myth in the Greek mythology, the 'First,' and the 'Second' Testament, which is possible because of his own speculative (that is, Hegelian) theology:

The essential difference [...] is that in [...] Greek mythology] the Deity himself is the subject of progression, becomes another being at the end of the process what he was at the beginning, something being effected in himself and for his own sake; whilst in the [...] Old Testament] God remains fixed in his own identity as the I AM, and the temporal is only a superficial reflection cast back upon his acting energy by that course of mundane events which he both originated and guides. In the heathen mythology the gods have a history : in the Old Testament, God himself has none, but only his people : and if the proper meaning of mythology be the history of the gods, then the Hebrew religion has no mythology. [...] The New Testament therefore knows nothing of mythology in the above sense. The state of the question is however somewhat changed from that which it assumed in the Old Testament : for Jesus is called the Son of God, not merely in the same sense as kings under the theocracy where so called, but as actually begotten by the divine spirit, or from the incarnation in his person of the divine λόγος ... The actions and sufferings of such a being are not external to the Deity : though we are not allowed to suppose a *theopaschitic* union with the divine nature, yet still, even in the New Testament, and more in the later doctrine of the Church, it is a divine being that here lives and suffers, and what befalls him has an absolute worth and significance. Thus according to the above accepted notion of the mythus, the New Testament has more of a mythical character than the Old. But [sic.] to call the history of Jesus mythical in this sense, is as unimportant with regard to the historical question as it is unexceptionable; for *the idea of God is in no way opposed to such an intervention in human affairs as does not affect his own immutability*; so that as far as regards this point, the gospel history, notwithstanding its mythical designation, might be at the same time throughout historically true.¹²⁰ (emphasis added)

"Appendix II" of the second volume of this project presents a summary of elements that confirm the prototype model of the *genetic mythical principle* in the gospels.¹²¹

118. Johann Friedrich Leopold George, *Mythus und Sage. Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Entwicklung dieser Begriffe und ihres Verhältnisses zum christlichen Glauben* (Berlin: Verlag von E.H. Schroeder, 1837): 125.

119. Strauß, *LJ*: 83–84. On First Testament archetypes for the accounts of Jesus' miracles, see 413 f; on Matthew and the use of First Testament prophecies for understanding Jesus, see 177; on the influence of First Testament prophecy, generally, see 440, especially, the principle that "[...] the greatest of prophets [i.e., Jesus] must not fall short of the achievements of any one prophet."

120. Strauß, *LJ*: 77–78. God's immutability is preserved, in Strauß' judgment, because God is Absolute Spirit, and the text consists of only a 'representation' of Absolute Spirit.

121. See "Appendix II: Annotated 'First' Testament **Concordance**:" 993 ff.

Myth ('Faith') and 'Science'

Another element of 'metaphor interference' with respect to Strauß' *LJ* is concerned with his understanding of the relationship between 'myth' and 'science.'

Horton Harris follows Hartlich/Sachs in the claim that "[...] *the mythical principle is entirely independent of Hegelian philosophy.*"¹²² (emphasis added) Harris quotes Hartlich/Sachs:

The hermeneutical principles and criteria by means of which Strauss ascertains the mythical element in the Gospels are free from specific speculative [that is, Hegelian] presuppositions. What lies at the bottom of his critical presuppositions was exactly fixed by himself [...] and bears a purely empirical-rational character. *His presuppositions are not those of a particular philosophical standpoint, but those which exhibit a scientific character in the particular realm of historical science.*¹²³ (emphasis added)

It becomes quickly clear that for Hartlich/Sachs and Harris, 'scientific' and 'science' here succumb to metaphor interference. When it comes to Strauß' *LJ*, there is no light between Hegel and Strauß when it comes to understanding myth and science. Strauß' understanding of 'science' is not to be squeezed into the notion of empiricism that governs the natural science as of mid-19th and the 20th C. Although Strauß speaks of scientific 'research,' science, according to Strauß, is not the hypothetical-deductive method searching for lawful order in phenomena by means of the systematic confirmation of hypotheses in the data. For Strauß 'science' means Hegelian philosophy. According to Hegel's Idealism, 'truth' consists in ideas (content), not in 'representations' (appearances). The true accounting for our solar system requires denial of the senses and invoking of imperceptible mathematical laws. To be sure, according to Hegel, an 'idea' is 'empty' without its occurrence in empirical 'representations,' but empirical perceptions do not determine what is 'true.' 'Truth' is eternal and determined by ideas, not phenomena. Heliocentrism is 'true' because its idea is 'true,' not because the appearances confirm that it is true. Were the appearances to determine 'truth,' heliocentrism would have to be judged as 'false.'

Perplexingly, however, when Christian Hartlich defends the role of 'historical science' ('Historical Criticism') as the exclusive tool for determining the 'factual' (or 'non-factual') status of gospel narratives, he doesn't do so on the basis of 'physical laws' but on 'coherence,' as I point out below. However, Strauß wrote not merely of 'coherence' but of 'law,' which allows no external causal power other than its ultimate cause, when it comes to determining the 'facts.' In the *LJ* Strauß writes:

122. Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 270.

123. Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 270, n. 30. Harris continues in this same footnote to cite Jörg F. Sandberger, *David Friedrich Strauss als theologischer Hegelianer* (Göttingen, 1972): 87: "Historical criticism, according to Strauss' conception, is in no way dependent on speculative [Hegelian] philosophy, but is a rational consideration of history which works in accordance with its own specific laws."

Our modern world [...] after many centuries of tedious research, has attained a conviction, that all things are linked together by a *chain of causes and effects, which suffers no interruption*¹²⁴ [...] [T]he totality of finite things forms a vast circle, which, *except that it owes its existence and laws to a superior power, suffers no intrusion from without* [...] God operates on the world only in so far as he gave to it [...] a fixed direction at the creation.¹²⁵ From this point of view, at which nature and history appear as a compact tissue of finite causes and effects, it was impossible to regard the narratives of the Bible, in which this tissue is broken by innumerable instances of divine interference, as historical [...] ¹²⁶ (emphasis added)

Not only does Hartlich *ignore the importance of lawfulness for causal explanations, but he also has his own dogmatic interest in separating 'historical facts' from 'faith.'* In an article that appeared 22 years after *Der Ursprung des Mythosbegriffes in der modernen Bibelwissenschaft* [*Origin of the Concept of Myth in Biblical Studies*], he claims that faith is untouched by 'facts' precisely because it is an epistemic faith whose 'knowledge' is beyond reason. 'Facts' are merely a matter of coherence, for Hartlich – something that is 'absolutely incoherent' is only 'a mere possibility of thinking:'

With reference to historical events, regular experience is only possible on the ground of a partial identifiability of basically repeatable contexts of experience within the phenomena of investigation. This means: An event must principally cohere with other events, that is, it must stand in an ascertainable connection with all other events. *An absolutely incoherent event is not ascertainable as having happened, but a mere possibility of thinking.*¹²⁷ (emphasis added)

Yet, coherence alone is no guarantee of a scientific fact any more than correlation between and among effects implies causation in statistics, and this is the insight at the core of Strauß' recognition that 'history' is incapable of establishing absolute truth claims.¹²⁸ Strauß' logic in the 1830s is precisely the same as Hartlich's logic, but Strauß' claim is grounded in Hegelian epistemology whereas Hartlich's claim is grounded in the epistemic 'faith' of Church Doctrine. Historical facts can't determine Absolute

124. This is the claim of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*). However, Strauß is claiming that 'all things' are governed by a closed system of 'formal, efficient causality' with every effect having a cause with at least as much 'reality' as its effect – with the only exception being the ultimate origin of the universe, 'all things' occur without 'eminent, efficient causality' of an ultimate cause possessing 'more reality' than its effect. What Strauß overlooks, though, is Kant's notion of autonomous freedom that is a 'finite, eminent causality' that can initiate sequences of events that nature's 'formal, efficient causality' is incapable of achieving on its own. This is a fateful lacuna in Strauß' understanding of Kant.

125. Note the anthropomorphism here! God is an agent with a plan.

126. Strauß, *LJ*: 78.

127. Hartlich, Christian Hartlich, "Historisch-kritische Methode in Ihrer Anwendung auf Geschehnisaussagen der Hl. Schrift." 475.

128. I will point out that with his increasing disenchantment with Hegel as a consequence of Hegel's historical 'Indifference,' Strauß comes to view Hegel's Absolute Knowledge to be 'empty abstraction,' hence, no more grounding of 'factual' truth than 'historical science'. This is the dilemma that Strauß addresses in his *Der alte und der neue Glaube* in 1872.

Truth, Absolute Spirit, Absolute Knowledge, and/or Absolute Freedom. Consequently, the gospels are open season for 'criticism' as a set of representations because they only 'point to' their 'higher' truth.

According to Hartlich, though, 'historical-criticism' only demonstrates the 'pseudo-historical' character of the gospels. According to Hartlich, the 'truth' of the gospels is not established either by Hegel's Absolute Spirit or by the text as a set of historical claims but by Personal Theism's 'faith' in divine grace.

Thesis 7 of Hartlich's "Historisch-kritische Methode in ihrer Anwendung auf Geschehnisaussagen der Hl. Schrift" ("On the Application of the Historical-Critical Method to Historical Claims") states: "The authors of sacred history, as it is in the Bible, make use of the form of history to call to faith – that is, indirectly-appellatively. Whoever – misguided by a misunderstanding of their [empirical] form – understands the statements of sacred history as assertions of fact, makes a fundamental hermeneutical error."¹²⁹

Thesis 8 states: "The consequence of this hermeneutical misconception leads to a fatal theological error, namely, when 'sacred history,' which wants to serve and be understood as a literary device, is turned into the first object of faith. Belief in God's forgiveness is something essentially different from believing in a story of God's forgiveness."¹³⁰ (emphasis added)

Hartlich justifies this thesis by claiming:

*"The Christian proclamation has used the form of the story in the New Testament in the service of the appeal to existential faith. Christian proclamation today may use this form, provided that preachers and listeners understand the sacred story properly, that is, as it wants to be understood. And that means: so long as it is not understood as a reflection of objective events, but as an indirect call to genuine faith, using the form of history."*¹³¹ (emphasis added)

In other words, the purpose of the 'historical critical method' is to expose the pseudo-historical nature of the Christian proclamation in order that the hearer not substitute a 'historical fact' for 'faith in the invisible God's gift of grace.'

[...] just as when it comes to justification, the Pauline-Lutheran doctrine excludes the error which consists in the fact that man wants to base his faith in God's grace on something other than God's grace alone – namely, on his own actions –, so with regard to the knowledge of God's grace, the radically implemented historical criticism excludes the error that humanity can base its faith in God's grace proclaimed to it on something other than God's grace alone – namely, on an advocacy of holy history recognized as pseudo-historical.

In both cases: in wanting to be justified by one's own work as well as in wanting to recognize the truth of pseudo-historical holy history, there is shared desire by humanity,

129. Hartlich, "Historisch-kritische Methode:" 482.

130. Hartlich, "Historisch-kritische Methode:" 482.

131. Hartlich, "Historisch-kritische Methode:" 482.

namely the desire to avoid the radical surrender to God's grace and to find another support for faith [McG: epistemic faith].¹³²

The conclusion to Thesis 8 states: "

The radical application of the historical-critical method carries out the concept of faith, as it guides the doctrine of justification, logically in relation to the recognition of grace. It reveals that *the original sin before God consists in not wanting to surrender to the invisible grace of the invisible God: As a sinner, man flees from the holiness of the invisible God into the visible, be it into his own work, be it into a dogmatized pseudo-history.*¹³³ (emphasis added)

Hartlich's conclusion for the article is:

The critical historian does not use arbitrary [...] presuppositions with his method to determine the truth of statements concerning events from the past. *He [sic.] is also not Cartesian, Kantian, positivist, atheist or whatever [...], which often take the place of argumentative refutation,*¹³⁴ but the critical historian merely methodically applies – representative for mankind striving for truth – the conditions of knowledge available to humanity with respect to statements of events of the past.

With this insight, however, the ontological case, which for centuries formed the scientific and systematic safeguard of the Christian faith [McG: by turning a literary device into objective claims of faith] and, measured by the state of knowledge at that time could form, is shaken from the ground up.¹³⁵ (emphasis added)

The 'possibility' of faith in forgiveness requires, precisely for Hartlich, the 'mere possibility of thinking'¹³⁶ that God has forgiven humanity's sins, not a 'factual' proof. Yet, the reflective reader will recognize that such a 'mere possibility' is an 'empty abstraction' precisely because it is imperceptible and not anchorable in the perceptible.¹³⁷

132. Hartlich, "Historisch-kritische Methode:" 483.

133. Hartlich, "Historisch-kritische Methode: 483.

134. In other words, avoid seduction by sophisticated arguments!

135. Hartlich, "Historisch-kritische Methode:" 484.

136. Christian faith, according to Hartlich, is grounded in an 'imperceptible possibility' made possible by the imperceptible God. He stated under his Thesis 3 that "No amount of effort possible to man, no theological effort either, can make real what is, according to his constitution of knowledge, a mere possibility." Hartlich, "Historisch-kritische Methode:" 474. He makes this claim in the context of the determination that historical facts cannot provide knowledge of the possibility of salvation (the forgiveness of sins).

137. Kant says in the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 75–76: "Without sense perception, no object is given, and without understanding, no object is understood. Thoughts without [sensible] content are empty. Perceptions without [imperceptible] concepts are blind [...] Understanding is incapable of perception, and perceptions are incapable of thinking. Knowledge can arise only by uniting them [uniting thought and perceptions] [...] Because this is so, we distinguish [McG: but do not dualistically separate] the science of the rules of sensuality in general, i.e. aesthetics, from the science of the rules of understanding in general, i.e. logic." These are the rules that govern 'theoretical' reason. 'Practical' reason's causal system of autonomous agency is governed by the 'rules'/principles of morality. Together

This conclusion by Hartlich places him squarely in the Kähler camp for whom the determination of ‘historical facts’ in the gospels has no role to play when it comes to the ‘truth’ of the Christ of faith.¹³⁸

The ‘possibility’ of faith in forgiveness requires, precisely for Hartlich, the ‘mere possibility of thinking’ that God has forgiven humanity’s sins, not a ‘factual’ proof. Yet, ironically in light of Hartlich/Sach’s rejection of Hegelian epistemology for reading the gospels, such a ‘mere possibility’ is, in Hegelian epistemology, an ‘empty abstraction.’

Unlike Hartlich for whom the ground of ‘faith’ is the ‘possibility of forgiveness,’ though, in the *LJ* of 1835 Strauß’ claim is that the Absolute Truth of the gospels is established by ‘science,’ that is, Hegelian philosophy. The ‘truth’ of Christianity is its doctrine of incarnation of the God/Man. For Strauß in the *LJ*, this truth was a Hegelianized, *inclusive* Christology that included all finite consciousness as the ‘location’ where Absolute Spirit, either in awareness or not, experiences itself through the negation of multiplicity as the ‘point of indifference.’¹³⁹

Finally, were Harris, Hartlich/Sachs, and Sandberger correct that Strauß’ aim in the *LJ* was to establish the historical ‘facts’ by demonstrating that the gospels are ‘myths,’ Strauß would have to be classified as a Rationalist, and, if there was a position that he ridiculed and purloined the most, it was Rationalism – even the half- or two-thirds Rationalist, Schleiermacher, as I will present in Chapter 4: “Why Schleiermacher was not an Option.”

History versus Myth: A False Dichotomy

Hegel’s epistemology distinguishes between ‘Spirit’ as ideational ‘content’ (*Inhalt*) of knowledge and ‘actuality’ [*Wirklichkeit*] as concrete ‘representations’ (*Vorstellungen*) of

‘theoretical’ and ‘practical’ reason constitute a single ‘architectonic’. See “The Architectonic of Pure Reason” in the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 860 ff.

138. See Kähler, *The So-called Historical Jesus and the Historic, Biblical Christ*: 43 (quoted in footnote 38 above) and *ibid.*: 74–75 (quoted in footnote 40 above).

139. In his *Streitschriften* in response to the opponents of his *LJ*, Strauß attributed the ‘blessings’ of Christianity not to the miraculous elements of the Gospels but to the spiritual impression that his personality evoked in Jesus’ followers: “The blessing, which Christianity brought, I do not derive from the gospel legends, but as the source of that blessing I consider partly the personality, partly the fate of Jesus, [and] the ideas partly communicated and partly caused by him, among which the latter also includes the belief in his resurrection. When we compare these elements with their letters and the reports of their original proclamation in the Book of Acts, we see that the Apostles were not satisfied with applying those blessings only to themselves, but they had to win others for Christ; and by means of them they believed themselves giving mankind all the blessings of Christianity. Thus, those blessings will also remain unabridged for us even if we drop that mass of narratives, which the Apostles [in their letters and the Book of Acts] also nowhere emphasize. If we also give up the resurrection of Christ as an external fact, then we attribute his impact all the more on account of his personal impression, which was able to work such faith in his disciples.” *Streitschriften* I: 88.

perception.¹⁴⁰ The latter, actual representations, according to Hegel and the Hegelians (including Strauß in 1835), are what ensure that ideational content is 'true' and not merely 'empty abstraction.' With his "On the Transient and the Permanent in Christianity" of 1838, that is, within three years of the publication of the *LJ*, it was clear to Strauß that the claim to avoid 'empty abstraction' ('one-sided theoretical reason') by asserting that the idea is actually represented in the text is the Achilles heel of Hegelianism. Representations are recognized by Hegel as a matter of 'indifference' when it comes to the 'Indifference' (non-difference/unity) of Absolute Spirit. In other words, it is not the representations that matter but only Absolute Spirit that liberates consciousness from representations.

Neither abstract ideas alone nor empirical data alone are adequate criteria for truth claims. One must beware of 'empty abstractions' because facts alone without ideas can be deceptive, but that does not mean, as Hegel claimed, that merely any perception of brute data can serve as a vehicle for communicating their truth by means of their deception. According to Hegel, only the philosopher who grasps the Double Negation of speculative metaphysics is capable of distinguishing the 'false' from the 'true'.¹⁴¹

What guarantees this 'real truth?' Hegelian epistemology claims that 'truth' is guaranteed by the Idea, not the representations of a (mythic) narrative, and this is what Strauß believed in the *LJ*. Ignoring the significance of Hegel's epistemology for Strauß in the *LJ* as Hartlich/Sachs do conceals a profound limit to understanding that Strauß came to grasp only in the course of his writings in the second half of the 1830s.

There are two issues in play here: Given that the representations of perception are required to ensure that ideas are not empty abstractions, 1) *do representations ground directly the 'truth' of the idea that governs them?*, or 2) *do representations ground indirectly the idea they seek to communicate?* Hartlich claims that the historical-critical method's purpose is to determine the former, that is, the method determines when the gospels are merely pseudo-narratives that constitute a threat to epistemic faith.¹⁴² Hegel (and Strauß in 1835) claim that representations only indirectly affect the 'truth' of the idea that governs them. The 'truth' for Hegel (and Strauß in 1835) is the 'idea,' which can be other than the representations that are taken to ensure that the 'idea' is not an empty abstractions.

140. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 366–367. See as well, Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik* I (1832): GW V: 43–44, 119–122, 164–166; especially on "Form und Inhalt" ("Form and Content"), see *Wissenschaft der Logik* II (1832): GW VI: 94–95, 460–461; Hegel, review of "Aphorismen über Nichtwissen und absolutes Wissen im Verhältnisse zur christlichen Glaubenserkenntnis.—Ein Beitrag zum Verständnisse der Philosophie unserer Zeit. Von Carl Friederich G[öschel]" in *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, Bd. 1 (Mai/Juni) (1829): 810–811; see also, Angelica Nuzzo, "Begriff' und 'Vorstellung' zwischen Logik und Realphilosophie bei Hegel," *Hegel-Studien*, Vol. 25 (1990): 41–63.

141. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 516–517.

142. According to Hartlich, the identification of the historical in the gospel narratives in no way affects the 'truth' of the Christian proclamation of epistemic faith in God's grace, as I pointed out above. The historical-critical method merely guarantees that the Christian proclamation of grace not be dependent upon verifiable factual representations.

According to Hegel (and Strauß in 1835), *historical facts can be directly, untrue' and yet they can, nonetheless, indirectly confirm the 'truth.'* For example, Santa Claus is 'true' in the sense of an ideal of selfless giving (not merely an 'empty abstraction') even when the narrative (myth) of Santa Claus as a distributor of presents to children across the globe in a single night is false. In other words, 'myths' are capable of presenting 'truth' in the form of 'false' representations. The truth of the myth depends upon something more than its empirical representation.

Hegel (and the early Strauß) claim that *the 'truth' of the gospels is not that the narratives are historical facts but that the narratives are representations in consciousness that present spiritual/mental truths – once one 'moves beyond' mere representations to grasp the role of Spirit in understanding.* In short, the gospel myths are 'true' in Spirit.

The problem that became increasingly pressing for Strauß in the second half of the 1830s was: What grounds the truth of the myth if its representations are 'false?' Furthermore, if 'false facts' can convey a 'truth' as well as 'true facts,' what, if anything, is the real role of empirical phenomena and just what confirms the determination that one's 'ideas' are not 'empty abstractions?'

Hartlich/Sachs cite Strauß' article "Hegel's Perspective on the Historical Worth of the Gospel Story,"¹⁴³ but they conveniently overlook a crucial point about Hegel's understanding of the truth of the gospel story that Strauß makes several times in the article. For Hegel, yes, *the truth of the gospel story does not depend upon historical facts (not even the 'facts' of the resurrection and the ascension¹⁴⁴), which are 'merely husks,' but upon faith in the Christ as the God/Man that arises only after his death* (as the surrendering of the finite, sensuous form of a human being), which is the 'true kernel' to the entire gospels. *Truth is beyond and 'above' historical facts.* It is this spiritual, *kerygmatic 'kernel'* and not simply kernels of historical 'facts' in the individual stories that the gospels portray.¹⁴⁵ Strauß writes:

The conception of the resurrection and ascension as external, *sensual facta* is not the true one at all [...] According to Hegel, the resurrection of Jesus is everywhere only this, that the God/Man, "as he stood [among other human beings] before as sensual existence for consciousness, so now he arose in Spirit,"¹⁴⁶ i.e. he has become the "general self-consciousness of the community." Jesus' ascension and elevation to the right hand of God only means the canceling out of its otherness (sensual presence [as a human being]) by which Jesus

143. Strauß, "Hegel's Perspective on the Historical Value of Gospel History" ["Hegel's Ansicht über den historischen Werth der evangelischen Geschichte"] in *Streitschriften* III: 76–94.

144. See Strauß, "Hegel's Perspective" in *Streitschriften* III: 91–92.

145. Strauß emphasizes this out at several points in his essay. See "Hegel's Perspective" in *Streitschriften* III: 80, 81, 83, 84, 86, 92, 93. Ironically or in a moment of self-deception (?), Hartlich's claim for 'grace' in his "Historisch-kritische Methode" is based on the same logic. Epistemic faith, ultimately, doesn't depend upon historical facts but on spiritual truth.

146. Strauß employs a wordplay between "*Aufstand*" (arise, stand up) and "*aufgestanden*" (risen, resurrection) here to establish the two 'moments' of the God/Man. The first moment is Spirit becoming 'a human being'; the second is the shedding of the human body to become 'Spirit/God'.

was "the absent (divine) being," which by its appearance as man "was alienated from itself, had natural existence, and self-existent reality. The canceling of its otherness (the sensual presence) by means of the second, becoming different (in this case, death)," leads God, who has stepped out of Himself, back into Himself [...].¹⁴⁷

Notwithstanding this indifference and the skeptical attitude towards the most important aspect of evangelical history [with respect to the human Jesus], Hegel [...] maintains that the appearance of God in the flesh, "came forth in this man (Jesus), in this place, in this time."¹⁴⁸ [...] he spirit knowing itself as Spirit, or, what is the same, man knowing himself as God, is in its first, unmediated appearance a "single, [individual], self-consciousness opposed to the universal One, which excludes [all particularities]." This difference is not only to be understood in such a way that men merely imagine it, but, simultaneously, that that consciousness really first appears as consciousness in a single individual, through which it immediately communicates itself to other individuals. However, even *this explanation, which seems to be quite definite, is again rendered ambiguous, or at least very limited, when we read passages like the following. "What manifesting Spirit is in and for Itself is not brought about by turning [...] back to the first, imperfect (Christian) community's [...] ideas [concerning Jesus], or even to what the real human being, Jesus, said. This [...] turning back] confuses the origin in the sense of the immediate existence of the first appearance [as a human being] with the simplicity of the Concept [the Idea that cannot be an appearance].*¹⁴⁹ Through this impoverishment of the life of the Spirit [...] there arises, therefore, instead of the Concept, the pale exteriority and singularity, the historical manner of the immediate appearance and the spiritless memory of a single imagined figure along with its past. One can almost say that *if one traces Christianity back to the first appearance, it is brought to the point of spiritlessness.*"¹⁵⁰ (emphasis added)

Contrary to Hartlich/Sachs, according to Hegel the truth of the God/Man, or what Hegel calls the very definition of religion,¹⁵¹ does not rest upon distinguishing between

147. Strauß footnotes here to Hegel's *Phenomenology*: 573, 583 f., 589.

148. Strauß footnotes here to Hegel's *Religionsphilosophie* (Marheineke version 1832), II: 240.

149. Hegel's formulation here is „Sabellian” or ‘Modalistic Monarchian’. Dynamic Monarchianism and Modalistic Monarchianism are two alternatives thinking about the Trinity already in the 2nd C: Dynamic Monarchianism is “Adoptionism” or the claim that Jesus was a human being chosen by God and confirmed by the descent of the Holy Spirit on him at his baptism (that is, Jesus was not always God's Son, he was adopted by God at a point in historical time) – NOTE: The Holy Spirit is active in the divinization of Jesus; Modalistic Monarchianism views the Godhead as temporally sequential: God existed first as Father, He ceased to exist when He became the Son, and the Son ceased to exist when the Holy Spirit became the activity of God as the Paraclete. Strauß points out that Schleiermacher's Trinity is Sabellian, but he does not specifically call Hegel's Trinity Sabellian. On Schleiermacher, see Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub, in ihrer Bedeutung für die Theologie unserer Zeit" in *Charakteristiken und Kritiken. Eine Sammlung zerstreuter Aufsätze aus den Gebieten der Theologie, Anthropologie und Aesthetik* (Leipzig: Verlag von Otto Wigand, 1839): 180.

150. Strauß, "Hegel's Perspective" in *Streitschriften* III: 92–94. Strauß footnotes here to Hegel's *Phenomenology*: 574 f. and *Geschichte der Philosophie*, *Streitschriften* III: III.

151. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: "Religion [according to Hegel] in its ultimate sense, then, is not an affair of a human being but essentially the highest definition of the Absolute Idea Itself to the degree that It has to make Itself finite in order that by means of this limitation it achieves knowledge of Itself." (514)

‘fact’ and ‘fiction’ in the gospels. According to Hegel (and Strauß in 1835), truth (*content*) can only be ‘represented’ in historical facts and is not limited to them. Historical facts alone for themselves are ‘spiritless’ and must be ‘negated’ in order to arrive at the truth of the Spirit. Strauß concludes, then:

The individual narrated incidents of the life of Jesus are to be distinguished from their absolute meaning, which is *independent of their historical reality or non-reality*, and therefore *the investigation of the latter point is to be left completely free to criticism*, which, however, according to the nature of the matter *can never reach a completely secure result*.¹⁵²

[...] Therefore, the meaning of the person of Jesus remains that in him, as in no other, the unity of the divine and the human has become manifest; only that the how and to what extent is, partly, left undetermined by Hegel and, partly, limited by the fact that he declares the content [*Inhalt*] of Christ’s consciousness when compared with that which over time developed little by little in the community was imperfectly [represented].¹⁵³ (emphasis added)

The ‘higher’ truth of the gospel narratives is their ‘Idea’/‘Concept,’ according to Hegel (and Strauß in 1835). Salvation for Hegel (and Strauß in 1835) consists in the liberating of humanity from the temptations of ‘sensualism’ and its ‘prison of the soul’¹⁵⁴ by negating one’s own finite spirit/mind to become one with infinite Absolute Spirit and achieve ‘true,’ Absolute Freedom that is represented in the Incarnation (the God/Man).

However, Christian Hartlich defines salvation as the ‘idea’ of the ‘forgiveness of sins.’ He defends an understanding of the ‘truth’ of the Christian faith whose ‘logic’ is remarkably similar to Hegel and Strauß (in 1835) even if the content (salvation by grace) is different from Hegel and Strauß (in 1835) (freeing from ‘sensualism’ into Absolute Spirit). Hartlich is claiming as did Kähler and, ironically (or in a moment of self-deception?), exactly as did Hegel and Strauß (in 1835), that the truth of Christianity cannot be determined by ‘historical facts,’ only by faith.

One is not saved because the biblical stories are ‘historically, true facts.’ That constitutes, for Hartlich, an example of the ‘original sin’ of humanity: “[...] *the original sin before God is not wanting to give oneself up to the invisible grace of the invisible God* [to embrace the possibility of forgiveness]: As a sinner, man flees from the holiness of the invisible God into the visible, be it into his own work, be it into a dogmatized pseudo-history.”¹⁵⁵

152. Strauß, “Hegel’s Perspective” in *Streitschriften* III: 94. This judgment was articulated by F.C. Baur in his section “Die Schleiermacher’sche Glaubenslehre” in *Gnosis*: “Historical observation can always show us only the relatively best, but between the relatively best and the absolute perfect there is a gulf that history can never bridge.” (638)

153. Strauß, “Hegel’s Perspective” in *Streitschriften* III: 94

154. In the *Cratylus* 400b-c, Plato spoke of the body as the ‘grave’/‘prison’ of the soul and as the ‘tomb’ of the soul in *Gorgias* 493a.

155. Christian Hartlich, “Historisch-kritische Methode:” 483.

However, Hartlich presents an insurmountable conundrum for any claim that faith is independent of facts. Granted that one cannot prove an invisible possibility by a visible 'fact,' on what grounds would one embrace an invisible possibility *if it has no correspondence in facts?*

This is precisely the conundrum that Strauß found in Hegel in the second half of the 1830s. Hegel (and Strauß in 1835), too, make faith a matter of belief in an invisible possibility that cannot be established by historical facts. Belief in the God/Man, the spiritual divinization of humanity, only arises after the death of Jesus as belief by the Church in the resurrection.¹⁵⁶

In 1835, Strauß is not concerned with distinguishing between true and false gospel narratives. At this point in time, his dissatisfaction with Hegel rested only on the *exclusive* claim of Hegel's Christology. An exclusive God/Man is, in Strauß' words, "inappropriate" for any idea/concept, much less 'the' Idea/Concept of the God/Man. Strauß writes in the *LJ*:

If reality is ascribed to the idea of the unity of the divine and human natures, is this equivalent to the admission that this unity must actually have been once manifested, as it never had been, and never more will be, in one individual? This is indeed not the mode in which Idea realizes itself; it is not wont to lavish all its fulness on one exemplar, and be stingy towards all others—to express itself perfectly in that one individual, and imperfectly in all the rest: it rather loves to distribute its riches among a multiplicity of exemplars which reciprocally complete each other—in the alternate appearance and suppression of a series of individuals. And is this no true realization of the idea? Is not the idea of the unity of the divine and human natures a real one in a far higher sense, when I regard the whole race of mankind as its realization, than when I single out one man as such a realization? Is not an incarnation of God from eternity, a truer one than an incarnation limited to a particular point of time?¹⁵⁷

It is precisely Strauß' universally, *inclusive* Christology based on Hegelian speculative philosophy that 'corrects' Hegel's epistemological 'error' that limits the God/Man to a specific individual or group and 'corrects' Hegel's epistemological 'error' that ties universal content (*Inhalt*) to particular individuals, in Strauß' judgment.

Nonetheless, within three years of the *LJ* in "On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity," Strauß jettisoned the Hegelian meta-narrative of Double Negation that made divinization or Absolute Knowledge the ultimate goal of all finite experience. In the *Glaubenslehre* of 1841, he called this meta-narrative Hegel's logical, immanent

156. On Hegel's post-resurrection Christology, see Strauß, "Hegel's Perspective on the Historical Worth of Gospel History" (Hegel's Ansicht über den historischen Werth der evangelischen Geschichte) of *Streitschriften* III: 80, 92–94. This is Karl Barth's thesis in *The Word of God and the Word of Man*, Douglas Horton trans. (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1978) as well as Wolfhart Pannenberg's thesis in *Jesus--God and Man*, Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe trans. (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1974). For both Barth and Pannenberg, the Christ event is not an event in history but 'above' history.

157. Strauß, *LJ*: 779–780.

or 'horizontal' Gnosticism that, far from providing the concrete representations that made the content of Absolute Knowledge real and not an empty abstraction, constituted a profound historical Indifferentism with respect to the actual details of history for faith.¹⁵⁸ In 1839, Strauß criticized this historical Indifferentism¹⁵⁹ by means of Kant's analogy that history was, in fact, only lightly touched by the Dove imagining flying in a vacuum would be easier (the dove being 'Absolute Knowledge').¹⁶⁰

When it comes to 'metaphor interference' with respect to Strauß' claim that the gospels are 'myth,' both Strauß' opponents and his defenders, alas, are victims. Myth does not mean falsehood, according to Strauß, and Strauß' hermeneutical interest is not to separate history and myth.

Speculative Metaphysics and Science

Five years after the publication of the two volume (circa 1,500 pages) *Life of Jesus Critically Examined*, Strauß published a two volume (circa 1,500 pages) his *Die christliche Glaubenslehre in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und im Kampfe mit der modernen Wissenschaft*¹⁶¹ (*Christian Doctrine in its Historical Development and in its Conflict with Modern Science*). The title suggests to today's reader that Strauß understood Christian doctrine to be in conflict with empirical, natural science. Yet, in the 1,500 pages there is no mention of what we today understand by the methodological assumptions of empirical, natural science. Even a shallow reading makes it clear that

158. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 500–501.

159. This is no capricious judgment by a Hegelian opponent. It is Hegel's label for his own logic that governs Double Negation. See Hegel's "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten 110–111, where Hegel speaks of the 'point of Indifference' *Indifferenzpunkt*) as the external point at which Absolute Unity negates multiplicity and returns to Itself. Hegel's paper was published in the *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie*, II/2 and II/3 (Dec. 1802; May 1803) jointly edited by Hegel and Schelling. The articles in the journal all came from Hegel and Schelling but without the author's (or authors') names specifically attached to the individual articles. According to Herman Nohl's work on Hegel's first *curriculum vitae*, Hegel wrote this article. See *Ibid.*: xv.

160. Already in "Schleiermacher und Daub," Strauß criticized both Daub and Hegel by invoking the analogy of their historical Indifferentism is like the dove imagining flying in a vacuum would be easier: "In [...] its witty, allusive manner, which in the swallow's flight of the concept touches the given real only approximately with the tips of its wings, without settling anywhere on it, the present Daub book [*Die dogmatische Theologie jetziger Zeit, oder die Selbstsucht in der Wissenschaft des Glaubens und seiner Artikel* dedicated to Hegel 124] perfectly resembles Hegel's Phenomenology, among whose finest charms belongs precisely this manner." Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 128. In criticism of such flights of intellectual fancy, Kant also employed the analogy of a dove trying to fly in a vacuum. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 8–9. See the use of the metaphor of the impotent flapping of wings in empty space in the *Groundwork* AA IV: 462.

161. David Friedrich Strauß, *Die christliche Glaubenslehre in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und im Kampfe mit der modernen Wissenschaft* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2009 [1841]).

Strauß is working with a different meaning for the term 'science' than is meant by the 'natural sciences' today.

In a nutshell, Strauß means by 'science' 'speculative metaphysics.' However, he no longer means that the 'truth' (*Ideelle* content) of Christianity is 'beyond history' expressed in 'actuality' (*Reelle* representation) as a 'post-resurrection' experience (Second Negation) of the logical meta-narrative of Double Negation. Rather, what Strauß retains as the 'science' of 'speculative metaphysics' is the Hegelian epistemology of 'actual' 'husk' (*Reelle*) as representations whose 'true' 'kernel' (*Ideelle*) is their abstract, lawful content.

Today's reader reads 'speculative' to mean that there was little, if anything, empirical about his notion of 'science' because we take 'speculative' to mean 'merely wager' or even 'fanciful.' If there is anything that the 20th C taught us it is that 'metaphysics' is meaningless if not imperialistic precisely because it is dogmatically 'speculative.' We 'have left' the metaphysical fantasy and speculation of meta-narratives on the trash heap of history. The consequence of our understanding today is that metaphor interference can occur in reading Strauß when it comes to what the term 'science' means for him. He does not mean that science is a flight of fancy of some untethered realm of empty abstraction (what became his criticism of Hegel). 'Speculative Science' for Strauß consists in the anchoring of perceptions in the imperceptible lawfulness of physical events.

Metaphysics has not always meant enthusiastic speculations by flights of mental fancy. When one only reads a tradition of thought with the intent of justifying why one can ignore it, one is easily susceptible to distorting it.¹⁶² In order to understand Strauß' notion of 'speculative metaphysics,' one needs to be concerned that the baby not be thrown out with the bathwater in the name of empirical reductionism or radical, Deconstructive, Pyrrhonian skepticism. Although I find Platonic 'Realism' as problematic as 'empirical reductionism' and Deconstruction's 'traces' 'all-the-way-down,' in my judgment, there is, nonetheless, a valuable insight to be drawn from Platonism that assist our understanding the inescapable significance of 'metaphysics' for our experience, understanding, and the exercising of responsible agency in the world.

From Plato down to the 19th C, metaphysics referred to all conscious experience that is not accessible to the senses. In contrast to the 'brain,' the mind is nothing that one can see, taste, touch, smell, or physically touch. In Platonic metaphysics, mind is imperceptible, immaterial, indivisible, immeasurable, and grounded in unchanging

162. Heidegger's aphorism is: "One thing is necessary [...] for a face-to-face converse with the thinkers: [...] Basically, there are only two possibilities: either to go to their encounter, or to go counter to them. If we want to go to the encounter of a thinker's thought, we must magnify still further what is great in him [*sic.*] Then we will enter into what is unthought in his [*sic.*] thought. If we wish only to go counter to a thinker's thought, this wish must have minimized beforehand what is great in him [*sic.*]. We then shift his [*sic.*] thought into the commonplaces of our know-it-all presumption." Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, Fred D. Wieck and J Glenn Gray, trans. (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968): 77.

‘ideas’ (Being) The physical world that one can see, taste, touch, smell, and touch, in contrast, is exactly the opposite: perceptible, material, divisible, measurable, and incessantly changing (Becoming).

Kant, too, had rejected the Platonic notion of innate, permanent ideas.¹⁶³ Nonetheless, he saw what was valuable in the notion of the concept that, although imperceptible, they are a ‘necessary’;¹⁶⁴ imperceptible condition that is required for us to experience, think, and act as we do. These imperceptible, necessary conditions of possibility are for Kant, on the one hand, ‘speculative’ because they cannot be proved themselves by sense data, but, on the other hand, they possess a degree of certainty that borders on their being undeniable. Without them, it would be impossible to experience the phenomenal world as we do, in fact, experience, reflect, and act.

For example, Plato’s (or at least Platonism’s) claims that ‘ideas’ constitute a mental dimension (for him, not for Kant) independent from the physical world and consisting of universal, eternal ‘paradigms’ (models) after which all transient particulars in experience are ‘copies’ are speculative claims and by definition incapable of proof in the senses. However, we could have no experience, much less understanding, were we to deny our dependence upon ‘ideas’ that remain the same throughout the transience of particular phenomena. To be sure, Kant rejects them as ‘innate ideas’, but he accounts for them by what he calls ‘the law of Association (*Gesetz der Vergesellschaftung*)’ which deduces the universal ‘concept’ as the relationality/function uniting the appearances of a set of particulars.¹⁶⁵ We take these ‘ideas’/‘concepts’ with us, *wherever they come from and whatever their ultimate status*, wherever we go in space and time. Their status as unchanging is crucial for us to be able to say in a particular space and at various times that this ‘object’ is the ‘same’ as an object experienced in a different space and time – even if they don’t ‘look’ exactly the same.

The necessary, imperceptible conditions of possibility for the experience of the phenomenal world are also appropriately called ‘transcendental,’ but the perceptible and the transcendent constitute no dualism¹⁶⁶ although the imperceptible elements

163. See the section “Rejection of Idealism” in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* B 274 – B 294.

164. Necessary, here, does not mean causally determining but conditions required merely for experiencing. What the individual actually *does* with these conditions and capacities is caused *to a degree* by nature but also, *to a degree*, by the individual’s *autonomous, creative freedom* ‘above’ nature. See the “Preface:” 42, n. 22.

165. On the ‘Law of Association’ and the deduction of concepts out of the relationalities of particular appearances, see “On Imagination, the Law of association, and Reflecting Judgment” at: 86, n. 26,

166. Although Kant acknowledges that there is a necessary difference between the *sensible* and *intelligible* realms on the basis of the distinction between sense perception and what cannot occur in sense perception and must be ‘added to’ sense perception in order for there to be any understanding, he explicitly rejects the notion that this is a *dualism*. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 311–315. Kant writes here: “Understanding and sensibility, with us, can determine objects only when they are employed in conjunction. When we separate them, we have intuitions without concepts, or concepts without intuitions—in both cases, representations which we are not in a position to apply to any determinate object.” B 314 Kant applies this insight to the imperceptible notion of the soul in the

are in consciousness and irreducible to physical nature. To be sure, unlike physical objects in nature, these transcendental conditions of consciousness are imperceptible, immaterial, indivisible, immeasurable, and, compared to physical phenomena, unchanging. Nonetheless, the fact that they are 'speculative,' 'transcendental' elements of finite consciousness does not mean that they are the product of 'fanciful raptures'¹⁶⁷ (*Schwärmerei*). In other words, simply to label them 'transcendental' does not mean that they are gibberish illusions. The *a priori* synthetic conditions of possibility of transcendental consciousness are *required by the experience of sense perception* (empirical phenomena) itself.

Unicorns and centaurs, to be sure, are the product of fanciful raptures (*Schwärmerei*) because they are not materially perceptible. In short, proper understanding begins with sense perception, but it is not limited to sense perception – even as it must 'return to' sense perception for the determination of its adequacy.¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, simply because one can think something, doesn't make it 'true.'¹⁶⁹

intelligible realm: "For were I to enquire whether the soul in itself is of spiritual nature, the question would have no meaning. In employing such a concept, I not only abstract from corporeal nature, but from nature in general, that is, from all predicates of any possible experience, and therefore from all conditions requisite for thinking an object for such a concept; yet only as related to an object can the concept be said to have a meaning." *Critique of Pure Reason* B 711–712

167. On the difference between 'enthusiasm' and 'rapture,' see: 27, n. 10.

168. Kant writes of fantasy and order: "Liveliness [the directing "of the imagination towards novelty, vivacity/liveliness" (*Lebhaftigkeit*) (Kant, *Menschenkunde* XXV,2: 1062: Olms ed. 240)] contributes to knowledge and is to be highly valued. However, it often detracts from clear unity of mind; it is sensual and arises from experience; for it causes our imagination to be stimulated, it does not adhere to the limits of reason. Order is based on the ability of our wit and our imagination to pair judgments. Multiplicity [*Mannigfaltigkeit* of appearances] is the [indexing] most necessary thing that we can seek in knowledge, for it brings the greatest facilitation [*Erleichterung*] to the mind. Order is more disconcerting (*peinlicher*), but when it is properly understood, it seems to us even more delightful than multiplicity; for *with multiplicity we abandon ourselves to the play of different objects, but order forces us to remain steady* (*regelmäßig*). Finally, combination (*Verknüpfung* (see "On Imagination, the Law of association, and Reflecting Judgment" at: 86, n. 26) is the most important part of cognition, but it is also the most difficult to grasp that which is parsed (*Gegliederte*) [diareisis]." *Menschenkunde* XXV, 2: 885; Olms ed.: 38

169. In proleptic anticipation of Hegelian 'science,' Kant explicitly rejects the point of view of those in his day who speak of the phenomenal and noumenal as a dualism in which the phenomenal is merely the perceived and the noumenal as a system of logic as if Copernicus and Newton merely applied an understanding in 'conformity with the laws of understanding' (logic) to phenomena. Kant writes: "In the writings of modern [philosophers] I find the expressions *mundus sensibilis* [the sensible world] and [*mundus*] *intelligibilis* [the intelligible world] used with a meaning altogether different from that of the ancients—a meaning which is easily understood, but which results merely in an empty play upon words. According to this [current] usage [of *mundus sensibilis*], some have thought good to entitle the sum of appearances, in so far as they are intuited [perceived] [angeschaut], the world of the senses [die *Sinnenwelt*/*mundus sensibilis*], and in so far as their connection is thought in conformity with laws of understanding, the world of the understanding [die *Verstandeswelt*/*mundus intelligibilis*]. The first, [theoretical] astronomy [*theoretische Astronomie*], which teaches merely the observation [*die bloße Beobachtung*] of the starry heavens, would give an account of the former [*mundus sensibilis* or *die Sinnenwelt*]. The second, [contemplative] astronomy [*contemplative Astronomie*], in contrast (as

Thoughts without perception are empty, just as perceptions without thoughts are blind.¹⁷⁰

Many philosophers in the post-Kantian world grasped this notion of ‘necessary, transcendental conditions of possibility as concerned with elements that cannot be given directly in perception and required in order for finite consciousness to experience as it does. However, there was a major difference between Kant and, for example, the Hegelians with respect to what one may claim to be the case on the basis of the ‘necessary conditions of possibility.’ For the Hegelians, they invoked ‘necessary conditions of possibility’ to provide a *causal explanation* for Absolute Knowledge and the creation of the world.¹⁷¹ For Kant, causal explanations are *a priori* synthetic

the case) with the Copernican system, or according to Newton’s laws of gravitation would give an account of the intelligible world [intelligible Welt]. But [sic.] such a twisting of words is a merely sophistical subterfuge. It seeks to avoid a troublesome question by changing its meaning to suit our own convenience. Understanding and reason are, indeed, employed in dealing with appearances; but the question to be answered is whether they have also yet another employment, when the object is not a phenomenon (that is, is a noumenon); and it is in this latter sense that the object is taken, when it is thought as merely intelligible, that is to say, as being given to the understanding alone, and not to the senses. *The question, therefore, is whether in addition to the empirical employment of the understanding (even in the Newtonian account of the structure of the universe) there is likewise possible a transcendental employment of the understanding that has to do with the noumenon as an object. This question we have answered in the negative.* [McG: that is, the intelligible world is no collection of ‘objects’ independent of the sensible world]

"When [...] we say that the senses represent objects as they appear, and the understanding grasps objects as they are, the latter statement is to be taken, not in the transcendental, but in the merely empirical meaning of the terms, namely as meaning that the objects must be represented as objects of experience, that is, as appearances in thoroughgoing interconnection with one another, and *not as they may be apart from their relation to possible experience* (and consequently to any senses), as objects of the pure understanding. *Such objects of pure understanding will always remain unknown to us; we can never even know whether such a transcendental or exceptional knowledge is possible under any conditions* —at least not if it is to be the same kind of knowledge as that which stands under our ordinary categories.

"*Understanding and sensibility, with us, can determine objects only when they are employed in conjunction.* When we separate them, we have [perceptions] [*sinnliche Anschauungen*] without concepts, or concepts without [perceptions] [*intellektuelle Anschauungen*]—in both cases, representations which we are not in a position to apply to any determinate object." (emphasis added) *Critique of Pure Reason* B 311–314; see as well, B 75.

170. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 75 (see as well, B 165–166 and 178). This applies to ‘logic,’ as well, Kant says in his *Logic* AA IX: 13–14. Logic is concerned with the rules (the canon) that govern abstract thought abstractly, but it cannot determine what ‘should’ be the case (logic is no organon). To be sure, Kant divides logic into ‘analytic’ and ‘dialectic’. Analytic logic, then, are the rules required for proper thinking. "Dialectic, which contains the characteristics and rules according to which we could recognize that *something does not agree with the formal criteria of truth*, although it seems to agree with the same. The dialectic in this meaning would thus have its good use as a cathartic [καθάρτικος] of the understanding." *Ibid.*, AA IX: 16. Note: For Kant ‘dialectic’ in logic can determine what ‘does not’ fit with the abstract rules of logic, not what proves or does fit with the rules of logic.

171. The invocation of logic of ‘conditions of possibility’ for establishing knowledge, shared by Hegel and Schleiermacher to ground Absolute Knowledge (Hegel) or to ground belief in the God/Man (Schleiermacher), is inappropriately attributed to Kant. See, for example, Strauß "Schleiermacher und

judgments because they are not directly given in perception and belong in the table of the categories of the understanding concerned with the 'relations' among phenomena. Furthermore, causal explanations are an aspect of *theoretical* reason that is concerned with understanding phenomena, not ultimate cause.¹⁷² When it comes to the 'idea' of God, Kant acknowledges that it is a 'necessary' assumption as a *regulative idea* (an assumption)¹⁷³, not an ultimate, causal explanation.

Whereas Hegel takes logic to be a metaphysical and ontological causal order of dialectic that creates all 'that is', Kant takes logic to be merely an aide of thought, not a causal explanation. As stated above, Kant says in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (B 75, s. B 165–166, 178) that "Thoughts (*Gedanken*) without content (*Inhalt*/perception) are empty; perceptions (*Anschauungen*) without concepts (*Begriffe*) are blind."¹⁷⁴ It is clear that Kant is reading 'content' as sense perception (*sinnliche Anschauung*). If one reads Kant's formulation within the framework of Hegelian epistemology that 'content' (*Inhalt*) is the abstract idea (*ideelle*) of intellectual perception (*intellektuelle Anschauung*), whereas representations (*Form*) are actuality (*reelle*) as sense perception (*sinnliche Anschauung*), then Kant would be saying, literally, that, without ideas, ideas would be empty. However, although Hegel's epistemology of content (*Inhalt*) and representations (*Form*) claims to agree with Kant's use of content (*Inhalt*) here as sense perception (*sinnliche Anschauung*), that 'representations' are the actual (*reelle*) that guarantee that ideas (*ideelle*) are not empty abstractions, this would mean that Hegel's entire meta-narrative of Double Negation is an 'empty abstraction.' Yet this is what Hegel explicitly denies. 'The' ultimate content for Hegel is Absolute Spirit, and representations are only empty place setters for Absolute Spirit's final aim of awareness of Itself.

Nonetheless, Hegel's absolute epistemology goes much farther than Kant's theoretical reason. Hegel's meta-narrative is a narrative of causal explanation, not merely an epistemology that finite consciousness requires in order to experience, understand, and exercise responsible agency in the world, as Kant maintained. The 'truth' of histo-

Daub:" 41. Hegel and Schleiermacher are speaking of the 'necessity' of a *causal explanation* for these ultimate elements (Absolute Knowledge and the God/Man). In contrast, Kant's Copernican Turn to 'necessary' conditions of possibility is to account for our experience, understanding, and responsible agency of a world of appearances for limited reason.

On Kant's use of the term 'necessary' with respect to the transcendental conditions of possibility and capacities identified by the Copernican Turn, see the "Preface:" 42, n. 22.

172. Categories require perception (*sinnliche Anschauung*) and are inappropriate when applied to a Noumenon (God). See *Critique of Pure Reason* B 311–312. See as well, Kant's rejection of categories of the understanding (theoretical reason) for speaking about God at *Critique of Pure Reason* B 724. He does not call into question the reality of God here or elsewhere, but he does say that all God-talk is analogical (B 724) and at best 'symbolically' anthropomorphic. See above footnote 64.

173. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 699.

174. In contrast to Norman Kemp Smith's translation, I prefer to translate *Anschauung* as perception, not intuition, because the term intuition can anachronistically be taken as a 'sixth' sense whereas the term *Anschauung* literally means 'to look at'.

ry, according to Hegel, requires the causal necessity of Absolute Spirit's grounding in actuality. Otherwise, Absolute Spirit is an 'empty abstraction.' The ultimate relationship between the 'true' content of ideas and the 'actual' representations of thoughts is caused by the Absolute Idea as it establishes the finite conditions for the experience of representations. Were the Absolute Idea not to be the cause of a process of Double Negation, it would merely be an 'empty' abstraction. However, *a description is not a causal explanation any more than statistical correlation is causality.*

Hegel claims that the process that results in the Absolute Idea 'appearing' in 'representations' is a *dialectical, logical, causal process* of Double Negation. However, in his *Logic*, Kant already pointed out that logic is only capable of establishing the rules of thought, not what factually 'is' or 'ought to be'.¹⁷⁵

In light of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (B75) that 'thoughts without perception are empty' and 'perceptions without thoughts are blind,' we can say: A canon without an organon is *empty*; an organon without a canon is *blind*.¹⁷⁶ "As a canon of the understanding and reason, logic cannot borrow any principles either from any particular science nor from any particular experience. Its laws must contain entirely *a priori*, which are necessary and apply to understanding, generally."¹⁷⁷ Logic only consists of abstract, theoretical principles without practical, moral principles.

'Representations' in themselves cannot ground 'concepts' because 1) no set of particulars can exhaust an idea¹⁷⁸ and 2) 'representations' can mislead because they don't present the things-in-themselves to us. Reason has two aspects: 1) the deduction of lawfulness (*legislatoris*) and 2) the application of lawfulness (*administrans*). Kant wrote in the posthumous *Menschenkunde*:

We need [...] a reason that is grounded in application [...] This application by reason (*Gesetzgebung der Vernunft*) is essential and constitutes the primary activity as well as the entire dignity of reason. – Humanity achieves knowledge through understanding, the capacity of judgment applies one's knowledge, and with reason we extend our concepts.¹⁷⁹

Causal 'explanations' belong to the categories of the understanding, which are heuristic constructions for understanding, not a direct account of ontological reality.¹⁸⁰ In order to avoid 'empty abstractions,' one needs *the lawfulness* (theoretical principles and

175. See Kant, *Logic* AA IX: 13–14 and 49.

176. On 'canon' and 'organon,' see 49, n. 36.

177. Kant, *Logic* AA IX: 13.

178. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 649.

179. Kant, *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1036–1043; Olms ed.: 213.

180. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 106.

practical principles) of the two, complementary 'domains' of nature and freedom¹⁸¹ in addition to 'coherent' representations of an *architectonic*.¹⁸²

For the Hegelians (in this respect, also Strauß of the *LJ*¹⁸³), the necessary, transcendental conditions of experience were not limited to finite conscious experience itself but concerned with an ultimate cause of all experience as well as the 'logic' of the events that 'had to have occurred' in order for there to be a consciousness in the world and for this consciousness to experience Absolute Knowledge. Hegel's *Phenomenology of Geist* (*Spirit/Mind*), then, seeks to give a causal explanation for the experience of Absolute Knowledge or the consciousness of an Absolute Unity and experience of Absolute Freedom 'above' nature.

In short, Hegel is caught in an inescapable, 'vicious' circle of causal explanation. 'Given' the experience in finite consciousness of what is taken to be Absolute Knowledge, the causal conditions necessary for the experience of Absolute Knowledge had to have occurred before it could be experienced. Rather than attribute the creation of those spiritual and physical conditions to a Personal Deity,¹⁸⁴ the Hegelians described those spiritual and physical conditions in terms of a series of events driven by the 'logic of negation,' which accounts for the spiritual and physical conditions for particular, finite experience by the individual of the Absolute, which is immanent to the world.

The 'logic of negation' is bookended by the 'Double Negation'¹⁸⁵ of a narrative above all finite narratives (that is, a *meta-narrative*). Hegel's meta-narrative begins with an Absolute Oneness that is an Absolute, 'indivisible-I'¹⁸⁶ without even the divisibility of intellectual perception (*intellektuelle Anschauung*), which together with

181. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* XX V: 174–175.

182. On the significance of an architectonic, see Kant's "Transcendental Method" in *Critique of Pure Reason* 735 ff.

183. Strauß recognized in the *Glaubenslehre* of 1841 that 'knowledge of the Absolute' as the ground for arguing that its condition of possibility is the Absolute involves a vicious circle. See *Glaubenslehre* I: Hegel says of Spirit: "[...] our [finite!] concept (*Begriff*) of an absolute essence (*Wesen*) is this [absolute] essence itself." 399 "The Hegelian ontological argument is conclusive, only insofar as for him the being of God, which he wants to prove, is no other than the idea of God, from which the argument begins." 400

184. Hegel acknowledges his agreement with Descartes' argument for God. See Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* §77: GW VIII: 167*. See Descartes 'ontological argument' on the basis of the experience of the idea of 'perfection' in finite consciousness for the 'necessity' of a 'perfect' Personal Deity in the *Third Meditation* in *Meditations on First Philosophy in which the Existence of God and the Distinction of the Soul from the Body are Demonstrated*, Donald A. Cress trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., Inc., 1983): 31–34 based on the "Principle of Sufficient Reason" (*ibid.*, 27) and the insistence that there cannot be an infinite regress (*ibid.*, 28). To be sure, Hegel is not employing the logic of eminent causality to 'prove' the existence of a Personal Deity of Traditional Theism but of an Immanent Deity.

185. On Strauß' employment of the notion and logic of 'Double Negation,' see *LJ*: 777 and 781.

186. On the 'principle of exception' (*das eigentümliche Prinzip*) above the sphere of knowledge and freedom (*über der Sphäre ihres Erkennens und ihrer Freiheit liegt*) in Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten:" GW II: 434–435.

the Absolute Concept constitute the 'divisible-I'.¹⁸⁷ This Absolute One must logically negate Itself into the multiplicity of intellectual perception before it's dialectical, causal logic can produce the 'divisible non-I' of the material world. which logically commenced with a *First Negation* when the Absolute One, which has no content (*Inhalt*), and is not even an 'empty' intellectual intuition (*intellektuelle Anschauung*) prior to the First Negation of ideas, denied its unity and externalized itself into the multiplicity of ideas. That initial negation, which established a difference between a 'this' and a 'that' (or what one called in Gnosticism the 'indivisible two') commenced a logical process by which the original 'this' and the 'that' produced by the Absolute Unity negated themselves in an open-ended process of 'negation' that generates the physical universe.¹⁸⁸ In that the 'this' and 'that' themselves were 'negated' (distinguished) from one another, they continued the process of division by means of further negation (separations) not only to generate the physical world but also to establishment of the physical conditions for the emergence of finite consciousness (finite spirit) in the midst of physical phenomena. With the emergence of finite consciousness, the process initiated by Absolute Spirit's 'First Negation' was complete because there is nothing that can be 'higher' than spirit/Spirit.

Once finite consciousness (that is, self-awareness) occurred, though, the logic of negation achieved the long historical process of emerging awareness not only in terms of knowledge of the world but, most importantly, in terms of the establishment of the conditions required for *the final goal of all of history*: the Second Negation, which can only occur in particular consciousness (finite spirit). This Second Negation consists in negating multiplicity to think/experience Absolute Oneness/Absolute Knowledge in consciousness, the only place where the Absolute One can experience Itself.

Unequivocally for the Hegelians, the necessary, transcendental condition of Absolute Oneness/Knowledge was '*proved*' not because it can be directly experienced in perception, which would be a contradiction. Rather, it was '*logically proved*' because they claim that finite consciousness experiences Absolute Knowledge and Absolute Knowledge cannot be generated by finite knowledge without violating the Principle

187. On the divisible-I of Absolute Spirit and the divisible non-I of the material world, see Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 455–456.

188. Hegel describes this origin of Absolute Oneness in the *Phenomenology*: "Pure insight has [...] no content [*Inhalt*] within it because it exists for itself by negating everything in it; to faith, on the other hand, belongs content [*Inhalt*], but without insight [that is, pure consciousness] [...] [Faith] is, then, pure consciousness of essence, that is, of ordinary inwardness and is, therefore, thinking, which is frequently overlooked. The immediacy by which the essence is in faith consists in its object is essence, that is, pure thought. However, in so far as thinking enters consciousness or pure consciousness enters self-consciousness, it acquires the significance of a being-in-the-world that lies beyond consciousness. It is by means of this significance [of objectivity], which contains the immediacy and simplicity of *pure thinking in consciousness*, that the essence of faith falls out of thinking as *representation* and becomes a supersensible world, which is essentially an *other* to self-consciousness." Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 394.

of Sufficient Reason (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*) according to which every effect must have a cause as great as the effect or else 'something can come from nothing.' Again, given that Absolute Knowledge is not only possible but has occurred (if not in the philosopher who claims to experience Absolute Knowledge, then, at the least, in the Christ event, according to Hegel), the meta-narrative of Double Negation *must* be the conditions that make it possible. Without these conditions of Double Negation, Absolute Knowledge would be impossible.¹⁸⁹

The Right- and Left-Wings of Hegelianism distinguished themselves from one another by claiming that this Absolute Knowledge in a human being occurred exclusively in the Christ event, according to the Right-Wing, or inclusively to the extent that a philosophers could experience the same Absolute Knowledge as had the Christ, according to the Left-Wing.¹⁹⁰ Strauß' *universal, inclusive Christology in the LJ*, though, claimed that the occurrence of Absolute Knowledge is possible, universally, for all finite consciousness. He argued at the time, again on the basis of logic, that an idea never expresses itself in a single particular (Right-Wing Hegelian exclusive Christology) or among a few in the same set of particulars (Left-Wing Hegelian, partially, inclusive Christology) but in all particulars (Strauß' universally, inclusive Christology).¹⁹¹

In dramatic contrast, for Kant, by definition the necessary conditions of experience are limited to *finite* (!), conscious experience – explicitly rejecting anything remotely like "Absolute Knowledge." Beyond *immediate, yet transient, self-consciousness and our dependence on the ultimate 'givenness' of the universe*, there is nothing absolute about finite experience. This immediate, transient self-consciousness, which he called the soul and its experience of an indivisible, imperceptible unity of 'apperception,' is by no means absolute. Kant stresses that it is no enduring substance and is incapable of proof/disproof. He calls the soul and its apperception a 'regulative idea' (a necessary assumption) that is required as the condition of possibility for us as finite consciousness to experience a finite world.

We misapprehend the meaning of this idea [of 'infinite systematic unity' – *ens rationis ratiocinatae* or inferred reason of 'apperception'] if we regard it as the assertion or even as the assumption of a real thing, to which we may proceed to ascribe the ground of the systematic order of the world. On the contrary, what this ground which eludes our concepts may be in its own inherent constitution is left entirely undetermined: *the idea*

189. There is a profound difference, as I noted above, between employing the logic of 'necessary conditions of possibility' as in the Kant's case, for understanding how there can be a finite consciousness that experiences a finite world and employing the logic of 'necessary conditions of possibility,' as in the Hegelians do, for claiming to prove *the absolute cause* of creation and the goal of history, that is, the achievement of Absolute Knowledge.

190. As I pointed out above on page 24, footnote 21, F.C. Baur took a position on the far Left-Wing of Hegelianism by maintaining an inclusive Christology that includes all Christians with proper spiritual understanding who make up the 'Body of Christ' in history.

191. See Strauß, *LJ*: 779–780. See as well, the final sentence of § 149, *ibid.*: 777 and "The Different Schools of Thought on Christology among the Hegelians" in *Streitschriften* III: 95–126.

is posited only as being the point of view from which alone that unity, which is so essential to reason and so beneficial to the understanding, can be further extended. In short, this transcendental thing is only the schema of the regulative principle by which reason, so far as lies in its power, extends systematic unity over the whole field of experience. The first object of such an idea is the 'I' itself, viewed simply as thinking nature or soul.¹⁹²

Two pages later, Kant adds that it is inappropriate even to apply the notion of 'spirit' to the soul and its unified apperception:

No windy hypotheses of generation,¹⁹³ extinction, and palingenesis [transmigration] of souls will be permitted. The consideration of this object of inner sense will thus be kept completely pure and will not be confused by the introduction of heterogeneous properties. Also, reason's investigations will be directed to reducing the grounds of explanation in this field, so far as may be possible, to a single principle. All this will be best attained through such a schema, viewed as if it were a real being; indeed it is attainable in no other way. The psychological idea can signify nothing but the schema of a regulative concept. For were I to enquire whether the soul in itself is of spiritual nature, the question would have no meaning. In employing such a concept, I not only abstract from corporeal nature, but from nature in general, that is, from all predicates of any possible experience, and therefore from all conditions requisite for thinking an object for such a concept; yet only as related to an object can the concept be said to have a meaning.¹⁹⁴

We must note carefully here this last qualification by Kant: "only as related to an object can the concept be said to have a meaning." In short, *Kant has delivered a fatal blow here to Fichte's dualism,¹⁹⁵ Schelling's Absolute Freedom, and Hegelian Absolute Knowledge before their respective positions were formulated.*

Kant is a 'Critical Idealist,' not a (Platonic) 'Transcendental Realist.'¹⁹⁶ Idealism is a schema of regulative (that is, assumed) requirements only for finite empirical perception of phenomena. Idealism cannot serve as anything like an absolute explanation or accounting for a dimension of 'things' independent of the empirical world of experience by finite transcendental consciousness *because of the limits to finite consciousness*. When dualism or an absolute capacity or absolute knowledge are offered to explain finite consciousness and its capacities, in Kant's terminology, they are *merely raptures (Schwärmerei) and by no means the conclusions of legitimate, metaphysical speculation.*

Nonetheless, Hegelianism claims to be 'science' (*Wissenschaft*) because it understands knowledge (*Wissen, Erkenntnis*) of phenomena to depend on the 'true' con-

192. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 709–710.

193. Such 'generation' includes Hegel's 'logic of Double Negation'.

194. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 711–712. See Kant's rejection of dualism at B 311–315.

195. Ernst Cassirer stresses that Kant's Critical Idealism involves no dualism. See Cassirer, *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff* (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1910): 392, 428, 430, 450–451, 455.

196. See the "Refutation of Idealism" in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* B 274–287. At A 378–379, Kant calls himself a 'skeptical idealist'. In *On a Discovery, whereby any new Critique of Pure Reason is to be made Superfluous by an Older One* (1790): AA VIII: 210, Kant employs the label 'critical idealism'. See as well, "Ergänzungen II," *Metaphysik Mrongovius* AA XXIX: 928.

tent (*Inhalt*) of the imperceptible idea of perceptible actual 'representations' (*Vorstellungen*). For the Hegelians, 'representations' are grounded in the imperceptible Idea/Concept of Absolute Knowledge that, ultimately, must lie behind all phenomena even when not consciously grasped. Absolute Knowledge is attributable only to the required, causal, transcendental Idea/Concept.

It is this conception of 'science' that Strauß took to be in 'conflict' with Church Doctrine in the *Glaubenslehre*. The conflict, though, is not a conflict about the ultimate 'truth' of Christian doctrine because Hegelianism understood itself to be re-covering/un-covering/dis-closing of the 'truth' of Christian doctrine 'above' the actual representations of the gospel narratives. Rather, *the conflict was over the status of the 'representations' (Vorstellungen) upon which Christian doctrine depended*. Traditional Personal Theism confused the 'representations' (the perceptible *Vorstellungen/ Formen*) of its scriptures to be the true content (*Inhalt*) of Church Doctrine whereas Hegelian epistemology and speculative metaphysics viewed knowledge content (*Inhalt*) generally to be independent of 'representations.' Knowledge gained from the text, in particular, consists in the imperceptible metaphysical ideas that lead ultimately to the Absolute Idea/Concept, which can be experienced only in Spirit, never (!) directly in representations (*Vorstellungen*) or 'words' of the text. Even though Strauß had come to reject the meta-narrative of Hegelianism, he remained an adherent of Hegelian epistemology, which is grounded on the difference between content (*Inhalt*) and representations (*Vorstellungen*) down to his writing of *Der alte und der neue Glaube*.

Hegelian 'science' drives Strauß' understanding of myth as husk/kernel, which, in turn, allowed him in the *LJ* to view 'speculative metaphysics' as providing the 'higher,' spiritual meaning of the destroyed historical grounds for Personal Theism. It, especially, is the key to the understanding of Strauß' universally inclusive Christology. *It is Hegelian 'science,' not the knowledge of 'historical science,' as Hartlich/Sachs claim, that is the motive and the content behind Strauß' gospel criticism.*

'Criticism' and 'Critique'

Another example of metaphor interference that can negatively influence one's reading of Strauß is his use of the term 'criticism' [*Kritik*]. The German title of Strauß' first life of Jesus is: *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined* (*Das Leben Jesu kritisch [!] betrachtet*). Kant had said of the term '*kritisch*,' which is not to be confused for 'critique' (*Kritik*), that '*kritisch*' ('criticism') "[...] confines itself to pointing out that in the making of the assertion something has been presupposed that is void and merely fictitious; and it thus *overthrows the theory by removing its alleged foundation without*

claiming to establish anything that bears directly upon the constitution of the object.”¹⁹⁷ This is the sense in which Strauß employs the term *kritisch* in the *LJ*.

Strauß’ terminology has nothing in common what Kant called ‘critique’ (*Kritik*) (for example in the title to his three *Critiques*: *Kritik* [!] *der reinen Vernunft*, *Kritik* [!] *der praktischen Vernunft*, and *Kritik* [!] *der Urteilkraft*). A careful distinguishing between Strauß’ understanding of ‘criticism’ and Kant’s notion of ‘critique’ will illuminate how little Strauß grasped of Kant – although Strauß’ writings are saturated with references to and dismissive judgments about Kant.

Strauß views *kritisch* (criticism) in the Kantian sense, yes, as a ‘destructive’ method but not in the sense that it demonstrates the content of the gospels to be false. Rather, he undertakes a critical analysis of the gospels to demonstrate the indefensibility of treating the gospels as historical facts to serve as the foundation of Church Doctrine. However, only once one has *critically* demonstrated that they are mythical narratives (*historical, philosophical, or poetic*) can one undertake the task of restoring their dogmatic significance, which Strauß provides in the “Concluding Dissertation” of the *LJ*. In other words, *criticism* for Strauß is driven by the logic of dialectic: a negative ‘thesis’ (although acknowledging that there are genuine historical elements in the gospels) with respect to the status of the gospel narratives as myths rather than factual, historical accounts (as maintained by Personal Theism) calls for the ‘anti-thesis’ of Hegelian, speculative metaphysics and epistemology to demonstrate the genuine, common ‘synthesis’ between traditional dogmatics and speculative truth.

However, in contrast to ‘destructive’ criticism in the sense of undermining the assumptions (not necessarily the content) of a point of view or of an argument, Kant takes ‘critique’ (*Kritik*) to be positive and constructive. ‘Critique’ is concerned with the imperceptible, transcendental (because not derived directly from phenomena) conditions of possibility that are necessary for finite conscious experience of phenomena. To be sure, as I pointed out above, the Hegelians (and in this respect, the Strauß of the *LJ* is included) appropriated Kant’s ‘critique’ of transcendental conditions of possibility of experience, but they limited it to *the ultimate cause (!) that is required in order that there can be a conscious experience of Absolute Knowledge and achieve Absolute Freedom above sensuous nature*, which, the Hegelians claim, the Idea/Concept alone can possess.

The Hegelians (and Strauß) took Kant’s *a priori* synthetic judgment to be concerned only with ‘empty abstractions’¹⁹⁸ because, in the judgment of the Hegelians, they are not grounded in representations (actuality/*Wirklichkeit*). Their judgment of Kant is correct only to a limited degree that is, in the end, inconsequential. It is correct that, for Kant, not all concepts are directly derived *a posteriori* from

197. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* A 389.

198. See George Elliot trans.: 779: “We should thus have fallen back again to Kant’s point of view, which we have[...] found unsatisfactory: for if the idea have no corresponding reality, it is an empty obligation and ideal.”

representations/perception because some are *a priori* and are required assumptions. Nonetheless, those *a priori* elements not directly given in representations/perception serve as assumptions, *not to determine absolutely what the ultimate cause* that drives historical events (representations), vague and indefinite as they are, which for Hegel had to occur in order for there to be an experience of Absolute Knowledge. In other words, Kant's *a priori* assumptions do not ground a 'speculative' metaphysical 'logic of negation' (cunning of reason) that '*causes*' the actual historical process regardless of historical particularities. Rather, Kant's *a priori* synthetic judgments don't blindly determine anything but are what are required in order for *finite thought* to experience and understand, particular, concrete representations. *In short, Hegelian speculative metaphysics and logic of negation are concerned with Absolute Knowledge. Kant's a priori synthetic judgments are concerned with the only experience that finite consciousness can have in light of the limits to reason: namely, particular, concrete representations (phenomena) in history.*

In *Metaphysik Mrongovius* we find "all concepts are acquired but not all come from the senses."¹⁹⁹ Some concepts are *a priori* synthetic judgments, which we acquire/learn only because they are required by appearances in order for us to experience the appearances. Yet, Kant then adds: "*Concepts presuppose representations of objects*, and are abstracted from their characteristics, *they cannot, therefore, be innate*, but are acquired, or made, but this cannot happen other than through the faculty of the soul, which so operates here."²⁰⁰ (emphasis added)

In short, *it is the Hegelians*, as I pointed out above, *who succumb to 'empty abstractions' because the representations that are supposed to ground their thoughts are inconsequential to the thought process itself. For Kant, representations are essential for thought because all thought ultimately arises out of and/or is in the service of representations.*²⁰¹ Again, "only as related to an object can the concept be said to have a meaning."²⁰² As a consequence, the Hegelians have no grasp of the significance of Kant's Copernican Turn that is 'critique' and not 'criticism.'²⁰³

Again, Strauß takes criticism to be a negative methodology that challenges the indubitable status of representations for dogmatic claims by turning myths into facts. However, treating the myths as myths, not facts, is no call for dismissing the gospels as false, according to Strauß. Nonetheless, Strauß does not apply the insights of Kant's

199. Kant, "Ergänzungen II, *Metaphysik Mrongovius* AA XXIX: 949.

200. Kant, "Ergänzungen II, *Metaphysik Mrongovius* AA XXIX: 949.

201. Hegel took Kant's philosophy to be 'weak' and 'barbarous' because it failed to place Absolute Spirit, Absolute Knowledge, and Absolute Freedom at the pinnacle of reason. See Hegel, *Glauben und Wissen* GW II: 287–288. As I present in Chapter 9, "Missing Aesthetic Judgment:" "VIII) On Hegel's Insistence that Kant's Reason is 'Weak,'" 911 ff., Hegel entirely distorts Kant's notion of aesthetic judgment so that he is incapable of grasping the significance of 'beauty' and the 'sublime' as illuminating the significance of beauty and moral culture (far from barbarous) and the sublime's infinite power even over nature.

202. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 711–712. See as well, Kant's rejection of dualism at B 311–315.

203. On Kant's 'Copernican Turn,' see the "Preface:" 47, n. 35

three 'critiques' (*The Critique of pure Reason*, *The Critique of Practical Reason*, and *The Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*) to religion, generally, and Christianity, specifically, as Kant does in his *Religion within the Limits of mere Reason*.

To the extent that Strauß in the *LJ* adheres to *Hegelian epistemology* and a *speculative and enthusiastic meta-narrative*, rather than Kant's transcendental reason and practical reason, he only generate 'criticism' of Kant's Copernican, not a 'critique.' Yet, it is already clear in *The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity* and explicit in the *Glaubenslehre* that Strauß came to realize that the Double Negation of the Hegelian meta-narrative contradicts the claim that 'representations' matter to knowledge even if they are claimed to be 'logically necessary.' For Hegel, 'representations' are merely accidental and indifferent moments for Absolute Knowledge. As of the end of the 1830s, Strauß struggled to find the 'positive' grounds for the restoration of traditional Church Dogmatics that he so confidently thought he possessed with Hegelian epistemology in the *LJ*.

By *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People* (1864), Hegel's meta-narrative of Double Negation that was leading humanity to Absolute Knowledge was replaced by the notion of moral improvement of humanity. However, faith in moral improvement, according to Strauß, did not refer to the progressive moral improvement of the individual, which Hegel's moral and ethical theory denied, but to the species, as whole, which *appears* to come (at least indirectly through Strauß' friends) from Kant. However, Strauß embraced to the end Hegel's understanding of morality (heteronomous duty) and ethics (the curtailment of the fulfilment duty by the circumstances of one's life) from "The Moral View of the World" of the *Phenomenology*.²⁰⁴ To be sure, he modified Hegel's 'Moral View of the World' with a 'genetic moral theory' in which moral development applied to the species identification of new moral principles in history, not the moral improvement of the individual.

As of *Der alte und der neue Glaube* (1872), Strauß' confidence in Hegelian epistemology's rendering value to concrete, historical events had also crumbled. Without the Idealism of 'true content' over against 'actual representations' and without having reexamined his inadequate grasp of Kant, he turned to a quasi-Reductionistic Materialism. This materialism reflected his confidence in the worth of history and offered Nominalism as a substitute for his lost Hegelian Absolute Idealism. Nonetheless, Strauß acknowledges that there are serious limitations to materialism.²⁰⁵ In *Der alte und der neue Glaube*, human consciousness is taken to be material nature's turning

204. See Hegel, *Phänomenologie*: "The Moral View of the World." GW III: 449–452 (Baillie trans.: 623–626). For a summary of Hegel's "The Moral View of the World," see Vol. II "Introduction:" "Hegel on 'I should, but I can't' in Contrast to Kant's 'If I should, I can':" 550 ff. and Chapter 7: "Practical Reason Elevates Theoretical Reason" the section "Hegel's Account of 'The Moral View of the World' is not Kant's Morality:" 727 ff.

205. See Strauß, "Ein Nachwort als Vorwort zu den neuen Auflagen meiner Schrift: *Der alte und der neue Glaube*" (Bonn: Verlag von Emil Strauß, 1873): 24 ff.

inward on itself in nature's onward push for improvement.²⁰⁶ Humanity's 'culture of skill'²⁰⁷ is combined by Strauß with the notion of the moral improvement of humanity as a species that takes moral progress to consist in the development of appropriate social rules for humanity's ever changing circumstances. However, Strauß' conviction that human agency is defined by sensuousness and self-interest clearly indicates that Strauß had no sense of Kant's notion of 'culture that promotes the (moral) will,'²⁰⁸ morally but not heteronomously!

Neither Grace Nor Hegel's Cunning of Reason

As much as Strauß came to reject Hegel's meta-narrative, I will demonstrate that Strauß never jettisoned, Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" from the *Phenomenology of Mind/Spirit*.²⁰⁹ Nonetheless, Strauß neither embraced Personal Theism's notion of grace nor Hegel's substitution of the 'cunning of reason'²¹⁰ for Personal Theism's notion of grace.

According to Hegel, the 'cunning of reason' [*List der Vernunft*] silently and unobtrusively functions in the background of all events to lead all actuality to the 'objective' truth of Absolute Knowledge and its reconciling unity.²¹¹ Hegel's 'cunning of reason' is yet only another example of Hegel's historical Indifferentism. Not only do particular, concrete events ultimately have no significance, the 'true' significance of events occurs in spite of those or any other concrete events.

206. See Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 240.

207. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 431–432.

208. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 431–432.

209. Already in the 1835 *LJ*, Strauß employed Baur's criticism of Kant as a 'subjectivist' who embraced only 'empty abstractions' when it came to humanity's moral effort. Strauß had Baur's criticism from Baur's *Gnosticism* in 1835, but Baur formulated it even more powerfully in his *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung* of 1838. See the "Preface:" 51, n. 47.

210. Strauß ridicules Hegel's thesis of the 'cunning of reason' in the "Introduction" to the *Glaubenslehre* when he speaks of humanity's 'dark urge' that was 'yet aware of the right way' (see *Glaubenslehre* I: 21–22 and the "Introduction:" 89, n. 35) and when he compares Hegel's Spirit to Böhme's God, the Father, "not as already something, but only as a desire for something as the dark urge of self-revelation (see *Glaubenslehre* I: 488–489). He employs the expression of the 'cunning of reason' in his review of three works on the origin of the gospels wherein Strauß concludes by invoking Hegel's definition of the 'cunning of reason'. However, The conclusion Strauß draws in light of the 'one-sided' tendentiousness of the scholarship that by dictum (*Machtspruch*) prioritizes one gospel, the ambiguities and problems that arise by careful analysis of the gospels internally, as well as the untrustworthiness of external claims (e.g., Papias) is formulated by means of an alternative: one is left with either the 'cunning of malice' (*List des Argen*), which "leads to the undermining of faith" or the 'cunning of reason' (*List der Vernunft*), which "is the schooling of humanity away from the literal text to Spirit." See Strauß, "Schriften über den Ursprung des ersten kanonischen Evangeliums" in *Charakteristiken und Kritiken. Eine Sammlung zerstreuter Aufsätze aus den Gebieten der Theologie, Anthropologie und Aesthetik* (Leipzig: Verlag von Otto Wigand, 1839): 285.

211. See Hegel, "Introduction" to the *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*: GW XII: 45–46, 53 (Sibree trans.: 31–32, 38).

Strauß did supplement Hegel's "Moral View of the World" with a 'genetic' ethical principle²¹² to account for humanity's dependence on new moral teaching to apply to its ever changing experience in the world.

The 'genetic' ethical principle here is that ever-new contexts of human agency require not only the retention of the moral insights (the *pre-figured*) of the 'great' ethicists of the past (here, he privileged Jesus but by no means placed Jesus at the pinnacle or even made him an exception) but also require the generating of new moral principles (the *con-figured* in conformity with the *pre-figured* insights) to guide human agency in its ever changing world. For this reason, he embraced a notion of the 'moral improvement' of humanity not as the ethical perfection of the individual in agreement with Hegel but as a species. As I will demonstrate, Strauß' 'scientific' view expressed at the end of his life in *Der alte und der neue Glaube* consisted of the conviction that physical laws govern experience and that humanity constitutes that location in the material order where nature has 'turned inward on itself' to consciousness, which along with living organisms itself is a product of natural causes according to Strauß, whereby nature continues its drive toward material progress.

Strauß' Hegelianism Blocked Appreciation of Kant's Paradigm Revolution

Undoubtedly, Strauß' failure to initiate a revolution was also because of the particular trajectory of his own Hegelian, philosophical theology. However, Strauß never developed anything like a philosophical theology as an alternative to Hegel although he had the resources at his fingertips in Immanuel Kant to do so.

It is clear that in 1864 with his second life of Jesus, *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People*, Strauß was, in fact, inspired by his close circle of friends in Heidelberg who called for a 'return to Kant.' All Hegelian language has long since disappeared, and Strauß' focus is on Jesus as a moral teacher whom Strauß portrayed by means of Kantian vocabulary, but not meaning.

Kant was distorted for Strauß by those upon whose judgment Strauß depended for his understanding of him. What I will describe as the '*pre-figured*' presentation that shaped Strauß' understanding of Kant (especially, F.C. Baur, Hegel, Schleiermacher, and Karl Daub) created a set of negative assumptions that effectively blocked Kant as a resource for him. I employ Strauß' reflections on Kant to illustrate how one always

212. In his "Schleiermacher und Daub," Strauß refers to a 'genetic criticism' in ethics analogous to the 'genetic development' of gospel mythic accounts of the history of Jesus: "Had Schleiermacher [...] given a genetic criticism of ethics up to our day and traced its development from the Greco-Roman world through the Christian-Germanic world into the modern world: At the end, as little as at any individual point of the investigation along the way would the result have been pure destruction, but, rather, each subsequent stage of development would have absorbed the earlier one as a moment in itself, and so at the end, the criticism would have stood there as rich in ethical insights as Schleiermacher's stands there poorly [...]" "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 30

commences with a pre-understanding of an author with the deciding issue being one's awareness (or lack of awareness) of the pre-understanding that has shaped what one claims to understand.

My positive engagement of Kant by no means ignores that most of his writing (the philosophical anthropology excepted), as well as Hegel's, is 'arid' and 'abstract.' However, examining Strauß' comments on Kant and examining the various sources for his reading of Kant, I believe, demonstrates the need for, and value of, 'going to Kant 'to encounter' him, not to 'counter him' – to this day. Despite the aridity and abstractness of his writing, one does not have to be a Kant scholar to grasp the importance of his insights.

An unfortunate consequence of the threat of censorship that drove Kant's need to present his insights veiled in the turgid vocabulary of the 'Academy,' which occurred, especially, with the writing of his *Religions within the Limits of mere Reason*. Kant has been taken by too many to be a standard for the prototype of erudition to be to write in an inaccessible style. Yet, Kant actually addressed the author's responsibility to her/his readers to encourage the reader's capacity of discernment because spoon feeding one's readers is an insult to their intelligence.:

Witty ideas [not reflecting and re-producing judgment] are thoughts shrouded in obscurity, which obscurity immediately dissipates [...] A witty idea does not need to be interpreted, because otherwise it becomes dull. The cause is surprise, when the mind is led to the meaning of the idea [...] A book, no matter how much reality it contains, will not please *if it does not conceal witty things under metaphorical expressions in a manner that the obscurity disappears by itself*. The reason for this is perhaps that the reader's powers of perception are also involved, and s/he can develop her/his capacities of discernment.²¹³

Rather than intellectual opaqueness, precision of thought always requires the acquisition of the metaphors appropriate to the themes at hand. The 'kernels' of the metaphoric language in Kant's case reward the reader with an astonishing fresh insight into the human condition and every day, responsible agency "when one reaches the point at which 'the obscurity disappears by itself.'" In other words, the aim of precision writing is to encourage reflection on the part of the reader, not enhance the intellectual reputation of the author.

However, Strauß' own reading of Kant was narrowly *pre-figured* by the work of those who influenced him early on in his philosophical theology and moral reflections, and it is clear that he never undertook his own serious reading of Kant to any

213. Kant, *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 874; Olms ed.: 25–26. Anticipating Ricoeur's creative *re-figuring* of an author's *con-figured* work, Kant writes: "If there is something in the product which animates unanimously through the whole, it is called spirit (*Geist*). A book may contain a great deal of wit, and be very entertaining but still be very far removed from spirit because wit is a kind of dainty work, which amuses, but need not come often, like sweets. Only true spirit calls for our own talents, and makes them similar to the original [spirit of an author's *con-figured* work]." *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1064; Olms ed.: 242.

degree like he had read others (for example, Baur, Schleiermacher, Schelling, Hegel, Daub, Spinoza, Jakob Böhme, etc.). Without a viable alternative, Strauß only had what even he acknowledged as an inadequate Reductionist Materialism as an alternative to Hegel.

For example, his materialism as expressed in *The Old and the New Faith* acknowledges a privileged status to consciousness in the material order. When he expresses his 'new faith' that consciousness is where nature 'turns inward on itself' to continue its onward progress,²¹⁴ his ignoring that consciousness adds elements to perception of the world that cannot be given in perception directly, results in his proclaiming a dogmatic dictum (*Machtspruch*) analogous to the Personal Theism that he rejected. In other words, Strauß insists (without the availability of any proof) that consciousness must (!) be solely a product of material nature²¹⁵ violates the very Principle of Sufficient Reason (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*) that 'something cannot come from nothing' that Strauß holds to so dearly. Consciousness is dependent upon matter, obviously, but in light of the fact that we only experience the effects of causes, not the causes directly, as well as consciousness involving teleology (establishing goals not given by nature) means that our causal explanations for consciousness will always remain conjectural, just as Kant pointed out.²¹⁶ How all this occurs, according to Strauß, is buried in the 'it must be so' logic of an 'is/ought' fallacy. Consciousness 'is' unequivocally experienced so that it 'ought' to have a material, causal explanation.

What follows in these two volumes on Strauß, then, is not merely an account of the context and an historical reader for the 1839 Zurich revolution sparked by David Friedrich Strauß' appointment to the University of Zurich. I take Strauß' work worthy of careful consideration for four primary reasons although I provide additional reasons, as well: 1) Strauß is important not only because of the unusual circumstance of a professor of theology causing a political revolution but also 2) because of the breadth, depth, and rigor of his gospel criticism in the *LJ* (1835) based on myth as 'husk' and 'kernel' as well as the 'genetic mythical principle.' 3) Furthermore, his extraordinary account of the history of Christian dogmatics in his *Glaubenslehre* (1841) demonstrates the inconsistencies and indefensibility internally to Christianity without the need to embrace an external, 'philosophical' point of view. Finally, 4) His epistemology and metaphysical reflections across his career that were initially fueled by Hegelianism, as exacting and thorough as they are and despite their diminishing influence on him, not only provide the occasion to follow a mind deeply shaped by his sources but also demonstrate what happens when one depends on the reading of others for one's

214. See Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 240

215. See Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 168–171

216. Already so formulated in his *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*, or *Essay on the Constitution and Mechanical Origin of the Entire Universe*, treated in accordance with Newtonian Principles (1755) AA I: 225–226. See the 'First Introduction' to Kant's *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA XX: 209; *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* AA IV, 544; and Volker Gerhardt, *Immanuel Kant. Vernunft und Leben* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2007): 312–314.

understanding – in Strauß' case, the unfortunate portrayal of Immanuel Kant that he had from those who influenced him.

My thesis is that, by the end of his career, Strauß had no adequate alternative to replace his 'speculative,' Hegelian metaphysics. A close reading of his final work, *The Old and the New Faith*, proposes that Strauß by no means ended up a 'mere' materialist. In other words, he had not (!) contradicted Ralph Waldo Emerson's claim that "Every materialist will be an idealist; but an idealist can never go backward to be a materialist."²¹⁷

In short, my goal is to reward the reader's time not through mere 'information transfer' of *re-producing* judgment concerning Strauß' intellectual odyssey (over which the accuracy and exhaustiveness can always be debated) but to trace Strauß' epistemological and metaphysical trajectory as an exercise in *reflecting* judgment.²¹⁸ This project is a demonstration of the consequences that occur when clever thinkers (already the case with Johann Gottlieb Fichte, but also Schelling, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Daub, and Baur, not to speak of Nietzsche) distorted and warped Kant's Critical Idealism. *Status and prestige is no substitute for careful and informed scholarship.* Already at the end of the 18th C, there was an alternative limb available on which to crawl even if it was ignored by Strauß in the 19th C!

217. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "The Transcendentalist:" 87.

218. On the difference between *reflecting* and *re-producing* judgment, see the "Introduction:" 86, n. 26.

Chapter 2: Strauß Who? What? Why Does It Matter?

Chapter Overview

The chapter examines the sources for the concept of 'myth' in biblical scholarship that Strauß employs and demonstrates that there was nothing revolutionary in his application of it, other than the exhaustiveness of his application to all of the narratives of the gospels. Strauß was convinced that myth and science were compatible, not antitheses. The landscape of gospel scholarship in the face of modern science of the time was divided between the 'Supernaturalist' reading that denied 'science' and the Rationalist reading that distorted the text to preserve 'science' in the text. Strauß presents the 'Supernaturalist' and the 'Rationalist' reading for each gospel narrative followed by the 'Mythic' reading as a third option that embraces 'science' and preserves the text as it appears. In the *Life of Jesus Critically Examined*, Strauß utilized the Hegelian 'scientific' epistemology of perceptible representations (*Form*) and concealed 'ideas' (*Inhalt*) to defend (!) the Christian Doctrine of Incarnation. In the *LJ* the ultimate, concealed meaning preserved by the gospel texts is recognized in the logic of the Double Negation dialectic of the Hegelian meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit becoming conscious of Itself in the God/Man. The unstated agenda of the 'Mythic' reading, though, is that, when it comes to the reading of the scriptures, what is at stake is not the historical evidence of the text that determines exegesis (and the Christian faith) but the theology that the gospel authors employed to generate their texts and the reader's theology that governs her/his eisegesis of understanding the text.

Strauß' Sources for Application of the Concept 'Myth' to the Bible

Just as Strauß in the *LJ* employed Hegel's *pre-figured* epistemology of content (idea) and representations (form) in order to distinguish between the 'kernel' (historical fact, philosophical/theological idea, and/or poetic symbol) and the 'husk' (the literal biblical narrative) and just as he employed Hegel's Second Negation of the meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit to formulate his own universal, *inclusive* Christology, so, too, his '*genetic mythical principle*' was *pre-figured* by the work of others (especially Wilhelm Krug and the author of the anonymous article, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten in welchen und für welche der Biograph Jesu arbeiten kann"¹ ["The Different Aspects with which and for which a Biographer of Jesus can work"]).

By no means the creator of the "mythic" interpretation of the Jewish-Christian scriptures, there is no name more readily associated with this hermeneutic strategy than David Friedrich Strauß. However, an examination of those who influenced his understanding of myth helps our understanding of what he was really trying to accomplish with his gospel exegesis. His aim was surely not to destroy the historical basis of the gospels.

1. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten in welchen und für welche der Biograph Jesu arbeiten kann" ["The Different Perspectives in which and for which the Biographer of Jesus can work"] in *Kritisches Journal der neuesten theologischen Literatur* 5 [1816]: 225–245

Strauß himself readily acknowledges his indebtedness to what is called the "Mythic School" of biblical scholarship that was centered in Göttingen, Germany, not Tübingen, and which began in the 18th C, more than a generation before Strauß. It's most well-known representatives were the "Old" Testament scholars Johann Gottfried Eichhorn (1752–1827) and Johann Philipp Gabler (1753–1826), who first applied to the "Old" Testament Christian Gottlob Heyne's (1729–1812) insights into the "mythical" as a "necessary developmental stage of human consciousness."² However, others played a crucial role in Strauß' use of the '*genetic mythical principle*,' which Wilhelm Krug formulated in his article "An Attempt with Respect to the Genetic or Formal Manner of Explaining Miracles"³ of 1803.

Yet, Horton Harris proposes that as late as 1832, when Strauß formulated his plans for a project in gospel criticism,⁴ "[...] the remarkable thing [...] is the complete absence of the mythical interpretation [...] He [Strauß] recognized only the presence of individual myths in the Gospels, [*sic.*] but had not yet discovered the [genetic,] mythical principle."⁵ Harris attributes Strauß' development after 1832 of his "most original mythical principle,"⁶ which "[...] derived the Gospel stories from the Old Testament narratives by means of an unconscious mythologizing process,"⁷ to his reading of four authors (although Harris actually discusses eight⁸) who advocated the mythical viewpoint "if only in a still undeveloped form."⁹ This 'viewpoint' is not that the bible consists of falsehoods but that the stories in the bible are the product of a process by which past expectations with respect to a biblical theme shaped the understanding and text of the later evangelical authors:

- I) "E.F."s (an anonymous author) 1796 "Contributions to the Clarification of the first two Chapters in Matthew and Luke,"¹⁰ claimed that the story of the virgin

2. See Chapter II of Hartlich and Sachs, *Der Ursprung des Mythosbegriffes*.

3. See the discussion of Krug: 40, n. 16.

4. See Ziegler, I: 123–124.

5. Horton Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 46.

6. To be sure, hardly original!

7. Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 263. Although clearly, this 'mythical principle' comes from Wilhelm Krug some 30 years before Strauß wrote the *LJ*.

8. Harris gives no documentation to justify his cherry picking of these four/eight authors as the source of Strauß' reflections on myth. I have provided references to the authors in the first and fourth editions of the *LJ* where the author is actually cited. Strauß, though, is clearly indebted to many author predecessors for his understanding of myth as he acknowledges in §§s 8–12 of the first edition of the *LJ* and §§s 8–14 of the fourth edition. Just why Harris chooses to discuss only these four/eight authors is unclear.

9. Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 265–266. The only thing left 'undeveloped' was a detailed, systematic application of the genetic mythical principle to the four gospels.

10. E.F. (Anonymous), "Beiträge zur Aufklärung über die beiden ersten Kapitel im Mattäus und Lucas" in *Magazin für Religionsphilosophie, Exegese und Kirchengeschichte*, V (1796): 146–181. Strauß cites this article in the first edition of *LJ*: 43, n. 2 and the fourth edition: 59, n. 2. Strauß points out that E.F. has not clearly distinguished among "natural explanations," "the historical-mythical," and

birth was derived from Isaiah 7:14 "[...] because it was the common belief at the time of Jesus that the Messiah would be born of a virgin. 'So then, this text also must refer to Jesus; if he were the Messiah, then he must have been born of a virgin.'" ¹¹

- II) An anonymous book, *Revelation and Mythology*¹² claimed that the idea of what the Messiah should be [...] was in fact actually present before Jesus appeared. The hopes, desires and longings of the poor, the suffering, the blind and the lame stretched out towards the arrival of their deliverer and his appearance could not be otherwise than the picture painted in the stories which preceded him. "A helper will come out of Judah: the exact portrayal of this helper was sketched before he came."¹³

"This man had to be the Christ [...] whom they had previously seen in the Old Testament prophecies. He must and would do everything that they wanted him to do."¹⁴

- III) Georg Lorenz Bauer, *Hebrew Mythology of the Old and New Testament with Parallels from the Mythology of Other Peoples, Primarily the Greeks and Romans*.¹⁵

Harris inserts four additional authors influenced by G. L. Bauer:

Wilhelm Krug "An Attempt with Respect to the Genetic or Formal Manner of Explaining Miracles"¹⁶ in which *Krug distinguished between the genetic explanation of the way in which miracle stories arose from the 'natural' or 'rationalistic' explanation*. These stories were not intended to deceive but obtained accruals through oral transmission until written down by the evangelists.¹⁷

Georg Conrad Horst (in his "On the first two Chapters of Luke"¹⁸ referred to the

"philosophical mythi" (first edition of the *LJ*: 45; fourth edition of the *LJ*: 61 – more clearly formulated by "other authors" (see first edition of the *LJ*: 29–30; fourth edition of the *LJ*: 53.

11. Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 266. Strauß refers to this article in the first edition of the *LJ*: 43, n. 2; in the fourth edition: 59, n. 2.

12. Anonymous, *Über Offenbarung und Mythologie* (Berlin: Verlag der Königlichen Akademie der Kunst und Buchhandlung, 1799). I find no reference to this text in Strauß' *LJ*.

13. Anonymous, *Über Offenbarung und Mythologie*: 98. From Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 267 and n. 21.

14. Anonymous, *Über Offenbarung und Mythologie*: 103. From Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 267.

15. Georg Lorenz Bauer, *Hebräische Mythologie des alten und neuen Testaments mit Parallelen aus der Mythologie anderer Völker, vornehmlich der Griechen und Römer*, 2 Vols. (Leipzig: Weygand, 1802). Cited frequently by Strauß beginning in §8 of both the first and fourth editions of the *LJ*.

16. Wilhelm Krug, "Versuch über die genetische oder formelle Erklärungsart der Wunder." From Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 267.

17. Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 267–268.

18. Strauß refers to and cites Georg Conrad Horst's "Über die beiden ersten Kapitel des Lukas" in *Henke's Museum für Religionswissenschaft*, 1/4 (1803): 693 ff. in the first edition of the *LJ*: 36–37 and n.

Lucan narratives "as a work of fiction and constantly referred to the author as 'the poet.'"¹⁹

J.C. Greiling's²⁰ "Psychological experiment on the psychological cure of the raving Gerasene Demoniac" rejected Krug's genetic/formal distinction to claim that the narratives should be understood psychologically.

Johann Philipp Gabler's review of G. L. Bauer's *Hebrew Mythology*²¹ recommended distinguishing between historical and philosophical myths.²²

- IV) Most significantly, though, was the anonymous article, "The different Perspectives with which and for which a biographer of Jesus can work" that was published in 1816.²³

This last article is cited twice in the "Introduction" to the *LJ*.²⁴ It is a remarkable document and rewards closer attention, especially for grasping its influence on Strauß but also for anticipating much gospel scholarship that followed. The author proposes four considerations when it comes to work on a biography of Jesus:

- A. One must consider the differences between kinds of reading with some concerned for history, others for doctrine.²⁵
- B. One must consider differences in perspective, which over the 2000 year history of Christianity have moved among wisdom, justice, healing, and salvation.²⁶
- C. One must consider differences in method: history, myth, and a mixture of both.²⁷

14, and he refers to Horst in the fourth edition: 56 with no citation to a work. Strauß also refers to and cites G.K. Horst's "Ideen über Mythologie" in *Henke's neuem Magazin*, 6: 454 in the first edition of the *LJ*: 40 and n. 4, but the references don't appear in the fourth edition. Strauß cites: "According to Horst, Christianity is mystical in its original nature, i.e. it moves only in inner feelings and ideas; but already Christianity's original founders, and still more subsequently, related these ideas to certain objects and facts, and as soon as mysticism transfers its thoughts and feelings out of itself and to external objects, it is mythology." *LJ* (first edition): 40.

19. Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 268.

20. J.C. Greiling, "Psychologischer Versuch über die psychische Kur des tobsüchtigen Gergaseners". Cited by Harris from Krug's "Versuch über die genetische [...]" 620–654. Cited in the first edition of the *LJ*: 55, 56, and n. 7; fourth edition of *LJ*: 67–68.

21. Gabler's review appeared as "Hebräische Mythologie des alten und neuen Testaments," von G.L. Bauer. Erster und zweiter Band" in the *Journal für auserlesene theologische Literatur*, II/1 (1805): 39–59. Bauer's *Hebräische Mythologie des alten und neuen Testaments*, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Weygandschen Buchhandlung, 1802) is cited several times in the *LJ*.

22. Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 268.

23. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten in welchen und für welche der Biograph Jesu arbeiten kann" ["The different Perspectives with which and for which a biographer of Jesus can work"] in *Kritisches Journal der neuesten theologischen Literatur* 5 [1816]: 225–245.

24. See Strauß, *LJ*; 57, n. 10 and 61, n. 7.

25. See Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 226–228.

26. See Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 229.

27. See Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 230.

D. One must consider the enthusiasm for the creative process represented by myth.²⁸

Here is a summary of the autonomous author's observations and conclusions with respect to these four themes:

A: On the different kinds of reading of the gospels as history or doctrine:

Christ is not only a teacher who lived and taught at a particular point in chronological history, but he was also the object of teaching as ultimate grounding of Christian claims.²⁹ "[...] Christianity consists [...] not only of moral principles but also of propositions that serve as the basis for those moral principles."³⁰ As teacher and the object of teaching interest in the Christ is twofold:

1) A purely historical interest:

The focus is merely on the teacher, his personality and deeds, and presents the history of a man who achieved something at a particular time, at a particular place, under particular circumstances that posterity admired as great and good.³¹

Particularly important for Strauß' Hegelianism in the *LJ*: "The purely historical perspective leaves to a broader philosophical discussion whether what occurred was miraculous or natural and is satisfied to know what actually happened."³²

2) A dogmatic interest:

The highest aim is not his (Jesus') teaching but he himself. Jesus' teaching is "only instruction on how we should reach the salvation that he offered."³³

Important for Strauß, here the author proposes that the text, dogmatically, is structured by an "external" husk and an "internal" kernel: For pious faith, "History is only external husk, only the shell, of a more beautiful fruit."³⁴ (228)

28. See Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 244–245.

29. See Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 226.

30. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 226.

31. See Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 227.

32. See Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 227–228.

33. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 228.

34. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 228.

B. Classification of the unlimited variety of readers of the gospels:

The anonymous author distinguishes here between readers 1) according to the extent of their education and 2) their sense of religion:

With respect to education, the author distinguishes among 'academics' and 'non-academics.' He includes under 'academics' α) Theologians, who are further divided between academic researchers and populist teachers, and β) non-Theologians.

Non-Academics can be educated (reflecting) and uneducated (coarse) adults or children.³⁵

With respect to their sense of religion, the author distinguishes between a) Believers who can be either α) Enthusiastic/rapturous (*schwärmerische*) and hyper-Orthodox or β) Scrutinizing or b) Non-believers who can be doubters or despisers of religion.³⁶

For each of these groups the presentation of history is, obviously, going to be different.

C. On the differences in basic perspectives (*Gesichtspunkte*)

Here the author distinguishes among three perspective: [1] true, pure history; [2] myth; or [3] a mixture of true history and myth.³⁷

[1] True, pure history takes there to be an alternative between treating the miraculous as factual history or explaining them naturally.³⁸

As miraculous [*wunderbare*], the entire biblical account is taken to be a literal documentation of a miracle because the hero of the story is a miracle.³⁹ The author recognizes that "[a] very venerable succession of scholars and believers, equipped with a most significant apparatus of erudition and acumen, contend for them"⁴⁰ as literal accounts of factual events.

When it comes to treating the gospel narratives as a natural history, we encounter the reading of the Rationalists. This reading :

[...] sees everywhere only actions following the ordinary course of events; which is why it partly *excludes the incomprehensible and partly makes it comprehensible through conjectures and additions*. The obscurities and apparent miracles fall, thereby, to the wayside, accountable from unfamiliarity with the time, people, country, and language of the age – if one doesn't want to indict the short-sightedness or the fidelity of the writers. If this natural history is to be carried out consistently, then it must inevitably, with a lot of arbitrariness,

35. See Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 229.

36. See Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 229–230.

37. See Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 230.

38. See Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 230.

39. See Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 230.

40. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 231.

strip the sacred and divine, and degrade itself to a vain entertainment reading, which only usurps the name of history.⁴¹ (emphasis added)

Opposed to this natural history approach to the biography of Jesus is α) an entirely unhistorical approach, "which takes the liberty of supplementing original records with conjectures and takes speculations literally"⁴² with history and literature standing in open conflict.⁴³ This conflict results in an often highly forced dogmatic reading that is always an inexplicable effort to portray naturally what the documents have presented as a miracle. Such a reading "reaches its culmination in [the Heidelberg biblical scholar Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob] Paulus's *Commentary*."⁴⁴

In his *LJ*, Strauß takes Paulus as the paradigmatic example of Rationalist exegesis. Strauß agrees with the anonymous author that: "[...] it appears to be far more natural to cover the fact with a mythic husk rather than want to make [rationally] graspable the clear [miraculous] text of the evangelists."⁴⁵ Strauß further agrees with the anonymous author that:

It is a serious deception if one thinks that the dignity of the Bible and religiousness are served [...] [by such an unhistorical approach]. On the contrary, nothing has been more detrimental to the dignity of the Bible and the respect due to it than this very arbitrariness with which it has been treated.⁴⁶

The anonymous author concludes his discussion of the text as 'pure history': "In a word, how can there be respect for a book [the bible] in which one may capriciously jump around with the text, its authors, and its contents as one pleases?"⁴⁷

[2] The anonymous author then turns to address the mythic perspective: "[...]the stories are left as they are. One doesn't attempt to twist or transform them but views them entirely not as true history but takes them to be sacred legends."⁴⁸ [This is exactly the position that Strauß takes!]

Here the anonymous author refers to Gabler's distinction between historical and philosophical myths, but our anonymous author distances himself from the implicit, infinite regress that Gabler's 'middle way' implies:

This view does not deny that most of the reports may be based on something that really happened; but it does not want to strip what is real of the mythical garment in which it is wrapped by doubting how much belongs to this and how much to that. Even *the middle*

41. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 231.

42. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 231.

43. See Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 232.

44. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 232.

45. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 233.

46. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 234.

47. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 234.

48. See Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 235.

way proposed by Gabler in the *New Theological Journal* (7. B. p. 386 ff.), according to which this astute scholar applied a prehistory to the history of the N.T., as well, that consisted of a division into historical and philosophical myths (i.e. which are based on either a fact or an idea) (235/236). T. (235/236) does not seem necessary to us here because we consider it more advisable to abstain completely from any judgment about the origin of the individual myths⁴⁹ for the attempts to explain them must necessarily be just as unstable and uncertain [...] ⁵⁰ (emphasis added)

The anonymous author calls for the application to the 'New Testament' of the 'mythic perspective' that had been applied to the First Testament by Gabler, de Wette, and others.⁵¹ [No one accomplished this task more rigorously than Strauß' with the writing of his *LJ*.]

The anonymous author draws an analogy with the entirety of the political and religious spheres in the Ancient World and asks: "If now it can be proven that the stories of N.T. are as similar to the myths of profane and sacred antiquity as one eye is to another, should we not be justified in considering them myths as well?"⁵² (emphasis added) In the absence of 'proof' that the conclusion is justified, the anonymous author writes:

[...] we only draw attention to some similarities in which profane and Old Testament myth strikingly coincides with the evangelical story. If Jesus is born of a virgin, without the help of a man, who does not find there Hercules, the Disocuri [Castor and Polydeukes, sons of Zeus], Romulus, Alexander etc.? Who does not remember that virgin in the middle tower of the temple of Belus [in Babylon] who, according to Herodotus, gave birth to the Babylonian priests? Who should not remember that also the OT lets strange men always be born by such mothers who would not have given birth according to the natural course of things; e.g. Isaac, Samson, Samuel, John? The prophets of the OT are in many respects to be compared with Jesus, true types, which the evangelical history has copied. Especially between Elisha and Jesus there are many striking similarities, which, if it is a myth for Elisha, must also be a myth for Jesus. Elisha awakens the son of Sunamitan (2 Kings 4); Jesus the young man of Nain, Jairus's daughter, and Lazarus. Elisha feeds 100 men with little bread and blesses the widow's jar of flour; Jesus feeds 500 men (2 Kings R. coll. John 6 and Mark 8). Elisha and Jesus heal from leprosy; both pass through water (2 Kings 2. Coll. Matth. 14, 25 [...]) [B]oth [Elisha and Jesus] know to blind those sent against them (2 Kings 6, 18. Coll. Joh. 18, 6); both have a multitude of invisible protectors (2 Kings 67, 17. Coll. Matth. 26, 53. 4, 11. Luc. 22, 43). Another prophet Elijah is elevated alive to heaven, Elisha watches; so with Jesus and his apostles (2 Kings 2, 12. Coll. Act. 1, 9. 10). Who fails to recognize the same spirit! Jesus should not be inferior to the miraculous men of the OT. In the same spirit, the legends of Christian antiquity are connected to myths of foundation by attributing all miraculous deeds and events of evangelical history also to the saints. Yes, just as one adds more and more to later stories that follow, so also the legends let not only Mary (like earlier Enoch, Elias, Jesus,

49. Strauß, as well, does not attempt to explain the origin of the individual mythic prototypes. The genetic mythical principle begins with the prototype without seeking to explain its origin.

50. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 235–236.

51. See Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 236.

52. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 237.

Romulus) go to heaven alive (see Jacob de Varagine, The Golden Legend), but even let her little house be carried to Loretto by the angels; and let not only the persons, but also the things (relics) responsible for them perform miracles. In such manner sacred legend extends to all times down to toothpicks used to treat toothache, which were made from Luther's deathbed, and the rags from his often-repaired cloak, which were sold to heal epilepsy.⁵³ (238–239) (emphasis added)

[Clearly, Strauß has a predecessor here for his 'genetic, mythical principle!']

Our anonymous author then points out that the 'mythic' reading of the text is untouchable by criticism. He lists such 'historical' issues as the dating of Easter, harmonizing the Synoptics with the Gospel of John, the frequent reference to the 'higher nature' of Christ are unique to Revelation, and, although s/he clearly takes the Griesbach hypotheses that claims Matthew to have been the first to author a gospel to mean that Mark has no significance, s/he concludes that these 'historical' issues are all irrelevant from the mythic perspective.⁵⁴ Our author asks rhetorically and ironically: *"If the narratives are so [literally] transparent, why these ['historical'] differences?"⁵⁵ "All that is offensive in Jesus' life is resolved when one removes the mythic husk [...]"⁵⁶*

Furthermore, the anonymous author finds it incomprehensible that Jesus could speak of the secrets of the Kingdom of God without accepting the popular belief in devil possession/demons.⁵⁷ *Strauß points out that demon possession is a phenomenon that emerges only in the Intertestamental Period between the First and Second Testament.⁵⁸* The anonymous author writes:

I readily admit that, in my opinion, the popular belief in the possession of devils and other delusions was so deeply rooted that it would have been unwise, even impossible, to really fight it in popular discourse; but that Jesus should not have given a hint about it to those who were destined to know the secrets of the kingdom of God (Matth. 13, 11) [...] is incomprehensible to me [...] It would be treason against mankind if Jesus himself had better insights, and the evangelists tell simply a mere story [...] Should the one who came into the world to spread truth, who would rather die than act against his convictions, have accepted so eagerly such a highly unwise (*sit venia verbo* [excuse the expression]) doctrine? Certainly not.⁵⁹

53. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 238–239.

54. See Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 239.

55. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 240.

56. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 241.

57. See Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 241.

58. See Strauß, *LJEGP*: 426, 446, and 454–455.

59. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 241.

Our author then asks: "[W]ould we rather let Jesus himself be ignorant, or unwise hide the truth,⁶⁰ than to admit that the whole demonology of the N.T. was not in Jesus, but in his later mythical biographers?"⁶¹

[McG: Strauß, of course, doesn't attribute the demonology stories to the capricious construction of the gospel authors. He takes them to arise out of the general application of the 'genetic mythical principle' in the Early Church Just as the gospel authors gleaned the First Testament for miracle stories that their 'Lord' had to have outperformed, so, too, Jesus had to have been sovereign over the new 'popularly believed' dominion of demons.]

When it comes to the absence of reference to Jesus of Nazareth among the 'profane' authors of his day, the anonymous author is not surprised. Profane authors were unaware of Jesus because they didn't and couldn't know anyone as he is portrayed in the gospels: "[...] [P]rofane historians didn't know Jesus, I [the anonymous author] add, because he never existed as the gospel narratives (the holy legend) present him."⁶²

[3] The anonymous author then turns to the third perspective of the 'mixed' version of history and myth.⁶³ This mixed version is either a mixture of the historical-mythic or the mythic-historical depending upon whether history or myth prevails.⁶⁴ Unwilling to surrender all history, "[...] both parties believe they can unite [history and myth] by this middle way – a smug effort that the strict Supernaturalist would declare heretical and over which the Rationalist would laugh."⁶⁵

Because these mediators would like to make comprehensible whatever is possible, they incur all the reproaches that are rightly made against them by natural history. However, because they also give space to myth, the complaint of inconsistency hits them with all its severity and weighs all the more heavily because this reproach is the worst that can be made against a scholar. It asserts a contradiction of the author with himself. Moreover, the procedure of these eclectics is the most arbitrary because they often decide on entirely subjective grounds what belongs to myth and what to history [...]⁶⁶

60. Strauß points out in the *Christ of Faith and Jesus of History* of 1865 that Schleiermacher chose to invoke Plato's 'Noble Lie' to avoid the issue. The disciples didn't ask so that Jesus wasn't obligated to deny. See Strauß' discussion of Schleiermacher's 'middle ground' between objectively false and subjectively true: 316.

Schleiermacher's translation of the *Republic* 414b-c is 'untadeligen und heilsamen Täuschungen' ('blameless and wholesome deceptions'), by means of which 'es sei löblich, durch Täuschung zu überreden' ('it is praiseworthy to persuade by deception').

61. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 241–242.

62. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 243.

63. See Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 243.

64. See Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 245.

65. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 243.

66. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 243–244.

D. The anonymous author concludes by expressing respect for the creative energy that the gospels have unleashed having clearly expressed her/his preference for the mythic character of the text:

The last consideration, in and for which the story of Jesus can be treated [...] is, namely, the great diversity of formal presentation that this very modest material allows. There is almost no form of presentation that has not been tried on this subject that one can't apply to it. Poets, orators, ascetics, historians, pedagogues, all have in their own way mastered the material and added their own. Thus, not only several ancients, e.g., Virgilius Christianus. but also among the moderns, Klopstock and v. Halem, worked the heroic material into real epic poems; Ramler and others sang about individual parts of the life of Jesus in cantatas; others dramatized it. The homily writers found here the most beautiful texts for edifying reflections. Hess and Greiling narrate rationally, only from different points of view and for different readers, the former broadly, the latter in ornamented presentation. Feddersen and Wilmsen, as well as the picture-bibles and biblical stories, written for children, either for edification, as preparation for religious instruction, or even just for useful entertainment; each in his own way. Thus, the diversity of form has no less a share in the ever-renewed treatment of a subject, which already with respect to its subject matter has so much appeal.⁶⁷

The anonymous author presciently celebrates the yet unrealized significance of the '*genetic mythical principle*' as an expression of the creativity that is '*threefold mimesis*.' What s/he overlooks with this engine of innovation is its implicit 'is'/'ought' fallacy. Are all readings of the text acceptable? Are there criteria for valuing a reading over another? One can take the anonymous author's conclusion to be an embracing of uncritical tolerance that 'lets a million flowers bloom' as all of equal worth.

Although the anonymous author *pre-figures* the 'genetic, mythical principle,' Horton Harris claims that

[...] Strauss' [...] exposition of the mythical principle [...] was quite distinct [...] [T]he mythical school of Heyne and his successors was concerned with individual myths (where myths are equated with fables) and not, as was Strauß, with the mythical principle. Strauss' theory differs significantly from all previous mythical interpretations in that the mythical principle which he employed [*sic*.] derived the Gospel stories from the Old Testament narratives by means of an unconscious mythologizing process.⁶⁸

This is a problematic formulation. Strauß did not take the '*genetic mythical principle*' to be an unconscious, but precisely, a *conscious* mythologizing process, and the anonymous author of "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten" ("The different Perspectives with which and for which a biographer of Jesus can work") in welchen und für welche der Biograph Jesu arbeiten kann") is thinking far more broadly than individual mythic narratives as s/he addresses the gospels as a whole.

67. Anonymous, "Die verschiedenen Rücksichten:" 244–245.

68. Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 265.

Harris also claims that Strauß' mythic reading of the gospels didn't occur until after 1832,⁶⁹ but he had already engaged Christian Gottlob Heyne's understanding of myth and the congruence between Greek, other ancient myths, and the First Testament as sagas in his school days in Blaubeuren under Prof. Friedrich Heinrich Kern,⁷⁰ who moved to Tübingen along with Ferdinand Christian Bauer to be Strauß' professors there. Harris' own sources for his thesis as well as Strauß' account in the *LJ* contradict soundly Harris' claim that Strauß didn't engage the issue of the 'mythic' until 1832.

What is extraordinary, though, when it comes to Strauß' *LJ* is the rigor and breadth with which he demonstrated the *genetic mythical principle* as, clearly, providing the most congruent accounting for the development of the gospel stories concerning Jesus' ministry and his status as the God/Man.

Rather than insist as does Traditional Personal Theism that the text be reduced to *a source of historical information* about God's actions in history or *factual, historical information* about Jesus of Nazareth, Strauß' *Life of Jesus Critically Examined (LJ)* of 1835 portrayed the *creative, religious character* of the scriptures' authors. An appreciation of this "poetic" (creative) character of the text recognizes that the bible's significance and power consists not to the extent that it is "historically factual" but far more because the text is a classic example of the power of the imagination for constructing narratives of understanding and explanation that preserve and communicate crucial insights into the human condition – not that the scriptures are merely concerned with whether humanity is incapable (or capable) of being a moral creature. Strauß clearly is a forerunner of Norman Perrin's notion of gospel literary criticism based on the evangelist as author.⁷¹

Furthermore, we need not insist that the text is entirely historical or to employ a fine fish net to cull out the tiny tidbits of historical "truth" in the text from which we retroactively *construct and argue for Jesus as a religious leader* (as Political or Religious Messiah, a poor man's Socrates, a Stoic, a Cynic, a vehicle to personal divinization, a solution to the Augustinian problem of original sin, etc.).

Horton Harris is surely correct when he points out that in the *LJ* Strauß' criticism of the gospels was *not* purely destructive⁷² although it is difficult to imagine how Harris sees anything positive in Strauß when he writes: "Strauss' *Life of Jesus* was the most intellectually reasoned attack [*sic.*] which has ever been mounted against Christianity."⁷³ Harris maintains that Strauß substituted for the presuppositions of

69. See Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 46, 265, 270.

70. See Ziegler I: 22–23.

71. See Perrin, "The Evangelist as Author: 5–18. Perrin's literary criticism emphasizes the theological agenda of the author. It is not the literary criticism of so-called 'synchronic,' reader response criticism in contrast to 'diachronic,' historical critical criticism.

72. Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 276.

73. Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 281–182.

Personal Theism the presuppositions of Hegelianism along with the corollary that "[...]the world was regarded as a closed system of natural laws."⁷⁴ However, he is wrong with his claim that Strauß merely "[...] was more a practical thinker; he thought logically rather than in a deeply reflective way [...]. [H]e had little interest in complex epistemological problems which [*sic.*] had little relevance for his life."⁷⁵

Although, as I pointed out in Chapter 1, Horton Harris follows Hartlich/Sachs in the claim that "[...] *the mythical principle is entirely independent of Hegelian philosophy*,"⁷⁶ Harris proposes that Strauß' 'attack on Christianity' "[...] replaced one presupposition [God is a personal deity] by its direct antithesis [God is no personal but an immanent deity] [...]"⁷⁷ It is difficult to imagine how an 'attack on Christianity' can occur on the basis of 'the mythical principle' by someone who has 'replaced one presupposition of God by its direct antithesis' on the basis of Hegelian philosophy *and simultaneously declare that 'the mythical principle is entirely independent of Hegelian philosophy.'*

Yet Harris, as the case with Christian Hartlich, appears to have his own response to Strauß' theistic dichotomy. Harris takes this theistic dichotomy to underscore the capriciousness of theological presuppositions to justify questioning "whether a presuppositionless investigation is possible at all?"⁷⁸ His implication is that there is no adjudicating among presuppositions so that Personal Theism's personal deity remains somehow a 'rational' option.⁷⁹

All Strauss' historical judgments were determined in advance by the philosophical presupposition that miracles do not and cannot occur, which in turn was derived from the prior presupposition that there is no transcendent personal God. This assumption [...] was only one of two possibilities. Either there is such a God (as has always been held by the traditional Christian faith), or there is not. If not, then any supernatural intervention of God in the world is also impossible⁸⁰ [...] What may be criticized in Strauss' methodology

74. Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 277.

75. Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 277. As if 'complex epistemological problems' have 'little relevance' for life? This charge against Strauß sounds more like a Nietzschean clever dismissal of Strauß. Perhaps the only criticism of Strauß by Nietzsche that is correct, is his observation that he never carefully studied Kant. See Friedrich Nietzsche, "David Strauß. Der Bekenner und der Schriftsteller:" 164. If not echoing Nietzsche, though, Harris' criticism applies more to the 'impatience' and 'laziness' of contemporary theology today than it does Strauß.

76. Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 270. See Chapter 1: "Methodology:" 143 ff.

77. Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 284.

78. Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 284.

79. Not all presuppositions are equal. Some are merely speculative, whereas others are required for us to be able to experience, understanding, and responsibly exercise our agency (for example, the conviction that causal systems are governed by imperceptible lawfulness and the capacities of transcendental consciousness that allow us to add things not given directly with the phenomena of experience).

80. This is a superficial alternative and treats the metaphor 'supernatural' as a univocal sign. God's presence in the world is either that of a 'Personal Deity' who is capable of capriciously violating the laws or nature, or it is not. There are, of course, other theological alternatives that include Spinozian

is that the presupposition that there is no God was simply taken for granted as proved and not held tentatively as one of two valid possibilities.⁸¹

The 'assumption' that Strauß denies the existence of God is patently absurd. Harris is assuming that the denial of a 'Personal God' is a blanket denial of any and all conception of God.

If God is dead, or if he never existed, then Strauss' arguments must be conceded. But [*sic.*] if there is a personal God who created the universe, then his power to break into history and to suspend his physical laws for the sake of higher spiritual laws⁸² must be conceded.⁸³

Harris measures the significance of Strauß in terms of Strauß' confronting the theological world only with a simplistic alternative: Personal Theism or the Death of God. He presumes that theology neither prior, nor subsequent, to Strauß has involved other options for thinking about God than Personal Theism. This is an astonishing claim. Especially, in the *generation before Strauß*, the Kantian 'Copernican Turn,' offers a theological alternative not only to Personal Theism and Pantheism but also to all other theological options, and Kant acknowledges the 'reality' of God without literal anthropomorphism (even leaving open the issue of 'Personal Theism'). All other theological options (animism, polytheism, henotheism, monotheism, pantheism, dipolar theism's pan-*en*-theism, and mysticism), which also includes Personal Theism, involve the anthropomorphic elevation of humanity onto the 'throne of God.'⁸⁴

Strauß wrestled deeply with Hegel. Whereas the *LJ* was shaped by Hegelian epistemology and metaphysics, within a few years of the *LJ*, he left most of Hegel behind.⁸⁵ In the *LJ*, not only is his understanding of myth anchored in Hegelian epistemology, but also he is convinced that Hegel's logic of Double Negation is grounded in the Absolute Knowledge of Spirit's Self-awareness occurring in human consciousness, which avoids requiring belief in miracles (as in the case of Personal Theism) and/or either distorting of the text or deception on the part of Jesus and his disciples (as

'immanentism,' Process Theology's 'dipolar theism,' and, not least, Kant's theology of a non-literal anthropomorphic, yet required, ultimate cause to the universe.

81. Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 283. Harris repeats that theology is reducible to two options: "either there is a transcendent personal God, [*sic.*] or there is not." Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 284.

82. This is Scholastic 'Occasionalism'/'Voluntarism' based on Aristotelianism's placing God's 'will' before 'thought' in contrast to Scholastic 'Intellectualism' based on Platonic ideas. Harris completely ignores the literal anthropomorphism involved in these arguments for God much less recognizes that there are other theological alternatives than merely these two or acknowledges Kant's 'symbolic' anthropomorphic theism.

83. Harris, *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 284.

84. This 'throne' itself is based on an anthropomorphic analogy, of course.

85. A glaring exception is Strauß' remaining consistently shaped by Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" from the *Phenomenology*, which takes moral duty to be ethically unachievable. See the "Preface:" 51, n. 47.

in the case of Rationalism). Rather, and in agreement with the Anonymous Author of "The Different Perspectives in which and for which the Biographer of Jesus can work,"⁸⁶ *Strauß' Hegelianism in the LJ allows the text to be exactly what it is because it is merely the perceptible representations* (the husks of stories) *of imperceptible truths* (the kernels of a historical fact, a philosophical idea, and/or a poetic enhancement). Strauß' methodology involves far more than a theistic presupposition in opposition to Traditional (anthropomorphic) Theism.

However, not only are there grounds for concluding that few if any of either Strauß' opponents *or supporters* (!) actually read him.⁸⁷ There is also little evidence that his work on Christian doctrine, the *Glaubenslehre*, has ever been seriously engaged. For example, there is no English translation of it. However, even when it comes to the *LJ*, almost all of the references by his readers and commentators are limited to engagement of the "Conclusion" in its various editions. Few refer to the "Introduction," where Strauß presents the theory of "myth;" especially his claim that myths consist of narratives with an "historical," "philosophical," or "poetic" kernel. Many of his defenders take him to be claiming that, by definition, a myth is 'false.'

Furthermore, I know of no reader of Strauß who has examined the accuracy/validity of the *pre-figured* Kant that he received in the form of Hegelian anti-Kantianism and anti-Enlightenment. For example, Neither Hartlich/Sachs nor Harris raises the issue.

In point of fact, rather than reject theology as Harris claims, an examination of Strauß' *LJ* requires recovery of *the priority of theology over biblical exegesis* because what is at stake in the reading of the text is the assumptions that the evangelist author, the lay reader, and the scholar brings to the text, not simply the words of the text. *Texts read us rather than we merely reading texts*, and, more radically, the texts themselves are the product of the extraordinary (certainly, in degree) capacity of humanity intentionally to bring about things – in this case, the text – that nature, on its own, could never cause as well as the capacity of transcendental consciousness to understand things not given directly in perception. Yet, precisely to the degree

86. Strauß, *LJ*: 56–57. See above: 181.

87. Strauß expresses his frustration over his teachers, student-day colleagues, and the theological guild, generally, in the opening paragraph of his dedication written to his brother in *LJEGP* of 1864: vii. In his *Streitschriften* of 1837, he even gives the page number (462 of 730) where Carl August von Eschenmayer stopped reading the first volume. See "Die Herren Eschenmayer und Menzel" (1837) in *Streitschriften* II: 87 after emphasizing that Eschenmayer only had access to the first volume for the writing of his damning criticism addresses only the first volume of Strauß' *LJ* because Eschenmayer's *Der Ischariothismus unserer Tage: Eine Zugabe zu dem jüngsten erscheinungen Werke: Das Leben Jesu, von Strauß, 1. Thl.* (Tübingen: L.F. Fues, 1835) appeared before the publication of Strauß' second volume. See Strauß, "Die Herren Eschenmayer und Manzel" in *Streitschriften* II: 65.

However, Strauß expresses appreciation, yet in 1864, for his beloved professor, Ferdinand Christian Baur, with whom he studied in Blaubeuren and in Tübingen, and those "who continue to research in conformity with his spirit" – although he emphasizes that he is not entirely in agreement with their conclusions. See *LJEGP*: xvi.

that these transcendental, *a priori* capacities are necessary, even if imperceptible, the assumptions illuminated by the Copernican Turn of Critical Idealism are not (!) capricious or merely subjectively relative.

Strauß offers an important lesson that we cannot limit understanding to the establishment of 'congruence' and 'plenitude' in contrast to a poor reading as 'narrow' and 'far-fetched' – as insightful as Ricoeur's hermeneutical principle is.⁸⁸ Even a reading that is 'congruent' and a 'plenitude' can be trapped in the 'is'/'ought' fallacy: that simply because things 'are' taken to be in a certain manner does not mean that they 'ought' to be so taken. Logical coherence alone is no guarantee of truth. Logical coherence is only a canon of rules to govern abstractions that is incapable of addressing what 'ought to be.' In addition to 'congruence' and 'plenitude,' I propose in Volume II of the present work that one needs a commitment to the structures of transcendental consciousness, with its capacity of *a priori* synthetic judgment that is committed to the lawfulness of causal systems of theoretical and practical reason. Precisely because the theme of Kant's practical reason had been so discredited in the *con-figured* Kant generated by the anti-Enlightenment and anti-Kantian diatribe of Hegel and those who wanted to believe that Hegel was 'correct,'⁸⁹ Kant was never a serious option for Strauß.

Mythic Epistemology is no Denial of Historical Factuality

Given the lack of a grasp of the meaning of 'mythic' exegesis,⁹⁰ the usual dismissive representations of Strauß' project, which can be found in the "con-"pamphlets and letters in The Historical Reader of Volume I of this project, accuse him: 1) of "destroying" or "stealing from them" the Christian faith because he concludes that the gospels are a collection of myths, not history; 2) lacking an appreciation for pastoral ministry's concerns for the anxieties and sufferings of the laity; 3) embracing an "elitist," esoteric, scholarly theology (Hegelianism); that results in his leaving 4) the theologian with little option but to step away from the pulpit and university lectern. The latter is required, in the judgment of Strauß' opponents 5) because a Straußian inspired theol-

88. See Ricoeur's distinction between a "good" reading ("coherent and plenitude") and a "bad" reading ("narrow and farfetched") in Paul Ricoeur, "Metaphor and the Main Problem of Hermeneutics," *New Literary History* VI, no. 1 (Autumn 1974): 104.

89. See, especially, Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen" GW II; 287–333.

90. Is it not strange that although Strauß explicitly acknowledges that there are three kinds of myths (historical, philosophical, and poetic), almost universally, the charge is leveled against Strauß that his notion of myth confronts us with a simple alternative: the text is either factual history or fiction. I will show in the next chapter that this is Ferdinand Christian Baur's take on the *LJ*. It is the simple alternative for Hartlich and Sachs (see *Der Ursprung*: 133 and 128), and it is the simple alternative for Harris (see *David Friedrich Strauss and His Theology*: 282–284).

ogy purportedly cannot escape "hypocrisy" in that it employs the biblical stories but does not accept them as history, which results in a "deception" of the congregation or students who are too unsophisticated to appreciate metaphors. Finally, 6) we get the criticism of Strauß by Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob Paulus, the "Rationalist," whom Strauß had so carefully examined and rejected along with the "Supernaturalists" in *The Life of Jesus* of 1835, who complains that Strauß, having paid attention to the breadth and depth of meticulous details, should now "*narrow* his position" "without holding himself bound to that which he has already questioned" to present Christianity as the desire for "an inward religiosity" "in harmony with the divine will."⁹¹ Paulus' *narrow* theology of harmony with the divine will stands in contrast to Strauß' Hegelianism of 1835 with which Strauß *broadens the Christological event (divinization) to the entire species, not to a particular individual at a particular point in time in Palestine*. I have encountered no record of Paulus' evaluation of Strauß on the history of Church Doctrine.

Strauß' nuanced notion of myth that includes acknowledgment that there are historical elements in the text alongside the text's ability to communicate profound philosophical or theological ideas and symbols of existential relevance is either missed or intentionally ignored – across the board. Rather than grasp the difficulty involved in distinguishing between husk (representations) and kernel (content), though, it was merely assumed by his readers that, if Strauß calls the stories myths, then he must be treating them simply and merely as falsehoods or equivalent to the immoral stories of Greek mythology.⁹²

Early Christianity attacked Greek mythology for its absurdities and immorality.⁹³ Already Paul in I Cor 10:20 condemns "pagans" for sacrificing to "daemoniai" (plural: τὰ δαιμόνια, singular: τὸ δαιμόνιον), frequently translated as "demons" but more accurately translated "gods;" although the term is also the label Socrates used for his "genius"/spirit, which told him 'what not to do' but not 'what to do'). In Pseudo-Dionysius (5th C CE), such eternal beings were "angels" mediating between God and the created world.⁹⁴ Particularly in early Christianity, the assumption was that Greek myths were taken to be literal stories of the activities of the gods. The unpredictable and immoral behavior of Greek gods made them easy targets for Platonists, generally, and the more prudish (ascetic) religious community like Christianity, particularly, if the stories are read literally.

The importance of Strauß' yeoman accomplishment that provides a meticulously, detailed analysis of the problems that arise when one reads the text literally (the

91. If we substitute 'reason' for 'divine will,' this is precisely what Strauß had done in his "On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity" of 1838.

92. See Strauß, *LJ* 66.

93. See the discussion of Cassirer' distinction between 'perceptual' and 'conceptual' structures of myth: 41, n. 20.

94. See Pseudo-Dionysius. "The Celestial Hierarchy" in *The Complete Works*, trans. by Colm Luibheid (New York: Paulist Press, 1987).

Supernatural reading) or when taken to be written in an age that misunderstood the natural, scientific explanations of empirical events (the Rationalist reading) is totally missed when one merely focuses on the boogey-man of "myth" as absurd or immoral. As a consequence, *Strauß' constructive (not destructive) reading of the text as a collection of narratives (mythoi, stories; in contrast to logoi, rational accounts), which shifts the focus from empirical history to the theological significance of the events described, is lost on the part of both many of his supporters and all of his detractors.*

The scriptures, according to Strauß then, are not an attempt to present a collection of mere instructional stories that talk of God's 'wisdom,' actions, and/or intentions (note the anthropomorphism!) for humanity. Such an account of the biblical stories was published a decade before Strauß in Johann Peter Hebel's *Biblical Stories*⁹⁵ (*Biblis-che Geschichten*, 1824) for the purpose of religious instruction in the public schools of the state of Baden in Germany. They were quickly adopted all across Germany by Roman Catholics in addition to the Lutherans and Calvinists. However, Hebel's storytelling is entirely different from the "Mythic School's" approach to scriptural stories.

For Hebel, the stories of the NT are true because they come from God. God is the story-teller, not the Evangelists.

For the "Mythic School," the stories of the bible are true because their truths are true independent of the bible. One can say that there is an echo of Lessing in the "Mythic School's" understanding of the biblical text: the text, properly understood, is a set of shortcuts to insight into truths available, in principle, to humanity in all times and places; in other words, the truths in the text are not true simply because they are God's stories.⁹⁶

Whereas the "Mythic School" outright rejected the historicity of the miraculous to focus on their 'kernels' of truth (historical, philosophical/theological, or symbolic), Hebel sought to de-emphasize the miraculous and anything that didn't readily fit into

95. Published in volume 5 of Hebel's *Werke* (Karlsruhe: Verlag der Chr. Fr. Müller'schen Hofbuch-handlung, 1843): 3–296.

96. See Gotthold Lessing's "The Education of the Human Race" in *Lessing's Theological Writings* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967): 83. See also Lessing's famous aphorisms in "The Proof of the Spirit and of Power" in *ibid.*: "I live in the eighteenth century, in which miracles no longer happen" (52) and "*accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason*" (53) Expressed in Kantian metaphors: all re-produced judgment was once acquired/learned through reflecting judgment.

Whereas Lessing and the Hegelian Strauß of 1835 claim that miracles no longer happen, Kant (and the Kantian Strauß of 1864?) proposes that the issue is not the proof or disproof of a violation of the laws of nature but, rather, what is the consequence of the assumption (because judgments of causal explanations are necessarily assumptions, not facts) that the laws of nature can be violated? The consequence would be that all human understanding would come to a screeching halt because understanding necessarily requires an enduring order – to be sure this order is itself incapable of proof or disproof because it is inaccessible to the senses. The assumption of an enduring order is an example of a necessary *a priori* synthetic judgment not given by and in the data of perception.

his narrow narrative of divine wisdom to focus attention on the this-worldly 'wisdom' and/or theological significance of biblical stories. Yet, for Hebel the validity of the 'wisdom' of the bible (for example, ethics) is because it is found in the bible. In other words, the "ethical wisdom" from the bible, for example, the Sermon on the Mount, is valid because it comes from God and/or was taught by His divine Christ, as *objectively* given in the text. Furthermore, and unlike Strauß, who views parables not as a vehicle of objective doctrines or principles but "[...] as a kind of problem, to be solved by the reflection of the hearer [...]" (LJ 345),⁹⁷ Hebel treats the biblical accounts as the revelation of deity with the intent of communicating objective, "Christian doctrines" to the young ears of the children of Baden and beyond.

For example, the story of the Prodigal Son demonstrates, according to Hebel, God's intention of unconditional forgiveness of the sinner⁹⁸ under the assumption that the core gospel of Christianity is objective 'forgiveness' by God for sin, which, conveniently overlooked by Hebel, makes Christianity a religion of pure self-interest, with, for example, Hebel simply ignoring any significance when it comes to the reaction of the older brother to his father's celebration of his brother's return.

The editors of the 2017 edition, Karl-Josef Kuschel and Thomas Weis, excuse the editing and liberties taken by Hebel by saying that he wrote in an "age of crisis" following the surge of secularism associated with the French Revolution and its destruction of institutional religion. Secularism (science) is dangerous for Hebel.⁹⁹

97. This acknowledgement of the centrality of reflection on the part of the hearer is not unlike the reading of the parables made by Robert C. Tannehill in *The Sword of His Mouth* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975). For example, Tannehill writes (45): "[...] the imaginative power of such material [as the parables] is sufficiently amplified and enriched that it challenges our preconceived perceptions of the world, activates our imaginations through the 'sympathetic vibrations' awakened in the deeper layers of the self, and so opens us to new ways of perceiving, feeling, and acting."

98. For a discussion of the significance and consequences of such divine, *vertical* forgiveness as well as an alternative, *horizontal* forgiveness, see Chapter 9: "Missing Aesthetic Judgment:" 928, n. 189. See as well, the prize winning essay in response to the essay question posed by the Forschungsinstitut für Philosophie in Hannover (2006), McGaughey, "Über die Rolle der Religion in der moralischen Entwicklung" in *Braucht Werterziehung Religion?* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2007): 101–135.

99. In addition, Kuschel and Weis speak of Hebel's commitment to "enlightenment" as a proponent of religious tolerance as reflected in his veneration of Moses Mendelssohn and, especially, in Lessing's *Nathan the Wise*. Nonetheless, Kuschel and Weis overlook that tolerance of the 'other' ought never to be blind to injustice either in the 'other' or oneself. Simply warmly embracing the other can lead to our being complicitous in her/his injustice. However, discernment of injustice requires insight into the *conditions of possibility* that make morality possible in the first place. Discernment of injustice does not arise just because a tradition claims to have received God's moral law by revelation in an objective text.

"Enlightenment" means far more than merely embracing pluralism, and it involves more than a religious instruction with respect to the "dangers" of secularism. As Kant formulated in his essay, "What is Enlightenment?," the struggle for enlightenment is between self-imposed immaturity and maturity. (See Kant, *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?* (*Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?*) AA VIII: 35.) Maturity is achieved by the individual as s/he gains insight into the human condition by means of the Copernican Turn from objective facts (subreption) to universal, subjective conditions of possibility for humanity to be able to experience, understand, and act responsibly in

In the *LJ*, in addition to his own version of Hegelian Christology, Strauß restricts his criticism (not 'critique' in the Kantian sense) of the gospels to two strategies for reading the gospels. The two strategies for reading the gospels, for which he substitutes his 'mythic' reading, are: 1) *the Supernaturalist*, literal reading of the text, which claims the events presented in the gospels, including the miracles, are factual events, and 2) *the Rationalist* reading, which eliminates the miraculous from the text by viewing miracles as the product of 'accommodation' to the 'level of understanding' of the age for which the stories were written.

In contrast to the Supernaturalist and Rationalist readings, Strauß' husk/kernel structure of myths dramatically shifts the focus of biblical scholarship from objective facts to imperceptible meaning. 'Meaning' can include 'historical facts,' but 'meaning' can and does extend beyond empirical facts as soon as one is concerned with a theological/philosophical idea and/or a religious symbol.

Rather than a search for facts for which the biblical scholar, for example, the Rationalist Paulus, or populist author, like Hebel, provide an account of their 'true,' objective meaning, *the biblical text is taken by Strauß in 1835 to be a collection of stories that, in some cases, preserve facts but are more richly read as creative narratives* (preserved orally in the Christian community or shaped by the evangelist author) *as a product of the 'genetic mythical principle' in order to communicate the theological agenda of the God/Man necessary for the salvation of humanity.* In contrast to Supernaturalist Christology, the Rationalist Christology, and the various Hegelian Christological options, Jesus is not an exclusive or only partially inclusive God/Man but 'represents' all of humanity's inward identification with God in Spirit. For Strauß in 1835, God's Spirit is the Hegelian Spirit that drives a logical meta-narrative of Double Negation.

In other words, *the theological concern for the "early" Strauß was the Christ as the key to humanity's spiritual deification.* The Christ is the actual (*wirkliche, Reelle*) 'representation' (*Form*) of the unity of God, who is the true (*Ideelle*) 'content' (*Inhalt*) united with humanity in an 'actual' representation. Christ as the God/Man is the

the world. The subjective condition of autonomous freedom (the capacity intentionally to initiate sequences of events that nature cannot initiate on its own) constitutes, as well, the ground of universal, *human dignity* just as it constitutes the condition for humanity being able to (but also to be free not to) assume responsibility for its decisions and actions unlike any other species to our knowledge. One learns to *respect the other* not on the basis of an *objective*, anthropomorphic claim (subreption) that "God has made us in His image" but on the basis of the degree to which the individual adheres to the lawfulness, grasped as universal, *subjective* conditions, that is the crucial condition of theoretical reason (understanding of nature by physical laws) and practical reason (guiding one's actions by moral laws). *Dignity is owed universally. Respect is conditional.* Yet, self-imposed immaturity involves submission to heteronomous authorities (that is, God, religion, the state, friends, our friends, and fellow citizens) with the consequence that they assume responsibility for us. However, we overcome subreption, which is knowledge built on the sands of ignored skepticism with respect to so-called objective facts, by recognizing the necessary, universal, transcendental, conditions of possibility that make for experience in the world with the consequence that those radically internal and necessary conditions alone make the assumption of responsibility possible, in the first place.

‘point of indifference’ as the point of transition from material determination and finite knowledge of difference to the Absolute Unity, Absolute Freedom, and Absolute Knowledge of Absolute Spirit. Strauß’ *mythic* reading of the Gospels and *inclusive* Christology in the *LJ*, are *entirely dependent upon Hegelian epistemology and meta-narrative*.

Mythic Embracing of the Text and Church Dogmatics?!

Just what did David Friedrich Strauß do in his "controversial" book *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined*? The conceptualization is incredibly ambitious, but the actual execution at the age of 27 is stunning. Strauß was not satisfied with the examination simply of a single story-cycle within a single gospel or even shared among the gospels. On the contrary, he examines, compares, and contrasts from three different perspectives (Supernaturalist, Rationalist, and Mythic) the entire narrative contents of all four, canonical Christian gospels – without the aid of a gospel parallels! In short, *Strauß sought to free Christian theology from the tyranny and speculations that insists it is grounded in treating texts as historical facts – as if understanding was the consequence of "merely opening one's eyes" to see/read properly. Far from seeking the destruction of the text or Christianity, Strauß intended to ground Christian dogmatics in 'science.'*

Strauß employed a three-step methodology in his criticism of the gospels according to three different sets of assumptions in conformity with the following principle:

[...] that any understanding is impossible between those who start from different principles [...] However, the tenability of the standpoint I have chosen must be proven by the fact that a number of difficulties in gospel history can be solved more easily from this standpoint than from any other."¹⁰⁰The ‘Supernaturalist’ and the ‘Rationalist’ were each driven by *theologically dogmatic assumptions* that were required for their reading the text to work whereas the early Strauß was convinced that the *mythic assumptions* were based on the truth of Hegelian ‘science.’ Hegelian ‘science.’¹⁰¹

Strauß demonstrates that *the ‘Supernaturalist’ reading* of the text requires clinging "[...] with childlike fondness to the empty husk of historical semblance, though void of divine significance, and estimates it higher than the most valuable kernel divested of its [mythic] variegated covering."¹⁰² The Supernaturalist reading inescapably results

100. See Strauß, "Herr Dr. Steudel oder die Selbsttäuschungen des verständigen Supranaturalismus unserer Tage" in *Streitschriften* I: 78.

101. In 1835, he took what in fact is a set of Hegelian assumptions to be ‘objective science’. As I stress continuously, though, he quickly realized that there were serious problems with his Hegelian assumptions, and within four years of the publishing of the *LJ*, he recognized the gnostic dogmatism of Hegelianism.

102. Strauß, *LJ*: 66.

in a conflict between religion and science because it denies the epistemological assumptions (of the relatedness of the imperceptible idea/law to its many perceptible manifestations) necessary for the natural scientific understanding of nature. This is most clear by the Supernaturalist's assumption that the coherence of physical laws events in nature can and may be interrupted by God.¹⁰³

Strauß was well aware that the determination of historical facts is the "most difficult" task of critical reflection. He agrees with Usteri that "[a] certain measure of *probability* respecting the preponderance of the historical in one legend, and of the symbolical in another, is the ultimate point to which criticism can now attain."¹⁰⁴ "The boundary line [...] between the historical and the unhistorical, in which as in our Gospels this latter element is incorporated, will ever remain fluctuating and unsusceptible of precise attainment."¹⁰⁵ In other words, Strauß fully recognized that *historical claims are always subject to skepticism because of the nature of an historical claim: although its truth is anchored in an imperceptible, lawful order, it is dependent upon perceptual data, and the observer never has direct access to anything but the appearances of events and agents, not direct access to the imperceptible laws, events, and agents themselves.*¹⁰⁶

103. Strauß observes: "[...] no just notion of the true nature of history is possible, without a perception of the inviolability of the chain of finite causes, and of the impossibility of miracles. This perception which is wanting to so many minds of our own day was still more deficient in Palestine, and indeed throughout the Roman empire. And to a mind still open to the reception of the miraculous, if it be once carried away by the tide of religious enthusiasm, all things will appear credible, and should this enthusiasm lay hold of a yet wider circle, it will awaken a new creative vigour, even in a decayed people. To account for such an enthusiasm it is by no means necessary to presuppose the gospel miracles as the existing cause. This may be found in the known religious dearth of that period, a dearth so great that the cravings of the mind after some religious belief excited a relish for the most extravagant forms of worship; secondly in the deep religious satisfaction [McGaughey: self-interest] which was afforded by the belief in the resurrection of the deceased Messiah, and by the essential principles of the doctrine of Jesus." Strauß, *LJ*: 74–75. Again, at *LJ* 78: "Our modern world [...] after many centuries of tedious research, has attained a conviction, that all things are linked together by a chain of causes and effects, which suffers no interruption [...] the totality of finite things forms a vast circle, except that it owes its existence and laws to a superior power, suffers no intrusion from without." See as well Strauß' comment in the "Concluding Dissertation:": "[...] to admit an interruption of the order of nature, and of the development of humanity, would be to renounce all rational thought [...] and] in order to be sure that certain results have not proceeded from the powers of nature and the faculties of the human mind, a perfect knowledge of the resources of both would be required, and of such a knowledge man is not possessed." (766) "[...] we have outgrown the notion, that the divine omnipotence is more completely manifested in the interruption of the order of nature, than in its preservation" (781) – taken by Strauß from Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*. See Strauß, *LJ*: 781, n. 9.

104. Strauß, *LJ*: 61.

105. Strauß, *LJ*: 91.

106. Stated negatively: "[...] to admit an interruption of the order of nature, and of the development of humanity, would be to renounce all rational thought [...] and] in order to be sure that certain results have not proceeded from the powers of nature and the faculties of the human mind, a perfect knowledge of the resources of both would be required, and of such a knowledge man is not possessed." (*LJ*: 766)

In contrast to the ‘*Supernaturalist*, and motivated by the aim of avoiding a conflict between religion and science, the ‘*Rationalist*’ reading, sought to provide a “naturalist” explanation of the miracles in the gospels, not because it believed that the viewers and authors of the text were engaged in deception by the relating of their stories, as Reimarus proposed,¹⁰⁷ but because in their age there was no understanding of the role of imperceptible, ideas and physical laws governing events. However, the valiant attempts on the part of the Rationalists to provide natural, material explanations to the miracle stories led them to do violence to the text,¹⁰⁸ by having to employ “conjectures to supply the deficiencies of the record.”¹⁰⁹

Strauß’ ‘spiritual’ restauration of both the text and Church Doctrine not only examined the gospels in terms of the assumptions of the coherence of natural laws that govern events, but he also employed the assumptions of Hegelian Theology (speculative *dogmatics*) as the larger framework for understanding the ultimate, spiritual significance of biblical Christology.¹¹⁰

Strauß engages in literary criticism for his mythic reading of the text in 1835 by analyzing the gospel narratives by means of 1) an exegetical strategy that employs the husk/kernel analogy not, as did Paulus, the Rationalist, in order to distinguish between “fact” and “meaning,” but to seek out the historical, philosophical, or poetic kernel/content of the story/*mythos* as it is now preserved in the gospels (*the Hegelian ‘husk’/‘kernel’ epistemology*). He, then, 2) applies the ‘*genetic mythical principle*’ to demonstrate how a textual narrative developed primarily stimulated by First Testament materials.

107. See Reimarus, *Fragments from Reimarus, Vol. I*, ed. Charles Voysey, G.E. Lessing trans. (London and Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate, 1879: 73–74. On-line at https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Hermann_Samuel_Reimarus (May 11, 2021).

108. Speaking of Krug’s “Versuch über die genetische oder formelle Erklärungsart der Wunder” in Henke’s *Museum der Religionswissenschaft*, I/3 (1803): 410 ff, Strauß writes: “It is this [...] difference between the natural and mythical modes of interpretation which Krug intends to point out, referring particularly to the histories of the miracles, when he distinguishes the physical or material from the genetic or formal, mode of explaining them. Following the former move [...] the inquiry is: how can the miracle [*wundervolle Ereignis*] here related have possibly taken place with all its details by natural means and according to natural laws? Whereas, following the latter, the question is: whence arose the narrative of the miracle [*Wunderereignis*]?” The former explains the natural possibility of the thing related (*the substance* of the narrative); the latter traces the origin of the existing record (*the form* of the narrative). Krug considers attempts of the former kind to be fruitless, [*sic.*] because they produce interpretations yet more miraculous [*wunderbarer*] than the fact itself; far preferable is the other mode, since [*sic.*] it leads to results which throw light upon miraculous histories collectively. He gives the preference to the exegetist, because in his explanation of the text he is not obliged to do violence to it, but may accept it altogether literally as the author intended, even though the thing related is impossible; whereas *the interpreter, who follows the material or physical explanation, is driven to ingenious subtleties which make him lose sight of the original meaning of the authors, and substitute something quite different which they neither could nor would have said.*” (emphasis added) Strauß, *LJ*: 56.

109. Strauß, *LJ*: 56.

110. See Strauß, “Hegel’s Perspective on the Historical Value of Gospel History” [“Hegel’s Ansicht über den historischen Werth der evangelischen Geschichte”] in *Streitschriften* III: 77.

Strauß' Hegelian Speculative Theology of 1835 claims that it neither requires nor insists on changes to the scriptural record nor does it result in any conflict between science and religion because science and religion share the same strategy of Hegelian epistemology for understanding phenomena: imperceptible ideas (true 'content') are manifested by and in physical phenomena (actual 'representations'). On the part of the sciences, human consciousness is capable of understanding physical phenomena, the *husks/representations* that are perception because it is able to bring imperceptible ideas and mathematics (*logoi*), the *kernel/content* of understanding, to the phenomena. On the part of religion, the mythic stories of scripture are analogous to the scientific understanding: stories (*mythi*) are the perceptible *husk/representations* that are used to preserve the significance of historical events and to communicate imperceptible ideas, their *kernel/content*.

Nonetheless, as he approached the end of his career, Strauß' shift in dogmatics from his Hegelian Speculative Theology to an adaptation to a degree of Kant's Philosophical Theology of practical reason is all the more significant because Kant's Philosophical Theology acknowledges the limits to reason while illuminating the capacities that are necessary for us to draw any understanding whatsoever, including skeptical understanding, as well as to take decisions and to assume responsibility for our agency.¹¹¹

111. The history of the reception of Kant's description of "pure" religion is both complex and rich and, at times, unsurprisingly, distorted by the interests of the interpreter. It is important to say here that that reception was by no means limited to Goethe's letter to Johann Gottfried Herder June 7, 1793: "It took a long lifetime for Kant to wash his philosophical cloak of many stains and prejudices. But now [in his Religion book] he has wantonly slobbered on it with the stain of radical evil, just so that Christians, too, might be enticed to kiss its hem." (McGaughey trans.) of the German from <http://www.zeno.org/Literatur/M/Goethe,+Johann+Wolfgang/Briefe/1793> (25 November 2017)]. It is also not limited to the conception that Kant's theological reflections are caught up in "conundrums," which emerge only when the reader assumed that "religion" must be a literal sign for Christianity (for example, see Wolterstorff, Nicholas P. "Conundrums in Kant's Rational Religion." In *Kant's Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered*, edited by Philip J. Rossi and Michael Wreen [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991]. Kant by no means must be read as a recovering Fundamentalist seeking to preserve as much of the Pietism of his youth as possible (for example, see. Edward Kanterian, *Kant, God and Metaphysics: The Secret Thorn*. [Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge, 2018]). Already within three years of the publication of *Religion*, Christian Wilhelm Flüge published the first volume of his two volume work *Versuch einer historisch-kritischen Darstellung des bisherigen Einflusses der Kantischen Philosophie auf alle Zweige der wissenschaftlichen und praktischen Theologie* (Attempt at a Historical-Critical Presentation of the Influence on all Branches of Scientific and Practical Theology to Date of the Kantian Philosophy), 2 vols. (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1982) in which he provided an amazingly nuanced reading of the Kant reception already at the end of the 18th C that is far more insightful than what followed in the 19th and 20th Centuries. It is not unreasonable, but incapable of proof, of course, that Strauß was familiar with Flüge's work if not directly than through his conversations with colleagues.

Myth and Science are Compatible

In our age, when one says, "That's just a myth," one uses the term "myth" to mean false or wishful thinking. A popular television program is called "MythBusters." The premise of the show was to expose *erroneous opinion* by means of scientific investigation of the *true facts* of the matter in question. In other words, myth is contrasted with science. If we take this to be the definition of myth, then we misunderstand Strauß from the very beginning.

As I've said, Strauß claimed that, far from rejecting science, myth was compatible with science. Myth picks up where the limits of natural, causal explanation are reached. However, this does not mean that myth offers an objective, augmented, causal explanation to events independent of and/or contrary to the causal explanations of the natural sciences. Rather, for Strauß, when it comes to explanation of events, natural causes are the basis for all proper understanding. It is precisely for this reason that the gospels must not be read literally because a literal reading would mean that the physical laws of nature could be capriciously violated, which would undermine all human understanding. Rather than the mythical view constituting a threat to human understanding by introducing a divine, eminent, efficient causality to supplement nature's formal, efficient causality,¹¹² Strauß echoes the anonymous author who wrote: "[...] if the mythical view be [...] admitted, the innumerable, and never otherwise to harmonized, discrepancies and chronological contradictions in the gospel histories disappear, as it were, at one stroke."¹¹³

The Rationalists took a half-step with respect to physical, causal explanation of the events in the gospels. They took the events to be reports by eyewitnesses who misunderstood what they experienced to be the result of supernatural causes because they did not possess the understanding of natural causes as 19th C science did. The Rationalist naturalists offered natural, causal explanations for what, otherwise, would be miracles. We will see shortly how the naturalist reading violates the text by forcing the text to say things that aren't there or suggesting that the agents in the gospel narratives were lying. *Whereas the Supernaturalist, literal account violates science in order to protect the text, the Rationalist, naturalist account violates the text in order to protect science.*

Consequently, Strauß was as dissatisfied by the Rationalist, naturalist account of the gospel narratives as he was by the Supernaturalist account. He claimed, though, that, if one doesn't read the text for either a Supernaturalist or Naturalist, causal explanation of events, one can both defend science and accept the texts exactly for what they are: stories. Nonetheless, that does not mean that the stories are just fairy tales. Writing approvingly about the First Testament scholar, Johann Gottfried Eichhorn, Strauß says:

112. On the difference between eminent and efficient causality, see the "Introduction:" 84, n. 23.

113. Strauß, *LJ*: 56–57. See above: 181, n. 56

Once admit, he [Eichhorn] remarks, a state of excitement, particularly of religious excitement, among a not unpoetic people, and a short time is sufficient to give an appearance of the marvelous not only to obscure and concealed, but even to public and well-known facts. It is therefore by no means conceivable that the early Jewish Christians, gifted with the spirit, that is, animated with religious enthusiasm, as they were, and familiar with the Old Testament, should not have been in a condition *to invent symbolical scenes* such as the temptation and other New Testament mythi. *It is not however to be imagined that any one individual seated himself at his table to invent them out of his own head, and write them down, as he would a poem : on the contrary, these narratives [...] were fashioned by degrees, by steps which can no longer be traced; gradually acquired consistency, and at length received a fixed form in our written gospels.*¹¹⁴ (emphasis added)

The Greek word *μῦθος* (*muthos*) means "story" and, as we suggested above, is contrasted from *λόγος* (*logos*), which means to give a "logical account" of something. To read the gospels as mythic stresses that they are stories, not a logical account of a teaching or a collection of literal events governed by physical laws.

One can find the same distinction between a logical account and stories in Plato's *Republic* where he provides a logical account of three parts to the soul (Book IV 435b-436b; Book IX 580d ff) analogous to three classes of a state. Plato then tells a story (Book IX 588c ff) of the soul as consisting of a multi-headed beast (the appetites), a lion (*θῦμος*, meaning rage), and human being (reason), and he warns about the injustice perpetrated by those individuals who are dominated by the multi-headed beast or lion rather than reason. Plato is not claiming that the individual is literally a multi-headed beast, lion, and a human being. The story or *μῦθος* (*muthos*) illuminates aspects of the appetites, rage, and reason that a strictly logical account can't provide.

When it comes to taking the gospel stories as myths (*μῦθοι*, *muthoi*), one is consciously required to make a distinction between the story itself and the content it wishes to communicate. The very conditions that make for a story reflect the fundamental structure of 'husk' and 'kernel,' 'representation' and 'content.' As the case with an ear of corn, the story itself is the external husk that is concealing the kernels of the ear of corn. One has to 'work' to get to the kernels. The same is true of myths. The husk that is the story is only the shell. The meaning of the story is the jewel that has been protected and communicated by the shell (story).

Strauß says that the goal of the *LJ* is:

To investigate the internal grounds of credibility in relation to each detail given in the Gospels, (for it is with them alone we are here concerned) and to test the probability or improbability of their being the production of eyewitnesses, or of competently informed¹¹⁵

114. Strauß, *LJ*: 58.

115. By "competently informed" authors, Strauß means authors who reported empirical facts according to physical laws. Strauß wrote: "[...] [N]o just notion of the true nature of history is possible, without a perception of the inviolability of the chain of finite causes, and of the impossibility of miracles. This perception which is wanting to so many minds of our own day was still more deficient

writers, is the sole object of the present work. The *external grounds* of evidence may be examined [...] only so far [...] as is necessary in order to judge whether they yield a definite result, which may perhaps be in opposition to the internal grounds of evidence; or whether the external evidence, insufficient of itself, leaves to the internal evidence the decision of the question.¹¹⁶

Succinctly, if the *external grounds* (husk) result in a violation of the physical laws of nature, then the story must be judged on the basis of *internal grounds* (kernel). *The judgment on the basis of internal grounds does not mean that the story (myth) is false or a deception*. Rather, it means that the story must be judged on the basis of the kernel that justifies its narrative structure.

Strauß distinguishes among three kinds of mythic kernels:

- 1st. *Historical mythen* : narratives of real events coloured by the light of antiquity, which confounded the divine and the human, the natural and the supernatural.
- 2nd. *Philosophical mythen* : such as clothe in the garb of historical narrative a simple thought, a precept, or an idea of the time.
- 3rd. *Poetical mythen* : historical and philosophical mythen partly blended together, and partly embellished by the creations of the imagination, in which the original fact or idea is almost obscured by the veil which the fancy of the poet has woven around it.¹¹⁷

As we have already seen, Strauß viewed the task of distinguishing the historical kernel of the mythic husk to be a "difficult task"¹¹⁸ – "[...] the precise boundary line between the historical and the unhistorical [...] is] the most difficult question in the whole province of criticism."¹¹⁹

First Testament scholars had proposed hermeneutical rules to govern the distinction between the historical and unhistorical, and Strauß summarizes them as follows:

The first essential is [...] to determine whether the narrative have [*sic.*] a distinct object, and what that object is. Where no object, for the sake of which the legend might have been invented, is discoverable, every one [*sic.*] would pronounce the mythus to be *historical* [McG: *Criterion of Inconceivable Invention*]. But if all the principal circumstances of

in Palestine, and indeed throughout the Roman empire. And [*sic.*] to a mind still open to the reception of the marvelous, if it be once carried away by the tide of religious enthusiasm, all things will appear credible, and should this enthusiasm lay hold of a yet wider circle, it will awaken a new creative vigour, even in a decayed people. To account for such an enthusiasm it is by no means necessary to presuppose the gospel dearth of the period, a dearth so great that the cravings of the mind after some religious belief excited a relish for the most extravagant forms of worship; secondly in the deep religious satisfaction which was afforded by the belief in the resurrection of the deceased Messiah, and by the essential principles of the doctrine of Jesus." (*LJ*, 74–75)

116. Strauß, *LJ*: 70.

117. Strauß, *LJ*: 53.

118. See Strauß, *LJ*: 43, 53, 61, 91–92.

119. Strauß, *LJ*: 90.

the narrative concur to symbolize a particular truth, this undoubtedly was the object of the narrative, and the mythus is *philosophical* [McG: *Criterion of Philosophical Truth*]. The blending of the historical and philosophical mythus is particularly to be recognized when we can detect in the narrative an attempt to derive events from their causes [McG: *Criterion of Imputed Causality*]. In many instances the existence of an historical foundation is proved also by independent testimony [McG: *Criterion of External Attestation*] [...] or bear in themselves undeniable and inherent characteristics of probability [McG: *Criterion of Historical Conceivability*] : so that the critic, while he [*sic.*] rejects the external form, may yet retain the groundwork as historical. The *poetical* mythus is the most difficult to distinguish [...] [for here one has] only a negative criterion [McG: *Criterion of Neither Historical nor Philosophical*]. When the narrative is so wonderful on the one hand as to exclude the possibility of its being a detail of facts, and when on the other [hand] it discovers no attempt to symbolize a particular thought, it may be suspected that the entire narrative owes its birth to the imagination of the poet.¹²⁰

Strauß himself offers the following set of nuanced, hermeneutical rules to govern the decision between the historical and unhistorical in the gospels:

Where not merely the particular nature and manner of an occurrence is critically suspicious, its external circumstances represented as miraculous and the like [McG: *Criterion of the Miraculous*]; but where likewise the essential substance and groundwork is either inconceivable in itself [McG: *Criterion of Inconceivability*], or is in striking harmony with some Messianic idea of the Jews of that age [McG: *Criterion of Messianic Similarity*], then not the particular alleged course and mode of the transaction only, but the entire occurrence must be regarded as unhistorical. Where, on the contrary, the form only, and not the general contents of the narration, exhibits the characteristics of the unhistorical [McG: *Criterion of Historical Inconceivability*], it is at least possible to suppose a kernel of historical fact; although we can never confidently decide whether this kernel of fact actually exists, or in what it consists; unless, indeed, it be discoverable from other sources [McG: *Criterion of External Attestation*] [...].

*The boundary line, however, between the historical and the unhistorical [...] as in our Gospels [...] will ever remain fluctuating and unsusceptible of precise attainment.*¹²¹

The observant reader will see that Strauß suggests that there is a profound difference between distinguishing, *generally*, between the historical and unhistorical in a narrative and distinguishing, *in particular*, between the historical and unhistorical with respect to a specific, gospel narrative: Strauß has added to the First Testament critics list both a *Criterion of the Miraculous* and the *Criterion of Messianic Similarity*. These changes in criteria are required by the particular theological concerns of the gospels: the miraculous is so overwhelmingly present because it serves the purpose of confirming the Christian community's belief in messianic fulfilment by the Christ. However, Strauß accepts the negative criterion for distinguishing *poetic* myths from *historical*

120. Strauß, *LJ*: 53.

121. Strauß, *LJ*: 91.

and *philosophical* myths: If the story is not a portrayal of fact and not a conveyance of a particular thought, it can be taken to be a product of the author's imagination.

The Unstated Agenda: The Theology of the Exegete

For all the talk of "competently informed" authorship and dismissal of miracles on the basis of the "modern world view" for which "all things are linked together by a chain of causes and effects, which suffers no interruption," the criteria from First Testament scholars and Strauß' own criteria for adjudicating the historical, philosophical, and/or poetic nature of the text all ignore an elephant in the room: *the theology of the exegete*.

Strauß engaged constructively an inherited tradition of mythic, biblical interpretation that he combined with Hegelian Speculative Theology. As I have commented, Strauß' radical, Left-Wing, Hegelian Speculative Theology as well as his understanding of the natural sciences have the same husk/kernel (representation/content) structure as his mythic model. This model distinguishes between representations (stories) and content (the idea/fact/symbol of the story) but in which both representations and idea are required, *dialectically*, for understanding. Strauß' formulation of the insight demonstrates his view of the complementarity of the natural sciences with his Hegelian Speculative Theology:

[...] science also in its newest development, has [...] perceived that to convert ideas simply into a mere ought [*Sollen*], to which no being [*Sein*] corresponds, is in fact to annihilate them, just as it would be to finitize the infinite to represent it as permanently beyond the finite [*als bleibendes Jenseits des Endlichen*].¹²² Science has conceived that the infinite has its existence in the alternate production and extinction of the finite; that the idea is realized only in the entire series of its manifestations; that *nothing can come into existence which does not already essentially exist*; and, therefore, that it is not to be required of man [*sic.*], that he should reconcile himself with God, and assimilate his sentiments to the divine,

122. Note what Strauß is saying here: without actual (*wirkliche*) representations, an idea is merely 'empty' of any truth. The translation of this sentence from the word "perceived" comes from the editor of the English translation, Peter Hodgson: 797, note to 777. Hodgson adds a comment that confirms that, he too, has misunderstood Kantian theoretical reason (not to mention entirely ignoring Kant's practical reason): "The point is that if the infinite is conceived undialectically, as *permanently* beyond the finite, not engaged in the alternate positing and annulment (*Setzen und Wiederaufheben*) of the finite, it is in effect finitized, for finitude *alone* is devoid of dialectical process. These concluding sentences represent, of course, the Hegelian critique of Kant." (*LJ*, 797, note to 777) Hegel's derisive dismissal of Kant for 'acknowledging the truth of' Absolute Spirit but ignoring its 'objectivity' along with Hegel's assertion that Kant's is merely a 'subjective' philosophizing are the clear indicator that he did not grasp the crucial insight of Kant's Copernican Turn. Strauß, as well, misunderstood Kant's Copernican Turn, but Strauß came to see that Hegel's historical Indifferentism results in his 'ideas,' themselves, being 'merely empty.'

unless this reconciliation and this assimilation are already virtually effected.¹²³ (emphasis added)

Two unstated, *dogmatic and truly speculative, theological assumptions* to this formulation are: 1) Hegel and Strauß assume that this dialectical structure is the product of *divine, logical dialectic of negation* (Absolute Spirit) *immanent to history* as the explanation of all of history and 2) humanity's reconciliation with God involves a turning from sensuousness to *divinizing the believer* in the Spirit. Both of these assumptions were 'brought to the text' by Hegel and the early Strauß.

Hegel views religion as the central theme of history as the achievement of a theological aim that commences with natural religion. According to Hegel, the natural religion of sensuousness passes through spiritual religion above natural religion by Judaism's sublime, transcendence religion and theocratic state as well as by the Greek religion of beauty immanent in the world in which the divine is a spirit in itself; followed by the Christian religion "of reason" in which the God/Man union is announced, with its highest expression reached in Philosophy in which the individual philosopher, internally, is capable of negating multiplicity to experience absolute unity.¹²⁴ For his part, though, rather than the God/Man having been exhaustively manifest in the historical Jesus or in the minds of philosophers, Strauß views the entire human species to be the necessary condition for the Second Negation (or spiritual reconciliation with God made necessary by the First Negation of God denying His Absolute Oneness to create multiplicity). The goal of Strauß' meta-narrative of Double Negation in the *LJ* is manifest, in point of fact, as a degree of awareness, but, *in principle, the full Negation of Negation, according to Strauß, is a form of realized eschatology as an always and already existing condition that is capable of being consciously recognized by all human beings.*

The second presupposition of humanity's reconciliation with God is confirmed by the following: "The believer, finding himself environed with the conditions of nature, must, like Christ, die to nature – but only inwardly, as Christ did outwardly, – must spiritually crucify himself and be buried with Christ, that by the virtual suppression of his own sensible existence, he may become, in so far as he is a spirit, identical with himself, and participate in the bliss and glory of Christ."¹²⁵ Strauß repeats two pages later: "By faith in this Christ, especially in his death and resurrection, *man is justified before God*; that is, *by the kindling within him of the idea of Humanity, the individual man participates in the divinely human life of the species.* Now the main element of that idea is, that the negation of Spirit [*Geist*] (the negation of negation, therefore), is the

123. Strauß, *LJ*: 777.

124. See G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* GW: XII and F.C. Baur, *Gnosis*: 722–740.

125. Strauß, *LJ*: 778.

sole way to true spiritual life.”¹²⁶ (Strauß’ parenthetical insertion) In the footnote here, Strauß responds to the charge that he is portraying only a “substantial, not a personal unity of man with God,” by saying: “That unity which exists in the determination of the race has already been present in individuals separately, according to the different measure of their religious development, and thus the substantial unity has become, *in different degrees*, a personal unity.”¹²⁷ (emphasis added)

The significance of these two theological presuppositions of Double Negation and Divinization is that the early Strauß is by no means engaged either in a theologically destructive enterprise or in the denial of history by speaking of the gospel stories as merely mythic imaginations in contrast to facts. For the early Strauß, the proper understanding of the gospel myths depends upon a ‘correct’ *theology* as well as the ultimately, theological understanding of the human condition, which the exegete ‘brings to the text’ – to be sure, for the early Strauß the ‘correct’ theology is *Hegelian dogmatics*.

As the theological elephant in the room, these Straußian presuppositions of 1835 are not (and cannot) be literally expressed by the text because they are “speculative:” –the imperceptible, concealed, dialectical dynamic (the ultimate kernel) that drives history, not the historical events themselves (the mere husk). Hegel appeals to the ‘*cunning of reason*’ in his “Introduction” to his *Philosophy of World History* to ground his claims about the goal of history, that is, humanity’s reconciliation with God. The “*cunning of reason*” works out the teleological goal that is the historical project of reason, precisely in spite of the events or the intentions of the actors of history.¹²⁸ As far as I have been able to determine, though, Strauß nowhere embraces this meaning of the ‘*cunning of reason*’.¹²⁹

According to Strauß, the gospel writers were neither the vehicle for supernatural revelation that violates the natural order nor were they deceivers. Rather, for Strauß in 1835 *the gospel writers are, unwittingly, articulators of a narrative whose significance is far greater than the gospels*. This narrative involves the origin of the universe as the original condition that establishes the possibility of a reconciliation/identification between creation and God, which has now come about, again unwittingly, by the emergence of human consciousness and its long but unavoidable religious development to the pinnacle claim of the God/Man as the model for the elite few (Hegel’s philosophers) or the entire species (Strauß’ humanity).¹³⁰

126. Strauß, *LJ*: 780.

127. Strauß, 780, n. 7.

128. See Hegel, “Introduction” to the *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*: GW XII: 45–46, 53 (Sibree trans.: 31–32, 38).

129. On Strauß’ engagement of Hegel’s notion of the ‘*cunning of reason*’, see the ‘Introduction:’ 168, n. 210.

130. Baur summarizes the contextualization of the gospels within the framework of the entirety of creation/history from Hegel’s *Phenomenology* and “*Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*” in his *Gnosis*: 36, 690, n. 28, and 763. Later, when I engage Strauß’ initial reading of Kant in 1835 in comparison to his *LJEGP* in 1864, I will examine the limits of speculative theology that includes not only Hegelian

In other words, Strauß is not alone when it comes to the presence of a *dogmatic*, theological elephant in the room with the reading the gospels. The (Lutheran) Supernaturalist brings to the text a *dogmatic*, atonement theology based on "original sin" from Augustine of Hippo combined with the logic of Anselm's *Cur deus homo* that only the sacrifice of a perfect human being can cover humanity's debt owed to God because of sin. The Rationalist, naturalist theologian brings to the text a *dogmatic* Deism. Strauß in 1835 brings to the text a *dogmatic*, 'Hegelianism.' None of these theologies are found literally articulated in the scriptures. All of them are based on speculations about divine causality (and intentionality) that can neither be proved nor disproved by the text or any historical event. Causes are incapable of proof or disproof given that we only experience their effects and must construct our understanding of them – although we don't create the causes themselves, but our understanding of them.

Important for grasping Strauß' understanding of myth in the gospels, though, is to recognize that whether he is talking about a gospel story, a scientific explanation of physical events, or his own theological vision for humanity, they all share the same epistemological structure of husk/kernel: appearances that require an imperceptible idea or law in order to be understood. The task of the "critical" reader is to peel back the husk to illuminate the kernel. This constitutes the crucial Hegelian assumption of the early Strauß, and it is inseparable from his mythic reading of the gospels.

On the Mythic Reading's Ancient, Classical Roots and Theology

In his "Introduction" to the *LJ*, Strauß provides a cryptic overview of the non-literal, hermeneutical strategies for reading (sacred) texts (not limited to Christian scriptures) employed in the past. He identifies Anaxagoras as the "inventor" of the allegorical reading of Homer. However, early on as well, there were attempts at 'Rationalist' or "Naturalist" readings of stories about the gods: Euhemerus read Greek myths of the gods to be exaggerated stories about extraordinary human beings, and Polybius in his *Histories* VI, 56, suggests that the purpose of accounts of the gods was encouraged by the founders of the state to inspire awe, subservience, and honesty.¹³¹ Strauß also refers to Philo of Alexandria's development of the allegorical reading, but Strauß

Speculative Theology but also the anthropomorphic theism of Augustinian and Anselmian atonement theology that is the elephant in the room of Supernaturalist biblical literalism. The notion of the "cunning of reason" is not a Hegelian invention but found in a *dramatically alternative form* a half-century before Hegel in Kant's notion of *unsocial sociality*. See the "Fourth Proposition" of *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim*, AA VIII, 20 as well as Otfried Höffe, *Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Die Grundlegung der modern Philosophie* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2004): 269 and *Kritik der Freiheit. Das Grundproblem der Moderne* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2015): 99.

131. See Strauß, *LJ*: 40–41.

points out that "In many cases [...], he [Philo] [...] considered the narrative merely as *the figurative representation of an idea* [...]" for example, whenever the sacred story appears [...] to present delineations unworthy of Deity [...] or otherwise to contain contradictions."¹³² (emphasis added) Strauß uses the example of Origen to indicate that early in the Christian tradition the text was not simply read literally. Origen drew on an anthropomorphic analogy to speak of the different "senses" of the text: the literal was the body; the moral was the soul; and the mystical (figurative) was the spirit/mind.¹³³

However, the fact that Strauß is highlighting the mythical (figurative) character of the gospels is no grounds to conclude that his questioning of the literal character of the gospels is merely to deny any and all historical value to the gospels. As I stated above, the structure of his reading is threefold: A Supernaturalist, Rationalist, and Mythic reading of the texts.

What Strauß accomplished as a 27-year old is astonishing. Despite the "advancements" in Second Testament scholarship since Strauß, the reader profits enormously from a careful reading of his opus although this is by no means to suggest that Strauß is not in need of correction, that his reading needs no amendment, or that one must embrace Hegelian philosophy to properly grasp the gospels' truth. Nevertheless, his detailed comparative analysis of the individual pericopes of the gospels and identification of their prototypes in the 'First' Testament remains valuable today for NT studies.

However, Strauß overlooks that the early church already saw theological significance in the miracle stories independent of the question of their historical status when it came to understanding the spiritual status of the clergy for ensuring the efficacy of the sacraments, which suggests, even more emphatically, that, early on in the Christian tradition, *philosophical ideas* were recognized to be a, if not *the*, ultimate intent of the stories, not simply the historical factuality of the stories.

For example: The miracle stories already functioned in the early church not only as confirmation of Jesus's divinity and status as Messiah, but as philosophical myths. A clear example is the case of Basilides of León and Martialis of Mérida (Spain) following the Decian Persecution of 250–251 CE. Their case resulted in a conflict between Carthage (Cyprian) and Rome (Pope Stephen) over the purity of the clergy for the effectiveness for the laity of the sacraments over which the clergy officiate,¹³⁴ and at the core of the controversy is a profound difference between the Synoptic gospels and John over the function of miracles: In the Synoptic gospels, the miracle occurs because of the faith of the recipient. In John's gospel, the miracle occurs in order to generate or enhance the faith of the recipient. In other words, *already in the third C* (if not before?!), *miracles have a theological significance in addition to the issue of the historicity or non-historicity of particular miracles.*

132. Strauß, *LJ*: 41.

133. See Strauß, *LJ*: 41–44.

134. See W.H.C. Frend, *The Rise of Christianity* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985): 352–357.

Basilides and Martialis were Christian bishops in Spain who gave up their offices during the Decian Persecution. After the persecution, they both sought re-instatement from Pope Stephen in Rome. To the horror of the North African church, particularly Cyprian in Carthage, Stephen re-appointed them as bishops in their respective dioceses. Cyprian called a Synod in Carthage that condemned Stephen's action – not insignificant, this is an important event with respect to the claim for priority in church matters made by Rome. The issue at issue: the "purity" of the clergy for the efficacy of church sacraments.

Given the widespread apostasy on the part of Christians during the Decian Persecution, even North Africa acknowledged the power of the church to forgive sins and to re-instate laity in the church contrary to Tertullian and the New Prophecy Movement. However, when it came to the clergy, Cyprian and the North African church stayed true to their tradition of spiritual purity by insisting that the sacraments would be ineffective because of spiritual corruption were they to be dispensed by an apostate clergy. In contrast, Stephen and the Roman church emphasized that the effectiveness of the sacrament was not dependent upon the spiritual purity of the clergy but on the faith of the recipient.¹³⁵ Obviously, North Africa appeals to the Johannine understanding of miracles (the miracle occurs to generate faith in the recipient) whereas Rome appeals to the Synoptics' understanding of miracles (the miracle occurs because of the faith of the recipient). The controversy was left unresolved as a consequence of the death of Stephen in 257 CE along with the much later conquest of North Africa by Islam.

Although it appears to presuppose the literal, historical status of miracles in the gospels, which Strauß is, of course, rejecting, the Basilides/Martialis controversy between North Africa and Rome underscores that, *by the second century church at least, the miracle stories were taken to have theological ideas as their intent in addition to their status as historical events*: not only that an anthropomorphic deity is capable of violating the laws of nature but also that miracles either generate faith or are the consequence of faith.

Furthermore, Strauß points out that demon possession although not found in the 'First' Testament, was a popular belief among Jews, Greeks, and Romans of the day,¹³⁶ and, despite his attributing the belief to Jesus, he emphatically stressed that the notion of demons constituting a "household of Satan" must be attributed to the popular belief among Jews of the day.¹³⁷ Rather than concluding that the demon possession stories were products of evangelical authorship (and the tradition they inherited), Strauß believes, on the basis of Matthew 12: 25 -19 and Luke 10:18–20, that Jesus was no

135. There are several parallel issues here, of course: 1) the priority of Rome in church matters and 2) the Roman throwing open the door to clergy abuse of power.

136. In *LJEGP* of 1864, Strauß points out that 'demon' possession is not found in the 'First' Testament but was the 'mode illness' of the inter-testament period. See Strauß, *LJEGP*: (§71: 426, §74: 446).

137. See Strauß, *LJ*: 419.

exception to this popular belief. Here Jesus speaks of "a kingdom and household of the devil." Strauß excuses Jesus' error by commenting: "In answer to the repugnance of those with whose enlightenment a belief in demoniacal possession is inconsistent, to admit that Jesus held that belief, [...] [Paulus, the Rationalist] justly observes that the most distinguished mind may retain a false idea, prevalent among his contemporaries, *if it happen to lie out of his peculiar sphere of thought*.¹³⁸" Apparently, Jesus is excused for his belief in demons because he hadn't carefully thought about it. Hence, *Strauß agrees with Paulus that Jesus accepted the notion of demon possession, and he was as mistaken about it as was his audience.*

In another unusual moment of agreement with the Naturalist/Rationalist Paulus, Strauß believes that Jesus practiced exorcism¹³⁹ *when it came to psychosomatic illnesses* whose "healing" *did not involve violation of natural causes*.¹⁴⁰ However, when it comes to the healing stories that obviously violate natural laws, he and Paulus dismiss the literal status of the stories, and Strauß claims, further, that the stories are only examples of "prophetic exaggeration" to establish Jesus' superiority over the First Testament prophets. In short, the historical element in the healings of persons possessed by demons is that Jesus healed psychosomatic illnesses by means of "conjuring" on the basis of the Jewish conception of demon possession of his day. However, the overwhelming majority of the healing stories are mythic as unhistorical embellishments of First Testament accounts in order to demonstrate Jesus' fulfilment of First Testament prophecy or his having exceeded the accomplishments of all prophets of the past.

One can only speculate with respect to why Strauß was reluctant to deny that Jesus performed psychosomatic healings. However, his own criteria and analysis suggest that the mythic tendency of the gospel writers and of their sources raises the possibility that even "conjuring exorcisms" are more appropriately understood to be mythic, as well. All the healing stories, including the psychosomatic healings, are driven by a theological *idea: Jesus superiority over First Testament miracle workers*. Strauß refers to the mining of the First Testament for precedents for the mythic development of stories

138. Strauß, *LJ*: 417. Strauß shares this logic not only with Paulus but also with Schleiermacher. However, for Strauß the logic is not for the purpose as it was for Schleiermacher of defending Christ's 'perfect God-consciousness' by means of the notion that outside of Christ's 'calling,' he was not obligated to 'correct' the perceptions of his followers. Thirty years later, Strauß explicitly rejects Schleiermacher's proposal of a 'middle position' between 'objectively false' and 'subjectively true' when it comes to the miraculous and demons because they lie 'outside of the domain of Jesus' calling.' See *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 67, 148, 138–139, 151–142. For Strauß the notion that something 'lie out of his peculiar sphere of thought' is an indicator of Jesus' finite, human understanding, not perfect God-consciousness as the case for Schleiermacher.

139. See Strauß, *LJ*: 416–417.

140. See the discussion of psychosomatic healing and Justinus Kerner in the opening paragraphs of Chapter 4: Why Schleiermacher was not an Option:" 249 ff.

about Jesus according to the *genetic mythical principle* some 50+ times¹⁴¹ to underscore Jesus' status as the Messiah capable of far more than the First Testament prophets.¹⁴²

Later, Strauß observes:

[...] apart from the difficulties which the notion of the existence of a devil and demons entails – whatever theory may be held as to the relation between the self-consciousness and the bodily organs, it remains absolutely inconceivable how the union between the two could be so far dissolved, that a foreign self-consciousness could gain an entrance, thrust out that which belonged to the organism, and usurp its place. Hence, for every one [*sic.*] who at once regards actual phenomena with enlightened eyes,¹⁴³ and the New Testament narratives with orthodox ones, there results the contradiction, that what now proceeds from natural causes, must in the time of Jesus have been caused supernaturally.¹⁴⁴

As a consequence, Strauß dismisses the Supernaturalist reading of a "kingdom of evil" in which greater immorality indicates the more that the kingdom of evil reigns. He suggests that this is refuted, for example, by the fact that Judas was not reported to be possessed.¹⁴⁵

Whereas, the Supernaturalist Olshausen proposed that there is demonic possession only where there's an inward moral struggle,¹⁴⁶ Strauß points out that disorders of the nervous system can occur without moral fault¹⁴⁷ to strengthen his conclusion that shifting from natural causes of affliction to moral causes "is one of the most useless which Olshausen's work contains."¹⁴⁸

Unquestionably, Strauß' provides analysis, details, and insights into the gospels, the First Testament, and the history of *theology* that are astonishing and worthy of careful engagement by every biblical scholar and historian of religion. However,

141. See for example, Strauß, *LJ*: frequently (see for example, *LJ* 58, 63, 69–70, 77–78, 84, 86, 104–105, 107, 127–130, 177, 215, 312, 413, 440, 495, 498, 517, and 582).

142. Today, the "Jesus-Seminar" continues to propose on the basis of the "criterion of multiple attestation" that the miracles in the gospels are historical, and that the historical Jesus was a miracle worker as Lane McGaughey frequently has said and the Jesus Seminar theologian, Lloyd Geerings, claims in his (to my knowledge) unpublished lecture "Excavating Jesus," the second of a four-part lecture series entitled "Is Christianity going anywhere? – although there are no accounts of demon possession healings in John's gospel (*LJ* 437). Yet, already in the second volume of *LJ* (1835), as the citations in this paragraph above indicate, Strauß demonstrated that the miracles are not historical but narratives (mythoi) stimulated by stories of miracles performed by Old Testament characters (especially, Moses, Elijah, and Elisha) or by the process of association evoked by certain themes (e.g., faith moving mountains and trees). It is precisely the miracle stories that allow for observing the creative power of the mythic in religious texts.

143. Strauß here refers to recent advancements in the understanding of epilepsy, insanity, and personality disorders that might be attributable to demons as indication of the afflictions having natural causes. (*LJ* 419).

144. Strauß, *LJ*: 419–420.

145. See Strauß, *LJ*: 421.

146. See Strauß, *LJ*: 422.

147. See Strauß, *LJ*: 426.

148. Strauß, *LJ*: 422.

we will see that what Strauß accomplished in 1835 is only the first step toward his contribution to a *theology of history*.

Strauß and 'Mediating' Theology

Strauß, in particular, and the Hegelians, generally, were attacked not only for their intellectual elitism but also for their ignoring of the need to address the "suffering and anxieties" of humanity¹⁴⁹ not to speak of their calling into question the "simple," narrative of Christian salvation that has in-formed the Christian faith of the Latin world since Augustine of Hippo and the 5th C CE.¹⁵⁰ These themes are emphasized in the letter by the First Testament scholar and "Mediating Theologian," Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wette in his "Dr. Strauß and the Church of Zurich: a Voice Out of North Germany" included in *The Historical Reader* that is Part II of Volume I of the present work.

De Wette was among those 19th C theologians seeking to mediate between science and religion. Their notion of mediation was not the Hegelian mediation between the finite "self" and divine "Other" that is ultimately "mediated" or "unified" by the Absolute Concept. Rather, the 19th C, "Mediating Theologians" (*Vermittlungstheologen*) in the German world sought to combine their commitment to the Lutheran principle of "sola scriptura" ("the scriptures alone" as the source of revealed, theological truth) with "historical-critical" biblical scholarship as well as with the ever-increasing, significant insights of the historical (that is, natural) sciences. The most well-known of them was Friedrich Schleiermacher, a contemporary of Hegel's at the von Humboldt University in Berlin who had already written in his *On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers* of 1799: "Therefore here and there at all times, God sends persons armed with miraculous powers, paving their way by means of an omnipotent Word, and giving them the task of translating their wills and works in order to mediate that which otherwise would be eternally separated."¹⁵¹ Their goal was to "germinate the dormant seed of an improved humanity, to spark a love for the highest of ideals, and to transform everyday life into something more elevated."¹⁵²

149. Hegel claimed that the 'sufferings and anxieties' of history are 'necessary' for Absolute Spirit, but they are only 'logically' necessary as the indifferent place holder for the Second Negation's 'point of indifference' that is the 'return' to Absolute Spirit above sensuousness.

150. See Douglas R McGaughey, *Christianity for the Third Millennium: Faith in an Age of Fundamentalism and Skepticism*, paperback edition (San Francisco: International Scholars Publications, 1998), "Chapter 2: The Separation Model of the Christian Faith" in *ibid.*: 37–82.

151. Schleiermacher, *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers*, John Oman trans. (New York: Harper and Row, Harper Torchbooks/Cloister Library, 1958): 6.

152. See <https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vermittlungstheologie> (8 October 2017).

The commitment on the part of these Mediating Theologians to "historical-critical" biblical scholarship sought a means to unite the very two exegetical strategies so thoroughly examined by Strauß in his *Life of Jesus Critically Examined*, that is, "Supranationalism" (biblical literalism) and "Rationalism" (a commitment to the laws of nature that limit even the God who created them). *Whereas Strauß saw the power of the "poetic" (narratives with historical events, ideas, or symbols at their core informed by the Hegelian meta-narrative of Double Negation) for avoiding the alternatives of the exegetical divide, the Mediating Theologians sought reconciliation of religion and science by means of mysticism*, for example, Schleiermacher's metaphysical option of the "feeling of absolute dependence" [*schlechthinniges Abhängigkeitsgefühl*] or de Wette's "mystical feeling" that elevates and unites above materiality. Their goal proved difficult to achieve, and in his *Geschichte der neuern evangelischen Theologie*,¹⁵³ Emanuel Hirsch gives de Wette's own acknowledgement of failure:

"Ich fiel in eine wirre Zeit,
Die Glaubenseintracht war vernichtet.
Ich mischte mich mit in den Streit.
Umsonst! Ich hab ihn nicht geschlichtet!"

"I fell into a tumultuous time,
Concord among believers was destroyed.
I entered into the fray.
Futilely! I was unable to mediate peace!"

Strauß came to see that his Hegelian 'reconciliation' of Infinite and finite Spirit was no more up to the task of 'mediating peace' between the gospels and the natural sciences than the 'mysticism' of 'Mediating Theology', and he fully recognized the insufficiencies of historical-critical scholarship alone to provide a 'factual' foundation for theological claims. Nonetheless, his gospel criticism in the *LJ* provides invaluable insights in biblical exegesis, and his work on the history of Church Doctrine (his *Glaubenslehre*) of 1841 marks a crucial watershed for his theological reflections that resulted in a twenty year hiatus in his theological publications. When he picked up his pen in the 1860s to articulate his theological reflections, he was in a very different world.

Dripping with cutting irony when it comes to those who take the accidental forms of religion to be the indication of religious essence, Strauß wrote a short, but illuminating, piece that appeared in the *Jahrbücher der Gegenwart* (April 1848). In an article entitled "Jewish Persecution and Jewish Emancipation," he presents the Jews in Germany from the Crusades to his day as occupying a similar position in society as farmers/peasants whose pressing for recognition of their legitimate status in society was marked by the brutally repressive Peasant Wars in the 15th C. and 16th C and

153. Emanuel Hirsch, *Geschichte der neuern evangelischen Theologie im Zusammenhang mit den allgemeinen Bewegungen des europäischen Denkens*, Fünfter Band (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1954); 362.

whose disadvantaged position continued to Strauß' day.¹⁵⁴ Strauß' proposal for the 'emancipation' of the Jews was to dismiss the 'top-down' legal attempts to provide access to broader social privileges, which he argued would only perpetuate stereotypes and isolation on the part of both Christians and Jews.

[When it comes to religious differences,] it is not possible to help [...] a people within a people] from above [...]. Therefore, it remains to try to find a remedy from below, from the physical side instead of the meta- and hyperphysical side. How impractical we Christians have become! *Thanks to our supernaturalism, we do not perceive the natural, that which lies before our feet.*¹⁵⁵ (emphasis added)

Strauß invoked the example of the attempts in Rome to overcome the separation of Patricians and Plebians by the 'physical' solution of intermarriage by which over time "the two estates came to become One People." "Where [...] henceforth the Romans wanted to unite a city or a nation particularly closely, they used to grant it the *connumbium*."¹⁵⁶

Strauß stresses that the formation of Jewish identity is as much a product of German persecution as it is of a Jewish 'national' identity and proposes that the goal is not simply to integrate Jews into German culture but to bring about the positive benefits for Germany that could come from an integration of Germans into Jewish culture. He optimistically proposed that within families, each group will try to maintain its identity, but this resistance will disappear over time.¹⁵⁷

As religious freedom has led to Catholics and Protestants fragmenting into sects (e.g., Trinitarians and Unitarians, Theists, and Pantheists, and Atheists [into] day-, night-, and sunset wrinkles), 'Jews' will no longer be such an anomaly. Those Christian families who love the light will shortly feel more united with educated Jews than with Christian Pietists. *One will regard ethos and education to be more essential than the fundamental rawness to which accidental religious forms are related only as coloration.*¹⁵⁸ (emphasis added)

He concludes:

The remaining knights of the Christian idea of the state should concede, even if reluctantly; for if hitherto the Jew had first had to become a Christian in order to be able to enter a higher profession, he could not be blamed for silently despising a religion which by such a

154. Wilhelm Zimmermann, Strauß' fellow student at the Stift in Tübingen, published a devastatingly, detailed account of the Peasant Wars between 1841 and 1843. See Zimmermann, *Der große Deutsche Bauernkrieg (1841–1843)*. 4th ed. Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1989.

155. David Friedrich Strauß, "Judenverfolgung und Judenemancipation" in *Jahrbücher der Gegenwart*, 30 (April 1848): 118b–119a.

156. Strauß, "Judenverfolgung und Judenemancipation:" 119a.

157. See Strauß, "Judenverfolgung und Judenemancipation:" 119b.

158. Strauß, "Judenverfolgung und Judenemancipation:" 119b.

clumsy coercion chased proselytes into its fold, as well as the state, which allowed itself to be used for such lowly service.¹⁵⁹

Although Strauß returned to publishing theological texts in 1862, it would not be until his final work in 1872, *The Old and the New Faith*, that he formulated a thoroughly (if containing serious gaps and begging of questions) bottom-up materialist 'faith.'

159. Strauß, "Judenverfolgung und Judenemancipation:" 119b.

Chapter 3: Academic Controversy and Reaction to Strauß' Life of Jesus

Chapter Overview

Two controversies marked Strauß' career as tutor at the Protestant Seminary in Tübingen: 1) His Hegelianism of the 1830s and 2) the *Life of Jesus Critically Examined* of 1835. An account is provided of similarities and differences already in the *LJ* between the Hegelians and Strauß in which he sought a 'correction' to Hegelianism, not a rejection of it.

The criticism of the *LJ* by his beloved professor, Ferdinand Christian Baur as well as an evaluation of their basis in Baur's work, as well as the review of the *LJ* written by Edgar Quinet are presented.

The chapter ends by addressing Strauß' ambivalent relationship to the Hegelians and his claim that biblical criticism does not necessarily mean either destruction of the text or the denial of history in the text.

Two Academic Complaints, the Hegelians, and F. C. Baur

With the publication of the *LJ* in 1835, the 27-year-old David Friedrich Strauß joined the elite circle of the best-known 'Second' Testament scholars of all time. Strauß made important contributions in Hegel Studies and in Historical Theology, and the incompleteness of his reading of Kant points to a 'middle' way in theology between Absolute Idealism and Reductionist Materialism.

With the 1839 political revolution that toppled the government in Zurich making clear that he was to be excluded from the classroom, Strauß turned his attention to writing about key individuals who represent a commitment to intellectual self-determination in pursuit of truth no matter at what cost to themselves: Nicodemus Frischlin (1856), and Ulrich von Hutten (1858). In 1870, he published his lectures on Voltaire. I will leave the judgment regarding these biographies to those more qualified than I. However, Strauß' choice to write on these authors was not capricious. He was making a case for unprejudiced scholarship. His 1862 work on Reimarus' unpublished writings represents his re-entry into the field of theology that was capped with his *Life of Jesus Examined for the German People* of 1864.

As familiar as the name David Friedrich Strauß is among 'Second' Testament scholars, one can unequivocally say that there has been no such thing as a 'Strauß reception.' He has been used as a strawman to be ripped apart on the basis of a superficial grasp of his work by his opponents and merely portrayed as a martyr by his defenders. Anything close to a full appreciation of his contributions has yet to begin with respect not only to gospel scholarship itself but also Hegelian' Speculative Metaphysics: and the history of Church Doctrine.

Perhaps an initial surprise to most readers is that Strauß' encounter with resistance in the academy did not begin with his *LJ* in 1835. Strauß had been appointed lecturer (*Repetent*) in the Tübingen Protestant Seminary (*das evangelische Stift*) in 1832, where he himself had studied. Over the course of his first three semesters, he taught courses on Hegel, also a 'son' of the Tübingen Stift, who in Strauß' day was the intellectual 'supernova,' whom everyone 'needed,' to 'know' in some fashion even if they didn't want to know. The conservative Tübingen School was angered by the Hegelian criticism of traditional Christology that turned the Christ event from a historical 'fact' into a 'mere representation' of the unity that is Absolute Spirit and by what they called Hegelian 'pantheism'¹ that challenged the traditional conception of a Personal Deity as well as individual forgiveness and immortality.

Strauß' courses on Hegel were eagerly attended by students, and their popularity led to competition for instructional space in the *Stift* and university – to the chagrin, especially, of the Philosophy Faculty.² This led to a complaint from the Philosophy Faculty over lecture hall assignments being filed with the University Senate, whose rejection of the complaint led to the first appeal to Stuttgart (the Ministry of Education) with regard to Strauß.³ Strauß' response was to stop teaching Hegel. His biographer Ziegler speculates that he did so in order to focus his attention on the writing of the *LJ*,⁴ which appeared three years later.

However, when it came to his embracing of Hegel in his *Life of Jesus Critically Examined*, the reader today may experience a second surprise. Strauß' intention was

1. Ferdinand Christian Baur pointed out in his "Abgenötigten Erklärung gegen einen Artikel der evangelischen Kirchenzeitung, herausgegeben von D.E.W. Hengstenberg, Prof. der Theol. An der Universität zu Berlin. Mai 1836" in *Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie*, III (1836): 225*, that the label 'pantheist' is inappropriate for Hegel. He and the early Strauß are "Immanentists" or today we would say "Pan-en-theists." God is not identical to the world/universe but an inseparable spirit (not substance) ubiquitously present in the world/universe. Ziegler labels Hegel a 'Panlogist,' which is the label I prefer, as will be obvious why below: "[...] Reason, Logos, *ratio* was for Hegel the principle governing the world [*Weltprinzip*]. He was a Panlogist, which one could translate with 'Arch Rationalist, just as well. Ziegler I: 257

2. Theobald Ziegler writes, Strauß faced strong opposing wind in Tübingen because of his Hegelianism: "In fact, though, the submission [of a letter of complaint over Strauß already in 1832 sent to the *Inspectorat* in Stuttgart] demonstrated [...] a completely petty spirit that dominated the academic guild [in the Philosophy Faculty and Protestant Seminary in Tübingen] fearful of a successful competitor as well as a personal animosity and hatred of a critic of Tübingen philosophy and the followers of the new [Hegelian] teaching." Ziegler I: 121.

3. Strauß' biographer, Theobald Ziegler, describes the threat that Strauß quickly posed for the Philosophical Faculty and the conservative, 'Supranaturalist Tübingen School' already with his appointment to tutor in May, 1832. Ziegler writes of the intellectual pettiness present in the 'Academy' (but, of course, not limited to Tübingen): "Already on 9 November 1832, the Philosophy Faculty [...] complained of Strauß that he used every opportunity with intention and zeal in order to cultivate followers for himself and, especially, his philosophical perspective (that is, his Hegelian perspective) and that in the course of it all [...] conducted himself to the highest degree unfittingly according to recognized, educated standards but appealingly to young people." (Ziegler, I: 119)

4. Ziegler, I: 123.

the defense, not the destruction, Christianity contrary to his opponents in Tübingen and as the populist Christians of Zurich (documented in the 'Historical Reader' documents in Part II) violently maintained. He certainly did not issue a call for humanity to leave Christianity on the trash heap of history. Rather, he believed that history is the greatest source of instruction for the improvement of Christianity. In 1841 in his *Glaubenslehre* he wrote:

The crucible or boiling flask in which dogma has been smelted and distilled, all reagents by which it is decomposed, all vessels in which it must be fermented and skimmed off are not made and put into operation by us. Rather, we are able only to take them as they have been given to us in church factions and conflicts, as heresies and synods, as Rationalism, and philosophy etc. *The true criticism of dogma is its history.* In its impartial and vague form, this dogma is present in the scriptures; with analysis and closer examination of it, the church falls apart in antitheses, which, doubtless, led also to heretical extremes. Immediately followed the fixation of church teaching in a creed, the creeds were processed as Church Doctrine. However, shortly but gradually criticism was awakened. Spirit differentiated itself from reality as it was presented in church teaching. The subject extracted itself from the substance of its faith in church teaching up to that point [from mere belief in objective accounts of things and agents] and negated that substance as its truth. This it was able to do because another truth arose – if at first only in itself and undeveloped. *Everything hinges now on the question whether this new, speculative truth [of the Hegelian meta-narrative concerned with the 'kernel' at the core of the gospels' 'husks'] is itself the same as ancient church truth or foreign and opposed to it – or whether there is a middle pathway⁵ between the two?⁶ (emphasis added)*

The key to the metaphysics of the 'new speculative truth' for Strauß was precisely this issue of the relationship between 'spiritual' content (*Inhalt*) and 'sensuous' form. Ironically, though, this very 'truth' is at the core of Personal Theism's own, Logos metaphysics! The 'new speculative truth' of Hegelianism preserves with the Concept (in the form of the Second Negation in consciousness to think Spirit as Absolute Spirit) what Personal Theism gives in perceptual representations as the historical 'fact' of Jesus as the God/Man Incarnation of the Logos. Both Speculative Metaphysics and Personal Theism make 'Spirit' the core claim of their notions of God.⁷ Although Hegel

5. In the *LJ*, Strauß takes a 'third way' to be a question of Christology. Strauß' 'third way' is a *universal* Christology a *universally inclusive* Christology distinct from the *exclusive* Christology of the ancient church and (possibly Hegel) and the *partially inclusive* Christologies of the Hegelians, Schleiermacher, and F.C. Baur.

6. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 71–72.

7. *Personal Theism's God places God outside of history as the origin and goal of history. The 'new' Speculative Metaphysics finds God in history as the World Soul/World Spirit* (see *Glaubenslehre* I: 390–391; *Glaubenslehre* II: 217). Although Ziegler calls Spinoza, Hegel, Schleiermacher, and Strauß 'Pantheists' (See Ziegler II: 352), the more appropriate label for Strauß is Immanentist or Pan-en-theist (not Pantheist or Panlogist) (see the footnote above: 214, n. 1). F.C. Bauer prefers the label 'Immanentism' for both Hegel and Strauß. For Hegel, this World Soul is the source out of which all things have emerged, and it is the goal to which all things return. It remains ambiguous in Hegel just what the

is an Immanentist, his theology is as Athanasian (divinization of humanity) as the teaching the ancient church. Consequently, neither Hegel nor Strauß are making a radical claim that signals the death knell of Christianity. Strauß wrote in 1839:

[...] [D]o not fear that Christ [God, as well] might be lost to us if we find ourselves compelled to abandon some of what has hitherto been called Christianity! He remains all the more certain to us, and for everyone, the less we fearfully hold on to doctrines and opinions that can become an impulse to the mind to abandon Christ. However, if Christ remains for us, and if he remains for us as the highest thing that we know and are able to think in religious terms, as the one without whose presence in the mind no perfect piety is possible, then the essence of Christianity remains for us in him.⁸

Ziegler reports that the issue of this 'mediation between the speculative, 'true' content [*Inhalt*] that is the 'Idea'/Concept and the historical representation [*Form*] from Hegel's *Phenomenology* is what Strauß in the 1830s "placed at the center of his thought [...]: *what Religion has in the form of representation, philosophy has in the form of the Concept*."⁹ Ziegler writes:

Hegel wrote in the Introduction to his *Philosophy of Religion* [*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, Bd. I, S.3f (elfter Band der Werke)] that [...] [*r*]eligion is "the region in which all the puzzles of the world are solved, all contradictions of profound thought are exposed, all emotional pains fall silent. It is the region of eternal truth and eternal peace. Engagement of religion disburdens the Spirit of all finitude."¹⁰ This engagement grants satisfaction and liberation. It is absolutely free consciousness as consciousness of absolute truth and, therefore, itself truly conscious. As *feeling*, it is the pleasure of blessedness. As *activity*, it is concerned with nothing other than displaying the honor of God in revealing God's glory. Those peoples possessing this religious consciousness as their truth dignity are taken to be the Sunday of life. All sorrows, all cares, the sand dunes of temporality float away in this ether whether in a feeling of devotion or in hope. In this region of the Spirit flow the floods of Lethe from which Psyche drinks, in which she submerges all pain, shapes all

nature of this 'return' is. Is it a return in the sense of an awareness that occurs only in those few minds who have learned to grasp it, or is it a metaphysical return back to Absolute Spirit by all things? Strauß' Immanentism knows no beginning nor end to history. The goal of history is humanity and the spiritual capacity that humanity possesses to 'rise above' its material conditions to grasp 'Spirit.' This is not a capacity or an experience of only the 'few' philosophers who grasp it, Strauß maintained in his universal Christology, but it is the concrete condition of all human beings.

8. Strauß, "Vergängliches und Bleibendes:" 132. Here already in 1838, though, Strauß' 'highest thing' that we can think in religious terms 'without whose presence in the mind no perfect piety is possible' is (Platonic) reason, not the Hegelian meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit, the door to which for Strauß was slammed shut by Feuerbach just prior to Strauß' publication of the *Glaubenslehre*. See Chapter 5: "1838 'On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity':" 566 ff.

9. Ziegler, I: 131.

10. F.C. Baur echoes this Hegelian definition of religion with the more succinct form: Religion is "[...] essentially a relationship of spirit to Spirit (*ihrem Wesen nach nur ein Verhältnis des Geistes zum Geist*). Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 287, 690.

hardships and the darkness of time into a dream image, and transfigures them into the light glow of the eternal."¹¹ (emphasis added)

Nonetheless, the true content of dogma must be distinguished from the representations of religion:

Ziegler continues:

Dogma is [...] truth and gives us truth, but by means of the inadequate form of representation. Dogma is identical with philosophy in content [*inhaltlich*] [...] It is distinguished from philosophy only in form. Consequently, [religious] dogma remains more or less far behind philosophy.¹²

Ziegler comments: "One can place the emphasis here either on the certification of the identical truth *content* of both [dogma and philosophy] (on the speculative kernel of dogma) or on the pointing out of the inadequacy of the form of *representation* [in dogma], in other words, on the un-philosophical of this representation of husks and shells."¹³ (emphasis added) Ziegler claims that during his service year as vicar in Klein-Ingersheim (Fall of 1830 – Fall of 1831), as required for becoming a pastor, Strauß emphasized the first option that stressed the identical truth between philosophy and Dogma, which is made clear in a sermon from November 1830.¹⁴ However, as tutor in the Protestant Seminary in Tübingen, he emphasized the second option, the inadequacy of representations for dogma ¹⁵ – nevertheless, this is far from championing the destruction of Christianity!

Three years after the controversy over his teaching of Hegel in Tübingen a second letter was sent to the Ministry of Education in Stuttgart. Within four days of the publication on June 6, 1835, of a one paragraph summary of the *Life of Jesus*¹⁶ in the

11. Ziegler, II: 338. Ziegler, inadvertently to be sure, is proclaiming the anthropomorphic foundation of all religion.

12. Ziegler, I: 132.

13. Ziegler, I: 132.

14. See Ziegler, I: 63 ff.

15. See Ziegler, I: 132.

16. [June 6, 1835, in the *Schwäbischer Merkur*].

"Tübingen. From C[hristian]F[riedrich] Osiander has just now appeared:

The Life of Jesus:

Critically Examined

From

David Friedr[ich] Strauß

Dr. of Philos. and Lecturer at the

Protestant Theological

Seminary in Tübingen.

With royal Württemberger Copyright.

1835.

gr. 8S. XVI 730 S. 5 fl. 24 fr.

"The author of this book thinks it is now time to put in place of the obsolete supernatural and natural

Schwäbische Chronik. Zweite Abtheilung des Schwäbischen Merkurs that announced the pending publication by C.F. Osiander of the first volume of the *LJ*, a letter calling for Strauß' removal from the Tübingen faculty was sent by the chief academic officer of the Protestant Seminary, Johann Christian Flatt,¹⁷ to the *Inspectoriat* in Stuttgart. Obviously, in light of its length alone (the first volume in German is 731 pages), it was not possible for Flatt, who is taken to be a "Rationalist Kantian," to have acquired and read it within four days. In short, driving Flatt's objections to Strauß is not simply Strauß, the author of the *LJ*, who is talking about gospel stories (*mythoi*), but Strauß, the Hegelian from 1832, who viewed all of conscious experience as distinguishable in terms of external, material 'husks' (stories, particular perceptions) but universal as their internal, spiritual 'kernel' (the true content that is imperceptible, Absolute Spirit). Strauß, the threat to the university Faculty in 1832, was now an even more formidable opponent to the conservative Tübingen Theological School because he had the temerity to view the gospels as a particular example of universal consciousness – to be sure, for Strauß, with the God/Man being the ultimate aim of all finite consciousness.

To this day, Strauß as Gospel critic and Strauß as an Hegelian constitute the central foci that frame Strauß' reception – although that reception has focused more on the perceptible 'representations' (*Form*) than on the actual 'content' (*Inhalt*) of both Strauß' 'gospel criticism' and his 'Hegelianism.' In other words, even this limited reception was simplistic and superficial: As gospel critic, Strauß was charged with destroying the historical foundation of Christianity. When it came to Hegelianism, Traditional Theists accused him, of substituting an elitist philosophy of religion inaccessible to the pious Christian in the pew, which, combined with his Gospel criticism,

approaches to the history of Jesus a new, namely the mythical (i.e., not that the entire history of Jesus should be taken to be mythic but only that everything be regarded critically whether it contains anything mythical). If early church exegesis proceeded on the basis of a double assumption: that the gospels contain, first, history and, second, a miraculous history; if in light of these assumptions the Rationalists dispense with the second only to cling all the more strongly to the first because in these books bona fide, natural history is found, so can scholarship not remain halfway stuck, but it must drop the other assumption and first be investigated whether and how far we stand on historical ground in the gospels?; an investigation from which, by the way, a concluding statement will demonstrate that the kernel of Christian faith is entirely independent. By the present text taking the path to an un-mythic perspective for each individual element by going through the supranatural and rationalistic readings and their respective refutation, it can serve simultaneously as a review of the most distinguished perspectives and examinations of all aspects of the gospel history and as such is recommended also for students.

"The second volume that concludes the work is already in press and will appear before the end of this year." (Trans. McG)

17. See Erik Linstrum, "Strauss's 'Life of Jesus': Publication and the Politics of the German Public Sphere" in the *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 71, No. 4 (October 2010): 593–616. Linstrum confuses the two brothers. He reports that Carl [sic.] Christian [von sic.] Flatt was the chief academic officer (*Studienratsdirektor*, see Ziegler, I: 229) in the Tübingen Protestant Seminary in 1835 who called for Strauß' dismissal (596). However, Karl Christian von Flatt left Tübingen in 1812. It was his brother, Johann Friedrich Flatt who called for Strauß' dismissal. Karl Christian von Flatt was a member (chair?) of the Inspectorat in Stuttgart to whom Johann Friedrich Flatt wrote.

was taken to mean the destruction of Traditional Christian Theism – regardless of his claim to preserve the core doctrine of Christianity: the Incarnation.

Academic Controversy Based on Criticism (*diairesis*)

The academy depends upon the dialectic that is identities and differences. In other words, academics do not only distinguish between and among particular things (*diairesis*), but they also seek what unites them, synthesis (συνείδησις), as the key to understanding/knowledge. Plato called those who engage this method "dialecticians" (*Phaedrus* 266b) . The Liddell and Scott Greek dictionary defines *diairesus/dihairesis* as "dividing, division, esp. of a class into its constituent parts; διαίρετος: divided: divisible: hence, distinguishable; from διαίρεω: to divide, part or cleave in twain [...] III. to define, interpret." Distinguishing between and among things by *diairesis* is described already by Plato as a bottom-up dialectic grounded in 'the logic of negation' (that 'this' IS NOT 'that').

Distinguishing between identity and difference is often called 'critical thinking' because it is a process that can only consciously occur in the mind. Plato wrote in the *Phaedrus* 266b: "[...] whenever I deem another man able to discern an objective unity and plurality, I follow 'in his footsteps where he leadeth as a god' [a reference to *Odyssey* 5.193]."

Understanding and knowledge consist of recognizing sameness (σύνθεσις) as an 'idea'/'form'¹⁸ of a set of phenomena if not (ultimately) a grasp of the absolute unity of all things (Plato's amoral Good in the Simile of the Line of Book VI in the *Republic*). When it comes to 'ultimate unity,' the key question is, then: Are visible, actual things merely a chance aggregate, or are they united a) by a common, ultimate origin (e.g., Plato), b) by 'matter' as concealed possibilities (e.g., Aristotle¹⁹ and Heidegger²⁰), c) by

18. Plato spoke of 'ideas' whereas Aristotle of 'forms' and Kant distinguishes between concepts of the understanding (theoretical and practical reason) and 'pure' ideas of reason . The 'pure' ideas of reason are Kant's answer to the question: "How are *a priori* synthetic judgments possible? The *Critique of Pure Reason* is Kant's answer. See B 193 ff.: How are pure synthetic judgments possible? Analytic judgment is concerned with concepts whereas synthetic judgments are 'something entirely different'. In other words, categories alone cannot make a synthetic judgment (see B 289, 291, 295) because experience alone is not sufficient although there is no experience of synthetic judgment without a world of experience (B 288–289). In fact, the highest principle of all synthetic judgment and experience is their givenness under the conditions of 'necessary conditions' (B 197–198). The three ideas of 'pure' reason that make 'pure' synthetic judgments possible are: God, the enduring identity of the soul, and the condition of freedom in cosmology (see B xxx and B 699–700).

19. See Heins Happ, *Hyle. Studien zum Aristotelischen Materie-Begriff*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971.

20. See Otto Willmann, *Geschichte des Idealismus. Band 1. Vorgeschichte und Geschichte des antiken Idealismus* (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1973 <1894>), 188–189, Paul Natorp, *Philosophische Systematik*

matter/substance (e.g., Material Reductionism), or d) by energy (e.g., contemporary physics)?²¹ As I pointed out above, (*Phaedrus* 266b), the answers to these questions have shaped the discussion of metaphysics throughout the Western tradition, to be sure, with the exception of Kant.

By its very task, then, the academy is threatened by dis-agreement over 'identity' and 'difference:' distinguishing between and among its concepts, to be sure, but also distinguishing between and among its practitioners. Consequently, no one is surprised that Strauß' work was viewed as controversial given the subject matter of its *diairesis* ('myth'). Furthermore, he, too, 'attacked' others; notably, Friedrich Schleiermacher, to whom I will return below and in Chapter 4, "Why Schleiermacher was not an Option," but, especially, Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob Paulus. Paulus, whom Strauß took as the primary representative of Rationalism, was the object of Strauß' derision in the *LJ*. Strauß himself by no means maintained the line between a logical and an *ad hominem* criticism of Paulus. However, after Paulus had written a letter in support of Strauß' appointment to the chair for Biblical Theology, Church History, and Dogmatics at the University of Zurich in 1839 specifically *on the basis of encouraging academic freedom and rigorous scholarship*, Strauß limits, dramatically, his criticism of him.

As a given that the academy thrives on controversy, the fire storm is imaginable but the depth of the negative effect on minds and hearts is beyond the imaginable that swept over Strauß with the publication of the *LJ* (and his other, in some respects more important writings in theology). The attack on his person was so vituperative that the criticism took center stage rather than a serious engagement of Strauß' staggering scholarship.

I present examples of the manner in which Strauß was personally attacked in Part II of this Volume I's 'Historical Reader.' Bruno Bauer (not to be confused with Ferdinand Christian Baur, Strauß' professor), the Right-Wing Hegelian,²² was a leading voice among the Hegelians who attacked Strauß.²³ With a cheap shot, Friedrich Nietzsche in his "David Strauss: the Confessor and the Writer" in his *Untimely Meditations* of 1873 attacked Strauß as a 'classic, education Philistine' (a self-righteous conformist)

(Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000): 376, and Heidegger's discussion of truth as 'concealment' in Paragraph 44 of *Being and Time*.

21. NOTE: This list intentionally ignores the elephant in the room in the first half of the 19th C that was Kant for whom the question was not that regarding an objective truth claim with respect to the chance aggregate of phenomena but the question of the necessary, subjective conditions that make it possible for drawing anything remotely like an objective truth claim.

22. Strauß used the labels "Right-Wing," "Centrist," and "Left-Wing" Hegelians in his "Verschiedene Richtungen innerhalb der Hegel'schen Schule in Betreff der Christologie" ("The Different Schools of Thought on Christology among the Hegelians") in *Streitschriften* III: 95-126.

23. See Ziegler II: 356-357.

for his *The Old and the New Faith*.²⁴ His opponents made life hell for him, and they made life hell for those few friends who stood by him.²⁵

A common strategy of his adversaries was to focus on Strauß' associates as somehow being contaminated by a heretical infection because of their association with him. For example, Ferdinand Christian Baur, criticized for his personal friendship with Strauß after the publication of the *LJ*, was accused of "the professor being influenced by his student." These charges were a key element that led Baur to write his response to the Hengstenberg article in the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*.²⁶ Even Strauß' visits with his pastoral friends (and attending of their worship services) led to public criticism of his friends by church authorities.²⁷ One of those public attacks on Strauß and those who dared to be associated with him is the reaction published in the *Schwäbische Merkur* following Strauß' funeral on February 11, 1874.²⁸ On March 12, 1874, the following declaration appeared in the *Schwäbischer Merkur* accompanied by 214 signatures of pastors:

According to the *Schwäbischer Merkur* of February 12th at the grave side of Dr. Strauß, this unequivocal atheist, Director [Gustav] v. Binder, who is at the head of our learned school system and supervisor of our Protestant theological seminaries, made a speech glorifying this man and concluded with the following words:

"The German people will remember you: the German youth will not forget you."

We feel compelled in our conscience to declare that, by such an appearance, a grave offence is given to the Christian faith of our people, and also call attention to the fact that the

24. See Ziegler II: 734, 759–760. That Strauß defended the Monarchy in *The Old and the New Faith* should not come as a surprise to anyone familiar with his treatment at the hands of the Christian populists in Zurich or the incessant attacks and haranguing by his legion of opponents. He favored a republic but did not view the general populous as ready for the task in his day. See Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube* (Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1872): 261–265.

25. Ziegler names, especially, Märklin, Binder, and Friedrich Theodor Vischer (see Ziegler I: 211 ff.). These three were friends of Strauß since the Blaubeuren years. (See Ziegler I: 107).

26. Baur warned against a 'heretic hunt' and responded vehemently against the charge of 'guilt by association.' See, Baur, "Abgenötigte Erklärung." 220–221.

27. Other examples of friends who faced pressure and the loss of their professional positions: Strauß felt he couldn't visit his friend Märklin when he was pastoring in Calw for fear that the Pietists would revolt against Märklin. (See Ziegler I: 260). On the surface trivial, but lives were at stake: Strauß' theologian friend, Märhlen, with whom he frequently ate lunch in Stuttgart, had to terminate a relationship with a woman because of resistance from her family in light of the fact that Märhlen associated with a "freethinker" (*Freigeist*). (See Ziegler I: 260–261. His Pastor friend, Rapp, in Unter-Münkheim where Strauß summer-vacationed with his children in 1857 and 1858 and whose Sunday services Strauß attended every week, was placed under massive pressure and threats by his church superiors. (See Ziegler II: 556–557, 560–563) His Pastor friend Fischer by whom Strauß' children did their Confirmations was told not to associate with Strauß. (See Ziegler II: 559; 571–572).

28. Strauß died on February 8, 1874.

Straussian teachings ultimately lead to the destruction of the only true foundations of state, family and morality, and consequently only play into the hands of socialism.²⁹

What had to have been shattering for Strauß is that very few, not even those whom we would have expected to do so, came to his defense. Most disappointing of all had to be the cool reception of the *LJ* by Ferdinand Christian Baur,³⁰ his beloved teacher from Blaubeuren and later his professor in Tübingen. Yet, a close second source of disappointment had to be the universal rejection of his Hegelianism by the Hegelians. Ziegler reports: All the Hegelians even those on the left-side with whom Strauß identified himself³¹ viewed Strauß as a "[...] renegade and an apostate and sought to eliminate any connection with him and brusquely rejected any cooperation with him."³² I will return to the relationship between Strauß and the Hegelians below.

Ferdinand Christian Baur's Criticism of Strauß³³

Baur is perhaps the most surprising and most disappointing of those reacting to the *LJ*. Strauß was his prize student. It is safe to say that no one influenced Strauß more thoroughly than Baur. A careful examination not only of what Baur said but also from within the framework of Baur's own 'historical' scholarship does not justify his coolness with respect to the *LJ*, but it does provide an understanding of Baur's reluctance to embrace the *LJ*.

Up to the time of Strauß' *LJ*, Baur was focused on the Pauline letters, and, in the same year as Strauß' *LJ*, he produced his masterpiece on Gnosticism that continues,

29. Ziegler II: 744–745.

30. By the end of Baur's life there had been a reconciliation even if the wounds were not entirely healed.

31. Strauß self-identification as a Left-Wing Hegelian is expressed in terms of disappointment at their rejection of him, but also accompanied with defiance. See Strauß, *Streitschriften* II: 126). In this respect, Ziegler is correct, Strauß remained a kind of Hegelian (see Ziegler II: 352), at least down to the end of the 1830s. However, contrary to Ziegler, Strauß was not a Pantheist but an Immanentist/Pan-en-theist. Strauß' Hegelian 'confession' couldn't be more clearly formulated than in "Hegel's Perspective on the Historical Value of Gospel History" ["Hegel's Ansicht über den historischen Werth der evangelischen Geschichte"] in *Streitschriften* III: 126: "With this [...] that the truth of the evangelical history is not to be left to philosophy, neither in whole nor in part, but the examination of it is to be left to historical criticism [Strauß called the criticism of theology its own doctrinal history], I would stand with [...] the Left-side of the Hegelian school did they not prefer to exclude me from their midst and to throw me into another school of thought – only to have them throw me back like a ball."

32. Ziegler, I: 210.

33. For a thematic summary of Baur's *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung* itself, see Chapter 5: "Traces of an Intellectual Crisis:" 592 ff.

if only silently, to influence profoundly Gnostic studies to this day.³⁴ In other words, Baur did not work on the gospels. Baur's son-in-law, who was Strauß' student in Maulbronn³⁵ between Strauß' vicariate in Klein-Ingersheim and his trip to Berlin (from 1830–1831) and later in the Protestant Seminary in Tübingen,³⁶ and good friend, Eduard Zeller, writes in his article "Ferdinand Christian Baur":

For [... Strauß] the first task was simply to remove the unhistorical elements of the gospel narratives, to liberate the portrayal of Jesus from the appearance of the miraculous, which the narratives had wrapped around him, and the retrieval of the historically natural point of view by destroying the dogmatic-supernaturalistic view. He could be satisfied with the mythic explanation of the gospel accounts, which ascribed the unhistorical in the accounts to the religious motives and Old Testament paradigms that guided folk legend. However, Baur, the historical scholar, found missing in this explanation a more exact proof of the relationships and tendencies from which those reports had emerged. He faulted such relationships and tendencies as incapable of establishing the actual course of events in place of what was recognized as unhistorical. He believed, however, that establishing the actual course of events was only possible were one not to begin with the storied events but with a criticism of the texts themselves by, first, orienting oneself with respect to the tendency and character of the texts and, then, constructing a determined judgment whether and to what extent the texts can be taken to be historical, whatsoever. Furthermore, he called for attention to the extent that the relationships, perceptions, and interests of their epoch are reflected with adequate obviousness in them in order to determine the point in time of their origination in order to use them as immediate sources for knowledge of their epoch. Baur had articulated the difference in this respect between himself and Strauß in the "Introduction" to his *Kritischen Untersuchungen über die Evangelien*. He called the most unique characteristic of Strauß' work, and at the same time the greatest one-sidedness, is that it gave a criticism of the gospel story without a criticism of the gospels.³⁷ (emphasis added)

Zeller repeats this last criticism by Baur of Strauß in "Strauß and Renan" and suggests that, particularly on the basis of this sentence, the common perception of Baur's reaction to the *LJ* of 1835 was outright rejection:

Baur identified the fundamental limitation of Strauß' [...] *Life of Jesus* [1835] that it consisted of a critique of gospel history without a critique of the gospels, and since then his remark is not only incessantly repeated but also is taken so one-sidedly that his [Strauß'] critic was virtually asked to renounce his [*sic.*] entire enterprise until he was perfectly clear how the

34. See, for example, Hans Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion: The Message of the Alien God and the Beginnings of Christianity* (1958), 2d ed. 1958. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963, and Kurt Rudolph, *Die Gnosis. Wesen und Geschichte einer Spätantiken Religion*, 2d ed. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980.

35. See Ziegler, I: 84. Zeller was "Primus der Maulbronner Promotion."

36. See Ziegler, I: 116.

37. Eduard Zeller, "Ferdinand Christian Baur" in *Vorträgen und Abhandlungen geschichtlichen Inhalts* (Leipzig: Fues's Verlag [R. Reisland], 1875): 462–463.

gospels were created, who of the evangelists was first and who copied, which sources each had used, to which decade each gospel belonged, etc. [...].³⁸ (emphasis added)

In his article "Ferdinand Christian Baur," Zeller reported, in addition:

In a word [Baur demanded] that the negative conclusions of the mythic explanation be augmented with a positive reconstruction of the historical development of earliest Christianity [...] [H]e found that not enough of a constructive critique was established next to the destructive critique and that, namely, the meaning of the Person Jesus was not adequately recognized.³⁹ (emphasis added)

Zeller immediately proceeds to report with respect to Baur's criticism of the 'mythic' reading of the text, generally:

Much earlier [...] in a letter of 1826, he criticized [Wilhelm Martin Leberecht] de Wette, saying that his criticism of the Jewish history was too negative, merely trying to show the inner untenability, improbability, and contradictions with the story itself, without putting something positive in the place of what had been destroyed, which would keep the criticism within the right bounds.⁴⁰

It is clear that Zeller viewed Baur's reaction to Strauß to rest on the 'destruction' of history involved in the mythic reading.

What Zeller overlooks, though, is Baur's own 'constructive criticism' that viewed the 'historical' character of Christian incarnation of the God/man to apply not to the individual and temporally located Jesus of Nazareth but to the entire sweep of subsequent Christian history of the church community, which Baur viewed as 'the body of Christ.' Here is where Baur's work on Paul influences his own Philosophy of Religion (see for example, where Paul speaks of the Church as the 'body of Christ:' I Corinthians 12:12 ff.: Ephesians 2:15–16 [to create a New Humanity], 3:3–6 [pagans included in the new body], and 5:30, and Colossians 1:15–18; and which is precisely the key to the Eucharist for Paul in I Corinthians 10:16–17). It is apparent that *what Baur missed in Strauß' LJ in 1835 was Baur's own Christology* that was a version of Left-wing Hegelianism, which did not limit the inclusiveness of incarnation to merely the philosophers as the case with Philipp Konrad Marheineke. Rather, for Baur the inclusiveness of incarnation was applied to those with proper spiritual understanding

38. Eduard Zeller, "Strauß und Renan" in *Vorträgen und Abhandlungen*: 487–488.

39. Zeller reports this from a letter of Baur's of February 10, 1836, in "Ferdinand Christian Baur:" 464. Baur's criticism of Strauß here is reminiscent of Moses Mendelssohn's criticism of Kant: "I know the writings of the great authors who have distinguished themselves in metaphysics, the works of Lambert, Teten, Plattner, and even *the all pulverizing Kant*, only from inadequate reports from my friends or from academic notifications, which are rarely more valuable." From the "Vorbericht" zu *Morgenstunden. Vorlesungen über das Dasein Gottes* (Berlin: Verlag der Contumax GmbH & Co. KG, 2014) 1785: 3. (emphasis added)

40. Zeller, "Ferdinand Christian Baur:" 464.

in the Christian Church. Baur says in his "Die Hegel'sche Religionsphilosophie" ["Hegel's Philosophy of Religion"] in *Gnosis*, a text to which Strauß refers in the *LJ* of 1835:

"If the God/man is the unity of the divine and human that unifies God and humanity, the historical Christ consists of all those persons who seek unification with God as all the bodily parts, which together constitute the living body of Christ and realizes the concept of religion as striving toward heaven from earth. In this humanity, which consists of Christ's constantly growing community [*Gemeinde*] and the fullness of the Spirit, the eternal victory of life over death, is celebrated as the eternal resurrecting and ascending to heaven of Christ's body, as history's living truth and actuality in the [now] present God/man Christ."⁴¹

In light of Zeller's formulation and without Baur's personal Christological formulations in *Gnosis*, one can understand how it could be concluded that Baur's criticism of Strauß' destruction of the historical foundation to Christianity referred to Strauß' mythic analysis of the text that is taken to be concerned only with what is historically untenable in the gospels.

Before examining more closely this criticism that Strauß only offered 'negative conclusions of mythic explanation,' it is helpful to look at what Baur himself said in defending himself from the charge that he was a 'Straußian':

"Characteristic of Strauß' critique is the mythic explanation⁴² of the events in the gospel account supposedly resulting, in part, from the character of the gospel narratives and, in part, from the untenability of the Supernaturalist and Rationalist viewpoints. However, I would like to know: Where even one place [in my writings on Paul], is my critique based on the mythic point of view? Where do I throw out even a single historical fact that is important for a critical judgment of Paul's letters because it is a miracle, or where do I argue exclusively on the basis of an internal contradiction of its content? Throughout, I proceed on the basis of specific, historically determined facts and seek to combine them into a single whole on the grounds of having first determined historically the different threads. This adherence to the historically given is what is unique in my critique, and it seems to me to meet the standards of our age not only to place the principles of historical criticism over against not only the historical practice up to now, whose limitations are no more obvious than in New Testament criticism than with the example of Paul's pastoral letters, but also *over against the Straußian practice (in which, by-the-way, already characteristically, when it comes to its subject matter [the gospels], there is no completely adequate comparison with my subject matter [the Pauline letters])*. Whoever has read carefully my text must be convinced how important it is to me, not only that nothing is claimed without a clearly established,

41. Ferdinand Christian Baur, "Die Hegel'sche Religions-Philosophie" in F.C. Baur, *Gnosis*: 721, See as well, *ibid.*, 685, 696, 706, n. 30 (actually 709–710), and 734–735.

42. Strauß offered no mythic explanation of objective events. His accounting for myth in the gospels was concerned with treating the individual mythic accounts as 'representations' of their respective 'content,' not an explanation of the causal origin of myths. His *genetic mythic principle* is no causal explanation but a description of how the Evangelists/Early Church came to portray their respective understandings of Jesus of Nazareth.

historical proof but also, and above all, it is my aim to achieve a historical impression that governs the whole. On the basis of this objective, critical perspective, I pointed out clearly and distinctly in the preface to my text that, in fact, *it takes a huge blind spot, when not a pernicious will, to fail to take this historical obligation into consideration*. Without self-praise, I can justifiably claim that no critic of Paul's pastoral letters has undertaken with such rigor the thorough investigation of the literary sources that is required to solve this critical question.⁴³ (emphasis added)

Baur asks, further:

[...] *[W]ill the entire objective foundation of Christianity be placed in question on the basis of my research in the same way as on the basis of Strauß', or can one leave untouched my research in its complete integrity and, nevertheless, be convinced that, when it comes to the authenticity of one or the other of our canonical letters, it is otherwise than one has generally assumed? As much as there has grown more and more agreement concerning the question and it is learned how little is worrying in such an admission, one can just as well also nullify the authenticity of not merely the pastoral letters but also some others of the smaller letters of our canon, should it be necessary, and no danger will arise with respect to the historical foundation of Christianity.*⁴⁴ (emphasis added)

Specifically, when accused of having questioned the authority of the gospel of John as Strauß did already in his *LJ* of 1835,⁴⁵ Baur neither accepted nor rejected the historicity of the gospel of John:

"[...] neither in my text on the pastoral letters nor in any of my other writings was I drawn to make any judgment about the historical authority of the gospel of John [...] because I had no interest in denying its historical authority or to make a claim about something that I am unable to prove in that it is by no means my way of doing business to raise critical doubts but, rather, only to allow doubt when it is objectively required. [...] *I have said absolutely nothing concerning the historical authority of the gospel of John; not anything that raised even the suggestion that the charge could be made that I, like Strauß, have already thrown it overboard.*⁴⁶ (emphasis added)

In fact, Zeller claims that Baur was so focused on what he identified as the 'authentic' Pauline letters (Romans, I and II Corinthians, and Galatians) as key to disharmony in the early church that he viewed the gospels as secondary.⁴⁷ At the same time, Zeller helps us to understand more adequately why Baur wrote about Strauß as he did:

43. Baur, "Abgenötigten Erklärung:" 206–207.

44. Baur, "Abgenötigten Erklärung:" 207–208.

45. Strauß' 3rd edition of the *LJ* was an attempt to mollify his critics by granting historical authenticity to the gospel of John. He regretted that almost immediately, and the 4th edition retracted the amendments. (See Ziegler II: 330 and 331.)

46. Baur, "Abgenötigten Erklärung:" 201–202.

47. See Zeller, "Die Tübinger historische Schule" in *Vorträge und Abhandlungen* (Leipzig: Fues's Verlag [R. Reisland], 1875): 311–312.

Whereas Strauß came from philosophy to his work, Baur came to his from history;⁴⁸ whereas for Strauß the first task was to free himself from the indefensible assumptions that came from the incomprehensibilities of Supernaturalism and from the tortures of Rationalist interpretation, Baur's concern was to achieve a satisfactory judgment with respect to the origin and the initial development of Christianity. Of course, Baur's aim is impossible without a prior or simultaneous examination of the tradition so that his 'historical construction' is in this respect conditioned by the Straußian critique and couldn't achieve fulfilment until this critique had paved the way. However, there always remained a difference between them in method that for one [Baur] the critical contesting of the tradition is only a means for determination of the historical circumstances; for the other [Strauß] the positive in his historical perspective is only the sediment and almost a by-product of his critical analysis.

This difference in method is obvious in a typical fashion already in their respective starting points. In his critique, Strauß turns immediately against those scriptures in which the miraculous and the unlikely disturbed him the most; in part because this material is most frequent; in part because this material is at the center of the Christian religion and affects the history of Christ himself. [In contrast,] Baur sought, above all, a defensible, [historical] base in order to establish further historical combinations; he preferred to concern himself with those New Testament books that are particularly suitable for this purpose as *the most immediate and oldest records of early Christianity, the authentic Pauline letters*. Having first established solid footing with them, he became convinced that almost universally a false understanding of the apostolic age arises in that, as is commonly supposed, it could not have been a golden period of undisturbed harmony. Rather, *he believed to have discovered in Paul's own statements evidence of deep differences and vigorous conflicts that he had to endure with the Jewish-Christian party, and also with the older apostles themselves [...]* [H]e [...] discovered prior to Strauß the foundation upon which he later constructed his far-reaching [historical] combinations [...] as he simultaneously in his writing on the pastoral letters and his investigation of Romans began to distinguish between the authentic and inauthentic Pauline letters, which in the end left *only the four primary letters to the Romans, I and II Corinthians, and Galatians as authentic*. As a consequence, *the question of the historicity of the gospels remained unexamined by him for years [...]*⁴⁹ (emphasis added)

Only in 1853, eighteen years after Strauß' LJ, with his Christenthum der drei ersten Jahrhunderte did the question of the historicity of the gospels become actual for Baur.⁵⁰

48. Strauß and Hegel, as 'philosophers' could just as well have written what Baur writes in his article, "Abgenötigte Erklärung:" 213: "[...] Faith ought never to be passive and convinced of its certitude but always be growing and gaining strength [... in order] that faith distinguishes ever better between the essential and the less essential, between content [*Inhalt*] and representations [*Form*], and separates the inner core, as the essence of the thing, ever more sharply from the outer shell and covering. The more that it [faith] has to give up and drop even in detail, the more it learns to hold on to what remains to it in its unity, with all intimacy and firmness." Nonetheless, Baur qualifies in his "Abgenötigte Erklärung:" 225*: "I am no adherent of some philosophical system because I know full well, how fallible it is to make oneself dependent on a human authority. However, at the same time, I am convinced that for the theologian there is much to be learned from Hegel [...]"

49. Zeller, "Die Tübinger Schule:" 310–312.

50. Zeller, "Die Tübinger Schule:" 312.

Baur pointed out that no one questions that Paul's letters are earlier than the gospels and that Paul maintained his authority as an apostle even though he never experienced Jesus in person. Indirectly, he is making a criticism of Strauß here for making the gospels the sole foundation of the Christian faith.

Who developed the entire depth and completeness of Christian faith more superbly than the Apostle Paul in his letters? Did he fixate on the details of Jesus' life, [did he] prize particular miracles and incidents, when he looked back at Jesus' historical life, was it not the completely, general events of the gospel story, which everyone must presuppose and recognize in some fashion and which are established without the gospels, that he presupposed and from which he exclusively builds upon? How much is to be learned from the Pauline conception of the gospel in this respect, altogether; from that Apostle, who never saw the Lord sensorily and in life, but, nonetheless, claimed emphatically the independence of his apostolic call over against the Apostles! [For Paul and me (Baur)] it is of least importance whether one holds this in the gospel stories for less historically certain and, thereby, as traditional, or that, which has long since been taken by theologians to be unquestionably given. What matters is only the plus and minus with respect to the relationship between the historical and traditional in the gospel story, and it would be good were this to be grasped and the conflict with 'contemporary' criticism over it reduced so that one can wrestle with what one can successfully fight over.⁵¹ (emphasis added)

Zeller summarizes Baur's judgment of Strauß' LJ:

Baur demanded [...] in a word that the negative results of the mythic explanation be supplemented by a positive construction of the historical development of ancient Christianity [...] [T]he constructive criticism was articulated too little in comparison to the destructive, and the meaning of the person Jesus was not adequately acknowledged.⁵² (emphasis added)

There are two threads running through Zeller's portrayal of the relationship between Baur and Strauß: 1) the obvious rebuke of Strauß' focus on the 'incorrectness' of the gospels' and mythic narratives grounded in a 'correct' philosophy and 2) Baur's own focus on the 'authentic' Pauline letters grounded in history. Zeller emphasizes on more than one occasion that both are required for anything like an adequate understanding of ancient Christianity, but he doesn't present why they both are required.

One way of portraying the relationship between Strauß (correct philosophy) and Baur (empirical facts) is to take their claims as leaving only a choice between already possessed *a priori* understanding or a *posteriori* 'facts.' Strauß' understanding in the LJ begins with a *a priori* 'speculative philosophy' whereas Baur's begins with a *posteriori* 'facts.'

A priori understanding, though, leaves no obvious defense against a vicious hermeneutical circle. If understanding always and already involves a *a priori* commit-

51. Baur, "Abgenötigten Erklärung:" 214–215.

52. Zeller, Eduard. "Ferdinand Christian Baur:" 464. This is essentially the criticism leveled against Strauß by Paulus in his reference letter in support of Strauß' appointment to the university in Zurich. See Paulus' letter in the "Historical Reader."

ments (either to abstractions or to facts), what protects one from the fallacies of circular logic?

The alternative epistemology to reductionist *a priori* understanding is that a *posteriori* 'facts drive understanding.' All of understanding's content is contained in the experienced representations or facts. We have to determine exactly what the 'facts' are before we can establish understanding. A *posteriori* understanding *appears to have the advantage that it can determine if a claimed content is 'empty' because it doesn't appear in the facts.*

On the basis of these two formulations of understanding, then, we can say that Strauß and Baur stand on opposite sides of this tension. Strauß' 'philosophy' in the *LJ* places the emphasis on an *a priori* 'understanding' of Absolute Knowledge whereas Baur's 'history' places the emphasis on 'facts.'⁵³ However, to the extent that both embrace the Hegelian epistemology of 'true' content and 'actual' representations, their difference is only an appearance because both place 'truth' as Spirit 'above' appearances. Their difference is only relative and rhetorical.

One may dogmatically claim, as does Hegel, that the 'true' content governs both the idea and its representations, but even Hegel has to add that it is only the philosopher who can recognize, on the basis of her/his grasp of ideas, that the 'truth' of literally false representations is their concealed kernel graspable only as their imperceptible content.⁵⁴

The genuine alternative between *a priori* ideas and *a posteriori* facts is that epistemology of dialectical *synthesis*, which abandons the claim to grasp objective content either *a priori* (Platonism/Hegelianism) or *a posteriori* (Scientism). Yet, *synthesis* here means far more than identifying the *causal* unity between *a priori* understanding and *a posteriori* facts.

Rather, for a *posteriori* experience of appearances (either 'true' or 'false') to occur, it requires that there be a form of consciousness that can *add to* the appearances certain elements that cannot appear directly in the appearances. This '*adding to* external *a posteriori* appearances requires a *synthesis* with internal, *a priori* transcendental capacities that by definition cannot appear in external appearances.

The genuine epistemological alternative to *a priori* Absolute Idealism and a *posteriori* empiricism begins with the acknowledgement that *what the a priori and a posteriori dimensions have in common is no substance but appearances.* Without a world of

53. I would not question that Baur viewed himself as a 'historian' rather than a 'philosopher,' and he explicitly denied that he belongs to a philosophical school. (See above: 227, n. 48.) However, Baur (as does Strauß) embraces Hegel's epistemology based on the distinction between 'true' content (*Inhalt*) and representation (*Form*), which allowed him to prioritize Spirit (*Geist*) over literalism (*Buchstäblichkeit*), which serves as the basis for distinguishing between 'kernel' and 'husk' in the text – exactly the distinction that Strauß employed to classify the 'mythic' narratives in the gospels. The alternative epistemology was Kant's system of *a priori* synthetic judgment. See Chapters 6: "Theoretical Reason" and 7: "Practical Reason," which, for want of an adequate reading of Kant, all three rejected.

54. On the recognition of truth by the philosopher, see; 148.

appearances, which can be experienced only *a posteriori*, there can be (to the extent that we have ever experienced) no *a priori* experience of *adding* to perceptions. However, *this acknowledgement comes with the corollary that there can be no a posteriori certainties because we can only experience appearances, not the 'things-in-themselves'*

Nonetheless, this synthesis of a *a posteriori* 'external' and a *a priori* 'internal' elements is no crass bridging of a dualistic subjective substance and objective substance. The 'internal' and 'external' are a *continuum of appearances (not substances)* with each contributing distinct elements that can only be symbiotically related. There is no scalpel fine enough to cut apart their 'differences' in the midst of their inseparability.

Furthermore, this requirement of both the *a posteriori* appearances and a *a priori* synthetic judgments is what makes possible the *avoiding of any and all vicious hermeneutical circles of systematic distortion and any and all empty ideas*.

Any and all *vicious hermeneutical circles are avoided* not because this epistemological option denies 'knowledge' of a *a priori* synthetic elements to insist on the merely empirical data as arbitrator of judgment, which may provide a limited test for discerning empty ideas but can never be achieved because the empirical is 'only' appearances. Rather, the vicious hermeneutical circle is avoided by focusing on the *universally required, a priori* transcendental elements/capacities that make possible any and all a *a posteriori* experience.

In addition, *empty ideas are avoided* not because every idea must be manifest in appearances but because those ideas are empty that are neither given a *a posteriori* in the appearances nor (!) required by those appearances *a priori*.

In the "Preface" to the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant distinguishes logic from metaphysics precisely with respect to elements that must be *added* to phenomena because they are not directly given by the phenomena:

"One can call empirical all philosophy in so far as it is based on grounds of experience; one can call philosophy that presents its doctrines solely from a *a priori* principles *pure* philosophy. The latter, if it is merely formal, is called logic; but if it is limited to determinate objects of the understanding it is called metaphysics."⁵⁵

Clearly, according to Kant, metaphysics is concerned with *understanding* phenomena, not with speculative, ultimate, logical, *causal* explanations of the origin and/or goal of reality. These imperceptible 'things' of *pure metaphysics* are a schema of unchanging concepts (a 'canon') that we are capable of 'properly' applying to appearances (e.g., the realm of science) because in addition to 'logic' transcendental consciousness is also governed by moral principles of the organon that includes phenomena.⁵⁶

Unlike logic, mathematics, according to Kant, is a system of a *a priori* synthetic judgments (a 'canon') inseparable from a *a posteriori* perceptions. Logic is a 'canon'

55. Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 388.

56. On Kant's notions of 'canon' and 'organon,' see: 49.

(system of rules) that applies to thought, generally, but is independent of perception and invokes no 'organon' of moral principles.⁵⁷ Kant compares logic to grammar in this respect.

The most rigorous strategy of a canon devoted to understanding an organon is mathematics, which is a system of *a priori* synthetic judgments (a 'canon') inseparable from *a posteriori* perceptions (the 'organon'). In contrast, logic is a 'canon' (system of rules) that applies to thought, generally, but are independent upon an 'organon' of perception.⁵⁸ Kant compares logic to grammar in this respect.

What is exceptional in metaphysics is that one is able to perfectly complete it; one can survey the capacities of reason according to their sources, comprehensiveness, and limits. Metaphysics is not able to hope to make discoveries in the nature of things, but reason must teach all things. I can discern which concepts are found in reason independent of experience – *It is as with grammar*,⁵⁹ *which can be exhaustive but is not a lexicon because as an author writes new words are being generated*.⁶⁰

57. On the understanding of mathematics as dependent upon an 'organon' and logic as independent of an 'organon,' see Kant's "The Concept of Logic" in *Logic* AA IX: 11–16. On logic and grammar, see especially, *ibid.* AA IX: 11–12, 15–16.

58. On the understanding of mathematics as dependent upon an 'organon' and logic as independent of an 'organon,' see Kant's "The Concept of Logic" in *Logic* AA IX: 11–16. On logic and grammar, see especially, *ibid.* AA IX: 11–12, 15–16.

59. It is not difficult to hear an echo in this passage of Noam Chomsky's notion of "generative grammar," which is a canon open to any and all languages analogous to logic open to any and all thought. See Noam Chomsky, "Methodological Preliminaries §1. Generative Grammars as Theories of Linguistic Competence" in *The Essential Chomsky*, Anthony Arnone ed. (New York: The New Press, 2008): 33–38. Chomsky attributes this understanding to Wilhelm von Humboldt – who surely (?) had it from Kant. With Kant's notions of logic and grammar as well as Chomsky's "generative grammar" we are concerned with *a priori*, imperceptible elements that make experience, understanding, and, in the case of grammar, communication possible.

60. Kant, *Metaphysik Mrongovius* AA XXIX: 785. In Kant's account of logic (*Logic* AA IX: 12–15), he calls logic an *a priori* analytical 'canon' (set of rules for thought, generally), not an *a priori* synthetic system of judgment as is mathematics, which is inseparable from a world of perceptions (see page 49, n. 36 and "Speculative Metaphysics and Science" in Chapter 1: nts. 175, 176, and 177), so that grammar here can be taken to be a foreshadowing of Chomsky's 'generative grammar'. Kant employed the analogy to grammar in his *Logic* as an example of an *a priori* analytical system analogous to logic itself (that is, as constituting the conditions for the application of understanding, generally, irrespective of particular objects): "When we set aside all knowledge that we take from objects and merely contemplate our application of understanding generally, *we discover those rules of the understanding that are absolutely necessary for our attention irrespective of all particular objects because without these we cannot think at all*. For this reason, these rules can be taken to be *a priori* (that is, independent of all experience) because they constitute merely the conditions for the application of the understanding generally – whether pure or empirical. From this follows that *the universal and necessary rules of thought, generally, are concerned merely with the form, by no means the matter, of these universal and necessary rules. Thus, the science concerned with these universal and necessary rules is merely a science of the form of our understanding knowledge or thought*. We can construct an idea of the possibility of such a science as if of general grammar that contains nothing more than the mere 'form' of language without words, which belong to the matter [*Materie*] of language." Kant, *Logik* AA LX: 12 (emphasis added)

In other words, theoretical reason understands appearances because it employs abstract 'canons' (rule systems and *a priori* capacities) in order to sort out the phenomena so that it can understand them. If the 'canon' is ignored or not adequately grasped, the understanding of phenomena will be inadequate.

We can apply this understanding of theoretical reason to Strauß' philosophical approach to the gospel narratives. The 'canon' (for Strauß in 1835) was Hegel's dialectical logic that insisted on a causal relationship between logic and the world/universe of phenomena. The 'truth' of the scriptures for Hegel was their ideational 'content' (Absolute Spirit's dialectical logic of negation) not their factual/actual 'representations'.

Nonetheless, Baur's emphasis on 'history' is equally important. There is no experience without phenomena, and proper understanding requires paying attention to the phenomena as well as the imperceptible *a priori* conditions that make possible consciousness of phenomena. A 'canon' without an 'organon' is equivalent to having a concept without any empirical content: it is empty! Whereas an 'organon' without a 'canon' is equivalent to having empirical content without a concept: it is blind.⁶¹ Analogously, a grammar without a sound system is like a 'canon' without an 'organon': it is silent. A sound system without a grammar is like an 'organon' without a 'canon': it is a meaningless cacophony. Understanding requires both 'philosophical understanding' and 'historical facts,' and that philosophical understanding is most adequate, I will propose below, that is the most comprehensive system possible.

Strauß proposes that Personal Theism has a too narrow, philosophical understanding (an *a priori* canon), which shaped Personal Theism's understanding of the narratives. Consequently, the tradition took the gospel stories to be historical accounts of factual events. Baur is charging Strauß of ignoring the historical circumstances that stimulated the gospel authors to create their narratives, in the first place.

In the *LJ*, Strauß' placed an, Immanentism/Pan-en-theism on the theological throne to replace Personal Theism's, Personal God and Rationalism's Christian Platonism – all of which make claims for objective, ultimate causal agency as the ground of religion. To be sure, with the *Life of Jesus Examined for the German People* (1864) Strauß has commenced a turn to an even broader theism/morality with emphasis on the significance of the particulars of history at the core of a 'religion of humanity' (*Humanitätsreligion*) that replaces the objective 'Christ religion' (*Christusreligion*)⁶² of Personal Theism, Rationalism, and Hegelian Absolute Spirit's Double Negation. Nonetheless, there is much more to be said than Strauß said about the nature of the Kantian Copernican Turn.⁶³ However, first a look at how Strauß reacted to Baur's criticism as reported by Strauß' biographer, Ziegler:

61. See Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* B 75 (see as well, B 165–166 and 178). On canon and organon, see "Preface": 49, n. 36.

62. See Strauß, *LJEGP*: 625–626.

63. On Kant's 'Copernican Turn,' see the "Preface": 47, n. 35.

[Particularly, Baur's charge that Strauß had thrown the gospel of John over board without proper historical grounding] [...] was experienced as a stab-in-the-back [...]: at a critical moment, his professor and friend had publicly renounced him as well as his project with a cutting rebuke [...] He wrote [to his friend, Adolf Rapp]: "[...] he [Baur] denies any commonality to our cause and supports this with a reproach that he expressed against my critical principles. Under the present circumstances no friend should rebuke me publicly to his personal advantage, even if the rebuke was justified." [...Strauß] then turns to Baur's accusation itself and continues: "However, Baur's reproach is by no means justified. He charges that I for the most part determine the incorrectness of the gospel narratives on the basis of internal contradictions of the narratives with one another or between them and reason without, just as he also external witnesses, that is, without, like him, also taking external testimonies, i.e. contradictory data of the otherwise authenticated history, to help, – as if such parallels could be found for the greater part of the evangelical history from elsewhere!" He did not refrain from expressing his displeasure to Baur. In a letter of August 19, 1836, he spoke openly to him thus: 'especially because I know myself to be deeply united with you by friendship and gratitude, I believe that I need not remain silent or conceal that [...] your paper belongs among the most saddening that I have had to endure with respect to my book. By enduring things such as I have, one becomes steeled and indifferent against harshness from strangers but, when it comes to wounds from friends, no matter how light, one is all the more sensitive. Please excuse my sensitivity and, therefore, do not revoke your benevolence from your most devoted D. Fr. Strauß.'⁶⁴

However, it is important to point out that Strauß offered not merely a negative criticism of the gospels, as Baur suggested.⁶⁵ Strauß acknowledged that there was history in the gospels not only with respect to a 'history' of the mythic formation of early Christian theology but also factual information, in all likelihood, with respect to Jesus of Nazareth. To be sure, that factual information was only a fraction of what the gospel authors portrayed as the history of Jesus.

Having learned from the Göttingen School the differences among historical, philosophical, and symbolic myths,⁶⁶ it is a serious mistake to claim that Strauß ignored the historical elements in the gospels. Strauß wrote in the *LJ*:

[...] [W]hen we undertake to extract the historical contents which may possibly exist in narratives recognized as mythical, *we shall be equally careful neither, on the one side, to place ourselves on the same ground with the natural interpreter by a rude and mechanical separation; nor, on the other side, to lose sight of the history by a hypercritical refusal to recognize such contents where they actually exist.*⁶⁷

64. Ziegler I: 219–221.

65. Again, in the letter of February 10, 1836, as reported in Zeller, Eduard. "Ferdinand Christian Baur:" 464.

66. See § 8 "Rise of the Mythical Mode of Interpretating the Sacred History in Reference First to the Old Testament" in the *LJ*: 52–57 and § 9 "The Mythical Mode of Interpretation in Reference to the new Testament" in the *LJ*: 57–59, as well as § 15 "Definition of the Evangelical Mythos and its Distinctive Characteristics" in the *LJ*: 86–87. See as well, Christian Hartlich and Walter Sachs, *Der Ursprung des Mythosbegriffes in der modernen Bibelwissenschaft* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1952).

67. Strauß, *LJ*: 63.

Equally significant, however, is Strauß' observation that

[...] *the pure historic idea was never developed among the Hebrews during the whole of their political existence; their latest historical works, such as the Books of the Maccabees, and even the writings of Josephus, are not free from marvelous and extravagant tales. Indeed, no just notion of the true nature of history is possible, without a perception of the inviolability of the chain of finite causes, and of the impossibility of miracles. This perception which is wanting to so many minds of our own day was still more deficient in Palestine, and indeed throughout the Roman empire.*⁶⁸

It is not to be denied that Strauß' emphasis is on the unhistorical nature of the text because the unhistorical is what dominates given the limited material that one can legitimately recognize as historical. However, quite in contrast to Baur's suggestion that Strauß only took a negative hammer to destroy the gospels, Strauß concludes here by asking "[...] what is the precise boundary line between the historical and the unhistorical?—the most difficult question in the whole province of criticism."⁶⁹ He proposes the following rule:

Where not merely the particular narrative and manner of an occurrence is critically suspicious, its external circumstances represented as miraculous and the like; but where likewise the essential substance and groundwork is either inconceivable in itself or is in striking harmony with some Messianic idea of the Jews of that age, then not the particular alleged course and mode of the transaction only, but the entire occurrence must be regarded as unhistorical. *Where on the contrary, the form [the representation] only, and not the general contents of the narration, exhibits the characteristics of the unhistorical, it is at least possible to suppose a kernel of historical fact; although we can never confidently decide whether this kernel of fact actually exists, or in what it consists; unless, indeed, it be discoverable from other sources. In legendary narratives, or narratives embellished by the writer, it is less difficult, – by divesting them of all that betrays itself as fictitious imagery, exaggeration, etc. – by endeavouring to abstract from them every extraneous adjunct and to fill up every hiatus – to succeed, proximately at least, in separating the historical groundwork.*

The boundary line, however, between the historical and the unhistorical, in records, in which as in our Gospels this latter element is incorporated, will ever remain fluctuating and unsusceptible of precise attainment. Least of all can it be expected that the first comprehensive attempt to treat these records from a critical point of view should be successful in drawing a sharply defined line of demarcation. In the obscurity which criticism has produced, by the extinction of all lights hitherto held historical, the eye must accustom itself by degrees to discriminate objects with precision; and at all events *the author of this work, wishes especially to guard himself in those places where he declares he knows not what happened, from the imputation of asserting that he knows that nothing happened.*⁷⁰ (emphasis added)

68. Strauß, *LJ*: 74–75. See as well, Ziegler I: 225–226.

69. Strauß, *LJ*: 90.

70. Strauß, *LJ*: 91–92.

In *LJEGP* (*Life of Jesus Examined for the German People*), Strauß indicates some of the likely 'historical' elements of Jesus' life as preserved in the Gospels. The summary is found in Appendix I: "Likely 'Historical' Elements of Jesus' Life"⁷¹ to Volume II of this project. For whatever reason, though, Baur misrepresented the positive, constructive historical contribution of Strauß' gospel exegesis.

A Voice out of France: Edgar Quinet's Criticism of Strauß

In a lengthy review of Strauß' *LJ* originally published in 1838, French Edgar Quinet, Professor at the University of Paris, not only dismisses Strauß but sweepingly dismisses 18th and 19th C 'German' biblical scholarship, generally, for depressively destroying 'life' and reducing everything to 'cold facts' that stifles feeling in reality, impoverishes nature and thought, and restricts the heart by demanding that the past conform to ideas of the present⁷². This German destructiveness Quinet contrasts with the 'French' who elevate humanity with poetry and rhetoric to defend the orthodoxy of "established belief" in face "[...] of the immense void which [*sic.*] the absence of Christ will leave in the memory of the human race [...]" if the gospels are reduced to myth as 'false' history.⁷³

Quinet accuses German Idealism of "killing of the letter" in order to give "Spirit life."⁷⁴ Quinet's claim assumes that 'everyone knows' what Christianity's 'established belief' is. Yet, if there is anything that Strauß' 1841 *Glaubenslehre* demonstrates,⁷⁵ it is that there is not a single teaching in Christianity over which there is common agreement with respect to 'established belief'. Nonetheless, even the rejection of the notion of an 'established belief' does not mean that 'life' has been sucked out of the scriptures. Yet, one can ask him, "What is life without Spirit?" Quinet claims that according to 'established belief' without the material there is no life, so that German Idealism by 'killing the letter' (literalism), one is 'killing the body'. Spiritual elevation (either in this life or the next) alone is insufficient for the elevation of humanity, according to Quinet.

Especially with respect to Strauß's universal, *inclusive* Christology, Quinet claims that by elevation of all of humanity into the Spirit *in history*

71. See Appendix I: "Likely 'Historical' Elements of Jesus' Life" 985 ff.

72. See Edgar Quinet, "Review of Strauss's 'Life of Jesus,' from the French" in *Voices of the Church in Reply to Dr. D.F. Strauss, Comprising Essays in Defence of Christianity* (London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Col, 1845): 18.

73. Quinet, "Review of Strauss's 'Life of Jesus,,'" 13.

74. See Quinet, "Review of Strauss's 'Life of Jesus,,'" 6.

75. Demonstrated, as well, by F.C. Baur's 1838, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*.

[... despoils] the individual, in order to enrich the species. The individual is diminished, to enlarge humanity: that which none would dare say of himself is put to the account of all. Self-love is at the same time lowered and deified [...] If the individual cannot himself [*sic.*] be the supremely just, the holy,— if he is incapable of raising himself to the supreme idea of virtue, beauty, liberty, and love,— what is said? And how will these attributes become those of the species? Tell me, how many men will make up humanity? [...] What matters the number, will the many succeed better than the individual? Heap up as much as you please of these empty unities, will the result be less empty than they? Is it not evident, that we labor at a senseless work?— that, if the human individual is but a nothing, alienated from God [...], it is in gain to multiply the zeros? The product of them all will still be zero; and, always aiming at the infinite, we really do nothing but embrace in humanity a more perfect nothing [...] The noblest work of Christianity is to have consecrated the individual in the highest manner;⁷⁶ for, if the life of the God-made-Man has a sense comprehensible to all unexceptionable to all, it is because it evinces that the infinite dwells in each [finite] conscience, as well as in the soul of the human race [...]⁷⁷

In other words, Strauß' *inclusive* Christology that takes the God/Man to be the *historical improvement of all of humanity* eradicates the exclusive, salvific role of the particular, historical individual, Jesus, claimed by 'established belief.' However, if 'established belief' is sustained only by rhetoric and poetry, what privileges the resurrection of Jesus as the key to his role as exclusive Messiah over against accounts of others whom rhetoric and poetry speak of elevation to heaven (e.g., Mary, Elijah, Caesar Augustus)? *A rhetorical and poetic resurrection knows no differences among examples except that the theological meaning attributed to the rhetoric and poetry in one case, Christianity, promises the fulfilment of eternal self-interest of the particular believer. Surely, individual, relative, self-interest is a questionable motive for a so-called universal religion.*

Quinet seeks to retain miracles within the framework of his universal self-interest. In order to give credence to the notion of 'miracle,' Quinet tells a personal story of his close call with the capsizing of a boat at nightfall near Malta. As the sailors gave up hope in the 'tempest,'

[...] the captain, who held an oar, suddenly arose [...] Inspired by the danger, he breathed mysteriously over the waters, and cried out, while pointing with his fingers to the ebbing billows, "Children! Look! See the demons are flying away!" The rowers looked around them with an air of stupefaction and then began again to struggle with the wind. A little after, the vessel which we pursued, was seen through the darkness. We were saved.—Is it not evident, that, from the recesses of a library, nothing would be easier than to convert this narration into a myth, borrowed from the Acts of the Apostles? The place of the scene is the same as that of the shipwreck of St. Paul. The demons which fled belong to the mythology of the Pharisees, who themselves have borrowed it from the religion of the Magi. It is impossible that the principle of evil should have appeared under a personal

76. Quinet is affirming Christianity as a religion furthering eternal self-interest. The question: what kind of 'justice' is this?

77. Quinet, "Review of Strauss's 'Life of Jesus':" 26.

form. Have demons wings? Do they inhabit the seas? How many questions are those of this simple incident, not to be solved by reason! It is much easier to admit, that all has been instinctively imitated from the recital of St. Luke [author of the Acts of the Apostles]. On the other hand, it is probable that the rowers, on arriving at their homes, would relate that they have seen marine demons, with wave-coloured wings. Who is to be believed? – the philosopher or the people? And can pure science be so near the borders of ignorance?⁷⁸

The reader can supplement this account, surely, with her/his own experiences or the reports of others of 'providence' that 'saved' one and/or one's group in the midst of certain calamity. Of course, we remain silent about those occasions where others were not granted succor in their terror.

The 'philosopher' calmly answers: We do not have direct access to causes. The 'good news' is that any causal 'explanation' that we propose (e.g., fleeing demons, divine providence, the fates, chance, a causal sequence whose lawfulness escapes us in the moment, etc.) is defensible, especially if we have support of others with our 'explanation' because there is no way to disprove, unequivocally our 'explanation' in light of the fact that we have access directly only to appearances, not causes. The 'bad news' is that, for the very same reason, there is also no unequivocal proof! However, if we accept the 'explanation,' which is really no explanation just a wish, that a miracle occurred, then there is an irreparable tear in the fabric of reality and not only are all our efforts at understanding fruitless, but also our confidence in lawful, causal systems would mean that we could not hold ourselves culpable for our creative, autonomous freedom. A supernatural power could be the direct cause of our agency, and we would not be responsible any more than we can be held responsible for our agency if we were exhaustively determined by physical causality. Between Quinet and his 'German' opponents, as he portrays them, we are determined either by a supernatural or a natural power. Furthermore, if the laws of nature are not trustworthy and events are dependent upon the capriciousness of a miracle worker who conducts her-/himself willfully, then that miracle worker is elevating her-/himself to the throne of God. However, there is no more dangerous placement of humanity on the throne of God than such anthropomorphic projections which defy all calm reflection and understanding.

With respect to Strauß' Christology, Quinet claims that Strauß has erased the full significance of the Christ because he denies eminent causality or the notion that the cause can be greater than its effect: "It is said, that the first term of a series cannot be greater than that which terminates it, which would be in effect contrary to all the laws of development; from whence it is inferred, that Jesus, being the first in the progression of Christian ideas, must necessarily have remained inferior to the thought and the type of succeeding generations."⁷⁹ However, Strauß' claim with respect to eminent causality is not that it is false, which, of course, would be to deny not only

78. Quinet, "Review of Strauss's 'Life of Jesus':" 22.

79. Quinet, "Review of Strauss's 'Life of Jesus':" 25.

humanity's ability to create new things. Strauß' point is that it is not 'necessary' that finite effects have an infinitely perfect cause.⁸⁰

Yet, *narrow focus on Strauß' so-called destructiveness ignores Strauß' concern in the LJ to 'positively' preserve the heart of Christian doctrine: the incarnation of the God/Man.* In Hegelian terms, he establishes the 'true' content of the God/Man rather than the 'factual' or 'non-factual' status of the 'actual' representations in the gospels of the God/Man, Jesus. In other words, rather than a concern for poetry and rhetoric to elevate humanity, in the LJ Strauß is concerned with the historical character of the gospels in two respects: 1) to account for the formulation of the gospel narratives on the basis of the 'genetic mythical principle' that drew on *pre-figured* stories in the 'First' Testament as prototypes for the 'New' and 2) to account for the 'truth' of the core Christian doctrine of the incarnation of the God/Man in all of history.

Biblical 'Criticism' Does Not Mean Negative Destruction

The title of Strauß' controversial text in German is *Das Leben Jesu kritisch bearbeitet*, which is translated as *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined*. The term '*kritisch*' itself is not unambiguous. 'Critical' frequently means a presuppositionless, rigorous analysis of or the negative dismissal of something, but it can also mean 'critique' as the identification of the transcendental conditions of possibility for experience, understanding, and responsible agency that, precisely, are *not* accessible by analysis of phenomena. When speaking of 'criticism,' Strauß never means transcendental 'critique' but employs the term *kritisch* exclusively in terms of 'criticism' in the sense of *diairesis*.⁸¹

Strauß' Hegelian epistemology calls for a *Kritik* both in the sense of diaretic 'criticism' and in the sense of a positive/negative 'critical' evaluation of the status of the

80. See Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*, Leander E. Keck, trans. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977): 30–31. See as well, Strauß' *Glaubenslehre* where Strauß writes: "I experience Christ as the promoter of the unity of my lower with my higher self-consciousness or promoter of my piety. – Tant mieux pour vous [Good for you!] – This cannot come from me myself. – Why not? – Because only restraints in my religious life come from me. How do you know that, you modern 'I'? The old faith, of course, knew how it knew because it can know nothing true and nothing good can come from the 'I,' which it knows out of the fundamental presupposition of the alienation and externalization of its spirit. However, with your self-certain and powerful modern 'I,' who gives it the means to make such a separation on the basis of pure psychology?" *Glaubenslehre* II: 181 Strauß then adds that Schleiermacher's Christology of an eminent, infinite causality of 'perfect God-consciousness' is 'built on sand:" "[...][T]his is no more than saying that: [the possibility of a sinless human development] must be possible because [in Jesus] it really occurred. Acceptance of this actuality, though, depends according to Schleiermacher on the supposed necessity for the explanation of the internal experience of the Christian[...], which as we saw above is the sole basis for the sinlessness of Jesus. This is indefensible. Furthermore, because Schleiermacher's entire Christology depends upon this necessity [for explaining the internal experience of the Christian], it is built on sand [...]." *Glaubenslehre* II: 193.

81. See the discussion of "Academic Controversy Based on Criticism (*diairesis*):" 219 ff.

'actual' representations of experience. 'True' knowledge is of the concept (*Inhalt*) and must be 'wrested' from the 'actual' representations in a struggle that frees the concept from the capriciousness of 'actual' representations.

In a passage rebuking Wolfgang Menzel's obvious lack of understanding of Hegel in Pamphlet II of his *Streitschriften*, Strauß responds to Wolfgang Menzel's assertion that Hegel claimed "Everything that is, is reasonable." Strauß makes clear here that Hegel does not maintain that all representations (*Form/Representations*) are reasonable. Rather, it is their imperceptible 'content' (*Inhalt*) that is reasonable. Strauß' statement, though, claims that the reasonable is 'actual' (*das Wirkliche*), whereas Hegel speaks of the 'actual' (*das Wirkliche*) as representations, not their 'true' content (*Inhalt*).⁸² Although Strauß' statement that dismisses the 'barbarian' Menzel is clear to what Strauß wishes to say, Strauß would have been more clear had he said that the 'true' (ideal content) is the reasonable, not that the 'actual' (*das Wirkliche*) as representations, regardless of their content, are reasonable.

"[Hegel said] that what is reasonable is also real/actual (*wirklich*), and what is real/actual (*wirklich*) is reasonable. [Wolfgang Menzel] [...] renders this "infamous" sentence thus: "Everything that is, is reasonable." The barbarian⁸³ [Menzel] does not know that there is a great difference between being (*Sein*), preeminent existing, and real [actual] (*Wirklichem*), in Hegel? that Hegel by no means calls everything that exists as such already real? that *the real* [*das Wirkliche*] is for him only the essential core [McG: this is the confusing assertion] of being, wrapped in a wide-layered shell of the merely appearing? whereby in the attacked sentence, which sanctions only the essential in that which exists at any given time as reasonable, everything favorable to the principle of stability disappears.⁸⁴

Strauß' claim here with respect to Hegel's distinguishing between 'content' (*Inhalt*) and 'form' (*Form/representations*) is correct, but his terminology here is equating 'content' (*Inhalt*) with actuality (*Wirklichkeit*, etc.) whereas Hegel calls 'content' (*Inhalt*) true being and *distinguishes* 'content' from actuality (*Wirklichkeit*), which is experienced by and through 'form' (representations).⁸⁵

82. On the difference between content (*Inhalt*) as 'ideas' (*Ideelle*) and representations (*Form*) as actuality (*Realität, Reale, Reelle, Wirklichkeit*), see the "Preface:" 46, n. 31.

83. Strauß' use of 'barbarian' here surely echoes, if unintentionally (?), Hegel's employing the contrast between 'external' phenomena and 'internal' Spirit to dismiss Kant as a 'barbarian' in *Glauben und Wissen*: GW II: 287–288.

84. Strauß, "Die Herren Eschenmayer und Menzel" (1837) in *Streitschriften* II: 214.

85. One can only speculate why this 'short-circuit' occurred. Was it a slip of the moment, or does it indicate something deeper about Strauß' opinion? Clearly, the distinction between 'content' and 'form' is crucial to Strauß' understanding of the significance of 'myths' in the gospels. The mythic refers to the actual 'form' of the text, its 'husk,' whereas the true content of the mythic husks are their ideational 'content'.

One might conclude that Strauß is only concerned to maintain the 'spiritual,' ideal content of the gospels/Christology and dismisses the significance of the 'historical' form/representations in themselves with respect to the spiritual truth. Strauß wrote in the *Streitschriften*: "Give up the non-essential but retain the essential of faith; science changes nothing of faith, *properly understood*." Strauß, *Stre-*

When it comes to the biblical text, though, Strauß maintains the distinction between what the texts 'actually' say (their *Formen*, representations) and what the 'true' content (*Inhalt*) of the representations is. The 'actual' representations of perception present a series of events as if they were historical facts. However, for Strauß of the *LJ* and the Hegelians the 'true' content of those 'actual' representations is a grand, meta-narrative 'above' history that consists of Absolute Spirit coming to awareness of Itself. Consequently, when it comes to a *Kritik* of the 'actual' representations (*Formen*) of events in the bible, Strauß' question is: *Are the gospel accounts merely 'actual' representations of events (Formen), or do those accounts confront the reader with a 'true' content (Inhalt) of humanity's divinization, the union of infinite and finite Spirit?*

Shortly after the publication of the *LJ* in his *Streitschriften* Strauß emphasizes in agreement with Hegel⁸⁶ that, when it comes to the miracles, one can only draw a 'negative critical' conclusion with respect to them in the sense that one can only say *what could not have happened* in light of what we now know about physical laws, *not what did happen*. He wrote in *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History* (1865): "[...] one certainly can reach a clear decision about what must be necessarily untrue [violations of physical laws], while, about what in itself might well be true but still might not be, there will always remain an uncertainty."⁸⁷

Clearly, Strauß acknowledges that *his Kritik in the LJ is 'negative,' but the negation is not 'destructive.'* In other words, "[...] no just notion of the true nature of history is possible, without a perception of the inviolability of the chain of finite causes [...]"⁸⁸ The 'negative' criticism is not that there is no factual history regarding the details of Jesus' ministry. It is simply that whenever a story violates the laws of nature, it cannot be historical.

[...] [W]hen we undertake to extract the historical contents which may possibly exist in narratives recognized as mythical, we shall be equally careful neither, on the one side, to place ourselves on the same ground with the natural interpreter by a rude and mechanical

itschriften I: 20. In other words, one might conclude that Strauß was proposing that the 'truth' of the gospels is not influenced by the conundrums raised by their 'form'. However, in *Streitschriften* II, Strauß criticizes Eschenmayer for using the distinction between 'husk' and 'kernel' to claim that, once one has grasped the 'good news' as the kernel of the gospels, one can ignore all of the conundrums and contradictions of their historical details. See Strauß, *Streitschriften* II: 11, 41, and 61. Nonetheless, *if anything is clear, it is that the historical veracity or falsity of the text matters for Strauß when it comes to the text's spiritual content*. See Strauß, *Streitschriften*: I: 36, 53, 76, and Pamphlet II of *ibid.*: 24 It is precisely this tension with respect to the weight of the 'actual' form of the gospels (their history) and the 'true' content (their spiritual truth) along with the circularity of Hegel's meta-narrative of Double Negation that resulted in Strauß' break with the Hegelians.

86. See Strauß, "Hegel's Perspective on the Historical Value of Gospel History" ["Hegel's Ansicht über den historischen Werth der evangelischen Geschichte"] in *Streitschriften* III: 90–91.

87. David Friedrich Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History: A Critique of Schleiermacher's The Life of Jesus*, Leander E. Keck, trans. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977): 128.

88. Strauß, *LJ*: 74.

separation; nor, on the other side, to lose sight of the history by a hypercritical refusal to recognize such contents where they actually exist.⁸⁹

Strauß proposes four criteria for discerning what is historical in the gospels⁹⁰ and acknowledges that "[...]the precise boundary line between the historical and the unhistorical? [...] is] the most difficult question in the whole province of criticism."⁹¹ Clearly, then, to conclude that by treating the gospels as myths means that Strauß believes them to be entirely unhistorical and false and that his aim was to destroy the historical foundation of Christianity is too simplistic. Once acknowledged that we're dealing with a story (myth) rather than a rational, factual account, the critical scholar has yet to decide just what about the story is grounded in a historical fact, or what about the story is grounded in a philosophical or theological truth, or what about the story is legitimately tied to a significant symbol.

Admittedly for Strauß, then, it is especially difficult to distinguish historical fact from stories (myths). Factual history and myths are both discerned in and through 'representations' (perceptions), not on the basis of direct and immediate access to 'what really happened.' However, for Hegelian epistemology, though, what is 'true' is not determined by the 'representations' but by the 'concept.' All knowledge involves an indirect discernment stimulated by 'representations,' but knowledge is impossible of being achieved merely by 'representations' alone.

The claim by Strauß' critics that he is *critically* 'destroying' any and all history in the gospels is not unlike the same kind of blanket (and superficial) dismissal of Immanuel Kant by Moses Mendelssohn, who, after having readily acknowledged that he knew of Kant's work only through the report of his friends, refers to Kant's work as "the complete shattering" (*alles zermalmenden*) of metaphysics and hopes that Kant "will rebuild with the same profound spirit that which he has torn down."⁹²

Even in his letter of recommendation in favor of Strauß' appointment to the university faculty in Zurich, H.E.G. Paulus⁹³ employs the same logic to Strauß as Mendelssohn had to Kant. Paulus expresses the wish that Strauß, *having broadly drawn negative conclusions with respect to the gospels*, "[...] would narrow his position,

89. Strauß, *LJ*: 63.

90. On Strauß' four criteria for establishing historical elements in the gospels, see: 37.

91. Strauß, *LJ*: 90.

92. See Moses Mendelssohn's "Preface" in *the Morgenstunden oder Vorlesungen über das Daseyn Gottes* (Berlin: Christian Friedrich Boß und Sohn, 2014): 3–4.

93. It is quite remarkable that Paulus, who as the quintessential "Rationalist" suffered the brunt of Strauß' ridicule in the *LJ*, should write a letter in support of Strauß' appointment at the University of Zurich. Surely his letter played a role in the subsequent absence of negative criticism of Paulus in Strauß' writing. Paulus' letter is included below in "Part II: A Historical Reader for the Zurich Revolution."

with the same agency and conviction, without holding himself bound to that which he has questioned."⁹⁴

Strauß' Ambivalent Relationship to the Hegelians

Not only did Strauß not ignore a 'factual,' 'positive portrayal of Jesus,' as Baur and so many others charged, but Strauß also was concerned with far more than a mere aggregate of likely 'factual' elements that one can draw out of the gospel stories.⁹⁵ In fact, Strauß satisfies Baur's own requirement of discernment of an 'organic history' that establishes the coherence of the text. I will demonstrate below that Strauß' 'inclusive' Christology, which Strauß articulated already in the first edition of the *LJ*, satisfies this insistence by Baur that history be governed by an Idea, not simply an aggregation of facts. For Strauß, as a Hegelian, Christology (the God/Man) is the central Idea of all history.

Eduard Zeller describes Baur's notion of 'organic history' as follows:

In a word, Baur was consistently concerned in each period of Church History to bring to awareness the driving powers and interests, which internally unify the multiplicities of the phenomena and to explain historical events by and large by means of these, their internal foundation [...] *The idea of an organic approach to history, which governed his entire work from the very beginning [...] is [...] entirely fused with historical empiricism: It is nothing external to the historical account but permeates it from within as the spirit that fills the whole. The organic coherence of facts emerges from out of themselves unsought, and the reader has no reason to be concerned that the historical account for that reason is any less rigorous because philosophy has opened the eyes of the historian to the internal connection of the phenomena.*⁹⁶ (emphasis added)

94. See Paulus' letter in "Part II: A Historical Reader for the Zurich Revolution" of Volume I of this project: "Paulus – On Theological Academic Freedom:" 387 ff.

95. On the notion of 'mere aggregation' and the 'architectonic' of reason, see the "Introduction" to the Historical Reader of this volume: 325, n. 2. I demonstrate the difference in strategy between Hegel/ Strauß and Kant for avoiding a mere 'aggregate' of moral principles. Hegel and Strauß subordinate 'moral specialties' to the teleological goal of the self-awareness of Absolute Spirit. Rather than treating the moral canon as a set of 'empty' abstract demands as Hegel and Strauß claims he does, Kant insists on the inseparability of form (*Form*) and content (*Inhalt*) – although he means exactly the reverse of the meaning of form and content as understood by Hegel and Strauß. Kant's solution to an aggregation of moral principles is the third step of the methodology of reason: the 'architectonic' of reason that anchors morality both in the transcendental capacity (*Anlage*) of autonomous freedom with its 'canon' that is the *a priori* synthetic foundation of practical reason and in the possibilities, demands, and limits of the concrete world of appearances (*sinnliche Anschauungen*), as 'organon'. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 735–884 and 49.

96. Zeller, "Ferdinand Christian Baur:" 476.

Zeller had written earlier of Baur's methodology:

[...] [A] history of external facts [...] is unworthy of its name to the extent that it only lines up facts in a row without going further into the inner coherence of what happened [precisely Kant's definition of an 'aggregate'] [...] [T]his claim must be placed on a historical discipline that has as its intuitive object not what occurred but thought, not external but *internal, the articulated thoughts of Spirit* [Kant would say finite, transcendental consciousness, not Spirit]. History is not merely a random aggregate but a coherent whole. However, recognition of the lawful coherence in history and the skill to reproduce it scientifically is precisely what Baur found missing in his predecessors.⁹⁷ (emphasis added)

It was precisely Hegel and Schelling (as well as Schleiermacher, perhaps surprisingly for those who view Schleiermacher and Hegel as antagonistic⁹⁸) from whom Baur derived his notion of history as governed by an 'internal,' coherence of Spirit. Zeller summarizes this attraction to the 'new' Speculative Metaphysics:

What attracted him [Baur] in [...] [Hegel] was, above all, the monumental conception of history with which his own attempts agreed: The idea of an inwardly necessary development of mankind, taking place by means of an immanent dialectic that brings all moments to manifestation according to a fixed law, which lies in the essence of the spirit.⁹⁹

It was precisely this "immanent dialectic" of Spirit that constitutes Strauß' 'positive portrayal of Jesus' through the *Glaubenslehre* of 1841 as no 'random aggregate' of 'facts lined up in a row' but, rather, as a far more radical and *inclusive* Christology than the *limited, exclusive* Christology of Personal Theism or the *limited, inclusive* Christology of the Left-Wing Hegelians. In short, *Strauß did not renounce or 'leave' Hegelianism*,¹⁰⁰ *the Hegelians left him!*

Strauß begins his examination of the historical value of gospel history in the (*Streitschriften*) by pointing out that *for Hegel the central point of gospel history is the incarnation of Christ*.¹⁰¹ Everything of importance in gospel history, then, depends upon the meaning and purpose of the God/Man incarnation. Exactly this is the question that led the Hegelians to leave Strauß out in the cold.

Strauß insisted in the *LJ*, the *Streitschriften*, and the *Glaubenslehre* that religion gives in representations (*Form*) what philosophy has with its content (the infinite

97. Zeller, "Ferdinand Christian Baur:" 446–447.

98. Zeller claims that Baur viewed Schleiermacher's notion of "absolute dependence" and Hegel's Spirit as identical. See Zeller, "Ferdinand Christian Baur:" 398, 431.

99. Zeller, "Ferdinand Christian Baur:" 402.

100. In this respect, Ziegler is correct, Strauß remained a Hegelian (see and Ziegler II: 352), but contrary to Ziegler, Strauß was not a Pantheist but an Immanentist/Pan-en-theist/Panlogist." See above footnote 31.

101. See Strauß, "Hegel's Perspective on the Historical Value of Gospel History" in *Streitschriften* III: 76.

Inhalt of the Concept/Absolute Spirit).¹⁰² For that reason, he developed what turns out to be his own (unique among Hegelians) "inclusive" Christology that the God/Man is not simply represented by the "exclusive" Christology of a particular individual at a particular point in history but realized only in the totality of the human species. Strauß articulated this inclusive Christology already in the first edition of the *LJ*:¹⁰³

[...] [G]od as spirit implies that God does not remain as a fixed and immutable Infinite encompassing the Finite, but enters into it, produces the Finite, Nature, and the human mind, merely as a limited manifestation of Himself, from which He eternally returns into unity. Because man, considered as a finite spirit, limited to his finite nature, has not truth; so God, *considered exclusively as an infinite spirit, shut up in His infinitude, has no reality (Wirklichkeit). The infinite spirit is real only when it discloses itself in finite spirits; as the finite spirit is true only when it merges itself in the infinite. The true and real existence of spirit, therefore, is neither in God by Himself, nor in the finite alone, but in the interchange of impartation and withdrawal between the two, which on the part of God is revelation, on the part of man religion.*

If God and man are in themselves *one* and if religion is the human side of this unity: then this unity must be made evident to man in religion and become in him consciousness and reality (*Wirklichkeit*). Certainly, so long as man doesn't know that he is a spirit, he cannot know that God is man: while he is under the guidance of nature only, he will deify nature; when he has learned to submit himself to law, and thus to regulate his natural tendencies by external means, he will set God before him as a lawgiver. However, when, in the vicissitudes of the world's history, the natural state discloses its corruptions, the legal its misery; the former will experience the need of a God who elevates it above itself, the latter, of a God who descends to its level. Man being once mature enough to receive as his religion the truth that God is man, and man of a divine race, it necessarily follows, because religion is the form in which the truth presents itself to the popular mind, that this truth must appear in an intelligible form to all, as a fact obvious to the senses: in other words, there must appear a human individual who is recognized as the visible God. Of this God/Man, uniting in a single being the divine essence and the human personality, it may be said that he had the Divine Spirit for a father and a woman for his mother. His personality reflecting itself not in himself, but in the absolute substance, having the will to exist only for God, and not at all for itself, he is sinless and perfect. As a man of Divine essence, he is the power that subdues nature, a worker of miracles; but as God in a human manifestation, he is dependent on nature, subject to its necessities and sufferings—is in a state of abasement. Must he even pay the last tribute to nature? does not the fact that the human nature is subject to death preclude the idea that that nature is one with the divine? NO: *the God/Man dies, and thus proves that the incarnation of God is real, that the infinite spirit does not scorn to descend into the lowest depths of the finite, because He knows how to find a way of return into Himself, because in the most entire alienation of Himself, He can retain His identity.* Further, the God/Man, in so far as he is a spirit reflected in his infinity, stands contrasted with men, in so far as they are limited to their finiteness: hence opposition and contest result, and the death of the God/Man becomes a violent one, inflicted by the hands of sinners; so that to physical degradation is added the moral

102. See Ziegler I: 131–132.

103. In the first edition of the *LJ*, this passage is in Vol. II, § 146, whereas in the fourth edition on which the English translation is based, it is in § 150.

degradation of ignominy and accusation of crime. If God then finds a passage from heaven to the grave, so must a way be discoverable for man from the grave to heaven: the death of the prince of life is the life of mortals. By His entrance into the world as God/Man God showed Himself reconciled to man; by His dying, in which act he cast off the limitations of mortality, He showed moreover the way in which He perpetually effects that reconciliation: namely, by remaining, throughout His manifestation of Himself under the limitations of a natural existence, and His suppression of that existence, identical with Himself. Inasmuch as the death of the God/Man is merely the cessation of his state of alienation from the infinite, it is in fact an exaltation and return to God, and thus the death is necessarily followed by the resurrection and ascension.

The God/Man, who during his life stood before his contemporaries as an individual distinct from themselves, and perceptible by the senses, is by death taken out of their sight; he enters into their imagination and memory: the unity of the divine and human in him, becomes a part of the general consciousness; and the church must repeat spiritually, in the souls of its members, those events of his life which he experienced externally. *The believer, finding himself environed with the conditions of nature, must, like Christ, die to nature—but only inwardly, as Christ did outwardly, – must spiritually crucify himself and be buried with Christ, that by the virtual suppression of his own sensible existence, he may become, in so far as he is a spirit, identical with himself, and participate in the bliss and glory of Christ.*¹⁰⁴ (emphasis added) (Eliot trans. modified by McG)

Strauß formulates his inclusive Christology in the *Glaubenslehre* so: "[...] God's Personhood must not be thought as a single personhood but as universal personhood; rather than on our part personify the Absolute, we must learn to conceive the Absolute as endless personification."¹⁰⁵ (emphasis added)

Yet, Strauß now states in the *Glaubenslehre* that in India the claim of divine incarnation in humanity would cause no surprise because it happens all the time and occurs in all persons. The surprise was the language of an exclusive incarnation (avatar) in a God/Man or even a limited, inclusive incarnation (avatar) of the God/Man by those who possess the proper Gnosis because in India such an incarnation happens all the time.¹⁰⁶

Having summarized the Christological formulations by the Hegelians Marheineke, Daub, as well as Rosenkranz, and presented a 'half-step' formulation by Blasche, Strauß frustratedly asserts in the *Glaubenslehre*:

104. Strauß, LJ: 777–778. See as well, *Glaubenslehre* I: 515–518. It is important for the later evaluation of Strauß' work and, therefore, not tangential to point out that even Strauß' inclusive Christology, like Hegelian Christology in general, is constructed on an *anthropomorphic* analogy to human consciousness. In the end, it is not the concrete details that have significance but the 'return' to the unity of Spirit. Strauß asks: "This work [of negation], can it be other than the (development of nature) and world history, which the world spirit assumes for itself because it is unachievable by any lesser consciousness? In this respect, the Absolute is essentially a consequence [*Resultat*], is only at the end [of history] what it truly is. This is what constitutes its nature, actuality, subjectivity, or its self-development." *Glaubenslehre* I: 513–514 (Strauß Footnotes to Hegel's *Phänomenologie* S. 16. Vgl. *Logik*, I, 2, S. 195).

105. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 524.

106. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II, 208.

The 'Concluding Dissertation' of my *Life of Jesus* should have terminated this lack of clarity and confusion [with respect to incarnation]. *If there is any reality to the unity of God and human nature – it was observed there, this does not mean so much that it must have become actual, like no time before or after, in a single individual. Emptying its entire fullness in a single exemplar is simply not the manner by which the Idea cultivates itself so that, in contrast, being stingy against all other exemplars, it would express itself always and only imperfectly. Rather, it [the Idea] loves to share its riches in a manifold of exemplars that complement one another by means of an alternating establishment and elimination of individuals. The God/Man as presented [in the 'Concluding Dissertation'] and declared to be the key to the entirety of Christology is that, rather than to an individual, an Idea in the sense of a real, generic term is the subject of the predicates that the Church attributes to Christ.*¹⁰⁷ (emphasis added)

The level of Strauß' frustration is palpable when he declares: "After all this, it may be lack of understanding, but it is certainly not conceit if I finally express the conviction here that in order to take Christology beyond the point of view of my "Concluding Dissertation" in the *LJ*, the first intelligible word still has to be brought forward."¹⁰⁸ In other words, Strauß' 'positive portrayal of Jesus' places Christology at the core of the Christian gospel and, in fact, stands shoulder to shoulder with Baur's thesis of 'organic history' even as Strauß expresses his disappointment over the Hegelians' failure to grasp the implications of their own understanding of *incarnation with respect to the human species as a whole* – rather than exclusively and only appropriately to the Christ (Right-Wing Hegelians) or inclusively, for 'mystics'¹⁰⁹ and for those few 'philosophers' who intellectually grasped the 'true' content (*Inhalt*) of incarnation of the God/Man (Left-Wing Hegelians).

Given that Strauß' full articulation of his inclusive Christology, the key to his grasp of the 'organic history' of Christianity, consists of only a few paragraphs at the end of volume II of the first edition after some 1,400 pages, one might grant to Baur that Strauß had in fact 'neglected' a 'positive portrayal of Jesus' because, in a 'quantitative' comparison with his 'negative' criticism, Strauß one can conclude that the 'positive' principle that drives his organic history in the *LJ* is only tangential.

Ziegler reports that it was Strauß' original intent to write a 'Hegelian' Part III on the "Separation of the Philosophical Conception from all Doctrinal, Fantasy Representations," which surely would have devoted far more attention to the 'organic history' informed by Hegelianism. In a letter of February 6, 1832, to his friend, Christian Märklin, Strauß outlined the plan for a book consisting of three parts: 1) Traditional Theology (objective Life of Jesus); 2) Critical Theology (subjective truths of the objective account in the pious Christian); and 3) Dogmatic Theology (the

107. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 214–215.

108. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 240.

109. Strauß called Johann Karl Friedrich Rosenkranz the sole Centrist Hegelian, who defended a Schleiermachian, exclusive Christology as the condition for *an inclusive mystical union of the 'lower' with the 'higher' consciousness* of those in the church. See Strauß, *Streitschriften* III: 120 and 122.

identity of the Traditional and the Critical).¹¹⁰ As tutor in the Protestant Seminary in Tübingen, the structure of the work was modified. It still consisted of three parts and *was to be constructed on a Hegelian foundation*.¹¹¹ 1) Biblical Teaching; 2) Historical Development of Dogma; and 3) Separation of the Philosophical Conceptual from all Doctrinal, Fantasy Representations.¹¹² The actual 1,400 page work that became the *LJ* was written between the summer of 1832 and the beginning of June of 1835. It consisted of an interweaving of the first two sections of his original outline. However, his plan for a section on the subjective truths of the pious Christian in harmony with philosophy was never written. In other words, part three, the 'dogmatic section,' was reduced to the "Concluding Dissertation."¹¹³

Nonetheless, cumulatively the negative judgments of Strauß' work, especially by Baur and the Hegelians, were painful for Strauß and contributed significantly to the cutting short of Strauß' opportunities for an academic career. With his 'friends' finding such fault, his enemies were left unchecked in their heresy hunt against him.

Yet, Strauß had a third concern (beyond gospel criticism and Hegelianism): His work on the history and dissolution of Christian doctrine. This two volume (1,500 page) tome has been ignored to this day. An off-print edition of his *Christian Doctrine in Its Historical Development and in Conflict with Modern Science* (1841) was published by the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft (2009), but the text has never been translated into English.

The central thesis of the *Christian Doctrine* [*Glaubenslehre*] is that Christianity has always been plagued not only with theological controversy but also, and more devastatingly, internal inconsistencies. The edifice of Personal Theism as absolute doctrine had collapsed long before his *LJ*. Furthermore, there is no better source for 'sorting out' Strauß' relationship to Hegel than this text because Strauß never wrote a text devoted exclusively to his Hegelian theology.

My thesis is not that Strauß was always correct in his reading of the gospels, metaphysics, or church history but, rather, that his work is incredibly rigorous, marvelously informative, and worthy of attention in and for itself. Nevertheless, Strauß was more a product of his time than, perhaps, even he wished to acknowledge. Hegelianism with its promise of Absolute Knowledge was the fashion of the day, especially for young, clever minds. Yet, Strauß was unaware of how Hegel himself had cleverly distorted and eclipsed Immanuel Kant's Critical Idealism.

By 1864 and the publication of his *Life of Jesus Examined for the German People*, a certain, yet still extremely limited, interpretation of Kant's moral theory has taken center stage in Strauß' reflections. Strauß' own 'Immanentism' and his attempt to 'return to Kant' (influenced by a movement among his friends) pushes Hegelian Speculative

110. Ziegler, I: 126–127.

111. See Ziegler, I: 132–133.

112. Ziegler, I: 132–133.

113. See Ziegler, I: 148.

Metaphysics to the side. Nonetheless, the lack of anything close to an adequate interpretation of Kant's Critical Idealism and the fact that Strauß' own convictions were rooted in subreption¹¹⁴ (the ignoring of all that consciousness must *add to* phenomena in order to understanding them and act responsibly in the world) combined with the distortions by his opponents and defenders of the content of his gospel criticism and subsequent scholars' ignoring of his criticism of historical theology makes him an, unfortunately, ignored opportunity for illuminating the foundation required for adequate understanding of the natural sciences as well as religion in general, not simply Christianity. I attempt to demonstrate in what follows what I take to be the incredible, as yet untapped potential of the pathway Strauß was walking at the end of his life.

114. All too glaring in the 'materialism' of his *The Old and the New Faith* of 1872, thirty-seven years after the publication of the *LJ*.

Chapter 4: Why Schleiermacher was not an Option

Chapter Overview

Strauß devoted more attention to Schleiermacher's work than any other theologian/philosopher with the exception of Hegel. This chapter examines Strauß' evaluation of Schleiermacher's methodology; Strauß' attempt at reconciliation with the Schleiermachians in the third edition of the *Life of Jesus Critically Examined*; 7 problematic elements to Schleiermacher's 'feeling of absolute dependence'; a criticism of Schleiermacher's attempt at reconciling science and faith; Schleiermacher's 'subjectivity' in contrast to Hegel's 'objectivity'; Schleiermacher's Sabellian, Modalistic Monarchian Christology; Strauß' embracing of Schleiermacher's notion of immortality as the 'eternal' in the 'present' from Schleiermacher's early work, *Speeches on Religion*; Schleiermacher's rejection of any grounding role for philosophy in theology; Strauß' identification of 8 themes in Schleiermacher that one finds already and 'more adequately articulated' in Spinoza; and the problems that confront Schleiermacher's insistence that the Gospel of John is from a single author who was the only eyewitness gospel writer; as well as the contradictions between Schleiermacher's and John's theologies.

Already in his earliest student days, there were two powerful intellectual currents that shaped Strauß. One was Hegel whom he encountered in his Gymnasium classes in Blaubeuren with Ferdinand Christian Baur. The other was 'spiritualism,' reflected, particularly, in the 'animal magnetism' of Justinus Kerner, as well as in the mysticism of Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher. However, that Kant had already anticipated and rejected the core ingredients of both Hegel's meta-narrative logic¹ and Schleiermacher's mysticism and Christology of Perfect God-consciousness² is indicative of Strauß' limited study of Kant and his blind acceptance of Hegel's and Schleiermacher's (as well as F.C. Baur's) reading of Kant.

Strauß visited Kerner in Weinsberg just outside of Heilbronn with his friend, Gustav (von) Binder during school vacations.³ Strauß and his bride, Agnes Scherbest, moved to Heilbronn at the end of 1843, and the Kerners were close friends. With Strauß and Agnes separating in 1844 and court proceedings of 1846 bringing an end (but not a divorce) to their relationship, Strauß moved to Bonn and then Köln. When

1. Kant dismissed the metaphysical fantasies of rapture (*Schwärmerei*) that recognizes no limits to reason as the dream of a dove that it could fly more easily in a vacuum (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 8–9. See as well, Kant's *Groundwork* AA IV: 462.) as well as underscored that logic is an empty canon without an organon in contrast to mathematics that is a canon with an organon (Kant, *Logik* AA IX: 12–14).

2. Kant clearly articulated indicated the profound problems with mysticism. (*Conflict of the Faculties* AA VII: 54–58, *End of All Things* AA VIII: 335–336, *Metaphysik Mrongovius* AA XXIX: 950) and pointed out that a Christology such as Schleiermacher's requires a new act of supernatural creation (Kant, *Der Streit der Fakultäten* AA VII: 92), a key observation made by Strauß in his *LJ* (771) and in *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History* (4–5; 168–169) but without reference to Kant.

3. See Ziegler, I: 43–44.

Kerner refused to cut off the relationship with Agnes as Strauß demanded, the cordial relationship between Strauß and the Kerners ended until 1860 when Strauß moved back to Heilbronn whereupon Strauß' friendship with the Kerners was re-activated. Kerner died in 1862. Strauß wrote an obituary essay in which he fondly remembered and portrayed his admiration as friend.⁴

Schleiermacher, however, meant more to Strauß, intellectually, than Kerner. Strauß devoted two texts to him: "Schleiermacher und Daub, in ihrer Bedeutung für die Theologie unserer Zeit" (1839) and *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History: A Critique of Schleiermacher's "Life of Jesus"* (1865). Hegel, who played by far a larger role in Strauß' work, was a key element in Strauß' *Polemical Writings (Streitschriften)*, but he was not the focus of book-length manuscript by Strauß, as the case with Schleiermacher.

In his essay "Über Justinus Kerner" from 1839, Strauß had resolved his Kerner fascination by embracing the need for, and confidence in, 'further research' as the only appropriate response to understanding the 'wonders' of 'animal magnetism'.⁵ On the surface, one might have expected the same kind of hesitation when it came to Schleiermacher. After all, stated crudely, Hegel is the 'Philosopher,' whose system is constructed on the basis of Absolute Knowledge. Schleiermacher is the 'Mystic,' who banned philosophy from theology and anchored religion in the 'feeling of absolute dependence.'

One might expect that Strauß would have abruptly dismissed Schleiermacher as a 'dreamer' whose reflections were 'empty abstractions' even more so than Kant, in Strauß' judgment. However, unlike Kant, whom Strauß encountered for all intents and purposes through the filters of others,⁶ Strauß engaged Schleiermacher ever again already in the *LJ* in 1835 and, especially, in Strauß' two volume *Glaubenslehre* of 1841 as well as authored two books devoted, either exclusively or primarily, to Schleiermacher that span Strauß' entire career. Furthermore, Strauß says that he went to Berlin in November of 1831 for two reasons: G.W.F. Hegel and F.D.E. Schleiermacher.

In short, Strauß was no more a superficial critic of Schleiermacher than he was a blind Hegelian.

4. On Strauß' relationship with Justinus Kerner, see Herman Niethammer's "Erläuterungen und Nachwort" to the posthumously published two essays on Kerner from Strauß, *Justinus Kerner. Zwei Lebensbilder aus den Jahren 1839 und 1862* (Marbach: Schiller-Nationalmuseum, 1953): 89–93. The first of the two essays in this Pamphlet labeled '1839' Strauß published in his lifetime as "Über Justinus Kerner" in *Zwei friedliche Blätter* (Altona; Verlag von J.F. Hammerich, 1839): 1–57. The second essay in *Justinus Kerner. Zwei Lebensbilder aus den Jahren 1839 und 1862* is labeled 1862' and is Strauß' Kerner obituary.

5. Strauß warned against turning the *mirabile* ('wonderful') into a *miraculum* ('miracle') in the second essay in *Zwei friedliche Blätter*, "Vergängliches und Bleibendes:" 91, with a specific mention of 'animal-magnetic powers'.

6. Negatively, in Baur, Hegel, and the Hegelian, Carl Daub, and, as well, Schleiermacher. Positively, only through his circle of friends, who included Zeller, in Heidelberg in the early 1860s.

Strauß' Opponents: Traditional Christian Theists, Hegelians, and Schleiermacher

It, of course, is no surprise that, on the basis of their heteronomous dogmatics and elevation of humanity to the throne of God by their literal, anthropomorphic analogies, Traditional Christian Theists responded in horror to Strauß. Especially, in Chapter 3 ("Strauß' Ambivalent Relationship to the Hegelians"), I present Strauß' conflict with the Hegelians, who had their own literal, anthropomorphic analogy that drives their meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit and which takes as its Christology the 'point of indifference' of the negation of multiplicity to 'return' to Absolute Unity/Knowledge/Freedom. Furthermore, already in his 1838 "Ueber Vergängliches und Bleibendes im Christenthum" and in his 1839 "Schleiermacher und Daub," Strauß was no longer using Hegel's meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit, and, in his 1872 *The Old and the New Faith*, Strauß had rejected Hegelian Idealism to embrace a problematic form of Feuerbachian, materialistic Nominalism.

It was not only Schleiermacher's writings that retained Strauß' attention. The Schleiermachians were a thorn – especially, when it came to his appointment to the faculty of the University of Zurich. The *intellectual opposition* that resulted in his withdrawal of his name in 1837 and the intellectual opposition in 1839 came from the Schleiermachian camp. In 1837, the Schleiermachian on the faculty, Alexander Schweizer, opposed the appointment,⁷ and in 1839, the academic letter of opposition in the "Historical Reader" of this present work came from Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wette, the 'Mediating Theologian,' especially influenced by Schleiermacher's *Speeches on Religion*,⁸ whom Strauß cited favorably, frequently, in the *LJ*.

Schleiermacher mattered for Strauß

Upon completion of his studies in Tübingen in 1830, Strauß spent his internship year of pastoral training (*Vikariat*) in the community of Klein-Ingelsheim.⁹ After fulfilling the requirements of the *Vikariat* in 1831, he taught for a half year at the Protestant school in Maulbronn¹⁰ before going to Berlin at the beginning of November 1831¹¹ to

7. See Anton Largiadèr, *Geschichte von Stadt und Landschaft Zürich* (Erlenbach-Zürich: Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1945): 146.

8. See Ernst Jenny, "Wie de Wette nach Basel kam" in *Basler Jahrbuch* (1941): 76–77. Ironically, although Strauß cited de Wette positively throughout the *LJ* in dramatic contrast to his derisive dismissal of Paulus, Paulus supported Strauß' appointment in Zurich whereas de Wette did not.

9. Theobald Ziegler, *David Friedrich Strauß*, Vol. I (Straßburg: Verlag von Karl J. Trübner, 1908): 58.

10. Ziegler, I: 83–84.

11. Ziegler, I: 92.

study with both Hegel and Schleiermacher. He completed and received his Doctorate for Tübingen in this same period. The diploma was actually sent to him in Berlin.¹²

Theobald Ziegler reports that in his very first days in Berlin, Strauß visited Hegel.¹³ "A few days later," he visited Schleiermacher¹⁴ who asked him if he was concerned about the cholera epidemic in Berlin. Strauß is said to have answered, "No, the epidemic is so good as over!" Upon which, Schleiermacher told him that the epidemic, nonetheless, had just claimed "another major victim. Professor Hegel died last evening."¹⁵

Ziegler is not convinced that Strauß actually exclaimed "It was for his sake that I came here!"¹⁶ Ziegler speculates that the legend arose because, later, Schleiermacher gave a cold reception to young, student Hegelians from Tübingen so that the first Tübingen Hegelian to visit him 'must' have received the same unwelcome reception.¹⁷ Whether legend or fact, Strauß went to Berlin not only because of his interest in Hegel but also because of Schleiermacher.

Strauß attended Hegel's funeral where the university Rector and Hegelian, Philipp Konrad Marheineke eulogized Hegel "not only as king in the Kingdom of Thought but also as the premier disciple of Christ in life."¹⁸ Within a year, Marheineke published posthumously Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*. Strauß visited Marheineke's lectures but found them impenetrable for the hearer.¹⁹ Most important, though, was Strauß' friendship with the Hegelian and private lecturer (*Privatdozent*), Wilhelm Vatke, whose lectures Strauß avidly attended.²⁰ However, Strauß also heard Schleiermacher's lectures.

Although Schleiermacher's extemporaneous lecture style was at first an obstacle for Strauß, he quickly learned to appreciate it and, in contrast to his dismissal of Marheineke's lecture style,²¹ recorded in his diary:

12. Ziegler, I: 92–93.

13. Ziegler, I: 93.

14. Ziegler, I: 94.

15. Ziegler, I: 94.

16. See Ziegler, I: 94. Karl Barth reports the incident as historical. See *Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert. Ihre Vorgeschichte und ihre Geschichte* (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1981): 379–380.

17. See Ziegler, I: 95.

18. Ziegler, I: 95.

19. Ziegler, I: 100. Marheineke was among the 'northern Germans' who criticized Strauß' Christology in the *LJ*. See *ibid.*, 209. Ziegler classifies Marheineke as a 'Hegelian Centrist' (*ibid.*, 210), but Strauß placed only Rosenkranz under this rubric. See Strauß, "The Different Schools of Thought on Christology among the Hegelians" ["Verschiedene Richtungen innerhalb der Hegel'schen Schule in Betreff der Christologie"] in Strauß' *Streitschriften* III: 120.

20. See Ziegler, I: 97–99.

21. See Ziegler, I: 100.

It soon became clear to me that Schleiermacher, with great deliberateness for students, distinguished between a written presentation and an oral one and that he gave the latter in well-rounded, complete objectivity (as far as possible from his point of view), but, as well, in a completely subjective attitude in such a way that one clearly can follow the development of his thought and can imitate it in oneself. Thus, his lectures have not only become attractive to me, but I have also learned something essential from him concerning lecture pedagogy.²²

However, Hegel's and Schleiermacher's influence on Strauß goes far deeper than this short period in Berlin. Four works from the beginning of the 1800s, especially, had a profound influence on Strauß: Schleiermacher's *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers* was published in 1799, Hegel's self-published papers (along with Schelling) in the *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie*: "Glauben und Wissen" (1802) and "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" (1803), as well as Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* [*Phänomenologie des Geistes*] (1806). Along with the profound influence of his professor, Ferdinand Christian Baur, these writings shaped Strauß' understanding of 'scientific knowledge,' and that influence resulted in the decade from 1831 to 1841 of tremendous intellectual fecundity and ferment for Strauß.

Further, crucial works for Strauß's intellectual development appeared at the beginning of the 1830s: Schleiermacher's 2nd edition of his *Glaubenslehre* [*Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt* (*The Christian Faith*)] in 1830/31; Marheineke published posthumously Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion* [*Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*] in 1832; and F.C. Baur's *Die christliche Gnosis oder die christliche Religionsphilosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung* (*Gnosis*) [*Christian Gnosticism or the Christian Philosophy of Religion in its Historical Development*], which included a detailed study of Schleiermacher and of Hegel, in early 1835.

Strauß' own two volume (1,500 pages) *Das Leben Jesu kritisch bearbeitet* [the *LJ*] appeared at the end of 1835 (Vol. I: June and Vol. II: by the end of the year). In this work, in addition to references to Schleiermacher throughout (especially important is § 13), Strauß devotes a section of the "Concluding Dissertation" to an initial criticism of Schleiermacher's Christology from the perspective of a dyed-in-the-wool Hegelian. Over the following two years, Strauß responded to his critics with three pamphlets that he published in a collection as *Polemical Writings in Defense of my Life of Jesus and on Characteristics in Contemporary Theology* (*Streitschriften zur Verteidigung meiner Schrift über das Leben Jesu und zur Charakteristik der gegenwärtigen Theologie*) in 1837.

Although Strauß already in 1837 was under consideration for appointment to the Chair for Biblical Theology, Church History, and Dogmatics at the university in Zurich, he withdrew his name because no one in the theological faculty supported

22. Ziegler, I: 101.

him, not even the Schleiermachian, Alexander Schweizer. A Schleiermachian, Eduard Elwert (from Tübingen), was appointed to the Chair.

However, in 1838 Elwert resigned for health reasons. In anticipation of his consideration for appointment to the Chair, Strauß wrote "Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum. Selbstgespräche" ("Transient and Permanent in Christianity: A Soliloquy") in which the reconciling tone of the third edition of the *LJ* is still present²³ and, especially, Schleiermachian language is invoked with respect to what is enduring in Christianity. The government of the Zurich Canton appointed Strauß to the Chair in January of 1839. Precisely at the point in time Strauß was publishing in daily serial format "Schleiermacher und Daub, in ihrer Bedeutung für die Theologie unserer Zeit" ("Schleiermacher and Daub: Their Significance for Theology in our Age"), which was published as a complete manuscript in *Charakteristiken und Kritiken. Eine Sammlung zerstreuter Aufsätze aus den Gebieten der Theologie, Anthropologie und Aesthetik* (Leipzig: Verlag von Otto Wigand, 1839). This text clearly marks the termination of Strauß' attempts to be a 'Mediating Theologian.'

Strauß capped the decade with the publication of his two volume (1,500 pages) *Die christliche Glaubenslehre in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und im Kampfe mit der modernen Wissenschaft* [*Christian Doctrine in its Historical Development and in Conflict with Modern Science*], which examines, compares, and contrasts in remarkable detail the theological trajectory of Christian theology from the early Church down to his day with each major section concluding with a commentary from the perspective of the theology of his day, particularly Schleiermacher and Hegel.

Nevertheless, in 1865 Strauß published a book exclusively focused on Schleiermacher, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*. No other theologian is the sole subject of a book by Strauß. Even without examining the content of all these texts, it is clear that Schleiermacher had a significant influence (for good or ill) on Strauß. He devoted more ink to Schleiermacher than any other author.

One might be tempted to summarize Strauß' engagement of Schleiermacher and Hegel in the last half of the 1830s in terms of a gradual decline in influence of Hegel and, if one measures by the concluding sentence (and final two footnotes) of the penultimate paragraph of Strauß' *Glaubenslehre* in 1841, the rise in influence of Schleiermacher. This is precisely what the Hegelians accused Strauß of doing.²⁴ However, Strauß responded to the accusation by saying that having obtained and read already in 1831 a copy of lecture notes of Schleiermacher's course on 'The Life of Jesus':

23. For example, Strauß writes in the "Introduction:" "I wanted to point out how, despite all the quarrels between me and my opponents, there are still points where we meet in harmony." *Zwei friedliche Blätter* (Altona: Verlag von J.F. Hammerich, 1839): vii.

24. See Strauß, "Allgemeines Verhältniß der Hegel'schen Philosophie zur theologischen Kritik." In Strauß, *Streitschriften* III: 66.

The truth is that *I found myself repulsed by [... Schleiermacher] almost on all points*, and owe to this repulsion, however, the closer fixation of my view on some parts of the life of Jesus in contrast to that of Schleiermacher. Schleiermacher started from a construction of the person of Christ out of the Christian consciousness, which could only give me the impression of an uncritical presupposition. In the course of the investigation he consistently preferred the fourth gospel, which at first had to appear to me as an impermissible partiality.²⁵ (emphasis added)

In contrast to Schleiermacher's grounding of religion in 'feeling' and the rejection of philosophy in theology, Hegel was, primarily, attractive to Strauß because of the 'necessities' of 'scientific' knowledge. What Schleiermacher and Hegel shared was their emphasis of their respective theologies on the 'Other' to the world of 'sensuousness' and the theme of ethical failure, which was not defined in terms of 'sin.' However, what separated them was their *disparate Christologies* (one can see them as Hegel's 'Athanasianism' for whom 'God became man that man might become God' and Schleiermacher's 'Arianianism' for whom 'there was a time with the Son was not'), and Schleiermacher's 'Arianianism'), with Strauß increasingly finding both indefensible.

The more Strauß came to understand their *shared theology* driven by a 'logic' of ultimate causality as a form of historical Indifferentism (Hegel) and the 'empty abstraction' of Perfect God-consciousness (Schleiermacher), the more he found their *Christological differences* to be illusions (Docetism and/or Sabellianism). However, it appears clear from the ending of the *Glaubenslehre* and Strauß' subsequent two decades of theological silence before publishing *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People* in 1864, wherein Hegel's influence on Strauß has evaporated and Immanuel Kant, who had up till then only been dismissively sidelined by Strauß, is dominant, that Strauß in 1841 had entered a stage of theological crisis.

Next to G.W.F. Hegel, then, no one was the focus of David Friedrich Strauß' intellectual production like Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher. It is not inappropriate, then, to ask: Why was Schleiermacher not an option for him?

Methodology

A crucial element with which Strauß resonated with Schleiermacher was with respect to Schleiermacher's method. In his article comparing Schleiermacher with the Right-Wing Hegelian, Carl Daub, Strauß writes, granted with damning praise but indicative of how even what he rejects from Schleiermacher stimulates his own reflection:

25. Strauß, "Allgemeines Verhältniß der Hegel'schen Philosophie zur theologischen Kritik, *Streitschriften* III:" 60.

Schleiermacher's method has the most important advantage over Daub's, in that it exercises a dialectical critique and polemic against the dogmatic determinations that have been maintained all the way back to the symbols [ancient Church creeds], even to the Bible itself. *This dialectic has the purpose of eliminating everything that is contrary to the regularity of thought.* However, this criticism in the doctrine of faith proceeds as little genetically as with Schleiermacher's criticism of morality, and would likewise have only a negative result, if feeling did not step in and provide a positive content [...], *which now dialectic, with respect to the usable elements of the ecclesiastically traditional formulas, has to work on and to smooth out in such a way that it offers no more impulses to think.* However, if criticism were to follow its own course [...], it would obtain a substantive [internal] result from this process, and dialectic would have a result that is just as positive as it is negative, which cannot be achieved from outside, from direct feeling and experience.²⁶

Dialectic, of course, is the methodological logic that drives Hegelianism because dialectic is powered by negation/distinctions between 'this' and 'not-this' devoted to an ultimately positive, Absolute synthesis. Strauß praises Schleiermacher to the extent that he seeks to identify and negate all that is 'contrary to the regularity of thought' in Church creeds and the bible. Yet, Strauß faults Schleiermacher for not following through with the method of dialectic because Schleiermacher does not grasp the

26. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 173–174. Strauß applauds Schleiermacher's biblical exegesis for a "[...] 'more comprehensive use of the text by which one doesn't treat passages independently of their context but only takes into consideration larger, especially fruitful material in order to demonstrate the coherence of the biblical authors upon which doctrinal conclusions are grounded' (*Glaubenslehre*, I: 163)." (Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 181) Were that actually to occur, which it doesn't in Schleiermacher to the extent that he remains a Rationalist, "[...] the coherence [of the biblical authors] could be distinguished from the scientific point of view of our age as having a completely different spiritual ground. This would allow the *rescuing both points of view* [early Church and Rationalism] *from their restraints and untruthfulness.*" (emphasis added) (Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 181). Strauß points out: "The educated Christians and theologians in the ancient church occupied the same ground and basis with the biblical authors. In the meantime, with the rise of science there arose gradually an ever more general difference between educated Christians and the biblical authors, which went unrecognized with the consequence that, rather than the natural identity between them in the past, a contrived and violent disparity arose. This occurred in two ways: Among Supernaturalists, today's ways of thinking were taken hostage by the earlier ways of thinking. However, at many points behind their backs, this imprisonment was modified or curtailed as a consequence of often unconscious influence of modern thinking. *Among Rationalists*, in contrast, [...] *biblical thinking was reformulated according to contemporary intellectual standards.* Nonetheless, even this strategy was undermined by the enduring influence of the early church's worldview." (emphasis added) (Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 181–182) In contrast, *Strauß proposes that 'proper' exegesis identifies the 'idea' (content/Inhalt) at the core of the biblical narratives (representations): "[... only], by recognition of the different mental foundations of the two sides [the side of the early Church and our scientific age] and, simultaneously, [by recognition of] their representing two realms [Reiche] in which the laws of neither could be employed in the realm of the other can the bondage and disingenuousness [Unfreiheit und Unlauterkeit] on the part of both the early Church and our age be eliminated.* For example, when the bible speaks of angels and the devil, today's theologian – to the extent that [s/]he wants to be in accord with the bible – is not required to accept the reality of such beings but only to recognize those religious ideas which are the foundation of such representations." (emphasis added) (Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 182).

contribution of dialectic to fuel development in understanding, which requires ideas (ultimately, the Absolute Concept), and to fuel development of morality.

Strauß points out that Schleiermacher's creative conclusion (the 'feeling of absolute dependence') is nothing that arises 'internally' out of the logic of dialectic. Yes, Schleiermacher creatively introduces the notion of subjective 'feeling' independent of knowing and doing as his strategy for making Church creeds and the bible more intellectually palatable. However, the consequence is that, *with the introduction of this new, additional element of feeling, dialectic's reflective thinking ceases*. The 'No!' to Church creeds and the bible is only responded to with the 'Yes!' of the *feeling* of absolute dependence. The synthesis is not thought but felt.

When it comes to Church creeds and morality, Strauß calls for 'more' than simply a final, positive content to a 'No!' He calls for the recognition of dialectic as an internal, on-going, creative logic by which *every* 'Yes!' is followed by a 'No!' For example, in his *LJ*, Strauß employs the '*genetic mythical principle*' for understanding why and how the gospels were written. The '*genetic mythical principle*' is the dialectical principle that drove the early Church *con*-figure its *pre*-figured inherited scriptures to articulate the 'Yes!' that is their understanding of Jesus' 'No!' to the religious consciousness of his day.

Nonetheless, in the *Glaubenslehre*, Strauß does not embrace the early church's elevation of an historical narrative to an eternal truth ('knowledge!') because it shuts down further development of new understanding. Furthermore, 'moral standards' are not established by the scriptures, according to Strauß' growing conviction. When it comes to agency, Strauß takes ever-changing social contexts to confront humanity with the need for a 'religious genius' to identify the new ethical rules ('proper doing!') appropriate to the new context. In other words, according to Strauß, the 'motor' of understanding that drives 'knowing' and 'doing' is a ceaseless dialectic with every new 'Yes!' establishing the context for a *necessary* 'No!' that leads to new understanding and new norms of action.

Most importantly, for Strauß, is that the 'logic' of a material dialectic generates the 'new' (understanding and social norms) out of the historical process itself. Not only does it not need any 'external' criticism (for example, from Hegelian philosophy or from 'revelation'), its true criticism is 'internal' to the dialectical, material process. This is precisely the meaning of Strauß' claim that 'the history of Church teaching is its own criticism.'

The crucible or boiling flask in which dogma has been smelted and distilled, all reagents by which it is decomposed, all vessels in which it must be fermented and skimmed off are not made by us and put into operation. Rather, we are able only to take them as they have been given to us in church factions and conflicts, as heresies and synods, as Rationalism, and philosophy etc. *The true criticism of dogma is its history*. In its impartial and vague form, this dogma is present in the scriptures; with analysis and closer examination of it, the church falls apart in antitheses, which, doubtless, led also to heretical extremes.

Immediately followed the fixation of church teaching in a creed, and the creeds were processed as Church Doctrine. However, shortly but gradually criticism was awakened. Spirit differentiated itself from reality as it was presented in church teaching. The subject extracted itself from the substance of its faith in church teaching up to that point [from mere belief in objective accounts of things and agents] and negated that substance as its truth. This it was able to do because another truth arose – if at first only in itself and undeveloped. *Everything hinges now on the question whether this new, speculative truth [of the Hegelian meta-narrative concerned with the ‘kernel’ of the gospels’ narrative ‘husks’] is itself the same as ancient church truth or foreign and opposed to it – or whether there is a middle pathway [materialism] between the two?*²⁷ (emphasis added)

Strauß’ conclusion on Schleiermacher’s methodology:

Schleiermacher is the [popular] Kant of Protestant theology. Not that he was a Kantian; rather, criticism²⁸ forms a relatively receding component in his [Schleiermacher’s] philosophical way of thinking, but the same critical, old-form-breaking, reformational position that Kant occupies in the history of philosophy, Schleiermacher asserts in the history of modern theology. Like the former [Kant] shattered [what Mendelssohn called Kant’s *alles zermalmenden metaphysics*²⁹] the edifice of the old metaphysics, the latter [Schleiermacher] shattered theological scholasticism; and like the former [Kant] shattered the dogmatism of empiricism and skepticism, the latter [Schleiermacher], brought down Rationalism and Supernaturalism. Finally, just as Kant gained a positive ground against this negative business in the moral consciousness of practical reason, so for Schleiermacher religious consciousness or pious feeling [subjectivity] was the firm anchor from which he postulated his Christ just as from his anchor in practical reason [subjectivity] Kant postulated his God.³⁰

However, far from having “brought down Rationalism,” Schleiermacher in many respects remained a Rationalist, as Strauß himself says in *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*:

Schleiermacher, we can say, is a Supernaturalist in Christology but in criticism and exegesis a Rationalist. His Christ, however many of the miraculous attributes of the old confession may have been removed, still remains essentially a superhuman, supernatural being. In contrast, his exegesis, as far as it pertains to the miraculous in the Scripture, is distinguished from that of Paulus only by somewhat more spirit and subtlety [...] The one [only] appears to contradict the other; rather, however, the one is the basis for the other. Because Schleiermacher wants to remain a supernaturalist in Christology, he must be a rationalist

27. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 71–72. Already in “Schleiermacher und Daub,” Strauß pointed out that “[...] the true criticism of a thing [can] only lie in its history.” Strauß, “Schleiermacher und Daub.” 30. (emphasis added)

28. Note: As I stressed in Chapter 2, what Strauß means by ‘criticism’ is not what Kant means by ‘critique’. Note, as well, that Schleiermacher was at least as much, if not more, a Rationalist as he was a critic of Rationalism.

29. See Moses Mendelssohn’s “Preface” in *the Morgenstunden oder Vorlesungen über das Daseyn Gottes* (Berlin: Christian Friedrich Boß und Sohn, 2014): 3–4.

30. Strauß, “Schleiermacher und Daub.” 203.

in criticism and exegesis. In order not to lose the supernatural Christ as a historical personality, he cannot surrender the Gospels as historical sources. But [*sic.*] in order to avoid a supernatural Christ in the sense in which the supernatural is unacceptable to him, he must remove exegetically from the Gospels the supernatural which offends him. Indeed, he retreats to one Gospel, the Johannine, and appears to let the other three go.³¹ (emphasis added)

An Olive Branch to the Schleiermachians and a Broken Lance

In *Pamphlet* III of his *Streitschriften* in 1838, Strauß wrote of his position in the *LJ* of 1835 that Schleiermacher was a Rationalist:

Schleiermacher proceeded from a construction of the person of Christ from Christian consciousness: which *could only give me the impression of an uncritical presupposition* [...] In the view of the most prominent events in the life of Jesus, such as the transfiguration, resurrection, and death, he coincided more openly or more covertly with Dr. Paulus [the Rationalist, whom Strauß roundly criticized in the *LJ*]: a standpoint which I believed I could prove to be untenable.³²

Strauß' third edition (1838/1839)³³ of the *LJ* was published as Strauß was under consideration for the appointment to the chair of Biblical Theology, Church History, and Dogmatics at the University of Zurich (a process that began in 1837). Clearly, Strauß' aim in the third edition was to offer an olive branch at least to his Rationalist critics by embracing key themes from Schleiermacher, but the revisions also indicate his increasing dissatisfaction with the Hegelian meta-narrative. With the third edition, he had a dialectical "No!" to literal, Church Doctrine with an antithetical "Yes!" of Hegelian science, but he no longer had the ultimate synthesis of Absolute Knowledge, Absolute Freedom, Absolute Spirit.

31. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 160. I will demonstrate, as well, that, when it comes even to the Gospel of John, Schleiermacher is selective in what he accepts as history and what is unacceptably supernatural.

32. Strauß, *Streitschriften* III: 60.

33. The second edition added 36 pages to the "Introduction" and clarified the notion of "myth." See Werner Zager's "Einleitung" to *Das Leben Jesu kritisch bearbeitet* [*The Life of Jesus Critically Examined*] (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2012): 28–29. The third edition (1838/1839) is acknowledged by most to have been a 'moment of madness' when he briefly took the Gospel of John to be historically accurate and in the "Concluding Dissertation" presented a Christology in which "Jesus was presented as 'the goal of all religious development' and 'in so far as the unity of God and man was present in him, it will not be exceeded at any other point in time' (Zager: 29–30). In the 1840, fourth edition, he returned to the formulation of his original text (Zager: 30). The observant reader will have noted that I formulate the three themes a bit differently from Peter Hodgson in his "Editor's Introduction" to the *LJ*: xxxviii.

The three core themes revised or added in the third edition are all related to Schleiermacher: 1) the status of the Gospel of John as an eyewitness, 2) the status of Jesus as unsurpassable founder of a religion, and 3) the taking of an 'intermediary position' on the miracles based on 'animal magnetism' that had Strauß endorsing at least some conclusions of Rationalism:

Re. 1) No one defended the eyewitness status of John's gospel more rigorously than Schleiermacher. Nonetheless, in § 12 of the "Introduction" to the first edition of *LJ* (§13 of Eliot's trans.), Strauß discusses and dismisses the arguments for taking John's gospel to be from an eyewitness.³⁴

However, in his 'Preface' to the third edition, Strauß attributes his re-thinking with respect to the Gospel of John to recent work by Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wette and August Neander, both Schleiermachian, 'Mediating Theologians:' "[...] a renewed study of the Fourth Gospel on the basis of de Wette's commentary and Neander's *Leben Jesu Christ*, has made me again skeptical of my earlier doubt concerning the authenticity and credibility of this Gospel. *It is not that I have become convinced of its authenticity, merely that I am no longer certain of its inauthenticity.*"³⁵ (emphasis added). I will return to the issue of the Gospel of John for Schleiermacher below when I examine the other problems the gospel of John present for Schleiermacher's theology.

Re. 2) The second theme of revision was Strauß' take on Jesus as a 'genius' religious founder at least consistent with Schleiermacher's claim for Jesus' role as an irreplaceable and unsurpassable founder of a 'new' religion.

In "Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum. Selbstgespräche" ("On What is Passing and Enduring in Christianity: Soliloquies") published at the time of the third edition of the *LJ*, Strauß employs the notion of 'genius' to speak of Jesus of Nazareth.³⁶ However in contrast to Schleiermacher, Strauß stresses that Jesus as a 'genius' who founded the new religion, that is Christianity, "has to step down from the divine throne."³⁷ because *he is only different in degree from others rather than an exclusive God/Man who appeared at a particular point in space and time.*³⁸

What distinguishes a religious/philosophical 'genius' from other 'geniuses,' according to Strauß, is that the former develops an 'inner harmony' whereas the genius of the non-religious is defined by external agency.³⁹ Strauß takes Jesus here to be "unsurpassable"⁴⁰ and "omniscient" with respect to his 'inner harmony'.⁴¹

34. See Strauß, *LJ*: 62 ff.; Eliot trans.: 72 ff.

35. Strauß, *LJ*: lviii.

36. See especially "Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum. Selbstgespräche" in *Zwei friedliche Blätter* (Altona: Verlag von J.F. Hammerich, 1839): §§ 29 and 30.

37. Strauß, "Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 104.

38. See Strauß, "Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 109.

39. See Strauß, "Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 112–113.

40. See Strauß, "Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 129–130.

41. See Strauß, "Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 130–131.

Strauß portrays the religion founded by Jesus as itself in need of improvement. His use of 'God-consciousness' to describe Jesus sounds remarkably similar to Schleiermacher's notion of 'perfect God-consciousness' (*granted formulated by a conditional 'if'*):

[...] the highest unity of human self-consciousness with God-consciousness results, by virtue of which the former, in all its movements, in determining itself purely from the latter, and knows and feels this determination by the divine at the same time as its own self-determination. *If* this unity really existed in Jesus; if he not only expressed it in words, but actually demonstrated it in all situations of his life, then in him, within the religious field, the highest has been reached, beyond which no future individual can go [...] ⁴² (emphasis added)

Strauß employs the conditional form ('if') in "On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity."⁴³ However, he does not speak of 'perfect God-consciousness' as does Schleiermacher! 'Perfection' would eliminate the historical included in Strauß' notion of the religious 'genius':

[... The] historical element relates to the personal element as the material does to the animating and ordering spirit: so even an equally excellent spirit will not be able to form the same stately and beautiful body from a poorer and coarser material than another [is able to form, though,] not better in itself, but out of a richer and more pre-processed material.⁴⁴

Yet, following the conditional 'if this unity really existed in Jesus,' Strauß immediately stresses that, with the understanding of the natural sciences, there has been significant improvement since the time of Jesus, which in turn influences the religion that he founded.⁴⁵ Furthermore, within Christianity itself there has been a '*purification*' (not perfection) in the conceptualization of understanding the relationship by God to the world so that rather than conceive of God possessing the ability to violate the laws of nature, God is viewed as working through the laws of nature. Strauß asks, when belief in angels serving as divine mediators and intercessors as well as the notion of

42. Strauß, "Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 127.

43. See Strauß, "Vergängliches und Bleibendes im Christenthum:" (1838): 126. In *The Old and the New Faith* of 1872, Strauß does employ Schleiermacher's 'feeling of absolute dependence,' but not with respect to 'Spirit above sensuousness' but with respect to our dependence upon the material universe: "Religion is no longer in us what it was in our fathers, but it does not follow that it is extinct in us.

What has remained in us in any case is the basic component of all religion, the feeling of absolute dependence [*das Gefühl der unbedingten Abhängigkeit*]. Whether we say God or universe: we feel absolutely dependent on the one as on the other. Also towards the latter [the universe] we know ourselves as "part of the part," our power as nothing in relation to the omnipotence of nature, our thinking only able to grasp slowly and laboriously the smallest part of what the world offers us as an object of cognition." Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube. Ein Bekenntnis* (Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1872): 138–139.

44. Strauß, "Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 124–125.

45. See Strauß, "Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 127–128.

the devil able to contradict God's purposes, which are contaminations of Christianity from other religions, "[...] *when these and similar prejudices gradually fall away: will not the essence of Christianity itself thereby be brought out even more purely than it could have been at the time of Jesus?*"⁴⁶ (emphasis added)

Even when one turns inwardly to the purely religious domain, for example, the nature of morality, where no one can understand or act for someone else, Strauß emphasizes that *no moral success is inferior to the first moral agent*.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, clearly echoing Schleiermacher as much as Hegel, the gospels present Jesus as the first to introduce to humanity "[...] the consciousness of the essential unity of the truly human with the divine, [who] showed such omnipotence that his whole life was uniformly permeated and transfigured by it until any noticeable dullness vanished."⁴⁸ Again with the 'conditional if,' Strauß concludes: "[...] *[I]f Christ remains for us, and if he remains for us as the highest thing that we know and are able to think of in religious terms, as the one without whose presence in the mind no perfect piety is possible, then in him the essence of Christianity remains for us.*"⁴⁹ (emphasis added)

In 1864, though, Strauß returns to the theme of Jesus' place in history in his *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People* as well as in his final book in 1872, *The Old and the New Faith: A Confession*. At this point some twenty years later, the notions of religious 'genius,' unsurpassable founder, much less absolute God-consciousness and omniscience have all disappeared. What remains, if at all, from Schleiermacher is the notion of religion as the 'eternal' in the 'present,' which is the concluding line from the 'Second Speech' of Schleiermacher's *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers*.⁵⁰ I return to Strauß' citation of this passage below.

Re. 3) The third theme threatened the consistency of Strauß' thesis with respect to the 'miracle' narratives in the gospels as the product of the '*genetic mythical principle*,'⁵¹ which views the miracle stories as constructions of the early church and gospel writers as they articulated their understanding of who Jesus of Nazareth was based on the accounts of God's chosen, charismatic leaders, prophets, and prophecies from the 'First' Testament. Here, Strauß comes as close as he ever does to adopting the Rationalist account of, at least some, miracles.

For the Rationalists miracles are a matter of misperception by their audience. What was a natural event was taken to be a supernatural event. In short, one acknowledged only the alternative: supernatural and natural. In the third edition of the *LJ*,

46. Strauß, "Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 128.

47. See Strauß, "Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 129–130.

48. Strauß, "Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 130–131.

49. Strauß, "Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 132.

50. See Schleiermacher, *On Religion*: 101.

51. Strauß was very conscious of this inconsistency between the first two editions and the third that arises from his accepting Rationalistic explanations in the third edition for certain miracles. In his "Preface" to the fourth edition, he describes the work of the third edition as having "[...] lost in unity but hopefully [...] gained in truth over both [earlier editions]." *LJ*: lvii

Strauß suggests an intermediate option: *some (particularly healing) stories are 'wonders' but not 'miracles.'* What today would be called unusual, psychosomatic events have a 'natural' explanation but were taken by Jesus' audience to be miracles.

Peter Hodgson refers to Strauß' "[...] allowance of an intermediary category of miracles (cures based on unusual powers of nature, *analogous to animal magnetism*)."

(LJ: xxxviii) (emphasis added) However, Hodgson's formulation should not be taken to mean that Strauß' acknowledgement of animal magnetism is as a champion of it in contrast to natural science.⁵² In "Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum," Strauß addressed this intermediary position of miracles: Strauß asks: "[...] [I]s it correct with respect to the miracles of Jesus, if they are admitted to have happened at all, that they can only be effected either by ordinary natural, or by divine powers? Is there no middle between the two? Already the formulation of the question suggests that *between the ordinary and natural* on the one side, *and the unusual and supernatural* on the other side, *the natural but unusual* stands in the middle. The only question is: Is this something? – Certainly!"⁵³

Strauß then stresses the difference between mechanical magnetism (requiring technical equipment) and animal magnetism (e.g., psychosomatic cures). Obviously, the former couldn't apply to Jesus. He acknowledges, though, that 'animal magnetism' occurs by means of an unusual power but adds:

[...] when madness and epilepsy are gradually eradicated by means of medicines and rubbing, this, rare as it is, is still considered part of the usual natural course. On the other hand, if one succeeds in breaking such an evil suddenly and forever by a word spoken strongly and in tune with the patient's fixed ideas, this is regarded as something unusual. However, this unusual thing is therefore not yet an extra-natural thing. Animal-magnetic power, [...] even the power of imagination and will, in so far as it acts on the bodily organism, are just as much natural potencies as the mechanical ones.⁵⁴

Strauß emphasizes "[s]uch [... things] could be believed without orthodox belief in miracles; in that here *the miraculum* [miracle] *has descended to the mirabile* [wonder-

52. Whereas Strauß was 'convinced that there were spirits' in 1827, he had his doubts by 1830, and, in the summer of 1832, he had definitely rejected the claims. See Ziegler, I: 114. Frequent visits with Kerner resulted in Strauß publishing several essays on 'demon possession,' the 'dark side' of nature, magnetism, and apparitions as part of his collection of essays from 1839, *Charakteristiken und Kritiken*: 301–404. Strauß approaches this phenomena with extreme skepticism and conviction that, although a natural explanation for the phenomena has not yet been achieved, in time it will be discovered. His wonder for Kerner was the patience and seriousness with which he acknowledged the dignity of his 'patients'.

53. Strauß, "Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 85–86.

54. Strauß, "Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 88. A year earlier, Strauß wrote: "Whoever has not perceived any sensory metastasis, remote sensation, etc. in the field of healthy life and common diseases, would be completely wrong if he would deny the reality of these phenomena [that is, healthy life and common diseases] also for magnetic states," Strauß, "Die Evangelische Kirchenzeitung" in his *Streitschriften* III: 37.

ful], to an indeed striking and unusual, but therefore not supernatural appearance.”⁵⁵ (emphasis added)

It is important to stress, though, that this identification of a ‘middle’ position more in tune with psychosomatic healing in the explanation of miracles is NOT Schleiermacher’s ‘middle’ position related to a ‘Platonic Nobler Lie’ that Strauß rejects 26 years later in *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*. Schleiermacher defended a ‘middle’ position between ‘objectively false’ and ‘subjectively true,’ not a ‘middle position’ of ‘wonder’ in the ‘middle’ between ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ causality. Schleiermacher defends the morally questionable conclusion that Jesus’s was unobligated to tell the disciples that they misunderstood (for example, concerning what happened in the tomb) so long as they didn’t ask him⁵⁶ in order to achieve his ‘higher’ spiritual goal of perfect God-consciousness for humanity. I return to this theme below.

If the third edition of the *LJ* was embracing a middle path between ‘faith’ and ‘history’ in order to placate Alexander Schweizer, the Schleiermachian, ‘Mediating Theologian’ who would have been Strauß’ colleague in Zurich but who opposed Strauß’ appointment already in 1837, Strauß’ 1839 “Schleiermacher and Daub: Their Significance for Theology in our Age” published in daily segments over the two months of January and February of 1839 – precisely the time frame in which the appointment of Strauß to the Zurich faculty was made – slammed shut the door of reconciliation.⁵⁷ Shortly after its appearance, Strauß expressed his regrets for the revisions of the *LJ*’s third edition, and the fourth edition, for the most part, returned to the original edition.

Schleiermacher’s Feeling, Hegel’s Absolute Knowledge, and Kant’s Morality

In the “Second Speech” of *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers* (1799), Schleiermacher claims that religion is neither a matter of ‘science’ (physical or metaphysical knowledge) nor of ‘morality’ (practical philosophy).⁵⁸ Speaking of religion as ‘piety,’ Schleiermacher says:

Only by keeping quite outside the range both of science and of practice can it [religion] maintain its proper sphere and character. *Only when piety takes its place alongside of science and practice, as a necessary, an indispensable third*, as their natural counterpart, not

55. Strauß, “Vergängliches und Bleibendes:” 91. See as well, Strauß’ “Part II: On the Science of the Dark Side of Nature” in *Charakteristiken und Kritiken*: 301–404.

56. See Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 148, 67.

57. See Strauß, “Schleiermacher und Daub:” 146.

58. Schleiermacher, *On Religion*: 30. Schleiermacher claims: “In order to make quite clear to you what is the original and characteristic possession of religion, it resigns at once, all claims on anything that belongs either to science or morality.” *Ibid.*: 35.

less in worth and splendour than either, *will the common field be altogether occupied and human nature on this side complete.*⁵⁹ (emphasis added)

Science and true practice (as culture and art self-produced) are possible only because there is religion in the form of the "sense and taste for the Infinite."⁶⁰ Science and culture "[...] can both come to life in you [...] insofar as there lives immediately in you the eternal unity of Reason and Nature, the universal existence of all finite things in the Infinite [...]"⁶¹ "If man [*sic.*] is not one with the Eternal in the unity of intuition and feeling which is immediate, he remains, in the unity of consciousness which is derived, forever apart."⁶²

Thinking can only occur where there is separation, a sundering of unity: between the subject and the object:

Consider how you delineate an object. Is there not both a stimulation and a determination by the object, at one and the same time, which for one particular moment forms your existence? The more definite your image, the more, in this way, you become the object, and the more you lose yourselves. But [*sic.*] just because you can trace the growing preponderance of one side over the other, both must have been one and equal in the first, the original moment that has escaped you.⁶³

Sense and object mingle and unite, then each returns to its place, and the object rent from sense is a perception, and you rent from the object are for yourselves, a feeling. *It is this earlier moment [of feeling] I mean, which you always experience and yet never experience. The phenomenon of your life is just the result of its constant departure and return.*⁶⁴

What Schleiermacher calls in *On Religion* the feeling "that our being and living is a being and living in and through God,"⁶⁵ he calls in his own *Glaubenslehre* (*The Christian Faith*) the 'feeling of absolute dependence.'⁶⁶

Schleiermacher emphasizes that awareness of the 'feeling of absolute dependence' is possible for humanity along a scale of none, whatsoever, to various degrees of cognizance, that culminates in 'perfect God-consciousness' in which all of one's being is shaped first by the feeling of one's dependence upon God.⁶⁷ The spectrum

59. Schleiermacher, *On Religion*: 37–38.

60. Schleiermacher, *On Religion*: 39.

61. Schleiermacher, *On Religion*: 39. NOTE: This is thoroughly anthropomorphic. Only a finite consciousness, so far as we have ever experienced, experiences anything remotely like the self-unity of apperception and the limitlessness and power of the sublime. See the presentation of Kant on beauty and the sublime in "Chapter 9: Missing Aesthetic Judgment:" 885 ff.

62. Schleiermacher, *On Religion*: 40.

63. Schleiermacher, *On Religion*: 42.

64. Schleiermacher, *On Religion*: 43.

65. Schleiermacher, *On Religion*: 50.

66. See Schleiermacher, *Glaubenslehre* § 9.

67. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 202. See as well, Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 63–64

represents a tension in humanity between the 'feeling of absolute dependence' and sensuousness with the greater degree of God-consciousness elevating humanity to that degree 'above sensuousness.'⁶⁸ NOTE: For Schleiermacher, this spectrum of degree of God-consciousness replaces the traditional, Christian notion of 'sin' as the violation of divine law.

If not knowledge or action, just what does Feeling Accomplish?

I address these seven themes individually below:

1. Finite anchoring of religion in human experience: Acknowledging humanity's limits, it provides a 'finite ground' for religion in human experience (feeling) that reins in metaphysical conceptions about 'God,' yet preserves the notion of God even though 'unknowable'.
2. Absolute Feeling as ground of religion: It gives us a subjective 'sense' or subjective 'intuition' of a unity, identity, and divinity at the core of life. In short, it grounds in 'appearances' (not metaphysical substance) both a 'cosmological argument' (first cause) and an 'ontological argument' (Absolute Being) for God.
3. Elitism avoided: It eliminates religious 'elitism' because of its 'universality' (that is, it is quintessentially 'Protestant' as the ground for the 'community of all believers' without need of an intercessory 'Church' hierarchy).
4. Perfect God-consciousness and 'natural' Developmental Growth: Religion is anchored in the 'developmental process' of human growth, physically and intellectually. Schleiermacher's 'theology from below' insists, then, that even the Christ must be understood as nothing that couldn't arise out of natural, human development.
5. Sin and Sinlessness defined with respect to the feeling of absolute dependence: As 'absolute' this feeling establishes a value hierarchy that explains the source of 'sin' and calls for the enhancement of God-consciousness within and 'above' 'sensualism.' Jesus' 'perfect God-consciousness,' by which all his life was in conformity with the feeling of absolute dependence, is 'sinless.'
6. Goal: enhanced God-consciousness, not overcoming sin as 'violation of divine law.' The emphasis on feeling allows emphasizing humanity's 'goodness' irrespective of the divine law by making the goal the 'achievement' of enhanced God-consciousness, not the 'overcoming' of sin.
7. Ultimate, Eminent Causality:⁶⁹ The feeling of absolute dependence 'explains' why there is a 'need' for a 'savior' because no finite cause can achieve an infinite,

68. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 154; *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 30 See F.C. Baur's, "Die Schleiermacher'sche Glaubenslehre:" 662; "self-consciousness must be liberated from sensuousness" (*Ibid.*, 663)

69. On the difference between eminent and efficient causality, see the "Introduction:" 84, n. 23.

perfect end (without contradicting the Principle of Sufficient Reason or *Satz vom zureichenden Grund*).

A Fragile Edifice Built on the Sand of Feeling

Constantly looking over his shoulder at the developments in the natural sciences that contradict the miraculous and convinced that the historical foundation of the gospels crumble if they are myths, yet, fully aware that the claim to ‘know’ God reduces God to a ‘finite thing’ among other ‘things’ confined to a subject-object structure of experience and, with respect to human lives, driven by the conviction that humanity is capable of perfection if not ethical than ontological even if it does not possess it ‘naturally’ by birth, Schleiermacher’s ‘feeling of absolute’ dependence appears to be the ultimate solution to humanity’s religious conundrums. Religion defined on the basis of the ‘feeling of absolute dependence’ avoids, most dramatically, the problems that accompany the claims for a Personal God, and it avoids the crushing debilitations of humanity that come with the narrative of ‘original sin.’ In fact, though, the ‘feeling of absolute dependence’ is itself grounded in ‘knowledge’ and is as much a condemnation of ‘sensualism’ with debilitating consequences for humanity’s responsible creativity as is Augustine of Hippo’s mistranslation of Romans 5:12 that gave us ‘original sin’ at the end of the 4th C. Furthermore, trapped in a circular, anthropomorphic argument, Schleiermacher’s ‘religion’ is sustained only by dictum (*Machtspruch*).

Despite overlap, I address the seven themes in order listed.

Re. 1) Finite anchoring of religion in human experience in the feeling of absolute dependence ignores the limits to feeling:

Strauß points out in "Schleiermacher und Daub" (1839) that, in order to avoid grounding religion in ‘knowledge’ or ‘ethics,’ “[...] Schleiermacher devotes all his acumen to get along without such help, and to spin all [religious] propositions out of the sense of dependence.”⁷⁰

Before turning to the theme of ‘feeling’ directly, it is helpful to examine what Strauß points out concerning the claim for the concept of ‘totality’ included in the notion of ‘absolute dependence.’ Schleiermacher defined Christianity in *On Religion* as consisting of the finite striving toward unity with the whole:

The basic view of Christianity [...] is no other than that of *the general striving of everything finite towards the unity of the whole*, and the way the Deity treats this striving towards Himself, how it mediates the enmity against Himself and sets limits to the ever increasing

70. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 163.

distance on the part of the particular points scattered everywhere, which are at the same time finite and infinite, human and divine [...].⁷¹

Schleiermacher, Strauß observes, is well aware that the individual's sense experience is limited by the particulars of its perceptions. In other words, it is clear that individual consciousness is 'dependent' on the collection of things that make up its immediate world. However, when it comes to a claim about a unity that is an identity to all experience in the sense of an absolute totality, Schleiermacher overlooks that "[...] the individual never experiences this totality directly."⁷²

Schleiermacher attempts to solve this aspect of human limitation by making a claim about the limitlessness of consciousness:

Our body, he says, 'is present in self-consciousness and always occurs as affixed to some other being in a natural coherence. However, there are no limits given here [in self-consciousness]. Hence, undeveloped, all finite being occurs as a whole [...] In this fashion, the entire natural order occurs in our self-consciousness,' and, to the extent that we feel ourselves with this consciousness of the world as inclusively sensuous always absolutely dependent, the entire world occurs as absolutely dependent on God (*Glaubenslehre* I: 193 f. [actually, § 34: 194]).⁷³

Strauß comments with skepticism:

[... Schleiermacher] admits that this occurrence of the world as a totality is only undeveloped in immediate self-consciousness. In fact, more exactly, *that which is direct in our self-consciousness as feeling is only always some particular worldly element* (and actually, even this is mediated by means of feeling [*Empfindung*], perception, etc.). However, *as a totality, the world occurs in our self-consciousness only mediated by thought [...]*.⁷⁴ (emphasis added)

In short, Schleiermacher makes a claim for an 'absolute dependence' upon a totality that depends upon our experience *within the limits of consciousness* of a 'limitless whole' of nature that we possess only in a finite world of extension. The step from finite consciousness to an absolute, 'comprehensive totality' is a conclusion drawn by finite consciousness in thought and nothing that the individual can experience directly

71. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 18–19. Oman's English translation of this passage from *On Religion* is: "The original intuition of Christianity [...] is just the intuition of the Universal resistance of finite things to the unity of the Whole, and of the way the Deity treats this resistance. Christianity sees how He reconciles the hostility to Himself, and sets bounds to the ever-increasing alienation by scattering points here and there over the whole that are at once finite and infinite, human and divine." *On Religion*: 241.

72. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 163.

73. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 163–164.

74. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 164.

– even in feeling.⁷⁵ Schleiermacher wrote in his *Monologues*, which appeared shortly after *On Religion*:

The inner determination of [... the microcosmos world] by the universe, by virtue of which it is just that which it is, is conceived here [in the *Monologues*], by virtue of the original unity of the I with the universe, as a *pretemporal intelligent act* of free self-determination of the I, and in this it boldly opposes all influences from outside, *refusing any dependence*. The material world must serve the 'I' and, as a system of organisms as well as an extended body, must assist the 'I' in achieving its goals. Infinitely more, the 'I' experiences its spirit to be challenged by its association with other minds/spirits. However, if the resistance of nature or the unfavorable clash with other minds prevents success, the 'I' is still not dependent upon the accidental coincidence of its external circumstances. '*External circumstances do not prohibit internal agency* [because the individual is liberated by the feeling of absolute dependence above the sensuous].'⁷⁶ What denies the individual from external success, contacts, and relationships is actually modelled internally, but no less real, by *fantasy*, 'this divine power that, alone *establishes the mind's/spirit's freedom above all forces and every limitation – without this divine power [of the imagination] the human sphere is apprehensively closed in on itself*' (*Monologues*, 4th ed.: 79 f.).⁷⁷ (emphasis added)

In the *Monologues*, Schleiermacher attributes *humanity's freedom* to the 'divinely given' power of imagination that soars beyond all limitation.⁷⁸ Although he emphasizes that we should never forget that we can only think and speak of God out of the limits of our humanity and that "all of our knowledge of God is very limited, concealed, and in every respect imperfect,"⁷⁹ he appears to overlook that the same warning not to forget our limits applies to 'imagination' and 'feeling' of the natural world as much as to 'God.'

Re. 2) Absolute Feeling as ground of religion, is a symptom, not a ground:

75. It is not insignificant with respect to the acknowledgement that Strauß has a limited understanding of Kant that, thanks to Hegel, he ignores Kant's notions of 'apperception' and the 'sublime' here. See Volume II of the present project Chapter 9: "Missing Aesthetic Judgment."

76. Schleiermacher writes: "No evil that changes its action can occur to spirit" ("*Dem Geiste kann kein Übel sein, was sein Handeln nur ändert*"). "Schleiermacher und Daub" 27. Strauß cites the *Monologues*: 93 f.

77. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 26.

78. In response to criticism of the 'arrogance' of this limitless feeling on the part of the self, Schleiermacher presented a distinction between 'idea' and 'appearance' ('archetype' and 'caricature') in the Preface to later editions of the *Monologues*, and he insisted that his concern was with 'ideas' and 'archetypes,' not with 'appearances' and 'caricatures' in experience. Strauß compares this attempt at revision to the 'Explanations' that Schleiermacher later added to *On Religion* and comments: "This [...] is a perverse reinterpretation, by which the *Monologues* would become the most meaningless machinations, and which is most definitely excluded by the fact that the contemplation in the *Monologues* not infrequently admits to present deficiencies of the ego contemplating itself, as clear proof that it by no means departs from its appearing side; For such deficiencies [of the ego] cannot lie in the ideal because they are rather only the places where the appearing I has lagged behind its ideal." Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 27–28.

79. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 32–33.

Schleiermacher takes the grounding of a reality claim to consist in the substantial condition required for the experience of a set of phenomena, or a cause. It is obvious that a '*feeling*' is not a substance. Hegel and Strauß establish that a '*feeling*' is, also, not a cause but an effect so that, precisely as an effect, *feeling cannot be a 'necessary' assumption* as a condition required for the experience of a set of phenomena – in Schleiermacher's case: the required condition for the experience of 'religion'/God. I examine here Strauß' issue with feeling as a cause.

Schleiermacher claims that the *feeling of absolute dependence that is the presupposition and shaper of agency* is called 'piety.' Consequently, religion is 'subjective' feeling for Schleiermacher, not a case of 'objective' knowledge or agency.

Furthermore, piety is both 'quantitative' (that is, a degree of strength) and 'qualitative' (that is, a difference in value despite a sameness in degree).⁸⁰ Both the quantity and the quality of piety arise out of feeling to the extent that it is stronger or weaker, purer or less pure; that is, *to the degree that its 'higher consciousness' is more or less attached to sensuousness*.⁸¹

As long as both [the higher self-consciousness and the sensual] are still mixed, when sensual consciousness is significantly touched by an object, which is still limited to a narrow circle, the higher self-consciousness, that is, the absolute feeling of dependence, will be reflected as being determined by the same object.⁸²

On this basis, Schleiermacher distinguishes among religions: 'Fetish' religion arises where 'lower,' sensuous consciousness dominates. 'Polytheism' arises when 'lower,' sensuous consciousness dominates a larger collection of objects and regions but is also fused with the 'higher' consciousness in which the variety of sensuous affections shatter the feeling of absolute dependence into a multiplicity of relationships, which are not yet taken to be united in a highest origin. 'Monotheism' occurs where 'lower' self-consciousness takes up the whole sensuous world in itself, but higher consciousness, left completely free, is able to unite this sensuous multiplicity into a feeling of dependence that is absolutely identical with itself.⁸³

However, Hegel points out that "[...] that *feeling is an empty form*, which takes up various things into itself, a mental form, which can be given to any content. Everything, namely, that wants to fit together with the I as its actual, living determinateness, can only do this under the form of feeling [...]."⁸⁴

80. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 153–154.

81. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 154.

82. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 154. Are they ever consciously experienced as anything but mixed?

83. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 154. Strauß cites to Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* § 8.

84. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 152. Strauß cites to Hegel's *Werke*, Vol. 17, 296 f.

Furthermore, *because there is no beginning or end to individual feelings, even to the 'highest' feeling of absolute dependence, piety is reduced to a vague differentiation.*

Strauß comments: "Admittedly, there is always an undeveloped form of feeling in play, but in a scientific presentation, who is satisfied with feeling rather than carefully developed thinking?"⁸⁵

Strauß asks: "*Is it [...] feeling that causes this progress across religions or not far more 'thought' that works its way from the individual to plurality, from plurality to totality, and in totality arrives at unity?*"⁸⁶ Strauß points out that these different 'levels' of religion are accompanied by feeling but they are not caused by feeling – "*feeling is not religion any more than a barometer is the weather.*"⁸⁷ (emphasis added)

Re. 3) Elitism is not avoided :

Schleiermacher's defining of piety as the 'feeling of absolute dependence' above sensuousness was intended to eliminate elitism (*gnosis*) in religion – as if only those who possessed 'proper' theological knowledge or those who were morally pure were to be acknowledged as 'religious.' However, *his placing the 'feeling of absolute dependence' at the core of piety remains just as foreign to the laity as elitist philosophy and moral purity.*

Schleiermacher wrote in "Two Epistles to Dr. Lücke on my *Glaubenslehre*:" "I do not want to be a privileged one in the church, who alone among thousands knows the [true] foundation of faith."⁸⁸ Strauß comments:

This is an ambiguous formulation. It suggests that the faith of the congregation would then be a groundless one, which completely confuses the proper point. Namely, even if the congregation is not aware of its ground, the faith of the congregation in itself can be a well-founded one. The congregation has a foundation for its faith, whereas the theologian knowingly grasps it. This is the whole difference, and this difference is so far from annulling the Christian communion and essential equality between the two parts (theology and philosophy) that without the difference the concept of a theologian cannot even arise."⁸⁹

However, Schleiermacher's grounding of faith in the feeling of absolute dependence (which is supposedly not philosophy – see below) leaves him, nonetheless, alone with his 'feeling:'

The common man will always stick to believing the Christian doctrines to be true on the ground that they are written in the Bible. If, however, according to Schleiermacher, this biblical conviction is not right, but rather the foundation of the truth of Christianity lies

85. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 164–165.

86. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 154–155.

87. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 155.

88. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 174.

89. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 174–175.

in the own inner experience of each individual, then here, too, it is the theologian alone, or among the common believers only the most educated, who have the true foundation of faith.⁹⁰

Re. 4) Perfect God-consciousness and 'natural' Developmental Growth (a backdoor Logos Theology) :

Strauß points out that Schleiermacher cannot sustain the claim that the Christ's development both physically and intellectually was 'natural' like all other human beings while, simultaneously, claiming that Jesus' moral and intellectual development was quite different from all human beings.

In natural, human development "[...] knowing proceeds, as Schleiermacher very nicely explains, from ignorance through undecidedness to certainty [...]; error arises through the fact that something strange intrudes and provokes a conclusion before truth is reached [...]"⁹¹

Schleiermacher wants this notion of natural development to be applied to Jesus. For example, he writes: "[...] Jesus' gradual, natural development appears to require a gradual transition. 'It lies in the nature of the case,' it is judged, 'that a rising development of a self-consciousness must proceed to its being shared, and an end of the one [self-conscious development] and a beginning of the other [public sharing] is not to be posited' [...] That has [...] a measure of truth in it; to that extent one could distinguish the still less definite activity of Jesus, which was provoked from time to time by individual occasions, from the definite and coherent activity as it was evidently characterized by the gathering of a special circle of disciples."⁹²

Nonetheless, "[a]ccording to Schleiermacher, we must think of Jesus' own God-consciousness quite differently: 'not only his moral development [= Perfect God-consciousness] was progress without struggle, but also his intellectual development was a progress without error,'"⁹³ that is, as 'sinless'.

I will examine below the logic of this 'sinless' savior claim. However, Schleiermacher already has a problem with his claim that Jesus is the archetype of 'perfect' God-consciousness when it comes to reconciling a 'bottom up,' naturally human development with the notion of a 'sinless' Christ in possession of 'perfect' God-consciousness.

90. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 175.

91. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 66. In his *Meditations*, Descartes defined error as the application of the will without sufficient understanding. Hence, error is not a 'fault' of either understanding and willing in themselves but of application of the will where there is limited understanding. See Descartes' "Fourth Meditation" in *Meditations*: 37–38 (Page # from Latin text in the Adam and Tannery edition: 58).

92. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 72.

93. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 66.

First, Schleiermacher acknowledges that "[...] an absolute control by God-consciousness over the sensual can no more be shown in Christianity than anywhere else." However, when it comes to comparing Christianity to 'the old religions' "progress is not to be denied."⁹⁴

Second, Christianity's progress over against other religions is explained "by the collaboration of completely natural causes:"

While the question of how an archetypal man [the Christ] could ever have become actual is to remain unanswered *to the same extent as the question about every actual beginning of life generally* [McG: not to speak of any other 'essence' that 'remains the same throughout all its variations in development (see footnote 97 below), which presupposes a 'Logos'], according to Schleiermacher's assurance it is enough to say that 'it would perfectly meet the requirement of a perfect historicity of this perfect archetypal reality if from that time forward [from the historical point in time of Jesus' presence] he had developed in the same way as all others.'⁹⁵

Nonetheless,

[...] Christ is described as that man who 'as a historical, individual being was at the same time archetypal' (§. 93); or who 'was equal to all men by virtue of the uniqueness of human nature but distinguished from all by the constant strength of his God-consciousness.'⁹⁶ (emphasis added)

Strauß correctly asks:

What then happens to the archetype? [...] [I]f the archetype really develops the way everyone else does, then the archetype is doomed; but if in the course of development this should remain constant, it could not develop as in all others.⁹⁷ (emphasis added)

94. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 30.

95. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 31. Strauß cites to Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*: § 93, sec. 3.

96. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 201.

97. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 31. In footnote 37 of his translation, Laender Keck seeks to defend Schleiermacher by claiming: "Actually, an archetype which did not develop would cease to be archetypically human." Keck is contradicting Schleiermacher's own definition of an essence as what is present throughout the rise and fall of its perfection. Speaking explicitly of the 'feeling of absolute dependence,' whose arche is 'perfect God-consciousness, Schleiermacher writes: "[...] what is not the measure of the perfection of an object in its rise and fall cannot be its essence." (*Glaubenslehre*, Bd 1, §. 3, S. 12). Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 153. Keck is equating an 'archetype' with development, which is a contradiction of the definition of an archetype. Strauß writes: "'As true Idealist, Schleiermacher deuced his Christ from his subjectivity, but, although he started from the same point [as the Idealists], he derived all absolute content [*Inhalt*] encountered in the subject from the message of the existence of the external God/Man, he relapsed into ancient Church Doctrine.'" Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 176.

Strauß refers to Schleiermacher's 'logic' of dependence on an Idealistic archetype In § 65 of his, Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II. It sounds like a paraphrasing of the logic of Anselm's *Cur deus homo* for the perfect God/Man and Descartes' 'ontological proof'" of the existence of God in the Third Meditation of his *Meditations*:

I find in myself as member of the Christian community the harmonic unity of the lower self-consciousness with the higher, including my remission of sin and religious perfection in a peculiar manner at ease and commencement of a constant progress in this relief. If I search for the cause of this relief, I don't find it in myself because from myself, as far as I can tell, this harmony is only ever made more difficult; even less [do I find the cause] in someone else who is a member of the Christian community because I recognize in this other the same sense of relief; nor do I find it in the totality of the Christian community because one does not get a perfect effect from many imperfect causes: this harmony has its cause even less from outside the Christian community where it is not even encountered. *It can come only from the founder of this community, who precisely by this influence remains its constant master.*⁹⁸ (emphasis added)

Schleiermacher cannot have his cake and eat it, too. Either he can maintain a Christ who is subject to 'natural development' (from below) as is the case with all 'natural' human beings, or he has a ideal archetype that initiates (from above) a radically new beginning of spiritual development of the human species that the human species could not generate on its own any more than it can generate the physical world or its ideas out of itself.⁹⁹ If there is any teaching that is a (poisonous) fly in Schleiermacher's soup, it is the teaching of a pre-existent Christ (the Logos). In clearly a moment of cognitive dissonance, the only gospel that claims the pre-existence of Christ is Schleiermacher's favorite gospel, the Gospel of John, However, Schleiermacher rejects the teaching of a pre-existent Christ, as I point out below (see below page 216 ff).

Re. 5) Sin and Sinlessness are defined with respect to the feeling of absolute dependence :

With the 'natural' individual, one can only speak of a relative, 'more or less' of God-consciousness in the individual "[...] because in actual life both sides [God-consciousness and sensuousness] are mixed together [...]"¹⁰⁰ Therefore,

In the actual religious life of the Christian, there is either the consciousness of the inability to impose the feeling of dependence on all moments of life, i.e. to raise it to the level of the determining power of the whole human being and life; whereby the Christian experiences her-/himself as a sinner and subject to punishment and the world is experienced as filled with evil, although God is recognized as holy and just. Or consciousness prevails of

98. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 177–178.

99. Schleiermacher is no Nominalist! Were he one, though, he would again be trapped in a circular argument because the *a posteriori* 'abstraction' of a 'concept' out of a finite set of phenomena requires that the set of phenomena already be 'structured' by the 'concept' abstracted out of it.

100. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 162.

having been freed by Christ from that incapacity, as being enabled to assert the feeling of absolute dependence as a life-determining power. In this, the Christian becomes aware of himself [*sic.*] as the one redeemed, justified and *in the process of healing* by Christ, of the world as the place for the church's institution of grace, but of God as love and wisdom. However, whether the human being is more inhibited or more encouraged by this intervention (for there can only be talk of a greater or lesser degree, because in the real life of the Christian both sides are always in each other), the feeling of absolute dependence is nevertheless present in him, and he must therefore have a side which mocks indifferently this opposition of inhibition and encouragement.¹⁰¹ (emphasis added)

Schleiermacher's logic of redemption is that an imperfect effect *requires* a perfect cause, requiring a savior who possesses 'perfect God-consciousness.' Here the point is that *Schleiermacher's notion of piety results in a 'vicarious (or substitution) atonement' theory no different from Traditional Personal Theism* [Anselm's *Cur deus homo*].

Redemption, says Schleiermacher, consists in the fact that sin [imperfect God-consciousness] *is expunged from our consciousness.* Therefore, sinlessness must become visible to us in the person of Christ. Only when we appropriate his sinlessness in the most intimate fellowship with him, 'the way everything is common to friends,' will we become participants in redemption and in its fruits. This is, as Schleiermacher furthermore expresses it also as God's seeing the redeemed in Christ, only the old doctrine of the vicarious atonement, even if weakened to a mere manner of speaking.¹⁰² (emphasis added)

Re. 6) Goal: enhanced God-consciousness is not overcoming sin as 'violation of divine law'

Schleiermacher rejects 'knowledge' of divine predicates because, according to him, recognition of the feeling of absolute dependence (that is, God-consciousness as an essential and general life-element of human nature) is the fundamental assumption of piety, not knowledge of God Himself.¹⁰³

Yet, for 'natural' humanity, one can only speak of a 'more or less' of God-consciousness in the individual because in actual life both sides (God-consciousness and sensuousness) are mixed together.

In his *Glaubenslehre* § 66, Schleiermacher defines 'sin' as "all [...] that obstructs the development of God-consciousness."¹⁰⁴

"If, [...] in the soul of the Christian, consciousness of sin is never set without the consciousness of the power of redemption, then that consciousness is also never really without its complementary half [of sin] [...], which for itself represents only the state of a hopeless incapacity of the spirit prevailing outside the sphere of redemption. *This explanation of sin as an inhibition of the determining power of the spirit caused by the independence of*

101. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 161–162.

102. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 168–169. See Schleiermacher, *Glaubenslehre* II: 407.

103. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 177–178.

104. Schleiermacher, *Glaubenslehre* II: 406.

the sensual functions is well-suited for those who describe sin itself as a turning away from the Creator, but less so for those who explain sin as a transgression of the divine law."¹⁰⁵ (emphasis added)

In § 67 of his *Glaubenslehre*, Schleiermacher adds: "We are conscious of sin as the power and work of a time in which the direction toward God-consciousness had not yet emerged in us."¹⁰⁶

Strauß observes in *Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History* that for Schleiermacher:

"[... *Christ*] did not want to destroy the law, so he did not want to destroy the temple worship either. Consequently, he would have also allowed his followers to attend the temple service just as he himself participated in it." His followers would have had to be satisfied first of all with following the synagogue regulations, as they subsequently actually did; and if Christianity had made progress without the rupture with Judaism which lay in the execution of Jesus, then the temple proper in Jerusalem would also have been partly Christianized. *'The peculiar spirit of this community must have consisted in seeing the ritual, the legal, and the ceremonial as a purely national thing and in basing religion on the foundation which lay in Jesus' person.'*¹⁰⁷ (emphasis added)

Clearly, Schleiermacher's theory of atonement avoids an atoning sacrifice for violation of divine law that views salvation according to the logic of an economic exchange for God, but he's caught in a contradiction. *If salvation means the ever onward improvement of God-consciousness' dominance over sensualism*, which becomes the function of immortality in the afterlife as Schleiermacher claims, then *he is contradicting that immortality is something that one experiences in this world as the eternal in every moment* in *On Religion* as Strauß points out in "Schleiermacher und Daub."¹⁰⁸

"[...] the true nature of religion is [...] *immediate consciousness* of the Deity as He is found in ourselves and in the world. Similarly, the goal and the character of the religious life is not the immortality desired and believed in by many [...] *It is not the immortality that is outside of time, behind it, or rather after it*, and which still is in time [...] [T]he immortality which

105. Schleiermacher, *Glaubenslehre* II: 407–408.

106. Schleiermacher, *Glaubenslehre* II: 409.

107. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 109–110. Whereas Leander Keck cites to "p. 362," the German edition of Strauß' *Der Christus des Glaubens und der Jesus der Geschichte* cites these quotes as 385–387. Schleiermacher is even more emphatic in his text that Jesus had no intention of abrogating the Jewish law.

108. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub" where Strauß discusses Schleiermacher's notion of 'universal salvation': 203–204. Although in his *Glaubenslehre* II, Strauß echoes Baur's notion of the church as the body of Christ in the sense of the real, historical God/Man, not the individual, historical person, Jesus (see Baur's "Die Hegel'sche Religions-Philosophie" in *Gnosis*. 721, 734–735?!): "[...] he would have to have been an unlearned student of Schleiermacher's doctrine of faith who would not have learned from it to be content with the continued work of Christ as spirit in his congregation; indeed, who would even find conceivable the continued existence of an individual who has been detached from his historical conditions and has been uprooted par excellence." Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 736.

we can now have in this temporal life; is [...] in the midst of finitude to be one with the Infinite and in every moment to be eternal [...] ¹⁰⁹ (emphasis added)

As I examine in greater detail below, Strauß concludes the second volume of his own *Glaubenslehre* with Schleiermacher's formulation of immortality as the experience of *the eternal in every moment in this world* from Schleiermacher's *On Religion*, not (!) *the open-ended, 'natural' development of the increasing dominance of the feeling of absolute dependence over sensuousness*.

Of course, Hegel and Strauß share with Schleiermacher a *profound focus on ego-centrism* – at least the Strauß before *The Old and the New Faith* – because they all make the Christ event an event of *divinization of the individual*. In the case of Hegel and Strauß, this divinization is a form of Athanasian divinization¹¹⁰ as the achievement of Absolute Knowledge and Absolute Freedom through the negation of multiplicity and return to Absolute Unity. In the case of Schleiermacher, this divinization is a form of Arian divinization as the achievement of the same 'perfect God-consciousness' that is the Christ. Here they stand in profound contrast with Kant for whom, wherever exclusive self-interest governs one's understanding and agency, there's an undermining of the very character of moral agency, which (although one never knows) is, at least, to be consciousness of, and rein-in, one's self-interest as the sole motivation for one's agency.¹¹¹

Re. 7) An Imperfect effect does not require a Perfect cause (but this does not mean for the early Strauß rejection of all eminent causality infinite and/or finite):

In his *LJ* of 1835, Strauß agrees with Christlieb Julius Braniss' observation:

[...] that it would be contrary to the laws of all development to regard the initial member of a series as the greatest—to suppose that in Christ, the founder of [... the Christian] community, the object of which is the strengthening of the consciousness of God, the strength of this consciousness was absolute, a perfection which is rather the infinitely distant goal of the progressive development of the community founded by him.¹¹²

109. See Schleiermacher, *On Religion*: 101.

110. The first so-called first 'ecumenical council' of the Christian Church called and paid for by the Emperor Constantine, who addressed the opening session by calling himself a Bishop of the Church although he was not yet baptized, had as its core conflict the difference between Athanasian divinization (the Christian's identity with 'God the Father') or Athanasian divinization (the Christian's identity with divinity at the 'level' of the created Christ).

111. See, for example, Section Two of Kant's *Groundwork* AA IV: 407, 410–411.

112. Strauß, *LJ*: 771. Strauß does not provide a citation for Braniss' observation. Perhaps this is because Braniss proposes what Strauß thought was the crowning thesis of the *LJ*: his universal, *inclusive* Christology?!

Braniss' thesis in *Über Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre; ein kritischer Versuch* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1824) is a criticism of Schleiermacher's 'perfect God-consciousness' Christology that claims that humanity requires an archetype of 'perfect God-consciousness' (*an absolute historical starting point*) as a new creation that makes possible humanity's gaining spiritual sovereignty over sensuousness

Edgar Quinet falsely accuses Strauß of having denied eminent causality (that is, the notion that an idea can have more 'reality' than its effect).¹¹³ However, at stake with an 'absolute' or a 'relative' savior is not whether there is eminent causality but, rather, 'what is the very meaning of necessary.'

Hegel defined 'science' (*Wissenschaft*) as 'what is necessary' as opposed to what is merely empirically 'capricious, arbitrary, and chaotic.'¹¹⁴ In his *Phenomenology*, Hegel asserts: "Let the other sciences try as much as they like to get along by ratiocination or

through the feeling of absolute dependence. In contrast, knowledge and ethics are always hemmed in by nature and the material.

Braniss' Hegelian element comes from the 'Preface' of *Phänomenologie*: GW III: 24 (Baillie trans.: 80–81) where Hegel claims that Absolute Spirit is only an 'empty abstraction' without 'the seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and the labor of the negative' so that the 'truth is the whole' of history, not its merely abstract Absolute beginning and/or end (see Braniss, *op. cit.*: 172–173). Braniss adds, though, that salvation is complete only with universal salvation, but, again, given that the salvific spirit is absolutely infinite, salvation can never come to completion (see Braniss, *ibid.*: 178); order, is never achieved absolutely (*ibid.*, 186) and efforts at its realization constitute an infinite process (*ibid.*, 179).

Furthermore, Braniss agrees with Schleiermacher, that humanity's freedom is manifest only through knowledge and morality in the world, which is always relative, whereas the feeling of absolute dependence in itself is absolute and involves no development (see Braniss, *ibid.*: 188). It is always and eternally the same although it is expressed in many ways because it is inseparable from the world, according to Schleiermacher (see Braniss, *ibid.*: 188–189). Although the 'relative,' historical starting point of salvation is found in other religions, Christianity 'contains the ground for all piety,' and, as the feeling of absolute dependence that comes from God, it is the highest expression of piety (see Braniss, *ibid.*: 190).

Consequently, given that spirit is always related to the world, salvation is not independent of the world, and it, too, is subject to 'the law of development' in which nature dominates originally only to be slowly 'liberated' by freedom/Spirit. Even the 'savior' is subject to 'the law of development' (*ibid.*: 195), which governs the struggle between the limiting principle (nature) and Absolute Spirit (the feeling of absolute dependence) (*Ibid.*: 173–174). *This means for Braniss that the historical 'starting point' of salvation is (and must be) relative, not absolute (Ibid. 196).*

Braniss responds to the claim that God could initiate a historical starting point as absolute cause by saying that, if God establishes an absolute, historical starting point: "[...] a causality must be thought, to which no natural one corresponds, yes, which even runs directly contrary to the one contained in the natural context; *for an absolutely sinless development, as it is brought about in Christ, there is not only no natural causality, but all natural causality is even absolutely opposed to such. If one now accepts such a causality in God, then the extra-worldly revelation of God is admitted, whereby our whole view of a merely immanent God, completely revealing himself in the world, is completely overthrown.*" (emphasis added) Braniss, *ibid.*: 197. This is exactly Strauß' claim in the LJ that "[...] it would be contrary to the laws of all development to regard the initial member of a series as the greatest—to suppose that in Christ [...] this consciousness was absolute, a perfection which is rather the infinitely distant goal of the progressive development of the community founded by him." (emphasis added) Strauß, LJ: 771.

113. See Edgar Quinet, "Review of Strauss's 'Life of Jesus,' from the French" in *Voices of the Church in Reply to Dr. D.F. Strauss, Comprising Essays in Defence [sic.] of Christianity* (London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Col, 1845): 18.25 and Chapter 3: "Academic Controversy:" the section "A Voice out of France: Edgar Quinet's Criticism of Strauß:" 235 ff.

114. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten: GW II: 443.

raisonnement without philosophy, they are unable to keep alive without it, or to have any spiritual significance and truth in them.”¹¹⁵ What is meant here by ‘necessary’?

With the scientific Copernican Revolution, there is common agreement that ‘science’ involves more than merely opening one’s eyes and engaging solely in empirical analysis of data. Rather, ‘science’ requires ‘necessary,’ *a priori* elements. However, beyond a common agreement that the ‘necessary’ is *a priori*, opinions were divided already in the 19th C over what these ‘necessary’ *a priori* elements are.

In Strauß’ world, two options were available: Hegel and Kant. For Hegel, ‘necessity’ is an objective, causal category that is governed by the Principle of Sufficient Reason (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*), which states: ‘everything has a cause’ or ‘something cannot come from nothing.’ However, for Kant, ‘necessity’ is a category of understanding that is concerned with the required, subjective conditions of possibility for finite, transcendental consciousness (the individual and community) to be able to experience, understand, and exercise responsible agency in the world. In other words, Kant is not using ‘necessity’ as a metaphor for causal explanation of objective phenomena, as is the case with Hegel, but for those elements that are not given in objective phenomena but must be possessed by the subject for her/him to experience a world, whatsoever.

Hegel is offering a causal explanation for both empirical and metaphysical ‘reality’ metaphysical whereas Kant is offering an accounting of non-empirical elements that make possible any and all experience of empirical phenomena. In short, according to Kant, it would never occur to finite, transcendental consciousness to seek out the subjective elements of consciousness that make possible experience of a finite world were consciousness not confronted with phenomena, not of its ‘creation.’¹¹⁶ ‘Necessity’ for Kant, then, begins with the conundrum that is our very experience of phenomena, and he seeks to identify how is it that phenomena can be experienced by finite consciousness in order to properly understand and engage phenomena; whereas, for Hegel, ‘necessity’ is concerned with the causal explanation not only for finite conscious experience but for ‘all that is, will, and can be’ – regardless of whatever particular phenomena might occur.

When Hegel speaks of the *a priori* that is ‘science’ (knowledge), he is speaking about cause and, above all, the ultimate cause of Absolute Unity, Absolute Identity, Absolute Knowledge, and Absolute Freedom that explains from where multiplicity, fragmented subjectivity, relative knowledge, and comparative freedom come.¹¹⁷ The

115. Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 63 (Baillie trans.: 125.

116. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 863. See as well, *ibid.* B xxxix* and *Prolegomena* (AA IV: 293).

117. Hegel claims that “[...] the Concept [...], without the variety of perception, is empty and without content, although it is *a priori* a synthesis. Because it is this, it has determination and difference in itself. As the determinateness of the Concept, absolute determinateness, the uniqueness, the Concept is the basis and source of all finite determinateness and multiplicity” (*Wissenschaft der Logik* II [1832]

finite originates in the infinite by an initial negation of unity, and the finite returns to the infinite by a second negation of multiplicity in finite consciousness.

Schleiermacher and Strauß, the latter at least until 1841, share with Hegel the teaching as old as Aristotle that wisdom consists of knowing the cause.¹¹⁸ All three take the notion of 'necessity' to be a causal category. Hegel takes God to be the ultimate, necessary causal explanation of multiplicity, fragmented subjectivity, relative knowledge, and comparative freedom, generally. Because these finite elements cannot create themselves, their cause must be an Absolute Oneness compatible with a reality that is a unified totality. Just as finite spirit, as a cause that is 'greater' than the efficient causality of nature itself, is able to create things that nature on its own cannot, so, too, God as the 'eminent' causality of infinite Spirit 'necessarily' creates not only finite spirit but all of finite reality. Otherwise, 'something would come from 'nothing,' which is *logically* impossible, according to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*).

Schleiermacher, in contrast, insists that finite consciousness is incapable of knowing what God is and does. All that finite consciousness can experience and know about anything ultimate is confined to what finite consciousness experiences. What consciousness experiences of the infinite and eternal is a 'feeling of absolute dependence' that is more or less capable of gaining sovereignty over sensuousness. Necessary causality comes into play for Schleiermacher, then, only with respect to finite God-consciousness. In order for finite God-consciousness to be capable of 'perfect' God-consciousness, which is Schleiermacher's definition of salvation, it requires a cause that is 'greater' than finite God-consciousness. Schleiermacher identifies this infinite 'eminent' cause in the particular, historical Christ who establishes a 'new

GW VI: 261); and Hegel claims that the I and the Concept (One) are an *a priori* unity: "That I am the One and that I am active as thinking, setting unity, is, however, not so precisely stated in Kant. That which thinking produces is unity; thus, it produces itself, for it is the One [the Concept]. (The unity can also be called relation; insofar as a manifold is presupposed and this remains on one side as manifold, it is called related). This is transcendental apperception; *the pure apperception of self-consciousness is the synthesizing function.*" *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* GW XX: 344 This is not Kant's *apperception* of finite consciousness. See, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 132, which requires empirical consciousness: *ibid.*: B 133. Rather, Hegel's 'I' here is Absolute Spirit. Absolute Spirit is the Absolute Unity of the 'divisible I' that is mental ideality (*Idee*) over against perceptible phenomena'. Perceptible phenomena are the 'unreasonable many' of the 'divisible non-I' that is empirical actuality (*Realität*). See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten:" GW II: 455–456.

118. Aristotle's *Metaphysics* begins: "All men (*sic.*) by nature want to know." (980a 21) He adds: "[...] [M]en (*sic.*) of experience know that the thing is so, but do not know why, while the others know the 'why' and the cause." (981a 29–31) Aristotle concludes that wisdom has to do with first causes and the first principles of explanation: "[...] so that [...] the man (*sic.*) of experience is deemed to be wiser than those who merely sense things, the artist more than men (*sic.*) of experience, and the master worker more than the manual workers. Thus, *wisdom is thought to consist in theoretical rather than in productive kinds of knowledge.* Clearly, then, wisdom is rational knowledge concerning certain basic factors and causes. (emphasis added) (981b 27 – 128a 1)

ontological condition,¹¹⁹ that is, 'perfect' God-consciousness as the ground for the liberation of finite God-consciousness from sensuousness:

'If science must admit the possibility that even today matter could conglomerate and begin to rotate in limitless space, then it must also concede that there is an appearance in the realm of spiritual life which likewise *we can only explain as a new creation, as the pure beginning of a higher spiritual life-development*.¹²⁰ (emphasis added)

Strauß points out: "In [Schleiermacher's] *The Christian Faith* [*Glaubenslehre*] this view is traced back to the statement that in general 'the beginning of life is never to be understood.'¹²¹

*Strauß acknowledges¹²² that the logic of 'ultimate,' eminent causality applies to 'the origin of the heavenly spheres, the emergence of the organic from the inorganic, and the beginning of the human race.'*¹²³ However, *once the human race has been created,, Strauß adds, "[...] whatever emerged further within the human race was a development either more sudden or gradual, and in any case natural;* and this development did not involve the appearance somewhere of an absolutely new thing any more than it did the appearance of an absolutely higher or perfect one."¹²⁴ (emphasis added) *Progress in the spiritual development of humanity "[...] is explained by the collaboration of completely natural causes* [that is, 'formal,' efficient causality]:"¹²⁵ (emphasis added) *What Strauß*

119. In Christ perfect God-consciousness was achieved. See Strauß, *LJ*: 770. Rather, Strauß observes in agreement with Braniss that "perfection [...] is [...] the infinitely distant goal of the progressive development of the community founded by him [the Christ]." Strauß, *LJ*: 771 See as well, Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 30–31.

120. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 29. Strauß is citing Schleiermacher's "Dr. Schleiermacher über seine Glaubenslehre an Herrn Dr. Lücke, Zwei Sendschreiben," *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, III (1829): 495.

121. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 30. Strauß footnotes here (note 34) to Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*, par. 93 sec. 3 and Schleiermacher's sermon "Dass der Erlöser als Sohn Gottes geboren ist," *Schleiermachers Predigten*, Sammlung 5, *Festpredigten* 1 (1826): 92.

122. However, he doesn't acknowledge that it rests upon an anthropomorphic analogy to human creativity and the 'logic' of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (*Satz zum zureichenden Grund*).

123. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 30.

124. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 30. Kant had stressed this distinction between a cause at the beginning of a sequence and a cause that arises within a sequence. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 446*, B 447, B 580, B 584. Of the two kinds of freedom (at the beginning of a sequence and emerging within a sequence of events), autonomous freedom arises within the sequence of events. See B 589.

125. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 30. It cannot be overlooked at this point, though, that Strauß ignores the *finite*, eminent causality of *autonomous freedom* at the core of Kant's understanding of reason.

It should not be overlooked, either, that in his *The Old and the New Faith*, Strauß himself, while acknowledging the ambiguities involved, insists that material nature '*must*' be able to generate organic and sentient beings. Strauß, too, is arguing from 'effects insufficient to be explained by themselves' by insisting that 'an ultimate finite cause *within* nature' *must be capable* of generating them. See Strauß, § 52 *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 169–171. Furthermore, here with respect to an absence of explanation

unequivocally rejects is the need for a 'new beginning' within the natural order that would be caused by a 'new act of creation' by an ultimate, eminent causality:

[...] *we need not assume the presence of an absolute in a [religious] initiator of a community in which [her/his] effects are only relative.* Since [sic.] it is widely recognized that Schleiermacher constructs his concept of Christ only by means of a conclusion traced back from the effect to the cause, he has no right to posit more in the latter than he can demonstrate in the former.¹²⁶ (emphasis added) [McG modified translation]

Note, though, that Strauß is not denying the reality of an 'ultimate,' eminent causality, whatsoever! Until 1841, he shares the logic of 'ultimate,' eminent causality with Hegel when it comes to ultimate origins (that is, creation). What Strauß denies with respect to an 'ultimate,' eminent causality is that it is required to introduce a new causal sequence not already present in the *imperfect* natural order to achieve 'its' *perfect* purposes. Strauß' point here is one that he shares with Braniss:¹²⁷ Progress in

for the organic/sentient, Strauß implicitly is employing Schleiermacher's strategy of simply ignoring a conundrum (e.g., John's pre-existent Christ or Jesus' failure to correct misunderstandings of the disciples). Strauß had already earlier insisted that 'the laws of nature are sufficient to produce all things' (see "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 169). However, the inconvenient truth of this dictum (*Machtspruch*) is that it commits Strauß to material determinism over which he remains silent, whereas Schleiermacher commits himself to a deceiving Christ by the Christ's remaining silent over things not asked of him. To be sure, Strauß is arguing by the logic of 'Intellectualism' (the laws of nature cannot be violated), whereas Schleiermacher is employing 'Voluntarism'/'Occasionalism' (God's will precedes 'His' eternal thoughts) to ignore the laws of nature for the sake of defense of a perfect God-consciousness. However, they both are overlooking a 'gap' in their respective, causal explanations. What both Schleiermacher and Strauß fail to grasp is that theoretical reason requires *a priori* synthetic judgment, which must *add* to perceived phenomena elements that cannot be given in the phenomena *if there is to be understanding*. In other words, in this case Schleiermacher and Strauß offer *inadequate causal explanations* of effects by appealing to the 'logic' of causal explanation rather than to the 'necessary conditions of possibility' required as *a set of assumptions for understanding*.

126. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 30. See as well, Strauß' *Glaubenslehre* where Strauß writes: "I [referring to the 'believer'] experience Christ as the promoter of the unity of my lower with my higher self-consciousness or promoter of my piety. – *Tant mieux pour vous* [That's nice for you!] – This cannot come from me myself. – Why not? – Because only restraints in my religious life come from me. How do you know that, you modern 'I'? The old faith, of course, knew how it knew because it can know nothing true and nothing good can come from the 'I,' which it knows out of the fundamental presupposition of the alienation and externalization of its spirit. However, with your self-certain and powerful modern 'I,' who gives it the means to make such a separation on the basis of pure psychology?" *Glaubenslehre* II: 181 Strauß then adds that Schleiermacher's Christology is 'built on sand': "[...] [T]his is no more than saying that: [the possibility of a sinless human development] must be possible because [in Jesus] it really occurred [McG: an example of the Ought/Is Fallacy]. Acceptance of this actuality, though, depends according to Schleiermacher on the supposed necessity for the explanation of the internal experience of the Christian [...], which as we saw above is the sole basis for the sinlessness of Jesus. This is indefensible. Furthermore, because Schleiermacher's entire Christology depends upon this necessity [for explaining the internal experience of the Christian], it is built on sand [...]." *Glaubenslehre* II: 193.

127. See above: 277, n. 112.

the development of God-consciousness or the dominance of the 'feeling of absolute dependence' in the life of the individual is sufficiently 'explained' by 'formal' efficient causality: the capacity of the feeling of absolute dependence already exists and only needs encouragement for its development. This encouragement, according to even Schleiermacher, comes from the Christian community as the location for the cultivation of the feeling of absolute dependence.¹²⁸

For his part, Kant places judgments of causal explanation within the limits of transcendental consciousness under the categories of the understanding, and he rejects the logic of 'ultimate' eminent causality on the basis of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*) as "a merely random groping, and, what is worst of all, a groping among mere concepts."¹²⁹ In the "First Preface" to *Critique of Pure Reason*, he says:

[...] the chief question is always simply this: – what and how much can the understanding and reason know apart from all experience? Not: – how is the ultimate cause of the faculty of thought itself possible? The latter is [...] the search for the cause of a given effect, and to that extent is [...] hypothetical in character [...]¹³⁰

He famously adds in the "Second Preface:" "[...] I have [...] found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith."¹³¹ As if presciently anticipating Hegel, Kant writes in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* of the deception of the dove that thinks that it can fly in a vacuum:

[...] once we are outside the circle of experience, we can be sure of not being contradicted by experience [...] Misled by [...] proof of the power of reason, the demand for the extension of knowledge recognizes no limits. *The light dove, clearing the air in her free flight, and feeling its resistance, might imagine that its flight would be still easier in empty space.* It was thus that Plato left the world of the senses, as setting too narrow limits to the understanding, and ventured out beyond it on the wings of the ideas, in the empty space of the pure understanding. He did not observe that with all his efforts he made no advance—meeting no resistance that might, as it were, serve as a support upon which he could take a stand, to which he could apply his powers, and so set his understanding in motion. It is, indeed, the common fate of human reason to complete its speculative structures as speedily as may be, and only afterwards to enquire whether the foundations are reliable. All sorts of excuses will then be appealed to, in order to reassure us of their solidity [...].¹³² (emphasis added)

128. See Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 168.

129. Kant, "Second Preface" of the *Critique of Pure Reason* B xv.

130. Kant, "First Preface" of the *Critique of Pure Reason* A xvii.

131. Kant, "Second Preface" of the *Critique of Pure Reason* B xxx.

132. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 8–9. See as well, Kant's *Groundwork* AA IV: 462.

Kant is underscoring here the danger of ‘empty abstractions’ that come with fanciful *a priori*, metaphysical fancies. Ironically, Hegel and Strauß, misunderstanding Kant, accuse him of such ‘empty abstractions.’

Defense of both Faith and Science: (‘Mediating’ Theology)

Ferdinand Christian Baur’s *Die christliche Gnosis* appeared in 1835, in the same year as Strauß’ *Life of Jesus Critically Examined* (*LJ*). In his *Life of Jesus Critically Examined*, Strauß cites Baur’s text in his first edition of the *LJ* (1835) along with other reviewers who point out Schleiermacher’s ‘self-deception’ with his claim that he defended Church teaching ‘from mutilation’ and left science ‘unoffended.’¹³³ The examination of the grounds for Schleiermacher’s self-deception is the core thesis of Strauß’ *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History* published 30 years later in which Strauß, presupposing the issues already raised in “Schleiermacher und Daub” in 1839, engages Schleiermacher systematically, once again. However, in the *LJ*, Strauß had already written of Schleiermacher’s *The Christian Faith* [*Glaubenslehre*]:

This [Schleiermacher’s] Christology is undeniably a beautiful effort of thought, and as we shall presently see, does the utmost towards rendering the union of the divine and the human in Christ conceivable; but if its author supposed that he kept the faith unmutated and science unoffended,¹³⁴ we are compelled to pronounce that he was in both points deceived.¹³⁵

133. Strauß wrote: “This opinion has been already put forth in the most noted reviews of Schleiermacher’s system; comp. [Christlieb Julius] Braniss, *über Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre*; [Johann Heinrich Theodor] Schmid, *Über Schl. Glaubensl.* S. 263 ff.; [F.C.] Baur, *die christl. Gnosis*, s. 626 ff., and the Review of [Johann Karl Friedrich] Rosenkranz, *Jahrb. Für wiss. Kritik*, 1831.” Strauß, *LJ*, first edition: 714, n. 4; Eliott trans.: 770, n. 3.

134. In *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*, Strauß refers to faith and science as Schleiermacher’s “two foci of his [...] ellipse” and observes: “[...] [T]he most ardent devout feeling must be harmonizable with the most analytic mind; the only question is that of how the balance is to be achieved.

Here [...] commences that reciprocal ‘tuning,’ in which everything depends on the middle line which defines the limits of one force against the other [faith and science]. We have seen already what we will see again at all points of our examination, that with Schleiermacher this line gives piety the advantage and science the disadvantage.” (emphasis added) (*The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 34.

135. Strauß, *LJ*: 770. See the footnote to Braniss, Schmid, Baur, and Rosenkranz in *ibid.*: 770, n. 3. In *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*, Strauß observes of Schleiermacher: The contradiction between Schleiermacher’s faith in Jesus’ absolute God-consciousness and his desire to prove exegetically the scientific basis of his faith “[...] lay so deep [...] that [...] it never entered his consciousness.” (33) I will point out that the same can be said of Hegel and the Strauß of the *LJ*.

Strauß states in the "Foreword" to *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History* that his task now is to "[...] deliver the proof in detail."¹³⁶

Schleiermacher's Christ is as little a real man as is the Christ of the church. By means of a truly critical treatment of the Gospels one reaches Schleiermacher's Christ as little as he does the church's Christ. The illusion, which is supported primarily by Schleiermacher's explanations, that Jesus could have been a man in the full sense and still as a single person stand above the whole of humanity, is the chain which still blocks the harbor of Christian theology against the open sea of rational science. *To break this chain is the purpose of the present work, as it has always been of all my theological writings.*¹³⁷ (emphasis added)

Strauß quotes from a letter that Schleiermacher wrote to Jacobi in 1819: "My philosophy [...] and my dogmatics are firmly committed not to contradict each other; but for just this reason *neither will ever be complete*, and as long as I can recall, they have mutually affected one another and gradually approached each other."¹³⁸ (emphasis added) There are two aspects to Schleiermacher's claim: 1) Schleiermacher's insistence that science does not contradict faith; and 2) Schleiermacher's claim that neither science nor faith 'will ever be complete,' which he offers as the explanation for why both are mutually compatible.

Strauß flags the dogmatic character of Schleiermacher's assumption that "[...] science and Christian faith cannot and may not contradict each other"¹³⁹, but even Strauß fails to question Schleiermacher's faulty logic, which claims that, because humanity's theoretical and practical reason are limited (and will always be limited), science and faith do not, ultimately, contradict one another or, at least, are not incompatible with one another. However, *the contradiction/incompatibility between science and faith does not depend upon empirical evidence alone but, precisely, upon their respective, ultimate presuppositions.*

Supernaturalism's Personal God, who is able to intervene in the lawful order of physical events, and science's materialism are contradictory/incompatible because, when it comes to ultimate causality, their presuppositions are mutually exclusive. *The limits to theoretical and practical reason do not justify a reconciliation of Supernaturalism and materialism simply by means of acknowledging humanity's inability to prove absolute causal explanations to events.* Merely because causal explanations (NOT the creation of causes) are constructions based on the effects of causality, with the actual cause always remaining inaccessible to direct perception, is *no justification for throwing the barn doors wide open for any and all causal explanations.* Rather, religion (Supernaturalism) and science (Reductionist Materialism) are mutually exclusive because the first assumes a form of causality (miracles) that the second cannot allow, and

136. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 5.

137. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 5.

138. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 21.

139. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 21.

the second assumes a form of causality (Reductionist Materialism) that is as much a blind determinism as Supernaturalism's double predestination.

Strauß is correct to point out Schleiermacher's 'self-deception' with respect to his claim that religion and science don't contradict one another. However, remarkably, in *Der alte und der neue Glaube* of 1872, Strauß employs the logic of 'incomplete understanding' to justify, his own, personal conviction that the 'organic' unequivocally 'must' arise naturally out of the 'inorganic.'¹⁴⁰ Schleiermacher and Strauß both would have been on more 'solid ground' had they recognized that the limits to reason, to be sure, raise doubts about any ultimate causal claims that drive Absolute Idealism, Schleiermacher's 'Feeling of Absolute Dependence,' or Reductionist Materialism. Nonetheless, paradoxically, *the very limits to finite reason illuminate a necessity* (but no causal necessity) *that provides a foundation to finite reason that is unshakeable although unprovable.*

Imperceptible, finite, transcendental reason (not limited to instrumental reason) 'must' possess a set of finite, necessary capacities that make it possible for it to experience phenomena as it does. This is not the causal necessity of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*: everything must have a cause or else 'something can come from nothing'), which can only lead one to a dictum (*Machtspruch*) with respect to some ultimate cause. Rather, it is a necessity required by finite experience itself. If humanity did not possess certain rational (transcendental) conditions of possibility, there can be no experience, understanding, or responsible agency, whatsoever – even though those rational conditions of possibility are incapable of establishing their absolute certainty by means of an ultimate, causal proof/disproof. Here *the limits to reason 'ground' convictions with respect to finite capacities whereas for Schleiermacher and the later Strauß the limits to reason are invoked to justify belief in (granted, contradictory) ultimate, causal explanations*: Schleiermacher's Feeling of Absolute Dependence and Perfect God-consciousness stands in contrast to Strauß' 'materialism' in *Der alte und der neue Glaube*, when it comes to content, but they are equivalent when it comes to a dictum (*Machtspruch*).

On Schleiermacher's 'Subjectivity' and Hegel's 'Objectivity': A shared Theology of 'Empty Abstractions' with Differences in Christology

Strauß viewed Schleiermacher and Hegel, in a core respect, to have ended up trapped in 'empty abstractions,' the very charge that Hegel, Strauß, and F.C. Baur had leveled

140. See Strauß, § 52 *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 169–171. As I point out in Chapter 8: "Strauß' Reading of Kant Over His Career:" 845, n. 153, though, Strauß is following Feuerbach here. From the Kantian perspective, though, Traditional Personal Theism, the 'new speculative philosophy,' and Strauß'/Feuerbach's materialism all succumb to a logical, μεταβάσις εἰς ἄλλο γένος (a substitution of one genus for another) that takes a description to be a causal explanation.

against Kant. Whereas the sequence to this conclusion is traceable in Strauß' work, I claim that the charge that it is a distortion to maintain that Kant's transcendental reason is only a system of 'empty abstractions'. This reinforces the general thesis of this two volume project. As important as Strauß' Gospel Criticism and internal criticism of Church History was, the significance of his position in the mid-19th C neck of the hour glass is that he allows a sorting out of the gnarled metaphysical threads, which continue to shape 21st C understanding of metaphysics. Specifically, Strauß' understanding of Kant was, unfortunately, profoundly warped by the interpretations of others who were part of the anti-Kantian and anti-Enlightenment movement at the beginning of the 19th C. Because Strauß never engaged in anything like a serious study of Kant equivalent, for example, to his reading of Baur, Schleiermacher, and Hegel, Strauß had no genuine alternative to his Hegelianism other than dogmatic embracing of an 'ought'/'is' dictum (*Machtspruch*) with respect to ultimate causality ('Materialism') as he rejected Hegel's (Absolute Knowledge of Spirit and Schleiermacher's Perfect God-Consciousness (immortality as infinite perfection in the midst of the finite imperfection)).

Strauß claims that Schleiermacher's *Christology* is 'subjectively' grounded in 'empty abstractions'.¹⁴¹ Until 1841, Strauß agrees¹⁴² with F.C. Baur that Hegel's Philosophy of Religion presents a *Christology* that is 'objectively' grounded in 'concrete representations'.¹⁴³

Strauß' 1865 *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History* emphasizes the 'empty abstraction' of Schleiermacher's grounding his *theological system with his 'top-down,' Christology* of Perfect God-consciousness.¹⁴⁴ With respect to Hegel, Strauß wrote of Hegel's Trinity as superstitious, 'Gnostic' speculation already in 1841:

Three persons, expressly determined as 'I's' standing opposite each other, as different centers of consciousness, shall nevertheless be absolute. Two such persons shall unite in a third, likewise person, to form a unity, which is more than mere unity. One person, an absolute one at that, shall for a time lose Itself, become impersonal, divide into an

141. See for example, Strauß' *LJ*, where he speaks of Schleiermacher: "We should thus have fallen back again to Kant's point of view, which we have[...] found unsatisfactory: for *if the idea have no corresponding reality, it is an empty obligation and ideal*." *LJ*: 779 (emphasis added) and Strauß' *Streitschriften* III: 100.

142. See for example, Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 523 where Strauß writes: "[...] the speculation of our day [Hegelianism] is not that God is merely general substance [...] but He is the eternal movement of the constant making of subjectivity by the universal, which only occurs in the subject as objectivity and true actuality, and, thereby, nullifies the subject in its abstract for-itself." However, Strauß is careful to emphasize that, for Hegel, the 'objective' moment of a God/Man is *a matter of belief*, neither the self-knowledge of an individual that s/he is the God/Man (*Glaubenslehre* II: 218–219) or that the God/Man has objectively appeared in history as a particular individual at a specific location and time. See Strauß' *Streitschriften* III: 91–92.

143. On Baur's conclusions regarding Schleiermacher's 'subjectivity' and Hegel's 'objectivity,' see *Gnosis*: 668.

144. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 27, 32. See as well, *ibid.*, 169.

endless multitude of endless personalities, like a potato stick into tubers, but after a certain period of time shall regain its personality. Whereby then, without ceasing to be many, and each for itself, the creaturely personalities that have arisen in the interim shall merge into the One Personality of the divine spirit. – Where is the *Symbolum Quicunque* [the ‘*Athanasian Creed*’: “God became man that man might become God”]? Give it to me! I want to swear it twice, before I call the sentences of our philosopher only once differently than superstitions.”¹⁴⁵

In *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History* twenty-plus years later, Strauß makes the same kind of dismissive comment with respect to Schleiermacher’s Christ as ‘sinless archetype.’

A sinless, archetypal Christ is not one whit less unthinkable than a supernaturally begotten Christ with a divine and a human nature. On the contrary, since [*sic.*] he appears on the basis of a world view [science] which otherwise excludes miracles or uncaused effects, a further contradiction clings to him from which the church’s Christology, which presupposes belief in miracles, is free.¹⁴⁶

Schleiermacher’s Christology insists that Christ’s humanity was the ‘maximum,’ perfect and sinless, God-consciousness as the necessary condition [according to the Principle of Sufficient Reason!] for stimulating an infinite progress towards God-consciousness by even the most ‘minimum’ God-consciousness of humanity.¹⁴⁷ In other words, Schleiermacher formulates this Christ as ‘sinless archetype’ “[...] as the pure beginning of a higher spiritual life-development.”¹⁴⁸

In contrast to Schleiermacher’s Christology, Hegel’s locates the ‘Christ event’ beyond history in *the belief of the community* (experienced by faith in the resurrection, not in experience of an historical individual¹⁴⁹) that, as the God/Man, Christ was the Second Negation of return to Absolute Spirit. To be sure, the Hegelians developed Hegel’s formulation in the form of a spectrum from a Right-Wing exclusive Christology limited to the historical individual, Jesus, over a ‘Centrist’ position by which

145. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 501. On the grounds for Strauß’ exasperation, see Theodore Parker’s presentation of the Right-wing Hegelian, Bruno Bauer’s melancholic meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit from his review of Strauß’ *LJ*: 70, n. 1.

146. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 29.

147. See Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 25–26, 63–64. According to Schleiermacher, Christ’s moral and intellectual life, nonetheless, involves a ‘progress’ that is ‘without struggle’ and ‘error’ (*ibid.*, 66) although Schleiermacher writes: “I can conceive of no moment when the relation between God and Christ would be changed; it must always be the same, and the unity with the Father can never have been destroyed [...]” (*ibid.*, 124) Surely, this is a curious ‘progress’ that is always the same and occurs without struggle and error!

148. Strauß quotes from “Aus Schleiermachers Leben in Briefen 2:343 in *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 29. See Schleiermacher’s *Glaubenslehre* §§ 98 and 109.

149. See Strauß, *Streitschriften* III: 80, 92–94.

Christ frees humanity from its evil will by restoring humanity's true essence,¹⁵⁰ to the Left-Wing, inclusive Christology that viewed those (few) philosophers having received the outpouring of Spirit,¹⁵¹ among the God/*men*. F.C. Baur maintained that the Hegelians only went half-way with their various Christologies. Baur asks:

What interest could [...] the Hegelian philosophy of religion have, to equate a form [a representation, not an 'idea'] (which it can consider from its point of view only as one offered by the need of sensual certainty¹⁵²) with the truth itself? If for [...]Hegelian philosophy], with good reason, faith is already a transformation of the sensually given into the spiritual, *why should it stop halfway*, and not continue this process of transformation until everything that can be distinguished as mere form [*Form*/representations] from content [*Inhalt*/Idea] is eliminated from the pure content of the Idea, and form and content finally merge into one another?¹⁵³ (emphasis added)

Baur's response to his rhetorical question is that Hegel and the Hegelians have incorrectly understood the meaning of the God/Man. According to Baur, the Incarnation is not limited to the options of a particular individual located at a specific point in time in Galilee (Supernaturalism), a post-resurrection *belief* in the Christ as 'the' God/Man (Hegel), or even to an inclusive group of philosophers (Left-Wing Hegelians), who, unlike the Supernaturalists, have grasped the notion of the Second Negation. Rather, Baur takes Paul's claim that the church is the 'body' of Christ (, I Corinthians 12:12 ff., Ephesians 3: 3–6, and Colossians 3:24–28) to mean that the 'historical' God/Man refers not to a single individual or limited set of individuals but to that growing number of those who grasp the significance of Absolute Spirit in finite spirit over the entire course of history that is the Christian Church (*Gemeinde*).¹⁵⁴

To be sure, Schleiermacher and the Hegelians are different with respect to their Christologies.¹⁵⁵ However, they are united in their ultimate conception of the 'divinization' of humanity. The difference in conception of this divinization is as follows: For Schleiermacher, the achievement of God-consciousness is *analogous to Arius'*

150. On 'Right-Wing' Hegelianism, see Strauß, "Verschiedene Richtungen innerhalb der Hegel'schen Schule in Betreff der Christologie" in *Streitschriften* III: 105–106, 116.118 and on 'Centrist' Hegelianism, occupied in Strauß' judgment only by Karl Rosenkranz, see *ibid.*: 120.

151. On the 'outpouring' (*Ausgießung*) of the Spirit in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, see Baur, "Die Hegel'sche Religions-Philosophie" ["Hegel's Philosophy of Religion"] in *Gnosis*: 696, 712, 714.

152. Baur here is referring to the Hegelian insistence that 'form' (representations) is what confirm that one's ideas (content) are not merely empty abstractions.

153. Baur, "Die Hegel'sche Religions-Philosophie" in *Gnosis*: 719.

154. See Baur, *Gnosis*: especially, 721 but also 685, 696, and 734–736. To the 'left' of Baur, though, is Strauß with his universally, inclusive Christology that is not limited to the Christian *Gemeinde*. In his *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*, Baur indicates his commonality with Schleiermacher when it comes to emphasizing the centrality of the Christian community (*Gemeinde*) for understanding the 'body of Christ'. See Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 618 and, especially, 625.

155. Baur observes the same in "Die Hegel'sche Religions-Philosophie:" "Hegel's ideal Christ is no longer the archetype of Schleiermacher's *The Christian Faith* but has as its truth the pure Idea ['reine Idee'], the unification of finite and finite and absolute Spirit." *Gnosis*: 720–721.

conception of the Christian as united with the Christ, not directly with the God-head. Schleiermacher rejected the notion of the pre-existent Logos for conceiving the Christ,¹⁵⁶ but the principle of unification is the same: creatureliness is preserved, and it is shared creatureliness with the Christ that the Christian can experience, not a direct union with God that characterizes Arianism ("There was a time when the Son was not."). For Hegel, the achievement of God-consciousness is *analogous to Athanasius*.¹⁵⁷ Finite spirit is re-united with Absolute Spirit: creatureliness with all of its attachments to sensuousness is snuffed out ("God became man that man might become God.").

The conclusion that Schleiermacher and Hegel share a rootedness in 'empty abstractions' just might have its origin for Strauß in Baur, as well,¹⁵⁷ for Baur in *Gnosticism* had not only distinguished between the Christologies but also identified a core agreement between Schleiermacher and Hegel.¹⁵⁸ Eduard Zeller, Baur's son-in-law, claims, as well, that Baur viewed Schleiermacher's notion of the "Feeling of Absolute Dependence" to be nothing essentially different from Hegel's Absolute Spirit.¹⁵⁹ I will address below Hegel's criticism of Schleiermacher's grounding of religion in 'feeling.'

Theobald Ziegler, Strauß' biographer, wrote:

By translating the concept of the universe into religious experience by means of the feeling of absolute dependence, [... Strauß] connects Schleiermacher with Hegel and thereby gains a concept of religion [...]
 [...] [F]or Schleiermacher as well as for Hegel, it is indeed correct [for both] that Spirit belongs to the universe and that the universe [...] in the end and foremost refers to the spirit realm, out of whose chalice Absolute Spirit infinitely foams, [...]¹⁶⁰

156. See Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 60–61, 62–63, 75. In his *Glaubenslehre* § 14, Schleiermacher refers to John 1:12–14, but there is no mention of John 1:1–5 in his *Glaubenslehre* § 14 in *Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt*. Zweite Auflage (1830/31), Rolf Schäfer ed. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008): 116, n. 3.

157. On Baur's conclusions regarding Schleiermacher's 'subjectivity' and Hegel's 'objectivity,' see *Gnosis*: 668. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 22 and 207–208.

158. In his *Gnosis* Baur personally argues for equating Hegel and Schleiermacher. "Belief in the immutability of the union of the divine essence with human nature in the person of Christ [Hegel] is, therefore, itself nothing else than the belief that the consciousness through which Christ has become God in human nature [Schleiermacher] will always remain the consciousness of humanity [Baur's Christology], which is *quite the same as the Hegelian claim* that the consciousness of God is always a God-human one, and therefore also the congregation of subjects being in the spirit of God is an eternally progressing one." (emphasis added) 706, n. 30 (actually 709–710) Baur emphasizes that in Hegel one has the same transition from the sensuous to the spiritual that is found in ancient Gnosticism and in Schleiermacher's *The Christian Faith*. See *Gnosis*: 713. What distinguishes Hegel from ancient Christian Gnosticism and Schleiermacher, according to Baur, is that Hegel locates this transition only within the emergence of faith generated by the death of the Christ whereas ancient Gnosticism and Schleiermacher claim, in harmony with populous Church teaching, that the God/Man as a combination of pure spirit and historical person has already occurred in the historical life of Jesus. See *Gnosis*: 713–714.

159. See Eduard Zeller, "Ferdinand Christian Baur" in *Vorträge und Abhandlungen*, Erste Sammlung und Zweite Auflage (Leipzig: Fues's Verlag [R. Reisland], 1875): 398, 431.

160. Ziegler, II: 690–691.

Furthermore, Strauß' criticism of Schleiermacher's invoking of a perfect/absolute, ultimate, efficient causality as the ultimate religious moment of his Christology is implicitly a criticism of Hegel's Absolute Spirit. Both Schleiermacher and Hegel employ the fallacious logic that an imperfect effect requires a perfect cause. Strauß writes of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* that it has really but a single dogma, that concerning the person of Christ. However, this single dogma of faith turns out to be indefensible exegetically and scientifically.

"[...] the positive element [...] lies only in what it [Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*] advances about the person of Christ [...] That *Christ was a man in the full sense* of the word, as today's mentality desires, *and at the same time*, as traditional piety wishes, can be *a divine redeemer, the object of our faith and of our cultus for all times* [...]"¹⁶¹ (emphasis added)

The tip that Strauß also has Hegel in mind here is that, in *Pamphlet III* of the *Streitschriften* of 1837, Strauß quotes Hegel to be concerned, ultimately as well, with the single doctrine of the person of Christ. The center point of "the gospel story" (and all of history) is the incarnation of the God/Man. Strauß quotes Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*:

"This incarnation of the Divine Being, its having essentially and directly the shape of self-consciousness, is the simple content [*Inhalt*] of [Hegel's] *Absolute Religion*.¹⁶² That Absolute Spirit has taken on the shape of self-consciousness inherently, and therefore also consciously for Itself—this appears (historically) [Strauß inserted 'historically'] now as the belief of the world, the belief that spirit exists in fact as a definite self-consciousness [...], i.e. as an actual human being; that spirit is an object for immediate experience; that the believing mind sees, feels, and hears this divinity. Taken thus, it is not imagination, not a fancy; it is actual [*wirklich*] in the believer."¹⁶³ (emphasis added)

Strauß proposes in the *LJ* of 1835 and in his *Streitschriften* of 1837 that Hegel's speculative metaphysics provides the 'true' content [*Inhalt*] of Church Doctrine and that this 'true' content as Absolute Spirit is capable of experiencing Itself in finite, human spirit. As I've stressed, this claim for the God/Man based on the difference between 'true'

161. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 4–5.

162. Strauß cites this as a single passage when, in fact, it is two passages. This opening sentence comes from Hegel's *Phänomenologie*: GW III: 552 (Baillie trans.: 758) whereas the remainder of this quote comes a page earlier: GW III: 551 (Baillie trans.: 757). Strauß has not distorted the meaning of the passages, though.

163. Strauß, "Hegel's Perspective on the Historical Value of Gospel History" ["Hegel's Ansicht über den historischen Werth der evangelischen Geschichte"] in *Pamphlet III* of the *Streitschriften*: 76. Strauß is quoting Hegel's, *Phänomenologie*: GW III: 551 (Baillie trans.: 757). NOTE: The reader unfamiliar with Hegel may overlook that Hegel is making a distinction here between true content (*Inhalt*) and form (*Formen*; representations; actuality/*Wirklichkeit*). Conceptual content is 'true' whereas the representations of perception/sensuousness are only 'actual'. The 'true' requires the 'actual' in order not to be a 'mere abstraction'. However, the actual without the true is only imaginative construction."

content and 'actual' representations is the key to Strauß' belief in the *LJ* that he can 're-store dogmatically' what his criticism of the gospels as literal history had destroyed.¹⁶⁴ For Strauß, when it comes to this key point of the centrality of God-consciousness to Christianity, Schleiermacher and Hegel are in essence saying the same thing when it comes to the centrality of God-consciousness for defining Christianity as a *causal system*.

However, in *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History* of 1865, Strauß now sees that Schleiermacher (and we can add, Hegel) are only moving chairs on the deck of traditional Church Doctrine. Just as in the case of traditional Church teaching, their theologies are constructed on *convictions about the absolute cause of what they can only experience as effects*. In the case of Schleiermacher, the effect is individual, finite God-consciousness, whose supposed cause is taken to be Absolute God-consciousness. In the case of Hegel, the 'effect' is individual, finite spirit, whose supposed cause taken to be Absolute Spirit.

In short, each has his own, absolute metaphysical, ultimate, *causal* explanation for finite effects. In Schleiermacher's case, Absolute God-consciousness is achievable by finite consciousness only if it has an absolute or perfect cause confirmed by an historical individual.¹⁶⁵ That is, according to Schleiermacher, the perfect archetype of God-consciousness, the Christ, had to occur historically at a particular time and place, otherwise, humanity could not achieve perfect God-consciousness because, if humanity could, it would be a violation of the causal Principle of Sufficient Reason (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*).

In Hegel's case, there can be Absolute Knowledge (finite spirit grasping Absolute Spirit) only if there is an Absolute Spirit, who by means of a First Negation of its absoluteness is the ultimate cause of finite spirit and only if this finite spirit is annulled by

164. See Strauß presentation of what he originally intended as the outline of the *LJ* in his *Streitschriften* III: 59 where he says that he third section of the original plan for the *LJ* was reduced to the "Concluding Dissertation" because of the length of the work.

165. Strauß makes this observation of Schleiermacher's Christology already in the *LJ*: 771. Strauß acknowledges that this claim of 'complete realization' of the archetype is limited to God-consciousness by Schleiermacher. Nevertheless, already in the *LJ* Strauß emphasizes that it is 'contrary to natural causality' for the "initial member of a series [...] to be the greatest." (*LJ*: 771) He attributes this point to Christlieb Julius Braniss' *Über Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre; ein kritischer Versuch* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1824: 196–197. Strauß doesn't give the actual page number, but it is concluding theme of Braniss' text. See *LJ*: 771; the footnote identifying Braniss' *Über Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre* as the source is on 770, n. 3. Rather, "perfection [...] is [...] the infinitely distant goal of the progressive development of the community founded by him [the Christ]." *LJ*: 771 Furthermore, Schleiermacher's logic is found in Anselm's *Cur deus homo* that defends a perfect Christ to achieve what humanity on its own cannot and Descartes' "Third Meditation:" A perfect idea cannot arise in an imperfect being by itself, and "the objective being of an idea cannot be produced by a merely potential being (which, properly speaking, is nothing), but only by an actual or formal being." René Descartes, *Meditations on First*: 30–31 (Page # from Latin text in the Adam and Tannery edition: 46–47). This is the logic of the 'Principle of Sufficient Reason' (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*) as old as Aristotle. See *Metaphysics* VIII 1032a 23–25 and 1032b 30.

the Second Negation and 'returns' to Absolute Spirit. However, for Hegel this Second Negation is not an historical event in reference to a particular individual at a particular point in time but is grasped in faith following the death of Jesus,¹⁶⁶ not confirmed by the historical data of Jesus' life and teaching.¹⁶⁷ *Although their respective claims with respect to the significance of factual history for faith are different, Schleiermacher and Hegel share the same conviction that they have grasped the 'absolute' and ultimate cause of all 'that is' and the core doctrine of Christianity (Christology).*

By the end of his *Glaubenslehre* of 1841, though, as I have demonstrated, Strauß had rejected Hegel's logical, immanent Gnosticism and historical 'Indifferentism,' to be sure, without fanfare or fireworks (for fear of losing valuable friends?) but clearly formulated in the course of the two volume work. Not only is Strauß theologically 'silent' for the next twenty years, but also in his theological writings as of 1862 all mention of Hegel's meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit as well as of Strauß' own *inclusive* Christology based on Hegel's immanent, Gnostic metaphysics has disappeared.¹⁶⁸

Strauß' Theological Position at the Conclusion of the *Glaubenslehre*: Schleiermacher's Significance Overshadowed by Docetism and Sabellianism

Strauß' disenchantment with Hegel and twenty year theological 'silence' raises the question: Where was Strauß theologically in 1841 when he had finished his *Glaubenslehre*? A hint, though only a hint, comes at the very end of the *Glaubenslehre*. He concludes the second volume with an *embracing of a theme from Schleiermacher* with his concluding comment – Humanity's experience of immortality in history is the experience of the 'eternal' in the 'moment.'¹⁶⁹ Strauß wrote:

166. Strauß,, "Hegel's Perspective" in *Streitschriften* III: 92–94. Strauß footnotes here to Hegel's *Phänomenologie*: 573, 574 f., 583 f., 589, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, III: III, and *Religionsphilosophie* (Marheineke version 1832), II: 240.

167. What Strauß doesn't stress, though, is that both Hegel and Schleiermacher depend upon literal, anthropomorphic analogies for their explanations. In the case of Hegel, his claim for a 'perfect' Absolute Spirit is grounded in an analogy to the 'finite' Spirit. We only know of the former only because we experience the latter. This was explicitly articulated by Feuerbach in his *Wesen der Religion* (1848–1849) (Berlin: Deutsche Bibliothek, 1913): Lecture 14: 134–135. In the case of Schleiermacher, his claim for 'perfect' God-consciousness is grounded in an analogy to the 'finite' experience of individual human consciousness. We only know of the former only because we experience the latter.

168. Strauß holds onto the Hegelian epistemology of content (*Inhalt*) and representations (*Form*) until *The Old and New Faith* of 1872 in which, again silently, but unequivocally he shifts to a form of Nominalism. Hegel's 'cunning of reason' is never an option for Strauß.

169. It appears that Strauß is confirming here a theme crucial to him in his *LJ* here (see *LJ*: 777–778), but Ziegler reports that when speaking of immortality in a letter to von Binder at the beginning of Strauß's tutorial work at the Protestant Seminary in Tübingen, he wrote: In life itself, the individual is driven "[...] to rise out of this mere individuality and finiteness into the unity of the Spirit Itself, thus to take away the power of death and to view earthly life as permeated with eternal life." Ziegler, I: 113.

Schleiermacher's aphorism: 'Middle in the finite to be one with the infinite, and to be eternal in every moment'¹⁷⁰ is everything that modern science¹⁷¹ knows to say of immortality. This concludes our task for now. The hereafter consists in 'all is the One,' but the last enemy is the shape it will have as future, which speculative criticism has to fight and to overcome where possible.¹⁷² (emphasis added)

In the letter to (von) Binder, Strauß refers to Hegel's *Phenomenology*, not Schleiermacher's *On Religion*, but the conclusion of his *Glaubenslehre* quotes Schleiermacher of *On Religion*, not Hegel. I don't believe that he is equating Hegel's Absolute Spirit and Schleiermacher's 'eternal in the moment'. I believe that it is a continuation of the notion of 'reason' from *On the Transient and the Permanent in Christianity*, that is, a classic, Intellectualist understanding of reality as conforming to divine ideas. Having become disenchanted with Hegel, Strauß substitutes Schleiermacher with respect to understanding the relationship between the infinite and the finite. In his *Glaubenslehre*, Strauß refers to the theme of the eternal in the moment in [Bernhard Heinrich] Blasche, *Die philosophische Unsterblichkeitlehre. Oder: Wie offenbart sich das ewige Leben?* (Erfurt und Gotha: Flinzer'sche Buchhandlung, 1831): 175 f., who was influenced by Schelling and in Feuerbach's *Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit* (Nürnberg: Johann Adam Stein, 1830): 95 f, 105 [McG: more directly expressed at 129, 244–246; published anonymously by 'a friend']. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 663. Neither Blasche nor Feuerbach are Hegelians.

170. That immortality is experienced as the infinite in the finite moment is expressed, as well, in Goethe's poem "Vermächtnis" ('Legacy') – independent of, influenced by Schleiermacher, or Goethe's influence on Schleiermacher?

Genieße mäßig Füll' und Segen,
Vernunft sei überall zugegen,
Wo Leben sich des Lebens freut,
Dann wird Vergangenheit beständig,
Zukünftiges voraus lebendig,
Der Augenblick wird Ewigkeit.

Savor temperate fullness and blessing,
Reason is present everywhere,
Where life enjoys life,
For there, past is present,
Future already alive,
The Present Moment is Eternity.

See Moritz Kronenberg, *Geschichte des deutschen Idealismus*, Vol. I (Munich: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1909): 141.

171. This is a reference to Hegel's notion of 'science'. See in Chapter 1: "Methodology:" the section "Myth ('Faith') and 'Science':" 143 ff. See as well, Hegel's account of 'science' as consisting not merely of direct, empirical perception but also as 'necessarily' 'elevating perception' into the intellectual (that is, the conceptual order and totality) in "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" 161.

172. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 738–739. Strauß cites Schleiermacher's *Reden über die Religion* [*On Religion*: 175] (738, n. 36). See Schleiermacher, *On Religion*: 101. Schleiermacher himself placed the sentence in context that perhaps helps illuminate Strauß' attraction to it: "[...] the goal and the character of the religious life is not the immortality desired and believed in by many [...] It is not the immortality that is outside of time, behind it, or rather after it, and which still is in time. It is the immortality which we can now have in tis temporal life; it is the problem in the solution of which we are forever to be engaged. In the midst of finitude to be one with the Infinite and in every moment to be eternal is the immortality of religion." (*Ibid.*, 101)

In the footnote to this citation to Schleiermacher, Strauß quotes a poem from the mystic, Angelus Silesius:

I, 12. Man, where you sway your spirit over place and time,
So can you be every moment in eternity.

13. I myself am eternity, when I leave time,
And I in God and God in me combine.

[Strauß immediately adds in the footnote:]

However, especially, recommended to those minds who find our eschatology like our God to be a Moloch to whom they ought to bring a sacrifice as is the new fashion in Berlin is [Friedrich] Rückert's poem: "Die sterbende Blume" ("The Dying Flower") in which they will find the same [... sentiment] depicted in more graceful forms:

I believe Strauß is referring to the following poem:

Withered flower
Human child,
One lowers gently
You down into the earth,
Then above you
The lawn will be green
And flowers bloom
And you bloom in the midst of it.

Nonetheless, although the citation to Schleiermacher is unequivocal, Strauß has chosen to conclude his *Glaubenslehre* with a truly enigmatic formulation. 'Speculative criticism' is given the task of 'fighting' eschatology's future 'shape' and 'to overcome it where possible.'

This concludes our task for now. The [content/*Inhalt* of] the hereafter is that in all is the One, but the last enemy is its shape as future [its representation/*Form*], which speculative criticism has to fight and *to overcome where possible*.¹⁷³

There are at least three ways of interpreting this ambiguous statement:

1. Although the statement suggests that 'speculative metaphysics' is taken to be the adjudicator of eschatological claims, the formulation 'where possible' concluding his *Glaubenslehre* could imply that Strauß *no longer thought it possible* for 'speculative criticism' (speculative metaphysics) to defend any credible notion of the afterlife – even as the 'point of indifference' that 'returns' to Absolute Spirit.
2. Alternatively, were 'speculative criticism' with its distinction between 'true' content (Idealism) and 'actual' representations (sense perception) to fight any and all

173. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 739.

'future shapes' of immortality successfully, and its 'true' content [*Inhalt*] were to 'overcome' any and all finite representations of an eternity 'yet to come,' then that would turn eternity into an 'empty abstraction' because it would be 'true' without 'actual' representations. If this was his point, Strauß would not only be rejecting the Hegelian epistemological structure that abstract content [*Inhalt*] constitutes 'truth' and perceptible representations constitute 'actuality,' but he also would be asserting that, whatever the abstract content [*Inhalt*] was, it would be overcoming, hence, annihilating, all actual perceptible representations of it. The consequence remains that 'eternal life' is merely an 'empty abstraction.'¹⁷⁴ This theme of 'empty abstractions' requires unpacking:

Already in the *LJ*,¹⁷⁵ Strauß points out that Schleiermacher made the same error of depending upon 'empty abstractions,' but Strauß does so even more emphatically in *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*. Schleiermacher's Christ is not only an 'unreal mental construct' [i.e., an empty abstraction], but it also is only 'the old doctrine of vicarious atonement.'

[...] we know that not a single person this way developed [as the complete realization of the archetype], that vacillation and struggle, errors and mistakes, are spared no one, and that therefore his Christ, if his development is to have been free of all of this, did not at all develop as other men do. Hence, he remains in his development as in his being an unreal mental construct, a lifeless ideal drawn according to a stencil.¹⁷⁶

Strauß returns to the analogy of a stencil drawing at the very end of *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*. Schleiermacher's entire theory of redemption is "[...] only the old doctrine of the vicarious atonement [...]. [His] theory of redemption can be conceptualized to a certain extent only if one surreptitiously substitutes [...] the dissolved church dogma for it. It is like a sheet of transparent paper which, when laid on an old picture, shows the outlines of a figure, but which appears blank when

174. As I have pointed out, in the *LJ*, Strauß' central ground for dismissing Kant is that Kant privileges 'empty abstractions' as the grounding 'truth' of his 'dualism' between reason and sensuousness. See for example, Strauß, *LJ*: 776 and *Streitschriften* III: 69. Strauß charges Kant of maintaining a moral theory that consists only of 'empty abstraction' because it involves what Strauß viewed to be Kant's dualism that separates reason from the sensual and views 'reason' to be limited to finite understanding of the world – both criticisms of Kant in Hegel's/Strauß' judgment fail to grasp the 'truth' of Absolute Spirit. In fact, Strauß' criticism of Schleiermacher here applies just as much to Hegel's Absolute Spirit as it does to Schleiermacher's Absolute God-consciousness – although they are not equivalent notions. Hegel's historical 'Indifferentism' only gives a faint impression that the actual (representations) matter.

Strauß agrees with Baur view that Schleiermacher and Kant are governed by a dualistic (perfect versus sensuousness) morality (See *Gnosis*: 660–661) but also as concerned only with 'mere abstraction'. See *Gnosis*: 665–666.

175. Schleiermacher's Christ is not a historical but an ideal Christ. See *LJ*: 773.

176. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 32.

removed from it.”¹⁷⁷ In fact, Strauß specifies which ‘old picture’ of vicarious atonement: Docetism.

Schleiermacher identified four ‘natural’ heresies in Christianity: Ebionism, Docetism, Pelagianism, and Manichaeism.¹⁷⁸ Ebionism is the belief that Jesus was merely human; Docetism that Jesus was completely divine and only ‘appeared in the flesh;’ Pelagianism that salvation is earned by ‘good works;’ and Manichaeism that good and evil constitute two domains in incessant conflict with one another.

In his “Die Schleiermacher’sche Glaubenslehre” in *Gnosis*, F.C. Baur attributes to Johann Karl Friedrich Rosenkranz that Schleiermacher’s Christ as ‘sinless archetype’ is, in fact, itself Docetic. Granted, Baur formulates his personal judgment conditionally: If the Christ is a ‘purely historical’ event, then Christ is Ebionitic. However, if Christ’s inner archetype of Perfect God-consciousness needs no history, then we have a Docetic Christ.¹⁷⁹

Strauß doesn’t hesitate with his answer:

[...] from the physical, as [...] from the moral side, [...] we conclude that Schleiermacher’s conception of Christ as well as the church’s, rather than finding the right middle ground between the ebionitic and the docetic, as he endeavors, is subject to the latter folly. This is also completely natural since [*sic.*] there is no such middle ground, nor can there be any. The ebionitic conception of Christ is of course precisely that which perceives him as a true and real man. Hence every conception of him which goes beyond this must necessarily land in what is still merely apparently human, or the docetic.¹⁸⁰

Strauß, in fact, points out that Schleiermacher’s Docetism is, even further, a version of ‘Sabellian’ or Modalistic Monarchianism, a Christian theological position in the Third C that held that God appears sequentially as the Father, followed by the Son and the Holy Spirit.¹⁸¹ Strauß views Schleiermacher’s theology as ‘Sabellian’ because, given that we have no access to God’s essence, Schleiermacher speaks of how God *appears* to

177. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 169.

178. See Schleiermacher, *Glaubenslehre* §25.

179. See F.C. Baur, *Gnosis*: 656, n. 23.

180. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 148.

181. Tertullian ridiculed Sabellianism as ‘Patripassianism’ for its maintaining, then, that not merely the Son but also the Father died on the cross. In the opening paragraph of “*Against Praxeas*,” Tertullian wrote in opposition to a follower of Sabellius: “[...] he [Praxeas] drove out prophecy [a reference to Tertullian’s “New Prophecy” commitments] and brought in heresy, he put the Paraclete to flight and crucified the Father.”

humanity.¹⁸² The God/Man is the way that God *appeared* (the etymological root for docetic)) in the world at the time of Jesus.¹⁸³ Strauß writes that

According to Schleiermacher, [...] [i]n Christian self-consciousness only the binary that God is united with mankind both personally, in Christ, and under the form of the common spirit, in the church is directly stated [...] In these unions [of God with the Christ and/or the church] nothing less is maintained than the divine essence in itself or that in each element nothing less is present in one as well as the other. Thus, *according to Schleiermacher, this whole distinction [of the Trinity] refers only to different spheres of activity and modes of action of the Godhead outwardly*, and to that extent can be unabashedly pronounced as a Trinity – not in the divine essence itself, but in its manner of revelation. The ecclesiastical expression, Trinity, seeks to preserve the unity of the divine essence against internal differences within the divine essence itself. However, such a unity cannot be included in any pious enthusiasm because in these distinctions God never appears in Himself but only in His relation to the world and to man. For this reason, all propositions referring to a distinction in the divine essence as such are to be rejected and relegated to speculation. Consequently, Schleiermacher, in a treatise in the theological journal which he edited with de Wette and Lücke (in the third issue¹⁸⁴), draws attention to the Unitarian doctrine of Praxeas and Noetus,¹⁸⁵ and still more to the more definite one of Beryllus of Bostra,¹⁸⁶ according to whom the Son of God did not exist before the Incarnation κατ' ἰδίαν οὐσίαις περιγραφὴν [defined exactly as specific entities], but especially the developed theory of Sabellius, according to which the divine Monas manifested itself in a triad of πρόσωποις [of masks] or σχηματισμοῖς [of appearances] – [appearing] as Father (according to Schleiermacher's interpretation of the incomplete texts) in the creation of the world, as Son in Christ, and as Holy Spirit in the Church. Because of its more subjective and modalistic character, Schleiermacher prefers this teaching [of Modalistic Monarchianism from Sabellius], rather than the ecclesiastical Athanasian doctrine of the Trinity.¹⁸⁷

Schleiermacher wants to claim that there are 'two starting points' for humanity: material and spiritual, and in his *Glaubenslehre*, Schleiermacher, therefore, speaks of

182. F.C. Baur makes this observation in his "Die Schleiermacher'sche Glaubenslehre" in *Gnosis* 628–629: "Divine predicates are only the different sides and relationships of the feeling of absolute dependence [*des absoluten Abhängigkeitsgefühls*], or, as Schleiermacher himself says (*Glaubenslehre* §. 50: 280.), none of the divine predicates that we attribute to God refer to something specific in God but only to something specific in the way absolute feeling of dependence stands in relationship to God. As finite life must be conceived in a multiplicity of functions, and because these, if they are to be particular, have to be opposed to each other, respectively, and partially exclude each other, attributing particular predicates to would result in God's placement in the realm of [finite] opposites." Baur adds that Schleiermacher's perspective "eliminates every form of objective distinction in God's Being." *Ibid.*: 631.

183. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 180.

184. Schleiermacher, "Ueber den Gegensatz zwischen der Sabellianischen und der Athanasianischen Vorstellung von der Trinität" in Drittes Heft of the *Theologische Zeitschrift*, Schleiermacher, de Wette, Lücke hrsg. (Berlin; Georg Reimer, 1822): 295–408.

185. Noetus was also a Modalistic Monarchian adherent of Sabellianism.

186. Beryllus of Bostra was also a Modalistic Monarchian who denied the pre-existence of the Christ, a teaching Schleiermacher also denied.

187. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 179–180.

'two Adams.'¹⁸⁸ In addition, in the second of his "Two Epistles to Dr. Lücke on my *Glaubenslehre*," Schleiermacher writes:

If science must admit the possibility that even today matter could conglomerate and begin to rotate in limitless space, then it must also concede that there is an appearance in the realm of spiritual life which likewise we can only explain as a new creation, as the pure beginning of a higher spiritual life-development.¹⁸⁹

However, the notion of 'two starting points' and 'two pure beginnings' makes indefensible the claim that the Christ, as sinless, Perfect God-consciousness, is a truly human being¹⁹⁰ who develops naturally as an emergence of the organic out the inorganic although Schleiermacher's claim is that, when it comes to the spiritual development of humanity, there is a spectrum of infinite variation.¹⁹¹

Schleiermacher claims that a 'new beginning' can occur in the spiritual domain¹⁹² if the physical universe begins 'naturally' out of an infinite aggregation of elements in space.¹⁹³ Yet, even if Schleiermacher wants to claim that there is an ultimate, eminent causality behind the origin of the physical, infinite aggregation of elements, the assertion that a 'new' spiritual creation occurs through the agency of a Perfect God-consciousness is pure speculation/fantasy. The physical universe is, obviously, directly given in sense perception. However, we do not encounter Perfect God-consciousness anywhere directly in sense perception. As with all causal explanations, the claim may be correct, but it is impossible of proof/disproof given that proofs are based on effects and causes are not, by definition, effects. As was stated above and in light

188. See Schleiermacher, *Glaubenslehre* II: § 94: "The appearance of the first man constituted [...] the physical life of the human race; the appearance of the Second Adam [the Christ] constituted for this same nature a new spiritual life, which communicates and develops itself by spiritual impregnation [*Befruchtung*]."

189. From Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 29. "Über meine Glaubenslehre, an Herrn Dr. Lücke. Zwei Sendschreiben" in *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* (1829): II: 255–284, III: 481–532.

190. See Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 4–5.

191. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 169 where Strauß quotes from Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*: "[...] 'just as we find in the world in general the most manifold gradation of life, and may not doubt that this very variety, as the rightful fulfillment of space and time, is the object of divine pleasure, and just as such gradations also arise within the domain of human nature, so we will reasonably expect also in the spiritual sphere of life created by redemption all that lies between the smallest and the greatest, and will regard this whole fullness, united in living communion, as the object of divine good pleasure, and base it therein' (*Glaubenslehre*. II. S. 301 f)."

192. It should be noted that Schleiermacher is employing the notion of 'domain' to talk about the 'spiritual' over against the 'physical' is entirely different from Kant's two domains of 'freedom' and 'nature' in the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*. In Kant's threefold distinction between 'field,' 'territory,' and the two 'domains' of freedom and nature, what distinguishes the latter from 'field' and 'territory' is 'lawfulness,' not merely spontaneous or merely 'Occasionalist'/'Voluntarist' causality. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 174 ff.

193. Ironically, Strauß analogously claims in 1872 that the 'organic' arising out of the 'inorganic'.

of the effects constituting a spectrum of imperfect realization in individuals, a perfect cause (sinless God-consciousness) is not required to account for imperfect effects of both the material and spiritual development of humans.

1. However, were Strauß to mean with his concluding sentence of his *Glaubenslehre* that speculative criticism is incapable of 'overcoming finite representations' in its valuing of the 'eternal' in the 'moment,' then the 'actual' is a weakening of the 'true,' ideal content of immortality because finite actuality in itself is not eternal and, thereby, the ideal content is by definition, then, not 'true.' The 'true' for speculative metaphysics is the absolute, infinite, imperceptible truth. In other words, if speculative criticism is incapable of 'overcoming' in the sense of elevating consciousness above finite representations, both Hegel's Absolute Knowledge as well as Schleiermacher's perfect God-consciousness, which are supposedly 'naturally' human, are 'merely abstractions' and neither 'true' nor anything 'actually' human. In short, both Hegel and Schleiermacher are docetic.¹⁹⁴

All of these options for reading Strauß' final sentence in the *Glaubenslehre* perhaps provide an indication, at least in part, for why Strauß remained theologically silent for the next twenty years. For my purpose here, though, it is not insignificant that Strauß ends the *Glaubenslehre* with a quote from Schleiermacher. Schleiermacher was the focus of continued and deep reflection across Strauß' entire career.

On the Role of Philosophy in Theology: Schleiermacher's Shell Game

In "Schleiermacher und Daub," Strauß wrote of Schleiermacher's understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology:

In his [... Schleiermacher's] *Glaubenslehre* [...] no reasoning, deduction, or proof is to be given, but only that which is internally present in pious self-consciousness, and that only in a way which, partly in its systematic arrangement, bears the guarantee of completeness, and partly, through the dialectical formation of the expression, seeks to cover itself against the objection of science. Only in this formal respect may philosophy exert influence on the doctrine of faith; *any material influence, especially that which would consist in substantiating the dogma by means of speculative proofs, is to be rejected* as an after effect of the scholastic mixture of theology and philosophy. However, because [...] a contradiction between [...] piety and philosophy] is certainly possible in itself, and a balancing of the same is necessary, this balancing is not a matter of the doctrine of faith, but the business of apologetics: the former [contradiction], like the faith of which it is the scientific expres-

194. Despite a dramatic shift in what 'subjective' and 'objective' mean by the writing of *The Old and the New Faith*, Strauß' understanding of the universe as always 'perfect' in any moment reduces the significance of the particularities of history (pain and suffering) to indifferent meaninglessness just as in the case of Hegel.

sion, remains a λόγος ἀναπόδεικτος [an indemonstrable teaching] ([Schleiermacher's] *Glaubenslehre* I: 171 f.) [...] ¹⁹⁵ (emphasis added)

Philosophy's contribution to religion is not to *ground* religious doctrines but to *establish that there is internal coherence to those doctrines*, which religious doctrines do not contradict. ¹⁹⁶ Strauß points out:

However, through internal consistency, a thing proves itself only as a possible truth, not yet as a real truth. From where, then, does dogmatics get the proof that it is real truth? It does not need such a proof at all, Schleiermacher replies; it is real as feeling and faith in the community, and therefore has enough proof of its possibility on the part of science. ¹⁹⁷

Philosophy's role, according to Schleiermacher, is to serve as a 'means' for theology. It doesn't establish or ground the 'end(s)' that theology seeks to claim. Yet, Strauß points out, neither in science nor in nature is there an actual organism where one or more parts are merely means and not, simultaneously, also ends towards which the other parts are related as means. ¹⁹⁸

In terms of preserving the internal coherence of its theology, philosophy serves church leadership and piety as a *means*; however, that is only one side of the relationship. "On the other side, [Strauß maintains in contrast to Schleiermacher], scientific theology [philosophical theology] as the self-consciousness of Spirit in its religious actuality is *the highest end* for which piety constitutes the material to be addressed, but church leadership is a facilitating experiment of service." ¹⁹⁹ In short, whereas, properly understood according to Strauß in "Schleiermacher und Daub," philosophy is a 'means,' it is also an 'end,' and piety and actual leadership-experience serve, in turn, as 'means' for scientific theology, whose 'end' is Spirit's becoming aware of Itself. His judgment with respect to the adequacy of this conclusion, Strauß suggests, must be postponed until he had finished his examination of Carl Daub, the Right-wing Hegelian. ²⁰⁰ Strauß eventual conclusion is brutal:

One finds in both Schleiermacher and Daub the 'scientific principle of their age,' the Absolute Concept, but diametrically in a one-sidedness. Both know that substance is subject. However, one in the lopsidedness of substance, the other in the lopsidedness of subjectivity. The unity of divinity with humanity was achieved by Schleiermacher only in the subjective form of feeling and reflection concerning this subjective form. Daub claimed

195. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 159–160. Strauß is citing § 28 3. of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*. Strauß also refers the reader to Schleiermacher's 'First Epistle' "in the middle" of his "Über meine Glaubenslehre, an Herrn Dr. Lücke. Zwei Sendschreiben." I believe that Strauß is referring to Schleiermacher's response to Bretschneider on the role of Philosophy in piety: *ibid.*, 262 ff.

196. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub," 51.

197. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 51–52.

198. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 52.

199. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 52.

200. See, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 52–53.

that one has not attained a complete unity of divinity with humanity when the believer has not selflessly sunk into the substance of Church faith. If Daub's thinking is submerged in the substance of belief, Schleiermacher's substance is absorbed in the feeling of the subject. Schleiermacher, as a dogmatist, does not seek the idea at all, because he is assured of its absolute content in inner experience. Daub has found the Idea, but in and with it he also believes to have assured himself of the experiential truth of sacred history. *Both lack the true mediation of dogma with the concept, of the historical with the ideal.*²⁰¹ (emphasis added)

Whatever Strauß means here by "the true mediation of dogma with the concept, of the historical with the ideal" (and he, of course, might mean Hegel's formulation), *according to Strauß, dogmatic theology needs more than logical possibility for it to be true but requires historical explanation – or what Strauß calls 'philosophy' to establish not merely the 'possibility' but also the 'necessity' of its truth claims.* To the extent that Schleiermacher and Hegel/Daub are trapped in 'empty abstractions,' they fail when it comes to the 'true mediation of the historical with the ideal.'

Especially when it comes to feeling, as I pointed out above, Strauß agrees with Hegel that "feeling can no longer be characteristic for religion if everything possible is feeling or if feeling is the general form under which any determinations become subjective determinations of the ego."²⁰²

The inescapable role of philosophy in religion is apparent when one employs the analogy of a shell game for Schleiermacher's religion of pious feeling. In a shell game, an object is placed under one of three cups. The goal is to determine which cup contains the object. The game presumes that one knows that the hidden object itself doesn't change, only the position of the cups changes. Analogously, for Schleiermacher the 'enduring object,' piety, is the feeling of absolute dependence, which is the 'measure of perfection' for piety. All experience, even if unrecognized, 'contains' the essence of piety. If everything is the 'same,' piety, then the particularities (the cups) are meaningless. All that matters is the 'essence,' piety. The claim that one 'cup,' Christ's perfect God-consciousness is necessary for other cups to achieve piety is illusion.

In fact, Schleiermacher defines the essence of something as that which is present throughout the rise and fall of its perfection:

[...] what is not the measure of the perfection of an object in its rise and fall cannot be its essence (*Glaubenslehre*, Bd 1, §. 3 [...]). The degree of an individual's piety is determined by the rise and fall of her/his religious feeling. In other words, [s/]he is more or less pious, depending on whether this feeling in [her/]him is more or less strong and steady. In this respect feeling proves itself as the essence of piety."²⁰³

201. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 208.

202. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 152–153.

203. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 153.

Christlieb Julius Braniss emphasizes that for Schleiermacher the feeling of absolute dependence itself is absolutely unchanging.²⁰⁴ Only because it is 'absolutely unchanging' in itself can the feeling of absolute dependence be the 'measure of perfection' when it comes to discernment of piety. According to Schleiermacher, then, the feeling of absolute dependence is an 'essence.'

However, this 'essence,' which allows a measurement of degree in the set of phenomena that is 'piety,' is one among all those 'essences' that constitute the measurement of degree of all other sets of phenomena. In short, logically, Schleiermacher is acknowledging the necessity of essences or logoi (λόγοι) for understanding that, in turn, constitutes the rational system of essences called the Logos (Λόγος) throughout Platonic Christianity.

In order to discern 'rise and fall' or the 'degree of clarity' of a set of phenomena, *one must already grasp its 'essence.'* *Schleiermacher, the translator of Plato's dialogues into German, is a Platonic Idealist*, and he is deceiving himself when he claims that piety is 'prior' to 'knowing' and 'doing.' Piety has merely a different 'essence' than what allows for the determination of the 'degree of clarity' in the phenomena of understanding and agency. Strauß adds:

[...] separation of the different spiritual areas [knowledge and doing] is no more natural than if it would occur to a naturalist to say that ice is something for itself, water something for itself, and steam something for itself, that none of them comes from the other, but has its own principle in itself; because they are all only different metamorphoses of one and the same substance, just as thinking, feeling and willing are different phases of the One spiritual life.²⁰⁵

Not only is an 'essence' an idea, not a feeling, but also Schleiermacher is shuffling an 'idea' in an illusory, shell game labelled as a 'feeling' in an attempt to avoid philosophy as essential for religion. In a very real sense, then, he engages in a philosophical slight-of-hand when he rejects the notion of a 'pre-existing Christ' and ignores the Logos Theology of his favorite Gospel of John.

Kant or Spinoza?

There are two points with respect to which Strauß disagreed clearly with his professor, F.C. Baur. The first was with respect to the role of history in Baur's Christian understanding of the historical incarnation of the God/Man as limited to the 'body

204. It is always and eternally the same although it is expressed in many ways because it is inseparable from the world, according to Schleiermacher. The feeling of absolute dependence "[...] is the expression of a unified relationship that is absolutely constant. (See Braniss, *ibid.*: 188).

205. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 156.

of Christ' that is the Christian community (*Gemeinde*). The second is over which philosopher was standing in the shadows behind Schleiermacher's theological ruminations.

When it comes to their relative differences over the degree of Christological inclusiveness, see my presentation of Baur's criticism of Strauß' having destroyed 'history' in Christianity by ignoring the Christian *Gemeinde* as the exclusive location for the Incarnation of the God/Man, see "Ferdinand Christian Baur's Criticism of Strauß" in "Chapter 3: Academic Controversy and Reaction to Strauß' Life of Jesus."²⁰⁶

When it comes to who stood in the shadows behind Schleiermacher, the question is: Was it Kant or Spinoza?:

According to Baur, the philosopher to whom Schleiermacher is most indebted is Kant.²⁰⁷ Baur takes Kant and Schleiermacher to be 'subjectivists' in contrast to

206. See above Ferdinand Christian Baur's Criticism of Strauß:" 222 ff.

207. Baur writes of Schleiermacher; "What Kant does not leave us in doubt about, that the Redeemer as the God-pleasing Man, the ideal of God-pleasing humanity, is only a personification of the good principle in its absolute victory over evil, emerges [...] as the actual meaning of Schleiermacher's archetypal Christ. The archetypal Christ, the God/Man, that is, the absolutely sinless and perfect man, is nothing other than the personally conceived idea of redemption, but redemption itself, insofar as it is conceived in an individual, is God-consciousness in its absolute steadiness and strength, to which the God-consciousness of the individuals forming the Christian life as a whole always stands only in an approximate relationship. It follows from this that *there can be no essential difference between Kant and Schleiermacher concerning the relationship of the Redeemer to the individual*, insofar as he is the object of redemptive activity. According to Kant, the individual is one with the Redeemer, or Son of God, insofar as the human being is a new human being according to his disposition, and is set as a unity in his disposition, which in fact can only develop successively. The Son of God as Redeemer, or that which is set in the individual through his redeeming activity, the community of the Redeemer and the redeemed, is, according to Kant, nothing other than the absorption of the good principle into the mind. *In his good disposition, the improved man has the redeemer in himself*; what is said of the redeemer is actually true of the new man, *which is why, according to Kant, the vicarious suffering of the redeemer is virtually the suffering of the new man* in the place of the old. *Schleiermacher's doctrine of the activity of the Redeemer comes to the same thing, insofar as it is the absorption of the faithful into the power of his God-consciousness. The Redeemer produces his deed in us, his deed becomes our deed, when the God-consciousness, which cannot be thought of as a more or less effective one without also presupposing an absolute effectiveness of it, is preponderant over sensual consciousness, so that God-consciousness and sensual consciousness relate to each other like positives and negatives, and to every plus of the God-consciousness corresponds a minus of the sensual consciousness. All that is different between Kant and Schleiermacher is only the difference between morality and religion. What for Kant is moral consciousness that comes from the victory of the good principle over the evil principle as the moral capacity of humanity, is for Schleiermacher God-consciousness, the religious capacity. The common perspective, however, from which both proceed, is the absolute dependence that is located in consciousness, which is traced by Kant to the absolute causality (!) of the unconditionally enjoining moral law, by Schleiermacher to the absolute causality (!) of God. However, the Schleiermachian concept of God leads just as little as the absolute of Kant's moral law, to an objective reality independent of consciousness, because Schleiermacher completely excludes all objective determinations about the essence of God and equates the concept of God only with the indeterminate abstract concept of an absolute causality without which the dependence of which man is conscious would lack the final point of reference to which it is to be attached, which is nothing other than the Kantian concept of the Noumenon. The*

Hegel who is a purely 'objectivist'.²⁰⁸ Nonetheless, Baur attributes two key elements of Schleiermacher's theology to Spinoza: 1) the denial of finite reality's freedom as spontaneous indeterminism, including humanity; and 2) the claim that God and the world are two essentially dualistic concepts with God as 'absolute, undivided unity' and the world as 'divided and split unity'.²⁰⁹

An absolute divine causality, which is opposed only by an absolute sense of dependence, does not permit freedom in the sense of Indeterminism, and if God and the world are in the last analysis only so different that, as Schleiermacher says (Th. I: 185), God is absolute undivided unity, but the world, even if set as a unity, is only the divided and split unity, which is at the same time the dividedness of all opposites and differences and everything determined by them, so God and the world always remain two essentially different concepts,

concept God is a completely lifeless, mere abstraction and, therefore, God's existence in Christ can be no truly lively and personal being. Far more, Schleiermacher's idea of the Christ is only the perfect parallel to Kant's idea of God, and the moral lawgiver derived from the absolute moral law, as the bearer of it, coincides with the idea of the moral world order, just as the archetypal Christ is only the concrete expression for absolute God-consciousness [...] Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre is nothing other than the perfect implementation of the opposition between the two principles that Kant calls radical evil and the individual's being well-pleasing to God. Their difference consists only in the substitution of God-consciousness by Schleiermacher for Kant's moral consciousness and Schleiermacher's artificial, as it is indefensible, connection that is supposed to unify the archetypal Christ with the historical." Baur, "Die Schleiermacher'sche Glaubenslehre" in *Gnosis*: 664–666. Whereas Baur provides a legitimate criticism of Schleiermacher here, his portrayal of Kant is either an unreflective or an unconscionable distortion.

208. The key to this classification is their understanding of the Incarnation. Speaking first of Kant and Schleiermacher, Baur contrasts their 'subjective' understanding of religion with Hegel's 'objective' understanding: With Hegel, "[...] we do not speak merely of an ideal of humanity pleasing to God, floating in the dubious distance [Baur's erroneous reading of Kant's 'Incarnation' as the subjective 'moral ideal' that drives humanity's goal of a Pelagian earning of God's favor]. We do not merely speak of an archetype that only raises the human to the divine, or of a God-consciousness that has become God's being [Baur's take on Schleiermacher's 'Incarnation' of perfect God-consciousness as a new spiritual creation of humanity that seeks to achieve perfect God-consciousness as a future goal of individuals]. Rather, Christ is [objectively] the God/Man, God became man, appeared in the flesh, that the unity of divine and human nature, which is in itself, has been revealed to man in a more concrete way in a certain individual subject, is asserted here with the full weight of the ecclesiastical expressions, and the more true and objective the idea of God is to this (Hegelian) philosophy of religion, the less also the full reality of its God/Man seems to be allowed to be doubted. However, it all depends, as is self-evident, on the sense in which their Christ is the God/Man." (emphasis added) Baur, "Die Hegel'sche Religions-Philosophie" in *Gnosis*: 711.

What Baur, Hegel, Schleiermacher, and Strauß overlook is Kant's explicit rejection of either 'sensuousness' or 'reason' as the sole ground of 'evil.' See Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 34–35, especially: "Sensuous nature [...] contains too little to provide a ground of moral evil in the human being, for, to the extent that it eliminates the incentives originating in freedom, it makes of the human a purely animal being; a reason exonerated from the moral law, an evil reason as it were (an absolutely evil will), would on the contrary contain too much, because resistance to the law would itself be thereby elevated to incentive [...] and so the subject would be made a diabolical being."

209. In contrast to Baur's reading of Spinoza and Schleiermacher, Hegel takes God (Absolute Spirit) to be a 'divisible I' and the material order to be a 'divisible non-I'. See: 160.

*but they are only as different as Spinozism must always make them undivided.*²¹⁰ (emphasis added)

Strauß agrees with Baur's emphasis on these two points of similarity. Strauß begins precisely with these same two themes, though in reverse order, in his list of eight elements in Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* that he claims can be traced to Spinoza.²¹¹ However, Strauß' thesis is that Schleiermacher becomes "understandable not from his dependence on Kant but [only] when he is translated back into Spinoza's system from which [... his reflections] arose."²¹²

1. "Schleiermacher's understanding of the relationship of God to the world is explained [...] from the relationship [of a logic of 'necessity'] between the *natura naturans* to the *natura naturata*,²¹³ on which all other things is based, according to which both, considered as magnitudes, coincide; only that the former unity is absolute and undivided, the latter unity divided and splintered ([Schleiermacher's] *Glaubenslehre* I, " 32: 185), according to Spinoza."²¹⁴

That God's creating (willing) the world is not separate from His will and that the latter is already included in the former, is what Spinoza says with: *Deum eadem necessitate agere, qua se ipsum intelligit* [God acts by means of the same necessity²¹⁵ by which he understands himself].²¹⁶ *Hoc est, sicuti ex necessitate divinae naturae sequitur, ut Deus se ipsum intelligat, eadem etiam necessitate sequitur, ut Deus infinita infinitis modis agat* [That is, just as it follows from the necessity of the divine nature, that God understands himself, it also follows from the same necessity that God acts in an infinite number of ways.] (*Ethic.* P.2, Prop. 3, Schol.)²¹⁷

210. Baur, "Die Hegel'sche Religions-Philosophie" in *Gnosis*: 632.

211. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 167–171. Strauß acknowledged the difficulties of identifying Schleiermacher's integration of Spinoza into his theology: "Not everyone has the apparatus and the endurance with which Schleiermacher pulverized Christianity and Spinozism for the purpose of mixing [Christianity and philosophy] so finely that a sharp eye is needed to distinguish the mixed components [...]" Strauß, "Introduction" to *Glaubenslehre* I: 70.

212. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 167.

213. Strauß follows Schelling's definitions for *natura naturata* and *natura naturans*: "The divine universe is not alone the spoken word [λόγος προφορικὸς] (*natura naturata*) but itself the one that speaks [λόγος ἐνδιάθετος] (*natura naturans*), not the created [*natura naturata*] but creating itself and self-revealing in an eternal manner [*natura naturans*]." (Strauß footnotes to Schelling's *Jahrbücher der Medicin*, I, 1, S. 33. I, 2, S. 14 f.; see *Philosophie und Religion* S. 43.) Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 658 Referring to Spinoza, Strauß writes: "[A]ccording to Spinoza, [...] substance is never without its attributes and *modi*; *natura naturans* (nature as created) never without *natura naturata* (nature as divine creative power) [...]" Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 655.

214. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 167.

215. NOTE the theme of necessity here is used in the sense of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*). On 'necessity,' see the "Preface:" 42, n. 22.

216. In short, what God 'thinks' necessarily 'is' because the cause of God's thinking is God Himself.

217. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 167–168.

For Spinoza, God and the world "[...] can only be explained by the relation of *natura naturans* (nature as eternal, divine, creative power or λόγος ἐνδιάθετος) to *natura naturata* (nature as created by God or λόγος προφορικὸς).²¹⁸

We cannot think of anything in God that is free without simultaneously thinking it as necessary, and vice versa.:" *solum Deum esse causam liberam* [only God is a free cause]; *Deus enim solus ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit et agit*; [For God alone exists and acts only from the necessity of his own nature] (*Ethics* P. 1, Propos. 17, Coroll. 2)²¹⁹

2. Schleiermacher's difference between thinking and willing, the real and the possible, knowing and doing, 'have their roots' in Spinoza, according to Strauß: For God "[v]ery obviously, [...] the differences between thinking and willing, the real and the possible, etc., have their roots in the famous Scholion to the 17th proposition of the first book of the Spinozian Ethics."²²⁰

Intellectum Dei, quo res creatas intelligit, et ejus voluntatem et potentiam, qua ipsas determinavit, unum et idem esse [The intellect of God,²²¹ by which He understands created things, and His will and power, by which He determined them, is one and the same] (see as well the *Cogitata metaphysica*, P. 2, cap. 7)

Schleiermacher would also not find a God who 'exercises self-restraint,' as unthinkable (as he declares to be the case in the first *Sendschreiben*), if he were not in agreement with Spinoza that *omnis determinatio negation* [every determination is negation].²²²

3. The Feeling of Absolute Dependence on God is equivalent to Spinoza's Divine Determinism:

The assertion that in the absolute dependence on God the so-called free causes are included in the same way as those belonging to the mechanism of nature (Glaubensl. 1. §. 49), is the Spinozian: *Omnia ex necessitate divinae naturae determinate sunt, non tantum ad*

218. Considered as Idealism rather than as mathematical magnitudes, Spinoza's distinction would be *natura naturans* = λόγος ἐνδιάθετος; *natura naturata* = λόγος προφορικὸς.

219. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 167. [McG: The question that this raises is what kind of necessity? According to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*), 'necessity' means an effect is determined by a prior (formal or eminent) cause because 'something cannot come from nothing'. However, 'necessity' according to Critical Idealism means something not given in the phenomena is required in order for there to be an experience of the phenomena. The Principle of Sufficient Reason (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*) is a claim with respect to what causes something to happen; Critical Idealism's 'necessary' (required) conditions of possibility is a claim with respect merely to what conditions have to be met for finite experience of phenomena, not for causing phenomena.]

220. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 168.

221. "Occasionalism" or "Voluntarism" formulated in Islamic theology in the Mu'tazila school of Islamic theology in the 3rd to 9th Centuries. See Dominik Perler and Ulrich Rudolph, *Occasionalismus. Theorien der Kausalität im arabisch-islamischen und im europäischen Denken* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000).

222. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 168.

existendum, sed etiam ad certo modo existendum et operandum [All things are determined by the necessity of the divine nature, not only for existing, but also for existing and operating in their particular way] (*Eth.* P. I, Prop. 29, Demonstr.)²²³

Consequently, Schleiermacher's embracing of the Augustinian-Calvinist teaching of Predestination is entirely consistent although Schleiermacher does not entirely embrace Spinoza's denial of human freedom:

However, in "[...] that he [Schleiermacher] did not claim Predestination to step on the moral freedom of man, he remained behind Spinoza's consistency or openness, who for his part declares the human will to be a *causa non libera sed coacta* [not a free cause but compulsory]."²²⁴

According to Schleiermacher: "The basic idea of the *Monologues* applies only to free will with respect to the constraint of external causes, but not from constraints on the internal determination of the individual." In the *Monologues*, Schleiermacher, contrary to Spinoza, defends human 'freedom' in spirit/mind above all external forces and every external limitation:

The material world must serve the 'I' and, as a system of organisms as well as an extended body, must assist the 'I' in achieving its goals. Infinitely more, the 'I' experiences its spirit to be challenged by its association with other minds/spirits. However, if the resistance of nature or the unfavorable clash with other minds prevents success, the 'I' is still not dependent upon the accidental coincidence of its external circumstances. 'External circumstances do not prevent internal agency [because the individual is liberated by the feeling of absolute dependence above the sensuous].' What denies the individual from external success, contacts, and relationships actually, is modelled internally, but is no less real, by fantasy, 'this divine power that, alone establishes the mind's/spirit's freedom above all forces and every limitation – without this divine power [of the imagination] the human sphere is apprehensively closed in on itself.' (*Monologues*, vierte Ausg., S. 79 f.)²²⁵

4. God is not the cause of evil. Evil is not real and occurs through humanity. God fills the spectrum of reality (material and spiritual) with a fullness that requires that we view it as the object of divine good pleasure:

The Schleiermachian formula that evil is something for us and happens through us, but for God it is nothing and not caused by Him, because that which is really from God, the free-acting sensual power on the one hand and the consciousness of God on the other, is not yet evil. However, that for which God cannot be the author, namely the opposite of good, is not real at all (*Über die Erwählungslehre, gegen den Schluß, und Glaubenslehre* I. §. 81).²²⁶

223. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 168.

224. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 168. See the discussion of 'Predestination' below.

225. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 26.

226. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 169.

Strauß points out that this view of evil is reminiscent of Spinoza's well-known 36th Letter in which he defines perfection as not leaving nothing out anything that could be conceived by an infinite intellect. 169

Furthermore, whoever reads in Schleiermacher: 'just as we find in the world in general the most manifold gradation of life, and may not doubt that this very variety, as the rightful fulfillment of space and time, is the object of divine pleasure, and just as such gradations also arise within the domain of human nature, so we will reasonably expect also in the spiritual sphere of life created by redemption all that lies between the smallest and the greatest, and will regard this whole fullness, united in living communion, as the object of divine good pleasure, and base it therein' (*Glaubensl.* 2. S. 301 f).²²⁷

S/[he] who reads this and the like, if [s/]he is differently versed in Spinoza, will not find his worldview in it, and [s/]he be reminded especially of the sentence at the end of the first book of the *Ethics*, where he says?: *Iis autem, qui quaerunt: cur Deus omnes homines non ita creavit, ut solo rationis ductu gubernarentur? Nihil aliud respondeo, quam quia ei non defuit materia ad omnia, ex summo nimirum ad infimum perfectionis gradum, creanda; vel magis proprie loquendo, quia ipsius naturae leges adeo amplae fuerunt, ut sufficerent ad omnia, quae ab aliquo infinito intellectu concipi possunt, producenda* –? [to those who ask: why did God not create all men so that they were governed only by the guidance of reason? I reply that [...] there was not wanting matter to him in all things, namely, to create from the highest to the lowest degree of perfection; or more properly speaking, because the laws of nature itself were so extensive that they were sufficient to produce all the things which can be conceived by some infinite intellect].²²⁸

5. Schleiermacher's Feeling of Absolute Dependence is nothing other than Spinoza's *concomitans idea Dei* (that which accompanies the idea of God) as what 'liberates humanity from sensuousness.'

Yes, even Schleiermacher's feeling of absolute dependence or God-consciousness, which is supposed to determine man's entire being and life, and thereby to sanctify and enliven him, is nothing other than *concomitans idea Dei* [that which accompanies the idea of God] for Spinoza, which, inasmuch as we recognize all things, especially our affections, as founded in God, results in our liberation from them, intellectual love for God, and the highest peace of mind and bliss (*Ethics* P. 5, Prop. 14 sqq. 25 sqq. 32 sqq).²²⁹

6. Both Spinoza and Schleiermacher find salvation and science to involve a separation of theology from philosophy. For Schleiermacher religion is concerned with the feeling of absolute dependence and reflection upon it; whereas for Spinoza religion is concerned with piety and obedience along with the simplest doctrines of God and His relationship to humanity:

227. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 169

228. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 169.

229. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 169–170.

[...] all that Schleiermacher says concerning the relationship between religion and theology with philosophy has a confluence with the basic idea of Spinoza's *tractatus theologico-politicus*. Both find the salvation of the Church and [the wisdom] of science only in the separation of theology from philosophy; neither the latter should be subject to the former, nor the former to the latter, but each should remain within its own proper domain. The difference here is only that Schleiermacher assigns to religion and theology the feeling of absolute dependence and the reflection on it, Spinoza [assigns to religion and theology] *pietas* and *obediential* [piety and obedience] and the simplest doctrines of God and his relationship to humanity, which are inevitably necessary for the justification of these.²³⁰ (emphasis added)

7. Even though Schleiermacher rejects any indebtedness to Spinoza in his *Über die Glaubenslehre. Zwei Sendschreiben an Lücke*,

Schleiermacher raises the question [...]: how would he have been able to derive from the Spinozian idea of God [...] the divine qualities of wisdom and love [... as he does] in Part Two of his *Glaubenslehre*?

[...] Spinoza justifies his famous word, *Qui Deum amat, conari non potest, ut Deus ipsu contra amet* (He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should love him in return) (5, Prop. 19) only by the impossibility of an affect in God, and his explanation proposes the Christian idea of God's love as the point of contact between God and humanity: *quod Deus, quatenus seipsum amat, homines amat, et consequenter quod amor Dei erge homines et mentis erga Deum amor intellectualis unum et idem sit* [it follows that God, in so far as he loves himself, loves man, and, consequently, that the love of God towards men, and the intellectual love of the mind towards God are identical]. (Prop. 36. Coroll.)²³¹

8. Strauß maintains that there's also a similarity between Spinoza's and Schleiermacher's conception of divine wisdom – both embrace Platonic (divine) teleology:

Although Schleiermacher admonishes in his *Abhandlung über die Erwählungslehre* that reason should investigate the effected final causes in the world instead of the individual final causes, in [...] Schleiermacher's] *Glaubenslehre*, he abolishes the difference between end and means with regard to divine wisdom. Thus, the main impulses for Spinoza are embraced – the anthropomorphizing of God and the pettiness of a finite teleology [humanity's first conceiving its goals mentally before acting externally]. If, of course, the determination of the world ordered by God according to his wisdom as the absolute work of art sounds more like Plato than Spinoza – who, by the way, says that everything in the world *summa perfectione procedere* [proceeds to the highest perfection] –, then Schleiermacher, who so often and so gladly calls himself a mere dilettante in philosophy, may be taken at his word for once, and a fusion of different philosophical principles may be presupposed in him, by which we do not have to defend their conflating into contradiction.²³²

230. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 170.

231. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 170.

232. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 171.

Strauß responds: "However, these philosophical propositions [from Spinoza] did not have to appear explicitly in Schleiermacher's theology, yet still be Schleiermacher's; but that they really form the foundations of his worldview, not in this crass form, but in the form in which natural philosophy has appropriated them, is sufficiently evident from what has been said so far."²³³

Schleiermacher and the Gospel of John

The Gospels – True or False? The Wrong Question

When the theme of 'myth' in the scriptures arose at the end of the 18th C, a good generation before Strauß, for many, and, particularly for Friedrich Schleiermacher, the alternative was: The bible is either 'true' or 'false,' and, if the bible is a collection of myths, then it is 'false.'

Rather than question his assumptions about philosophy and science, Schleiermacher seeks to anchor Christianity's historical, factual truth by dismissing the Synoptic Gospels (Matthew, Mark, and Luke) as merely a capricious collection of stories compiled by their authors long after the events. In Schleiermacher's judgment, the differences among them are the consequence of their not being from eyewitness. However, John's Gospel, Schleiermacher insists, is from an eyewitness who is the guarantor that Christianity is anchored in 'truth,' not 'myth.'

Nonetheless, the Gospel of John is a conundrum for those who seek 'historical facts' with respect to Jesus' biography or to ground theological convictions in the teaching of Jesus. In contrast to John, the three Synoptic Gospels all share the same basic outline of a one year ministry of Jesus that occurred primarily in Galilee and ended with his going to Jerusalem, the 'Last Supper,' arrest, trial, conviction, execution, and experienced resurrection. They conclude with the centerpiece of resurrection as the confirmation of Jesus as 'the Christ' (the Messiah) although they don't agree on the details. Furthermore, Matthew adds a birth story and an escape to Egypt, whereas Luke has a very different birth story, no account of an escape to Egypt, and adds anecdotes from Jesus' childhood that include a visit to the temple in Jerusalem where Jesus' 'wisdom' astounded the priests. The three Synoptic gospels are distinguished, particularly, by their respective theologies.²³⁴ Matthew takes Jesus' aim to be the presentation of a 'New Torah' on the hearts of his followers. Mark takes up his pen to correct the misunderstandings of the apostles, especially Peter, and to reformulate the apocalyptic vision of the Church as a consequence of the Jewish War with Rome and destruction of the temple in 70 CE. Mark substitutes individual martyrdom in

233. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 171.

234. This is Norman Perrin's core thesis in *The New Testament: An Introduction*.

solidarity with the Christ for a general apocalyptic retribution and establishment of the people of God to their 'rightful' status of a new worldly or cosmic order. Luke responds to the delayed apocalyptic expectations by portraying the goal of Christianity to be the 'conversion of the world' with his first book, the Gospel of Luke, an account of the central status of Jerusalem for Jesus, personally, and with the second book, the Book of Acts of the Apostles, an account of the shift of the focal point of the Christian church from Jerusalem to Rome as the symbolic center of the world from which the conversion of the world will follow.

John's gospel is profoundly different. Its emphasis is on a 'spiritual' Christ and the Christian's participation in that spirit. It's Logos Christology is at the core of both Athanasian and Arian conceptions of Christianity that struggled for dominance in the Greek Christian world. It, like Mark, has no birth story or accounts from Jesus' youth, it opens with a proclamation that Jesus is 'the Christ' (the Messiah) not by 'resurrection' but by his 'metaphysical status' as the very thoughts of God, the eternal Logos, that (had to have occurred) prior to God's creation but was 'incarnated' in Jesus as the Logos (not the words of any text). John's gospel has a three year ministry that began with the 'cleaning of the temple' in Jerusalem (whereas the other gospels have the account at the end of the ministry), and Jesus's actual ministry occurs in and around Jerusalem with only infrequent visits to Galilee as his way of acknowledging Jesus' origin out of Galilee. In addition, John's gospel has as its core aim of the final supper the introducing of a new ritual for Christians, but it is the ritual of feet washing, not the Eucharist as in the other gospels. Numerous details in the account of Jesus' ministry are different from the Synoptics that include the replacement of enigmatic parables with long discourses by Jesus.

Strauß documents Schleiermacher's contorted efforts not only to justify his claim that John's Gospel is from an eyewitness but also, ironically, Schleiermacher's efforts to avoid John's Logos theology because it contradicts Schleiermacher's own theology. According to Schleiermacher, Christianity arose not because the Logos was incarnated in the Christ but because in the Christ a new act of creation occurred of 'perfect' God-consciousness,²³⁵ not seduced by sensuousness/sin, that established the absolute conditions necessary for the historical, developmental process of humanity to ever more perfect God-consciousness/sinlessness. In short, whereas according to the Gospel of John, the Christ has been present since the original creation itself, according to Schleiermacher the Christ is a new act of creation whose completion requires the infinite open-endedness of history for individual consciousness to run the race to 'perfect' God-consciousness.

Even more importantly, though, Strauß saw that the alternatives 'true' or 'false,' 'fact' and 'myth' were the wrong concern when it came to the gospels. Where Schleier-

235. On Schleiermacher's insistence on the need for a new act of eminent causality to accomplish Christian salvation, see above: 277 ff.

macher sees falsehood in the concept myth, Strauß in 1835 sees (Hegelian) ‘science’ in the biblical ‘myths’!

Schleiermacher on the Gospel of John as Eyewitness

Two passages from Strauß emphasize that for Schleiermacher, the Gospel of John is the only source from an eyewitness:

It is well known that from ancient times onward the church regarded the Synoptic Gospels to have been written first, whether in the sequence in which they stand in the canon, or even in the order of Matthew, Luke, Mark; only after these three, for spiritual as well as for material supplementation, was the Johannine Gospel written. *For Schleiermacher, the first three Gospels were not written by the apostles or disciples of apostles but were secondary compilations, but he accepted the fourth as the work of an apostle.*²³⁶ (emphasis added)

Strauß cites Schleiermacher himself:

‘The Gospel of John [Schleiermacher says] presents itself everywhere as one which originates from an immediate eyewitness, in contrast with which the others’ compilation from single elements is subject to comparable doubt, and all three without exception are to be seen as coming to us secondhand.²³⁷ This is not the case with the Johannine Gospel; it clearly has the character of originating from a single person who narrates what he himself experienced.’²³⁸

This concern to ground his theology in the reports of a historical observer of events illuminates an aspect that is crucial for Schleiermacher. Having swept aside the Synoptic Gospels as untrustworthy, Schleiermacher clings to the Gospel of John because “[...] if also in the case of the Gospel of John we found it necessary to see the narrative as derived second- or third-hand and to have been modified in manifold ways, *nothing reliable would be left for us.*”²³⁹ (emphasis added) In other words, it is Schleiermacher who approaches the gospels with an ‘either’/‘or,’ not Strauß as so many of Strauß’ interpreters erroneously concluded. It is Schleiermacher who concludes: *Either there are historical reports from eyewitnesses in the gospels, or the Christian faith is built on shifting sand.*

It is not simply Strauß’ judgment but the conclusion of biblical scholarship generally that John’s Gospel could not possibly be from an eyewitness in light of the historical issues of duration, location, and sequence of its narrative. The content of

236. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 46.

237. Strauß has combined two quotes from Schleiermacher. This first sentence comes from Schleiermacher’s *Das Leben Jesu*, 181 (although Keck gives the citation as 171). The second sentence is found on 168 (although Keck gives the citation as 159).

238. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 41.

239. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 43.

John's theology drips with Greek metaphysics and it is written far more in the spirit of 'Mystery Religions' of the Greek world (Isis and Mythraism) that eclipse history with the call to a spiritual realm beyond the physical world. John's theology, of course, is as Christian as any of the other theological options that one finds in Christianity. However, according to Schleiermacher's own criteria, John's theology has little to do with the factual, historical narrative that is the 'husk' for its theological 'kernel.'

What Schleiermacher doesn't Share with The Gospel of John:

Far more crucial to Strauß' dismissal of Schleiermacher's gospel exegesis is that there are points of disagreement between the theologies of John's Gospel and Schleiermacher.

John's Pre-Existent Logos and Schleiermacher's New Creation:

I have already referred to this discrepancy. For Schleiermacher the Christ is a new moment of creation that establishes the ontological conditions for the enabling of perfect God-consciousness in Christ's followers. The Christ was not present from the beginning of all creation. The incarnation of perfect God-consciousness at a particular point in time is what establishes Christianity as the 'highest' form of religion or 'pure' God-consciousness.²⁴⁰

It is not simply that Schleiermacher's theology is a contradiction of John's gospel that disturbs Strauß. Rather, it is that it, along with the other themes of disagreement, is simply ignored by Schleiermacher with no acknowledgement of the centrality of the themes to John's gospel.²⁴¹

An example comes from Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* §14. Schleiermacher speaks of the Christ as savior. Belief in God is "[...] nothing other than the certainty of the feeling of absolute dependence as such."

[This certain faith] [...] cannot be in an individual until, through an impression that he receives from Christ, a beginning, even if only an infinitely smaller one that is a real realization in him of the annulment of the state of need for redemption. The expression 'faith in Christ' is here as well as [the expression] 'faith in God' consist in the relation of an effect with Christ as cause. This is also how John describes it.²⁴²

240. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 154 and Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* §8 [4.].

241. See Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 60–61; 102.

242. Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt*. Zweite Auflage (1830/31), Rolf Schäfer ed. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008): 116.

Schleiermacher footnotes to John 1:12–14; ignoring entirely John's account of the pre-existent Logos present at the beginning of creation and incarnated in Jesus of John 1:1–11. Here John emphasizes not only Jesus as the incarnation of the eternal, divine Logos, but he stresses that the incarnated Lord 'was not recognized' and 'was not accepted' even when he came to his own people (1:11), a cornerstone to the author of John's thesis of the importance of miracles for evoking faith. The Logos alone was insufficient to evoke faith. It needed 'historical' manifestation of its power in order to be recognized. John's faith is 'objective' whereas faith for Schleiermacher is entirely 'subjective.'

Schleiermacher Emphasizes Theological Tendency in the Synoptics but Ignores the Theological Tendency of the Gospel of John:

Strauß indicates that Schleiermacher is quick to dismiss an account in the Synoptic Gospels as the product of the author's 'theological tendency,' but Strauß illustrates Schleiermacher's blindness with respect to John's 'theological tendency.' For example, Schleiermacher insists that John received his account of the baptism of Jesus by John the Baptist from John himself.²⁴³ Luke reports that there was a family relationship between the Baptist and Jesus. However, John 1:31 denies that the Baptist had any prior relationship, much less a familial relationship, with Jesus.²⁴⁴ For Schleiermacher all this means is that Luke's account is non-historical. Luke's account is "a manifestly poetically inclined presentation"²⁴⁵ However, Strauß points out that Schleiermacher doesn't ask if John's denials of a prior relationship with John [the Baptist] is driven by John's theology, that is, that the Messiah was unrecognized among his 'people.'²⁴⁶

Furthermore, Strauß points out "[t]hat Jesus submits to John's repentance-baptism creates a contradiction with the presupposition of his sinlessness [...]," which Schleiermacher defends and whose contradiction Schleiermacher seeks to avoid.²⁴⁷

Schleiermacher's take on John's theological tendency stresses the *nature of Christ's activity* (as Perfect God-consciousness), not the *nature of Christ's being* (as incarnated Logos, which Schleiermacher ignores).

For example, John's theological tendency "[...] is 'to make understandable simultaneously the catastrophe in Christ's fate [what is it called a catastrophe when it is what is required for the salvation of humanity?]²⁴⁸ and the proper nature of his activity,' or

243. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 74.

244. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 73.

245. See, Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 73. Such 'poetically inclined presentation' would mean that it is 'mythic' (non-historical) in Schleiermacher's judgment.

246. See Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 73.

247. See Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 73–74.

248. See Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 79, 98–99, 110.

to solve the contradictions of how, this nature of his activity not being perceived, he nevertheless could be rejected by the Jews.”²⁴⁹

Strauß asks: “[...] [W]hy then does Schleiermacher speak only of the activity of Jesus and not of his nature or of his being itself, as the content of the Fourth Gospel’s presentation?”²⁵⁰ It is clear why: Schleiermacher does not want to admit that the Fourth Gospel speaks of a peculiar nature of Jesus, that is, of him as a superior, superhuman being.²⁵¹ Strauß points out that, according to John: “Had he [Jesus] been only the human Jewish Messiah, then the Jews would scarcely have refused him; but he was really the enfleshed Logos, the divine light-principle; hence it is no wonder that the children of darkness did not accept him.”²⁵² It is unthinkable for Schleiermacher that an eyewitness disciple could have taken Jesus to be the incarnated Logos. Consequently, because Schleiermacher claims the author of the Gospel was the disciple John, he refuses to find that claim, as obvious as it is, in the gospel.

This strategy by Schleiermacher with respect to a pre-existent Christ is analogous to his simply ignoring difficult issues with respect to Jesus and miracles. Schleiermacher’s Christ doesn’t need to ‘correct’ misconceptions of geocentrism or accounts of what happened in the tomb because ‘they don’t belong to the domain of Jesus’ calling.’²⁵³

Christ as miracle worker:

For Schleiermacher, miracles are unacceptable because they violate the laws of science. The Christ neither is independent of physical laws nor does he establish his claims to Messiahship on the basis of the violation of physical laws. He is ‘naturally human’ (not omniscient), has no need to mention the Copernican heliocentric solar system, and is not a nationalistic, theocratic Messiah. Schleiermacher ends up defending what Strauß calls a ‘middle ground’ that constitutes a ‘Platonic Noble Lie’²⁵⁴ (*Republic* III 414b-c) between objectively false and subjectively true: Jesus didn’t have to address physical laws, the Copernican Revolution, and nationalistic, theocratic Messiahship because

249. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 79.

250. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 79.

251. The Gospel of John does not portray Jesus as subject to gradual human development. See Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 63 and 103.

252. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 80. See as well, *ibid.*: 60.-61 and 102.

253. On Schleiermacher’s attempt to take a ‘middle’ position on the miracles between ‘objectively untrue and subjectively true,’ see *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 67; 148. Schleiermacher’s efforts reach the point of ridiculousness with respect to Jesus’ not being obliged to correct the (possible) misunderstanding of the disciples because, as long as they didn’t ask, Jesus wasn’t obligated to provide information (see *ibid.*: 138–139; 149) beyond the ‘domain’ of his calling (see *ibid.*: 67; 138; 148).

254. Schleiermacher’s translation of 414b-c is ‘*untadeligen und heilsamen Täuschungen*’ (‘blameless and wholesome deceptions’), by means of which ‘*es sei löblich, durch Täuschung zu überreden*’ (‘it is praiseworthy to persuade by deception’).

they were not essential to faith. Because the disciples didn't directly ask about these themes, there was no reason for Jesus to address them.²⁵⁵

The accounts of miracles are the consequence of the limitation of human reason, precisely as a good Rationalist would propose.²⁵⁶ The Copernican Revolution was not part of the common understanding of his day so that he didn't need to refer to it.²⁵⁷ In other words, Schleiermacher does not invoke 'accommodation' to excuse the miracles but 'service to a higher truth.' The 'miracles' are unimportant for Schleiermacher because they 'don't affect the domain of his calling,'²⁵⁸ which is the 'higher truth' of his spiritual vocation for humanity.

John speaks of resurrection and judgment – Schleiermacher did not:

John claims physical resurrection and judgment whereas Schleiermacher speaks of spiritual resurrection and ongoing' personal self-judgment by the believer.²⁵⁹

Rather than it being Strauß who takes 'history' in the gospels to be threatened if their stories are 'mythic,' Schleiermacher has to insist on the eyewitness status of the most questionable historical source for Jesus of Nazareth as the bulwark against the threat of science.

Conclusion

The years of engagement of Schleiermacher resulted in a breadth and depth of analytical criticism of Schleiermacher that is astonishing. With the exceptions of Schleiermacher's definition of immortality as the experience of the eternal in the present moment (although Strauß takes its meaning in a different sense) and his at least partial rejection of miracles, Strauß challenged all of the key ingredients (and many more minor details) of Schleiermacher's work: 1) His rejection of philosophy and ethics as the basis of religion and, in their place, emphasized 'the *feeling* of absolute dependence' on God as the heart of religion. 2) Consequently, his grounding his theology in 'human experience,' not thought or action. 3) His bracketing out all 'predicate' language for God. All God-language that wasn't concerned with what humanity's experiences was excluded (for example, what God 'is' and 'His' characteristics). 4) His emphasis on the

255. For example, the gospels provide no explanation for what happened in the tomb because the disciples didn't ask. See Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 148, see as well, 67, 138–139, 141–142.

256. See Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 86–87, 92, 147.

257. See Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 67.

258. See Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 67.

259. See Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*: 105–106.

key divine element as the God/Man, not God 'Himself.' The God/Man (the Christ), Schleiermacher claimed, had 'perfect God-consciousness' (that is, everything that he was, said, and did arose out of the steadfast orientation grounded in his 'feeling of absolute dependence' on God) but was not the incarnated divine 'Logos.' 5) His understanding of 'sinlessness' as the achievement of 'perfect God-consciousness, which, did not (!) mean 'always acting according to God's law' (as if we could know that God is a lawgiver) but the highest degree of living, thinking, and acting out of the 'feeling of absolute dependence.' 6) His insistence that the God/Man was a historical individual, Jesus of Nazareth, who constituted a 'new moment of divine creation' with his model of 'perfect God-consciousness' for humanity. 7) Jesus was not a miracle worker. The claim that he performed miracles was the consequence of the limited reason of his age. Yet, Schleiermacher acknowledged that there are moments in 'the' gospel, John, where Jesus could have denied his possession of miraculous power, but he didn't because those moments/elements were not 'essential' to his ministry. 8) His understanding of the 'Christian' Church as that community devoted to encouraging one another to realize the potential of the God/Man model (a so-called *inclusive* Christology, possible for everyone; not an *exclusive* Christology, accomplished only by one individual, Jesus). In other words, the individual Christian is to seek to live out of her/his sense of the 'feeling of absolute dependence' as an on-going developmental process that 'overcomes mere sensuousness.' 9) Because Schleiermacher insisted that the God/Man was an historical individual, he claimed that the Christian gospels *had to provide factual, historical information* that 'proves' the truth of the God/Man. 10) Although he briefly modified his reservations over the priority of the Gospel of John in the third edition of the *LJ*, Strauß quickly returned to his rejection of Schleiermacher's solution to the contradictions and inconsistencies among the four Christian gospels (Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John) by dismissing the first three so-called Synoptic Gospels as unhistorical accounts that consist of stories collected long after their occurrence, NOT from authors who were eyewitnesses. According to Schleiermacher, only the Gospel of John comes from an eyewitness!

Strauß reflections leave the reader with little ground for taking Schleiermacher's work seriously. One can summarize the results by two questions: 1) How does one distinguish between an absolute and a relative feeling when/if one always has a feeling?; and 2) Why is a feeling of unity more 'valuable' than a sensuous feeling? The answers require more than merely the claim that feeling is more universal than knowledge or morality. It presupposes an understanding that claims that the human condition is corrupted by sensuousness and incapable of escaping its imperfections. A way beyond these unresolvable conundrums is to give up the conviction that Christianity (or religion generally) has to do with perfection of any kind to concentrate attention on the necessary conditions of possibility for a transcendental consciousness to be able to experience, understand, and the exercise responsible agency in a community – and across the globe.

Volume I

Part II:

An Historical Reader for the 1839 Zurich Revolution

Introduction to the Historical Reader: on the September 6, 1839, Revolution in Zurich, Switzerland

Overview

Strauß' appointment to Zurich University's Theological Faculty by the government of the Canton of Zurich triggered a coup by populist Christians that led to the deaths of fifteen people. This 'Historical Reader' provides translations of materials that are concerned with the events leading up to, on, and resulting from September 5/6, 1839. It provides official reports, formal letters pro and con of recommendation to the government in support of Strauß' appointment, responses from Strauß and the Superintendent of Schools, Scherr, pro and con street pamphlets, newspaper reports, an unusual historical account of the events signed off for its historical accuracy by all three factions of the revolution (leaders of the government, populist Christians, and soldiers), and the "Report on the Activity of the Aid Society for the Good of the Victims of 6 September 1839."

Having failed in 1837, the Liberal government, which had come to power with the first democratic election in the Canon in 1831 and founded the University of Zurich in 1833 as part of the government's educational reform from grade school through post-secondary school, was successful on its second attempt to appoint Strauß to the chair for Biblical Theology, Church History, and Dogmatics at the University of Zurich in January of 1839.

The failed appointment in 1837 had prepared the explosives and the successful appointment in 1839 lit the fuse for the populist, Christian coup that brought down the Liberal government of the Canton of Zurich on September 6, 1839.

The Zurich populist Christians took it to be not only their right to defend 'true' Christianity but also their democratic obligation to overthrow a government they viewed as threatening their religious worldview and dogma and to demonize the government's 'liberal' educational values as a threat to their traditional, social convictions.

Storming of the capitol city of the Canton of Zurich was fueled by the 'fake news' that the 'Seven Concordat'¹ Canton troops were on their way to Zurich to defend the hated Liberal government.

Xenophobia drove the populist Christians who used the metaphor of the 'northern virus' threatening the Canton in the form of the German liberals, Strauß and the progressive pedagogue, Ignaz Thomas Scherr appointed as Superintendent of Schools for life by the Canton government. Scherr had instituted a reform not only of the general school curriculum but also, specifically, of the religious instruction in the schools.

1. On March 17, 1832, the Cantons of Zurich, Bern, Luzern, Solothurn, St. Gall, Aargau, and Thurgau had agreed to a Concordat which committed them to military intervention not only upon request of the threatened Canton but also without invitation should there be a circumstance in which a Concordat member's constitution was threatened.

The 'deep pockets' funding and fueling of the populists in Zurich came from an industrialist who was angry that the Liberal government had eliminated child labor.

Among the lessons to be learned from September 6, 1839:

- a) *Civic law provides no guarantee of justice much less virtue.* Before one examines the civic law (if one does at all) for guidance in accomplishing one's goals, one has already given or withheld permission to oneself to do something. A revolution is grounded in the conviction that the legislating government is illegitimate or immoral so that maintaining its constitution would be a moral and not only a political failure. Although the self-permission to attack one's own government can occur on vague and imprecise 'moral' grounds, that decision is, nonetheless, a decision that invokes the moral culture 'above' the civic law. Obviously, the significance, reality, and discernment of this internal, moral culture is still worthy of reflection, today.
- b) *Socially constructed rules, including 'objective' religious revelations preserved in texts or preached before followers, are also no guarantee of virtue much less justice.* Such 'hypothetical' rules ("if you want to do this, then you must ...") are specific to individual cultures, communities, and institutions. Adherence to them is governed by 'honor' or the wish to achieve 'status and prestige' in the eyes of others. Hence, both their social origin and their aim of status and prestige make them relative. 'Hypothetical imperatives' are by no means 'wide,' universal, 'categorical imperatives' that 'fit together' in the unitary whole of an architectonic of lawfulness. In turn, 'categorical imperatives' are not simply an aggregate of rules applicable to diverse and various aspects of life. As with the civic law, the moral decision that gives oneself permission to do something on the basis of socially constructed rules occurs prior to one's concern with socially constructed rules themselves so that, again, it would be a valuable exercise to engage the significance, reality, and discernment of this internal moral culture, today.
- c) *The capacity to make clever, imperceptible distinctions and to weave them into 'coherent' narratives (e.g., conspiracy theorists and theories), while often taken to be an indication of 'intelligence,' is no guarantee of their 'truth.'* By employing such narratives in blind adherence to the narrative or mere fealty to a 'leader' based on their role in perpetrating the narrative in order to give oneself permission to do something (e.g., initiate a political revolution) substitutes wild speculations for moral conviction. One avoids wild speculation by embracing precisely what the conspiracy theorists deny: that there is a lawful, causal order that governs physical events as well as a lawful, causal order that governs personal and corporate agency.
- d) *Insisting that the Christian gospels are literal, historical accounts of factual events in the life of Jesus of Nazareth elevates the literary 'husks' (stories: myths, *muthoi*/μῦθοι) to the status of absolute truth and ignores, if not intentionally destroys, the significance of the stories' 'kernels' (which can be a historical fact, a philosophical/theological idea, or a symbol).* The consequence is that the theological options

to be found in the text are glossed over with a dogmatic insistence on a single message of 'salvation,' and one places on the divine throne what, in fact, are finite, anthropomorphic capacities (thought, creativity, teleological planning, compassion, will, etc.). Although exaggerating the importance of anthropocentrism by placing humanity at the center of the story of creation and salvation, this 'divinization' of humanity is neither elevating nor enriching of humanity but a crippling and impoverishing of humanity's real capacities for responsible agency.

- e) *The examination of the implications of Strauß' turn to Kantianism at the end of his life provides a host of other lessons for responsible agency.*² The core lesson, though, from September 6, 1835, is that science and religion are not adversaries but complementary and inseparable, universal (not socially relative) causal orders that govern personal and corporate decision taking with respect to 'what is' and 'what ought to be.' *What science teaches us about 'what is' and practical reason about 'what ought to be' must be engaged prior to one's consideration of the civic law, socially constructed rules, and/or populist social narratives.* To do so, though,

2. In anticipation of the suspicion that these lessons constitute merely an aggregate of themes without the grounded coherence of an architectonic, it is important to emphasize that these lessons constitute a coherent theoretical and practical architectonic accountable to sense perception. For example, the lawfulness of material conditions is the basis of all other capacities and, therefore, should be the starting point of all efforts to understand anything. The individual should treat her-/himself and the other never as a mere means but, primarily, as an end to one-/her-/himself. The three maxims of understanding: 'Think for oneself;' 'Think from the perspective of the other;' 'Be consistent (lawfully and with one's highest capacities)' contribute, as well, to the framework of 'wide' categorical imperatives for the individual to invoke in giving her-/himself permission to act. Furthermore, lawfulness is grounded in two systems of causality (nature and freedom) that are required (but do not determine in advance) for us to experience the world as we do. Here we can/must speak of a 'transcendental' metaphysics *within the limits of reason*. Reason is a set of conditions that enable understanding and responsible agency in the world rather than a static, 'divine' order of mere ideas (the *Logos*), a mechanical, material order, or the fulfilment of a set of anthropocentric wishes grounded in anthropomorphic analogies that make humanity the navel of the universe and the actual object of worship. Humanity's 'significance' is its capacity to understand and to create in ways that nature cannot, on its own, create. Humanity's significance, then, is its 'place' where nature is 'open-ended' and not a mechanically, closed causal system. Humanity's creative openness is, also, the key to a profound satisfaction that gives our lives genuine meaning in the face of the staggering 'negativity' of our world-situation. Kant contrasted his 'negative method' that consists in the 'positive' empowerment of responsible agency with Stoic indifference, Epicurean concupiscence, Cynic hardening of the self, melancholy, mysticism, drunkenness, and grace. (See 'Kant's 'Negative Method' in 45, n. 28.)

There is no better starting point for the achievement of meaning than the four examples (not exhaustive) of the 'duties owed to oneself and others' (NOT to God and country): 'don't lie,' 'don't commit suicide' out of social frustration and economic despair, 'develop one's talents,' and 'respond to the suffering of others'. All 'duties owed to oneself and others' along with the conditions and capacities of transcendental consciousness that make 'duty' possible in the first place are part of an internally coherent architectonic and not simply a random aggregate of elements grounded in speculative analogies. This methodology comes from Kant's "The Transcendental Doctrine of Method" in the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 735–884.

requires a 'religious' 'culture' that grasps the significance of a hope for efforts not driven exclusively by self-interest, which is grounded in imperceptible lawfulness.

A "Historical Reader" of Translated Materials from the 1839 Events

The materials of the "Historical Reader" address the issues and present diverse official reports from the government as well as populist documents used by the opposition as a contribution to establishing an adequate record of the events in Zurich.

If this material teaches us nothing else, we should not be surprised that Matthew 5:43–44 ("You have heard it said, 'Love your neighbor and hate your enemy. But I tell you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you'") is no hindrance, obviously, to 'Christians' employing the "devil's deception" in their interaction with their opponents, to hating others not of one's tribe, or to killing of those opposed to one or one's group.

An individual or a group is no more dangerous than when they take their *re-figured* reading of their tradition's *pre-figured* narrative to be absolute truth. The revolution in Zurich on September 6, 1839, is a classic example of Personal Theism's elevating of human understanding to the throne of God in the belief that it must employ violence to achieve its aims. Sadly, Zurich did not learn that lesson with Huldrych Zwingli.

Organization of the Historical Reader

The Historical Reader opens with three accounts of the revolution of September 6, 1839. The first is my account that draws on wider resources than the other two, which were written by eye-witnesses. The second is from Colonel Friedrich Schulthess, who was a commander of forces on September 6th. His account, written some ten years after the events, is unusual in that its accuracy was signed off on by all three parties involved in the violent events: the government, the military, and the rebelling Christians. The third account is from 1840 and is a partisan account written by a member of the Christian opposition to Strauß' appointment and the government.

These three accounts of the events are followed by three reference letters. The first is from a supporter of Strauß' appointment, Dr., Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob Paulus from the Ruprecht Karl University of Heidelberg. Remarkable about this letter is that Paulus was the 'Rationalist' theologian who was ridiculed most vociferously by Strauß in his the *LJ*. The second letter is a letter of opposition to Strauß' appointment by Dr. Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wette, Paulus' student. De Wette was dismissed from the University of Berlin, where he was friends with Schleiermacher, for having

a written a note of sympathy to the mother of Karl Ludwig Sands, the fraternity member who murdered August von Kotzebue, an opponent of fraternities and political reformer. At the time of his writing in opposition to Strauß' appointment to the faculty, De Wette was professor at the University of Basel, Switzerland. The irony of this letter from de Wette is that Strauß viewed him as an ally in the *LJ*. The third letter is a humorous street pamphlet in support of Strauß 'by a farmer,' which is written as if it were in opposition to his appointment.

After this material, there are six letters and street pamphlets addressing Strauß' candidacy. The three in favor are each immediately followed by a letter in response that opposes the appointment. The first letter is Strauß' own that he sent to the government on 1 March 1839.

Included, as well, is the letter to the 'Committee of Faith' from Ignaz Thomas Scherr, the Superintendent of Schools in Zurich, whose educational reforms, which attempted a restructuring religious instruction in the schools, were particularly hated by the rebellious conservative Christians.

The Historical Reader closes with the "Report on the Activity of the Aid Society for the Good of the Victims of 6 September 1839, which documents the tragic consequences of the revolution for its victims.

German originals are posted at <https://criticalidealism.org> under "Theology and Revolution."

McGaughey – On D.F. Strauß and the 1839 Revolution in Zurich¹

Overview

Perhaps no other individual theologian served as a lightening rod for the explosive energy of the theological world of the 19th century than did David Friedrich Strauß. As author of the controversial *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined*, he came to be seen as the representative of the liberal attack on the sacred scriptures because of his conclusion that the gospel narratives are myth. The theological right immediately initiated and applauded the dismissal of Strauß from the university in Tübingen in 1835. Conservative Christians in Germany and Switzerland were mortified with the announcement of his appointment in 1839 to the university in Zurich. Nowhere was the destructive power of religious conviction unleashed with such political consequences in the 19th century than in Zurich with this appointment. As consequential and deadly as the events surrounding Strauß' appointment and the subsequent political revolution in the canton of Zurich were, their details have not been told in English.² What follows seeks to fill that lacuna.

The Appointment of Strauß and Its Context

Strauß' successful appointment to the chair for New Testament Theology, Church History, and Dogmatics on January 26, 1839, was the second attempt³ by the Education Committee for the canton of Zurich to hire David Friedrich Strauß. In 1836, the position came open because of the death of Heinrich Christian Michael Rettig. According to Strauß' biographer, Theobald Ziegler,⁴ Strauß was nominated for the appointment already in April of 1836 by Ferdinand Hitzig, who was Professor of Old Testament Studies since the University's founding in 1833. Hitzig was the cousin of

1. This article is the result of a Fulbright research grant under the sponsorship of Prof. Ulrich Köpf, Director of the Institut für Spätmittelalter und Reformation. In particular, it is indebted to the invaluable assistance of Prof. Hans Geißer and his graduate assistant, Mr. Ernst Friedauer, at the University in Zurich.

2. No comprehensive history of the events surrounding September 6, 1839, was published before that by Friedrich Schultheß in 1906 (see Schultheß, *Aufzeichnungen über die Straußische Bewegung und den 6. September 1839 in the Züricher Taschenbuch* (Zurich: 1906 <1864>): 79–80) though Schultheß wrote his account in 1864 (see *ibid.*: 80 and 127). Its importance is enhanced because it is written by a participant (he was commander of the citizen's defense force, see *ibid.*: 79–80) and because he submitted the report for approval of its accuracy to representatives of all parties involved (see *ibid.*: 81).

The present account depends primarily upon Schultheß, but it draws on newspaper reports from 1839 and at the time of the 50th anniversary of the revolution among other documents.

3. According to the *Züricher Post*, Strauß was rejected in 1837 when "the entire theological faculty" voted against the appointment (see "Die Züricher September-Revolution vom Jahre 1839" in the *Züricher Post*, September 7, 1889: 2). This is contradicted by Strauß' biographer, Theobald Ziegler, who says that Hitzig nominated him in 1837. See Theobald Ziegler, I: 264. In the second round, only Hitzig from the theological faculty supported the appointment (see Ziegler, I: 290; *Züricher Post*, September 7, 1889: 2).

4. Theobald Ziegler, I: 264 ff.

one of Strauß' closest friends from the time of his studies in Tübingen, Gustav (von⁵) Binder.⁶ Strauß himself withdrew his name in 1837 because he had reservations given the resistance to his appointment among the populous and he refused to accept a title less than was to be offered to Eduard Elwert. With Strauß' withdrawal of his name, Elwert was appointed to the chair. Eduard Elwert was a Schleiermachian, whose pamphlet, "A Layman's Opinions of the Hegel-Strauß Christology" ("Laienworte über die Hegel-Straußische Christologie") found great resonance among Strauß' Christian opponents for its 'pietistic vituperations' against him. Elwert had to resign because of illness in 1838.⁷ This made it possible for the government to select Strauß as his replacement with Mayor Hirzel, chair of the Education Committee, breaking the tie.⁸ On January 31st the Governing Council of the canton voted 98 to 49 in favor of the Education Committee's recommendation which was followed by the approval on February 2nd of the Upper Council in a stormy session by a vote of 15 to 3.⁹

The university in Zurich only had been founded in 1833 as part of an educational reform movement initiated by the liberal government elected in 1830.¹⁰ The driving force behind this educational reform movement was Thomas Scherr, also from Württemberg as was Strauß,¹¹ who had been named director of the reform in the canton and city of Zurich by the liberal government. The strategy of Scherr and the reformers was the introduction of an entirely new curriculum replacing the drill and memory method of instruction. Included in the reform was a thorough revision of religious instruction. School instructors were carefully trained in the new pedagogy. However, they were perceived, at least out in the countryside, as blind automatons of Scherr, who personally became the symbol of all that was wrong with the new curriculum in the eyes of its opposition.¹² Strauß' appointment was meant to be the crowning accomplishment of the reform movement.

5. He was given the title 'von' in 1864 according to Wikipedia https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gustav_von_Binder [21 January 2023]).

6. Gustav Binder was Director of Academic Studies for the Württemberg monarchy at the time of Strauß' death. He eulogized Strauß at his funeral on February 11, 1874. A month after the funeral, the *Schwäbischer Merkur* published a denunciation of Binder's comments at the funeral signed by 214 people for expressing his thanks to Strauß whose accomplishments 'will never be forgotten by the youth of Germany' because "the Straussian teachings ultimately lead to the destruction of the only true foundations of state, family and morality, and consequently only play into the hands of socialism." Ziegler II: 744–745.

7. See Anton Largiadèr, *Geschichte von Stadt und Landschaft Zürich* (Erlenbach-Zürich: Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1945): 145.

8. See the *Züricher Post*, September 7, 1889: 2.

9. See Friedrich Schultheß, *Aufzeichnungen*: 84.

10. The liberals had come to power for the first time in the canton and city of Zurich on March 20, 1831 (see Largiadèr, *Geschichte*: 116). The University of Zurich opened on April 29, 1833. See Largiadèr, *ibid.*: 128.

11. See the *Züricher Post*, September 6, 1889: 2.

12. See the *Züricher Post*, September 6, 1889: 2.

Within months of the publication of the first volume of his work in 1835, Strauß had been fired from his position at the Protestant seminary in Tübingen and sent to his home town of Ludwigsburg to be a professor of classical languages at the Lyzeum.¹³ Needless to say, Strauß was not satisfied with a position that encouraged such a limited range of his intellectual talent, and, upon obtaining a clear answer from the king of Württemberg that no church position would be made available to him,¹⁴ he moved to Stuttgart and commenced a career as a writer – primarily of biographies.¹⁵ His supporters in Zurich attempted to provide him with the academic career appropriate to his talents.

The intention behind the appointment of Strauß in Zurich was to establish a reputation for the new university as a center of free inquiry and to attract young people to a liberal institution on the cutting edge of its day. In addition, Strauß "should protect the people and the church 'from the Pietist and Orthodox head cold threatening out of northern Germany.'¹⁶" The liberals erroneously diagnosed the extent to which the canton was infected with its own virus.

The Spark in the Tinderbox

By the time of Strauß' appointment in Zurich in 1839, it was clear to the conservatives that either the school reform movement in the canton of Zurich must be slowed down, if not stopped, or the church must itself undergo a major reform.¹⁷ Strauß' appointment became the occasion for the conservative church leadership to take the initiative against the educational reform movement in general, symbolized by Scherr, and against Strauß' appointment in particular.

For Scherr's account of the reform, which equally provides one with the flavor of his contempt for those who misunderstood what the reform was all about, see Scherr's *Ein freies und belehrendes Sendschreiben des zürcherischen Seminardirektors an die Herrn XXIIer des sogenannten Glaubenskomite's. Allen guten Christen zur Betrachtung empfohlen von einem Freunde der Wahrheit, aus dem pädagogischen Beobachter besonders mitgetheilt* (Zürich, 1839) provided in translation below.

13. From Jörg F. Sandberger, "David Friedrich Strauß (1808–1874)" in *Theologen des Protestantismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Martin Greschat (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1978): 92.

14. See Sandberger, *ibid.*: 92.

15. Among the many tragedies of Strauß' life, in addition to the catastrophe in Zurich and a destructive marriage, was the stormy relationship that he had with his theologically arch-conservative father, whose beliefs were a source of amusement for both mother and son. See Sandberger, *ibid.*: 84–5.

The darker side of this relationship with the father, Sandberger reports, is that Strauß' father, lying on his deathbed in 1841, said that he (the father), "was cursed by God because of his son's *Life of Jesus*." See Sandberger, *ibid.*: 94.

16. The *Zürcher Post*, September 7, 1889: 2.

17. See the *Zürcher Post*, September 7, 1889: 2.

Schultheß observes that, even among liberals, there were those opposed to Strauß' appointment for fear that faith would no longer be accommodating to the conceptual capabilities of the common man which would only encourage disbelief and immorality. Schultheß quotes a letter from Major Uebel, one of the officers on the government's side during the uprising, written shortly after the fateful events, that contained the commonly held opinion among even those favorably inclined to support Strauß that his work is perhaps laudable in terms of its scientific critique but he had not yet developed a definite system that portrayed his positive faith.¹⁸ Strauß was aware of this deficiency. He wrote a public letter *Sendschreiben an die hochgeachteten Herren: Bürgermeister Hirzel, Professor Orelli and Professor Hitzig in Zurich*, on March 1, 1839, to the mayor and supporters in which one can observe not only a conciliatory tone but the formulation of a constructive theology.¹⁹ The conciliatory third edition of *The Life of Jesus* (1838) should be evaluated in light of its coincidence with the possible professorship in Zurich in 1837. The thematic changes of the third edition are all reflected in the *Sendschreiben an die hochgeachteten Herren*.

Nevertheless, the shibboleth of the conservative movement became: "No salvation without the historical Jesus."²⁰ At no point, however, did Strauß or those influenced by him, deny the reality of the historical Jesus! The quarrel between the conservatives and the Straußians was not over a historical fact or whether there was anything historical about the Christian faith, but, rather, what is the relationship between historical facts and spiritual truth?

The Two Phases of the 1839 Revolution

The resistance to Strauß' appointment in 1839 and the education reform movement under the direction of Scherr involved two phases. The first phase resulted in the pensioning of Strauß before he ever came to Zurich. The second phase resulted in a bloody revolution, the fall of the liberal government, and the firing of Scherr.

Phase One: The Pensioning of Strauß

The Upper Council's decision in favor of hiring Strauß occurred on February 2, 1839. By February 13th representatives from 29 Christian congregations throughout the can-

18. See Schultheß, *Aufzeichnungen*: 83 and 83, n. 1.

19. See Strauß' *Sendschreiben an die hochgeachteten Herren: Bürgermeister Hirzel, Professor Orelli und Professor Hitzig in Zürich*, herausgegeben von dem Vereine zur Beförderung der Volksbildung (Zürich: Züricher und Furrer, 1839).

20. The *Züricher Post*, September 8, 1889: 2.

ton had met and decided upon creating an association in every congregation with two representatives to be elected from each association to form a Central Committee to coordinate the activities against Scherr's Education Committee and the call of Strauß. On February 28th an elected Central Committee from these church associations met for the first time in Zurich to develop a common strategy.²¹

A petition was generated covering the following ultimatums and grievances: 1) demanding the firing of Strauß; 2) insisting that the church councils play a role in the calling of the faculty to the university in Zurich (particularly, the petition called for the appointment of a professor decidedly of Protestant faith [*evangelischer Glaube*]²²); 3) calling for the establishment of a synod independent of the government constituted out of pastors and lay persons elected by the congregations; 4) requiring at least a third of the Education Committee to be elected by this same synod, 5) fostering and insuring of the religious dimension throughout the school curriculum from grade school through the university by a return to teaching Biblical literalism and memorization of Biblical passages, and 6) demanding revision of the education law including the dismissal of Scherr.²³

The congregation associations met on March 10, and 39,225 signatures were collected in favor of the petition with only 1,048 opposed.²⁴ During the Shrove Tuesday festival, effigies of Strauß, Hirzel, and Scherr were burned.²⁵

On March 16th the Governing Council met to discuss the situation in what was a very turbulent session. Mayor Hirzel argued that the "masses" had no business interfering in the decision process concerning academic affairs, and he reminded the session of its responsibility to preserve the peace; if necessary even with the assistance of the "Seven Concordat." In this political alliance from March 17, 1832, seven cantons (Zurich, Bern, Luzern, Solothurn, St. Gallen, Aargau and Thurgau) all agreed to mutual support in the event that one of them was threatened with a violent uprising. A key provision was that the others could intervene *without* being invited.²⁶ Despite the mayor's defense of Strauß, the Governing Council's final vote (149 to 38)²⁷ was

21. See Schultheß, *Aufzeichnungen*: 84. The government was clearly already nervous about the impact of this movement. Schultheß was named commander of a 60 man elite corps that was to protect the town hall. Another 200 men were in reserve, and troops were sent to protect the education seminar responsible for the education reforms. See Schultheß, *ibid.*: 84–5.

22. See Schultheß, *ibid.*: 85. : "*Evangelische Kirche*" (literally, "evangelical church") in the German speaking world refers to what the Anglo world calls the "Lutheran" church. The term "*evangelisch*" does not have necessarily the conservative, pietistic overtone that "evangelical" has in English so that I have chosen to translate "*Evangelische Kirche*" more generically as "Protestant church" and to distinguish it from the "Roman Catholic church" and to translate "*evangelischer Glaube*" as "Protestant faith" rather than to refer to a sectarian, theological orientation.

23. See the *Züricher Post*, September 8, 1889: 2.

24. See the *Züricher Post*, September 8, 1889: 2, and Schultheß, *Aufzeichnungen*: 85.

25. The *Züricher Post*, September 8, 1889: 2.

26. See Schultheß, *Aufzeichnungen*: 91, n. 1.

27. Schultheß, *ibid.*: 85.

to pension Strauß at the amount of 1000 Franken per year before he ever entered the classroom.²⁸ Sandberger reports that Strauß donated the pension to the poor.²⁹

Phase Two: The Fall of the Government and Firing of Scherr

The Central Committee of the church associations took the decision of the Governing Council to dismiss Strauß as having defused the situation, and, in the belief that interim elections would bring their side stronger representation in the Governing Council to enable implementation of the remaining ultimatums, it disbanded on March 21st.³⁰ The government, however, saw the dismissal of Strauß as having satisfied the radical faction, and it proceeded with business as usual ignoring the additional demands.

The failure of the government to address the other demands made by the church associations resulted in the Central Committee being called back into existence on April 22nd. The Committee issued a letter of August 8th to all the congregations calling for a public gathering in Kloten for the 2nd of September.³¹

The Upper Council met on August 23rd and issued a statement forbidding the gathering on September 2nd. It announced that it would press legal charges against those who persisted in attempting to call such a public protest into existence. The Central Committee's response was to insist that it was answerable only to its constituency. At the end of its letter to the congregations, the Central Committee included the rallying cry, "be manly and strong." This was taken by the government to be a call to revolt. The letter was confiscated, and legal charges were brought against the Committee's leadership.³² On August 31st the government tried to calm things down by issuing a letter explaining the intent behind its actions, but it also underscored that it had the obligation to preserve order. It announced that it had arranged for troop support and in part had called some troops to Zurich.³³

Nevertheless, 15,000 people gathered in pouring rain on September 2nd to underscore their support for the educational reforms demanded in the spring.³⁴ Four demands were formulated at this demonstration: 1) that the government rescind its charge that the Central Committee was acting in any way in violation of the constitution; 2) that the government rescind its legal charges against the Committee's leadership; 3) that the government ensure that press freedom not only be used to the advantage of the government but that the opposition have the same rights; and 4) that the right to

28. See the *Züricher Post*, September 8, 1889: 2.

29. Sandberger, "David Friedrich Strauß:" 94.

30. Schultheß, *Aufzeichnungen*: 86.

31. Schultheß, *ibid.*: 86.

32. See Schultheß, *Aufzeichnungen*: 87.

33. Schultheß, *ibid.*: 88.

34. Schultheß, *ibid.*: 88–9.

petition be underscored, the government's hindrance of the Central Committee cease, and that the leaders of the Upper Council be called to accountability for its actions. Furthermore, the intention was announced to generate another petition along the lines of the March 10th version.³⁵ Finally, the Central Committee called for a peaceful, public demonstration in Zurich on September 9th, during the next session of the Upper Council, to increase the moral pressure in favor of the demanded reforms, and to insist that the government either cease its current policies or resign.³⁶

On the other side, a group of "extremist" members of the government wanted to call a public demonstration for September 6th in support of the government. They were also in favor of crushing the opposition at all costs and, therefore, advocated calling in the help of the Seven Concordat. It was decided to leave any such decision up to the Upper Council which was to meet on September 9th.³⁷

The Seven Concordat members, however, demanded an account of the situation from Zurich. The Upper Council, therefore, decided on the evening of September 5th to formulate its response to them on September 6th. The membership was divided (with several members absent) seven in favor and six opposed to seeking military assistance from the Seven Concordat. Nevertheless, those who favored involving the Seven Concordat were convinced that they would retain their majority the next day.³⁸ However, even the possibility of such outside intervention enraged the opposition who, upon hearing of the vote, now saw the honor of the canton to be at stake in addition to feeling threatened by despotism from their own government.

Already on the morning of September 5th, however, a member of the Upper Council had reported to the opposition that within 24 hours 30,000 troops from the Seven Concordat were to be on their way to Zurich to protect the government from any public threat.³⁹ The situation was ripe for an explosion. The vice-president of the Central Committee, Dr. Rahn, issued a statement to all the district presidents that the Fatherland stood under threat from foreign troops, and they should have their followers ready to march on Zurich at the signal of the ringing of the church bells. Although this order was subsequently rescinded by Dr. Rahn,⁴⁰ the president of the district of Pfäffikon, Pastor Hirzel (not to be confused with the mayor and sponsor of Strauß or the commander of troops in Zurich), a liberal who was soured by having

35. See Schultheß, *ibid.*: 89.

36. Schultheß, *ibid.*: 89–90.

37. See Schultheß, *ibid.*: 91.

38. Two battalions from Thurgau were already situated on the canton border ostensibly engaged in military exercises but available at any moment to respond to a call for assistance from the government in Zurich. See Schultheß, *ibid.*: 92.

39. Schultheß, *Aufzeichnungen*: 92.

40. Schultheß, *ibid.*: 93.

been denied a position at the university in Zurich,⁴¹ "on his own initiative and own responsibility gave the signal for the public to march on Zurich."⁴²

Pastor Hirzel had received Dr. Rahn's rescinded notice along with reports that some 800 to 1,000 "radicals" from Hinweil and Winterthur in support of the liberal government were secretly planning to take up strategic positions around the arsenals in Zurich. Pastor Hirzel feared that the news of such numbers would convince the Seven Concordat that the canton was not unified⁴³ and that the outside cantons would intervene on the side of the government.

The call to march on Zurich swept through the countryside like wildfire, and, by early morning of September 6th it was reported in Zurich that Hirzel was leading some 5,000 men towards the city.⁴⁴ Pastor Hirzel's group reached the city at 4:00 a.m. He acknowledged that a few hundred of his men were armed with firearms, but he insisted that such weapons were only for their own protection.⁴⁵ He maintained that their intent in coming at all was only to bring moral pressure on the government in support of the demands from Kloten.

About 6:00 a.m. two government representatives, Hegetschweiler and Sulzer, visited the protesters to learn about their intentions. They carried back to the government the demands of the demonstrators, which essentially were that the government not employ foreign forces to enforce its undemocratic policies.⁴⁶

The mayor decided to place troops only in defense of the arsenals and on Münster Square rather than block the bridges, even in light of the threatening assembly on the left side of the Limmat river, because September 6th was a weekly market day and there was lots of traffic on the bridges in preparation for the market.⁴⁷ The mayor's forces, greatly outnumbered, amounted to only 356 soldiers and cavalry,⁴⁸ who were given the command to use their weapons only in an emergency, and the soldiers were to withdraw into the neighboring houses should they be pressured by the crowd.⁴⁹

Given its recall of the order to march on Zurich, the Central Committee was now faced with having to choose to support Pastor Hirzel or permitting their movement

41. The *Züricher Post*, September 10, 1889: 2. See, as well, the *Neue Züricher-Zeitung*, September 6, 1889: 1, and Largiadèr, *Geschichte*, pp. 148–149. Hirzel was a friend from university days of Alexander Schweizer, the Schleiermacherian mediating theologian on the faculty in Zurich. Schweizer himself opposed the appointment of Strauß arguing: "The Education Committee does not have the right to reform the church. A reform may perhaps be necessary, but this must occur under the auspices of the church itself. The reconciliation between faith and knowledge cannot be achieved by sweeping faith aside and leaving knowledge occupying the field alone [...]" (Largiadèr, *Geschichte*: 146).

42. Largiadèr, *Geschichte*: 148.

43. Schultheß, *Aufzeichnungen*: 94.

44. Schultheß, *ibid.*: 100.

45. Schultheß, *ibid.*: 100–101.

46. Schultheß, *Aufzeichnungen*: 101.

47. Schultheß, *ibid.*: 101–2.

48. Schultheß, *ibid.*: 104.

49. Schultheß, *ibid.*: 102.

to crumble. They decided to send a signal to the Seven Concordat, that Zurich was under their firm control. At 9:00 a.m. the general alarm was sounded to bring down the government.⁵⁰ At this point, two columns, four men abreast moved out from the left side of the Limmat river toward the center of the city. One column of some 600 men was led by Pastor Hirzel in the direction of the lower bridge (the *Untere Brücke*). At the head of the second column of some 1,100 men was Dr. Rahn, who crossed the Münster bridge. For the most part, both columns were armed only with scythes, pitchforks, and morning-stars. They marched singing in unison: "This is the day, that God has made; May He be honored, by all the world; May He be praised, for that which comes to us through Jesus Christ; in Heaven and on Earth!⁵¹"

After having crossed the lower bridge, Pastor Hirzel led his column down Stork Alley (*Storchen Gasse*) towards Münster Square where they were met by the cavalry whose commander ordered, "Go back, the square must remain open!⁵²" Hirzel responded, "Peace! We've only come to peacefully pursue our demands with the government. For God's sake don't initiate a civil war!⁵³" After loud cries and shoving by both sides, a shot rang out from the back rows of the demonstrators.⁵⁴ The cavalry rushed forward, and a shot startled one of their horses which turned and fell throwing its rider. Shots continued to be fired as the cavalry turned to ride back onto the square firing at the demonstrators as they retreated. The infantry withdrew into houses from which they, too, fired on Hirzel's group. Hirzel and his followers pressed forward in rage and were joined by Dr. Rahn's column. They entered the Post Alley (*Post Gasse*) in an attempt to reach the yellow arsenal rather than stop at the post office building where the government was in tumultuous session.⁵⁵ At this point the troops fired another round at the crowd before it could reach New Market Square. This time the demonstrators scattered in panic. Within five minutes no demonstrators remained on the right side of the Limmat river.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, the Upper Council had been in a rowdy session since 7:30 a.m. in their meeting hall in the post office building.⁵⁷ As the demonstrators were crossing the bridges shortly after 9:00 a.m., the only form of action they could agree upon was the rescinding of the legal charges against the Central Committee.⁵⁸ As shots rang out in the streets, they were shouting at one another about who among them was responsible

50. Schultheß, *ibid.*: 104–5.

51. "Dies ist der Tag, den Gott gemacht; Sein werd' in aller Welt gedacht; Ihn preise, was durch Jesum Christ; Im Himmel und auf Erden ist!" *Neue Züricher-Zeitung*, September 15, 1889: 1.

52. Schultheß, *ibid.*: 106.

53. Schultheß, *ibid.*: 106.

54. Schultheß is convinced that it was not intentional. See Schultheß, *ibid.*: 106.

55. Schultheß, *Ibid.*: 107.

56. Schultheß, *ibid.*: 109.

57. Schultheß, *ibid.*: 111.

58. Schultheß, *ibid.*: 111–2. Earlier, they had responded to this demand by claiming that they were powerless to intervene in an action initiated by the attorney general. See *ibid.*: 90.

for the spilling of blood. After the second round of shooting, the mayor commanded a cease fire. Representative Hegetschweiler delivered the order to the troops, and, as he turned to return to the government session, a corporal from the cavalry shot him in the face.⁵⁹ In addition to Hegetschweiler, the uprising brought fourteen deaths and another fourteen demonstrators were, in part, seriously wounded.⁶⁰

The government was no longer able to function in any reasonable fashion. One member even attempted to flee under the disguise of a woman.⁶¹ Under the circumstances, the government resigned and was replaced by a provisional government called to order by 10:45 a.m.⁶² Both this provisional government and the Central Committee called for peace.

In the interim, well-armed reinforcements for the demonstrators (circa 100 men) from parishes on the right side of the Lake of Zurich, along with some 100 men from the Pfäffikon group, entered Münster Square. They were eventually calmed by provisional government representatives only to be followed by another group of 300 men. The city witnessed such a succession of armed and angry crowds well into the night.⁶³ The next day brought further waves of groups through the city who filled New Market Square by 10:00 a.m. spilling over into Münster Square. The Central Committee greeted them there and congratulated them on their victory. In the meantime, the provisional government had taken steps to assure the Seven Concordat cantons that their intervention was not necessary.⁶⁴

The Upper Council met on September 9th, and it confirmed the new provisional government and called for new elections in fourteen days. A further action taken was the firing of Scherr.⁶⁵ They were greeted with cheers of support at the end of their session.⁶⁶

One final irony in the tragic events of September 6, 1839: the city theater, founded in 1832 not without protest from the religious right,⁶⁷ was to have performed "Romeo and Juliet" on the evening of the revolution, but for obvious reasons the performance

59. Schultheß, *ibid.*: 112.

60. Initial reports were of eight dead and twenty-eight wounded. See the *Schweizerischer Republikaner*, 73 (10 September 1839): 1. However, the more accurate statistics of fifteen dead and fourteen wounded can be drawn from the relief organization formed to assist those families who lost loved ones in the uprising. See *the Bericht über die Wirksamkeit des Hilfsvereins zum Besten der am 6. September 1839 Verunglückten* (Zurich: J.J. Ulrich, 1840), pp. 6–12, which provides biographical sketches of the victims. See, as well, the *Schluss-Bericht über die Wirksamkeit des Hilfsvereins zum Besten der am 6. September 1839 Verunglückten* (Zürich: J.J. Ulrich, 1843).

61. See "Beschreibung des 6. Herbstmonats 1839 in Zürich" in the *Neuer Züricher-Kalender auf das Schaltjahr 1840* (Zürich: Verlag S. Mann, 1840): 6.

62. Schultheß, *Aufzeichnungen*: 118–9.

63. Schultheß, *ibid.*: 118–120.

64. Schultheß, *Aufzeichnungen*: 123.

65. *The Züricher Post*, September 12, 1889: 1.

66. Schultheß, *ibid.*: 125.

67. See the *Züricher Post mit Handelszeitung und Stadtchronik*, March 25, 1906: 1.

was canceled. The diva, who was to have performed on that evening, was Agnes Schebest, later to become David Friedrich Strauß' wife in a stormy marriage that ended in a bitter separation. It was even rumored in Zurich upon hearing of their marriage that Strauß had applied to be the new director of the theater.⁶⁸

In place of the pensioned Strauß, the new government hired the orthodox theologian, Johann Peter Lange⁶⁹ as of the summer semester of 1841.⁷⁰ Four years after the revolution the liberals returned to power in Zurich, but it was not until 1850 that they were able to hire a theologian of their liking for the university. Their choice was the "freisinnige" (liberal) Alois Emanuel Biedermann. Biedermann, a Swiss, was educated in Switzerland although he spent several years studying under the Hegelian Wilhelm Vatke in Berlin. Beginning in 1869, Biedermann had yearly visits with Strauß on the Lake of Constance, and he even managed to convince Strauß to visit Zurich on one occasion.⁷¹

68. The *Zürcher Post*, September 11, 1889: 2.

69. See Largiadèr, *Geschichte*: 229.

70. See Paul Schweizer, Alexander Schweizers und Alois Emanuel Biedermanns Theologie im Rahmen der Züricher Richtungsbewegung des 19. Jahrhunderts (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 1972): 293.

71. See Alois Emanuel Biedermann, *Ausgewählte Vorträge und Aufsätze*, ed. by J. Kradolfer (Berlin: Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1885): 50.

Schulthess – Explanatory Notes on the Strauss Movement and September 6, 1839

Lieutenant/Colonel Friedrich Schulthess^[1] (1804 – 1869)

Comments by Schulthess [Editor of the Pamphlet]

The so-called Strauß-Affair in 1839 unquestionably belongs to the most remarkable and unique movements ever to stir a republic. With the force of a hurricane, it struck a society that had become calm following the dramatic transitions in 1830,^[2] and, although without enduring political consequences, to this day these events in 1839 continue to engender a particularly psychological fascination above all with respect to the intensity of personal sentiment that swept through all levels of society at that time. The reason the story has not been written up to this point lies in this powerful, entirely base temper. All participants but particularly those in opposition to the government have suppressed even after the fact an objective portrayal of their either significant or insignificant roles in the events; and equally, the new generation feels itself in part too subjectively close to the events so that the public portrayal of the perceptions and experiences of its relatives is resisted to a certain degree.

Today after two generations, we stand more dispassionately over against these things. All the more, a calm, professional portrayal would be a meritorious and thankful accomplishment. In part, truly valuable contributions to such an enterprise must still be here and there available and accessible. Reception of such information would be desirable, and any and all sharing of such knowledge would be gratefully appreciated both by the editors and the city library.

The following pages published with the consent of the author's descendants represent one contribution and give us spirited satisfaction. Its significance rests in the combination of personal judgment, like that dominating in the first part, along with the description of the events experienced and initiated by officials that structure the second part. This report comes from the pen of Lieutenant-Colonel Friedrich Schultheß "of Weinleiter" (1804 – 1869), founder of the Schultheß bookstore who as commander of the city militia was called to be a personal participant in the events of September 6. Schultheß was the son of the choir director, Johannes Schultheß, who carefully sought

1. [1] Translator's comment Published as a supplement to the *Züricher Taschenbuch* (1906); written 1864. Filing No. PK345e in the Zentralbibliothek Zürich.

2. [2] Translator's comment 'The Canton of Zurich held its first democratic elections in 1830, and the Liberals were elected to power. They assumed office in March of 1831. See Anton Largiadèr, *Geschichte von Stadt und Landschaft Zürich* (Erlenbach-Zürich: Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1945): 116.

to be acknowledged as the Swiss representative of old Rationalism and embraced a Liberal perspective in his early years. The events of 1830 drove him to the Conservative side where he remained for the rest of his life. Nevertheless, he was no blind party member. In his calm way, he avoided all extremes; he especially took great pains to be carefully reserved in his comments and judgments including his scrupulously just analysis for which the submission of his notes provides the best example. As one sees from the concluding comment, these thoughts were formulated after twenty-five years or approximately at the end of 1864. The supplement is provided by the author.

In recent years whenever the 6th of September 1839 is mentioned, which still frequently occurs, regrets are always expressed that this event, although one of the most important in the history of our little free state, has not yet received a detailed and truthful portrayal from the perspective of the citizenship and military. In contrast, the religious and pedagogical sides of the movement have appeared in different books and larger publications albeit not without errors or without the distortions of party interest as one could hardly expect otherwise.

Having been encouraged by friends to undertake this task before the sickle of death takes even more than it has of those personally involved in these events, I present in what follows the results of my own memories, from my notes of interviews with those still living who were involved in one way or another, as well as from my research in official archives and of private written reports or from publications and newspapers of the day. I pursued my research and questioning until I had the feeling that I had obtained an accurate account. I then shared my work with three representatives of the three parties involved in the events: District President (*Regierungspräsident*) (currently City President [*Stadtpräsident*]) [Colonel Eduard³] Ziegler; Member of the Governing Council (*Regierungsrat*) (currently Assistant District Attorney [*Substitut des Staatsanwalts*]) Benz; and Press Secretary (*Fürsprech*) (currently Secretary of the Central Committee [*Sekretär des Zentralkomitees*]) Spöndi. I asked them to determine whether the factual contents of my work were true and correct.

Perhaps these notes will have some value for future historians now that these individuals have examined them and that examination is taken into account.

I.

The year 1839 followed eight years of forgotten peace. Externally, relations had developed satisfactorily; internally, everyday life gave a tranquil appearance on the surface; and even in the city where the citizens politically and commercially defended earlier opinions and where still so many carried open wounds because of the changed circumstances, people accommodated themselves, above all, to the unavoidable. The

3. Addition of the editor of the "Explanation of the Strauss Movement"

sharp divisions having been ameliorated and the rapprochement over the years on the part of the party leaders had come so far that the city, without resistance to its subsequent prerogative, had waived the right to the election of a third of the Upper Council (*Großen Rat*).

The intervening years were a period of turbulent destruction but also of energetic development. There evolved a restless activity in all areas of political life, Canton and city competed in charitable works and in education, and on the northern heights of the capitol they built palace-like buildings as worthy testimonials of these purposes. In addition, the building of a Canton-wide highway system facilitated traffic like never before, the elimination of highway and bridge taxes encouraged commerce and industry, and prosperity accompanied these productive years.

The weaknesses of advancement were hidden behind a glittering facade, however. Many found it difficult to come to grips with the new circumstances not only in the city but also in the countryside. Rising taxes, as ever, were accepted only reluctantly. People complained of the arrogance of the new university-trained school-teachers and of the bureaucracy of the regional administration. Many of the highest officials of the new order took it upon themselves to ignore public decency and morals. They visited brothels openly and at every opportunity made fun of religion and faith. This went so far that one brothel was named "Café Supreme Court Justice." The most influential man could and would be accused of scandalous profiteering.

Nevertheless, a deep tranquility prevailed, and no one had the slightest idea that these abuses would contribute to a massive and universal political movement.

However, on January 26, 1839, the Education Committee took the unfortunate decision (by the deciding vote of its president, Mayor Hirzel) to name Dr. David Strauß of Ludwigsburg, author of *The Life of Jesus*, as professor to the theological faculty of the university. In this work that had brought him considerable reputation as a critic, Strauß challenged the divinity of Jesus and declared the greater part of the historical foundation of Christianity as untrue and the miracles to be myths.

It is entirely possible that the opposition to this vote would have been limited to the officials, the press, and the academics had not Hirzel announced that the choice of Strauß was the beginning of a new Reformation of the church in the Canton. For years in Zurich unrestricted research with appropriate seriousness had been practiced if without going beyond the limits of Christianity as Strauß had done. However, to Strauß' appointment and this call for Reformation of the churches must be added that Strauß' most enthusiastic supporters came from those above-named individuals who were most offensive in terms of their public morality and that the Seminar Director Scherr generated the suspicion that his ultimate goal was to displace the church through the schools, an impression encouraged by the actions and statements of several of Scherr's followers.

One can attribute primarily to these factors the powerful agitation that momentarily overwhelmed the entire population; even among those who embraced or tended

toward a Rationalist interpretation^[4] of ‘Second’ Testament miracles. Most of these Rationalists feared that the consequence of Strauß’ experiment and call to the university would not be a faith more compatible with human intellectual capacities but, rather, unfaith and the destruction of morals.⁵

These concerns were expressed by professors to the Governing Council (*Rgierungsrat*) and again to the Upper Council (*Große Rat*) on January 31 by the Antiste or head pastor of the Zurich churches, Füßli. Following a long and in part passionate discussion of the latter because it was important to the vote of the theology professors at the university, Füßli’s report was rejected by a vote of 98 to 49. In effect this faculty vote constituted approval of Strauß’ appointment, which was sanctioned by the Governing Council (*Regierungsrat*) by a vote of 15 to 3.

Deeply disturbed by these developments, first, a group of acquaintances met at the initiation of Hürlimann-Landis along with his aged father, the earlier representative from Richtersweil. Then on February 13th representatives from 29 communities met in Mädensweil and determined to establish associations in all the communities of the Canton in order to determine the will of the people concerning the appointment of Strauß and to communicate that opinion to the government. This meeting of February 13th had the additional significance that its majority was constituted of older and influential men from the [Zurich] lake area who themselves were devoted to the new political order.

Already by February 24th, associations were approved by the majority of the residents in almost every community. Each association elected two representatives to the [citizens’] Central Committee which was made up of 22 representatives and which was called to Zurich for its first meeting on February 28th.

The government was deeply concerned about this pending gathering, and the police chief advised the City Council (*Stadtrat*) to undertake all necessary steps to

4. [] Translator’s comment: A “Rationalist interpretation” at the time of Strauß involved adherence to the physical laws of nature as God’s creation, which even God cannot violate without contradicting Himself, but it did not take the scriptures to be intentionally deceiving as was suggested by Hermann Samuel Reimarus in his famous “Wolfenbüttel Fragments” published by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing between 1774–1778. Rather, Rationalists like Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob Paulus, whom Strauß criticized in his *LJ*, defended a form of “accommodationism” by which understanding was relative to the age in which it occurs. Given that there was little or no understanding of physical laws at the time of Jesus of Nazareth, God was understood by human beings to be capable of exercising sovereignty over all of nature at will. The “Rationalist interpretation,” then, sought to give a “natural” account of what, otherwise, would be miracles by proposing that what were, actually, natural physical events were mis-perceived by the audience. In other words, the authors of the gospels did not engage in deception, they themselves were subject to the same misunderstanding as their audience given the limited understanding of their age.

5. Major Uebel still could write from Bern after the 6th of September 1839:..” The Plan to call Dr. Strauß as Professor of Dogmatics would have remained a mistake even if the government had had enough power to have been successful. Where there is only one position in dogmatics at a university, one cannot give it to a man whose intellectual accomplishments might be of value in the area of criticism but who had not developed a constructive faith system.”

ensure safety and security. An elite corps of 60 officers was formed and placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Schultheß [author of this report]. The corps was to appear at City Hall at the first command; a further 200 men were stationed on the lower bridge and if necessary the "Panner"⁶ were to be called up. However, because the members of the [citizens'] Central Committee intentionally gathered without escort, these steps were not implemented; in addition, it was determined to be superfluous to send soldiers to protect the [Scherr's pedagogical] Seminar in Küssnacht.

At its meeting, the [citizens'] Central Committee unanimously determined to submit to all the congregations a petition to the Governing Council (*Regierunsrat*), which demanded that Strauß not be brought to Zurich and that a professor of unequivocal, evangelical-Christian faith be called in his place in order to maintain Christian teaching and a Christian university.

The petition was placed before the congregations on March 10th, and the unified response was overwhelming, having been accepted by a vote of 39,225 to 1048.

In light of this almost unanimous will of the people, the majority of the government in the Upper Council (*Großen Rat*) proposed in response that Strauß be pensioned. The motion was brought before the Upper Council on March 16th, and after a very stormy debate, it was approved by a vote of 149 to 38.

Following the success of this main objective and the [citizens'] Central Committee's receipt of assurances from a number of influential members of the Upper Council (*Großen Rat*) that the wishes of the citizenry would be taken into account and the belief that, in light of the impending partial replacement vote for the Governing Council (*Regierungsrat*), a number of members would be voted into office who enjoyed the trust of the people, the [citizens'] Central Committee dissolved on March 21st without terminating the organization of the district and community associations.

However, when with the next session of the Upper Council (*Großen Rat*) none of these expectations were fulfilled, the [citizens'] Central Committee reconstituted itself on April 22nd at the behest of many. The Central Committee issued an open letter to the citizenry on August 8th in light of the recommendation of the earlier petition and in light of the increased disdainful and irritated feelings in opposition to the movement's supporters. This open letter called both for the renewal of the struggle and, especially, for the necessity of renewed emphasis on religious instruction in the schools. At the same time, it was decided to call a gathering in Kloten of the regional committees along with other interested parties.

The decisive opposition to the movement among those in the government contemplated whether or not the movement should be repressed. On August 20th members of the Governing Council (*Regierunsrat*), Weiß, Bürgi, Zehnder, Fierz, Krauer, Hoß, and Schäppi met with Dr. Keller in a secret session. This group decided that the government should attempt to bring an end to the renewed efforts of the [citizens'] Central Committee. Dr. Keller endeavored to influence Mayor Heß who continually shifted

6. All citizens and residents between twenty and sixty capable of military service.

between the parties, and in the August 23rd session Dr. Keller recommended approval to Mayor Heß of the following motion of Governing Council (*Regierungsrat*) member Weiß: "The representatives of the eleven districts immediately send by express to all of their mayors, community leaders, pastors, internal church resistance (*Stillstände*), and bureaucrats a printed decree containing the explicit order not to allow any public gathering called for by the so-called Central or any other similar Committee. Representatives of the state are empowered to commence civil proceedings against anyone allowing such a public gathering in his community."

Only the Governing Council (*Regierungsrat*) members Hegetschweiler and Escher expressed reservations against the motion.⁷ Their concerns were quickly dismissed by Mayor Heß, and the motion was passed. Mayor Hirzel and the Governing Council (*Regierungsrat*) members Ed. Sulzer, Hüni, E. Hirzel, and Hauser were absent from the session. M. Sulzer abstained from the motion.

The Central Committee immediately distributed the decree to the citizenry along with a commentary in which they protested that the decree gave a command and tasks to the communal bureaucrats whereas communities had the right to receive advice from whomever and whenever they wished.

Given the Central Committee's commentary's concluding words to "stay brave and strong," which was taken as an attempt to provoke a revolt, the publication was confiscated, and the leadership of the Committee was indicted by the state's attorney.

If one had hoped that the path of peace was to be followed and had the hope of the determined friends of the movement been limited to maintaining the mood of the populous until the replacement of the Upper Council (*Großen Rat*), these measures were entirely suited to pour oil in the fire and all the more so as zealous officials attempted to strengthen the decree of the government.

Within days the government was confronted with reactions from communities who either rejected the decree outright or who sought clarification with respect to its meaning. No one could comprehend why the government had issued such a decree particularly in light of the fact that it was these very individuals who seven years earlier on the basis of the same demands had founded the resistant Bassersdorf Association and had demanded from the Upper Council (*Großen Rat*) political freedom in the widest sense for all clubs and organizations.

On August 31st (Saturday), the Governing Council (*Regierungsrat*) issued a new proclamation in which it attempted to calm reactions to the decree. Nonetheless, although the government affirmed the exercise of constitutional rights of all citizens, it expressed its determination to maintain law and order in the Canton. To this end, the government mobilized reserves and actually called some of them to Zurich.

The next day, September 1st (Sunday), a day of abominable weather, the Markwalder battalion of 621 soldiers was mustered to its barracks, but the troops were

7. [Regierungsrat] Ed. Sulzer was not present, and upon his return he declared several times that such actions were injurious.

so contumacious that they were released from duty already by 3:00 a.m. the next morning.

1. Likewise, the same evening and despite the despicable weather that lasted until noon of the next day, one could see the movement of the first procession of demonstrators through Zurich to Kloten. Pedestrians, horsemen, and drivers swarmed through the streets to Kloten throughout the night and into the early hours of the morning; huge groups with flags followed one after the other in quick succession. By 10:00 a.m. some 15,000 peaceful but very determined people had gathered to ratify the following which was to be turned over to the mayor by a committee constituted out of two representatives from each district:
2. The government was to rescind as entirely groundless any and all assertions against the (citizens') Central Committee and the district committees in general of guilt for instigation to rebellion contained in the decree of August 23rd.
3. The government should withdraw the indictment as illegal that was initiated by the attorney general against the narrower commission of the Central Committee for having called for insurrection.
4. The government was to have the attorney general called to account for having violated paragraph 5 of the constitution, which was concerned with freedom of the press, that paragraph 5 not be applied only to the opponents of the people but equally to all.
5. The government should permit the citizenry to exercise its right to petition without restraint, it should eliminate all restrictions in this respect placed upon the citizenry, and the government representatives should be called to account for their actions.

Furthermore, the gathering called for the establishment of church voter alliances in all communities and for the development of a new petition along the lines of the one from March 10th.

Given the distance from any large populated center and in spite of the despicable weather, this large public gathering constituted out of the middle class from the entire Canton was, on the one hand, decisively inspiring for some, but, on the other hand, it was very depressing for others with the consequence that the optimists hoped to bring about a decision of the issues quickly whereas those in despair doubted more than ever their ability to rein-in the movement on their own.

The (citizens') Central Committee intended that there should be a meeting of the Upper Council (*Großen Rat*) in eight days on the 9th of September and that its party would be allowed to go *en masse* but unarmed to the city with the aim of morally forcing the Upper Council either to resign or to decisively distance itself from the current system. The government, more accurately (given that it was divided in its opinion), the more extreme and determined in the government, wanted to call its supporters together early on September 6th to come to the city. The goal was for

these supporters to morally demonstrate their support for the government and for the crushing of the movement even if it required help from the Concordat Cantons.^[8]

As a consequence, the government's response to the representatives from Kloten that follows was unsatisfying to both sides:

The Governing Council (*Regierungsrat*) finds after careful examination on August 31 of its decree of August 23 that there is no evidence that the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the public to petition the government and of the freedom of the press have been violated in any fashion. Furthermore, the Governing Council would give a full report over the findings to the Upper Council (*Großen Rat*) at its next meeting.

With respect to the attorney general's indictment that was initiated independently of the government and was already in the hands of the court, the Governing Council constitutionally has no power to intervene in the process of the justice system.

As a consequence of an earlier complaint, the Governing Council has already requested a report from the attorney general with respect to paragraph 5 of the constitution.

Finally, the Governing Council finds that the authorities have already received the necessary instructions with respect to the carrying out of the decree of August 23 in light of the clarification of August 31.

During the session of the Governing Council, the representatives from the Diet in Bern, Neuhaus and Steinhauer, were given admittance. They asked for clarification of the situation from the two Canton representatives, Hegetschweiler and Zehnder. In light of the circumstances, they offered the assistance of troops in accordance with the Seven Concordat agreement.⁹

The Governing Council was unable to come to a decision with respect to this offer of assistance, and the issue was postponed to the next day. The session the next day brought the same division in the house with several members threatening to resign were Concordat troops called into the Canton. Finally, the decision was taken to submit everything to the Upper Council (*Großen Rat*) on September 9th.

On September 4th, at the preparatory gathering of radicals on the Platte in Zurich, more precise preparations for the gathering to occur on the morning of September 6th in Zurich [were made], [and] testimony of mistrust of the government's ability, determination, and power to pursue energetic measures [were discussed].

In the meantime, representatives from all of the six Concordat Cantons had demanded clarification concerning the strength of the movement as well as, and above all, over the available forces and effectiveness of the Canton's troops. Their concerns and offer of help were reviewed by a session of the Governing Council (*Regierungsrat*)

8. [] Translator's note: See next footnote for clarification.

9. On March 17, 1832, the Cantons of Zurich, Bern, Luzern, Solothurn. St. Gall, Aargau, and Thurgau had agreed to a Concordat which committed them to military intervention not only upon request of the threatened Canton but also without invitation should there be a circumstance in which a Concordat member's constitution was threatened.

on the evening of September 5th, but any decision was deferred until the afternoon of September 6th. Seven members of the Governing Council were inclined to accept the offer of help, six were opposed, one in a surprise move demanded that the government resign on constitutional grounds, and several members were absent. Nonetheless, those inclined to accept the offer of help had every reason to hope that they could achieve a majority because most of those absent were of their persuasion.

The public was quickly informed of the government's discussion going on behind closed doors, and the possibility of an outside intervention into the situation raised tempers even more. Even the most temperate now reacted with condemnation, and one heard emphatic determination that under no circumstances should any intercession in the internal church and school affairs of the Canton by Protestant and Roman Catholic Concordat members be tolerated. Alone the honor of the Canton of Zurich demanded that any such despotism be repulsed. We were informed that a group of people were engaged in making military preparations among able-bodied men for such an eventuality on September 4th. Their intention was to create a battalion of no more than 400 men.

In light of all this, the news was explosive when Ed. Sulzer, member of the Governing Council, ordered the Regional Treasurer (*Domainekassier*) Steffan to come to him and told him: "Tell your friends, above all [Oberamtmann] Escher from Mädenschweil, that their plans are threatened by a plot; for within twenty-four hours a 30,000 man Concordat force will be on the march toward Zurich, Füssli has gone to Bern, and Nordorf will bring forces from Basel." Sulzer went first to the vice-president of the (citizen's) Central Committee, Dr. Rahn-Escher, but when he couldn't find him, he went to other friends of the movement. The news spread through the city like wildfire. The hot-heads wanted to rush to the cathedral, but that was decisively forbidden by the city president (*Stadtpräsident*))¹⁰

In the meantime, Dr. Rahn[-Escher] was found. That very morning, he sent the following to all the presidents of the district committees:

"The enemy threatens to allow an invasion of our Fatherland by foreign troops. Neuhaus has sought assistance from Bern, and Basel is arming. I implore you to be prepared to be ready to mount an assault at the sound of the church bells. The majority should come to Zurich, but some should stay at home to guard the hearth."

Zurich, 5 September 1839.

Rahn-Escher

When it became clear by mid-day that an intervention was by no means a given for either the government or the Concordat members, Dr. Rahn rescinded the above order. However, although the first order reached Pfäffikon by 2:00 p.m., the second

10. The city president declared that he did not want to waiver from his commitment to maintain peace and order and would get personally involved only when the security of the city was at stake.

order did not arrive until late evening. At that point, the local militia was already on the march toward Zurich.

The president of the district committee in Pfäffikon was its Pastor, Dr. Bernhard Hirzel, a talented man of 31 years trained in Near-Eastern languages, who joined the movement with his characteristic fire. He was entertaining friends from families out of Zurich when the wire from Dr. Rahn-Escher arrived. He shared the news with his guests and then withdrew to his room where, according to his own account, he made the following observations:

"Already on the evening of [September] 4th, I received news from several sources of a gathering of radicals from the eastern part of the Canton in Hinweil and of the collection of signatures. Both activities had as their goal to march Thursday night on Zurich to take the arsenal and to inspire courage in the radical majority of the Governing Council (*Regierungsrat*) to take all necessary disciplinary action. About 11:00 a.m. on September 5th, I received word from a personal emissary that similar preparations were being made in Winterthur although not for Thursday night but for next Monday, namely: given the assumption that the masses would come unarmed to Zurich as they did to Kloten, one should gather with concealed weapons near the arsenal in order to demonstrate who was in charge. Deeply moved by this news that was contradictory with respect to its timing but consistent with respect to its goals, I withdrew for personal contemplation until about 2:00 p.m. when the above mentioned dispatch from the Central Committee arrived.

"This report was incorrect with respect to its indication of success, but the goal of those sent (Neuhaus, Pfyffer, Baumgartner) was only too true. Furthermore, it was based on an intentionally deceptive untruth perpetrated by Weiß, a member of the Upper Council, in order to encourage fear. What was to be done? I calculated that the projected gathering of radicals in Winterthur to be between 800 to 1,000 close to a city of curious, unemployed citizens that could swell their ranks. Naturally, the radical press of the Cantons constituting the seven Concordat Cantons would exaggerate those numbers threefold if not sevenfold in order to make credible that the inhabitants of the Canton of Zurich were dramatically split. What in the name of God was to be done? – A decision had to be taken, and the one to land the first blow would be the winner! Delaying the decision until Monday would have resulted in a horrible bloodletting. The Canton is united; all that is missing is the start. Success is certain; equally certain, the ruin of the initiative. These and a thousand other thoughts flooded my mind. – For three hours I examined myself and my intentions before God – and I let church bells sound the assault."

Hirzel was properly informed. While he was in his room in Pfäffikon still meditating, the radicals were preparing to march that night to Zurich. Rumors were flying that the extremists among them (along with a group of students) had the intention of taking the arsenal during the night. Mayor Heß secretly informed the director of the arsenal, Colonel Hirzel [Translator's note: not Pastor Hirzel from Pfäffikon], that he should be on the watch, and that evening even before anything was known

of Pfäffikon, the president of the arsenal committee, Fierz, also a member of the Governing Council, repeated the warning with the specificity that, according to the many rumors, the arsenal was to be captured that night. Were Pastor Hirzel able to unite his profession with his conscience to take this fateful step, the moment could not be more appropriate.

At about 7:00 p.m. friends from Hirzel's parsonage in Pfäffikon brought the first news to the (citizens') Central Committee in Zurich that Pastor Hirzel had taken the decision in the moment of their departure to have all the church bells in the district sound the assault. Immediately the members of the (citizens') Central Committee who were present (president Hürlimann-Landis was tranquilly at home in Richtersweil) ordered the actuary Spöndli to have Hirzel return to Pfäffikon because he had not been called to Zurich. Around 9:00 p.m. Spöndli learned in Fluntern that the entire countryside was in an uproar. He sent messages by express to all of the community committees involved entreating them to be calm. At about the same time both the government and the (citizens') Central Committee received the definite news of the revolution. The Central Committee immediately requested of the communities on the Lake not to be seduced by rumors of revolt until the bells in New Cathedral (*Neumünster*) were rung.

The only troops in Zurich were those of the military school whose numbers according to the paymaster was as follows:

1. Fortification Pioneer Unit:	4 Officers, 7 Non-Commissioned Officers	Total 37
	and Cadets, 1 Drummer, 25 Soldiers	
2. Dragoons	8 Officers, 8 Non-Commissioned Officers	
	5 Drummers, and 13 Soldiers	" 34
3. Marksmen:	2 Officers, 2 Non-Commissioned Officers	
	2 Drummers, 18 Soldiers	" 27
4. Infantry	3 Chief Instructors, 17 Master Trainers	" 20
Cadets 1st Class: 7 Officers,	" 33	
26 Cadets		
Cadets 2nd Class: 6 Officers,	" 29	
23 Cadets		
1. Academy Company:	7 Officers, 10 Non-Commissioned Officers	
	17 Drummers, 62 Soldiers	" 96
2. Academy Company:	5 Officers, 10 Non-Commissioned Officers	
	18 Drummers, 55 Soldiers	" 88
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to which must be added the chief instructors of the infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Sulzberger, and of the cavalry, Major Uebel.

In the name of the ruling mayor, the president of the War Council and member of the Governing Council (*Regierungsrat*), Weiß, gave the command of these 363 men to Colonel S. Hirzel, director of the arsenal. At the insistence of Colonel Hirzel, Weiß then gave him the following orders that were approved shortly afterwards by the government:

Artillery Inspector Colonel Hirzel is hereby commissioned and empowered to employ any and all necessary military powers to protect the citizenry, its property, as well as all constitutionally elected officials.

Signed:

The President of the War Council: Weiß, [Regierungsrat]

Colonel Hirzel activated for service the Artillery-Lieutenant Colonel v. Orelli and the Infantry-Lieutenant Colonels Markwalder und Brunner and established the following regulations:

1. He requested and received from the President of the city of Zurich 40 to 50 men from the city militia and from the rural police 15 to 18 men to be divided among the three arsenals for their defense to the extent necessary, and he armed them from the arsenal.
2. He activated the Dragoons and called them to the barracks courtyard, but he did not disturb the people.
3. He met with the city president and described to him the steps taken on his part and the further necessary security measures he intended to implement.
4. He rejected the help of the congregated students who had gathered first at the Goat Market and then on the New Market.¹¹

Here is perhaps the point to observe just what a difficult situation in which this high officer was placed in order to understand his preparations. If we are right, his thoughts must have been something like the following:

My responsibility was to protect above all the arsenals and then the citizenry, property, and the government first a) against the extreme radical party who were set upon a surprise attack and b) perhaps also against the on-coming local militia; and finally, the government, against the local militia.

I do not know who and how many were going to be involved in the surprise attack and whether and from which members of the divided government they were supported. It is therefore certainly best that I call into service those field-officers who might be leaders of such an uprising, that I keep them as well as the troops under my observation, and that I assign weak detachments of the city militia who were not considered dangerous along with some members of the city police to the protection of the arsenals. By such a strategy I maintain the compounded advantage of secure

11. Editors Comment: The barracks were in Thalacker street where today stand the street numbers 21 and 23. "New Market" was the name of what is today called the Parade Grounds. For what follows, consult the accompanying city plan.

support against the extreme, radical party as well as the likelihood that the local militia would not seize the arsenals as long as they know, or see, that the civil militia was defending them. On the basis of this logic, I can employ the entire military school for the protection of the entrances to the arsenals as well as the immediate vicinity surrounding them.

Immediately upon the arrival of the report that the local militia was underway, the city President permitted the command for 150 armed citizens to come to the town hall, and he gave to Lieutenant-Colonel Schultheß the responsibility for their organization. In addition, he asked that the following positions be manned:

20 men were to be placed under Captain Meyer-Finsler in the yellow, large arsenal
 16 men under the command of Captain Grob in the Löwenhof
 18 men under the command of Captain Eyger in the Exercise yard
 20 men under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hirzel-Blarer near Falken¹²
 12 men under [Aidemajor] Assistant Major Fäßli at the Kronenporte
 25 men under Lieutenant-Colonel Rahn went to protect Drs. Rahn and Spöndli in Hirslanden in order to negotiate with the expected local militia coming over Mytikon
 20 men were to remain at the town hall
 131 Total

After midnight another 300 men were called up to active duty. Between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m., at the request of the President of the War Council (Councilman Weiß of the Governing Council [*Regierungsrat*]), the War Council, Mayor Heß, and Councilman Ed. Sulzer of the Governing Council [*Regierungsrat*]) were given a clear and open briefing by City President Ziegler and Chief of Police (*Stadtpolizeipräsident*), Sysi, concerning the position taken by city officials. This position was as follows:

The measures taken by city officials are meant solely to maintain peace, order, and security; the evidence for which is that they have forbidden the ringing of church bells and that they were about to decide to place security officers in front of houses of well-known persons. However, in order not to attract the gathering opposition to these very houses, this decision was changed to having patrols regularly pass by such locations. City President Ziegler added that this was a true report of what city officials had done and sought to accomplish. All were instructed to allow the local militia and its followers to pass unhindered and not to join them. Nevertheless, the possibility could not be denied that given the mood in the city, some might choose to join them.

When after this public pronouncement the Governing Council (*Regierungsrat*) decided to make available to the civil militia an additional 500 men¹³ (some of whom were already in the arsenals and available for the civil militia), one can account for the

12. Editor's comment: corner house Thalgaasse and Neuenhoffstraße.

13. 462 soldiers were taken from the arsenal, and 482 were returned, an increase of 20 from the local militia.

decision because of the huge mistrust of the city and because the Governing Council saw in the civil militia protection for persons and property that would be reassuring for themselves and their supporters. The Governing Council (*Regierungsrat*) was not deluded in this respect.¹⁴

As these transactions were occurring, the news arrived that Pastor Hirzel refused to return home, his column was made up of some 5,000 men and already by Schwamendingen. In addition, it was learned that he had warned other districts; but it was not clear whether or not these other districts were to follow his example or to follow the command of the (citizens') Central Committee.

Colonel Hirzel stationed a strong contingent from the military school on the upper and lower bridges as well as at positions in the park in front of the Ship Crown near the Wollishofer bridge, the Selnaufsteg, in Thalaker street, in the Fröschengraben, and at the Peterhofstatt. The Dragoons [cavalry] he stationed on Münsterhof ("Cathedral Square").

Shortly after 4:00 a.m. the news arrived that the local militia had reached the Oberstraß and had taken up positions near the Linde. There were a few hundred armed with weapons among them, but Pastor Hirzel explained that they were armed only for their own protection. Their intention was only to participate in a moral demonstration against the government.

At 4:30 a.m. two members of the Central Committee went to the Oberstraß under protection from a detachment of the civil militia. The Councilmen Hegetschweiler and M. Sulzer of the Governing Council (*Regierungsrat*) appeared in the Oberstraß at 6:00 a.m. with the aim of asking what the goal and intentions of the uprising were. The officers of the civil militia presented arms; their example was followed by the local militia who received the delegation with all the signs of respect.

After a short discussion of the leaders with the members of the (citizens') Central Committee present, they [Hegetschweiler and Sulzer] were given the following to bring to the government:

It is the respectful but resolute desire of the people:

1. that the directions of the Kloten gathering be acknowledged;
2. that the people wanted assurance that the government was not seeking to secure internal order by accepting outside interference;
3. that the government annul its participation in the Seven Concordat because it was an un-republican conspiracy of the governments against their citizenry.

14. It is inexplicable how Councilman Weiß in his text appearing after the 6th of September could come to the incorrect assumption that in addition to the high command of the military school, Colonel Hirzel had also taken over command in the city of the civil militia. – It is easier to understand how Major Übel came to hold this erroneous belief. – On the basis of this error, one can explain some of the false judgments in the two texts.

The two representatives of the Governing Council (*Regierungsrat*) promised to have an answer as soon as possible, and they returned to the city. The people scattered for the most part; many went into the city to eat, others just to see what was going on. They were to gather again at the same place in two hours.

With the coming of daybreak, it was clear that the bridges were not to be blockaded without hindering traffic to the weekly market. Colonel Hirzel decided to draw his circle of defense narrower by concentrating on the arsenals and their entrances. He so informed the government along with the comment that he could give them protection only in the Löwenhof in Arsenal Alley.

This second and last positioning of troops was as follows:

1 School Company in front of the Waag to defend the entrance to the Arsenal Alley¹⁵ from the Münsterhof ("Cathedral Square"); this involved a strong chain of sentinels from Wiser'schen House¹⁶ up to the entrance of Post Office Street (*Poststraße*).

1 Cavalry unit at the entrance to In Gassen ("In the Alley") from the Storchengasse ("Storck Alley") and on the square behind St. Peters under Lieutenant-Colonel Markwalder.

2 units of cadets at the front entrance to the Yellow Arsenal towards the Neumarkt ("New Market") with a strong chain of sentinels from the corner of the Hotel Baur up to the Fröschengraben.

1 unit marksmen for the defense of the Zeughausgasse ("Arsenal Alley") on the side of the Neumarkt ("New Market").

1 unit of cadets, the chief instructor and armed fife and drum members as reserves in the In Gassen ("In the Alley") and to watch the entrances to the university buildings.

The commanders of the troops received instructions to use weapons only in the most extreme emergency and, in the case that the troops were in danger of being trampled by the crowd, they should withdraw into the nearest buildings. The cavalry was instructed in such a situation to join the troops at the Yellow Arsenal.

Outside of these other troop deployments, about 20 artillery forces were ordered into the exercise yard to set up canons behind the doors of the upper wings to defend the entrances. All remaining defenses as possible were placed in the wing along the Fröschengraben, and, in the remaining wings, nails were provisionally driven into the doors and two trustworthy workers were instructed in the case of emergency to nail them shut.

Returning at 7:30 a.m. from a recognizance ride out to the Krone¹⁷ and Oberdorf, the Supreme Commander confirmed the existing deployment and declared that especially on the Münsterhof ("Cathedral Square") there should be absolutely no

15. Editor's Comment: today "Waaggasse."

16. Editor's Comment: today hardware store Pestalozzi and Co.

17. Editor's Comment: today Haus zum Rechberg.

restriction on free movement from the Storchengasse and the bridge to the Postgasse. Only the line already occupied by sentinels from the Miser'schen House up to the William'schen House¹⁸ in the Postgasse was to be held as long as possible. The commander of the cavalry was given the order to continue sending patrols out to the Krone in order, periodically, to remain informed enough of the size of the on-coming crowd.

The commander of the government's troops having in this manner ensured the security of the arsenals through a concentrated placement of personnel, it was the task of the city officials to station some strong detachments in the city center next to the positions at the public entrances to the city with enough strength in an emergency to engage any possible threat. Along with those deployed after midnight, by 8:00 a.m. the civil militia had grown to 386 men who had taken the following positions:

- 80 men were at the Schmidstube under Lieutenant-Colonel Landolt,
- 84 men were at the Wegggen under Lieutenant-Colonel Bürkli, who at 9:00 a.m. deployed
- 24 men under Lieutenant-Colonel Rüscher at the Badergasse
- 20 men in the Yellow Arsenal under Lieutenant-Colonel F. Meyer
- 16 men in the Löwenhof under Captain Grob
- 18 men in the exercise yard under Captain Enger
- 20 men in the Falken under Captain Fäsi-Usteri
- 12 men by the former Kronenporte ("Crown Entrance") under military aide Fäsl
- 20 men under Captain Meyer-Finsler in the lower Hirschengraben to defend the city magistrate's office
- 86 men as reserves by City Hall under Lieutenant-Colonel Schultheß
- 356 Total

Like the Supreme Commander of the military school, the Supreme Commander of the civil militia had no idea that the point was to allow the militarily organized and mustered land militia to march into the city because no new volunteers (*posse comitatus*) had joined them, the armed and by all appearances mal-tempered and seedy persons encamped in the Oberstraß were portrayed as wretched, and their numbers were much smaller than was earlier thought. One began to doubt the entire operation and to see it as a failure.

In fact, the (citizens') Central Committee that was meeting in the Zimmerleuten found itself in a difficult and embarrassing situation. One could not and did not want to extend the uprising to other communities, but one also did not want to abandon the people out of the region of Pfäffikon, which was all that could be expected if they were left by themselves. Yes, one feared that the entire cause of the movement in this

18. Editor's Comment: today Bank Kugler and Co.

case was lost and that the intervention of the Concordat Cantons was certain.¹⁹ In addition, with the arrival of Hürlimann-Landis, the view began to dominate that, as the situation now stood, there was no other choice but either to lose everything in a criminal proceeding or to call up the people from the entire Canton in order to put moral pressure on the government to resign. – The decision was taken to have the land militia in the Oberstraße enter the city in an orderly fashion, to station itself on the embankment²⁰, and from there to wait for new volunteers (*posse comitatus*). The church bells in the Neumünster ("New Cathedral") should be rung as a signal that all on the lake and in the surrounding communities should rise up. However, the Community President (*Gemeindspräsident*) who was a member of the (citizens') Central Committee declined to support this strategy and withheld his approval for a long time until the urgency of the situation forced him to comply.

This decision to enter the city was either held so secret or it was carried out too quickly that the news of its happening arrived at the two Supreme Commanders almost simultaneously with its occurrence. The church bells in the Neumünster ("New Cathedral") began to ring a few minutes before 9:00 a.m. and from there the gruesome sound spread. At the same time one saw two long, four-man wide columns marching and singing hymns. One column crossed over the lower bridge towards the Storchen-gasse; the other marched along the embankment up towards the Münsterbrücke ("Cathedral Bridge").

The first column under pastor Hirzel consisted of some 600 men led by some 20 marksmen. Behind them was Hirzel with other leaders of the region followed by some 150 armed infantry and civilians with their hunting guns. The remainder carried staffs, cudgels, and swords with several carrying lances and maces. The second column under Dr. Rahn consisted of some 1,100 men without guns. The remaining [who had come to Zurich in the night with these forces] did not join in the march. With pomp and circumstance but wearing the very work clothes they had been wearing when the church bells called them from their fields and factories, wretched in appearance, the columns moved through the streets of the city. Not a few hearts were racing as they contemplated what the next hours would bring.

The first column proceeded in this manner up to the point where the Storchengasse entered the Münsterhof ("Cathedral Square"). At that point the cavalry rode up to them and blocked the entire width of the entrance to the square. Major Uebel, who had just been briefed by a patrol that had observed the moving columns, took it for granted that the instructions to allow for free movement across the Münsterhof

19. One member from the designated delegation to the City President explained this incessantly. He would take no part in the insurrection as long as the government had not taken any hostile action against the people and had not thereby threatened the security of the city.

20. Only with the march into the city did an older, experienced, higher officer offer the advice that two columns should be made in order to march over both bridges onto the Münsterhof ("Cathedral Square"). (Editor's Comment: The embankments at that time consisted of only the City Hall embankment, the Sonnen-embankment, and the Stadthaus-embankment.

("Cathedral Square") did not apply to an armed and militarily organized group of men. Colonel Markwalder at the entrance of In Gassen street, however, allowed the column to pass, and he called to them: "Go back! The square must remain open!" Pastor Hirzel who was now at the head of the column called back: "Peace! We come only to engage the government in peaceful negotiations. For God's sake, don't begin a civil war!" This kind of exchange, lost in the turmoil and incapable of reconstruction, passed back and forth during which the two groups became intermingled. What is certainly the case is that neither leader of the two groups wanted to be the first to make use of their people and that both tried to restrain in word and deed their respective sides. Then, from the back of the crowd a shot rang out; most probably unintentionally because it went up into the air. At this, the cavalry pushed forward, and one rider with drawn sword pushed his horse into Pastor Hirzel. A marksman fired, and the horse turned and fell with its rider, though as it turned out neither the horse nor the rider was injured. This was followed by shots and shoving from both the cavalry and the crowd. Some of the horses were slightly injured, and one man from Pfäffikon was seriously wounded. The cavalry then turned and rode back, stopping twice on the Münsterhof ("Cathedral Square") in order to retrieve fallen comrades and with some firing their pistols back toward the crowd, they crossed the square and rode into the Neumarkt ("New Market Square") to the entrance to Thalacker street where they regathered and took position.

The infantry at the Waag withdrew too quickly at the very beginning of the skirmish. Some went into the Haus zur Waag, some onto the balcony on the other side of the street from the Vögel bakery, and some withdrew into the Zeughausgasse ("Arsenal Street"). From these positions they fired on the armed group from Pastor Hirzel as they pushed forward toward the Zeughausgasse ("Arsenal Street"). Seven of Pastor Hirzel's following were killed or wounded. The second column of demonstrators under Dr. Rahn met up with Hirzel's column in the Postgasse, and they all withdrew in a rather orderly fashion back to Oberdorf and See ("Lake") streets.

Furious about, in their opinion, the insidious attack on the part of the government troops – because they neither knew nor believed otherwise than that the Fraumünsterplatz was open – the overwhelming number (a small group through the Kappeler-gäßchen) plunged down the Postgasse past the Hotel Baur towards the Yellow (large) Arsenal that they believed was being held by the civil militia. Meanwhile, as we learned above, there was only a defensive guard of 20 men there. Accompanied by a frightful clamor and with weapons held high in defiance, the hoard stormed toward the guard consisting of cadets.

Colonel Hirzel, who received word of the approach of the land militia while in his apartment in the exercise yard arsenal where he had gone for a half hour rest

not thinking any advance of this kind would happen,²¹ rushed to the Münsterhof ("Cathedral Square"). However, the cavalry was already involved in the skirmish with the crowd, and the infantry was in the buildings so that no orders could be given or heard. He quickly returned to the Yellow (large) Arsenal to join the cadets in anticipation of the confrontation.²² As the crowd rounded the west wing of the Hotel Baur toward In Gassen street, he called along with the other officers for them to turn back. The crowd in blind rage pressed onward irresistibly, entirely ignoring these repeated and intensified commands to stop and despite the readiness of the troops to fire. After the crowd pressed 8 to 10 steps onward, the soldiers fired in self-defense. Because they fired without being commanded to do so, many intentionally wanted to avoid shooting anyone but only to startle them. This explains why there were only seven dead and wounded despite the short distance fired and the thickness of the crowd. The shots were enough to cause the crowd to retreat in terror. It scattered. The cavalry rushed forward and shot into the Neumarkt ("New Market") and the Postgasse bringing down nine protesters.²³ The crowd, throwing away their staffs, etc., retreated rapidly in all directions so that in five minutes there were none on this side of the Limmat river except a few stragglers in Kratz street who could not find their way out. Pastor Hirzel, Hürlimann, Dr. Rahn, Spöndlin and others sought their reconstitution at the Stadelhofen.²⁴

Hardly were the last shots fired when the church bells of the city began to ring. The City President (*Stadtpräsident*) thought it in the interest of security and of property to re-establish peace and order. He ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Schultheß to have the reserves at City Hall leave the shops and to follow him while the detachments at the Weggen und the Schmidstube received the command to return to the Münsterhof ("Cathedral Square") and those stationed at the Falken were to go to City Hall.

Battle drummers now led some 60 men to the Münsterhof ("Cathedral Square") where the square was empty with the exception of a few dead and seriously wounded near the Waag. The City President (*Stadtpräsident*) proceeded alone to the platoon of infantrymen at the entrance into In Gassen street. The civil militia detail stationed at the Weggen commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Nüscherer stood on the other side at the Badergasse street. Both detachments were combat ready. The City President

21. Similarly, and under the same logic and at the same time, the adjunct to the City President had taken an hour break.

22. At the time of the attack, the fortification sappers and marksmen loaned from Winegg were on the right wing, in the center were some 50 cadets, and on the left wing was a mixture of marksmen and infantrymen.

23. The troops suffered no casualties in the skirmish. The cavalry had a few contusions because of the falling of horses and blows from hand weapons.

24. Hürlimann-Landis remained throughout the skirmish remarkably calm. He said to friends he met at the Stadelhofen: "We had a skirmish, unfortunately a few dead; the people are a little shocked; I will gather them together outside the city, and we will march again."

commanded Lieutenant-Colonel Markwalder to stop all shooting. His detail, however, had not fired.

The reserves moved from Münsterhof ("Cathedral Square") through Postgasse street toward the Neumarkt ("New Market") just as Hegetschweiler, Councilman of the Governing Council (*Regierungsrat*) was shot [see account below]. At the very moment as they spilled out of the narrow opening onto the Neumarkt ("New Market"), the gate of the eastern wing of the military exercise yard was opened exposing a canon under the command of the artillery Lieutenant-Colonel von Orilli that placed the platoon of civil militia in a vulnerable position. Not knowing whether or not this officer viewed the forward movement of the civil militia as threatening, Lieutenant-Colonel Schultheß commanded the civil militia to step back a few feet in order to be protected by the corner of the Hotel Baur and in order to wait for re-enforcements from Weggen and the Schmidstube.²⁵ As these re-enforcements arrived and the civil militia had grown to some 260 men, Weibel Brändli brought an open order from the ruling mayor to Colonel Hirzel commanding that no one was to be on the streets and giving the task of ensuring the curfew to Lieutenant-Colonel Schultheß. The order read:

"Colonel Hirzel is hereby empowered to turn over the arsenal to the civil militia.

F. Heß, Governing Mayor"

Schultheß, who was on his way down In Gassen street, met Colonel Hirzel coming from the exercise yard. Lieutenant-Colonel Schultheß had taken other defensive steps and he passed those on to Hirzel. Hirzel read them and answered: "By all means ensure that it happens quickly."

The civil militia in the arsenals having received re-enforcements took over the defenses of the same. The troops withdrew to their barracks, but they already encountered in Thalacker street the land militia coming in from Außersihl. Saluting one another, they passed by one another. Once in the barracks, they first began to set up barricades. Then they contemplated marching as an entirety to Dietikon on the border of the Canton. However, they soon received the command from the newly constituted provisional government to disband and for as many as possible to change into civilian clothes and to go home.

During all of these events and as of 7:30 a.m., the Governing Council (*Regierungsrat*) was in session in the post office building nearby. The first order of business was a report by Councilmen Hegetschweiler and M. Sulzer from their mission. They had met some 2,000 men of whom some 200 were armed in the Obersträß where they were received with all respect. Through their leader, Pastor Hirzel, they communicated their desires (already mentioned above). – Following this report, the Governing Council spent some one-and-a-half hours discussing how to answer. Councilman Hegetschweiler spoke openly and clearly against any intervention. By so doing, one could maintain

25. At this point, the cavalry had stationed themselves between the exercise yard and Fröschengraben street. Colonel Hirzel expected a new and stronger attack and believed he needed the cannon in order to ensure victory.

the peace. Escher called, once again, for the resignation of the government, because the split between the government and the people was too great. Despite the feeling of powerlessness, they remained undecided one way or the other and took no measures for an energetic defense. Finally, they decided to draw up a proclamation stating that neither foreign troops had been summoned nor were they on their way and that the Governing Council (*Regierungsrat*) had turned over responsibility for the entire situation to the Upper Council (*Großen Rat*).

As the bells in the surrounding countryside rang out their call to revolt and the crowd began to enter the city, the members of the government continued to fight with one another. In that very moment as one member cried out, "We cannot and must not withhold our intervention," news arrived that the crowd was on the bridges. Immediately, a proclamation was approved and in a flash it was decided to rescind the indictment against the Committees. Then, shots rang out from Münsterhof ("Cathedral Square"). When one member yelled that canons should be used, other council members blamed one another for the disaster. The populous streamed past the building on their way to the Neumarkt ("New Market"). Shots were fired, the rataplan of horse hooves could be heard, as well as the flight of the armed volunteers (*posse comitatus*) from the countryside (*Landstürme*) – all in a matter of minutes. Councilmen jumped out of their seats, several rushed down to the Post courtyard and rooms there; it was impossible anymore to contemplate anything like an ordered assembly. At that point, the incumbent mayor gave Colonel Hirzel the command to cease fire. When no one volunteered to bring the order to him, Councilmember Hegetschweiler stepped forward. Holding the order high over his head, he rushed around the Hotel Baur to the yellow Arsenal, first, to hand them to a Cavalry officer at the west corner who, in turn, brought it to Colonel Hirzel's assistant. As he intended to return to the Post courtyard, Hegetschweiler was shot in the face by a cavalry corporal's shotgun blast, killing the noble-minded man on the spot. What followed was even greater confusion and demoralization in the government, the advance of the civil militia, the ordering of the civil militia to surrender the Arsenal, and the dissolution of the government.

There has been great debate over the whole scenario:

1. If and to what degree Major Uebel overstepped his authority and, thereby, brought about the spilling of blood.
2. If the situation might have been mastered and the government remained in power had the military school advanced to the Limmat bridge immediately after the populous fled and the Cavalry had pursued them to the edge of the city.

The first question can hardly be adequately determined, otherwise, then by looking more carefully at the circumstances and the agents involved.

Colonel Hirzel, who is among the most recognized officers in the Canton and Switzerland, a man of great life experience and a mild, sympathetic character, had to have viewed the undertaking of the responsibility given to him by a government that was so internally fragmented to be one of the most difficult duties of his commission

and of his military rank. Even the incumbent mayor ventured only confidential communications (see above), and he by no means respected several of the government's council members apart from their political and religious convictions. Such a military and political task in which, as in this case, one can find at least as much moral propriety on the one as on the other side of the conflict and in which one is opposed to his own people, his fellow citizens and friends, this brave officer undertook only with innermost reluctance; but once he was committed to it, he carried it out in good faith albeit with a proportioned forbearance.

We see Hirzel functioning in this fashion from the evening of the 5th with his preparations in the arsenals. We see the same, for sure, when it came to taking over the citizens' defense divisions, with the gendarmes, and the concentrated deployment of his troops, which was characterized by its insight and experience of the officers. Admittedly, one could have perhaps significantly strengthened the position with artificial means like breast plates, but doing so could have suggested an uncertainty that is more damaging, especially in such situations. On the other hand, Hirzel, in order to avoid the spilling of blood, took care that no weapons without necessity and without his command should be deployed. These orders accord with the instructions that he gave (see above) – that one use weapons only in extreme emergency. All the officers adhered to this command, for example, the positions down at Schlüsselgasse and St. Peter's streets, as well as, Lieutenant Colonel Markwalder at the entrance to In Gassen street both had to pass directly by Pastor Hirzel's column. It was another matter, though, with Major Uebel on the Münsterhof ("Cathedral Square").

Uebel, a younger, well-educated, and honorable officer, who had left the Prussian army at the beginning of the 1830s and for some time managed the instruction of our cavalry with insight and skill, was a soldier by class and career. As someone new to our situation, he could hardly do otherwise than to regard his task from a purely military perspective and, thereby, as a consequence easily ignore patiently allowing to wait with the implementation of military procedures. When even Uebel had not viewed the advancing populous as common rebels, which he did, especially because the head of the crowd and a substantial number of those approaching were armed, he could see from that point of view that in order to be able to maintain with 28 cavalry and some 60 infantry the line from Miser's house to the corner of the Postgasse he could not allow what he at the time erroneously took to be 2000 persons simply to pour out into the Münsterhof ("Cathedral Square"). If one acknowledges that he in fact violated the literal content of the order given to him, a military perspective could not for that reason question his decision. His commanding officer, who had not considered this circumstance, would himself not have questioned him.²⁶

26. The words that he cried out as he charged with his men were admittedly somewhat too offensive: "Now, let's do this!"

With regard to the second question:

To a remote observer, the populous appeared totally disheartened immediately after the second skirmish, and the military school appeared to be the decisive victor (having attacked admirably). However, closer investigation of the reports from the leaders and officers as well as consequent events require crucial modifications of this set of conclusions.

First, with respect to the populous, shortly following the skirmish and before the civic guard had intervened and the government's resignation, their leaders were successful at gathering together a part of those fleeing outside of Stadelhofen and at convincing them to advance once more as soon as reinforcements arrived from around Lake Zurich. Second, the core half of the populous was not dissuaded from advancing even in light of the announcement of the lost skirmish and the victory of the government's troops. As, for example, the armed volunteers (*posse comitatus*) from Außersihl, as well as the armed infantry from Erlenbach, Rüßnacht, and Herrliberg; he Richterschweiler (400 men strong) without weapons, were already on the march to Zurich but turned back after receiving the report of the skirmish, armed themselves, and arrived in the evening along with the some 800 men from Mädensschweilern, so, as well, Horgen, Meilen, Männedorf, Stäfa, Uster, etc.

Had the government not dissolved, and had the citizens' guard left everything as it was, the troops of volunteers (*posse comitatus*) and thirty to 40 students would have been by evening perhaps strengthened by 500 to 600 men, but then they would have faced at least 1,500 well-armed, among them some 400 marksmen, 1,000 poorly-armed and a few thousand unarmed opponents most of whom were frighteningly rancorous over the spilled blood and the assassination of Hegetschweiler. Despite this numerical superiority, a force of about 600 men with weapons and some cavalry, which the opponent didn't have, stationed in a good position could defend itself for some time. However, these conditions didn't exist. That group who had engaged the skirmish at the yellow arsenal was in shock, as is usually the case with young troops; many of the cavalry were dispersed, the reserves in Gassen street were at the most dangerous point in time no longer to be found in that they were scattered and hidden away in the farthest corners of the arsenals and nearby houses.²⁷ However, if we assume that they had all regrouped, that the victory had brought with it élan, consciousness that they must defend their lives, even were the faint of heart inspired, there would have been, nonetheless, no prospect of their being able to hold on for long. The situation of the arsenals, surrounded on three sides by narrow alleys was so unfavorable: Nowhere was there place for a row of soldiers as there was on the side towards the Neumarkt ("New Market").

What would have happened, had part of the populous positioned themselves in the houses between Hotel Baur and Baker Mögeli and others in the houses along

27. Colonel Hirzel said to a friend: "Of all the disappointments of the day, this experience hurt him the most."

Storchengasse and from there had fired down on the detachments of the military school, who would have been exposed without any protection, or, on the opposite side, had another part of the populous stormed the entrances with axes, etc., and broken into the exercise yard arsenal in Bärengasse and the Thalhouse? With the first shots, the cavalry would have withdrawn, the infantry and artillery would have drawn back inside the arsenals: a vigorous shooting exchange from window to window would have developed until a fire had broken out and the troops in the street would have dispersed in chaos where they, otherwise, would have had the upper hand. However, even without a fire in the buildings, the troops would have been jammed into the arsenals, cut-off and without food supplies because all the entrances to the neighboring houses close by could be made unusable. Even with a force of some 900, it would have been impossible to re-take an enclosed housing complex like the northwest side of Poststrasse from Hotel Baur to the Williams' house, from Waag over Münsterhof ("Cathedral Square") to In Gasse and both rows of houses of In Gasse down to St. Peter's Church. No experienced officer would hand over to the opposition such control because what is hidden away in houses isn't accessible.

We have to negate the second question; the consequence of a more extended defense could not have been victory but only the spilling of much blood and creation of great destruction.

A third question would be: What could have been done had the government kept its head and heart?

Even if more out of self-defense as open attack, when a partially armed mob advances against a government in session in order to force physical or moral concessions, it is engaged in revolution. Pastor Hirzel was very clear about that; he knew that his own religious convictions and possibly his very life were in jeopardy, but he was also clear that the cause which he chose to serve was so just and so threatened that he decided to put his life on the line. However, he overlooked that, precisely by his intrepid action, the very cause itself could have been lost; he calculated with too great a certainty that the other districts would follow his example and summons; and he took too little into account that the far larger portion of those who joined him had no desire to cause a revolution but only wanted to defend a particular faith in church and school. He entirely overlooked how a revolution would increase the legal position of his opponents. What would have happened, had the government with daybreak on the 6th [of September], after it had learned that the armed volunteers (*posse comitatus*) from the countryside with only about 2,000, of whom only a few hundred were poorly armed, had advanced to Oberstrasse, had given the order to leave 60 to protect the arsenals and to advance against the populous in order to disperse them?

A platoon of infantry in the Old Strasse, four platoons in the New Strasse with two light artilleries and cavalry, two platoons of infantry and artillery on the right in the New Strasse and in the vineyards, a platoon further to the right below the forest and ready to outflank, four platoons in reserve in the New Strasse: not even a wild shot would have been necessary much less the commanding of the cavalry to

Schwamendingen – by 7:30 a.m. everything would have been over without blood, the military school would have been back in Zurich and the efforts of the government opposition under Hirzel would have been compromised. Both he and his cause would have been lost because, with the revolution, thousands both in and outside of the Canton turned their backs to the cause.

We return now to our account of events:²⁸

After the arsenals were occupied by the civic guard and the troops withdrew, the former occupied the troops' positions. Already prior to 10:45 a.m., reserves had gathered before the town hall where a provisional government had formed itself constituted out of former government councilmen: The ruling mayor Heß, councilmen Meyer von Knonau, M. Sulzer, Ed. Sulzer and joined by Hürlimann-Landis, T. von Muralt and Escher-Schulthess. They along with the [citizens'] Central Committee announced the new government's existence to the public by publications which admonished order and restraint.

Around 10:45 a.m., the city's Police Director Sysi rushed to the town hall to tell Mr. Ziegler that he should come to Münsterhof ("Cathedral Square") as quickly as possible because new armed volunteers (*posse comitatus*) were approaching over the bridges with the intent of storming the barracks. Because Mr. Zeigler was upstairs, his adjunct rushed ahead of him and met a column at the Meise under the leadership of Procurator Spöndli, who at that very moment was entering Münsterhof. In contrast to the armed volunteers (*posse comitatus*) from Pfäffikon, these approximately 100, well-dressed, burly men from the lower parishes of the right bank of the Lake of Zurich, the majority of whom carried carbines and ammunition pouches, were entirely organized militarily, marching in double rows along with a few hundred men from the district of Pfäffikon behind them, who had joined their ranks. Their leader and followers were terribly outraged over the spilling of blood.²⁹ Schultheß told their leader what Sysi had already said that the troops had withdrawn and pleaded with them to abstain from their intent. In his agitation, Spöndli hardly heard him,³⁰ and the column surged forward rapidly. Although Schultheß tried continuously, but unsuccessfully, to convince him otherwise and having arrived at the Arch, Schultheß tried one last means. He commanded as loud as he could: "Column stop!" With the exception of those at the front, the men hadn't seen who had given the command, and they stopped in their tracks. At this moment, Councilmen Ziegler and Sysi arrived and, along with Schultheß, they were finally able to convince Spöndli and his men to

28. Remark of the Editor: To page 24 should be added that the question who had fired the unfortunate shot that killed Councilman Hegetschweiler was given diverse answers.

29. Those in front wanted to shoot toward the "Haus zur Waag" [from where the infantry had fired in the skirmish, trans.] whereby Spöndli struck them with his staff and grabbed the wildest of them by the throat.

30. Shortly afterward, Spöndli maintained against Schultheß that he had barely any memory of this encounter, his agitation was so great.

refrain from their undertaking and to march by the barracks that had been vacated already by the troops.

Right behind this column came a second that consisted of some 300 men. From noon until into the night, there was one influx after another of such groups so that the city was filled with armed and unarmed men.³¹ One heard threats to demolish the Haus zur Waag from which the infantry had fired that morning, to free those imprisoned for the fire in Uster, to destroy the Guillotine, and to drive off the Gendarmes from the main guardhouse and city hall. It was pressingly necessary, on the one hand, to take further protective measures, and, on the other hand, to place the people under military orders. To accomplish that end, the provisional government appointed the City President, Lieutenant-Colonel Ziegler.

First, the Haus zur Waag was occupied by a 30-man civic guard along with 30 infantry men armed with muskets from Herrliberg under the command of Captain Fäsi-Usteri, who performed his duty admirably. The police in the prison were strengthened by 18 civic guards under Lieutenant W. Meyer, and 50 men from Enge und Außersihl under Captain Ullmer were stationed in the barracks where the crowds were quartered. Those who arrived after this point in time until 4:00 p.m. were dispatched to the New Market (*Neumarkt*) under the command of 20 subordinate officers of the civic guard.

The City President's intent was to arm those without weapons with guns from the arsenal, to organize them into three to four battalions under officers from the civic guard, and to station them in the churches. At 3:00 p.m., therefore, four officers who were to be given these commands were invited to City Hall. The City President disclosed to them the goal and the necessity of these measures and tried to convince them to assume the command.

How it must have surprised him when immediately one officer refused vehemently. He had serious reservations about commanding such men who were little more than a rabble. One should leave the task to those who had called them together in the first place. When it came to the civic guard, he would assume any and all command, but with the others he asked to be spared the responsibility. Two other, merited and from service in the civic guard distinguished, staff officers were unable to overcome their resistance to assuming the command and quietly but emphatically entreated to be left with the civic guard; only Lieutenant-Colonel Landolt was silent. Then, the City Present demonstrated his great character. He answered: "Gentlemen, I can't force you. You are, more importantly, older officers than I; however, the measures are absolutely necessary, and if no one supports my decision, then I will command alone." The officers held to their position, and in their place Lieutenant-Colonel Heinrich v. Orelli, bank official W. Meyer, and Captain Rasp. Fösi were called, who along with Lieutenant-Colonel Handolt assumed the responsibility.

31. By evening there were 4,000 to 4,500 men.

Given the task of dividing up the groups, Lieutenant-Colonel Schultheß was confronted at 4:00 p.m. on the Neumarkt ("New Market") with a mass gathering of colorful confusion of whom many had consumed too much alcohol. However, with only a few exceptions, they were obedient and willing so that Schultheß along with the help of two officers quickly divided them into four battalions, led them to the arsenal where they were given arms and ammunition, and then were stationed in the four largest churches.

The first battalion under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Landolt consisted of 340 men primarily from Wädenschweil and Richterschweil was placed in the Großmünster ("Great Cathedral"); the second battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Heinrich v. Orelli consisted of 380 men from Maur, Egg, Greisensee, Grüningen, etc., was stationed in St. Peter's; the third battalion under the bank official W. Meyer had 136 men from the lower right Lake parishes was stationed in the Evangelist Church where there were already some 60 unarmed men; the fourth battalion under Captain Rasp. Fösi consisted of some 400 men from various communities was stationed in Frauenmünster.

Everyone remained good and obedient with the exception of the unarmed men from Wehntal of whom many had drunk too much wine and had come to the city out of curiosity and other reasons; until midnight, they made life difficult for their commanders.

The civic guard occupied the following positions through the night:

I. Small City

[Old Town Left of the Limmat River]

- 124 men at the Weggen, under Lieutenant-Colonel Bürli
- 25 men at City Hall under Captain Diggelmann,
- 28 men at the Löwenhof Arsenal under Captain Grob
- 32 men at the Yellow Arsenal under Lieutenant-Colonel J. Meyer
- 41 men in the Exercise yard Arsenal under Captain Gyger
- 24 men at the Post Office under?
- 20 men at the Grainery Office under Lieutenant-Colonel Nüscherer
- 18 men at the Prison under Lieutenant W. Meyer
- 12 men at the Bleicherweg Bridge under Lieutenant C. Brunner
- 18 men in the outside Thalacker under Lieutenant L. Siber
- 18 men in the Music Hall under Lieutenant Eßlinger
- 30 men at the Waag along with 30 from Herrliberg under Captain Fäsi-Usteri

Total 390

II. Large City

[Old Town Right of the Limmat River]

- 36 men at the Canon (*Chorherrenstift*) under Lieutenant-Colonel Weiß
- 18 men at the Schmidstube under Captain J.J. Meyer
- 20 men at City Hall under the Guard House under Major Füßli

20 men at the Falken under?
 17 men at the Kronenporte under Captain P. Heß
 36 men at the Neumühle unter Captain W. Ziegler
36 men at the Gun Club under Captain Frei

Total 183

In toto: 573 Men

The night passed without incident, interrupted only with the cries of the numerous sentries and patrols of the civic guard. The next morning brought new arrivals of the armed, unarmed, and curious. It was impossible to imagine that the Neumarkt ("New Market") could contain the crowd of people planned to occur at 10:00 a.m. so that a second gathering occurred at the Münsterhof ("Cathedral Square"). The [citizens'] Central Committee, surrounded by the armed infantry from Richterschweil, congratulated the gathering for its victory and called for allegiance to the provisional government as well as for obedience and rejection of revenge. The unarmed men were dismissed immediately whereas the armed, with the exception of those guarding the Waag, were dismissed that evening.³²

The provisional government immediately undertook the required steps to neutralize the attempt on the part of the envoys for the Canton Concordat, namely those from Bern, Luzern, St. Gallen, and Aargau to intervene in the Canton and to move them to Bern. The government mobilized two battalions of infantry and an artillery company, part of whom moved into position already by 7:00 p.m., and it gave the supreme command, which included command over these troops, to Lieutenant-Colonel Ziegler. His staff consisted of the following:

Chief of Staff: Lieutenant-Colonel Schultheß
 First Adjunct and Commander of City Squares: Captain Fäsi-Usteri
 Second Adjunct: Staff Captain Guyer
 Third Adjunct: Artillery Captain Reinacher.

In the night from the 7th to the 8th, there remained in service 475 men of the civic guard; only a [limited; trans.] number of officials who had elderly and ill parents took advantage of the offer to go home. Between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. the civic guard still consisted of 350 men, who by 8:00 p.m. gradually were reduced to 70.³³

The discipline and dedication of this civic guard was from beginning to the very end generally excellent. The greater number remained at their posts from Thursday night until Tuesday noon, and the commander of the guards at City Hall could correctly report on the 9th: "The squad consistently willed to do everything, but this

32. It should not be overlooked that of the 631 weapons that were distributed on the evening of 6. September without audit, which couldn't have been done otherwise, to the rebels from the countryside (*posse comitatus*), all were returned with the exception of three or four.

The expense for the landsturm cost the city fl. 1343, 32 ß, 9 hlr.

33. Expenses for maintaining the civic guard cost the city fl. 1899, 16 ß, 6 hlr.

will was soon stronger than the force necessary for the adequate fulfilment of the guard duty expected of them.” Trust in the supreme commander and obedience to the officers was absolute to the point that under the most difficult of circumstances they were not only able to restore and then maintain peace and order but also able to ensure the safety of persons and possessions of even the most hated. Not even an attempt at much less any injury of anyone occurred. The flight of a number of radicals, partly in comical costumes, proved to be completely unnecessary and premature.

The engagement of troops brought with it the surfacing again of party hatreds fueled by followers of the former government and a part of the officers. It took great determination on the part of the supreme commander to avoid any mutiny. Anxious and naïve rumors of the approaching troops of the Canton Concordat from Aargau and supporters of the old government from Regensberg spread so that the troops and civic guard had to be armed for several nights.

The meeting of the Upper Council of September 9th brought a welcome conclusion to this tense and tiring situation. In spite of the warning of the President, 137 council members gathered in the Großmünster ("Great Cathedral") – 75 were absent. Following a short discussion and affixing of two counter motions, the Upper Council decided the following unanimously with the exception of one vote:

1. The City Council constituted on September 6th as possessing the attribute of the Governing Council ("*Regierungsrat*") and cantonal Governing Council ("*eidgenössisches Staatsrat*") was confirmed and charged with performing all of the tasks of the same according to the provisions of the Constitution and, further, to legislate laws until the Governing Council can be thoroughly organized.
2. The current Upper Council ("*Große Rat*") disbanded itself; the Governing Council is charged with immediately arranging for a constitutional election of the members of the Upper Council in order that the Council can assume its duties at the latest within 14 days.

The Upper Council was greeted with multitudinous cheers when it ended its session.

A member of the dissolved government tried to divert discussion when it came to the accusation of bloodletting. The government had not given the order to shoot. Tremendously angered, Hirzel wanted to respond, but he was restrained by those on his side with the promise that reparation should come in a different fashion. As the session ended, he remained in the church leaning on a column in deep contemplation with tears streaming down his furrowed cheeks giving those friends standing around him confirmation of the horrible wound that had shaken his innermost being.³⁴

34. According to the protocol of the Upper Council, one of the members of the Governing Council said: "... I speak as member of the dissolved government and state unequivocally that it was never the intention of the Governing Council that casualties should occur. No order to that end was given although it was the duty of the commanding officers to prevent the raid. On the contrary, there was only one person in the Governing Council who voiced the clear opinion that one should deploy neither

Given the task by the provisional government, he [Hirzel, trans.] generated a report on the commands and delegated powers of the dissolved Governing Council in which he presented his own orders and instructions as well as a clear portrayal of the ensuing two, bloody confrontations with the populous, and it exonerated the self-same Mr. Hirzel so completely that on September 13th the government gave him the command of the Canton's troops. However, for the sake of others the report was never published [see the "Attachment" at the end of this report, trans.], and the honest Hirzel to his death never got over the slight.

As he assumed the command from the previous Chief of Staff on the evening of September 12th, he said with tears in his eyes:

"View me with regret; I am a compromised man."

To describe the consequences of September 6th is beyond the designated task given to me. Today, after 25 years, little remains to be seen and felt; the politically democratic, and religiously tattering events have not been able to withstand the trajectory of time. Nonetheless, from the events the good endures that the openly displayed immorality and the previous ridicule of religion and church have not returned.

foreign nor domestic troops but follow the will of the people as soon as they had clearly expressed their will."

In his "Posting to the Revolution of 6. September 1839," pages 63/64, Councilman Weiß contradicted this assertion:

"Unanimously and with gratitude my directive (from the afternoon of the 5th of September) was praised and ratified and, as a consequence, embraced as the directive of the Upper Council. Its most vigorous endorsement came especially from Messrs. Ed. Sulzer and ..., and it was even said to me, I should notify Lieutenant-Colonel Hirzel that he had extended authority ... The vote of Mr. ... in the Upper Council on 9. September agitated me all the more according to which it would be, was generally, and was in fact believed that the government had no role in the military preparations and thereby either I or Lieutenant-Colonel Hirzel (or both of us) had been compromised to the highest degree.

Addition by the Editor: In this case, the person involved spoke who as one of the few leaders of the dissolved government had participated in the meeting of September 9th whereas others, such as Keller, Ulrich, Füssli, Hirzel, Weiß, Fierz, etc., were absent, and in his later memoirs stated as follows: ... "Dr. Bluntschli, leader of the political opposition of the dissolved government, ... said among other things that the government had even given the order to fire on the peacefully advancing populous. I am disgusted by such distortion of the facts. I write, especially, to repudiate this last accusation. To be sure, I say, the government had commissioned and designated authority on the morning of September 6th to Lieutenant-Colonel Hirzel that the barracked military should maintain order and security; needless to say – although not expressly stated – to stop the busses by the utilization of weapons; but the express command to fire on the approaching populous was never given."

The "N.Z.Z." ["Neue Züricher Zeitung," trans.], Nr. 108 wrote concerning the vote: ... "it was never the intent (of the government) to take steps that would lead to the spilling of the blood of citizens. No one gave that command; even the commanders only did their duty ...".

Attachment [never published, according to Schulteß' report, see above, page 374]: Report from Lieutenant-Colonel Sal. Hirzel on his Orders from the 5th to the 6th of September [1839]

To the
Honorable Governing Council of the State of Zurich

Mr. Mayor!

Honorable Gentlemen!

As commander of troops from the evening of September 5th until the catastrophe that occurred on the following day of September 6th, you asked me, yesterday, to generate a comprehensive report on the events of these days.

Already on the afternoon of the 5th, some confidential signals were sent to me by a high-ranking individual³⁵ that I should remain on alert because of the arsenal; however, without informing me more precisely just what danger threatened. I had correctly guessed, as I was confirmed the next night.

Thereupon, I initiated immediately the most necessary preparations in the case of an ambush of the main arsenals with the aid of some trustworthy arsenal workers and requested a few confidential friends immediately to go there in the event of need.

Late that evening, Councilman Fierz told me that, according to several reports from multiple townships, it was aimed to occupy the arsenal that night, and he cautioned me to be alert and to inform him and Councilman Weiß of events.

At approximately 9:30 p.m., Councilman Weiß came to me in the field office, and, after he briefly had informed me that according to confidential information that he had just received, in many townships in the district of Pfäffikon the call to arms had been raised and that great numbers of men would move toward the city, he gave me in the name of the mayor command over those troops in the military school and issued to me at my request the following written orders:

"Mr. Lieutenant-Colonel Artillery Inspector Hirzel is hereby commissioned and authorized to take all necessary and apparent military measures in order to protect and secure the citizens and their possessions as well as the constitutionally authorized officials."

Signed:

President of the War Council:

Weiß, Councilman [Regierungsrat, trans.]

Because I had received communications about the activities in the Pfäffikon district from a side with whom I otherwise had no contact, I believed it all the more important to proceed with care and took it prudent to inform in this respect the Chief of Police (with whom I had written contact already after receiving the report from Councilman

35. Mayor Heß; his name is provided by him himself in the column of the original text.

Fierz to keep a mindful eye on the arsenals during the night) as well as for the City President and a few others who had joined me yet before midnight.

As time passed one grew more concerned about the arsenals; however, I didn't think it was appropriate to occupy them with troops from the military school, but because the few friends and arsenal workers who were in them could not have defended them against a determined attack, I asked the Chief of Police to give me five or six gendarmes for each of the three main buildings. I asked the City President, as well, for 40 to 50 trustworthy citizens whom, under the commission that I had received from the President of the War Council, I armed from the arsenal and posted in the Löwenhof, the large arsenal, and in the field office.

Shortly after midnight, I went to the main police station, where I found Councilmen Weiß and Hegetschweiler and heard things that indicated clearly the difficulty of my position and task. I was offered the help in a very meddlesome manner by students gathered at the Widder, which motivated me, first, once more to check on the arsenals and then to go to City Hall in order to speak with the City President about his sense and intent of what security measures were to be taken.

I had hardly arrived when I observed that some 100 students had been stationed under the Linden next to Tiefenhof. I promptly went there, but they were gone. I learned that they had gone to the barracks.

After returning to the police station, I arranged for the Chief of Police and the above named two Councilmembers to go to the field office where they found the students who had returned from the barracks. After a brief coaxing, the students dispersed, and from that point on, as far as I could tell, they at no point regrouped en masse.

Immediately after I was given the commission as Commander in Chief, I gave the command for the troops in the military school to muster in anticipation of further orders but to remain in their rooms and keep calm. I also moved the cavalry from Platzschoppen to the barrack yard.

As with daybreak various reports were received concerning the approach of large crowds and that the civic guard in no small number were with them, in agreement with Councilman Weiß and the City President, I ordered that the lower and upper bridges be occupied by strong units of the military school and positions to be taken at the Landanlage in front of the Schiffschopf, at the Willishofer-bridge, at Selnausteg, Thalacker, the Fröschengraben, und Peterhofstatt from which measures I then informed the gathered Governing Council in the court house by a staff officer.

With the ever more complete gathering of the civic guard over time, I ordered all the troops of the military school to return to their original positions, in order to defend the arsenals over which I personally took responsibility, and I informed not only City President Ziegler but also Councilman Fierz on behalf of the Governing Council of this decision, both of whom approved.

This final positioning of the troops was as follows:

- 1 school company of about 40 men before the Waag to defend Arsenal-Alley from Münsterhof ("Cathedral Square")
- 1 cavalry unit of about 24 men to the left next to the company named above
- 1 school company at the entrance to In Gassen from the side of Storchengasse and on the square behind St. Peter's
- 2 units of cadets in front of the large arsenal
- 1 unit of marksmen to defend Arsenalgasse on the side of the Neumarkt ("New Market")
- 1 unit of cadets, the drill instructor, and armed Spielleute [minstrels?; trans.] as reserves In Gassen and to watch the entrances to the university buildings.

The stationing of a post at Schlüsselgasse by the unit behind St. Peter's was a military mistake, contrary to my orders, and I became aware of it only as the troops were drawn back.

True to my intent not to place troops in the arsenals themselves, I left them occupied for the duration by weak units of the civic guard. Given that the field office was separate from the positioning of the troops, the doors of the arsenals were well blocked, the ordinance as far as possible were placed in the wings along the Fröschengraben, nails were provisionally placed in the touch holes and two trustworthy workers were charged with nailing them up if necessary; finally, behind the doors of the entrances of the upper wings were placed canons.

After all of these preparations had been made, I rode back in the accompaniment of some cavalry at 7:00 p.m. up to the Krone and over the Graben and the Oberdorf in order both to check on the positions of the civic guards and to make myself visible to the already numerous civilian peasantry circulating in the streets of the Large City [see page 30; trans.] that, in the case of an eventual disturbance I would be recognized and my voice, raised to hinder any calamity, would be obeyed.

Having returned to the troops, I repeated to the commanders my instructions with respect to the decision solely to defend the arsenals, which essentially consisted of only in the most extreme necessity to use weapons; should the danger arise of being crushed by the crowd they should retreat into the closest houses.

I especially explained once again at the Münsterhof ("Cathedral Square") that the free circulation on the square from Storchengasse to the bridges after the Postgasse was in no way to be restricted, and only the already existing line of sentinels from the Senior Civil Servant Miser to the corner house of the Postgasse was to be maintained as long as possible. I commanded the leader of the cavalry to continue patrolling up to the Krone in order to remain continuously informed of the arrival of the crowd's sizeable numbers.

Before I turn to the tragic events what occurred shortly after, I must here add the personal comment that I had constructed an entirely incorrect notion concerning

the manner with which the crowd would come into the city. I thought, namely, that they would arrive in much smaller groups and would move back and forth as they had during the afternoon in far greater numbers through the streets. In fact, I couldn't have imagined what, in fact, turned out to be the case, that they would advance peacefully in great, disciplined numbers under designated leadership on the Münsterhof ("Cathedral Square") and Neumarkt ("New Market"). Had a single person been able or wanted to say with what leadership the arrival of the crowds was to be accompanied, I would have so taken measures that even more could have hindered the disaster. However, I received no advice and no closer instructions.

In my erroneous opinion with respect to how the situation would develop, I expected that any possible disarray would occur only in the evening, but shortly I was informed that the crowd was arriving in great numbers. After I had been impressed with how the military calmly interacted with the crowds at the Large Arsenal, I rushed to Münsterhof ("Cathedral Square"). However, I was already too late in that the cavalry had already advanced into the crowd. The infantry had withdrawn, as well, into the houses.

Given that there was no time to investigate why this had all occurred or to issue contrary orders, I quickly returned to the troops in front of the Large Arsenal in order to take the necessary precautions to protect it and, namely also, to ensure the increased security of the field office in light of the actual circumstances. However, in light of the rapid development of events, even this goal was entirely impossible to achieve.

Shortly thereupon, the cavalry followed me down the Zeughausgasse ("Arsenal Alley") and rushed on to the Neumarkt ("New Market") where they later in part and as individuals intruded into the crowd.

Soon afterwards, a tightly compact crowd with raised clubs and other weapons under frightful cries streamed around the corner of Hotel Baur towards the few defenders of the Large Arsenal. My shouts and those of others had no impact. As this crowd advanced eight, at the most ten, steps, self-defense commanded opening fire.

The shots, which easily could have been far more murderous, had the consequence that the advancing crowd rapidly withdrew, and the infantry refrained from shooting as of this point onward.

Constantly concerned about the field office, I was able finally to get inside with some men, given that the entrance through the garden gate should have prevented.

At that point, the cavalry was also able to regroup at Windeck.

My intention was that weapons were to be deployed in the night for the defense of the arsenals, and, in order to prevent any other or hasty use of the armaments by me or anyone else, I ordered trustworthy workers already in the course of the evening to hide the loading equipment and detonators for them.

After the above mentioned events, entirely unexpected as they were highly lamentable (even from most of the troops deeply disturbing), I felt that I had to make preparations should there occur a new attack overnight on my small, miserable troop by deploying some ordinance; to which end the doors in the upper field office wing

behind which the ordinance was placed were opened toward the square and ordinance was deployed from the Large Arsenal next to the Venetian Arsenal.

These steps having barely been taken, I received concomitantly and by hand two written and extremely welcome orders by Mayor Heß to prevent any further firing of weapons. Shortly afterwards, I received the command to turn over the arsenals to the civic guard. As a consequence, I immediately called back the troops to their barracks. Later, I ordered through Lieutenant-Colonel Hirzel-Blarer and Dr. Escher their dispersal and as many as possible to leave the barracks in civilian clothes.

For my part, I arranged for the defense of the civic guard in the field office with the aim of their being in a good defensive position in order to facilitate accommodation between them and any possible intrusion of the crowd. I left them at 12:00 midnight.

Looking back on the short but bloody event, it appears in agreement with public opinion to be unquestionable that, had the cavalry under my instructions stopped and conducted itself with more calm and self-control, perhaps no use of weapons would have occurred.

In defense of the cavalry leaders, may the following be emphasized:

1. that, because the returning of the cavalry patrol was enmeshed in the rabble just as it entered the Münsterhof ("Cathedral Square"), and, as a consequence, the troops stationed there were completely surprised, a rather quick decision was necessary;
2. It could be the case, according to rumor, that someone misused my name to give the commandant of the cavalry the order to keep the Münsterhof completely clean;
3. I have since been told that the cavalrymen were exhorted and incited by bystanders to act rashly and violently.

Once they had ridden into the square, it was natural that, under the circumstances, some time was required before the cavalry could be brought to its senses.

In my opinion, no allegations can be brought against the other troop units and their commanders. The immediate retreat into the houses on Münsterhof ("Cathedral Square") without real necessity was, granted, a mistake that could have led to unfortunate consequences. However, it is equally excusable due to the surprise and, apparently at least, partial dismay of the squad. Finally, that shots were fired at the crowd in front of the Large Arsenal should not be surprising because it was delayed as far as possible and was unavoidably in self-defense.

I can justify the frequently discussed and rebuked deployment of cannon not only by what subsequently occurred, but also – regardless of whatever horrible consequences would have transpired had they actually been used – I am completely exonerated of any responsibility by the oral command that I received to withhold fire from the responsible authorities in that moment as the massive crowd arrived.

Messrs. President, honorable Councilmen, this is the truthful report requested of me, which I believe enables me to ignore a multitude of unconfirmed or distorted tales of errors in judgment by individuals because it would be impossible for me in my

present position and because of the absence of many staff officers under my command to clarify them.

For my part, I have at this time no one to accuse.

While I am able to submit it to you with calm conscience, my actions in the so highly difficult position in which I found myself from the evening of the 5th to noon of the 6th and in which to escape my sense of duty and the, unfortunately, false hope of avoiding harm, does not permit me [to judge³⁶], I ask you to approve the document with my complete and highest respect.

S. Hirzel, Lieutenant-Colonel

36. The bracketed words are absent in the original.

The New Zurich-Calendar for the Leap Year 1840:

Description of 6 September 1839 in Zurich

On January 26, 1839, the entire Canton of Zurich was in an uproar when the unbelievable happened. The Education Council named Dr. Strauß Professor of Dogmatics (in Doctrinal Theology) and Church History at the University in Zurich as the consequence of the vote by the mayor, Melchior Hirzel because it was no longer opposed by the judicious author (d. December 26, 1836) of the *A Layman's Judgment [on Dr. Strauß' Life of Jesu and Views in Opposition to His Call to the University of Zurich]*.¹ – Then, what father or mother would not cringe over sending a son to an institution where the number one professor of theology declares the New Testament to be a myth (legend, fable); who denies, on the one hand, the divinity of Christ, our Savior who was crucified for our sins and rose from the dead, and then admits, on the other hand, that, perhaps a Jesus existed at some point who proclaimed salvation, but he was no more than any other a man This author [Strauß] who himself said in his book (Vol2, page 740): "whoever shares his conviction either has to elevate the congregation to his point of view or, because he will necessarily fail in this respect, must scrupulously adhere to the imaginations of the congregation (hence, Strauß permits and teaches lying and hypocrisy!); or should he fail in this respect, he should resign from the ministry."

However, the Lord protects his church and chooses individuals as his agents who create a society that above all calls itself a Christian society and has positive Christianity as its goal.

In Mädenschwil [a former monastery (trans.)], representatives from 29 congregations came together from all over the Canton to voice emphatically their strong objections to Dr. Strauß' professorship They found it advisable to have each congregation elect twelve men (to be called the Congregation Committee) who, in turn, would select from among themselves two members to serve on the District Committee who would pass on their resolutions to the Central Committee who, then, would receive instructions from the Central Committee. Without exception, every congregation in the Canton committed itself to the Central Committee in a deliberated seriousness and manner that indicated the importance of the situation and brought at all times honor to the people. Followers of Strauß also wrote, sold, and distributed many pamphlets, and Mayor Hirzel published a new, truly Straußian, newspaper called "The Friend of the People. Despite its friendliness, however, it was nothing but smoke and

1. Hans Georg Naegeli, Laienworte über Dr. Strauss Leben Jesu, und Ansichten gegen dessen Verufung auf die Universität Zürich (1839).

mirrors. A Straußian Club was formed, but it accomplished nothing. Opposition from the Faith Committee increased steadily. Everywhere, truly pious men were elected whom one could trust to pursue the good cause.

Then, on March 2nd, the Central Committee distributed an open letter to all the Congregation Committees that contained a statement to the Upper Council of the Canton and asked each Congregation Committee to accept or reject it.

The gratifying result of this referendum was that some 40,000 persons voted for the statement with approximately 1,000 in opposition although several congregations (for example, Winterthur) were not included. On March 4th the Canton's Governing Council sent the following petition to the Upper Council: The Professor of Theology chair is to be filled anew, and Strauß is to be removed. The Education Council agreed to pay Strauß a pension of 1,000 Franks a year. The Governing Council approved the pension.

However, the 40,000 voters were not satisfied with these decisions because they brought no assurance to the church or schools. Long standing opinions concerning the schools were raised anew. The Education Seminar's Director Scherr had been unable to win the confidence of the people. His students were required to absorb too quickly a massive amount of scholarship that distracted them from proper concentration on their profession and frequently came in conflict with pastors. Many of them called themselves Straußians, and that increased the aversion to Scherr's new teaching. The Central Committee had shut down, but the wave of protest against Scherr resulted in its reactivation. Messrs. Dr. Rahn-Eicher, vice-president, and Supervisor Spöndli, actuary, called for a People's Assembly in Kloten on September 2nd.

The Meeting in Kloten

In incalculable groups, some 20,000 men, surged toward the meeting place in the early morning hours despite the frequently drenching rain. The Central Committee had gathered there several days earlier. They were entirely surprised by the participation of so many, and, as a consequence, their spirits were raised. Mr. Hürlimann-Landis gave his greeting from the "Wild Man" Guesthouse balcony to those who had come from near and far (some as much as seven and eight hours). He explained the cause and the goal of the gathering to be the ignoring of the will of the people by the authorities.

Then, the Committee asked whether it should continue in office. After a loud cry of affirmation and with the ringing of church bells, the Committee and as many as were able to find seats moved to the church. After an hour of deliberation, Mr. Bind-schädler from Männedorf stepped out onto the balcony and shared with the crowd the speech that had been delivered by Mr. Hürlimann-Landis in the church. Thereupon,

the Committee's actuary and proctor, Mr. Spöndli, delivered to incessant cheering the resolution to be sent to the Governing Council, which was immediately brought to Mayor Heß by twenty-two representatives. Merz read a resolution concerned with the organization of Christian congregation clubs in which well-meaning persons could gather to be able to find encouragement in standing up to the enemy cabal. Finally, Pastor Meyer from Glattfelden read the petition that contained the unaddressed wishes from the spring. In a moving speech, Dr. Rahn closed the gathering whereupon Mr. Hürliemann-Landis dismissed the crowd.

As the twenty-two representatives under the leadership of the old, senior civil servant Eicher of Mädenschweil brought the resolution to Mayor Heß, he offered a calming response. The Governing Council assembled shortly afterward, came to an unsatisfactory assessment that was then shared with those representatives from the public gathering who had remained in the Casino. They were not a little shocked. Nonetheless, they brought the decision along with their commentary back to the Central Committee.

The Governing Council called for its convening on September 9th.

A slew of rumors again stirred up the people. One heard that foreign troops were to be called to the Canton, one spoke of gatherings of radicals in Hin[...]il and Winterthur and that they were to occupy the armory in the night of the 5th to 6th of September in order to demonstrate who was in control. Not infrequently, one spoke of the guillotine. In all of these rumors the people saw their holiest interests violated and ridiculed by their government's representatives. Dr. Rahn sent the following to all the presidents of the Regional Committees:

"The enemy threatens to have our Fatherland overrun by foreign troops. Neuhaus musters Bern, and Basel is calling up arms. I ask you to stand ready so that when the church bells ring you are prepared for the attack. A good portion of you should come to Zurich, and another should remain at home to protect the hearth." Zurich, the 5th of September 1839, Rahn-Escher.

Preservation of the highest interests was called for against the hubris of individuals and the interference on the part of foreigners, and the longer one waited, the greater and intractable the fight could be.

On the evening of the 5th, out of Pfäffikon came some 600 men, mostly without weapons because one didn't want to use of arms to force the government to accomplish the aims of the people. There followed 300 to 400 men each from Rußikon, Bauma, and Hittnau. After naming a leader, they advanced orderly. As they passed through each village, their numbers grew. In Volkentschweil, men from Metzikon, Sternenbergr, Fischenthal, and other communities from the region of Hinweil swelled their numbers so that, according to eye witnesses, some 3,000 men or so had come together. Calmly yet determined, this group marched onward without clamor, outcry, or spoken word with the solemn stillness broken only as they neared villages either by spooky ringing of church bells or the voices of thousands singing pious hymns from the bottom of hearts. A letter from the Central Committee that arrived in

Dübendorf called for retreat, but the people demanded loudly to be led forward. As a consequence, the procession approached ever nearer to Zurich. Arriving in Oberstraß at the Guesthouse zur Linden, they stopped. Shortly afterwards, two representatives of the Governing Council, Messrs. Hegetschweiler and M Suler, arrived to hear the demands of the people Dr Rahn-Escher arrived, as well, and it was agreed to present the following requests to the Governing Council:

1. The fulfilling of all of the wishes articulated in Kloten.
2. The explicit declaration that the Governing Council had no intention either now or in the future to call for the intervention in the internal affairs of the Canton by foreign troops.
3. The annulment of the Seven-Concordat Agreement.

The Messrs. Representatives declared their intent to do everything possible that these wishes be fulfilled and headed back with the assurance that the Governing Council would give its answer as soon as possible.

The people dispersed in all directions in search of food and drink and gathered back together in two hours. They demanded from the city to be given space for them to camp out and by means of representatives be able to ask for a speedy decision from the Governing Council. Thereupon, the procession, divided into groups of four with twenty marksmen in front followed by other armed men behind them with the remainder, some 2,000, armed only with sticks, many poorly clothed, but all well-disciplined, broke out in the following song:

This is the day the Lord has made,
His will be done throughout the world,
Praise Him, what was done by Jesus Christ,
In heaven and on earth.
The people awaited You,
Until the time is fulfilled,
Then God sent from His throne
Salvation to the World, You, His Son.

The strong notes echoed powerfully through all the streets and surely, as well, in many hearts.

On the town hall square, the armed men joined Pastor Hirzel and moved over the Lower Bridge. The unarmed men under Dr. Rahn-Escher went to Münster bridge in order to gather on St. Mary's square to rest. It was about 8:30 p.m.

God is my song! He is the God of the strong
Noble is His name and great are His works
And all of heaven is His domain.

The crowd separated singing this song. However, as the armed men arrived at the point where the Storchengasse entered StMary's square, Pastor Hirzel heard the approaching cavalry and stepped before his marksmen and implored them, in the name of God, in the case of an attack not to return fire until two of them, even if he is one, lay dead on the ground. The cavalry burst onto the square with waved swords.

Pastor Hirzel stepped forward and cried out to Major Uebel: "We have not come belligerently but to continue our discussions with the Governing Council; I swear to you by God, don't start a civil war!" There was no response but also no charge by the cavalry. Rather, Major Uebel and his dragoons took a few steps back. A discussion could have avoided the spilling of blood.

However, the dragoons surged a second time, were met with the same response from Pastor Hirzel, and they pulled back again without a verbal response. A third time the cavalry surged with raised swords, this time much closer to the demonstrators. A shot was fired into the air (according to one witness from the left side of the dragoons; according to another from a house, still another says from a cavalryman, another that shots came from both sides), and in that moment a dragoon spurred his horse forward and charged Pastor Hirzel. A marksman behind Hirzel saw this, and he fired in response. The horse fell with its rider. Shots were exchanged, the cavalry retreated toward Münster-bridge where the other column of demonstrators, those without weapons, arrived from the upper bridge onto the square singing:

No sparrow falls, Lord, without Your will;
Should I not silence my heart with the consolation,
That Your grace preserves my life

The cavalry turned against these new arrivals. A fight ensued, and someone called to Pastor Hirzel: "OK, then! Charge, in God's name!" Just how little the crowd wanted blood, however, is confirmed by the fact that Hirzel led his people past the fallen dragoon and his horse without touching a hair on his head.

Following the delivery of a few blows, the cavalry retreated at a gallop so that most of them came to a halt outside of town. However, the demonstrators were then met with a more dangerous enemy. As one half of the people entered Postal Street in order to block the return of the cavalry, the other half, most of whom were armed, turned in the direction of the Venetian Armory in an attempt to gain weapons for the demonstrators. A shower of deadly fire came down on them from windows of several of the surrounding houses, as the residents themselves reported. The demonstrators, nonetheless, believed that they would soon be victorious because they were told from trustworthy sources that the arsenal was in the hands of the city, which was no more in support of the Governing Council than the assembled demonstrators. Unfortunately, though, this rumor was false. Arriving at the arsenal only to be greeted by fire from the houses above and without the proper implements to force open the door, the armed demonstrators retreated quickly but orderly – at first, over the upper bridge, in part to escape from the assassin's fire from the windows above; in part, in order to rejoin the other half of their comrades who were mostly unarmed but engaged in battle in the Postal Alley with the infantry behind whom was a canon loaded with grape shot. The result was that the smaller group from Pfäffikon, consisting of all the armed demonstrators, retreated to Riesbach in order to wait for their brothers from around the Lake of Zurich whereas the unarmed demonstrators fled the city in all directions

Right at this moment, in the midst of his efforts to save the lives of his brothers, State Councilor Hegetschweiler lost his own life whether by accident or intent is unclear but, in any event, at the hands of troops of the government. He was wounded by shot- This man of the people, who in the truest sense of the word had worked for the interests of the people, which made clear not only with his penetrating insight but also with his honor-filled heart that the prevailing eccentric tendency in whatever respect, also in the public lives of despised public officials, can only result in ruining the whole state. His life as his death will be eternally remembered by the people of Zurich.

As the Pfäffikon group was withdrawing, the alarm bells rang out in the city. We need to examine more closely their role in the decisive day's events. On Thursday evening at some point between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m., the dispatch arrived from Zurich that the region of Pfäffikon had sounded the alarm. In Zurich some 300 to 400 men immediately signed up not so much to defend the present government from the people but more to protect persons and possessions. The leader of this civic guard was the head commanding officer, Ziegler. Of these recruits, some 40 were posted at the armory along with government troops by the Governing Council following the recruits' indication of their preference of assignment. The above misunderstanding arose over the city's or the Canton's control of the armory, as a consequence. Generally, the intention was that there was to be no question of a conflict, and this was strengthened when it was learned that at daybreak the armed volunteers from Pfäffikon had stationed themselves calmly and in an orderly fashion outside of the city and had already established contact with the Governing Council. Even the approach of the volunteers had not disturbed anyone because it was known that they were merely concerned strategically to locate themselves in order to conduct negotiations with the government and, for the most part, were unarmed. It was all the more a surprise when the news of a skirmish having begun between the people and government troops reached the convened officials at city hall. Immediately, the commanding officer, Ziegler, called his staff together and made it officially clear to the officers that he himself would fire on them with the very first shots against the people. The advancement of the city's troops and the sounding of the general alarm moved the Governing Council to place the armory entirely under the control of the city.

At this very moment, the Governing Council took flight: some went behind, others above, and still others below the building. Only four members remained as the fighting broke out. The troops retreated from the demonstrators, and Colonel Sulzberger, their fearless leader, demonstrated his true colors as he tried to take flight dressed as a noble woman with veil and corset but was recognized and brought back. However, he was not harmed other than that he was dismissed.

At 11:00 a.m. residents arrived from both sides of the Lake of Zurich from Küßnach, Ehrlibach, and Herrliberg having been informed of the tragedy experienced by their brothers from Pfäffikon. These new arrivals were all well-armed, with fierce looks, and filled with courage in the face of death. Following much misunderstanding,

the news of the departure from the region of Pfäffikon arrived only later in these lake communities. However, when it arrived, everyone was united, young and old, rich and poor, that they would go to the aid of, and risk their lives for, their brothers, God, and country. The countryside and lake were covered with troops rushing to bring assistance. Thank God that they were not greeted with more resistance because it would have brought far more bloodshed.

In addition, droves and droves of volunteers arrived from the remaining parts of the Canton, especially from the region of Uster, so that in a few hours a huge gathering of people, courageous in heart and with weapons of all kinds had gathered without, now, any government. Who wanted to take into his hands the reins of this massive group with all of its responsibility, especially the burning hate of the hunted party? Yet, driven by the wish to avoid any further disaster, Heß, Muralt, Mayer von Kuonau, M. F. Sulzer, F. Sulzer, Hürlimann-Landis, and Escher-Schultheß took on the perilous task of assuming the leadership of this public situation. They deserve eternal thanks not only from the Canton of Zurich but also from all of Switzerland for their devotion to, and love of, the fatherland. Only strangers by origin or heart could fail to recognize and defame them.

They won this thanks: The joy with which these thousands unequivocally accepted their leadership; the peace that has been preserved ever since; the happy hope with which the entire Canton looked toward a better future is the best proof of how sacred the people viewed the situation for which it had risked everything.

Let us now turn our grave attention to the wounded and death of September 6th.

They had followed the call of the Lord to protect the sacredness of the fatherland and left their homes behind but were not to return with their comrades. They fell in the grim, bloody fight: some, to suffer through to renewed health; others, to find their home immediately in heaven. The wounded were brought to the Canton hospital, and the dead were brought to the Predigerkirche in which all evening until midnight their Christian brothers sang spiritual hymns of comfort. In order to learn for themselves to live with, and to inculcate, a sacred fear of the horrible consequences of civil warfare, many thousand wanted to view the bodies of those sad victims who had fallen for their faith.

We are all indebted to the fallen, the dead and the living, to make known that from the drafted reports of the government and pastors about many individuals – with but one exception – the universal testimony to their piety, integrity, industriousness, and quiet, domestically inculcated purpose. By far the most came from poor, extremely meagre circumstances who had to struggle by means of strenuous effort to acquire the daily bread to sustain themselves, their wives and children, and not a few, also, older parents and siblings.

The Wounded

1. Heinrich Kreis from Altikon, the last ten years from Myla
2. Heinrich Meier v Bäretschweil, born 17 April 1814, weaver; married and father of one child
3. Hans Jakob Lattmann of Bauma, born 27 March 1814; married but died without a child
4. Johannes Kägi from Bauma, born 23 May 1816, pamphlet printer; married, father of one child
5. Hans Jakob Spärri from Fischenthal, born 14 October 1819, cotton weaver
6. Hans Rudolf Müller from Hittnau, 59 years hold (he defended himself with his stick against the attack of the military and received three wounds on his head and a bayonet stab in the stomach)
7. Georg Weber from Ausliko, parish of Pfäffikon, father of two children
8. Conrad Boller from Pfäffikon, father of one and of four stepchildren
9. Johannes Gubler from Pfäffikon; bachelor
10. Heinrich Keller from Turbenthal, born 11 March 1798; married, father of a son
11. Johannes Würgler from Uster, resident of Hottingen, born 8 April 1787; father of six grown children of whom four are married
12. Heinrich Bär from Weißlingen, born 19 October 1814, pamphlet printer; bachelor.

Wounded among those in the crowd: the student Wirz, woodworker Nüscheler, student Freuler, and carpenter apprentice Hoffmann.

Deceased

1. Hans Jakob Kägli from Bauma, 56 years old; left behind his wife and two children
2. Hans Jakob Jucker also from Bauma, 53 years and six months old; left behind his wife and three children of whom two were infants
3. Hans Rudolf Spärri from Allweisen, parish of Bauma, 21 years and six months old, left one child behind
4. Heinrich Tobler from Hinterbalm, parish Pfäffikon(Unknown; rumored to be from Gossau
5. Hans Jakob Weber from Vorderbalm, parish Pfäffikon, left behind three children
6. Hans Jakob Boßhard from Auslikon, parish Pfäffikon; left behind an emotionally disturbed wife and a 14 year-old child
7. Bartholomäus Diener from Herisau, Canton Appenzell, 27 years old, the last three years from Zettel; he supported his 80 year-old, extremely poor Father
8. Konrad Marthaler from Oberhasli, parish Niederhasli, 34 years old, served in Hegnau, joined voluntarily the civic troops; bachelor

9. Hans Heinrich Egli from Metzikon, 20 years and eight months old; bachelor, pamphlet printer; left behind poor, gloomy parents whose only consolation was his sister
10. Heinrich Schnurrenberger from Sternenbergr (died on the 12th), 20 years old; bachelor, the single, dedicated and childish naïve and deeply loved son of his aggrieved parents. Remarkable is the particular, official declaration of how he, four weeks before his death, anticipated his horrible fate. On a Sunday evening, his departing, weighty words as he left the home of one his closes relatives where the disastrous developments of the day were discussed were: "I feel that I don't have long to live. There is going to be war, and I will die in this struggle! Care for my father and mother!" He spoke gravely and anxiously concerned although normally he was so cheerful given that he rarely had cause to have such thoughts.
11. Jakob Diggelmann from Pfäffikon, twenty years old; bachelor (died on the 16th)
12. Jakob Dietliker from Pfäffikon, resident of Kempten, parish Wetzikon, 28 years old, carpenter; left behind his wife and three children
13. Heinrich Müller from Hittnau, amputated and died on the 29th; left behind his 54 year old wife, three grown sons and two daughters; as the case with others, he said at the time of his death: he dies joyously because he dies for a just cause.

The first nine were buried on Sunday, the 8th, the tenth on Saturday, the 14th, the two following on Friday the 20th, and the last on Sunday, the 22nd of September. The services were officiated by the second pastor of the pastoral community, deacon Pestalozzi, who had faithfully comforted the wounded with the gospel.

Thursday, September 12th, the most beloved sacrifice brought through these events, Governing Council member, Johannes Hegetschweiler (born in Rifferschweil), whose massive head wound prevented his regaining consciousness so that he died on the 9th, was carried to the grave from the Post Office building that he had left with full awareness to deliver the message of reconciliation. The crowds were huge that accompanied the procession to the grave: relatives, his physician colleagues, the provisional government, the city council of Zurich, professors from the university and Canton schools, several governmental envoys, representatives of various committees, the civic guard of Zurich and several other communities, everyone dressed in black, and thousands from city and countryside accompanied the coffin to the graveyard in which also were laid to rest long ago; Lavater, Usteri, Schultheß, Escher from Linth, archivist Hirzle, and Dr Römer. Even the military remaining in the city gave their honors to the passing deceased. In St. Peters, Deacon Fäsi delivered a eulogy and passionate hymns of mourning accompanied the blessed departed on his way home. Hegetschweiler's name and the grave remembrance by all of this man killed in action remains a blessing to our Father land! Those left behind have united themselves in friendship by helpfully accepting Christian hearts and hands. May your ashes rest in peace!

Listen, the bells toll their muffled sound
And proclaim the coming struggle and storm,
Gruesome echoes ring out from every church tower!
Alas! Today death and life hold forth.
Crusading – great Father – crusading be victorious,
Or die having succumbed in the fight.

Pastor Hirzel draws nigh,
(With the bold people of Pfäffikon,)
He proclaims God and His Son,
God's Spirit induced him,
To stand at their helm,
To fight with them for the most Sacred.

The crowds grow ever greater,
Ever larger gather the soldiers for the fight,
All have taken up arms;
On ships they come to land,
In order to fight for sacred Right,
Surging forward God's servants come.
Rounds follow upon rounds! The fighters' daggers rattle;
This hour came too early –
Brothers fall on top of brothers,
And the bullets ring out in the air.
Many faithful found their deaths,
Many groaned under their horrendous wounds.
Hegetschweiler, without any weapon,
Courageously pressed through the crowd,
Was gravely wounded by a shot
Peace was his good aim
Where they fought bravely for their Sacred Heart,
He fell! – Now he has slipped away.

Paulus – On Theological Academic Freedom and the Election of Instructors for Universities

Sent to All Those
In the Free Canton of Zurich,
Who would also like to test
The Conscientiously, Examined Convictions
Of A Liberal Foreigner

From
A Councilman of the Grand Ducal Baden Privy Church Council and Professor
For Theology and Philosophy,
Dr., Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob Paulus,
in Heidelberg

Zurich,
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Translator's Summary of Paulus' Themes

1. Justice is above the law
2. Academic freedom rejects prescribing in advance that which is permitted to be found.
3. "Theory" is not the enemy of "praxis."
4. What "is to be learned requires truths that are not concretely empirical."
5. Academic theology demands time from church leaders to convert the mental exercise and conviction of the university into church teaching.
6. "That which is presented to [... persons] without adequate reasons by means of merely the authority of old names and models can't have any resonance in those unbiased, ruthless minds [of students] and should all the less be presented to people only to be recited blindly."
7. "[...] the content of the teaching of early Christianity is not dependent on these [questionable New Testament] stories."
8. "Nothing [...] is heartedly more necessary as inward religiosity." "The word itself [religiosity] suggests a thoughtful mental attitude, a reflectiveness. Out of this

- reflectiveness with respect to humanity and God comes the desire for a closeness and harmony with God as the certainly good, perfect spirit.”
9. Against sexism and slavery: "The oppressed feminine sex would be elevated to human dignity, and the slaves who were innumerable and as horribly despairing would be treated as 'Fellow brothers before God' and allowed to expect for themselves to be among the fellow redeemed."
 10. Reconciliation with the godhead and united for Christ's Kingdom of God is what it means to become a religious Christian. Building a faith committed to divine reconciliation, the Christian Kingdom of God would emerge and every honest person's welfare secured.
 11. Understanding cannot be strong-armed by a certainty that cannot be understood differently.
 12. "When it comes to spiritual things, what is less adequate than a majority vote?"
 13. "Vehemence is never a sign of a certain faith."
 14. "Who made us judges over those who think differently from us?"
 15. "[...] those should be trusted who are able to have thought things through having bracketed self-interest."

The Text

"Should we believe religion and Christianity for the sake of the persons or the sake of the thing [*Sache*] because of its essential substance?" This, succinctly stated, is the question that, unexpectedly and with vehemence has been thrown down before you as a gauntlet, O staid, free, but for that reason easily agitated, Swiss citizens!

More accurately understood, this is the universal question of our time. Reputation of the person? Or the content of truth? Which is the best possible self-examined conviction? Which is correct?

One places the person and the thing over against one another. This is a fundamental error, but one committed all too easily. One separates the thing from the person. One forgets that persons are *the means*; the thing should be and remain *the goal* of everyone. One shouldn't oppose the secondary aims of persons with the attainment of the primary aim of the thing. Persons are united for and by the thing. However, the thing should be primary. This is in general the solution to the conflict.

We want to consider the question, for the moment, generally. What should hold true?

What is to be obeyed, when it comes to the decisive action of a government by a great, legislating Council of a free state from the carefully advised, more knowledgeable authority? The will of the people? Or the truth-in-itself? That is it, which is reflected in clear, impartial minds worthy of truth that in any case occurs only by means of calm, multifaceted, clear observation of an object and all the opposing

reasons involved. That which the honest and considered person can say with full consciousness: Good! This is what is correct, the best possible!

Many outside of government oppose the persons in power and, therefore, reject what they have carefully considered and chosen as the best possible for everyone because the government didn't respect something as excellent (and recognized even by the opposition) to be acceptable and most worthy not only for the (properly named) *hoch-Schule* ["higher-"School or university; trans.] but also for the spirit of the whole of that which externally is no little respected but not in common with the scrutinizing, observing, republican Canton.

Others want some other persons because one could have more influence on them or because the legislators do something, as the case with all finite persons, that they don't like; but something perhaps, were it not difficult and frequently hindered, could be achieved more quickly and would flourish.

Other persons would prefer to be the rulers. Unsatisfied persons, who don't believe they have enough say, suggest other plans that, in part, also have, or could have, their good sides. The worst is when they inspire others to heated action out of prejudices, as a consequence of smaller issues. For what clouds healthy judgment of the common citizen more than the fear of, or desire for, agitated passion? In this fashion, the opposition links up with powerful and respected men. They can bring honor to the leadership of the faction. They attract blindly following or half-blind followers.

Ambitious persons at least see that the legislators possess a power that one can envy as long as one doesn't recognize patriotically enough how much effort, care, and responsibility lurks behind the glitter of this power, and that, behind the transient power, duty, and law that is dependent on the will of all citizens, one can expect a strict tribunal by means of the free, public judgment that can bring honor and shame for life in the free history of the entire free confederation [Swiss: *Eidgenossenschaft*].

I do not possess any information about all of the particular personalities who would like to inflame you. No friend of the people would gladly expose the nakedness of the fatherland. As Napoleon said, in order to wash black clothes, one doesn't go to the market and invite the pouring of juices over them.

Only as an observer of people, as once the Swiss-honored knight Hutten who fell asleep on the island of Usnau said, as one to whom comes everything humanly important warm in the heart, and as an observant freeman by means of insight, I describe as a carefully deliberated man who may never either allow or encourage destruction of a well-meaning cause, a means of discernment, of wisdom, or of intellectual formation for improvement. Personal concern should never "captivate" independent goals.

Having grown up in a spiritually akin neighboring country under a monarchy but a long tradition of constitutional government, I have paid attention to but, nonetheless, never personally fulfilled a lifetime wish to see with my own eyes Swiss customs and Swiss prosperity or to experience the causes of the same. I can envision the Swiss situation only by means of general anthropology and several, particular phenomena. However, having been educated up-to-date some almost 60 years ago in even the

ancient, once monastic educational institutions of Württemberg, which to this day raises its pupils, without stifling mental restrictions but all the more shaped by comprehensive "studiousness," – as now Professor Strauß in a livelier epoch – I have been obliged since to acknowledge my great appreciation to several German monarchical governments for fifty years of rich research and teaching. However, never, not from dissenters even, in that time did the constantly exercised freedom granted to me as a university professor and in writing bring forth good fruit by means of [external; trans.] personal persuasion or party pressure but through clarification of reason aimed to be valid either by means of dutiful agreement with others or practiced confirmation of them.

I have taught publicly for years. I have written much (almost too much?) but never claimed something that I didn't regard as having been proved to be true. When it frequently diverged from what was usual, from that which the majority wanted to be the case, never did either the German people or the government call into question my academic freedom, still less my person.

In all of my theological efforts, what mattered to me as my conscience and utterances confirm, was the most important thing: to portray the Christian religion grounded in itself, in its simple, undeniable, permanent truths from within itself, believable, applicable, independent of persons and times; as I look back at the enduring important persons with respect, with amazement, with the intent by others and myself to be able to make them firm convincing examples of the (practical) will's activity. And as long as I am aware of the reasons of my conviction, I will not cease to look back on them so reverently although I at the same time have found nothing human that is infallible.

This all was permitted to me by the principal ruling individuals, as well as by many others in our German-monarchical institutions of higher education or universities, as among the most important corrective means for all that can be improved academically, and it unquestionably enjoyed legal protection as was also the case with those who taught otherwise than I.

O esteemed Neighbors! Even you can't be surprised, that I am astonished, yes, extremely surprised, that even now in a state organized through itself (by a clear and developed understanding of its citizenry) and under a government that has planted the corrective means through rearing and education in school, church, and institutions of higher learning, to be sure commencing at the right places, nevertheless should seek to achieve exactly the opposite having been forced by demand of the people. Simultaneously, a fear of ghosts was engendered like once occurred at the Sea of Galilee where Jesus' disciples believed that the storm raging around them was caused by wandering ghosts on the shore. Or is it more than a fear of ghosts when you, strong Christian believers as you are!, when you allow yourselves to be convinced that someone could steal from you your faith, when you truly know what you believe? Or the tiny boat of faith of at least the good trusting citizenry or of the children and grandchildren will sink because a non-Swiss will be called to the university, an

individual about whom in recent years, by those irritated with him, all kinds (mostly very insignificant) opposing voices have rung out, but with respect to whom, as well, many testimonies of respect on the part of rigorously examining dissenters, has gained universal recognition.

Why this split? Because he, this 30-year-old, distinguished Tübingen private lecturer, by means of lengthy, excellent preparations and thorough philosophical-theological lectures, armed by a research method that promises much more and with unselfish love of truth and possessing a mental calm, whose strength and mildness in his work and even more in his defensive *Streitschriften* must shame all of iron will. Because he has directed attention in a radical manner to the great difference "that stories of the distant past, when viewed in reflecting minds as the truth in-itself and from which should arise ever more clarity, cannot by far have the clarity and certainty as pious teachings whose stories' primary content are the product of those very pious teachings."

How is this any different than that Strauß adds to the principle:

Certain and effective is the internal, religious Christian faith when it is constructed on essential content more than on stories from persons and brief, merely traditional events of the past, which, certainly, have attained from their temporal context their powerful, salutary influence.

An honest mind should question himself when he conscientiously holds himself back as a result of some inclination to injustice in a biblical passage or a biblical example. Is this not primarily possible because it corresponds to an in-itself true warning from one's innermost reflection? The warning occurs because it is true and undeniable at all times. And we should thank the person who says and adheres to it because it is true in-itself. But the warning isn't true because that person said it. And the judgment remains for that reason universally solid:

There would be many, and many among us, who would be habitually more effective in Christian action when from childhood onward, they had taken on as their own as in-themselves true and as eternal duties of conscience, certain powerful words and examples from our book of holy folk tales and not mixed them with tangential claims that often require too much belief.

Doesn't just the opposite occur, when one wants to rebuff a pressing desire by means of a biblical passage all too aware that it is just a mere play of understanding to interpret merely historically differently – with the consequence that the passage is no longer so strongly applicable for erasing my desire from my mind by the interpretation providing an excuse for this entirely different situation? Yet, only that decides how to act properly and cannot be denied as worthy of, and desired by, God, which still today is and has been for thousands of years as true-in-itself in conscience and reason. Where else does the rawest contempt for religion break out than where piety is to

be constructed on the unbelievable and to be followed only to achieve the praise of people.

In contrast, the principle that what is historical and personal from antiquity, indeed, is to be tested, but, primary recognition of the means for the applying of the in-itself as true of Christian piety is due, surely, to the higher academic freedom that has arisen in the German, monarchical universities; the academic freedom that until recently still no one dared to be stunted for the blessed Johannes Schultheß. Someone with his conventionality, erudition, and biblical exegesis could be compared, in the first place, to us non-Swiss whereas his talent of presentation, his breadth of knowledge, his gentleness still especially justified the vocation with the young and the stranger. For now, we are speaking only of academic freedom that is primarily exercised only by such individuals who are generally recognized as talented, as independent, and capable of serious research.

How can it be that this academic freedom can be now placed in question with respect to someone with these qualities among a very respected part of proudly, freedom loving Switzerland? Why so intently fought against? Before I can speak to the issue and person, I need to make myself clear.

Switzerland, to this point, has had little engagement on its own with the question of the goal of higher education. Germany has tested its dual goal for centuries.

One would never call a professor of law to a German university under the stipulation that he exclusively propound and teach the currently applicable (now stable) law. One does such things perhaps in the Gymnasium as an introductory exercise to be expanded upon in the higher years of school in order (one perhaps doesn't even know why?) to bring the uninformed students closer to the so-called "sciences" of the university.

However, the academic professor of law must explain the existing laws in his discipline with respect to their usual or controversial meaning. He must also draw attention to and nourish by comparison to external causes and internal reasons how the currently existing law has come to be. But where he no longer finds the existing law relevant enough, he will clearly formulate, unquestionably, precisely this existing sense of the law in order that what he regards as needing improvement can be carefully judged and his modifications clearly profiled. Never has it occurred to a Department of Justice to forbid such a practice, which would threaten the authority of existing law.

Why not? It is clear that one is to act and govern in conformity with existing law as long as the law is valid. But from where would appropriate improvements and often great improvements come from given that there are constant changes in circumstances and, especially, changes in human character? Would the religious and worldly authorities or the people have stopped burning persons at the stake had not the university professor of law, Thomasius, lit a different light in the minds of youth? Would the examining magistrates have substituted other methods that were for them much more difficult, objective investigations for what was for them the convenient strategy of torture? Would those comfortable with the long-standing lawful order have

made the effort to carefully distinguish between justice and injustice, if not for the spirit of justice and legislative skill that stands above the law – by observation of the true in-itself also in these disciplines – had they not been trained by men, who, according to the standard of academic freedom in institutions of higher learning, had concerned themselves, irrespective of past and present practice, exclusively with the examination of the knowledge and ignorance in the broad expanse of their science? Such improvements come from men who have nothing personally to gain either in honor or profit from maintaining or changing long-standing traditions and only are powerful as a consequence of the thoroughness of their judgments! It would be irrational to expect those who wish to be guided by truth in-itself from now on to search out the most careful and demonstrable if it were to be prescribed in advance what they are permitted to find.

That manner of investigation that examines its object on the basis of nothing other than itself (i.e., with respect to the truth in-itself), as is well known, is called theory or the theoretical (that is, contemplated [Grk.: *theoria*; trans.]) However, it is not to be set over against praxis as an enemy. They are to be combined with one another, to be sure. However, acclimatization in application or praxis has become so comfortable for some officials and most conduct themselves so mechanically that, when they happen upon something in practice that shows itself to be in need of improvement, most leave everything "as it's always been," were there not institutions and times in life where new wine must be filled in new wineskins; to be sure, in a manner that the wineskins don't tear. However, I can't imagine that Swiss youth, prepared for university, are easily torn: such tearing would have to be caused by ignorant wrenching.

Seriously, when it comes to the teaching of law, one hears least frequently anything about limiting academic freedom, the one strategy that can bring about learning and self-reflection. The historical school wants to further broaden itself by drawing upon all the legal wisdom of Rome, Byzantine, and India. The newly educated, legal understanding might give examples that adapt a German legislation to the Germans, but it isn't necessary first to make them un-German. Should there be competent professors who perhaps as individuals are too one sided with respect to this or that other favorite opinion, his concern is to create a discussion with those in his audience and with the public generally who wish one.

It occurs to no one, to whom the most pressing issue is justice with respect to mine and yours, that without academic freedom one can hinder on the basis of recommendations from accepted praxis unthinkable self-reflection over symbolic books, or objections by juridical graybeards, or impromptu decisions of citizens.

Why not? Jurisprudence has things that through perceptible life experience can readily be used to confirm what is missing whenever academic freedom attempts something inappropriate. In contrast, only those disciplines eager to protect themselves prohibit certain teachings for whom those in control find it difficult or impossible to demonstrate that they are immutably correct (as those in control usually want to believe themselves to be, without backtalk).

The more one's work advances into uncertainty, the more people tend to believe. That is, that which they mean to have brought back is to be trusted without question although much of it nobody can demonstrate as true in-itself as something to be accepted by everyone as indispensable.

Nevertheless, I don't even want to ask, for example, if one could expect of a long-standing, traditional, medical staff of reputable practitioners to give their studied opinion for approval of a university professor who introduces unsophisticated, simple remedies that question the credibility of well-studied prescriptions and could give pharmacists less to do. However, a government board concerned with the healthcare as a whole would not veto the entirely different method from usual health practitioners that healed by means of simple procedures, and would vouchsafe the academic freedom of circulation for his opinion. However, the resolution of the conflict is not so obvious. For, if the patient dies, despite one's having done for him everything possible with medicinal flasks, the experiment can't be repeated again to see if the more simple remedies would have saved him. Unlike by the jurists, the question hovers over the imperceptible. The authorities may for a long time defend their traditional practice. Though, if one wanted to decide the issue by means of a republican, general election or by means of XXII representatives, in place of the absent professional wisdom, the majority would triumph with ease [regardless which side it took; trans.] under the old saying: "The more the better!" as long as no other considerations come into play.

We turn, rather, all of our attention to that, which the theological faculty?, to what by them is to be the teaching of Christian piety?, and what through this teaching can be necessary for the entirety of Christian faith for conscientious, liberty-loving citizens.

What once was done or attempted to be done better in your vicinity at the Councils of Constance [1414–1418] and Basel [1431–1445], where did that come from? As is generally known, from the seat and vote of learned instructors from university faculties next to cardinals and highly sinecured dignitaries of the church! Admittedly, instead of from relics of opinion, a piously-formed person knew more about how to ground in-itself true convictions. Pursued for that reason, he barely reached the Swiss border where his life was saved, whereupon Aeneas Sylvius first by the people (through popularity) and then by flattering the self-made church leadership and those congenial to them was transformed into Pope Pius II [1458–1464].

The Reformation, this great renewal, that pressed for focus on the cause not the person and replacement by biblical teaching of papal and church authority – this once tremendous renewal that we all now respect as an ancient faith, where did it come from? From the universities and from placing such intellectual and knowledgeable men filled with the power of youth, as a Melancthon from Bretten and Tübingen as well as a Luther from his Augustinian monastery to Erfurt, who were allowed un-atrophied, diligent academic freedom that soon elevated the schools and the clear self-awareness of the populous.

And your Zwingli, who can never be praised enough, would he have ever had convincing effect if he hadn't first, in an academic manner, gathered teachers around himself and investigated with them collegially the coherent significance of the Bible and essential, true teachings? Then, according to his own understanding, he called someone to account who, according to merely personal beliefs, converted gold into common coins and put them into circulation for the purpose of meeting the needs of the congregation. That is something even the noble Ruling Council of the day wouldn't have accomplished, that is, the replacing of the everyday for the preaching of the sincerely, pure biblical teaching, if Zwingli hadn't prepared the teachers academically and when the populous hadn't attentively waited to see what it could find for itself to be the truth in-itself.

How powerful in 1829 your Dr. Johannes Schultheß referred in the preface to his excellent explanation of the parable of the lost son (to the pleasure of the rejoicing senior citizen, Pastor Oeri) and at the same time to the enlightened Antistes Wirz [1737–1769], with whose lectures on the symbolic books and orthodoxy the older majority of the Synod of 1740/1741 was unhappy, and in the face of whom he [Schultheß] together with the theologian Joh. Jaf. Zimmermann erected a monument to truth. Schultheß remarked with regret on page XXVI that back then one "by repetitive presentation of the path that religion and church have wandered for as long as anyone can remember, never was given to hear the name of this pioneering man in the Zurich Synod; after whom came the Antistes Ulrich [1769–1795], an equally honorable benefactor and supporter of free thinking and clarification in religious matters."

You know yourselves that this good could not have emanated from Zwingli and also from the instruction of the people of Zurich if the veto of a church council, at the discretion of the majority of the clergy at the time and not yet independent, had reigned supreme in opposition to the application of this academic self-investigating manner of teaching and academic freedom. Indeed, in Germany also, it is reported at times of individual church councils but still more frequently on the part of half-Methodist pastors and synod members that they got all worked up against scientific, intellectual improvement in the institutions of higher education; that they warned against it as non-applicable; even warned against its dangerous overexcitement of the people's piety; and, therefore, more volubly preached against heretics of hearsay about which their congregations otherwise would hardly have heard a word. They quarreled over the character of science and didn't know what they were doing because they had never thought about the fact that, in order to be known, what is to be learned requires truths that are not concretely empirical.

They would gladly have us forget just how narrow-minded theological studies were in Germany as long as the consistorial councilors (*Konsistorialräthe*: in the Protestant Church of Germany these are members of the administrative authority; trans.), while focused on the practical especially in church governance, claimed to be competent, as well, when it came to constantly changing theoretical content and to decisions regarding the appointment of academic positions. For that reason, they viewed in particular

the academic, scientific nature of theology as really unnecessary because they were very conscious that, when academic theology began to influence congregations, they (the consistorial councilors), admittedly, first had to expend undesired attention in order that, what first and foremost was a mental exercise and conviction established in the university, now in part was to be utilized as edifying teaching in the church – but also in part was able to be pursued in private discussions with non-theologians. However, should the intermediary persons between the scholarship of instruction and that which is generally comprehensible, between theology and popular religion, after all, not be instructors, who are sovereign in their discipline and have learned to distinguish between prejudices and the essential in order to correct doubters? Should they vainly compel doubters like the laity to simply believe? Would Jacob Boehme have been an honorable school master, if he only knew how to accomplish instruction by beating people? Or isn't the skilled cobbler he who can cut leather for shoes neither too ineptly nor too lazily?

Those of us as fellow thinkers above the dreadful state of affairs of the factionalists want to ask more about the causes than the concealed intentions of prejudices that one seeks to cast before the populous – contrary to the way one proceeds in the university.

When we encapsulate the entire curriculum as would a law faculty as I briefly portrayed above, it is certainly the case that an academic institution doesn't instruct upfront its students to be completely fixed and set in their ways in order to be future lawyers and senior civil servants or to present them to the examining board the exceptional to be assistant heads of a government department, presidents, or even ministers of state. Someone is not well educated whom the master tailor has trained just to sew what is saleable today. He who wants to succeed over time must constantly learn new patterns and be capable of improving himself, which is why preparatory training with the master in the new but also the old fashion is necessary.

Only with three things is the student to become acquainted in all of the interrelated disciplines: with that which is taken presently to be valid; with that about which it is yet worth thinking (from out of which, as with inadequate knowledge, improvements can yet arise); third, however, with that which appears already now to require improvement. Indispensable in this threefold curriculum aim, by which the tradition bearers of the past are retained sometimes with praise, sometimes with ridicule, is that always student judgment is practiced on all such compelling material by searching for and finding of justificatory reasons. That which is presented to them without adequate reasons by means of merely the authority of old names and models can't have any resonance in those unbiased, ruthless minds and should all the less be presented to people only to be recited blindly.

However, if judgment as much as possible becomes not only enriched but also accustomed to the sharp distinction between that which is merely apparent and that which is true in-itself, then, admittedly, such a one must first immerse himself in what for him is the reality of everyday life and apply to that multiplicity of particularities of the real world that which he has learned to see in generalities according to the various

levels of approximation from the probable to the certain. This is what can't be learned in advance because someone can get close to the truth by this or another perspective, and even the Apostle surely thought about whether he had to give his brothers milk toast or heavy nourishment, in other words, must have prepared himself to distribute both.

In addition, many mental skills themselves are unexpectedly stimulated only through life experience; and, in any event, tenacity in commercial industriousness and perceptive agility (sagacity) in seeing through a situation is manifest in various degrees. Therefore, it can surely occur that someone without social status can rise to be the Minister of Justice because no academic training and academic freedom can prophesize such things.

How strange! Academic instructors themselves, who contributed to making such a promotion possible, do not fancy that they could be just as well Minister of Justice. They know their task consists in the observations of scholarship, not in life practice. They preserve (for others, as well) this inner mental life of free contemplation of those things that they can share with others as true in-itself; a mental love and sense also that with respect to mental things "It is more blessed to give than to receive." However, they are certain and are properly proud that the successful man of honor could not have become a worthy Minister of Justice without their competent, academic training, not without their academically sharpened legal sense but simply by means of faith and ignorance about why the law is fitting, also not without a clear overview of many, carefully thought through legal cases, and not without the skill to subordinate the reputation of persons below what is essential and true in-itself.

Why do I converse with you, friends of the mind (!) about what the juridical part of academic freedom in higher education does? – Only because, thereby, I have already portrayed to a great degree the theological-academic function. Here, too, the general, primary task is the threefold, foundational presentation of the utilization of the most accredited, then the ancient, out of which arises reform and other conflicts as well as judgment with respect to controversial opinions but also with respect to already accomplished improvements that, in part, have become, established but also, in part, are yet to be applied.

How? Will perhaps he, who has made public some suggestions of improvement with which others disagree, for that reason not be able to be competent in properly presenting on the basis of reasons variations of what is currently acceptable in church dogma and morality? Will he not as church historian be capable of portraying what is controversial (just as the law professor has to apply legal sense to many controversies) according to reasons and decisively important empirical instances if his talents for elucidation and justification and his technical skills in philosophy and languages have been proved to be excellent?

Otherwise with respect to the issue at hand, it is well known by most about Professor Strauß that he has drawn attention to deficiencies with respect to certain, mostly short (not with respect to investigation and transmission of many important

circumstances), established stories in the gospels, and, as a consequence, he's made himself conspicuous. Nonetheless, there is nothing clearer for those who comprehend the breadth of Christian religious studies than that the content of the teaching of early Christianity is not dependent on these [questionable] stories. Hence, for these scholars early Christian teaching certainly is able to stand itself with justifications. Because he not only believes it merely out of trust in the persons to whom the revelation of those teachings is indebted but also knows on the basis of internal reasons that the teaching in itself is true, so can he who knows his talents, teaching ability, knowledge, and his distaste for controversy, and non-revolutionary character not doubt that also Christian teaching (of the sort the teacher of the people must be prepared to defend with academic conviction) can be a central task of his scholarly, free teaching appointment. Isn't that confirmed by his statement of faith with respect to what is transitory and permanent in Christianity? Does not the human spirit of his writing in which he accepted the appointment testify to how correctly he distinguishes what can be taken to be striking by the less informed from the more difficult task to be able to meet the requirements of the informed?

Should not those, who spread suspicion with respect to Strauß' academic theology and created fear among the trusting masses, first and foremost state whether their Christian faith, rests on particular, personal considerations rather than, far more, on personal salvation that is capable of being recognized in-itself? Rather, we know far less than we might wish of the person, who fewer than three years ago appeared in the public sphere and, nonetheless, left his sunlight for the entirety of the educated world. Should not those, who assume that the faith of the weak is to be safeguarded like a shell-less egg, first say, themselves, what it is they believe to be and as faith wish to have guaranteed, if not that the guarantee of every truth of the spirit must be maintained only on the basis of itself?

All the less one-sided can Professor Strauß' Christian faith constitute a class of its own and appear so to students because it is likewise explicitly stated as his professional duty to provide historical presentation of that which has been the teaching of the church from the very beginning throughout the changing opinions in time as well as the constitution of the oddest churches. Who can work through the history of dogma and still remain opinionated and intolerant? By far not (!) a primary task of his teaching position is the outstanding dissonance among scholars over how the original stories were generated; even less is that a concern of the people and of general Christian faith.

It is good that these kinds of open questions have arisen. Only after having presented the possibilities with respect to what is most likely can those on the basis of the means of research decide whether the questions have validity entirely, in part, or not at all. However, how imperious those act, who question that which must first be illuminated by means of the pro and con of the researcher, and who depict the questionable as necessities of life to be decided by a majority vote in great haste as the "will of the people."

Those will hereby trust me to provide an all the more certain impartial evaluation [*Gutachten*], in that I already have the luck of being known by some of you, already. This is because for more than forty years I have sought to defend another view concerning the generation of the oral and written stories of the gospels. This has been the product of an incessant and conscientious academic freedom by an undisturbed examination on the basis of my acquired language-, historical-, and human-knowledge and most recently presented in my exegetical handbook of 1830 and in my "Life of Jesus" in 1828. By my pursuing the internal traces, the events of the life of Jesus in our gospels are closer to me. They appear to me so pure of connections to Jewish and church circumstances in contrast to those that arise following Jerusalem's destruction in 70, that they certainly would not have remained so had the narrator and collector had already inserted those later views into the earlier history. Could more fanciful images emerge of a pious faith so short, so incomplete, and mostly without expression of astonishment? Foremost, doesn't Matthew's gospel refer most of all to articles about which Jews of the Jesus' day could raise objections (such as that Jesus had done and suffered much that doesn't apply to the Messiah); objections, which few after the year 70 would have noticed and would not been recognized by later Jewish doubters with respect to Jesus' divine mission because they could originate only out of closer impressions regarding what had happened?

That it is possible to transform opinions into facts and then anachronistically to attribute them to the past is, admittedly, also an explanation of the origin of a transmission. However, aren't most of the peculiarities in stories generated more likely already with the idiosyncrasies of the first observers, witnesses, and by those re-telling them? Moreover, it is almost impossible to conceive how the so precise, specific descriptions of evident and palpable confirmation of the bodily resurrection of Christ so soon after having been laid in the tomb could have been generated out of mere visions. Yet, the effects of it were immediate not only by the courage to remain in Jerusalem but also that a congregation, in that very place in the presence of enemies, could organize itself and so rapidly grow by means of prudent organization.

Enough! You yourselves, who listen tolerantly to this old geezer talk about himself, will perhaps laughingly think that I have succumbed to my humanity by this tarrying with wanting to establish as valid a few of my own counter-arguments. It is so! I have published several reviews in the Darmstadt Theological Literature Supplement (*Darmstädter theologische Literaturblatt*) with almost all of my reasons against Strauß' personal view concerning those stories that are anachronistic (myths), over which very few on all sides possess adequate knowledge and training that would make it possible for them to form a judgment in such matters. However, are not the less trained, therefore, more certain that I wouldn't be so yielding in the face of an opinion that in the moment has won far more approval than my own which remains closer to the usual, common judgment? How could it be possible to champion something that so obviously would cause fear of a disturbance of popular Christianity? It has been my life-long endeavor to clear aside only views and reasons whose indefensibility even the

blind repeaters no longer will be able to conceal as expendable and not as un-Christian in order that, far more, popular Christianity all the more certainly consist of the true in-itself, of the universally believable and applicable, as well as bringing forth more living fruit. Meanwhile, my aim was that indolent belief in secondary matters that can only be addressed by scholars would become inefficacious and incapable even of evoking belief in eternal divine anger.

All the more earnestly can I come to the main point. Professor Strauß finds only narratives of events more uncertain. Not stories but what contributes essentially as teaching of the origin and fostering of Christian religiosity, what therefore, in the faith of a Christian people should be planted and cherished most of all is also what for him is the in-itself true and enduring in the gospels. This Christian teaching is so elevated not only above the expectations of the Jewish, later prophets but also above pagan, fearful, priestly opinions concerning the necessity to propitiate the gods with blood that Ur-Christian congregations, also, would not have had such certain visions and anachronistically included them in the gospels if they themselves hadn't received these "out of His fullness." What has been preserved and passed on in the gospels in the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus' parables (especially of the tax collector and of the prodigal son); what has been passed on of the sayings concerning his life's goal, the believers' emancipation from sin and connect it with forgiveness only through the desire to have true conviction, but above all, also of the necessity of strenuous remorse, and rebirth by means of which arises a more and more conscious increase of God's Spirit elevates one out of the dominance of sensuality; all this is the teaching pressing into Christian hearts, which, if only since childhood our complete Christian living had been bound, worthy persons and truly Christian citizens would be shaped.

These teaching points are in-themselves so eternally true that they certainly were made to be revealed by the true Christ, who fulfilled the better ideal of messiahship; because this ideal itself could not have been achieved according to the opinion and expectations of its time. It would be only our, the teacher's, fault if our church congregations believe merely on the basis of the effectiveness at that time of miracle stories and then, should it be that these historical stories prove to be uncertain, Christian faith be threatened.

Let me quickly summarize what is at stake and, especially, what is at stake for a people striving for the strength of faith and freedom.

Nothing, dear fellow Christians male and female, is heartedly more necessary as inward religiosity. I say: Religiosity (!) and not simply religious teaching. Just what is true religiosity?

The word itself suggests a thoughtful mental attitude, a reflectiveness. Out of this reflectiveness with respect to humanity and God comes the desire for a closeness and harmony with God as the certainly good, perfect spirit. Even pagan religiosity: from where does it come?

Thoughtful persons came to the belief in the necessity of harmonizing with imperceptible, higher spiritual beings. However, because they mostly considered the power

of these spiritual beings to cause external things, by them not even human virtues and the righteousness of the will that comes with them were presupposed with respect to those spirits; hence, they expected anger or grace from them to be capricious. As a consequence of their still all too incomplete reflection, religiosity couldn't be aroused as spiritual, active volition. Soothsayers and priests of sacrifices intervened in order that with their help the people were meant to win divine favors and grace by means of gifts, abasement, and vacuous devotion.

Alas, human reflection works slowly! However, at the time of Isaiah, not only for those capable of thinking had the faith in a single God arisen. After Anaxagoras had looked on the single God in awe as spirit, Socrates had stimulated knowledge or attainment of knowledge in terms of that which humanity should want and achieve – far more than in terms of speculations about superhuman rulers over nature. For that as is well known, ostracized forever from Athens by its misguided citizens, the venerable man was even shamefully maligned and rewarded with the cup of poison. However afterward, all the sooner and generally, a manifest, benevolent shame and remorse occurred. The maligning accusers were detested both in and outside of the Athenian free state (see Nüsslin's excellent explanatory notes to Plato's "Apology:" 69). Later philosophers or "want-to-be" philosophers were no more allowed to be disturbed and tormented by self-interest and reverence although their attempts at thinking, as is the case with everything human, never reached perfection; often, they had many peculiarities, occasionally a disgusting side.

At the time of Jesus, many reflective persons, the quiet ones in the country, developed the yearning to come into harmony in a reliable manner with the gradually acknowledged God, the One, highest, the ruler of many subordinate gods (Polydämonie). Only the long, ancient acclimatization with respect to conceiving God as capricious, as revengeful (one doesn't know how long), whose anger first needed to be propitiated (one didn't know, by what means), frightened many away from a religiosity fulfilled mainly among the pagan cultures of the no longer raw Greeks and Romans.

How did the one designated from the manger onward as the "Holy God" (John 6:68–69), raised by God the Father for that purpose, in a for us impenetrable silence and reverence, know to find the religiosity in the so-called Holy Land? Almost even worse!

To be sure, a great advantage of the Jewish people was prepared already several centuries earlier in that a magnanimous prince of shepherds in full possession of his desire for righteousness connected up with a righteous God and consciously affiliated with him. Abraham entrenched it in the popular religion of his descendants that those who are reflective (but these are frequently only the few!) revered the perfect willing of the divine whereby the instable capriciousness (the absolutism) of the pagan gods could be eliminated from religious teaching.

Reflective persons grasped this already that Abraham's confident adherence and his God of righteousness was acknowledged by God as the true virtuousness of the spirit and must be in the judgment of the one who knows hearts as counted up and

accredited (Romans 4:3 according to Genesis 15:5). They certainly hoped that all must go well for those who in this faith of Abraham lived in the desire for righteous-harmony with the just God – above all for themselves but also by the respect of others.

Oh, how easily human desires transform spiritual hopes of faith into expectations unworthy of God. They were even transformed into raw demands of selfish advantage and pleasures. At the time of Jesus, almost the entire Jewish community argued that, merely as Abraham's descendants, they must be blessed by God and preferred before all non-Jews.

The Pharisees added that, whoever only follows the laws commanded by Moses and their interpreters' is righteous enough if he only adheres to the external side of the fear of God and doesn't want to adhere to that in-itself lawfulness. The temple servants raised the stakes of national pride higher: They cried out that, we alone, possess the true worship of God. However, God has to want that the entire world worships him. God's omnipotence must put all peoples at the feet of us, God's only people, in order that we may force them to bring sacrifices to Jerusalem. They should work for us, and fall to our feet, so says a concluding chapter in the prophet Isaiah (60:10, 12, 14, 61:5; 66:12). And the arm of God (the unbeliever may always recommend other methods of conviction!) will guarantee for us an eternal rule over the world by our world-overpowering Messiah (Daniel 7:14, 27).

The worst was: the simple, freely chosen spiritual righteousness of the founding patriarch was forgotten. A faith of service to God without inner respectful harmony with his will of rights was called, in the context of such traditions, the religion on which one no insists. In addition, on the basis of an erroneous notion of the Messiah, a hate must rise up over against all other peoples, a contempt for the omnipotence of Jehovah that must achieve victory by means of the authoritative will of the Pied Pipers through their violence; the one who, like it occurs to the incorrigible, accelerates the demise of the wildly immoral and self-serving rage of the crumbling state.

Jesus' holy religiosity came to the rescue in opposition. He stood as if "on the parapet of the temple." His spirit said to all people: Only when you want to be spiritual children of Abraham will you be in possession of that righteousness-desiring religious faith that makes you free of sin and, as a consequence, free from fear of God's capricious punishment. Only when your actions arise out of conscientious righteousness willed by God, will you be religious or in harmonious peace with the perfect, good God.

However, Christ's spirit stood, also, as "on a high mountain that surveys all peoples." Then, his word began to make widely apparent that spiritual righteousness makes "children of God" of every single person everywhere, among all peoples and at all times; to make participants in the universal Father of all humanity that then, where such children of God remain in enduring fidelity to God and also hold together to the external order and supportive community, they achieve a part of God's great kingdom, a universal, life-effective religiosity. Everyone should "aim first" to be in accordance with this spiritual, messianic kingdom of God" because it can and should spread to

all humanity when each one for himself begins to want this religiosity without waiting first for the majority.

This was the original redemption of the Christ-religion. Especially the God-revering people of the pagan world accepted this comfort that God as Father could not be angry, who must be propitiated by means of one's own or by the penance of others. It was clear that God as spirit could be served only by that which is spiritually true, the righteousness of the will, but that the faith of the just without just actions would be only a poor secret deception. Thus, became obvious that this righteous attitude was available everywhere; the good of all nations would be united. The oppressed feminine sex would be elevated to human dignity, and the slaves who were innumerable and as horribly despairing would be treated as "Fellow brothers before God" and allowed to expect for themselves to be among the fellow redeemed.

Only those who continue to call for the reign of temple sacrifice and not that of religious harmony with God must call out to the world redeemer: "Your house will become for you forsaken and desolate" (Matthew 23:38, 39) until you are better prepared for the blessing of the coming Messiah (the founder of a spiritual reign of God) in the name of the Lord.

Safeguarding these simple, comprehensive ideas, along with everything that is necessary for the internal improvement of humanity, primarily contains that which is the original redemption that is our Christian religion. It is not about particular controversial questions, tasks of reflection, and possibilities that all too easily will be raised to dogmas or contentious doctrines but, rather a single reconciliation with God, inclusive of both pagans and Jews, that can be carried from Arabia, across Syria, Asia Minor, Greece over Rome to Spain. How could it have been made a world religion, offering a hand to every city as a light igniting from one town to the next if it didn't comply with the needs of hearts and lives en masse, but had been constructed on subtleties for which one demands belief by guarantee of literal formulae?

The certainty of a single, revealed reconciliation that is capable of universal achievement by active wills harmonious with the godhead and united for Christ's genuine Kingdom of God (i.e., what it means to be able and to expect to become a religious Christian) was as simple as it was unmistakable. Simultaneously, it was shocking to pious pagans and Jews that the Messiah for this universally convincing truth without violence, like a Pied Piper, had to sacrifice his own blood. It became clear that this direct mental connection with the fatherly divinity dissolves all that is limiting in Judaism and paganism (according to II Corinthians 5:17) into a third, into "a new creation" of conscientious, free spirits. Every reflecting person grasped that as ever more persons come together in this active attitude of faith committed to divinely desired reconciliation, the most trustworthy, Christian Kingdom of God would emerge and every honest person's welfare would be secured.

Out of this arose warm, spirited, excited resolutions. One fraternized, assisted, and exhorted one another. New converts were full of the Holy Spirit. On the tongues of acquaintances and strangers was proclaimed that "One thing is necessary!"

Yet, soon the simply undeniable became all the more difficult. Unquestionably, each individual in this moment of consciousness can renew the resolution "be consistently right" to make it a law for oneself. He fulfils in that moment, according to Matthew 5:48, Jesus' task: "Be perfect as your Father in heaven."

However, in this same moment, one can backslide by imagining exceptions. Only consistent habits lead to the spirit's subordinating the sensuous under itself without hesitation.

The more backsliding appears to make one's intention more difficult, all the more one believes: earlier I, too, was religious as one concerned only with God and divine things in thought – more than with willing. So much is excited by the invisible but also only the imagination. How more comfortable it would be if only by wishing all kinds of riddles in religion like (dogmatic) claims could be solved. Oh, how entertaining visions of spirits that accompany such descriptions; and if one in the first half of one's sermon calls up representations of the heat of hell, so the second half extinguishes the flames with the thought that one has already confessed and done enough if one only this or, even more, that believes – or wishes to believe. One overlooks, though, that Jesus himself, as often as he spoke in the gospels of his suffering death, never revealed anything of such things as the goal of his death. And if one or the other of such supposed teachings (dogma) is difficult to believe, the talking and hearing of them is more comforting than the serious, biblical demand for repentance, change of heart, and no one pleases God by believing that, without repentance, one's actions are already sanctifying.

In short! Mere belief in thought about teaching opinions has little effect on conscience, but, to be sure, educated and uneducated can feel as if by such speculations they are religious. The consequence is that in Christian congregations one deteriorates quickly into fragmentations of the primary, central ideas and slowly instructs and forms for oneself all kinds of ever more artificial, doctoral systems in which the morally sublime essential becomes concealed beneath the many pointed and entwined distortions. By means of sophisticated artificialities, in gothic cathedrals thousands of pointed columns stretch up toward heaven. However, not only do they not reach it, but they also don't bring hearts any closer to it ... and the sense of beauty and taste for them, as well, does not descend down from heaven.

In any case, anyway, not only was the philosophy of the day, generally, congested with such questions about dogmatics, but also it is altogether the nature of understanding that it not only wants to know "what" but also, still much more, wants to know "how." Already for the congregation in Corinth according to I Corinthians 15:35, it was not enough that the spirit would have influence on someone for whom spirit was due. The question was also "Why?" ... and the individual? He believed that his faith required a physical resurrection of a body that was recently discarded – as perhaps many now claim to believe that there can be no heaven or God if he cannot imagine and calculate for himself "how" God exists and reckons to his faith that there is a literal throne of God some hundred miles above Mont Blanc.

To be sure, one cannot magisterially prohibit even the understanding of such specific flights of thought as well as the transient doctrines that come from them. They are the training school of the understanding. Understanding should learn by means of them. We can do no otherwise than to examine carefully all possibilities in order to discern what is the most probable. Nonetheless, neither an instructor nor students, nor any other authority, is permitted to make an unequivocal law out of possibilities. Your Swiss form of agreement has the good intent, to spare people from doubt about some syllable, and prohibited even teachers to believe that biblical providence allows for some important textual discrepancy (variants). How does it help that one wants to restrict this provision only to the Hebraic text, which, in any case, appears to call for effort only on the part of candidates for the pastorate? Understanding should not be limited by understanding and still less by misunderstanding, which mostly occurs when understanding requires a strong-armed certainty about something that it cannot otherwise understand and believe (and also can't give convincing reasons) for which no other understanding is permitted to be different.

Do you not remember yourselves Zurich's famous, long followed, little misunderstood example? Our Luther with his prejudice-free research of the obscure biblical sense was convinced, not without trepidation (as he said himself), in opposition to Leo X that Jesus word: This is my body! This is my blood!" does not say: This bread is "transformed" into my body, and this wine (especially) is "transformed" into my blood.

What we human beings cannot know without revelation must either be openly said to us, or it is not a revelation. Luther adhered to this indisputable rule; but – not always consistently. All too long accustomed to worship of the "great mystery" (*tremendum mysterium*) of the glorified body of Christ, he felt something spooky when he no longer had to think about it as a mystery, a divine miracle. He examined the feeling and found that it led him to a new, unstated mystery. He said to himself. This blessed bread is the body of Christ. It is and is so because Jesus said so. Therefore – in, with, and under this bread, which stays bread must be Christ's body, and still more amazing in, with, and under this persisting wine is given to us Christ's blood by God's miraculous power.

But then, how did your reformer, Zwingli, equally scrupulous in the sense of possessing a more easily acquired sense of antiquity after study of Greek and Roman and who was freer and more calm in many ways (in the authentic sense: "republican"), judge differently? That in, with, and under the bread and wine was given a miracle, he found to be not certain! If we were supposed to believe it, Jesus would have said it to us openly without needing to wait for Luther's revision to be clear. Am I permitted to give up the one, unstated miracle, to replace it with a still more mysterious one, and to require it of popular belief?

Despite the danger of zealously being called an opponent of the mystical, a "matter-of-fact person" (because of Rationalism), your confessor and martyr differentiated himself in his "Dogmatics" by emphasis first and foremost on the essentially certain of original Christianity which can and should be interpreted reliably according to

common understanding and without depending upon mystery because, in fact, if it were to be believed by means of mystery, it would not be revealed by revelation.

For Jesus, who was still completely present with his entire body, and for the twelve disciples, the broken bread could obviously be taken as a symbol for what his body was to be confronted with the following day on the cross if he didn't sink into a death-slumber beforehand. It is explicit that he charged them, as often as they broke bread, to think of him, the person, in order that all that was connected with him would be never forgotten.

The obvious is revealed! That was Zwingli's conviction. The understanding in the period that followed him (that inquired conscientiously) noticed ever increasingly that he possessed the correct rule of explanation. Only "Church faith" appeared to suffer under the Lutheran danger. Many feared: "We turned Luther's re-writing into revelation for our people because we ourselves sincerely believed, all too narrowly. But now? Will not the people generally suffer a shipwreck of faith, will they not fall into superficial unbelief in opposition to Christianity, if we admit that we have made a mistake with respect to such a central article of faith?" This is the fear of ghosts which in so many cases surround that which is certain (but also much that is only probable) of the comprehensive church faith. However, religious faith and devotees of Christ will be only so fully faithful and, which is the central point, devout and actively committed, the less they are expected to believe as absolutely necessary what is incredulous!

In the end, no one among us can deny any more that the ambiguous cannot be revelation. Where there's no sign of mystery, what is said is to be explained according to the plain natural sense in conformity with its situation.

However, each comprehends this as good as he is able to comprehend it. Each one should beware trying to convince the other of his doctrinal position or to describe the other's position as abominable by means of denunciation, even with distortion of his character. The Evangelical Church-Union finally has offered in this respect the radical, better example.

At least in this respect of church faith, where one believed all too long that one must stand over against one another as damned, those of firm convictions have broken fresh ground when it comes to this effort, when it comes to wanting to be right, to think as correctly as possible. The desire to be exclusively correct dogmatically in order to want to rule on its basis universally, must abdicate. A more inward religiosity says that everyone should cooperatively do what Jesus openly said to remember of his cross and everything clearly united with it. However, neither God nor humanity will want to steal from someone what he is able to think or feel according to his own best possible insight. Only, the liberated ones also should not enslave others by meaning that they should make the means to spiritual liberation more difficult.

Here is a great example that the simple, clear, pious understanding finally leads more successfully to the goal than that which seeks mysteries and would like on their basis to construct castles in the sky that seek to employ laws enforceable by the police rather than reason to protect the people. Here is a proof from experience for

the fundamental rule that says: "Dogmatics" should in every significant aspect of its ingredients, that is, in its articles of probability, maintain nothing for popular faith as a mystery that is not given openly.

Surely, however, there are things that are mysterious over which the scholars and popular faith would gladly like to articulate more as different possibilities (i.e., dogmatically). For example, some want to know with such certainty the "how" of our eternal life, yes, even what we were or weren't before our existence, and what we inherited some six thousand years ago in body and spirit that they hate and avoid everyone who could "steal" this, his certainty from them. Oh, what certainty!, what faith renunciation that so easily must become uncertain that it is fearful of what the claimant actually only scornfully likes to call: "Winds of doctrine." I want to feel sorry for those who must be so anxious that, because they have maintained much that is merely possible as secure and certain doctrines of faith, all of a sudden fear they must see all religious faith evaporate as soon as they acknowledge they have attributed too much to them. However, No! On the contrary, what distances one from the community of faith is only insisting on what is unbelievable, the wanting to be right in matters of the church because whoever is committed to vigorously acting on what is right also wants to hear and think correctly and thoroughly.

Nonetheless, there are also mysteries! – mysteries both in and above nature, this great totality of all changing things! There are also religious mysteries although religiosity as wanting to be in harmony with the divine will is clear and without mystery. Who wouldn't gladly know how spiritual beings are in contact with God's essence? – and many other such things?

It is emphatically permitted to investigate impartially and conscientiously the solution to religious mysteries. However, when in the process different solutions depending on human ability and receptivity arise, the great, primary doctrines of Christianity are not, thereby, endangered. The zealots must learn humility that the mere possible doctrines (dogmas) should never become the foundation of the religious edifice! If something begins to be shaky in church faith, the blame can only fall to those who, in opposition to I Corinthians 3:12, now and again don't want to stop construction with combustible wood, rather than use bricks.

Here, too, I am reminded of a Zurich example. Jesus' so tremendous, historical influence stands as a miracle in the sense of being a delimiting meteor between our two worlds. How are we to think and what are we to believe about the divine and the human natures in the world? Were a human to be created beyond the degree of everything that any human spirit is capable of achieving with respect to wanting to do what is right, how could God be our standard in God-given true conviction?, how could He demonstrate what a human spirit with determination is able to achieve of divine-acknowledged dignity according to the aim of doing so only by means of the matter itself without the assistance of any accommodating social power? Was he able to do so by his own will, or was he essentially and from the beginning inalterably related to God?

Difficult questions? Nonetheless, it was not what he was as a person but what this person by means of the matter itself (through teaching and deeds) did for all Christians wanting to do what is right (and for what we should want to do in conformity with what is right) that is the primary concern of our religiosity. The personal is a mystery just as the eternality of spirits generally. However, the personal is capable of being investigated to a degree.

Only, from the very start it is established that, when it comes to this class of teachings about mysteries that are incapable of being known unequivocally, one is not permitted to ground what is essential to the Christian religion.

How the questions were answered over time when it comes to the essential divinity of the person, is known by almost everyone with respect to the words. Whether or not faith in the essential of the person Christ has been effective and enduring throughout the many centuries can be even less unclear. The perfection of our desires and actions is not dependent upon mysteries. For that reason, its investigation is unrestricted!

Your pious, educated, and judicious Antistes Heß, did he not discover (as I recently published along with a review of the excellent dissertation by Professor Melchior Ulrich in the *Theologisches Literaturblatt der allgemeinen Kirchenzeitung* [1838], Nr. 118 on the basis of the thorough description of his life by Professor Escher) something different (over against what has dominated since the Church Council of [Nicaea] in 325) in several biblical passages about the relationship of Christ with the godhead? He discovered something biblical and believable from that opinion of Zwingli and the German Reformers drawn from the majority of this Council. When it comes to spiritual things, what is less adequate than a majority vote?

Antistes Heß didn't only discover his honest conviction. He published it in his writings, in German, in universally understandable biblical exegesis. Even our best forebears are incapable of investigating from the beginning and sufficiently everything and for all times. How would it be to hope that, from the many possibilities, the overwhelming possibility (or perhaps better, the impossibility of determination), if not every possibility with all its apparent justifications, was permitted to be presented for open examination?

Well? Would that mean that that deviation would necessarily require a modification of Zurich's Church Doctrine? – when identified by an Antistes, especially an active and approved Antistes who has more direct influence on church faith than any instructor of theological knowledge and investigation at an institution of higher learning? Or would you think that God and Christ would resent this honest man, were you in all sincerity and conviction to be a different opinion on such points, which are not so formulated that they must be understood the same way by all linguists? Will all that is necessary [for faith] not be revealed with such certainty and made so humanly recognizable that all deliberating persons universally would understand in the same way?

Must not that belong to the unessential, which is not clear and revealed in the same way for everyone; about which each individual should believe what he finds believable according to his possible, best conscientious conviction?

When it comes to that which is necessary for Christian, religious harmony for desiring that which is right with God, no one can doubt. "Those with pure hearts see God" in non-counterfeit faith. Who can interpret this otherwise (although, unfortunately, most don't adhere to it) as it is undeniably understood? Remember each of you, though, what has equally been said: God doesn't allow His own to be ridiculed! Who among us could conceal from the all-knowing One, when he desired to embrace the Christian faith made it look as if he had, but was aware that his political and church principles were entirely opposed, or when he let himself be enthralled only by the noise makers to riot or to pursue dishonest intent under the resolution: Believe! Religion! Participate with others in the defense of that which is impossible or a universal harm. Vehemence is never a sign of a certain faith. That is as certain as that the clear, deep, heavenly blue in our beautiful lake is reflected when the powerful calmness of the lake receptively looks up.

A third point, still, is that there are traditions preserved in our Bible that ask us, what in that time was believed about such secondary issues but is not to be taken to be doctrines for us as enduring, central ideas.

One thought back then, for example, was that, until it was re-united with an appropriate body, every soul sojourned in an appropriate intermediate stage: the good in a heavenly, others in a painful place. Those crucified with him were to expect that, on the very day that their souls separated from the body, their souls would be in paradise with Jesus Christ. Read Luke 23:43 and 16:23! Christian doctrine not only began with expecting an immediate entrance into blissful heaven but also, in accordance with Matthew 25:41, 46, combined with an eternity of damnation in hell.

You yourselves know how many honest persons take this as an opinion of that age and not as Christian teaching; or only understand it as an expression of doctrinal cleverness. You know that when it comes to the question concerning – for many unbelievers – eternal punishment in hell, generally starts with the distinction between what is enduring and what is in keeping with the epoch. Who made us judges over those who think differently from us? Could, should we not allow their reasons to be open for examination and completely communicated in order with greater certainty that which is unbelievable in them can be separated out?

How did Friedrich the Great calm the storm many years ago in the case of Neuchatel where there was a temporary, threatening uproar in matters of belief with respect to the eternality of punishment in hell? "If my dear Neuchatel citizens want to be eternally damned, I am not able to do anything about it (as painful as that is for me)! However, that no one in this world will be damned or harmed is my obligation as the defender of the rights of all!"

Let us summarize that for which I have attempted to provide reasons for your reflection,

The quintessence, the result.

It is short and simple.

Nothing is to be decided in terms of the person, everything is to be decided and done with respect to the state of affairs, the truth, that is, with respect to the investigation of truth and the living of the truth!

Respect the person. The state of affairs can only be aided by persons who have earned trust and for whom faith in them is supported by enduring influence.

When it comes to religious faith, distinguish between what is necessary for harmony with divine will (the "Peace of God" of Romans 5:1; 8:6) and what is poisonous to our reflections and clarity.

What is personal can be historically doubted. For that reason, the state of affairs cannot be constructed on the personal. One has doubted whether or not the stories of [Wilhelm] Tell are historical. Has that in any way brought doubt about the achievement of Swiss freedom?

In conclusion! – in order not to be too loquacious. Dear friends and You who are of a different opinion! – with one word: You voters of the Republic of Zurich! Could a freedom-loving individual not view it as sinister when he with the greatest and least earnestness ends with the words: Don't do anything that would dishonor the constitutional spirit of free states!

It is no small thing, when I remind you of Athens, that once self-ruling people. As much as it was famous for its sense of the beautiful and good (for *kalagathie*), nonetheless it did its theory of freedom an indelible dishonor when it presumed to judge beyond its powers and banned Anaxagoras as an atheist (thankfully, not permanently). Anaxagoras, the first philosopher, whom we all venerate because he alone was able to think of God as pure, knowing, desiring, and active spirit (as *nous* independent of body) – at least, the first who risked stating it.

Why did they judge him such that their greatest, most powerful statesman Pericles, could drive the calm thinker, who merely uttered his own opinion, out of the agitated city and place him in physical danger? How otherwise than because the so-called free people made a judgment about something, which at the time required a much more improved, teaching aid. How many were able to say in their conscience that great word from the outcast: "God is a spirit!" in all its scope and unprejudiced consequences?

The will of the people is something powerful – yet, it is more easily destructive than constructive. It is only exercised in conformity with human dignity when each individual himself adheres to the law: decide nothing by means of mere will. Only when each individual wants nothing other for the public realm than that about which he has conscious, clear, and calmly thought through enough – only then can the will of the people in a republic achieve well-being and honor. Otherwise, those should be trusted who are able to have thought things through having bracketed self-interest.

I have not been merely concerned here about the person, Professor Strauß. To be sure, I am convinced that, were he able to be observed for a quarter of a year in your Canton, you would vote for him to come permanently. Wherever he has appeared in

person, he has won minds! I even believe that, were you to hear him lecture in church history and philosophy of religion, you will find it worth the effort to hear him lecture in dogmatics. Permit, then, others also to take your place. However, my wish would be that now the development of his mind has begun, he would narrow his position, with the same agency and conviction, without holding himself bound to that which he has already questioned.

Enough! In the Christian, cosmopolitan sense, I believed to be permitted to write to the honest Swiss. Examine! Vote, for what you take to be worthy!

Heidelberg, the 6th of March 1839

Dr. Paulus

De Wette – Dr. Strauß and the Church of Zurich:
A Voice Out of North Germany from Dr. W[ilhelm] M[artin] L[eberecht] de
Wette

With a Preface

Basel,
Printed and Published by the Schweighauser'schen Bookstore

Translator's Summary of de Wette's Themes

1. The important conflict in Zurich is between "free scholarship and the Church as a community of faith," "not because salvation is near." "[...] [I]n the background of the battlefield one sees clearly enough the beginning of a universal struggle in which church and scholarship gauge one another and both go at one another over the final question whether and how far the one is the boundary to the other.
2. The issue at issue is "absolute" academic freedom versus Church faith [Trans.: ignoring of the problems/advantages of "content" claims on the part of either party].
3. "Is the state so thoroughly the guardian of the church that the church must silently and obediently learn and accept from the state what is best for it? Or do we think of scholarship as outside of the church and state [...]"
4. "[...] Truth is not scholarship's product or its discovery but its foundation and content." "Had scholarship, namely, the absolute philosophy, created the Christian faith, that is, invented it, scholarship might do what it wishes with faith: destroy or preserve it."
5. "There is a papacy and priestly class of learning and scholarship, a fanatical tyranny of knowledge. Its motto is *fiat scientia et pereat mundus* ["Let scholarship be done, though the world perish"]!"
6. Warns against the tyranny of scholarship. Scholarship must necessarily be supplemented by religion, art, the state, church, and family. Truth is not produced by scholarship but is the foundation and content of scholarship.
7. Strauß represents the confrontation between Hegelian, speculative philosophy "above" history and the Church's historical faith.

8. Rejects the portrayal of Jesus as a religious genius: "[...] [G]enius can only be transitory whereas the Church has as its content an eternal gospel. The "genius-cult" combined with the tyranny of scholarship turns the Christ into a personality among many.
9. Defends an anthropomorphic conception of God ("the eternal self-conscious providence over the world") and the Christ as the exclusive, "actual second Adam without sin."
10. "Dr. Strauß' teaching^[1] [...] and the Christian faith on the basis of the scriptures and in all editions of the church's doctrinal concepts are essentially different and nullify one another.
11. "[...] [I]t is one thing within the church to practice free, scholarly debate, with doubt and questions about schools of thought. It is another thing to instruct future pastors in faith and knowledge with respect to the gospels."
12. When it came to the calling of Strauß, it was not good that the church was ignored and general Christian believers were only self-serving, anxious, pious religionists.
13. There is true and false reform. The false is merely destructive of the church's "positive foundation of faith."
14. True reformers would rather be burned at the stake than "lose the historical Christ, the eternal redeemer and savior of all [...] peoples."
15. Is the inward kernel of the Christian faith (God, eternal life, and freedom) to be thrown away and consist of a "wise kernel" of stone rather than bread? The "new teaching" does not defend the same God, freedom, and eternal life as that of the Christian faith.
16. Strauß' Hegelianism is not the product of historical criticism but its philosophical ground.
17. We won't desert the "good faith" of our youth by substituting for it the superstition of absolute faith.

1. ^[1] Trans. note: De Wette portrays Strauß as defending a universal, speculative Christology of the "transient," religious genius.

The Text²

Preface³

Although personally a close and by no means indifferent observer of the church movement in our neighborhood, I don't understand myself to be called to take some kind of active part in it. This "Voice from North Germany" I would prefer to see appear with those harmonious names of authors in all parties rather than under my own name. However, because my friend once preferred anonymity and wished to have an introduction from me, I didn't want to fail my obligation. Certainly, these words earn understanding, hearing, and heeding. Scholarship requires a defensive preface, as well, in that it has experienced rejection of a presence on the theological faculty of the Straußian critique by the raucous opposition by church people and their leaders, about whom a suspicion easily could be raised about them, as well. Especially to be desired is that young theologians, from whom will arise the guardians of theological scholarship, will be saved from passionate partisanship and not be the prize of a reaction which threatens to bring to us the fruits of protracted, grave, and radical investigations. The worst enemy of scholarship, that ought never remain alien to the church and whose results should be implemented bit by bit among the people (as my friend has shown), are its incompetent, lazy, or grimly determined youths who are incapable of learning or unwilling to learn the authentic spirit of scholarship and, when they enter their practical profession identify with the side of unscientific thought and maintain and promulgate suspicion against scholarship. The true mediation between them and the church should occur by means of the clergy who inwardly stand in the middle and who should mint out of pure gold the coins in circulation in the school. It is true that pure gold is not always presented in theological lecture halls. However, whoever has acquired an independent spirit and the capacity of independent thinking can find it in himself at least in mature years. Out of the deep, holy desire of my heart, I express the hope that the Lord of the church may send to you ever more such laborers, as you need!

Basel, April 15, 1839

2. The irony of the letters from Paulus and de Wette is that, whereas in the *LJ* of 1835 Strauß had employed Paulus as the paradigm of the erroneous, Rationalist reading of the gospels and de Wette as a defender of the 'mythic' reading of the scriptures (also in his *Streitschriften*), when it came to their submitted letters of recommendation regarding Strauß to Zurich, Paulus came to Strauß' defense and de Wette strenuously attacks him.

3. ^[1] Translator's note: "*Evangelische Kirche*" (literally, "evangelical church") in the German speaking world refers to what the Anglo world calls the "Lutheran" church. The term "*evangelisch*" does not have necessarily the conservative, pietistic overtone that "evangelical" has in English so that I have chosen to translate "*Evangelische Kirche*" more generically as "Protestant church" to distinguish it from the "Roman Catholic church" rather than to refer to a sectarian, theological orientation. There are two state churches in Germany: the Protestant and the Roman Catholic Church.

Dr. De Wette

The call of Dr. Strauß to be professor of theology in Zurich and, still more, the development of the drama that began with that appointment, has raised the greatest attention all over Germany, as well. Who could remain indifferent when confronted with phenomena that contain the beginning of unsettling life decisions! As in Zurich so also in Cologne, one would like to cry out in the same way: Look up and hold your heads high! However, not, as is claimed there, because salvation is near but because a fierce struggle is approaching.

The judgments of momentary impressions having been taken into consideration along with the clamoring parties both left and right – all calm observers, to be sure, agree that in Zurich a long conflict in the Protestant Church, at times secretly but soon openly, has come to a critical eruption between free scholarship and the church as a Christian community of faith, whose devastating power no one is capable of calculating. The movement won't be limited to Zurich. It will inexorably take its course through the entire Protestant Church, and sooner or later will find its end either in a new institutional split or a new powerful union. May God protect from the former and bring about the latter!

The confusion in Zurich provides a measuring stick of the degree to which the new theology has come to stand in contradiction with the church. What is gratifying is that, yet still, resistance is there from the side of the church; that the church is still present, yes, has even received new vitality. If we take Strauß and his party to represent theological scholarship in its purest form, as negative criticism, we then have the spectacle that the church, taking itself to be under attack, decidedly takes itself to be engaged in a life and death struggle. Scholarship, though, at the moment retreats, beat back with severely restrained resentment for a new defiant attack. When now this scholarship says that it, too, belongs to the church and whatever threatens it is not the church but a party in the church (the so-called pious), but the church party equally thinks itself not to stand over against scholarship as such as an enemy but only a scholarly sect (the so-called liberals), one sees of course that the conflict in the minds of the opponents is not yet a general war between church and scholarship generally but a conflict between parties – more like a broad duel than a proper war. However, in the background of the battlefield one sees clearly enough the beginning of a universal struggle in which church and scholarship gauge one another and both go at one another over the final question whether and how far the one is the boundary to the other. We are of the strongest opinion that actually each is and should be the measure of the other and that in their true universality this one has in the other its truth and its life. This will be the goal and true freedom in Zurich as will be the case everywhere that the struggle arises. We maintain this with all the more certainty because we don't find any other result in the first act of the Zurich drama as this: that the church, when it is attacked in its most inner heart and conscience because of God and law, will push scholarship back to its borders.

The objective of this pamphlet is not to follow the facts to their final foundation but only to point out a few things from this perspective that can serve understanding and peace both in and outside of Zurich. Far from the theatre of conflict, we are also without any personal commitment to any of the individual agents involved and can hardly be a party for anything but the facts. We have no personal knowledge of the particular events and individuals of the case; we don't know how the many political parties have been engaged. We know only that we find that both sides have been intent agitators. However, although the colors and nuances are faded for the distant observer, the more universal moments and outlines of the conflict are more clearly and simply manifest, and our judgment can be, all the more, calm and impartial.

We don't want to investigate what led to Dr. Strauß' call, whether it was *his extraordinary talent*, his quick-witted, critical gift, the art of presentation, the comprehensive, complete, and pure erudition, – or *his particular theological orientation*, his speculative, critical Rationalism, or even both together. In fact, his call to this university in the full flowering of youth and for its publicity would confer an important glamour, and it may be that some old and new universities have wished for such a new impetus wish for the same. The faultlessness of his development, his gracious personality of which one hears would be no little bonus. If he knows how to speak and teach so well as he writes, it would be difficult to find a more perfect professor. It is also appropriate for a free state that has freed itself recently to try out what can come from modern North American academic freedom for the lecterns and pulpits in old Europe. If the Protestant Church is nothing more than the community of absolute, individual freedom, so one can expect of it yet more than Strauß' teaching. Whoever holds this teaching [of academic freedom] as absolute truth, as the long-cherished, silent conviction of all scholars, for him it can hardly appear otherwise than as a stab in the back of the Protestant Church, particularly, when it refuses to accept this truth in such golden containers. Perhaps the politicians (in my opinion, the philologists and philosophers, as well) acted on the basis of this view of history who proposed Strauß' call. Though, when the church of Zurich explains its faith otherwise than by means of this pure negation of all that is held together by a common, positive belief, when it discovered that the religious communities in Zurich decisively believed what this new teaching emphatically denies, the clergy had to rebel. After it had been brought to the attention of the church in honorable humility by the Theological Faculty (in this respect the church had an inalienable right) and, more decisively yet, by means of the actual church regime, that, the theological students would be confronted with the original Straußian dilemma – either the faith of the congregations must be abolished (and in place of a historical Christ, was to be preached openly a half mythical, half speculative Christ) or one must engage in concealment and hypocrisy when one stands before their congregations –, it was thoroughly a duty to engage with the church in a more comprehensive debate. The church as a religious community had an absolute right to protest against a teaching of this kind – it is the right of self-preservation, not the right of governance. Or is it only the state that possesses the

right to forbid theories which threaten to destroy it at its foundation? Is the state so thoroughly the guardian of the church that the church must silently and obediently learn and accept from the state what is best for it? Or do we think of scholarship as outside of the church and state, and these [church and state], on their own neither knowing nor in fact having knowledge, are only to obtain an absolute truth, life and death, knowledge and ignorance from scholarship? For us scholarship is a valuable commodity, and we surrender it only by sacrificing life itself. However, scholarship is not the most valued good even were it to be complete and its truth be transparent to all. As an essential part of the highest good, scholarship is necessarily supplemented by religion, art, the state, the church, the family and, as when it comes to life as with nature, truth is not scholarship's product or its discovery but its foundation and content. Had scholarship, namely, the absolute philosophy, created the Christian faith, that is, invented it, scholarship might do what it wishes with faith: destroy or preserve it. However, even Dr. Strauß wouldn't make this claim. Hence, it remains the case that church and scholarship are equally divided, and, as limit to one another, each possess truth and life. We discard and disdain everything of the papacy and priestly class, all fanaticism, not merely in the church. There is a papacy and priestly class of learning and scholarship, a fanatical tyranny of knowledge. Its motto is *fiat scientia et pereat mundus* ["Let scholarship be done, though the world perish"]! We discard and disdain this tyranny, as well. Is there any trace of it in Zurich? We don't wish to judge, but we know this: this monster is equally deleterious to scholarship and the church.

If the church has a birthright to require a more comprehensive debate over its relationship to Straußian teaching, it has also, on its part, the duty to recognize that, after his most recent explanations, Dr. Strauß does not face this dilemma between open destruction and hypocrisy but has sought out a mediating position where this appalling choice is eliminated. The quiet power of the church's and scholarship's arguments, or both together, which no one can deny, may have made it necessary for him, eager to placate his opponents (be that as it may) in the third edition of his *Life of Jesus* to give Christ's historical actuality more scope and honor. Christ, to be sure not the sinless and absolutely perfect but the amazing, religious genius, actually founded the church – no longer merely as mythic exponent of a [Trans.: Hegelian] speculative idea. Admittedly, speculation informs thinking of something yet more perfect, but, as history knows nothing higher and the church is content with history, so one could be undisturbed by the speculative element. In light of this explanation, one now asks, is this the correct meaning and expression of church faith? It could be that the church here might find expressed the true substance of its faith, only more modern, clearly, and precisely in the style of the new education. Were that the case, peace would be achieved. The aristocratic community that consists of the witty might perhaps draw this conclusion although a leading presbyter, the deceased and subsequent Semilasso [Trans.: the nom-de-plume adopted by Prince Hermann von Pückler-Muskau (1785–1871)], and the much celebrated Jewish or much more

universal prophetess of Berlin hardly would be in agreement. Namely, this faction of the new church appears to snuff out the power of the religious genius, Christ, as well as the genius of Moses and Muhammed so that either a new genius of this kind is to be expected or even none at all. However, the church not only generally but also in its deepest foundation must forbid this Christian genius-cult in all earnestness for that reason alone because such a genius can only be transitory whereas the Church has as its content an eternal gospel. It must reject this teaching still more, or on these grounds, because the notion of a religious genius in combination with the new teaching in actuality is nothing other than one among many personalities through whom the eternally evolving world- and human-spirit is manifest and resigns itself to the Golgatha of history as a moment of its self-consciousness and self-reconciliation.^[4] This open-ended process permits one to think of an infinite number of Christs, and no one can know whether or not in the next moment a new, higher Christ will arise. However, the church knows no other than that the eternal, personal love and wisdom of God, the eternal self-conscious providence over the world, has sent once and for all this man from Nazareth with his cross, not as product of *natura naturans* but as the work of free, creative grace, as true saint, as the actual second Adam without sin, not as one of many for whom unavoidable sin is just a point of passage, with world history simply a wagon that rolls on, and not the exemplar of general Spirit for which perfection and imperfection completes one another.^[5] Here we have straightforward points of comparison, and, therefore, the decision, which is understandable and clear even for the masses, cannot be otherwise than that Dr. Strauß' teaching, including this new formulation, and the Christian faith on the basis of the scriptures and in all editions of the church's doctrinal concepts are essentially different and nullify one another. We admit, that the free Protestant Church is capable of an open-ended expansion and its faith, too, can consist of different levels and through multiple forms maintain its substantial unity. However, this expansion has its limits, and if one wants to expect that the church recognizes what is most contradictory as a moment of its truth, its faith would become, admittedly, very general and ethereal. Nonetheless, even in this airy universality it would find its demise as the Christian church, and it would

4. [□] Trans. note: de Wette is here describing the Christ event according to Hegelianism as a universal, Second Negation by means of which God is reconciled with Himself. Strauß' Christology in all versions of *LJ* is an *inclusive*, universal Christology in contrast to Hegelianism, which either limits the Second Negation to the individual, the Christ, or to those intellectuals who grasp the meaning of the Second Negation. De Wette is conflating the Hegelian meta-narrative of Double Negation with Strauß' presentation of the Christ as "religious genius" in Strauß' 1838 "On the Transient and the Permanent in Christianity" ["Ueber Vergängliches und Bleibendes im Christenthum"]. Although in the latter, the Hegelian meta-narrative is silenced and replaced with a 'Rationalist,' Scholastic 'Intellectualism'.

5. [□] Trans. note: This appears to indicate the influence of Schleiermacher's Christology of "Perfect God-consciousness" of the 'feeling of absolute dependence' as the originating, historical impetus that makes possible the individual Christian's cultivation in her-/himself of Perfect God-consciousness.

not be foreseeable why it didn't in addition to the positive, Christian chair, name an Islamic, a Jewish, for my part, an Indian chair for its reciprocal completion.^[6]

The Protestant Church does not damn or ban anyone no matter what level of knowledge he possesses in faith. Someone who advises that the author of the *Life of Jesus* should be expelled would be an archenemy of the Protestant Church, and I would be his most outspoken opponent. The church has enough strength to hold this courageous and sharp mind within it and to be reconciled with him in love and patience. She has endured and retained keener minds. However, it is one thing within the church to practice free, scholarly debate, with doubt and questions about schools of thought. It is another thing to instruct future pastors in faith and knowledge with respect to the gospels.

For this reason, it was not a good thing to call Strauß against the will of the church and to take the warning voices from general Christian believers to be only the self-serving cry of anxiety of some pious religionists.

The unwavering principle of the Protestant Church is continuous reformation. She has never denied it although it has frequently appeared to be obscured and restricted. When properly embraced, the church has judiciously accepted every true reform. However, there is also false, merely apparent reformation, which, as purely negative, destroys the church's positive foundation of faith. No one expects that, without examination, the church is to embrace every reforming mind that presents itself and, in turn, allow itself with the same readiness to have anything whatsoever done to it by the uncalled as if legitimately called, for example, to take the English Deists as equal to Luther and Spener.

However, in Zurich one frequently said that Strauß was a true reformer as once Master Huldreich [Zwingli]. In Zwingli's name one absolutely demanded the appointment. Completing the parallel, one thereby viewed the resisting church as the reflection and horrendous vision [Ebenbild und Schreckbild] of the fanatical obscurantists of the 16th C. Surely many were shocked when Mayor Hirzel invoked the great reformer's shadow to aid his call for Strauß' appointment. It was even more unexpected and sad that Dr. Strauß was not humble enough to forbid the parallel. Would he take offense when one asks in all seriousness whether or not Luther and Zwingli, Melancthon and Calvin (were they to appear among us today, undeceived by the culture and leniency of the 19th C) would recognize Dr. Strauß as their comrade and true successor? Certainly, they would treasure and honor him as an honest and diligent researcher, but, even when it came to the third edition of his *Life of Jesus*, they would more than merely shake their heads. Both Luther's and Zwingli's speeches would be sharp and heavy blows. They would not ask him concerning his particular, doctrinal formulas but rather about Christ, who permeated their souls, and about the substance of faith on the basis of which they built their congregations. Or should

6. ^[1] Trans. note: De Wette is obviously very prescient here.

the Reformation of the 16th C actually and essentially have no other content than the destruction of everything that the heroes of that age took to be an indestructible rock? Or would the essence of the Reformation be nothing other than the formal negation of every present-day church? Every actual church has more from Christ than Strauß acknowledges. Back then there were minds, in their own way honorable minds, who themselves would have found joy and truth in the first edition of the *Life of Jesus*. However, we don't find them among the reformers but, in part, among the Scholastics, who had a Christ of speculation without the appropriate historical grounding, or among the Italian men who spoke of the legend of Christ and for whom, in the end, Plato meant more to them than Christ and his Apostles.^[7] Yet, even the latter would reject Strauß as a comrade because Strauß [claims to] have and know even more about Christ. However, both Strauß and his friends should consider that the Reformation was simultaneously the destruction of such Scholasticism that obscured the historical Christ. Those who truly and enduringly reform were always those who would rather allow themselves to be burned at the stake than lose the historical Christ, the eternal redeemer and savior of all times and peoples. When the Roman church excommunicated them, these men were given the task of establishing a new Christian community, an enduring church, grounded in the Word of God from which it has its right and its strength. We don't want by means of the new Reformation to have imposed a difficult test by which a new community or church succeeds in its right over against the old Protestant Church. There may be a large number here and there attracted to such a new church, but what about the devolution? We have enough wise examples, old and new. To be sure, it will be attempted, but God's judgment will reign down on the effort! –

History teaches through the founding Reformation as well as the on-going reformation in our church that, although scholarship always played its part, the school of Christian faith, of religious life, is its actual, positive strength and power. However, this life always had, and wanted to have, no other foundation than Christ, the only begotten one, as judge, who cannot be duplicated by another.

If the conflict in Zurich was only about a few doctrinal, church formulas, whether or not they should be maintained or step aside to be replaced by scholarship, it would be not only outrageous but also laughable to raise resistance. The church that would be protesting in this case would be no pure, true Protestant Church. However, cross your heart! Is this all that is at stake? The talk is about the most inward kernel of the Christian faith, and the question is whether or not this kernel should be turned into the husk, which one winnows out and throws away. What one then takes to be the wise kernel, I question if it's not a stone that one gives when people are asking for

7. □ Trans. note: As correct as de Wette is to identify the Scholastic roots of "Rationalism" and Hegelianism in the *via antiqua* "Intellectualism" of Christian Platonism, he fails to acknowledge that his own "Rationalist" (Schleiermachiian) Christology stands squarely in Scholasticism's *via moderna* of "Occasionalism"/"Voluntarism".

bread. God, eternal life, and freedom, this holy triad is what one says is the true kernel, the eternal, the immortal. Granted, that is the schema of Christian truth. However, is that the content that is really at stake? Until there's evidence to the contrary, it is permitted repeatedly and skeptically to ask: does the church teach the same God, the same freedom, and the same eternal life as the new teaching? Whoever looks more deeply cannot answer, "Yes." The church is supposed to retreat unequivocally and unconsciously until it attains this, its new world, by means of an endless progress of which Lichtenberg once predicted would lead to where the breath of faith evaporates in the highest peak of absolute knowledge?

Strauß' teaching is a leap, not an absolute beginning. Its first principles, its guiding threads, lie clearly enough in the history of the recent past. If one had asked in Zurich whether or not these first principles are the peak, the completion of the new Rationalism that is countenanced, even demanded, everywhere from the lectern to the pulpit, one would not be completely wrong. However, when one carefully examines this earlier Rationalism that stood over against Supernaturalism not only in opposition but also as correction and supplementation, one sees that the old Rationalism is something other than that, which this new opposition has abolished by means of absolute philosophy. The primary difference lies less in historical criticism than in philosophical background. Earlier Rationalism always had as its background the decisive, anti-pantheistic substance of Christian faith even if frequently weakened. As often as it reached the outer limits where this threatened to disappear, it was convinced, again and again calmly and from the beginning, Christ actually had established, once and for all, the church, as the community of the absolutely, true religion. We can leave open whether this Rationalism necessarily leads to Strauß. What matters is what comes of it? Only this! Rationalism's correctness, which it possessed in its original form and as correction to Supernaturalism, is snuffed out with the commencement of the Straußian phase. In order to retain its truth, it must reverse itself. The true resolution of the contrast that scholarship requires of the church does not lie where Strauß found it but over and above that which he found.

In short, the way we also prefer to regard it: the church in Zurich acted not fanatically, not as a pious party, but actually as the Protestant Church, when it forbade the Straußian teaching from the theological lectern. Yet, the church cannot and will not suspend scholarly debate. It would also be a disaster for the church to violently terminate scholarship. However, another question is: whether this scholarly debate is something to be presented from the theological lectern as the theological education of young men? Even educated youth are not called to be judges in this conflict. Youth are not even listeners, who thoughtfully examine everything carefully and take only the good. We have a good faith in the youth. We live with that faith and won't desert it. However, we take absolute faith to be superstition – for something out of [Ludwig] Tieck's inverted world. The issues can be engaged in complete freedom and brought to verdict only by a senate or jury of experienced leaders of scholarship and religious life. This jury is available, only it is strewn across the entire church. However, it has been

gathered as a published forum long since, and its verdict will be given in due time. To be sure, it is not possible to conceal the conflict from students. Nonetheless, it is one thing from the lectern to turn them into party members, to transform the Youth Council into the absolute opposition of the Aged Council. It is another thing, on the one hand, to inform them out of a calm center in the interest of the church and at the same time to impress upon them veneration of the church as well as, on the other hand, to impress upon them veneration for scholarship that they learn to be modest and humble in their scholarship and to be fresh and of good courage in the church. Had the church in Zurich only wanted this – who can say it is wrong? However, it will be wrong if it allows the impassioned conflict to serve something else other than to clearly formulate and peacefully order the relationship among church, school, and state. Woe to it, when despicable passion is introduced into the mix and the conflict doesn't come to resolution until the university of Zurich becomes servilely bound by it or, what others can be blamed for, it pays with its own demise! Revenge would be inescapable. It is equally fanatical for the scholarly school of the church as well as for the church itself to bring about the sacrifice of one by the other. May the grace of God preserve the noble church of Zurich from both kinds of fanaticism! –

Anonymous – Strauß Can't and Shouldn't Come!

A Truthful Account of
How a Farmer in Canton Zurich
Feels about Doctor Strauß

Author: Anonymous

A Fun Read but Very Serious

1839

Printed by Oreli, Füsli, and Company in Zurich

"Strauß Should Not Be Allowed into Our Country!"

"We will not permit our religion to be stolen! We adhere to the old faith!"

That's what I thought and said as I – now a few weeks ago – entered the community meeting that was to call Doctor Strauß.

The room was full of anger and zealously. It felt like I had drunk a glass of wine. In the heat of it all, I no longer can remember what occurred; although I had had my fill of coffee; but then, my wife had put way too much water in the coffee because she had her mind on Strauß. That's what happens when women get mixed up in things with which they have nothing to do.

Nonetheless, I remember clearly one thing. As we gathered to make our decision, someone stepped forward and wanted to say something in favor of Strauß. A cry went out: "What does he want? He should be silent! Away with him!" and I had joined in. Now that I think about it, that wasn't right. If one doesn't allow one's opponent to speak, one could conclude that we aren't intelligent enough to answer him intelligently. Doesn't that give the impression that he was wise when he actually

wasn't ("*die Weisheit mit Löffeln gefressen*"), and we are the stupid ones? But we're free Swiss, and our opinion should be free! Today mine; tomorrow yours! If I help shut someone's mouth, then I must accept that tomorrow it won't be otherwise for me. In that case, those are right who have big mouths and scream the loudest. But that would be, God knows, the worst regime there could be and then – Good night freedom! But I had only joined the cry out of zeal, and that must be taken to have been meant for the best. Especially, when religion is threatened, as our Pastor said.

I went home completely red-faced. I was so wild that, had my wife greeted me with a wry face, in my Christian zeal I would have boxed her ears. Afterwards, I would have greatly regretted it, but that wouldn't have wiped out the blows. Fortunately for me, my wife was busy in the kitchen, and I was in the living room. The Bible was on the table. As I saw it, my blood pressure raised even more. "I won't allow the Bible to be taken from me!" and hit the table with my fist so hard that the walls shook. And – I must confess – I cried out in anger: "The devil take me, I'm not giving up my Christianity!" Then I gathered myself together as these words flew out and thought: "But how can it be that the devil came just now into your mouth as you were filled with Christian courage?"

And I remembered that a lot of devilish things have been written in the name of religion. That the Jews, in the name of the Jewish religion, nailed Christ to the cross; that in the name of the Christian religion, heretics were burned at the stake; that pious men, Zwingli and Luther, were attacked and ridiculed by a zealous Christian mob. Such things happen in the world! Everyone has in his heart his own devil or demon! Namely, his evil passions and desires, his dark thoughts, his arrogance over against heterodox believers and whatever they can be called. These demons are so crafty that they frequently make us believe that we're acting out of pure, Christian love to God and humanity, when they are leading us around by the nose in order to take us deep into the thick muck of sin and injustice. Even our pastors have such demons in them and are not a hair-width better than the rest of us. And because one thinks of the devil as the black one, so must – I believe – our pastors wear black clothes in order to remind each and all of us there is something of evil exasperation, even in our pastors: that no one internally is pure and clean. As it says in the Bible:

"No one is good but the one God"

However, if that is correct, could there be something devilish going on in the great outcry against Strauß and against those who have called him [Trans.: to the university]? Since this has occurred to me, I've been pensive. Yet, I've kept tight reins on myself with: "I will not allow my faith to be stolen!" I sat down to the table and began to leaf through the Bible. A passage from the Gospel of Matthew (5:5) caught my eye:

"Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth"

I had to be a bit ashamed for my earlier anger so that I quickly turned to the next chapter. It could well have been the devilish pride or vanity that caused me to quickly skip the quote. So I read further and found the passage from the Gospel of Matthew (6:20): "Lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust consumes and where thieves break in and steal."

Wait a minute! What kind of treasures are these? Surely it is a good and righteous change of lifestyle, which pleases God? Faith in God as a living Father of mankind? And faith that we will be rewarded for our works in this and in the next life? And faith that, out of his love for humanity, Jesus Christ suffered death on the cross to the bitter end? When I think vividly, now, how Jesus Christ loved, how he was persecuted, how he died; I remember how I here and there, overcome by evil coveting, have treated unjustly those closest to me. I experience remorse. And I want to make everything better that was wanting. I, then, treat more kindly my wife and child, my servant and maid. Then I have proper Christian love in my heart, and I notice that I am closer to God because "God is love!" And I feel myself comforted and know that my injustice is forgiven because "whoever loves greatly will be forgiven greatly."

According to my simple mindedness, this is the core of a good Christian faith. I'm not so good at talking about it. It doesn't spill off my tongue easily as it does by our pastor. But I know that I carry it in my heart as a treasure inaccessible to any thief. I also don't know how Doctor Strauß would want to begin to take my faith from me. Were my faith like a full keg of wine in my cellar to which I go down every Sunday to draw out a glass and enjoy its taste: then Strauß could sneak into the cellar overnight, take the peg out of the keg, and let all my faith drain out into the sand. I would have to look. But I don't think that's not how it is. If Strauß wants something of my faith, he must say to me perhaps the following: "Look, good friend, I believe this and that," and he must tell me why he believes such and not something else. Now, Strauß is among those who've studied. He throws around pieces of Greek and Latin and perhaps doesn't talk in a way that one like us would understand. But if I don't understand him, then I also don't believe him. That's at once very simple. But if I realize where he's going, I think for myself about the matter. I perhaps go to our pastor and listen to what he thinks. Or I speak with this or some other reasonable man in the congregation. Now, if I've heard, talked, and reflected, and I don't like what Strauß said; then, I hold onto my faith and Strauß his. He hasn't taken anything from me, and I haven't taken anything from him. That's also very simple. And still – it is very peculiar! Didn't I cry out today: "They want to take our faith from us!" Now, I said something dumb! That can happen to the wisest among us. And at least I'm wise enough to think better.

There's no big danger when it comes to stealing faith! But could there be something worse hidden behind the call of Doctor Strauß? Let's take a look. Here the Apostle Paul says:

"Test everything and hold onto the best"

It is true that there are many and among them truly brave people who are opposed to Strauß and who oppose all who don't take Strauß for the living devil but for a professor from Swabia [Trans.: southwest Germany between Baden and Bayern]. But! But! There could be a bimbo among one or the other of them. It could be that they have a hoe by which they want to seize us and lead us around, should we, namely – allow ourselves to be led around.

Take for example our pastor. He is a courageous man. He means well, to be sure, for his congregation. But he means even more well when it comes to himself. Should Strauß come, people would come running to his house asking him to explain this and that, which Strauß said or didn't say. And that will require great effort by the good pastor. As well, the pastor must increase his understanding in order to show just where the error is in Strauß' teaching. He will have to bring something new to the pulpit every Sunday. He won't be able to use warmed over, old sermons. This, too, would require effort from our good pastor. But a bit more effort wouldn't hurt the good pastor. Doesn't he already have it comfortable enough! A lot more comfortable than we country people who, sulking, toil and sweat in the fields or at the loom to earn our bread.

There's also the rich manufacturer in our village who employs over a hundred workers. For the sake of Christian love, about which he talks a great deal, he could reduce a few hours the work done by poor children in his factory without cutting their wages. He could increase the income of the other workers and still be able to keep enough for himself. But he means much better for himself. In short! Strauß is something new. Should he also bring something bad, so, too, he could bring something else. For the rich, naturally, it is good enough the way things currently are.

Then, there's the physician in our village. He doesn't often obstruct seats for others in the church. He doesn't have a halo on his head but an ordinary hat. He treats his sick patients no better or worse than the way he was taught. And he means well by those patients who come to him and pay him. But he means much better for himself. This physician has most rapidly come to be a strange Christian. But – speed is no heresy. At least here there is none because it has come about entirely by natural means. The pastor doesn't want Strauß, and, should people need a doctor, the pastor can say: "Take this one; he is a truly Christian doctor." If the pastor does something to please the physician, the physician can do something to please the pastor and speak against Strauß. One hand washes the other! And the physician now talks entirely incensed against Mayor Hirzel with whom we all until now have been completely satisfied and who was until four weeks ago for many even very pious. But, my dear doctor, we won't allow our legs to be pulled. Mayor Hirzel has become so little an Antichrist overnight than the physician overnight has become a good Christian. Such things don't happen in a gallop either with one or the other.

And then, there's old debt-manager in our village or old Seckelmeister or – I myself don't properly know his name. But he is old and one of the aristocrats. And he would gladly have things remain as they were, namely with respect to the old social order. There he had a say in things. Now, though, all that has come to an end since we brought an end to the old social order in the "Days of Uster" (*Tage von Uster*).^[1] Perhaps he means well. But when it comes to himself he means better. And because he had a small leadership role earlier, he's itching to occupy one of the regime's easy chairs. That reminds me of a story. Once upon a time there was an ape and a cat. And the ape badly wanted to reach some roasted chestnuts; but the chestnuts were roasting on hot coals. Hence, the ape spoke to the cat with moving words, and the cat was convinced to take the chestnuts out of the fire. Thereupon the ape ate the chestnuts – but the cat? Well, naturally, the cat had burned its paws. Roughly, that's the way things are now. The aristocrats are the ape, and the people, whom one wants to drive into the fire in opposition to Strauß and the regime, are the cat, whom the aristocrats want to take the chestnuts out of the fire. Bless the meal! Yes, if we were dumb enough!

These gentlemen in our village who are striking out against Strauß and the regime, then, have their own reasons that they don't want us to know about. But their reasons are not our reasons. If they want to be the bell-weather and charge with their horns, we're not yet the good sheep willing to run after them in order, in the end, to return home sheared. And – I bet you! Precisely those with the shrillest voices will be the first to draw in their horns and leave the people, who chased after them, stuck in misery.

Our good pastor, whose sermons I hear gladly when he climbs to the pulpit, and the other gentlemen who with him now are blowing their horn so loudly – they won't be especially pleased with this pamphlet. The "*Bürklizeitung*,"^[2] church papers, and others are not likely to praise it, either, because they recognize in it that we don't blindly follow them but want to see, first, with open eyes. For that reason, they will say and write: "Don't allow yourselves to be fooled by such writings! That is, again, just another work of Satan!" Or they will say: "There are only dumb and silly things in it," and so on. Agreed! The pamphlet is nothing special. I have only simply written as it came to me. But must one be a well-educated man in order to speak clearly (*frei von der Leber reden*) and to hit the nail on the head? The all too educated people, like Bürkli, trip all too often over their shrewdness and are unable to see the forest because of the trees. If you want yourselves to be confused by the pamphlet, let them only gossip and write. With educated gentlemen it's like water drooling from the mouth. We don't know how we're to respond. After they have finished babbling, go home and read through, entirely calmly, the pamphlet once more for yourself. Then ask yourself:

1. [1] Trans. note: Uster is a city and capital of the district Uster in the Swiss Canton of Zürich. On November 22, 1832, on the day of the Cantonal Public Meeting, fire was set to the Korrodi textile company in opposition to its automated looms; trans.

2. [2] Trans. note: "*Züricher-Zeitung*" purchased in 1724 by F. von Johann Kaspar Bürkli, later published by Johann Heinrich Bürkli and, until 1890, David Bürkli.

"Who is right? This one or the other? Because it is clearly stated in the Bible: "Test everything and hold onto the best."

If we want to test properly, naturally we must ask first: Do you have the right to do such and such? – That's why it says in the Holy Script:

"Seek first the Kingdom of God and its justice"

Now, the regime says: "Strauß come!" And we want them to say: "Strauß don't come!" I have a neighbor who lives a bit of an angle across from me. Through his garden I can see my field. If my servant and maid are engaged in buffoonery and laziness instead of working, I can call and wave to them that they return to their work. My neighbor now is building a shed in his garden, and, once it is built, it's all over with the view of my field. If he had asked me first, I would have encouraged him to build a bit to the left or to the right. Maybe he would have done it to please me. But now the shed has been begun. Can I now threaten and say: "Neighbor, you must stop building, or else –? Of course not! My neighbor is building on his property, and he has the right to build as he wishes.

It's no different with Strauß. Had someone said to us half-a-year ago that he was to be called [to the university], we certainly would have said our little piece. And had we enough time to come to our senses and calmly spoken about it, I am certain, that many would not have objected who now protest loudly once the decision had been taken. But can we now threaten and say: "The decision must be reversed!" Should we say: "Strauß can not and should not come!" Or else: "And then threaten the regime with fists, as the 22 pastors, physicians, industrialists, and other gentlemen did who met together on March 1st in Zürich?" Of course not! ... if we're true republicans who believe the law sacred. The regime should have told us a half-year earlier that Strauß was to be called; no differently than my neighbor should have said that he intended to build a new shed. The Board of Education [*Erziehungsrath*] and Governing Council [*Regierungsrath*] have the right to call professors. That is clearly stated in the law, and to make matters worse the Upper Council [*Große Rath*] explicitly acknowledged this right. Just as my neighbor stayed on his own property, so, too, the Board of Education and the Governing Council stayed on the property of their rights, and they didn't take a step beyond the boundary. Were we to force them to reverse their decision, we would violate the word of the Holy Scriptures that one should honor and obey one's superiors. And it would not only be unlawful, but also it would be to disembowel ourselves. The people itself wrote the constitution; voted itself for the government (or through the Upper Council voted). Now the people should curse and bluster because the government has exercised the right that was given to them by the people? That looks entirely too childish and not a hair width better than were I in anger to use my own mouth to bite my head off.

Granted! If the country generally were threatened by the event of Strauß' coming, then one must watch how things worked out. But – "Test everything and hold onto the best!" What can happen that's so horrible? OK, let's assume Strauß comes and occupies his professorship just like all the other professors. Whichever students want to attend his lectures, can do so. Those who don't want to, can stay away. Then, Strauß begins with something like: "Gentlemen!" or "My dear audience!" or whatever it is that he says. "You see, I myself believe this or that, because or because. But others believe something else, because or because." Then, the dear students see for themselves, which "because" is the best; whether Strauß' own or the others.' And they would not leave it at that, but they would go listen to other theology professors and receive their advice. And they would read the writings in favor and against Strauß; and they would consider and compare them all. I can't begin to imagine how one in all haste should be so constipated by falsehood and erroneous teaching that the truth could not yet sink in – in as much as our young students in Switzerland haven't fallen on their heads any more than the ancients. They're also no airheads and easily swayed by the slightest, newest thing, as the case with the Walhaz in France on the Art river. Even if it should occur once that someone becomes enthralled with Strauß and his teaching as right and proper; so must he first be seen and heard by us before we permit him to become our pastor. And if we're unsatisfied with his chatter, we can let him go his way. He can keep his wisdom to himself or find others of his opinion elsewhere. And that's the end of that!

Or what else could happen were Strauß to come? So much is certain, our pastors would watch out for every wrong word that came out of his mouth; and for every wrong word he has written or will write. And what would then happen? Strauß must be a clever man! Even his enemies must say that of him, and, if he wasn't, they wouldn't have to worry about him. That's the reason why our pastors must take such effort, as I said earlier, in order to say something intelligent against him. We would not only get something new every Sunday but also something good to hear. If Strauß stays in Swabia, our pastors will forget him quickly and wouldn't engage him at all. Everything would be like it always was: the harp – and that's all! The old harp has in the meantime become boring. We've had enough of it! Fewer people are going to church. But since the chatter over Strauß has begun, our pastors have become agitated, and going to church has become interesting. Were Strauß to be here, we would get better sermons – it couldn't be otherwise – those of us in the countryside who go to church most regularly would benefit the most.

And yet – it occurs to me suddenly -our pastors have begun a racket as if the Canton of Zurich would stumble head over heels into hell if Strauß was even to be seen by us. Some are so afraid of him and have lined up as if in his Strauß-head there was more brains than 200 pastors in the Canton, or how many there are, all together. Otherwise, they wouldn't have raised such a horrid, wailing cry. But now I have an entirely other opinion. I have far greater respect for our pastors! They have become too humble. They've allowed themselves to be too overcome by Christian humility.

Because I'm certain that they are far more clever than they even think themselves to be. And I won't allow anyone to convince me otherwise than, were Strauß to be here, our pastors would have enough mind to force him to cease with all his brilliant leaps. Admittedly! I haven't been any different. Didn't I also scream: "Away with Strauß!" Even when I did so because I heard the others so screaming. Another brings the next into an agitated state. A fire spreads to the next, and in the end it's burning in every head. Anyway, it's no different than Carnival [*Fastnacht*]. There one shouldn't take offense over the other because at Carnival all over the world it is common that pleasing comedies are played out. And the comedy that we performed in the Canton of Zurich unquestionably generates heat: "Much Ado About Nothing!" I have only to laugh that I was so strongly heated by it all.

I had just gotten to this point with my thoughts when I heard cries and noise out in front of my house. I threw open the window. A rabble of young men was passing by with a Scarecrow that they called Doctor Strauß and wanted to burn. There were also older people with them. The young men didn't get the idea from themselves, and the straw was surely given by the older people from their own heads. The youths were screaming their heads off: "Drive Doctor Strauß out of the country!" And some of the older people screamed with them; admittedly, only a few. Then, I had to laugh out loud! As I went to Germany seven years ago, someone said to me: "The people of Nuremberg are clever; they don't hang anyone until they have them." If we are so eager to chase Strauß out of the country, so must we above all else have to allow him into the country. But because I laughed so, a serious thought came to me: Would it be so horrible to put Strauß to the test at least once? There's a good aphorism:

"Tested is superior to studied"

And so could Strauß come, yes indeed, at least once and allow himself to be seen and heard. I know this much: fire and brimstone would not rain down on Zurich. That couldn't be the case; we're all so pious here. Should we be unable to get along with Strauß, and he with us, surely, he would leave on his own. Or one could make him understand: "Mr. Strauß! You see yourself that it's not working out between us. We citizens of Zurich agree. Also – – " Naturally! Everything would be said with the greatest politeness, as is always the case with us.

But, as things stand at the moment, we're going to have to wait awhile before Strauß comes. There are those, I'm told, in the government who want to pension him, that means, to give him our money although he has done nothing for us. I'm not all that excited about that! We have already enough such gentlemen to whom we pay our money for nothing. And – that's how it goes! Now, I'm truly curious about Strauß and would like very much to see him up close. There must be something special about him otherwise we wouldn't be making such a great fuss over him. For my sake! He can

come! He might like to stay awhile; it's no skin off my nose. And in the end, it doesn't trouble me that I participated in this spectacle. Admittedly, some dumb things have happened. How can it be otherwise when everyone is screaming? But here and there a kernel of truth has also sprouted. And I am certain, that we now will find an open ear for all just and proper wishes on the part of our government and the Governing Council. We surely have screamed loud enough that they must notice that there's a populous in this country.

If they want to force the government to rescind its decision that it has lawfully taken, I don't want any part of it. I also don't want to hear that the Governing Council in all haste has swallowed what the 22 Deputies have brought on. Recently, these gentlemen circulated a document in which stands at the beginning: "The citizens of the congregation N." and at the end stands: "The citizens of congregation N.N." And between the N.N. one finds all kinds of amazing stuff. Some of these things have perhaps been allowed to be heard. As such, it wouldn't displease me when in church affairs and at the synod not only pastors, but also other persons, were permitted to speak. First, they are saying: "We have had seven productive years, and in those seven years much good has been accomplished in the country. But it has been almost too good, and one had done better had one proceeded with more caution." Hardly have they said that, then they come – mixing up cabbage and turnips! I, II, III, IV, V, and VI and with a, b, c, d, and e, that one doesn't know where one stands for all their wise and smart-aleck recommendations. Would they want to call a church conference again, I would attend. But then I would take the liberty to speak on my own behalf. And my address might sound so, only it must be composed with other words:

"Messrs. Upper Council! There's a lot of talk going around that in church affairs many things need improvement. And there may be something to it all because there is nothing perfect under the sun. But look before you leap! And look very carefully because good things take time. Many of us citizens said, "Yes!," to all of the seven items that were presented to us by the 22 representatives. But just because of that, you shouldn't conclude that we allow ourselves to be duped and that the pastor has bagged everything. That is because it is obvious that we only said, "Yes!," because we know that it is the duty of a gentleman of the Council before taking a decision after having gathered all of the inquiries and checking everything wisely and weighing all the evidence. With all the suggestions concerning Strauß and in light of the church council, the seminar, and the university; or whatever you otherwise took into consideration or wish to present, nothing should occur too quickly. Take the time that you need! Otherwise, in the end you will receive poor thanks from us', and a member of the Upper Council would be properly advised: And that's the bottom line!"

If we did otherwise, we would be fools ourselves. And in the other Cantons, they would laugh over us as they already now have grounds to make fun of us, and we have earned nothing better.

I know, what I am doing. And when it comes to Strauß, I also know, what I am doing. I'm not doing anything! If you want to call meetings again against him, I'm

staying home. One participates once, but a second time would be two times too many. And as I think, I know, so will many others also think.

**Strauß – Epistle to the Highly Esteemed Messrs
Mayor Hirzel, Professor Orelli, and Professor Hitzig in Zurich from Professor
David Friedrich Strauß**

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by the
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Translator's Summary of Strauß' Themes

1. Should congregations not be able to trust the claims of their pastors? Clerics "[...] are above all, the least appropriate to be an independent judge in this matter where they [...] constitute a party in the case."
2. Describes the "old Christian faith" and its anthropomorphic "difficulties."
3. It's not specific miracles that confirm the legitimacy of faith but "[...] those so-called miracles disappear like drops in the ocean among the countless miracles that God performs daily and hourly in every region of His created and sustained world." "We lost nothing [...] with these heavenly voices than is lost by the removal of a piece of paper stuck on a beautiful painting that contains the message that it is a beautiful painting."
4. Accused that the savior is nothing special because the "[...] Son of God has become just a normal human being." Response: "A human being, a true human being: Yes!, but a normal human being: No!, and he also remains for us the Son of God no longer in the coarse sense that must eternally remain an offence to reason. Does it say in the scriptures Christ is called merely the Son of God? Isn't he not also often called the Son of Man? [...]"

5. The old Christian faith has the deceased Christ immediately rise from the dead [...] [W]e speak of resurrection that always was in this life as he already resurrected this side of the grave all those who follow him as he himself said: Whoever hears my words and believes in Him who sent me, he has eternal life and has passed out of death into life (John 5:24).” Christ “[...] didn’t need a cloud first at the end of his life to take him up to God in heaven; rather [...] he was incessantly with God [...]”
6. Question of Strauß’ belief in a judgment of the world? “[...] [H]is coming in judgment for us is not as in your case such that it remains outstanding and delayed from century to century: rather, the Lord sits on the judges chair in us every day because he gave to our hearts his spirit that judges us, punishes us, whenever we do or desire evil, and rewards us with peace and bliss when we permit ourselves to be driven and ruled by him.”
7. Responds to the charge that he contradicts biblical teaching and “turn[s] the books of the Bible into a book of fables.” The bible is “[...] indispensable for our edification. However, it is a misunderstanding to take this holiness in such a way that we have to accept everything in it as literally true [...]”
8. “How many up to now have come to reflection over his [Jesus’] moral teaching through believing astonishment or curious rumination with respect to Jesus’ miracles? However, how many, conversely, have spurned the entire Bible in ridicule or indignation because for him these stories of miracle were repugnant? Our view protects us from both. No one who embraces it will henceforth be distracted by the glitter of the supernatural away from the less gleaming but more important parts of the biblical content.
9. “The hostility on the part of the greater part of clerics against the new view of Christianity is no more astonishing than as has occurred everywhere on the part of members of professional guilds against a new invention because that invention makes it easier to do a task than the way the profession has practiced it. The majority of clerics, I say, are well practiced in awaking pious feelings in their parishioners by means of clinging to the literal words of the biblical stories and concepts. That we undertake to edify ourselves and others by means of a more liberated insight into the Bible is an embarrassment for them and arouses their indignation because they are not equipped to respond to it.”
10. Strauß maintains that there are three books that “[...] in combination [...] constitute the one and entire divine revelation:” the book of nature, the book of history, and the bible.

The Text

Epistle to the People of Zurich From Professor Orelli

Dear Fellow Citizens!

Read, I beg and implore you to do that; read calmly and non-prejudicially this booklet in which the believing thinker, Doctor Strauß, presents and explains in a completely understandable manner accessible to everyone the perfect example of his theology and Christian faith – just as formerly the highly enlightened men of God, Zwingli and Luther, communicated openly and clearly over against the papacy their religious conviction to the people and a new, more beautiful life emerged for them.

Once you've read this, then with all conscientiousness test the teaching of Dr. Strauß for yourselves, preferably in a quiet chamber when God's peace prevails over you and in your hearts. Hold onto the best, that is, to everything that appears to you, reasonable Christians, as true, good, and beautiful; throw out the remainder that might appear to you to be untrue, un-Christian, or dubious.

Ask, as well, your pastors with their synodal vows and conscience: what stands in agreement with the divine savior's teaching in this epistle; what, otherwise, stands in contradiction, hence, is heretical and condemning.

Ask your trustworthy, ecclesiastical leaders, whom you wish to advise you calmly and with gentle minds, honest and openly regarding each particular item and how it fits with Christ's servants.

I beg that you don't only spout spirited rage against Dr. Strauß and this his pamphlet -such rage is appropriate only for the Pope in Rome.

Ask your shepherds whether they might want to contradict what for them are, apparently, false claims in Strauß' epistle on rational grounds and with sound proofs drawn from the treasure of their erudition.

Dear fellow citizens, I speak with the holy Apostle Paul (I Corinthians 7:23, 24): "You have been purchased for a dear price: don't become slaves of people. You brothers! each should remain in that profession to which he has been called."

Heed without all passion what an old friend of yours in evangelical freedom of faith, who lovingly calls all to the constitution and laws to which we have sworn and, as well, to the free schools!

Your,
Johann Kaspar Orelli

Epistle From David Friedrich Strauss

When I read in the public press of the agitations in your city and Canton that my having been called to the university in Zurich have caused, of the meetings that have occurred, of the speeches that have been delivered, of the texts that have been exchanged; when I think about the attacks made against you, highly respectable men and on all the others who helped to bring about my call to the university, the invectives directed at you, the insults that you have received from all sides: I am overcome with a deep and deserved pain that men, to whom I feel myself so indebted, should have to pay such a price for their benevolence and disposition on my behalf. All this while I, for whom you expose yourselves to the indignant waves of popular outcry, I am anchored in a calm, wind-still port, barely aware of the howling storm and the roar of the flames in the distance and send over to you at most a word of greeting, but unable to charm the wild waters to calmness.

When my call to the university after long and tenacious conflict came to fruition, I believed that your fight had come to an end and comforted myself with the hope that I would be soon personally in your midst and be able to gradually remove the debt of so highly accrued guilt of thanks to you as a consequence of your heartfelt goodwill, respectful courtesy, and encouraging helping hand with respect to the common goal of spreading truth and light. However, it was just the beginning of your efforts, and the point at which I am going to be in the position to assure you my thanks in person – who knows when that is going to be? I would vainly sow seeds of scholarship upon a field flooded by such wild waters as now is the case there. Didn't Noah first have to allow the floodwaters to recede before he could be a farmer and plant vineyards? – but what am I saying to you about thanks? For men of your sensitivities, when unfavorable circumstances make action impossible, thanks is enough that lives in hearts: and that this thanks in me will not lapse before my life ends is assured.

How do I want to answer before the bench of public good and scholarship that, as a consequence of my call to Zurich, men like you, have been so woefully troubled who have worked to advance both [the public good and scholarship]? Like fruit of general well-being carefully harvested by your work and care, most honorable Mayor, has blown unripe from the branches or hindered from ripening by the current storms, so the many hours that you would have devoted to the ancients to the advantage of all lovers of Classical Studies, esteemed Orelli, have been curtailed by the negotiations or the annoyance caused by the present circumstances! ... and you, dear Hitzig, how frequently might the devoted action or feeling for my sake have hindered your own work by which you have shined such pleasant light on what, to this point, have been dark passages in the Old Testament! Yet, here may it be that the public good exculpate me with public good; scholarship with scholarship. You meant to serve both were you to have brought me to your university, and, when it comes to my own good will in that respect, you would not have been disappointed. For now, I am not in the position even to undertake the attempt as much as I would like to fulfil your expectations. For that

reason, unfortunately, it appears that with respect to your more important aims, your time and effort have been wasted.

However, don't believe that, honored Gentlemen! Your voices have echoed far and wide and, even more, they've found quiet resonance; your words are not lost even if they don't have an enduring effect in your immediate vicinity. They are like feathered seeds that appear to be blown away by the wind but frequently find fruitful ground faraway where they can germinate and sprout. Now or later, by me or someone else, in Zurich or wherever in Germany or Switzerland: it's all the same; but with certainty the day will come when one will be able to think and speak freely about religion rationally and without being taken to be godless; and will be in one's heart pious and god-fearing without defaming reason and branding the sciences as heretical. The events in Zurich, the deliberations of the three Councils, the addresses and opinions expressed are all indisputably portents of that day to come. Even without unequivocal success, it is already infinitely important that at least once in the assembly of a people's Council thoughts were expressed like the conviction that one can be a Christian without believing [literally] every word and story in the Bible. The results of these negotiations and the decisions [to call Strauß to Zurich] taken by these sessions might now from a particular perspective want by some to be reversed: hopefully, not! Nonetheless, if it were to happen: for that very reason, those who would succeed will have little grounds to celebrate. Were they to be more insightful leaders than they appear to be, they would say, as that old war hero said in victory: one more such victory, and we are lost.

This is because a single victory and single defeat decide nothing. Frequently the victory is the seed for a future defeat; whereas in defeat, to the contrary, the guarantee of ultimate victory is concealed. Everything depends upon the manner with which the battle was conducted [On the one hand,] on the part of those whom one now seeks to overpower, the fight has been conducted in open deliberation where speech has stood up to counter-speech, the accuser has been confronted by the defender, and the assembly, as judge, after hearing both sides, has decided in favor of the accused and the defendant. It was an honest open fight and an impartial judgement. On the other hand, on the part of those who would like to nullify this ruling, the battle is being waged, as all battles have always been waged from this side. For some, the Council Hall is an unwelcome battle field on which to fight for their cause because there, one can expect that every strike will be met by a counter-strike. A more pleasant battle field for them is the church, where the parapet of the pulpit constitutes an unconquerable fortification and the orator is right because no one is permitted to contradict him. This is the courtroom where the prosecutor, yes, is heard but not the defendant and his defense lawyer; where with the slightest declaration of the prosecutor, the judging community proclaims, "Guilty!" No one can deny a just court, an honest battle; were the good congregation, which is to decide here on the Christianity and admissibility of an appointed teacher at the university, only had some other knowledge of his teachings, so that it could compare what the preacher accuses him of and judge him

according to what it itself knows of him. Yet, ask this community: what do you think Strauß' actual teaching is? I cannot keep myself from laughing when I imagine what the answer would be. The simple, modest citizens who constitute the majority of the congregation will certainly admit that they have not read or hardly seen the book that stands in question; and even the educated to the extent that they are not actual scholars should at least admit that they, if they have read it, do not possess the means to appropriately appreciate and to thoroughly understand it. There remains merely the judgment of the cleric, who, consequently, ends up being prosecutor and judge in the same person because the judge [in this case, the assembly] has no informed opinion of his own in the matter.

Should the congregations not be able to trust the report of their pastors with certainty? Definitely, in all those aspects that are concerned with the personal salvation of congregation members! When it comes to the question: What must I do in order to receive eternal life?, clerics are expected to give the nurturing answer to their flocks. In the absence of any special reason to the contrary, one presupposes that they will give the right response. In contrast, who will name clerics as such judges, for example, with respect to the best way to farm the land, build factories, govern the state? Surely, one will retort that that is not their office. However, clerics must know how to judge the true faith of a theological instructor because they themselves have studied theology. That they have! Nonetheless, if I may use a parable, the clerics in general are, above all, the least appropriate to be an independent judge in this matter where they, on the contrary, constitute a party in the case. When Guttenberg created the printing press, who were the most strenuous opponents to the new technology but those who up to that point were the producers of books by hand copying them? To take an example from our own day, who opposes weaving machines with greater energy than those who up to now likewise are weavers but without machines? Who curses with the greatest passion steamships? Surely, those who likewise are sailors but who row and sail! Would the book copiers ever vote for the coming of the printing press?; or, if left to the decision of freight haulers, would they vote for the steam engine?

These examples are sufficient to demonstrate that, at the beginning, with every new discovery, no matter in what discipline, the irreconcilable opponent is precisely the guild that until that point had performed the task of the new invention. This is a perfect analogy for the reaction of the majority of clerics to those changes which are being introduced (and I am among those so engaged) into theological scholarship. Awakening pious sensations in their audience, fortifying virtuous resolutions in them, planting the fear of God in children, keeping adults safe against the forces of passion and the business of the world, providing comfort out of God's Word to the sick, giving the dying blessed hope as a companion in their last days: that was always, remains, and will be the profession of clerics. For that reason, Protestant pastors are so used to tackling these tasks that they take the Bible into their hands and say: "See, there is a God who in ancient times created this world in six days and rested on the seventh, to whose commemoration the seventh day is sanctified as a day of rest for

the faithful. God also created man out of a clump of clay; but man, at first innocent and without error, allowed himself to be seduced by the coaxing of a snake (behind whom was perhaps the devil) to decide to eat the forbidden fruit; upon which he was thrown out of the garden of paradise, and the earth as well as all humanity were cursed because of him, his descendants ever since having been born sinners under the judgment of eternal damnation. However, God revealed Himself to certain members of the corrupted race from then onward. He appeared to Abraham as a human being, personally wrestled with Jacob and lamed his hip. By means of Moses, he led his people out of Egypt and on Sinai gave Moses the law with his own audible voice. A sequence of miracles followed through the entire history of this people: Balaam's donkey talked for himself; Joshua commanded the sun and moon to stand still; Elijah prayed for fire from heaven and rode in a fiery chariot up to heaven. Straightaway, the prophets rose up one after the other who prophesized a future Messiah; and when the time was full, the Christ appeared. He was like all other human beings except with respect to sin and was also an exception in that he didn't, like the rest of us, who not only had a human mother but also had a human father, but in his case the role of the father was replaced by the divine spirit. His birth in Bethlehem was proclaimed by an angel to shepherds, and the Wise Men from the East were guided by a star, like a carried torch, to the town and birth house of the divine child. With adulthood, he was baptized by John, and God's spirit hovered over him in the visible form of a dove. God the Father Himself spoke in distinctly clear words his blessing upon him. Straightaway his life was a sequence not only of good deeds but also miracles. He raised persons from the dead, fed thousands with little bread, walked on water, and transformed water into wine. However, he succumbed to his enemies, died on the cross, and spilled out his blood for the atonement of the world. After three days, he rose again from the dead, and after another forty days he rose to heaven visibly before the eyes of his disciples from where he immediately, in the roar of a storm and in fiery tongues of the spirit, poured into his followers and from where at the end of time he will come again in order to raise the dead and lead them to judgment."

This is the old Christian faith. Who wants to underestimate in it what is beautiful, elevating, and comforting? We certainly don't. However, on the other side, one shouldn't for that reason be so cheesy not to acknowledge the difficulties and the challenges that are plainly more obvious with every decade. God should have walked in paradise with Adam, appeared to Abraham in a visible form; whereas John says: No one has ever seen God; and our reason agrees with the Apostle. God formed man out of a clump of clay: is He not presented as a person with hands? In paradise, the snake talks, later the donkey of the pagan seer: but is a speaking animal something that we in any way properly can imagine, not to say, think? The sun stands still or, more appropriately, the earth is halted in its daily rotation on its axis: we know what happens to a chariot when it in a fast race suddenly is brought to a halt by a barrier; a jolt occurs, someone who hasn't held on tightly will be hurled out of the chariot; and were the earth stopped with its incomparably faster spin, should Joshua with his

droves been able to pursue unshaken the enemy, or, is it not more likely that Israelites and Amorites including towers and houses not only in Gibeon but all on the entire earth would be thrown to the ground by a jolt stronger than the strongest earthquake? Then there's the elevation to heaven by Elijah and Jesus: is there a divine throne up there over the clouds? Are not there stars above and completely surrounding the earth in all directions, and do not these stars not have worlds, and is God not omnipresent? ... When "we live, move and have, our being in God," as the Apostle Paul says (Acts 17:28), why would He then need to abduct someone from the surface of the earth whether on a fiery chariot or clouds if He wanted to call someone to Himself?

However, this and everything else will be held against us, which you take to be an offence against sacred history, as when Jesus drives out the devil, heals the sick, resurrects the dead, yes, simply performs miracles by which God demonstrates that He made heaven and earth and everything in it – How? Wouldn't God be able to be recognized as the creator simply by the existence of the extant order of things and the orderly course of the world and nature? Who is godless enough to make a claim to the contrary? Or should I not rather say, childish enough? This judgment is really almost exactly the same as that made by children who aren't especially moved when one says to them: the clock, whose constant pendulum swing you see and whose routine striking of the hours you hear was created by this artist; but, when only now this man steps forward and lifts the bell hammer with his hands and lets the bell ring, interrupting the order, once, twice, or as often as the child would like, only then is the clockmaker celebrated by the children and acclaimed. It is sad that humanity hasn't wanted to escape from this childish notion. Miracles in the sense of ancient, popular faith can only have a special value for someone who is incapable of recognizing in the natural order the power and wisdom of the creator. We, who are accused by others of not believing in miracles that God did in the land of the Jews at the time of Moses, the Prophets, Jesus, and the Apostles, think nothing of it because those so-called miracles disappear like drops in the ocean among the countless miracles that God performs daily and hourly in every region of His created and sustained world. – Recognize the finger of God – one cries out at us – He stopped the sun and moon in their tracks at the time of Joshua! What, "Just a finger?," we respond. We recognize His entire hand, his strong arm that doesn't stop the sun and moon only once for a few hours, but His arm that since the creation of the universe until now holds, carries, and moves in their proper paths all suns, moons, and earths, as well as the entire army of stars. – According to your faith, speechless animals have talked with persons and, thereby, promulgated the divine power to do miracles: by the artificial construction of their appendages, by their wonderful powers and urges; what about animals forces us to believe that it has spoken with a human tongue? when precisely this is the greatness and marvelousness in God's creation that He is praised by every creature by its own language, by a polyphonic chorus. – You find yourselves elevated that in his Father's power Christ twice fed thousands with limited supplies. What? only twice long ago your God has done what ours does every year, yes, daily? It is certainly a

limited supply that we yearly entrust to our fields and our gardens; but the broadcast seeds bear fruit, as Christ said, some hundredfold, some sixtyfold, some thirtyfold (Matthew 13:23); and from that fruit, daily, hunger is stilled for more than only four or five thousand and still there are leftovers. – In short, there is no miracle that you can present that we don't also have and that we don't have that is greater and more marvelous.

However, we are accused that for us the savior is nothing special; the Son of God has become just a normal human being! – A human being, a true human being: Yes!; but a normal human being: No! He remains for us also the Son of God but no longer in the coarse sense that must eternally remain an offence to reason. Does it say in the scriptures Christ is called merely the Son of God? Isn't he not also often called the Son of Man?; and doesn't it follow that one must be able to be Son of God and at the same time Son of Man? Just so, for us Christ is the son of two pious parents, Joseph and Mary; but God also sanctified the fruit of their union is the sacred God; he blew into her the beautiful, pure soul, the lofty and powerful Spirit, that showed itself precociously in her child: and, therefore, we properly call the Son of Man also Son of God. – This is the case with all the other miracles in life. Twice God is supposed to have called down to Jesus that he is his true son, of whom he is well-pleased, to whom humanity should listen. What do we lose if we doubt these stories? That the shock in us is eliminated when we think that God speaks to us in a human voice, we don't take to be some kind of loss, should we? Still, nothing disappears; God must have been pleased by a life like Jesus' life, and we can do nothing better than to adhere to him as God and His holiness, on the one side, as we know without explicit explanation when we observe the divine blessedness and purity of this life and, then, on the other side, consider our determination [as human]. We lose nothing more with these heavenly voices than is lost by the removal of a piece of paper stuck on a beautiful painting that contains the message that it is a beautiful painting. Whether Christ healed the sick merely by word and touch – what difference does it make for us to whom this good no longer can occur and for those who will never be able to do it themselves? He might have possessed special powers from God even to perform such works, which was the conclusion of those who lived in his day. However, he doesn't help us by these means any longer as he did the blind man of Jericho or the exiled and lame in Capernaum, or the dead men of Nain and Bethany: but he opens our eyes that we see what God's holy will is for us; he strengthens our paralyzed powers to follow his example through his admonition and promises: our heart is made pure by his Spirit and awakened through solidarity in his life in which he accepts us to a new life of sanctity and justice.

Where do we find – someone asks us – the atoning death of Jesus in your faith? Is he also for you, as he is for us, the lamb of God sacrificed for the sins of the world? – Here we have to ask a question in response: Do you mean by atonement that God at the time of the Old Testament was only angry and zealous, sought revenge in humanity, and that only with the shedding of the blood of Christ was His wrath appeased and His temper toward humanity was milder? Whoever thinks that is opposed to God

Himself (not to speak of the irrationality and unworthiness of the whole notion), when he dismisses the love of God for the world as the presupposed motivation for why God gave us His Son (John 3:16). Were God from the beginning mercifully inclined to forgiveness, it is not obvious that that, other than repentance and the improvement of life on the part of human beings, in addition, should require the death of an innocent man and that this death should have established the conditions to indulge his mercy, and, for the purpose of cleansing humanity, actually to forgive. Notwithstanding, even for us the death of Jesus is the image and the guarantee for our pardon and salvation. Because as with that man, whose mind was united with God, whose love for sinful humanity never diminished even to the point of suffering death, yes, pleaded to God for his murderers, so we ourselves are able to measure the grace of God by the charity of this God/Man and his willingness to forgive even those who acted towards him in the most egregious fashion, if they only do penance. Whereas an Elijah called for fire from heaven to fall on those who were sent to capture him appears to reveal an angry God (however, God had already made Himself present to him by a gentle whisper [I Kings 19:12 etc.]), so we see in the patience and personality of the dying Christ that God is, far more, love.

The old Christian faith has the deceased Christ immediately rise from the dead and ascend to heaven. – Ours, as well; but not merely once and not first at the end of his life. Rather, we speak of resurrection of those dead whom he called "their dead" (Matthew 8:22), a resurrection that always was in this life as he already resurrected this side of the grave all those who follow him as he himself said: Whoever hears my words and believes in Him who sent me, he has eternal life and has passed out of death into life (John 5:24). For that reason, he didn't need a cloud first at the end of his life to take him up to God in heaven; rather, already in his lifetime he elevated himself to heaven in those prayers that he nightly offered on lonely mountains or in daylight in the circle of his disciples; yes, that which Paul requires from Christians (I Thessalonians 5:17) occurred with him in full measure so that, namely, his life was a prayer without interruption. Thus, he was incessantly with God as he himself said to Nicodemus: the Son of Man, he is in heaven (John 3:13); in heaven where also the true Christian transformation already occurs in this life, as Paul said (Philippians 3:20).

We are asked: "Surely you believe, as well that Christ will return to judge the world?" We do believe that, we respond! Only his coming in judgment for us is not as in your case such that it remains outstanding and delayed from century to century: rather, the Lord sits on the judges chair in us every day because he gave to our hearts his Spirit that judges us, punishes us, whenever we do or desire evil, and rewards us with peace and bliss when we permit ourselves to be driven and ruled by him. Our inner judge recognizes and prepares us already in this life that we be purified by the Spirit of Christ and by a strengthened conscience, according to our worthiness for reward or punishment, pleasure or pain. Is that not a guarantee that also in the coming life the divine judge will assign us to that apartment in his Father's house for which he has made himself worthy here below? Is a special, solemn day of judgment necessary

for this? I believe hardly so; at least the rich man was judged, and the poor Lazarus blessed, each immediately after his death without the day of judgment. What about the resurrection to eternal blessedness and damnation of our bodies? The Apostle Paul speaks of an ecstasy that he experienced up to the third heaven and added: whether he was in the body or outside of the body, he didn't know; God knows; but he [Paul] knows that he was in ecstasy and heard inexpressible words (II Corinthians 12:2 f.). Hence, were we, as with the Apostle, to want to hope to enjoy ecstasy and blessedness in a future life, that we leave up to God, who will do that which is best for us.

That all sounds acceptable enough, perhaps some clear and calm thinkers say to us. However, you contradict all too much that is said and taught in the Bible, and you scorn divine revelation in that you turn the books of the Bible into a book of fables. – We scorn neither the revelation nor its record; we seek only to gain a more correct understanding of the Bible. Granted, we no longer believe that God talked with Moses and Abraham like a human being, that he inspired word for word what the writers of the Old and New Testaments should write. However, from time immemorial God reveals Himself to humanity in their own minds, in the works of creation, and, finally, in excellent and talented individuals, whom He awakens as lawgivers and prophets, teachers and Apostles among them. Such men arise in all nations, especially the Jewish nation. Among the Jews arose early the insight that there is only one God, that He is the omnipotent creator of heaven and earth, that he is not to be represented by any image, that he is the holy lawgiver and just driver of human history. For that reason, because the religious texts of the ancient Jewish nation are the only ones in which this foundation of true religion is so purely and powerfully to be found (for that reason the New Testament, also, is grounded in, and draws from, them), therefore, it is for us also Holy; the books of Moses and Samuel, the Psalms and Prophets are indispensable for our edification. However, it is a misunderstanding to take this holiness in such a way that we have to accept everything in it as literally true – every notion that every book in the Bible contains, every story that they tell. The same applies to the story of creation – a pious Israelite who was immersed in the marvelous divine works pondered their origin and imagined graphically that process; with childish sense, he divided God's work in daily tasks just as we humans do, and as a Jew accustomed to observance of the seventh day, he let the Creator himself celebrate this day. Furthermore, he or an author thought about the fallenness and suffering of humanity; he couldn't believe that humanity was originally created by God in such corruption and for such hardship; it must be humanity's own fault that everything has deteriorated so badly; therefore, he wrote the story of the original parent's fall into sin. The people of Israel experienced a remarkable fate, especially in ancient times; it escaped slavery in Egypt by a strange set of circumstances and, after a sojourn of nomadic wandering, conquered Canaan in a bloody war. Naturally, these events lived on in the mouths of the people from generation to generation; correctly, one saw God's guiding finger in them; but, because one did not yet realize that it was also God's work that He had left the people in Egyptian slavery to become strengthened,

that he, afterwards, at the proper time allowed a man like Moses to emerge and equipped him with all of the capabilities that were necessary for the liberation of his people, that He, further, let the Israelites encounter in Canaan corrupt and divided tribes – because one did not recognize the imperceptible influence of God but still was correctly convinced that God had played a role in them, so one imagined to oneself the divine activity with respect to the exodus out of Egypt in such a manner as if God with a human voice had called upon Moses to liberate his people and as if He himself led the people in cloud and fire pillars, etc. That was all written at a later time. In this fashion, the stories developed as we now read them in the so-called Books of Moses [Trans.: the Pentateuch]. There is a similar explanation for the New Testament. One asked oneself in the earliest days of Christianity, from whence came this clarity of Spirit, this sovereignty of wit, this purity of heart, which are all unlike anything in any other human being? One answered, he was not conceived out of a sinful seed; he comes directly from God, the origin of all light and so developed the stories of his supernatural conception that we find in Matthew and Luke. He appeared to be a higher Spirit who came down to earth for us for a short period of time, but, upon his departure, appears to have been raised up again to God from whom he came: Hence, the stories of his resurrection and ascension to heaven, etc.

It is far from the case that this insight debases or that Christians are being admonished not to read the Bible: far more, only from this point of view is the reading of the Bible for the thinking Christian truly edifying. As long as he feels himself obligated to the literal faith in all the biblical accounts, so long will he find an affront to his every step – the overcoming of which requires so much effort; and the mind is rocked by such wavering and turmoil that the best benefits of reading the bible are lost. How many up to now have come to reflection over his moral teaching through believing astonishment or curious rumination with respect to Jesus' miracles? However, how many, conversely, have spurned the entire Bible in ridicule or indignation because for him these stories of miracle were repugnant? Our view protects us from both. No one who embraces it will henceforth be distracted by the glitter of the supernatural away from the less gleaming but more important parts of the biblical content. No one, however, will be shocked by the offence in the face of these kinds of stories in the Bible. We rejoice over the pious and childish sense of the biblical authors and the deeper meaning of their stories even when we must recognize these to be legends and fictions. The author of the book of Matthew reports to us, and certainly believes himself, that pagan Wise Men from the East followed a star to the newborn child Jesus. However, we don't take this to be literally the case; although we recognize it for a useful image of light that was illuminated through Christ also for pagans. The same is the case with the Fall of Man. Don't teach us how the first humans fell: they [the first humans] only show us – which is more – as in a mirror, how it happens when we bring ourselves to fall by succumbing to sins. In this way, the Bible remains for us the foundation of edification; but also with the creation we are edified and by the guidance of humanity in the little and great things of life of which the bible grasps only

one but the most strange and instructive part; these three books: the book of nature, the book of history, and the bible must supplement one another; we are not permitted to neglect one over the others, and only in combination do they constitute the one and entire divine revelation.

Yet, where have I gotten to? All this is not what I want to say to you, esteemed Messrs., who know so well as I and who have known for some time that this is my conviction. Unnoticed, I turned my talk to others who don't know this as good as you and who perhaps would accept it from your instruction. Surely, this is not to be expected from this aroused crowd that glows a certainly un-Christian pagan-hatred and now wants to defend under the cover of piety all possible other-worldly interests: with these I have nothing to say – mindful of Christ's saying, that forbids presenting explicitly to such people the jewel of religious conviction. Yet, what I actually wanted to say to you, and from which I have been diverted by this digression, was this: The hostility on the part of the greater part of clerics against the new view of Christianity is no more astonishing than as has occurred everywhere on the part of members of professional guilds against a new invention because that invention makes it easier to do a task than the way the profession has practiced it. The majority of clerics, I say, are well practiced in awaking pious feelings in their parishioners by means of clinging to the literal words of the biblical stories and concepts. That we undertake to edify ourselves and others by means of a more liberated insight into the Bible is an embarrassment for them and arouses their indignation because they are not equipped to respond to it.

We let them be so indignant as they want and let them defame and brand us as heretics as they wish. They or their successors will adjust themselves in the end to what we say with certainty and must become comfortable with our new approach as the case with those trades, chosen above in comparison, who were required to accept, in the end, new inventions and to adopt them although initially most cursed the inconvenient development. Naturally, who today still has a book hand-copied when he can have it printed more cheaply and beautifully? Likewise, sooner or later the time must come that no one will listen to a cleric who believes he edifies his parishioners by a sermon in which he maintains and interprets the children of Israel as crossing the Red Sea on dry ground, Jesus' walking on water, the discovery by Peter of a coin in the mouth of a fish as truthful miracle stories. Do you not know – one will then ask a preacher – do you not know nothing more important about Jesus and Peter than this? Do you not know to prove divine omnipotence by nothing greater than that He should have done something once at the time of Moses? I don't know and it is not important whether one will think of us when that time comes – it can take a long time to occur because, when it comes to humanity as our daily experience testifies, God has in them no students in a rush to learn. However, to have diligently played a role to that end that Christ's promise of a time when one will worship God in Spirit and in truth finally comes to fruition, this witness we are able now already to provide.

May you ascertain, honorable gentlemen, consciousness of the numerous contradictions that are occurring around you as it has maintained the serenity of Christianity before in the past.

Stuttgart, March 1, 1839.

Your sincere admirer

and, more specifically, colleague, even when at this point still partially,

Dr. David Friedrich Strauß

Anonymous – Response on the Part of a Layperson to the Strauß' Epistle to Hirzel, Orelli, and Hitzig

[Anonymous Author]

Translator's Summary of Anonymous Authors' Themes

1. "We understand him to be free and rational [...] who views his own self-will as sinful as soon as it is not in agreement with God's will. You appear to view someone to be rational and free who assumes there to be no limits to the human spirit."
2. With [...] your] kind of [...] universal rationality], [...] you] stand[...] opposed to God, arraign[...] Him for His deeds, and with [...] this] limited human understanding want[...] to reign over the omnipotent creator of all things even over [...] your] own creator.
3. Should not clerics defend God's Word and against attacks of unbelief?
4. On the charge that Strauß' opponents have not read his Book: Those who have read it tell us that you maintain that most of what is in the Bible is untrue. We call such wisdom foolishness. "Your epistle, which is written from an entirely unscientific perspective, does not deserve [...] investigation."
5. On a Guild's Rejection of New Inventions: "[...] [W]hat is your invention? It is a well-known, old story [...] [Y]ou deny God's revealed Word and replace it with your understanding [...] You laugh over what believers worship and ridicule them for what they are unable to grasp. Our clerics do not accept this method for becoming a Christian. They believe according to God's Word that, in order to be part of Christian salvation, a person must let go of arrogance and confess to being a sinner, yes, must be entirely reborn so that you must peddle your invention elsewhere.
6. On miracles: "[...] [I]t is these [particular] miracles, performed entirely by our savior, that make it possible for us to understand the essence of our God and the daily occurring miracle of his providential sustaining of the world." "You cannot understand [...] [miracles] so long as God does not give the grace of understanding necessary for his revelation. You should pray for that understanding for the sake of your salvation!"
7. On Christ as a Normal Human Being: "If Christ is just a normal person, then you have no savior, and what will become of you? ... Your sins remain, and for them is promised eternal damnation!"

8. What "We" Know: "[...] [W]e know this, that what God does is done for good and that whoever knows Christ's teaching but does not believe it cannot attain eternal life."
9. On the Bible's Provision of Comfort to the Anxious and Suffering: "According to your explanation, the Bible is a collection of good stories, yet most of them are for children. What has happened to the strength of the Bible by which already millions have endured the suffering and accidents that life brings to all of us, by which already millions received peace at the hour of death, by which alone thousands of martyrs were strengthened to overcome disgrace, plagues, and painful death?"

The Text

In light of the fact that, as of today's decision by the esteemed Education- and Government-Council that you should in fact remain Professor *in partibus*, to be sure not *Infidelium* but *Antistraussianorum* – and as a result I will not be permitted all that soon the honor to see you with us, I take the freedom, to write a few lines to you. The cherished recipients of your last epistle took it to be addressed to the people and distributed it widely (there would have been only a few who would have purchased it because you name – you will excuse the Swiss-openness – is not among the most loved at this point in time). I received a copy, have read it twice, and found that I absolutely do not share your opinion. Yes, I take your perspective to be so wrong that I must speak out against it everywhere, but first, in order not to reason behind your back, I speak to you directly. – Admittedly, I am only a simple, you might say, dumb, layperson. However, as God lets the humble and simple live, yes, specifically to the latter has promised salvation, so also you will not refuse me the right to a small statement as a drip in the ocean of Spirit.

After a long, polite introduction, you hope (page 2) "the day will come when one will be able to think and speak freely about religion rationally." That's nothing new to us! A Swiss by birth thinks and speaks freely, and he doesn't allow that right to be taken away; even speaking rationally is Swiss! However, you probably understand free and rational in a different sense from the way we do. We understand him to be free and rational whose thoughts, talk, and will are completely subordinated to the will of God and who views his own self-will as sinful as soon as it is not in agreement with God's will. You appear to view someone to be rational and free who assumes there to be no limits to the human spirit because he, like you (for example, when it comes to explaining miracles and the greatest miracle, resurrection) applies the universal, measuring stick of everyday experience and its understanding. With this kind of understanding, he stands opposed to God, arraigns Him for His deeds, and with his limited human understanding wants to reign over the omnipotent creator of all things even over his own creator. I call irrational this kind of reason because it

ignores anything coming from above by taking everything from itself. It will not find any receptivity by us. No Hirzel, Strauß, Hithzig, or Orelli is capable of prevailing upon us to embrace such an opinion. For precisely that reason, you cannot come to Zurich. It appears that even in Tübingen your reason is not recognized as rational. Otherwise, you would have surely remained there. Yes, as far as I can discern from the pamphlets of silly laypeople, your reason is not recognized anywhere in Germany!

On page 2, you begin to strike out at clerics and accuse them of having attacked you from the pulpit because from there no one is permitted to contradict them. Mr. Strauß!, you are wrong, or you only want to mislead yourself. Have you heard nothing of the advisory opinion from the Theological Faculty, from the minority of the Education Council, from the unanimous advisory opinion of the General Council, and from the open advice from our Antistes in opposition to the motion calling for your appointment?; from the addresses of a Vögelin, a Brunner? Haven't you read anything of the many publications in opposition to you and Hirzel's warm, but not wise, defense of you? Even the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* would have served to give you notice of the open conflict in and outside of the Council Chamber if you did not learn about it from your friends. From that place where they proclaim God's Word, should clerics not also use the same place to defend against attacks of unbelief? It would be to their disgrace if they did not. However, you go further: the congregations do not know what you teach. The simple citizens have neither read nor understood your book.^[1] In that respect, for once, you are correct. For example, I have not read your book and surely would not have understood it, but it is not necessary to understand your huge book in order to want to remain as far from it as possible. Your friends Hirzel, Zehnder, and Co., who surely understand (!) your book, told us that you are to become a Reformer and that you will explain to our pastors, who till now have taken the Bible to be a true book, that most of what is in it is untrue. That alone is enough for us. According to the scriptures, we call such wisdom foolishness, and we don't want any fool to be a Reformer. Your short epistle, written for a public audience, is sufficient in itself, without any assistance from your friends, to recognize your teaching as heresy as we will soon see.

In your attack on the clerics, you on occasion employ pictures, to be sure neither beautiful nor noble minded but, as you say, appropriate. You say pastors, like professional, guild members, view as evil those who invent new machines and methods. However, because you would probably not depose the pastors directly, they would have no reason to oppose you with your simple method of turning people into learned theologians and good Christians – I was entranced by your analogy, I almost said

1. [1] Translator's note: Strauß actually says that the "scholars" "admit that they, if they have read it, do not possess the means to appropriately appreciate and to thoroughly understand it." Of "simple, modest citizens" Strauß wrote: "The simple, modest citizens who make up the majority of the congregation themselves, will certainly admit that they have not read or hardly seen the book that here is in question [....]"

"to fabricate" them. Yet, what is your invention? It is a well-known, old story. As has always been the case by those who are not illuminated by a higher light, you deny God's revealed Word and replace it with your understanding. You laugh over what believers worship and ridicule them for what they are unable to grasp. Our clerics do not accept this method for becoming a Christian. They believe according to God's Word that, in order to be part of Christian salvation, a person must let go of arrogance and confess to being a sinner, yes, must be entirely reborn so that you must peddle your invention elsewhere.

Then you turn to miracles and present them delicately – whether correctly, as well? – so as if belief in miracles was limited to Christianity. Laugh, Mr. Strauß, all you want; we believe in miracles because we view the Bible from alpha to omega as God's revealed Word whose correctness and truth precisely does not depend upon whether or not it is a weak human understanding that takes it to be true. The explanation that you give for the miracles is also less than new. It is the most trivial that has ever come from shallow Rationalism. Indeed, the preservation of the world is a daily miracle. Indeed, it is a divine miracle that He still permits mockers of his Word to remain unpunished for their attempts to foment devilish revolt against Him among the people. However, as amazing as this is, precisely in comparison with the known, if still uninvestigated, rules of the reigning natural order, the miracles in the Holy Scriptures turn out to be miracles quite definitely and clearly. They prove that the persons who performed them were not so completely normal men as – God forgive the comparison – you, Mr. Strauß! I will not try to explain to you the deep, holy meaning of these miracle stories to be constructed stories by humans (as you take them to be) but as true events (the significance of the darkness at the death of Christ, the resurrection of Christ, the guiding light of the Wise Men). You cannot understand them so long as God does not give you the grace of understanding necessary for His revelation. You should pray for that understanding for the sake of your salvation! As you say, what is true is that these miracles in terms of their numbers disappear like water drops in the ocean when compared with the daily occurring miracles. However, it is these miracles, performed entirely by our savior, that make it possible for us to understand the essence of our God and the daily occurring miracle of his providential sustaining of the world.

Parenthetically, you speak, then, of Christ's nature. For you, Christ is a normal, obedient human being. This is actually the central issue. We believe that the Christ who said: I and the Father are one; the Christ is God's Son who constitutes the Trinity along with the Father and the Holy Ghost. Woe to him whose reason takes offense over this truth! Woe to him who takes eternal truth to be a fable! – Mr. Strauß, you will surely admit that you, as I, am a sinner. How do you think you will escape your sins? Somehow like him who, sinking in mud, pulls himself out by the hair? You yourself know that that is not possible. Do you believe that some other, normal human being is capable of saving you? Hardly! If Christ is just a normal person, then you have so savior, and what will become of you? ... Your sins remain, and for them is promised eternal damnation! –

Mr. Strauß, what God does with people who only know the law and not Christ's teaching, whether He damns them or gives them grace, that we do not know, and you also do not know! However, we know this, that what God does is done for good and that whoever knows Christ's teaching, but does not believe it, cannot attain eternal life. – You do not believe in retribution after death. We believe in it because we believe in God's justice. Because you don't believe, [my wish is that you] may come sooner rather than later to faith!

According to your explanation, the Bible is a collection of good stories, yet most of them are for children. What has happened to the strength of the Bible by which already millions have endured the suffering and accidents, which life brings to all of us, by which already millions received peace at the hour of death, by which alone thousands of martyrs were strengthened to overcome disgrace, plagues, and painful death? In your hour of death there is no comfort offered. At that point, your reason will abandon you, and the last hour will be bitter. However, Mr. Strauß, when you say at the end of your epistle that you want nothing to do with a people who are a fanatic crowd, who under the guise of piety only defend this-worldly interest and then at once say: "Don't throw pearls before swine,^[2]" that is a way of speaking that even a half-educated person should not allow from himself, particularly over against an entire people. All of Germany has rejected your teaching. Four thousand citizens of our Canton have declared: "Strauß may, and should, not come! None is concerned with worldly things but only with the promotion of religious elements in our schools and life, and – they demand guarantees for them. Now you come with your arrogance and speak to our people in this fashion! Shame on you, Mr. Strauß, and plead to God that he does not treat you as your deeds deserve. You, who still have not constructed a system but only destroyed the sacred, want to speak of pearls. – You can keep your bad jewelry that no one wants so that whoever still wants to doubt you can measure you for the spiritual child that you are.

So much for now! I am incapable of theological investigations as a layperson. Your epistle, which is written from an entirely un-scientific perspective, does not deserve such investigation. I only wanted to give you a public witness with respect to what the people of Zurich think of your teaching and to explain to you freely that you have lost all respect with this epistle. Still, take 1,000 Francs yearly out of our state coffers! Only, stay far away! That way we will not regret this sacrifice.

Zurich, March 20, 1839

One of the 40,000

2. [] Trans. note: Strauß makes no reference to swine in his epistle. The author is speaking metaphorically?!

Henne – Epistle to the Upper Council of the Canton of Zurich From Dr. Anton Henne

St. Gallen, 1839
Printed in th J.Fr. Wartmann'schen Offizin.

Translator's Summary of Henne's Themes

1. God is ubiquitous and present with all peoples.
2. All "[...] believe and trust that the Father has left to them the gift of His authentic and true will and that they cannot be deceived in that belief." "Out of ignorance, the children condemn each other to hell, and stay far away from one another."
3. There are two "gospels or revelations:" nature and history. The latter is God's "[...] covenant that He has made with the peoples of the world [...]" communicated like "parents speak to the child according to its ability to understand" "written in a sequence of books appropriate for the age of their origin."
4. "[...] the people of that time could not endure true food; they need to be raised yet on milk." "[...] [T]he New Testament texts are God's Word but only as He at that time could reveal himself to the Jews and pagans of that day."
5. The Reformation did "[...] well to see that which was non-essential to be modifications according to the times and circumstances. However, you were wrong when you took the written word [...] to be the eternal, unchanging Word of God."
6. "[...] [W]hat is paganism but to take the search for God to be found in what is merely transient, the worship of, and praying to, what is created by human beings?"
7. "Christ proclaimed the living God, who has never come but is always coming. And when they ask you: 'Is He here or there?' you should not believe them!"
8. Academic Freedom: "No branch of research can be lacking at the university as long as it wants to have earned its name [...]"
9. "[...] when [...] [Pietists] condemn others who question, then they step outside of the circle of what is acceptable."
10. Were someone to say that s/he cannot imagine an "authentically, living and complete God-head in Jesus of Nazareth" but that he is "a human being in the sense of the first among all human beings as the divinely desired and created individual

actuality of the *imageo dei* (divine image) in human nature,” “I would elevate Him [Jesus] in my thoughts far above him, [who says such things], who hangs onto the church’s conception or some other concept of Christ’s divinity, and who exclusively for that reason believes himself to be enlightened and blessed [... as possessing] the comfortable feeling of condescension for being among the chosen but by no means living in Christ in Spirit and mind [...]”

The Text

Epistle To the Upper Council of the Canton of Zurich

Honorable Men and Confederates [*Eidgenossen*]!

The events happening in Zurich are so serious that they serve as a mirror of our time to every thoughtful person. The decision of the Governing Council on the 4th entrusts them to history and public judgment. They have become general property and now serve, as the case with all historical facts, as instruction. They are no longer Zurich events; they are Swiss. They are no longer isolated events, but one of the oscillations of the earthquake of our century. You, Honorable Men, will find on the 18th a touchstone of your manhood. You will have to take stock, and it is always good to know how one stands or, even, whether one is even standing.

Here, we have an agitated horde; not agitated by nature, not out of pressure, not by an historical event, but because of clerical arrogance [*Pfaffheit*] and demagoguery. (The agitated horde was around as the region of Basel bled, as in Schwyz the Hornen-regiment exercised wantonly capricious destruction. The horde was around just a few months ago as the masses remained indifferent to the achievement of the rule of law. It showed itself to be fed by pure inventions as at the time of Montebello [cousin of French King Louis Philippe I, diplomat in Switzerland from 1835–1838, bitterly hated by revolutionaries and anarchists], and, religiously as well, the horde was always more practical than pleasant.) Here, we have barbarism rather than strength; intoxication instead of enthusiasm; blustering and tension in place of calm sense. This is not how hurt religious feelings speak.

Those in power, of whom a part was never popular [*volkstümlich*]; who, when it came to the Canton Alliance, were never open and offered nothing fresh in the developments of the day; who under Kummert, instead of being a true banner declaring itself at the front of the national majority, preferred to push the cart from the rear; who above all, when it came to the Swiss question, caused the turn to viciousness; who sadly, rarely stood in solidarity with the Canton’s populous in true, republican

openness and, as a result, in a matter such as the simple occupation of a professorship, some muddled people in her midst and individual demagogues outside her were immediately thrown from their horses. In this case, the victims were the truly upright, solid, manly minority.

However, abroad and at home there is a corrupt driving and churning up of hatred in all the papers that reported nastily with respect to the cause of the people seeking reform and republicanism. Further, there was a spying by the [German] *Allgemeine Zeitung* [newspaper], the paper open for purchase by all interests with the exception of the greatest, humanity, that preferred to take a position with respect to Switzerland like that of the papal nuncio along with the *Ablégeplaze* [?], that absolute opinion of the day, which, as a consequence admittedly, was never dangerous because it was never popular, as the case with the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, as well. The same goes for the so-called *Bundeszeitung* [Confederation Newspaper] that was once a claw but now is incessantly narrow-minded. A flood of pamphlets, that, stirring up dust, sacrifices what is actually such a clear cause rather than to illuminate it for what it is. Yes, as if such struggles ought to contain within them all the puss of the times, the party of darkness consisting of even two converted Jews, as if by command, sound the bell: the friend of truth, Joel Jacobi against the government of Prussia and the pietism of an inflated pastor from our Canton against Hirzel [Mayor of Zurich].

Once more: what kind of *posse comitatus* [*Landsturm*: posse; volunteer militia] is this? What army marches under such a flag? Who are these men whose catchwords are hate and raw violence? Indignation has brought me to label crude things crudely. I couldn't do otherwise, but I want to change my tone and, in the face of the devil, once again speak from the heart, even if it has been slapped or stabbed.

A person originates from God as a creature fashioned for something great, for all eternity, full of strengths, the divine essence, and spirit, a true "image that is like God." In this manner he awakens and doesn't know from where and how. He is surrounded by the eternally changing earth, which is also eternally beautiful that possesses an order according to a wisdom that assures him, as anything perceptible is capable of assuring anyone, that in and behind the perceptible the imperceptible lives, rules, creates, and leads him. He sees the seasons of the year in their fullness and enjoys their different configurations as they truly appear to, and pass before, him. When the sun leaves, he shuts his eyes in sleep; before the sun appears, a voice wakens him, and low-and-behold, the sun reappears. A current of comfort undulates out of his heart in all his arteries. He feels that everything is arranged for luck and joy, and, if he remains awake, worlds like sand on a beach appear immeasurable and a quantity that he sinks down on his knees, longingly stretches out his arms to embrace his homeland, and believes that he hears voices from distant shores where great things await him. There is a God, there is a will, there is a providence, there is a greater plan, and he feels fulfilled. The small plants with their tender and sublime structure call out to him. His heartbeat and the eye confirm it just as with the enigmatic text that are flowers strewn out by the millions over pastures as well as those unmistakable features like the stars

above in their silent spaces. Whoever's courtyard is so wonderful, His house must shine! Whoever's external appearance compels worship and adoration, how sublime, how deep, how great His essence must be! All that is what the eye sees, first. Yet, what ideas of Him and what voice about Him will ring out in the mind! When joy in Him arises like a red sky in the morning – just as when a jolt of pain strikes one like a lightning bolt – how can he not feel the "passing" of the Lord! When he shuts his eyes and also sees in his inward heaven the rising circle of stars, he peers into the depths from which his own soul often looks back as if it brushes the spirit world. Where is the being who says to me: "God does not exist?" Where is a spirit who grasps how He is? Is that not enthusiasm [*Schwärmerei*]? Is that poetry that flows through the arteries of all creation, causes a million voices to cry out, and is felt to be present in every heartbeat and breath of air? Truly, a day calls forth the next, and a night is followed by another. A century strides into the next, and the events of history show the fire pits where He passed by and set up his tent. That is the living, eternal God. Who hasn't felt and believed in Him?

Where is that people on this earth who cannot show the footprints where He has stood? From the Maoris who lay there dead in the earth and make offerings of fruit to the Great Spirit, to the magnificent, hallowed out cliffs of India with their more than 4,000 year-old carved pillars and images – up to the highly sublime temples of the old Nile and the pyramids as well as the light, heavenly-rising column-halls of Greece and Italy in which the fine spirit of a splendid people left its image – where has He not wandered and passed by? Which of His children has He not visited? Which has He cast out? Which has He privileged? When we ask them, they show us the sophisticated, holy books from their ancient times and know of holy rituals and visible festivals in which the ancient world depicted the imperceptible and sought to say the inexpressible. These religions all bring forth tremendous phenomena, personal sacrifices, death for the Fatherland and truth, the magnanimity of the soul in life and death, comfort to the suffering, and hope in passing.

Here we're at the crucial point. All of these children believe and trust that the Father has left to them the gift of His authentic and true will and that they cannot be deceived in that belief. All are equally His children and reflect in their faces his unmistakable image. However, in pride, the Jew but also the Christian separate themselves from the others, point to their books in Hebrew or Greek, and explain in their arrogance: He is solely with us; our scriptures alone are God's Word; He has only visited us; He was never with you. We are God's people. When the others ask: How do you prove the divinity of your book? Jews and Christians answer: miracles prove their divinity. – OK, but how do you prove your miracles? – Answer: the book in which they are written proves them.

Out of ignorance, the children condemn each other to hell, and stay far away from one another. Is that the way things should be? That's nothing that God wants because he has not stopped coming, continues to wander to this day through the world, and

humanity could remove the destructive obstacle if it wished. I state my confession of faith openly. It is well-nigh time that we state so to one another clearly.

God has given us two gospels or revelations. The oldest is creation: nature, unchanging despite its eternal transformation and fluctuation, unfalsifiable because He has written it by His own hand in the truest sense of the word. I am sorry for whoever is unable to read it (it is truly, the most childish and most understandable to be read); he misses the most beautiful and the greatest; he is not yet God's child because such a child understands and should perceive, above all, the eyes and laugh of father and mother; his heart remains cold and his mind barren. Creation is full of wonders, which we will never be able to measure or grasp although the most erudite have tried to do so for thousands of years – and ever-new realms and new gateways open up into new courtyards for the investigator.

The second gospel is history, the revelation in the person, in his inner self, his experiences, or as people say, in the covenant that He has made with the peoples of the world. Now everyone knows that parents speak to the child according to its ability to understand, its age. With a child they speak as a child in childish expressions and images. In this fashion, God has spoken with his children on every island. However, it is God's Word solely in a form that is appropriate for them. Is not the Christmas tree and the laying of the Christ child in the manger not also a parent's word surely meant for the young? For those who are older, it is no longer true, but they, too, remember with affection these childish days. He spoke in this fashion with the peoples of India and Egypt (their wise men, who came from the East, knew for a long time of a coming Messiah, and recognized his star as it shined) and helped them build their temples, which to this day evoke astonishment from the observer. He spoke here, too, but now as an adult with the Patriarchs on the mountain tops of Mesopotamia and Canaan and with Moses on Sinai. I speak now from my innermost soul: all that was God's words, but each time spoken according to the concepts and the mental standpoint in which the Father speaks to children. They are revelations in history; the divine becoming human, appearance of the Word in flesh; the old covenants; testaments.

Bits and pieces of this revelation were written down by individuals in the course of time. The Old Testament of the Israelis provides the apparent confirmation of how God's Word slowly was written in a sequence of books appropriate for the age of their origin. For example, as a divinely enlightened individual so truly anticipated, designed, and saw God in creation and history that he, in the truest sense, spoke with Him spoke, and God took him into Himself, which didn't happen frequently, he wrote in a book this fullness, a prophet of his time, as a saving legacy in order to transmit this divine fullness to others. However, first, no finite human being is able to grasp in words this complete fullness to represent it; (yes, can never place on paper an idea, not even a great one, in the way that the idea completely fills him, – yes, he can only write a word that would be as it came from his own heart and mouth). Second, it was only God as he could reveal Himself in that time, and His revelation is no number or measure. In this manner, Moses presented the God of the Old Testament.

In our age, God revealed Himself in his complete fullness and truth in Jesus Christ, in the new covenant. I hold it to be at this point a sin, given that I am speaking with Christians, to say a single word concerning the divinity of the man or his teaching. I have already done so with my whole heart in the epistle to the people of Zurich, and in the course of my entire life. However, I speak ever so decisively and would sacrifice my life for this conviction: not even here in the God/Man of our age has his complete fullness or his complete essence appeared in a written word. He himself didn't write anything; his primary goal was his work of salvation; text and letters are dead, they're nothing. His church grew, flourished, lived, added saints and martyrs, and spread itself across the world before a single word was written. The Messiah wanted to appear as the Son of David to the Jews (i.e., as Jewish) and did so. He himself explained that only in the course of time did he intend to send his spirit that will teach, at that point, all truth, and the writings appeared without arrangement, hence, in pieces and at different times. The Apostles say this themselves that there are not enough books in the entire world to contain all of what he did and said (i.e., God's entire Word). Further: the people of that time could not endure true food; they still needed to be raised on milk.

I am not going to be smart, as my friends advise me to do and speak out without fear what I am thinking without making any bones about it or retreating. Here I abandon myself to the enthusiastic Pastor Bernet in St. Gallen, the only one who in the Strauß affair has hit the nail on the head,¹ equally childishly impartial, my complete heresy: the New Testament texts are God's Word but only as He at that time could reveal himself to the Jews and pagans of that day. The work of salvation is his entire, divinely nature; but text and letters, language and narrative character is Jewish. That is where I am, as well.

Dr. Strauß (as I understand him – if he is otherwise, God knows) is the man, who takes his research to show how one might distinguish what is Jewish in the New Testament from what is generally human or Christian as do others (it was earlier the case, but I also don't have that from him – Schultheß in Zurich and Fels in St. Gallen don't either), and that is his crime.

Protestant Christians (!), your Reformation removed from the written word all human additions made over time and took the core document to be the foundation of the church. You did well to see that which was non-essential to be modifications according to the times and circumstances. However, you were wrong when you took the written word, as it could and must have been given some 1,800 years ago by tenacious and narrow-believing Jews and in the sensuous fallenness of the Greeks and Romans, to be the eternal, unchanging Word of God. You restricted the Holy Spirit that was promised, and you hindered Jesus' work of salvation to make his coming, his return, impossible. Yes, you are precisely on the way to do what he came to destroy, namely, to establish the merely written word as a new covenant, a new circumcision,

1. "Daß neue Heil und das geschriebene Wort." St. Gallen 1839.

a new Talmud and Koran. For what is paganism but to take the search for God to be found in what is merely transient, the worship of and praying to what is created by human beings? However, "text, mere letters, according to His own Word, is death, and only spirit is life." Christ proclaimed the living God, who has never come but is always coming. "And when they ask you: is He here or there, you should not believe them!"

The Catholics let God be ossified in dead works of faith and dead words. Luther and Zwingli didn't want that, and had they wanted it so, they, too, would have been mere revelations of their time. When Bernet says to me that everything is merely negative, whereas humanity needs a positive church so that the negative and protest must have its limit somewhere, I must ask: when and where does God's coming have an end? When will He be completely here? Don't be concerned about that! Be concerned that Christ is in you, but the living, not the dead Christ! Allow him, the Christ of freedom, full of grace and truth to appear to our depressed people, to whom spirituality was present 1,800 years in the Jewish Christ, and you will stand under his crusader flag. Once again, the protectors of the Word have sinned horribly, and their hour of judgment has struck. The winnowing fork is to separate the wheat from the chaff. The axe is laid to the tree. If you don't do what is yours, it will be done by someone else. Yes, it has already happened, and your guards of Zion have promoted themselves against their own will.

And you, deceived, misled people!, you let yourselves hear that your constitution has been violated. Have you forgotten the time when Roman Catholicism was a mainstay in Zurich, and the city was filled with cloisters and ceremonies?, when Zwingli 1519 stepped forward and illuminated the night?, as new believers you participated in the Federal Diet?, as those of you set out for Rappel, toppled the tattered army at the gates, the reactionaries fleeing proclaimed the return of the old regime, and the people's dangerous movement smoldered? How did things stand with Zurich, how did it stand with its Council in this storm? Was the need not greater?, the situation not more difficult?, the test not more serious? Honorable Men, don't you recognize the role that you play for Switzerland and Europe? Do you want to break your word and, because of a rowdy crowd, be cowardly? Reassure the people that a competent man at the university is teaching dogmatics "according to the Protestant-reformed doctrinal concept" and that the agitators are failing in their real purpose, which is to place the demagogic element above the government and to be able to endanger order and tranquility at any moment. Were that to happen, scientific research, the voice that was given to the university by the Education Council, would be conducted only by the Protestant element. Don't stand there in the face of such decisions, like even the smallest Canton wouldn't, and destroy Zurich's powerful influence on the Swiss confederates! If one doesn't pay careful attention, he can no longer be trusted anymore. Don't let individuals triumph who then in victory go it alone in this struggle! Don't submit to a government majority that with one hand curtly and politely dismisses the movement's Committee while it with the other hand breaks its sworn oath formally and calmly before the whole world in order to do something that is neither tepid nor

hot! You men of Zurich, you see differently than the government. A proclamation from you will be a different voice for the people than what has been heard to this point. You know the people. It honors dignity and character even when it is agitated. Don't erase the one, marvelous achievement that has come to the fore again out of the history of Switzerland! Representatives of the people, don't strike down the people, who have turned back, once again, from confusion and present themselves as true and courageous at your side! When honor is lost, everything is lost! The best words do not whitewash a retreat. This time all of Europe is watching!

If you do all this, what will happen? It would leave the institution of the university to the believers and the direction of research to the current Protestantism. If you don't do this, I grant you, the university would offer positive theology; but without this, theology would be neither Protestant nor scholarly. No branch of research may be lacking at the university, especially in these matters, where the system has long been in place, but so far more suspicious of the holy scriptures than seriously and openly examining them, if the university wants to deserve its name. Luther and Zwingli challenged a church power structure with far deeper rootedness. They destroyed a much more splendid worship service with its engagement of all the senses, they suddenly took away from humanity an entire world of blood and poetry. They risked much more – and on the basis of what authority? – merely on the authority of free investigation in opposition to all that was to that point sacred whereas the present reformation, in contrast, with some things wants to re-vitalize and revere the world of blood and poetry.

Truly, he whose mind is faithfully committed to something remains unoffended. I take the truly believing Catholic or Protestant as well as the so-called Anglican, to be people who deserve respect. Blessed are those who believe! They have retrained their sense of childhood, which so many others have left behind. I have worked with all my strength for a long time, privately and publicly, against the oppression of so-called Pietists because I honor them and take it to be outrageous to infringe on someone's inner conviction. However, when they condemn others who question, then they step outside of the circle of what is acceptable. A believer may feel sorry for someone of less faith. He has advantages over the latter. He dies calmly holding onto the certificate of the Word in his hand. The person of less faith has more difficulty with life and death. He can only depend on God's Word in his heart and in nature; he has to sacrifice, like Abraham, the Isaac of his heart without having it in writing how it will all work out. He must step onto the bridge to the afterlife with a determination that recalls the heroes of ancient times and thereby dare to trust in God and life, I would say. His submission must be greater; his faith deeper and more internal despite the appearance of unbelief. I take such a person to be one filled with Christ. Pastor Bernet, to whom I referred above, says in his sermon on understanding the essence of Christ (St. Gallen, 1839)), where he says on p. 15:

"If someone were to admit to me: 'He absolutely cannot imagine the presence of the authentically, living and complete God-head in Jesus of Nazareth and, therefore, cannot convince himself to believe it; is unable, likewise, to think of the glorified and resurrected Christ in heaven in his particular personage and simultaneously universal, worldly power; especially not, then, when he in the process considers God as Father. Yet, he takes Christ to be a human being in the sense of the first among all human beings as the divinely desired and created individual actuality of the *imageo dei* (divine image) in human nature – Christ's person and essence is for him, nevertheless, or more correctly said, his enduring attention is directed toward the ideal of his Spirit, the joy of his heart, the life of his innermost living. He only began to properly recognize his own humanity after he came to know Christ. His humanity is each day for him preferable, more important, venerable, and sacred for the sake of the human Christ. Yes, Christ became for him above all the God of humanity. Christ's existence made religion credible and faith possible (i.e., made living religiosity necessary). He sees for himself no true salvation except, with his mind, fittingly heartfelt, to live in this Christ, and he knows of nothing in the world able to provide a substitute. He believes that he has come somewhat closer to his self-determination when Christ's Spirit and life also comes alive to a degree in himself, is palpable in and on his own spirit and life, etc.' – Should a person come to me in whom these things are lived not merely in words but in Spirit and in truth, I would elevate him in my thoughts far above him, who hangs onto the church's conception or some other concept of Christ's divinity and exclusively for that reason believes himself to be enlightened and blessed and, as now thousands and thousands do, with the comfortable feeling of condescension for being among the chosen but by no means living in Christ in Spirit and mind and thereby demonstrating in all that he does that it is the fruit of a spiritual union with Christ but only results, as with the former believer, at best in a superficial moral teaching.

I would say to the first believer with cheerful certainty: 'Continue in confidence on your path of simple experience and purely human appreciation of Christ! The more you seek him, the more you will find him. The closer you meet him, the more he will grow in you to immeasurable heights, yes, even to heaven just as the ever-approaching high mountains elevate the hiker.'

Whoever doesn't take a Moses Mendelssohn to be close to God although he remained to the end with the One God of the patriarchs and with Him whom Jesus called his and our Father, he does not possess Christ's Spirit.

Yet here there is no issue of introducing religious pluralism or indifference where, on the contrary, precisely the religious feeling of a person as his inviolable sanctuary is being defended. When in the temple of Christianity, the two confessions have each his own huge side chapel, why should the majority not also enter, who constantly increase in number and who, when they hear the call to repentance, remain on their feet, beat their breast, and are silent, but with the deep feeling of God's omnipresence? Once again: the Jewish savior Jesus has become the savior of the world as the Christian savior under whose flag we want to live and die, just as he came down transfigured from Mt. Tabor and brought a new age. That is his promised second coming.

His peace be with you, honest men; his courage lift you; and the hope in Him to whom he wants to lead us make you strong!

St. Gallen, March 12, 1839.

Dr. Anton Henne

Afterword for the People of St. Gallen

Here is an Oestrich egg [*Straußenei*]. My faith is so that it, without any ground, may be presented [*dargelegt*] to you. Each should take it as I present it. I leave it to free judgment. For Pastor Wirth in Rappertswill, it will just be "sheer invention" [*blauer Dunst*], again. In God's name, I cannot do otherwise. To the St. Gallen citizens who sent me three publications in recent days, for whom my confession of faith generated discomfort, may this serve as an answer to you. Let us bear with one another until we enter into God's glory in whose expectation I calmly and humbly approach death. Pastor Bernet's pamphlet was a direct hit on my heart. However, I believe that we are of one faith and that his Christ should also be mine. We, who want to meet one another on the other side, are not opponents here. I would never be able to shoot him. That he knows.

Meyer – The Value of the Written Word

from M. Meyer, Pastor in Glattfelden

An Answer
to
"The Epistle of Dr. Anton Henne"
to the People of Zurich

[Translator's Note: It is not until the "Postscript" (page 246) that Meyer refers to Henne's "Epistle." He, apparently, wrote the majority of this "Answer" in response to another pamphlet from Henne.]

Translator's Summary of Meyer's Themes

1. Evangelical-Reformed Christians "[...] recognize the written Word, as it has come to us by direction of the Lord, as elevated above all human wisdom and as the decisive authority in matters of faith."
2. Henne takes "[...] our Holy Scriptures [...] to be no more worthy of respect than some human text directed at some finite goal [...]"
3. All human suffering arises "[...] because humanity has been disloyal to God's written Word [...]"
4. "Just try sending to pagans someone with all of the trappings of Straußian scholarship and philosophy, and you will see that the written Word, simply understood by means of faith, has infinitely more value than the empty abstractions of fleeting ideas of a Speculative Idealism."
5. "[...] [M]any teachers in the church and especially in school elevate themselves above the written Word of God and want to conquer it with their own wisdom [...]"
6. Even you, Dr. Henne, could not have come to your watered-down faith "without the written Word that you so scorn."
7. "[...] [Y]ou come out swinging unconcerned whether or not you undermine for thousands their faith in the Holy Scriptures and their authenticity and throw them into a painful fire of doubt from which they cannot possibly save themselves [...]"

8. No question that the gospels are authoritative: "[...] [A]ccording to the unanimous witness of the church Fathers, the four gospels were in general use already in the middle of the second century and that the church already then had eliminated all that was inauthentic or doubtful from the recognized gospels so that we can take as certain that our handwritten scripts are copies of the early, authentic gospels [...] Only ignorant hubris or concealed malevolence can attack the authenticity of the gospel history on the grounds of insufficient hand-written manuscripts."
9. Dr. Strauß presupposes that "What human understanding is incapable of grasping and an educated reason cannot grasp is not true – as well as that everything must be set aside that he is not able to bring into agreement with his way of conceiving things so that he works through the entire life of Jesus and leaves nothing left over of Jesus but empty shadows."
10. "You want us to doubt the written Word of God and, as substitute, give us a living Word of God. Yet, where is this living Word of God to be found except among Christians and, namely, the true Christians whose knowledge has been refined by humble investigation of the written Word, who have received their faith by reading and lived understanding and commitment to this Word?"
11. "You are able to do everything self-sufficiently, you are able to rule the world, you are able to create faith, you possess Titan powers and pile up the crags of your understanding and knowledge on top of one another in order to conquer heaven. For you, pride is a virtue; but humanity is a poor cowardice that you see in the clouds only at a great distance."
12. Ridicules Henne's focus on nature as revelation of divine providence: "May you with your sighs of freedom be conjoined with mild spring air, may you entrust your lamentations to the sublime mountains and cliffs, may a rushing stream of complacency flow out of your heart into your arteries; all that we do not begrudge you in the least. [However,] we need far more for our hearts. We follow on His way to the cross the scorned Son of God and Son of Man. Doing so, His divine love invades our souls; there we find rest for our souls. For we know: the Lord sacrificed Himself for us."
13. We know (!) that the scriptures are God's Word and our reading is God's interpretation: "We know that when we read or hear with reverence the written Word that the Lord Himself is in our midst, that He Himself interprets for us this Word [...]"
14. Bible believers "[...] hear far more eagerly the stories of their loving Father than the stories of charlatans told for money and relate pleasant words as they wish or what occurs to them in the moment. – If you wish to write something, again, concerning the written, divine Word, I advise you: First ask someone who knows this Word, even the most simple farmer [...]"

The Text

Always ready to stand in the front line when it comes to the struggle for freedom, Dr. Henne encounters us here in the field of theology, and we are only sorry that, again, we must experience that a heart committed to every form of human freedom is by far insufficient to be successful in the holy struggle, which he undertakes. His failed attempt is driven by the assumption that the people of the Canton of Zurich, blinded by self-serving pastors and an aristocracy that seeks to oppress, have been misled to declare a war of freedom against the pastors. In the process, he combats the written Word and maintains that "the dead, written Word has always served to oppress the people. With the written Word one has burned at the stake and frequently silenced and killed the most honorable hearts and tongues that risked proclaiming the sunrise of a coming day, etc." He raises the question: "Has the written Word up to this point brought you blessedness or salvation?"^[1]

Every Christian owes him a response, especially evangelical-reformed Christians who indeed recognize the written Word, as it has come to us by direction of the Lord, as elevated above all human wisdom and as the decisive authority in matters of faith. Though before I respond to you, Dr., I must call your attention that what you mean by the written Word is something entirely different from what we mean and that you, apparently, take our Holy Scriptures, which we take to be God's Word, to be no more worthy of respect than some human text directed at some finite goal or other. You say: "with the written Word in the hand, one has alienated the people from emperor and oaths, loosened all holy alliances, and whipped up upheavals, national wars, and civil wars, etc."^[2] Your raising such charges betrays that you know very little of the written Word to which our people hold themselves committed as God's revealed Word. Our people know this Word completely differently. They know that all such sufferings of humanity arise because humanity has been disloyal to God's written Word, that they have placed on the lampstand their own will-o'-the-wisp rising from the swamp of loveless selfishness rather than this light of heavenly revelation and, thereby, thrown the deceived people out into the darkest night. As a Catholic, who bewails the bondage of the Papacy and groans for freedom for the Catholic people, shouldn't you know that the true commitment to the Bible as God's Wort can be, by no means, compared to holding firmly to the human statutes of the Papacy; that, far more, the turning back to God's revealed Word was the first mortal blow to the capricious pretensions of the Papacy? Shouldn't you not know that all zealous devotees to the Papacy, at all times and still today, maintain that the free and true reading and application of biblical teaching is the most dangerous weapon that can be employed against the Papacy and that all those liberal Catholics who encourage the reading of the Bible are viewed by the Papacy as an evil?

1. [1] Trans. note: These quotes do not come from Henne's epistle.

2. [2] Trans. note: This quote does not come from Henne's epistle.

When I answer these questions, when I maintain that the words that the Lord spoke in the written Word of the Old and New Testaments are not dead letters but spirit and life, when I claim: indeed, the Lord has blessed and saved primarily by means of the prescribed Word those who have clung to them truly, I must refuse to tolerate that you place on the same level with our divine Word the repressed Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals and other esteemed human concoctions, or generally other merely profane written words, or our Zurich laws. I claim that, certainly, our written Word in God's hands has been the primary means, already before the Reformation, to sanctify and save from the spirit of bondage all the heretical individuals and groups who have risked reading our Word of God, have proclaimed it, and have led their lives according to it. I claim that Huss and Jerome of Prague under the severe persecution from the Catholic Church primarily found their salvation by means of the enlightenment by, warming of, and enthusiasm for the written Word. I claim that the best readers, those noblest Christians, in your Catholic Church before and after the Reformation were always those who demonstrated themselves in their writings, teachings, and way of life to be humble, true students of the written Word. I further claim that our Reformers were able to achieve an enduring victory over the Papacy only by means of the written Word of God that had lain for many centuries in dust by pulling it into public light and by translating it into the public language of the people. – I believe further that it was just this written Word whom the black slaves in our newest time owe thanks not only for their freedom in an external sense but also, and primarily, for their internal freedom of the spirit. Just try sending to pagans someone with all of the trappings of Straußian scholarship and philosophy, and you will see that the written Word, simply understood by means of faith, has infinitely more value than the empty abstractions of fleeting ideas of a Speculative Idealism.

You ask our people: "Have your pastors, the servants of the written Word raised you in wretchedness, and do they stand at your side?"^[3] I believe that I can claim that all people who believe in a historical and living Christ, can say to you from their hearts: "His Word has become our faith from sunrise to sunset, and His cross is the flag of our freedom" – they will answer: Yes, certainly, the more a pastor is a true servant of the written Word, the more truly he himself is committed to it, the more truly he defends it and needs it for the reason that it was given, to teach, to punish, to improve, and to raise in justice, that the Man of God was sent in perfection in every good work (II Timothy 3:16, 17), all the more he has raised us in wretchedness, all the more he stands with us at our entrance now in this life all the way to the last hour. This is precisely the complaint of the faithful among the people (the unfaithful, indeed, want a teaching that itches their ears and cultivates in them nothing other than always something new to say and to hear) (Acts 16:21) that so many teachers in the church and especially in school elevate themselves above the written Word of God and want to conquer it with their own wisdom instead of learning from, warming to, and being

3. [] Trans. note: This quote does not come from Henne's epistle.

enthusiastic for the written Word in humility as is the case with the rest of the people. You know from many years of experience in joy and flesh that the Word of God, even the written Word of God, can save the soul to the extent that it is adopted in faith (James 1:21).

Now that I have answered your question, I want to ask you something: How can you say: "All of us hold in heart and mind that age in which the Patriarchs communicated with God," etc. – further: "It will grip our soul with overwhelming power when we see later the anticipated, promised one come in his gentle, stern, and true divine manner,"^[4] etc.? From where does such faith come to you? I am assuming that your words are serious and not merely presented to deceive your readers. Do you have such faith from [Carl] Venturinis' *Natural History of the Prophet of Nazareth* [1802], from the writings of Dr. Paulus, or his transfigured Schultheß, or Strauß' *Life of Jesus*? I must seriously doubt that you have come to such faith without the written Word that you so scorn. Here is something to think about: Romans 11:18. "Boast not against the branches. But if thou boast, thou bearest not the root, but the root thee." –

However, I almost want to say that the faith of which you speak in your writings at the very outset is not a living faith as our written Word requires. It is not the living faith on which you base your salvation, or else you at the least must be on mighty shaky ground with this faith. Otherwise, how could you off-handedly maintain in an open call to a faithful Christian people: "The books of the Old and New Testament are honorable remnants of antiquity, treasured resources, but they are not the covenant, they are not the Word of God."^[5] In order to claim this, you are making everything easy for yourself. You pronounce a quick judgment in a few sentences over the origin and development of the Holy Scriptures. You have come to this judgment so quickly, have read here or there, perhaps in a dictionary or acquired from a circle of associates, what other people must research and investigate their entire lives before they venture to give a judgment about such an important matter. However, you are a Dr. and are a zealous man of freedom and, because you are convinced that you mean well, you come out swinging unconcerned whether or not you undermine for thousands their faith in the Holy Scriptures, their authenticity, and throw them into a painful fire of doubt from which they cannot possibly save themselves because they can't check themselves to see if Dr. Henne has spoken the truth or if he only has spoken in the manner of the times of things about which he knows nothing. Unfortunately, the history of the Kingdom of God is so little known on earth, also in our Canton among the educated and uneducated so that many could easily take as valid the counterfeit coins of an educated Dr. Even our Association for Public Education broadcast provisionally such things.

4. □ Trans. note: These quotes do not come from Henne's epistle.

5. □ Trans. note: This quote does not come from Henne's epistle.

How do you know – "that the church was split over 500 years into two camps, with one side, mostly Egyptian, founded by an educated Alexandrian in the first century (i.e., a contemporary of the disciples) who constantly challenged the authenticity of the New Testament writings, namely the history of Jesus?"^[6] – This claim I throw back at you as crassest ignorance or as brazen distortion of the truth. With "educated Alexandrian" you most likely are referring to Philo? However, he was a Jew. You mean by the one camp that questioned the authenticity of the New Testament writings, namely the history of Jesus – probably primarily Clement and Origen the church Fathers of the so-called Alexandrian school born in 183. I can assure you that there are students among us who know more about these church Fathers than you, and I recommend to you that you consult the first, best instructional text of Church history, in order to learn of your crass error. Yet, because you are an educated Dr., because you can consult the writings of the church Fathers in St. Gallen,^[7] so I ask you to take a look in them and to hold in more honor the written Word. Otherwise, I will have to soon believe that you talk about all written word, even our written divine Word, without having read them. – To be sure, it is true that the Alexandrian school applied its scholarship and its philosophical knowledge to Christianity (contrary to those Christians whose gospel and its history was taken to be more external) by placing more worth in solitary contemplativeness, in self-tormenting abstinence with respect to external pleasures of life (especially in contrast to the realistic tendencies that dominated in Asian Minor and Africa as Montanism) to urge a higher, academic version of Christianity. It is true that Origen distinguished between a sensuous and a higher, spiritual understanding of Christianity, but he was far away from calling into question the New Testament and especially the history of Jesus. On the contrary, he said:⁸ "One must believe that there is no point in the Holy Scriptures in which the Wisdom of God is lacking. For He, who had spoken to a human being, 'You should

6. [1] Trans. note: This quote does not come from Henne's epistle.

7. [1] Trans. note: St. Gallen is the location of the oldest library north of the Alps. The library itself has a storied history: that extends from its association with Gallus, companion of Columban, the Irish monk determined to "re-Christianize" Europe after the departure of the Romans, who because of illness remained behind and established a hermitage in what is now St. Gallen, Switzerland, rather than go on to Italy; to Wiborada, the aristocratic woman who had herself walled-into a tiny cell with only an opening for food and a view of the altar of the church of St. Gallen, who after ten years of solitude had a vision of the coming of the Hungarians and warned the Abbott to hide the library, who herself was removed through the ceiling by the Hungarians and martyred for refusing to disclose the monastery's treasures, and who was the first woman to be elevated to sainthood by a pope; to reception of the status of a World Heritage Site by UNESCO for the baroque library that now houses the manuscripts. See Arno Borst, *Mönche am Bodensee 610–1525* (Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke Verlag GmbH & Co., 1978): 83; Peter Ochsenbein and Karl Schmuki, *Sankt Galler Heilige. Handschriften und Drucke aus dem 8. Bis 18. Jahrhundert* (St. Gallen, Verlag am Klosterhof, 1988): 32–35; Johannes Duft and Tibor Missura-Sipos, *Die Ungarn in Sankt Gallen: Mittelalterliche Quellen* (St. Gallen: Kommissionsverlag Leobuchhandlung, 1992): 68–75; Johannes Duft, *Die Stiftsbibliothek Sankt Gallen. Der Barocksaal und seine Putten* (St. Gallen, Verlag Ostschweiz, 1974).].

8. *Philokalia* c.1.51.

not appear before me empty-handed' (Exodus 34) will Himself not say anything empty. The prophets take what they say from His fullness. Therefore, everything wafts out of this fullness, and there is nothing in the prophets, in the law, or the gospel, or the Apostolic letters that does not come from this fullness. The revelation of the divine fullness wafts over those who have eyes to see, ears to hear, and a nose to take in the fragrance that comes from it. However, if you ever in your reading come across a passage where you say that it is a stumbling block and a rock of offence, you should call yourself into question. Don't doubt that this stumbling block contains [Trans.: valuable] thoughts, and it will at times appear to be so, but as it is written: Whoever believes will not have his hopes dashed. Believe first, and you will find much holy benefit among those things that appear to be a vexation."

Could this be an any more diametrically opposed from the way of understanding the scriptures than that by Dr. Strauß? Admittedly, it is true that Origen took to be his highest goal to impart the higher truths to the academically trained capable of understanding them; that he didn't reduce everything to the single goal that we find in Christianity: salvation, rebirth, healing, and blessedness; that the practical goal of improving the heart played for him a more secondary role. He was more interested in the investigation of what God is, what the nature of His only begotten Son was, and in what respect the Son was divine; why He descended and took on human nature, etc. However, he maintained throughout that there must be a connection between what to him was the higher aim of spiritual development and the subordinate aim of improvement of the heart. It is also true that the Alexandrian spiritual school of thought could have resulted in the historical dissipating into merely abstract ideas, but the pious sense of these men protected them from such a false path. Precisely in this we recognize the marvelous leadership of the Lord that He balanced out this great one-sided form of Christianity with the other side so that such one-sidedness very quickly deflated as a Christian sect and, therefore, gradually disappeared.

What you present to the people about Arius and his followers is, again, entirely erroneous because Arius fought over nothing else than the nature and essence of Christ before he appeared on earth. Precisely out of this long-lasting, fruitless conflict, we can recognize how much people can err when they distance themselves from the written Word and with their reason and wisdom want to go beyond the revealed Word.

However, now you wish to show how uncertain the origin as well as the authenticity of our New Testament texts are. You rely on the fact that now in the entirety of Europe no single handwritten manuscript can be found that is older than the fourth century. This reliance I take to be nothing less than plain. When you know this, so must you also know that, according to the unanimous witness of the church Fathers, the four gospels were in general use already in the middle of the second century and that the church already then had eliminated all that was inauthentic or doubtful from the recognized gospels so that we can take as certain that our handwritten scripts are

copies of the early, authentic gospels. You surely also know that nothing questionable was able to be brought forward against the other writings of the New Testament that over time could achieve validity and that the newer and newest investigations and research of academic theologians have successfully defended them. Nonetheless, the primary question is that of the gospels and the history of Jesus that they contain. Only ignorant hubris or concealed malevolence can attack the authenticity of the gospel history on the grounds of insufficient hand-written manuscripts. That is also by no means a dangerous attack that can dispute, successfully, our written Word. Thanks be to God that in our age scholarship has achieved some victory in this respect. If Dr. Strauß wished to undermine the written Word in this fashion, he would not quickly achieve his desired aim. He does not seek the truth without prejudice but establishes for his entire project a condition that must be met, namely: What human understanding is incapable of grasping and an educated reason cannot grasp is not true – as well as that everything must be set aside that he is not able to bring into agreement with his way of conceiving things so that he works through the entire life of Jesus and leaves nothing left over of Jesus but empty shadows. The huge number of those who quickly, audaciously, and with wanton recklessness and, thereby, take themselves to be people of influence affirm everything that they have overheard from the boulevard press and eagerly clap their hands in gleeful agreement when, by driving through the entire field of theology in a steam-roller of arrogance, it can maintain that: I have seen that there's no substance to it [the Jesus history]. The young student, instead of studying fervently and humbly submitting his heart to the written Word to transform the Word in himself into spirit and life, finds it more comfortable to dismiss the entire task and likewise conclude: There is nothing to the historical Jesus. We would rather study and do something that appeals more to us. This is the reason that our people are so concerned and is generally so unhappy over the call of Dr. Strauß. —You, in contrast, recommend this kind of teaching to us. You want us to doubt the written Word of God and, as substitute, give us a living Word of God. Yet, where is this living Word of God to be found except among Christians and, namely, the true Christians whose knowledge has been refined by humble investigation of the written Word, who have received their faith by reading and lived understanding and commitment to this Word? When we ask them, how they came to the living Word of God and by what means the Lord was revealed to them, how he saved and sanctified them; they confess that they came to the correct knowledge of God and their salvation by means of the written Word that that this alone was the right measuring stick by which the spirits will be able to be and must be tested. When we ask the reformers how they liberated us from the oppression of the Papacy and how we can best preserve our freedom; they will answer us unanimously⁹ with the Apostle Paul in I Thessalonians 2:13: "For this cause also we thank God without ceasing, because, when ye received the

9. Not as the Committee of the Association for the Protection of Christian Freedom of Faith in which suddenly two theologians demonstrated that they apparently know only so much of the written

Word of God which ye heard of us, ye received it not as the word of men, but as it is in truth, the Word of God, which effectually worketh also in you that believe.”

When, finally, they cry out to us – “from their most inward soul” –: “Now is the judgment day for the clergy” –; many of our people and above all many pastors will agree with you, but perhaps not in the exact manner as you mean. The judgment occurs, certainly, in all countries and among all peoples, and it is the Lord of the church who calls to us through his Apostle: “Awake thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee light” (Ephesians 5:14) and that means, obviously, that the call goes out to the pastors, first. Certainly, woe to those “who want to relax on the basis of the written Word” –! The written Word must become the Word of spirit and life, and that will require a difficult struggle on the part of many. The Lord demands difficult sacrifices and humiliation and indignities on the part of pastors; so that I believe that I can guarantee that many pastors, especially those who have doggedly opposed the frivolous spirit of the times, that especially those who have defended most faithfully the written und at the same time living Word of God to use it as the sharpest sword of the spirit, that especially such pastors are ready to make the difficult sacrifice as soon as it comes to the point of helping the Fatherland in living faith to experience rebirth and the one freedom that originates from the spirit of the Lord. You [Henne], too, in your efforts to save the Fatherland should remember well: Only where the spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom (II Corinthians 3:17) – and don’t forget – as it is written: See, I place a stumbling block in Zion and a rock of offense, and all who believe in him, will not come to ignominy.

Postscript: occasioned by your [Henne’s] “Epistle to the Upper Council of the Canton of Zurich,” which has just come into my hands, I take the floor [*ich ergreife das Wort*; word play on *das geschriebene Wort* (i.e., the written Word)] once more against you. – For those members of the Upper Council who agree with you from the get-go and for whom you probably were encouraged to stand by them in their hour of need, you may have written well. For such an individual will, indeed, always be pleased to hear beautiful and superficial words concerning God’s revelation in nature and history because one is always able to get into this revelation, to interpret it, and to enjoy it, how it is pleasant and on a fancy calls forth such pleasantries. Such people will forgive this kind of a sermon, no matter how reluctantly they normally hear a sermon because you confirm your true intention immediately afterward: to destroy the revelation of God to be found in His Word. For this revelation, which for everyone who doesn’t read just a dead letter but draws Christ’s life out of it and must look into one’s heart and know the weakness and need for salvation, is for such gentlemen in

Word and Reformation history as the bossy pastors have communicated to their youth; namely Messrs. Furrer und Benz. This Committee gives us the brand-new information about Catholic teaching: “The basis of Catholic teaching is the New Testament according to the literal Word; – in the Word of the New Testament thy find divine truth, and only someone who believes the Word, can be saved according to their conception.” – Such ignorance is surely not worth contradicting.

part foolishness (as with pagans) and an offence (as with the Jews). You are able to do everything self-sufficiently, you are able to rule the world, you are able to create faith, you possess Titan powers and pile up the crags of your understanding and knowledge on top of one another in order to conquer heaven. For you, pride is a virtue; but humanity is a poor cowardice that you see in the clouds only at a great distance.

Other members of the Upper Council who already have experienced in their own the life giving and saving power of God's Word know because of it that it is for them, doubtlessly, an obvious lie and a blasphemous perversion when you say: "The Messiah wanted to appear as the Son of David to the Jew (i.e., as Jewish) and did so. He himself explained that only in the course of time did he intend to send his spirit that will teach, at that point, all truth ...," etc. – These other members of the Upper Council also know that Jesus himself said: Heaven and earth will pass; but my Word will not pass. – They know, indeed, that the lord promised the Holy Spirit to his first disciples, and this promise was fulfilled in the most dramatic manner. – Your [Henne's] pious gestures will bring you little thanks from them because they recognize the evil demon even when he appears dressed as an angel of light. They will be pleased to be able to turn in the last days to the living Word of their risen savior after the sad judgment process in which you must defend in the midst of so-called Christians your Christian faith jaded by your, from Strauß' and his compatriots dead, written Word. I believe that I can guarantee to you that in the next few days we will celebrate in our Canton and our fellow Christians in other Cantons a death- and resurrection-festival unlike anything that has occurred in years. We leave you over the Easter holiday to graze on resurrected nature and in the process to think, feel, and wish that bad weather doesn't rob you of your joy. May you with your sighs of freedom be conjoined with mild spring air, may you entrust your lamentations to the sublime mountains and cliffs, may a rushing stream of complacency flow out of your heart into your arteries; all that we do not begrudge you in the least. [However,] we need far more for our hearts. We follow on His way to the cross the scorned Son of God and Son of Man. Doing so, His divine love invades our souls; there we find rest for our souls. For we know: the Lord sacrificed Himself for us.

We gather at His grave with all those who have been faithful to Him and take from His written Word the joyful news: See, He is not in the grave; for He is risen from the dead. With childish faith we wait until He reveals to us that He lives, until we can cry out with heavenly bliss: My Lord and my God! We know that when we read or hear with reverence the written Word that the Lord Himself is in our midst, that He Himself interprets for us this Word, and that for us it is like the disciples on the way to Emmaus who said to one another: Didn't our hearts burn as He interpreted the scriptures? Our holy communion, shared with all believers in joy, brings new comfort, strength, and heavenly love into our souls, our homes, our communities, and in our entire Fatherland, and we thank the Lord that He heals so many wounds, which you and other so-called men of freedom have smitten on the Fatherland in these days.

However, I would like to advise you, Mr. Dr.: Forget writing to our people in the future! Your so-called thinking believers already know it all as well as much much more than you are able to say, and they quietly smile at Dr. Henne, who still hasn't discarded so many prejudices and who is not yet a radical man of understanding. Nonetheless, Bible believers, whom you wish to indoctrinate, don't believe a single word of what you say. They don't sell their Bible so readily, and they don't need your observations of nature and history. Their Bible gives them far more delectable nourishment of the heart. For example, in the Psalm, where it is said that in the observation of nature one finds one's God and heavenly salvation by experiencing and thinking about nature as God's creation is of far more worth to the Bible believer than beautiful words in which one sees that they exist only to conceal a poisonous snake beneath the flowers. However, if you want the Bible believer to read history and to see God's revelations, you should preferably let them be led by their Bible to God and to search in history the wonderful guidance of their loving, living God. They hear far more eagerly the stories of their loving Father than the stories of charlatans told for money and relate pleasant words as they wish or what occurs to them in the moment. – If you wish to write something, again, concerning the written, divine Word, I advise you: First ask someone who knows this Word, even the most simple farmer, and you will experience that till now you have spoken of the Bible as the blind speak of colors. May the Lord help you to the light!

Kottinger – Doctor Strauß and His Teaching.

A Free Word to the Free Citizens of Zurich
Handwritten Note on Text: Presumably written by Hermann Markus Kottinger
Motto:
Test everything, and take the good
Paul
[I Thessalonians 5:21]
1839
Printed by Fr. Schultheß in Zurich

Translator's Summary of Kottinger's Themes

1. "You want to know what [Strauß'] 'The Life of Jesus' says? I can only answer that the book is not written for you. It is meant for theologians, as Doctor Strauß said himself. Were I to present to you its content, you wouldn't understand me."
2. "[...] [Y]ou should not accept the opinion that its teaching is contrary to religion and morality."
3. "When it comes to those, who say that Strauß does not believe in God, much less the eternal life of the soul: these I call straightaway brazen liars and slanderers [...] For him, Jesus is both savior and head of the church just as the case with all of you."
4. "[...] [W]hen it comes to such an important issue, you should trust no one but your own judgment."
5. "He will steal neither your faith nor anything else from you. This invisible jewel cannot be stolen! If you want to believe in the Trinity, no one is able to force you in your heart to say, 'No!!' Leave to others their faith! 'Love endures all things.'"

The Text

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Part II

Doctor Strauß' Teaching

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Foreword

Dear Fellow Citizens!

In our day much has been said and written about a man who soon is supposed to teach at our university. This is Doctor David Friedrich Strauß with whom you are familiar. He was born in 1807 in Ludwigsburg; his father is a successful salesman in whose house one finds simple morals and religious sensitivity. His mother is a woman of healthy mind and many talents. Strauß attended the schools of Ludwigsburg, Blaubeuren, and Tübingen. In 1830 he was vicar of a cleric and in 1831 administrator for a Professor. At the end of 1831 Strauß went to Berlin, and in March of 1832 he was lecturer in Tübingen until 1833 [*sic.* 1835], when he became assistant rector in Ludwigsburg, which he gave up in 1836 and moved to Stuttgart in order since then to devote himself exclusively to research. The name Strauß, Antistes Füssli says, is known in every hut.” However, he is frequently slandered, feared, and notorious as an unbeliever. Yes, one even says that he believes neither in God, eternal life, nor in Jesus. Is this rumor true? Furthermore, the Education Council, the Governing Council, and even the Ruling Council itself are criticized by many that Strauß has been called to

Zurich. Especially, our highly esteemed Mayor Hirzel has been the focus of the hate by many citizens. In short, there prevails a true outrage in the minds of our people.

Therefore, I've taken it upon myself to write a true account, a well-meaning word to you, dear fellow citizens, in order to show you the true circumstances of this case. I thought to myself: "The man (I mean Doctor Strauß) has so many enemies! No one of our clerics with the exception of a single professor of theology,^[1] dares to defend him. By thousands he is misunderstood and reviled. Why, if you were to present the true witness?" As a result, I wrote this pamphlet. Without darkness and haughtiness, calmly I share with you what appears to me to be the man and his teaching. No, I want to report to you not with semblance but truth. I will articulate solely my own, solid conviction, and I speak only after fully developed reflection. Reflect, then, for yourself, examine everything, and keep what is good.

Let us keep two things in mind:

- 1) -The person Doctor Strauß
- 2) -The teaching of Doctor Strauß.

May my words bring applause from many of you! May mothers and women to whom I especially direct my missive be won for the foreigner.

Part I: The Person Doctor Strauß

1. First Emergence of Dr. Strauß

Doctor David Friedrich Strauß was initially instructor of theology (the knowledge of God) in Tübingen in the state of Württemberg. He had the most talented young men, to be sure, as his students, who were to serve the kingdom of truth. They honored him sincerely and to an unusual degree because of his scholarship and even more because of his fidelity to his profession and untiring engagement. He proclaimed with excitement to them holy truth. His audience clung to his splendid teaching with complete love and devotion. These were beautiful, blessed years. However, shortly they would disappear. A sad period of suffering was about to begin.

1. [1] Trans. note: Ferdinand Hitzig, who was Professor of Old Testament Studies since the University's founding in 1833, supported Strauß. Hitzig was the cousin of one of Strauß' closest friends from the time of his studies in Tübingen, Gustav (von) Binder. Binder gave the eulogy at Strauß' funeral.

2. Persecution of Him

A famous work was published: "The Life of Jesus." The second volume of which was at the press as the storm broke over the audacious man. The government of Württemberg informed him that he could no longer keep his appointment as instructor of theology. He was expelled from the pulpit, was called a dangerous man, and declared to be unfit for any public teaching position. So much for religious freedom in educated Germany!

After the highest officials had issued their judgment of condemnation, authors and fellow members of the academic guild pounced on his work, tore it apart, took out pieces here and there, and rained down lightening on the defenseless man. The public split into opposing sides over him. The vast majority approved his teaching and welcomed it with enormous enthusiasm. Many, however, discarded it without being acquainted with it.

3. Judgment of Him

Let us stop here for a moment! Independent of the question whether or not the book contains truth, everyone must agree that his lot was difficult. Think of a man who had to attend school many years in order to become a clergyman. You can easily calculate how much that would cost. How much mental hassle and effort that required! Finally, the man reached the goal. He has become Doctor of Philosophy (love of wisdom) and instructor of Theology. He was called to the office of teaching theology in Tübingen. The most splendid prospects lay open before him. He had reached the strength and prime of his human age. The highest hopes were calculated for his unusual talents, his comprehensive knowledge, as well as his penetrating perspicacity. Precisely these characteristics of the mind were attacked by his fiercest opponents. He was on his way to the highest state- and church-offices. Then the judgment thunders down: "You are no longer an official instructor, preacher, clergyman; away from your teaching position!" – The path to office and honor is closed forever for him. The scholar lives from his knowledge. Tis pen is his plow. This you all know. A friend warned him against publishing his "Life of Jesus" because it would cost him his office and bread. Strauß answered that he felt himself called and unable to do anything else. Should I lose my position, Strauß said, I will leave it up to God who surely will open other doors for me. Those who shunned and hated him the most took it upon themselves diligently to portray to you this martyr of faith. How heartless! How inhumane! I say to you with God as my witness that I speak the truth: If his enemies encountered him as a beggar, they would have showed him no mercy. All the more fame for our people that they have opened up to him an honorable free state. I say intentionally: "Our people," for we, the people are the ones who called Doctor Strauß to the university. Does not the Ruling Council represent all citizens? The Education- and Governing-Council could well have named and confirmed the appointment! However, if the Ruling Council has

exercised its veto, spoken out its, "No!," naturally, Strauß would nevermore set foot in our university!

4. Strauß in Ludwigsburg

Doctor Strauß was discharged. Many tears were shed by the public and students for the revered and loved instructor! He returned to Ludwigsburg, close to his residence, where he lived in humble silence as a private individual. As his King indulged his pleasure, the righteous citizen bled from the arrows of injustice.

His opponents did nothing to hose down their poison. He, who had already lost office, bread, and public honor must daily witness the appearance of new lampoons. Even in our Canton, a "man of love²" made it his business to collect the voices in Germany against Strauß. A sad piece of work! Yes, some even said that Strauß was lucky to escape. He only lost his appointment! One praised the government for its mercy! Admittedly, it acted with more mercy than the Spanish Inquisition's courts in their day: Doctor Strauß would have been burned at the stake! O Christians, when will you learn to be human!

5. His Lectures Against His Enemies

Doctor Strauß let his enemies rage on. With calm earnestness he responded to their allegations, with gentleness he endured their ridicule, with victorious truth he knocked down their slanders. Precious metal withstands fire. Strauß had to suffer, otherwise Europe couldn't have learned of its noble character. I do not know whether he will ever be a Zwingli, whether he will play a role among us. I only know that he exceeds Martin Luther in one respect. Luther was heavy. Strauß is soft. Luther swamped his opponents with invectives that frequently bordered on vulgarity. Strauß even in the middle of conflict never forgot decency and honor. Luther was, finally, incompatible even with his friends, as for example, with our Zwingli. Strauß, in contrast, ignored much of even his friends' impudence. Strauß listens carefully to his opponents. He is pliable.

To this point, we have viewed our man in the public arena. Let us turn to the household circle in the middle of his private life.

2. Pastor *** in ***.

6. His Private Life

"If you don't believe my words, then look at my works!," so said the one whom we venerate as our religious founder. His Word is the standard by which we should measure our man. In this respect, I challenge all of his enemies to point out any stain in his moral life. You are permitted to do so were you to have the occasion, and mortified I want to be silent. I am a man! Why require a litany of words? Friends and enemies have testified to Doctor Strauß' integrity. Mayor Hirzel spoke openly in the Ruling Council of the same; and it was confirmed by all speakers even those in opposition to him. Antistes Füsli, as well, said that it would be a defamation to question Strauß' moral character. A well-known clergyman from Germany³ visited Doctor Strauß with the intent of converting him. The poor man! His efforts failed as was to be expected. Nonetheless, this very pastor acknowledged: "If one were to visit Doctor Strauß with a dagger in his garment to murder him only to meet this serene, sympathetic face filled with trust and the love of humanity: truly, the dagger would drop from his hand; he would be unable to kill him!"

He lived the years of examination in silent resignation. His demeanor of loving man and friend was never missed by those in his closest circle. Although he had reason enough to be unhappy with the world, he never reflected it among them. The more he was rebuffed, the more he remained true to them. He never lost his faith in providence. He awaited his fate confidently. He had survived the test of the senses and in action and truth confirmed that he is a Christian – Christian in a far more worthy sense than his enemies who in their happiness bravely totter and in days of unhappiness doubt!

To one of these friends, he wrote on February 10th: "I acknowledge completely the magnitude of the task that you and your fellow citizens have trusted to me, and it would frighten me if I weren't able to promise myself strong defenders and good judges. Only I must fear that you overestimate yet the strength of this hand, and I almost must fear that it would be easier for me to contradict the defaming opinion of my enemies than to fulfil the high opinions of those who support me." Against such a person you wish to petition whose humility and scholarship speaks for itself.

7. Conclusion

Such a person must endure this kind of encounter with a part of our citizenry? Granted, he is not present among us. Yet, he will come. He has accepted the appointment. Perhaps he will come shortly. How will you receive him? It is rumored that some congregations would like to organize Canton-wide assemblies against him. One even

3. Krummacher.

hears that his death is desired. Who are these people who contemplate such things? Do they know Strauß? – Read what I have presented of his person; read it again and again, then answer me: has such a man not earned high esteem and love? May all our clerics think so nobly and conduct themselves as he. Our congregations would welcome him. Yes, perhaps we don't deserve such a one. I declare Strauß to be an honest man [*Biedermann*^[4]! Whoever agrees, he will declare openly his support of him in order that the good goal that is at stake is successfully achieved. He has earned his crown!

Part II. Doctor Strauß' Teaching

1. "The Life of Jesus"

You know, dear fellow citizens, that Strauß wrote a book with the title: "The Life of Jesus." This book has generated the greatest uproar since Zwingli's and Luther's writings. All over Europe Strauß' name is famous. In just a few years it has gone through three editions. As expensive as it is (it costs 10 Fl.), it, nonetheless, is eagerly purchased and read. Is that not already a confirmation of its excellence? It has to have been well received, I want to say. It has delighted millions. Otherwise, it would not have been read. Reading a book means: to listen to someone speak. We listen only to that which we like! No! Some also listen to their enemy with the intent to construct a denunciation. One should not give such people one's trust. Yes, it is well known that the truth has many enemies. Further: what publisher would pay 5000 Fl. for a book if it were not a book of great interest? Without interest there would be neither publisher nor reader ... Or would the Bible be so frequently purchased if it contained nothing to satisfy the needs of humanity? – But just what is the content of this book?

2. On the Content of the Book

You want to know what "The Life of Jesus" says? I can only answer that the book is not written for you. It is meant for theologians, as Doctor Strauß said himself. Were I to present to you its content, you wouldn't understand me. It is a book for the classroom. The meaning of the final sentence of the book can be grasped only after one has accepted the many other truths that it contains. In order to benefit from

4. [□] Trans. Note: Four years after the 1839 revolution, the liberals returned to power in Zurich. Ironically, the professor whom they hired in 1850 to fulfil the role that they had hoped for Strauß was Alois Emmanuel Biedermann – an honest man!

reading the book, one must also know ancient languages. Yes, even with all of these conditions having been met, it is still possible to come to a wrong conclusion. Many of our scholars have everything except a healthy common sense. In the case of others, their heart is in the wrong place, or, even more, they have no heart. What should I say to such people?

3. Continuation

A time will come when even the uneducated should and will know the true content of "The Life of Jesus." However, you should not accept the opinion that its teaching is contrary to religion and morality. Someone who says that it does has not understood Strauß or does not want to understand him. Were his work contrary to religion, one would have to mean by religion that there was once a Jupiter, a Hera, a Venus, who could transform people into trees, etc. When it comes to those, who say that Strauß does not believe in God, much less the eternal life of the soul: These persons I call straightaway brazen liars and slanderers. With such claims, these people only want to do Strauß harm and to bring discredit upon him. I, too, have read Doctor Strauß' book seriously from beginning to end, and I assure you by my honor, yes, by God Himself: No one believes more strongly on God and eternal life than the esteemed author of "The Life of Jesus." – "But," I hear you say, "he doesn't believe in Jesus!" If that was the case, would he accept a teaching position in a Christian faculty? Do you trust him to have so little a conscience? Remember the character of this man, whom I described in Part I above! Can one speak of integrity or whatever noble characteristic without a belief in God, eternal life, or high esteem for the prescriptions of our religious founder in agreement with the same in life and ministry? Doctor Strauß explicitly says that he has not attacked faith. His book is concerned only with the stories of the Bible. For him, Jesus is both savior and head of the church just as the case with all of you. Those who know otherwise and call Strauß an atheist should step forward openly with their names in order that one can respond to them.

4. Defamations of Doctor Strauß

Because Strauß' opponents find nothing about his person that they can attack, they turn to his teaching. You already know their charges. Are they worthy of belief? Paul says, "Test everything and take the good!" Those of you who have not read "The Life of Jesus" are incapable of testing or of judging and should be silent! "But the pastors say thus and so?" First, I want to hope that this is not a claim for all pastors. The judgment of a fanatic is not taken by you as biblical truth? My advice is that, when it comes to such an important issue, you should trust no one but your own judgment. One and the same can be said about something from many perspectives. "Test everything!"

5. For What was Doctor Strauß Appointed?

Pay attention, as well, to the goals that were the reason for calling Doctor Strauß. He is not to teach in a particular congregation but at the university. He is called to work with theologians, not the people. He will not be our pastor but our professor. It is enough when he fulfils his duty as professor. The determination of whether or not he does must be left up to the judgment of others! You, my fellow citizens, can calmly perform your tasks. There is order in a state when each citizen performs his calling. Should Strauß educate pastors whom you reject, your right not to accept them remains untouched. Those who claim that Strauß will damage the reputation of the university only demonstrate that they have not read or understood his work or have alternative motives. Should it come to the point that, in the case of Strauß' coming, congregations petition the Governing Council to close the university: then I wouldn't know what to do with the empty buildings except to incarcerate in them those shrill voices from each congregation and put a sign above the entrance, "School of Fools."

6. Will He be a Reformer?

Some of our church institutions need improvement. Otherwise, why is it that the churches are so poorly attended? Among those who do attend, why is there so little participation? Why has the status of the pastors declined? Why have thousands left the state church to join separatist churches? Reforms are necessary, no one can doubt that. For that reason alone, Doctor Strauß is not to be feared, by far. Yes, it would be a true shame, as Antistes Füsli publicly has said, were all pastors to fear one individual. The authorities will prescribe, what the man is permitted to do and not do. His own reason will instruct him. Or did Zwingli in his day reform only on the basis of his personal will? Was he not also called from abroad? We will not allow a religion to be forced upon us? Freedom of religion is guaranteed for us. No matter what may occur, no one will retaliate against us when we act on the basis of Paul's advice: "Test everything and take the good." As long as Strauß lectures in the classroom, we are able to remain calm. He will steal neither your faith nor anything else from you. This invisible jewel cannot be stolen! If you want to believe in the Trinity, no one is able to force you in your heart to say, "No!" Leave to others their faith! "Love endures all things."

7. Who Called Doctor Strauß?

Finally, do not forget what authorities called Doctor Strauß to us. The call occurred, as we have already said, according to your will by the Ruling Council where a significant majority voted for him. The Education Council selected him to be professor, and the Governing Council confirmed the selection. The highest authorities of the land,

therefore, have spoken in favor of him. Does this circumstance have no weight in your eyes? Are not the men who hold these offices highly worthy of your confidence? Over a long time and carefully they deliberated about this step: it can only be to your benefit. These authorities deserve recognition and thanks in this manner: especially, Mayor Hirzel, the untiring promoter of the education system. You ought to be filled with indignation over every step taken against him, who has earned the mayor's crown rather than ridicule.

Conclusion

Do not permit yourselves to be led astray by some impassioned voices! You especially, fellow citizens on the lake shore and in those other communities, swear to yourselves that you will not be awakened by the fearful lion of civil strife! Let Strauß calmly come! Our laws protect his academic freedom. No one has the right to place barriers before him when it comes to the performance of his duties. He offers his talents: to you comes the opportunity to make use of them. Our market of life is available to him. There, where so many theological babblers are allowed to bring their embarrassing wares, it must be allowed that a famous physician of the spirit can make known his secrets for the healing of those in need. May he be the right physician for our religiously sick age! And it is our people who receive him. Germany, educated Germany, has violated its great son: free Zurich has accepted him! You were till now always the protectors of the rights of the citizenry as well as in religious matters. As Ulrich Zwingli 300 years ago was misunderstood and cursed abroad, Zurich opened its doors to him. In return, he gave us eternal fame. Once [Ulrich von] Hutten, the defender of faith and public freedom, was protected by Zurich and the residents of the lake communities on the Ufenau. Arnold of Brescia, the early religious instructor, was concealed under the name "Leemann" for a long time from papal persecution in 1130. It appears that the lake this time wants to leave to another jurisdiction the honor of protecting a great man. May Master Friedrich Strauß follow in the footsteps of the unforgotten and his name ring out like that of Zwingli's hundreds of years ago. To your fame! You owe Strauß free activity, a worthy professional circle, and a secure future. The one pursued till now on all sides will be protected and respected in your midst. Who is not pleased and honored by these thoughts? May you be praised, you free citizens of Zurich! –

May Strauß soon be called fellow citizen among us! Let us stand strong with him just as our highest officials have already done! Test everything and take the good!

Wirth – Epistle to the Author of the Pamphlet: Dr. Strauss and His Teaching

from K.M. Wirth, Lutheran Pastor in Rappersweil
"Doctor Strauss and His Teaching"
and
the Zurich People

Motto:

[...] no one can lay any foundation other
than the one already laid, which is Jesus
Christ."

Paul

[I Cor. 3:11]

Zurich
Print and Publisher von Fr. Schultheß
1839

Translator's Summary of Wirth's Themes

1. Moral Life not enough to be Christian.: "He is far from being a Christian who makes the effort to live morally [...]"
2. Belief in God not enough to be Christian.: "The scriptures say that devils believe in God and tremble."
3. Strauß is not called to be a philosopher of ethics but of faith.: "We respect and honor him and allow him his faith, but he should not teach his faith to our pastors."
4. Not clear whether Strauß' God is the Christian God.: "[...] [I]t is still to be confirmed whether Strauß' God is the Christian God, or the Hegelian God, 'who has not yet reached complete self-consciousness.'"
5. Strauß is not rational – because the people say that he is not.: "Is Strauß' teaching rational? What do you say? In the face of the entire citizenry, I cry out.: "No!"
6. Wirth's antidote to the corruption of Christianity by worldly wisdom is that academic freedom, which "is authentic [and] leads back to faith." "It is now the

task of theology to present the eternal truth, which is objective, as also rational, and the church should form it in everyone for life."

7. Strauß' Christ is a Teacher not a Redeemer.: "No confession of faith sees in Christ only a teacher but a savior who by his holy, sin-free life, by his death and resurrection (do you even understand the latter?) wants to elevate humanity again into life partnership with God."
8. Strauß offers only "worldly wisdom."
9. "Does Strauß teach a special perfect revelation of God in Christ? Does he believe that he is the one who must come, and that we must no longer wait for another? [...] The exact opposite is his teaching, and for that reason he can be a man of wisdom and a scholar, but he is not a teacher of Christian faith!"
10. Strauß does not recognize the "positive faith" of the Protestant church.: " Its foundation is the Holy Scriptures. The standard of its interpretation is not singular, ludicrous capriciousness but the universal mind of the church [...] With the Reformation arose a time of literal reading."
11. Wirth's explicitly Augustinian Christology is "salvation from sin:" "[...] [T]he history of the Christian church [...] is not concerned [...] with a pair of concepts but that it entirely permeates human beings to become a new person, saved from sin [...]"
12. Wirth, too, wishes for reform in the churches.: "If one wants to reform, one should become positive; give the arts a larger place in worship, the congregation more involvement in the liturgy; more deeply engage and depict the Christian faith; make the scriptures, including the historical scriptures (which are mere fables in your opinion) better known; more religiously train the youth and protect them from pedagogical perversities. This is the reformation that is needed, and whoever in the 19th century wishes to introduce some other kind of reformation, he belongs to be placed with others where the sign reads.: 'Apply here for the Madhouse.'"
13. Wirth rejects violence and political subordination.: "Never tread on unlawful paths! [...] A Christian does not turn to weapons when things don't go as he wishes. He is subordinate to all human authority according to the will of God."
14. Wirth defends the university.: "Do not call for the closing of the university! Honest, honorable men, whom you can trust, work there! There are still professors there from whose hands you can accept your pastors [...]"
15. Wirth criticizes the press [fake news].: "The radical press of all the Cantons looks with fury at the events in the Canton of Zurich. They, thereby, demonstrate what the press is. For the press the cry for help of a people whose innermost marrow has been infringed upon is only a blind clamor of clerics. It sees in the commotion only what is corrupt (which often, unfortunately, occurred), but it fails to see the noble foundation. The press shows that, for it, positive Christianity is an institution that no longer belongs in our age. With the leaking of abuses, the press

wants to throw out everything with the exception of a few cheerless notions of a falsely enlightened reason.”

16. "There is nothing in common between Christ and the world.”

The Text

Foreword

Just as the author of the pamphlet "Doctor Strauß and His Teaching.: A Free Word to the Free Citizens of Zurich" felt driven to write in order to portray the true state of affairs surrounding the call of Dr. Strauß, the author of this pamphlet feels induced to write and hopes to report, not like him with his mere make-believe, the truth. The present author, also, will express his own strong convictions. He directs his comments to the author of the text referred to above with clear words.: you promise to speak truthfully but often present what is other than truth. He addresses, also, the people of Zurich to show them that they correctly are enraged and offers them a pathway to show that out of rage can come salvation and blessing.

The following will be investigated:

1. -The Person Dr. Strauß
2. -The Teaching of Dr. Strauß
3. -The Call of Dr. Strauß
4. -The Proper Fight Against Dr. Strauß

So, listen to my words that you may not be blind; O opponent, who provoked me, listen, as well, and if I distort and exaggerate as you, so take me to be just like you. Otherwise, I protest against this honor of comparison with you.

1. The Person Dr. Strauß

This individual has been portrayed, good people, in very different ways. You must learn to know him impartially. I do not want to fight for a good cause with bad weapons.

It is true that this Dr. Strauß is a scholar and an astute man. Abroad in Tübingen, his students loved him because he taught them according to his convictions. To be sure, now one says.: because he proclaimed sacred truth. It is already decided in Zurich that he has found the Philosopher's Stone. However, Dear Opponent, what

do you mean? You certainly have researched the entire depths of truth in order now to say just what the truth is. No one other than Christ said it.: I am the truth! You say.: Dr. Strauß proclaims sacred truth. Yet, we will come back later to this truth. – When Strauß wrote his famous book, he was discharged from Tübingen. However, there was no blood- and heresy-court that damned him. Mr. Opponent, in light of the fact that you have read Strauß from beginning to end, you surely know that he himself said.: "Whoever is of my opinion, he must either elevate his congregation to himself, but, because this will surely fail, he must carefully conform to the manner of thinking of the congregation, or, finally, to the extent that he, also, here inadvertently betrays himself, he must resign from the pastorate." He says further.: "It doesn't help to say, he should step down from the pulpit and, instead, climb to the lectern of the professor's chair, etc., because he whose educational formation required that he reject the pastorate now only has students to educate who are made incapable of being pastors; in this way, the bad would only be turned into worse." This is what Strauß said himself.^[1] He recognizes the right of officials, yes, even their duty, not to let him take a professor's chair, still less the pulpit, and you present him as a martyr!

It is not true that Strauß has suffered persecution. Many publications have appeared against him, but most are purely academic and far from condemnation. Strauß

1. ^[1] Trans. Note.: Wirth is correct, of course, that this is what Strauß wrote. However, Strauß goes on to write already here in the *LJ*: "We have [...] admitted the difficulty with which the critical and speculative views are burthened, with reference to the relation of the clergyman to the church; we have exhibited the collision into which the theologian falls [...] But this collision is not the effect of the curiosity of an individual; it is necessarily introduced by the progress of time and the development of Christian theology; it surprises and masters the individual, without his being able to guard himself from it. Or rather he can do this with slight labor, if he abstain from study and thought, or, if not from these, from freedom of speech and writing. Of such there are already enough in our day [...] But there are also a few, who [...] freely declare what can no longer be concealed—and time will show whether by the one party or the other, the Church, Mankind, and Truth are best served." (*LJ*, 784) Having made clear that he was writing for scholars but had to use the language of his opponents for them to engage his work and cannot be held accountable for the 'excessive curiosity' of untrained lay readers, Strauß says of the relationship of the pastor to the congregation: "When it comes to the relationship of the clergy to the congregation, nowhere did I claim that the mythical view of gospel history should be applied first." *Streitschriften* I: 89 Strauß adds in response to the Tübingen School theologian, Johann Christian Friedrich Steudel, who found Strauß' presentation of the alternatives facing the theologian and the pulpit to be Strauß' acknowledgement of the uselessness of his 'mythic' interpretation for the church and laity: "I have only hinted at how [professional dilemma confronting the 'critic'] has partly already undeniably taken shape, and partly could take shape in the near future. It cannot be denied that this view, if it spreads among theologians and also among educated members of the congregation, will for the time being change nothing essential in the form and content of church preaching; but the clergyman, depending on how he [*sic.*] knows to reconcile it with his conscience, will either adapt himself to the traditional form in such a way that he tries to put into it what he considers to be its true meaning, or he will think of withdrawing from the office of preaching. Of the parishioners, however, those who are still in the old faith, provided they are not incited by sectarians, will be content to hear from the clergy the old faith undiminished. Those who are infected by criticism, however, will either take the clergyman's speech, like himself, only figuratively, or withdraw from public service." *Streitschriften* I: 89–90.

himself must recognize this, and, if one or the other is a little too unruly, it is already chastened enough. Strauß has not earned the martyr's crown. However, this is the case.: You and those of your ken cannot endure that someone fights against Strauß with another, Holy Truth. Even a Neander, whom you admittedly don't know, because he possesses a different Holy Truth, must bow down and pray to the Holy Truth of Ludwigsburg. Aren't you ashamed to call the worthy writings of Tholuk, Harleß, Hofmann, and Zeller in Stäfa (one is able surely to name them) thunderbolts and lampoons against the defenseless one?

The defenseless one! Read again, dear chap, Dr. Strauß' polemics, learn from him about his academic opponents, and ask him for forgiveness that you have called him defenseless! –

Here the martyr stands in line. What he himself acknowledged as correct is what cancelled his theological professorship, but that didn't cost him his livelihood. He was appointed to another position in Ludwigsburg, which he soon left of his own accord. He received a magnificent honorarium from a book dealer. Oh, what a martyrdom! To suffer what an academic loves and over which he is thrilled. He can fight for his point of view because worthy and scholarly theologians with honor and erudition have risen up against him. Do you think, O people, good people, dear "fellow citizens," that the honest citizen has bled from the arrows of the unjust (who are recognized as right)?

Dear Opponent, is that your truth that you are reporting? Woe to Strauß' Holy Truth if it is even close to the truth that you claim to speak!

So much is certain when it comes to the person Dr. Strauß.: He is no martyr. Now as for his character:

It is true that his private life is untouchable. What is not often the case, though, is that with him the error and unfaith does not come from an evil heart but from his erroneous school of thought. He has done nothing externally wrong. However, is every honest and educated man [*Biedermann*^[2]] best to be a professor of theology? "You will know them by their fruits!" You bet! We clearly see Strauß' fruit, and it gives us little reason to trust him. However, listen, great representative of modern education!.: He is far from being a Christian who makes the effort to live morally, a bit more is needed.: a pious, religious sense that lives in and with God and is able to be free by that which makes one truly free. Yet, you [Dear Opponent] can't be satisfied by this. Such words are for the uneducated.

In spite of Strauß' unquestionable and not unbelievable moral worth, we protest against his having been chosen to be professor of theology. We respect and honor him and allow him his faith, but he should not teach his faith to our pastors. You know, he is not called to be professor of ethics but for the teaching of faith. Don't forget, one wanted to make him actually a reformer. However, one needs more than ethics to be

2. [] Trans. note: See footnote 4 in Kottinger, "Doctor Strauß and His Teaching: A Free Word to the Free Citizens of Zurich."

a reformer. For that one needs, among other things, faith, and, indeed, a constructive, not destructive, faith.

2. The teaching of Dr. Strauß

In your little writing, dear Opponent, in the second paragraph, the shining brilliance of holy truth is to be found. I allow myself to examine more closely some of these truths, before I portray, in my way, Dr. Strauß' teaching.

"The Life of Jesus from Strauß," you cry out with enthusiasm, must have found applause among millions! The evidence.: otherwise, it wouldn't be read! Of the million instances (or perhaps half-million because perhaps by twos they acquired it), how many actually read it? Don't you agree that the book will be most adequately read only by theologians and other academics? Indeed, many school teachers have purchased it and – read the Foreword and Conclusion, and a few pleasing hits in the gospels, etc. However, do you believe that of the reflective readers perhaps half were pleased? Those happy ones whose hearts were so quickly opened for the "Holy Truth!" – And still yet a word! The book is already in its third edition. Do you also know that the Life of Jesus from Neander in six weeks already had a second edition published even though the first had 3,000 copies!?

Now, with respect to the book's content that pleased a million readers: Cleverly enough, you don't articulate it. The public doesn't understand it. Oh, the consequence! Here among us, people of your ken for years have preached Strauß' teaching among republicans, now one should be silent about it. Now you merely assure us.: Strauß' believes in God, eternal life, and in Jesus. Now you say merely.: Strauß doesn't touch faith, he explains it. (Here the pen wants to give you due recognition!) For him Jesus is savior and head of the church.

Look, I am no revolutionary. Therefore I only want to respond to what was already challenged by force in many ways. If then you, or a member of your new community of faith, again and again, provoke against it, then, I promise you, literal passages from Strauß' *Life of Jesus* will be printed.

Someone who believes in God is not, for that reason, a Christian. The scriptures say that devils believe in God and tremble. By the way, it is still to be confirmed whether Strauß' God is the Christian God, or the Hegelian God, "who has not yet reached complete self-consciousness." Even someone who believes in eternal life is, therefore, still not a Christian. For that matter, it is doubtful whether Strauß' eternal life is the Christian teaching of eternal life, or the Hegelian.: according to which the individual's spirit returns to the "One Spirit" and disappears like a drop in the sea. Look, Dear Chap, if you praise to the heavens so highly and dearly Strauß' belief in God and eternal life, you must be very skilled in discerning the heart. I am careful not to say more. Perhaps on another occasion I will say more, when I have enough time to expose a few of the tricks performed by such a friend of the people as you. I will

say this, though.: when someone says hay to straw and, thereby, means that his straw is hay, that is deception. Words are cheap, and one can conceal a great deal with words.

Strauß believes in Jesus! Here, Sir – I am not sure whether I can call you Doctor, as well – here you are a subtle man. Yes, he believes in Jesus but not in the way that all the Christian confessions of faith believe in him. Now you are leading the people around by the nose, O viceroy of the Holy Truth. For Catholics, Greeks, and Protestants, Christ is God's son; and no matter how much you laugh that is as rational as Strauß' teaching! Is Strauß' teaching rational? What do you say? In the face of the entire citizenry, I cry out.: "No!" In Strauß' teaching, Christ is no true savior. He is only a teacher. No confession of faith sees in Christ only a teacher but a savior who by his holy, sin-free life, by his death and resurrection (do you even understand the latter?) wants to elevate humanity again into life partnership with God. He not only brought a teaching but also life itself. However, permit me along with the entire Christian church to believe that Strauß' Christ cannot say in truth.: I am the way, the truth, and the life!

Nonetheless, according to your claim, Strauß is concerned in his book only with the stories of the Bible. Apparently, you want to say.: the New Testament. That he rejects everything historical with the exception of a dry skeleton does not concern you. For you, Strauß is no atheist. That's enough! Sir, you are either narrow-minded or malicious if you believe that in order to be a professor of Christian dogmatics it is enough that one is no atheist. So much for the shallow, superficial education of our day. You take as the essence of Christianity a few general concepts that, admittedly, Hottentots and Eskimos also accept. Their god is common sense that only recognizes the everyday. They know nothing of Mind [*Gemüt*] and the deeper grasp of the whole person and his needs. You have slept already for years and, having awoken just a quarter-of-an-hour ago, you have no idea what time it is. You are not sophisticated. You are unaware of the true dispute of the day and the serious wrestling with truth. You grab onto what comes first, the favorable book of frivolous and superficial goings-on of the times, and fall to your knees and cry.: Great is Diana of the Ephesians!^[3]

Whoever turns history into fable and turns the apparitions of ideas into reality, he himself should be capable of holding onto ideas? In other words.: Strauß robs Christianity of every Christian foundation. Christ was probably there, but one knows little of him with certainty. Of the teaching that one finds in the gospels, only the smallest portion was ever said by Him, but, nonetheless, He's the savior! Sir, you are dreaming! What are we left with other than human dreams when the gospels are robbed of their content (i.e., the texts are unhistorical)? If you wished, you could know that the pillar of Protestantism consists in.: the sole authority is the Holy Scriptures. What remains of its foundation when the authority, which is the scriptures, itself becomes fable? One can no longer speak of religion but only of worldly wisdom. This is what you and your companions wish to substitute for Christianity. You can do so

3. ^[1] Trans. note: The idol worshipped 'throughout all Asia' whose temple in Ephesus was finally destroyed as the consequence of Paul's preaching.

for yourselves, but you should most kindly allow us other, simple men to hold onto positive Christianity.

Sassily, you still say.: Strauß doesn't touch faith. Perhaps he doesn't touch your faith, but that's no longer the Christian faith. Had you ever in your life read one of Paul's letters without bias and viewed without "presuppositions" ["*voraussetzungslos*"] the history of the Christian church, you would know that one is not concerned in Christianity with a pair of concepts but that it entirely permeates human beings to become a new person, saved from sin. Yes, it elevates the person to the status of a child of God through Jesus Christ, who has gone out of God in order to bring the world to the Father. You would know that this Jesus not only preached wisdom but also that He revealed God in Himself, that He was in God, that the divine appeared in Him, and that He is truly the Son of the suffering God.

Does Strauß teach a special perfect revelation of God in Christ? Does Strauß believe that he himself is the one who must come, and that we must no longer wait for another? Does he believe that outside of him there is no salvation and that without him no one can come to God? Does he believe that in religious prayers humanity is united for all time in the One and only One, who was completely perfect and above whom no one can go? Answer.: "No!" and again "No!" The exact opposite is his teaching. For that reason he can be a man of wisdom and a scholar, but he is not a teacher of Christian faith! Such teachings may appear now to you as antiquated superstition – but in this ancient teaching there is more. There is also here a wisdom with which this faith is entirely compatible. Were you even once to make the effort to hear a sermon from Professor Schweizer, then you could at least see that such a Christian teaching is compatible with a higher education than you yourself apparently possess. Yet, one cannot see if one does not want to see. Day for bats (who take themselves to be eagles because they can flap their wings) is night because they cannot endure the light of day. It is the same for you and the Christian faith.

Enough of Strauß' teaching for the time being!

3. The Call of Doctor Strauß

You can well imagine what we will say about his call to Zurich. We call it a *coup* that its authors can hardly defend. It is perfectly obvious that it did not occur only on academic grounds. Let's be clear! Among the powerful in our Canton, there has long been a dislike of the church and its faith. It was hated because their pseudo-wisdom on its own wasn't sufficient. What from the seminar in Küßnacht^[4] could have been so beneficial and have had an impact on everything unrelated to religion was, instead,

4. ^[1] Trans. note: The teacher-training seminar under Ignaz Thomas Scherr, whose life-time appointment as director by the Liberal Government was revoked following the 1839 revolution.

entirely poisonous. The teachers' opposition, apparently directed against the pastors, was really against the Christian faith of the people. The false, shallow Enlightenment of the waning century was to be disseminated among the people of Zurich from below.^[5] What was to be begun in many schools was to be completed by future pastors. That was the poorly concealed plan. That is the reason Strauß was called. One wanted to move a reformation a little faster than just by means of the education of the youth; without which some public benefactors [Trans.: a reference to Thomas Scherr, Superintendent of Schools?] would not have been able to achieve the reputation of reformers for posterity. You yourself, Mr. Opponent, still want a reformation. Admittedly, you cannot say exactly how, or you are not permitted to say. Like Zwingli and Luther, Strauß should come and found a protestant-protestant church. Oh, a free, beautiful, bright church where one would celebrate Christmas in Zurich no longer as the birth of Christ but only the spiritual birth of the wisdom of our day; on Easter, no longer the true resurrection of Jesus Christ but only the resurrection of humanity out of the old, blind faith to the new religion of Zurich; on Pentecost no longer the sending of the Holy Spirit to the first Christians but the appearance of the Holy Truth from Ludwigsburg – where every old superstition still remaining from the half-way Reformation from Catholicism would disappear before the new light of the world, and the great, sublime truth would sit on the world throne next to Christ or in place of Him of His throne.^[6]

I won't speak of the laughable arrogance of wanting to dictate from above a Reformation by professors' chairs in the 1830s. There is much that needs improvement but in a very different sense than what you think! You ask.: Why are the churches not well attended? Answer.: because some pastors are neither lively nor excited and pious enough to proclaim Christianity and its gospel! Why have thousands left the state church? Answer.: because frequently Christ and the authentic, old, perfectly healthy Reformation faith is not preached! Or do you seriously believe that, were Strauß to come and our young theologians were to become Straußians, church attendance would increase? The separatists would return to the church? Happier is he who has such comforting dreams! You are truly a lucky fellow!

5. [□] Trans. note.: Ironically, the school of theology/philosophy to which Strauß adhered at the time of the *LJ* was itself anti-Enlightenment and anti-Kantian. See Hegel's "Glauben und Wissen oder die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjektivität in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen als Kantische, Jacobische und Fichtesche Philosophie" in *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie*, F.W.J. Schelling and G.W.F. Hegel, eds., I/1 (1802): GW II: 287–433.

6. [□] Trans note.: Dogmatists frequently assert that teaching contrary to the dogmatist's own teaching consists in 'elevating the philosopher onto the throne of God'. The charge overlooks that there is not a single religious conception from Animism, Polytheism, Henotheism, Monotheism, Pantheism, Dipolar Theism's Pan-en-theism, to Mysticism whether concerned with (a) Personal God, an Immanent Deity, or an ineffable Unity that isn't grounded in anthropomorphic analogies. Immanuel Kant offers the one exception for whom the anthropomorphic analogy is not taken to be literal. He acknowledges that it is impossible to avoid anthropomorphism but insists on 'figurative' anthropomorphism because of the limits to reason.

If one wants to reform, one should become positive; give the arts a larger place in worship, the congregation more involvement in the liturgy; more deeply engage and depict the Christian faith; make the scriptures, including the historical scriptures (which are mere fables in your opinion) better known; more religiously train the youth and protect them from pedagogical perversities. This is the reformation that is needed, and whoever in the 19th century wishes to introduce some other kind of reformation, he belongs to be placed with others where the sign reads.: "Apply here for the Madhouse."

You ask in order to protect your great reformation, whether or not Zwingli reformed in his day on his own? Was he not also called from abroad? Here your understanding drives me crazy – please, forgive me! Zwingli and all the other Reformers did not reform out of themselves and also not because a mayor with 98 Canton Councilmen commanded it but because the people demanded it. The Reformers were only the agents of an omnipresent movement that had been in preparation for centuries. Yet, to people like you, all history is myth. The account of a people trembling and wrestling with faith and salvation is for you without question only a glorification of the Reformation in retrospect. In other words.: the Mayor and Councils of Zurich only wanted to free themselves from the yoke of Rome.

The call of Strauß was a *coup* that for the time being has been prevented by the uproar of the people at least with respect to the primary goal of reformation.

One could say a lot more about this call. One could unpack the speeches in the Upper Council; could demonstrate more thoroughly the striking differences between Protestant teaching and Strauß' that would be violated by his call to church and state. However, we must stop here after adding the following.: You Sir, who tests everything and only takes the good, have the opinion that a true Pope [the people], who is opposed to the calling of Strauß, has either not read his work, not understood it, or has only alternative motives. The author of these lines has read it more than you have recognized; whether or not he has understood it – –?, at least he is permitted to believe that, when it comes to ancient and contemporary theological and philosophical education, he is as familiar as you and people of your ken, who, despite all merely apparent wisdom stands at least with one foot in earlier centuries. He rejects any hint of ulterior motives, whether or not you believe it. However, do you know that he is a coward, who doesn't dare to speak his mind? If he were to fear a radical inquisitional trial, he would have earned even your contempt.

I am finished with you for the time being. Should you wish, call – I will answer.

4. The Proper Fight Against Dr. Strauß

Now at the end, a short word directed to the dear fellow citizens of the Canton of Zurich!

You have spoken out against the call of Dr. Strauß with an overwhelming majority and made it perfectly clear to your leaders.: We want to keep our faith and will not permit that our future pastors proclaim the gospel filled with doubts instead of certainty. It is good that you have spoken so clearly and loudly. Now, because you can well believe that I wish to hold on to Christ and his Holy Scriptures as irrevocable truth, listen to my well-intended words. Never tread on unlawful paths! Send petitions to the Upper Council as often as you wish; demand the removal of Dr. Strauß calmly and sternly! Should that not be enough – adhere to the decisions of the constitutional authorities. A Christian does not turn to weapons when things don't go as he wishes. He is subordinate to all human authority according to the will of God. Therefore, no insurrection, no rebellion, should Strauß come!

Do not call for the closing of the university! Honest, honorable men, whom you can trust, work there! There are still professors there from whose hands you can accept your pastors; and it is good when your sons can obtain their education in the Fatherland and not have to go abroad. The university is worthy for a free people! If you topple it, you will rob yourselves of the possibility that ever more truth, Christian light, and true, Christian scholarship will be disseminated among you. The cost is not as great as many believe. You must have an institution, though, in which pastors can be trained and another for physicians. Have nothing to do with destruction! Build!

Should in the end Strauß come, there will be other measures that you can take to protect all that you take to be valuable and sacred.

Above all, demand of the Upper Council that it reform the schools; that you be guaranteed that your teachers obtain a religious education. However, even here you should not be destructive but, rather, improve that which is erroneous. The new educational system has accomplished a lot that is good. Is it not good and redeeming that you have capable, well-educated young men in all the congregations? One needs more education these days than earlier otherwise one falls behind. Nonetheless, religious inclination is truly the foundation for everything. Hence, demand another frame of mind in the seminar, and, if not, create another. It will quickly be superior to the old and will be established as the Canton seminar.

Brothers, don't let solemn, good time pass without winning enduring blessedness by means of it! Agree among yourselves, furthermore, that another professor of theology can be called in the case that your desire be unfulfilled that Strauß not come. There are many who measure up to Strauß who not only are sagacious but also have a solidly grounded and joyful faith. Such a person can defend successfully the proper, Holy Truth and our church by means of faithful servants whom he will educate to lead to an ever more beautiful and effective life that you all and your descendants can continue to insist on the one foundation, which has been laid, Jesus Christ.

Above all, demand that a synod be elected in which, in addition to pastors (as the natural and scholarly representatives of the church) also lay persons have a place and a vote. If only from every congregation one or two church-minded, Christian men united with pastors were to confer with respect to the most important affairs of

faith and church, then you will be secure in front of this violent destruction; however, the guarantee will also be given that the church, without diverging from the eternal, unchanging faith, achieve timely progress in liturgy, teaching, and discipline. Then, no longer will a profane hand undertake any action that the combined will of the people decisively would deplore. Only so will the church of a free people stand secure and be able to progress by means of a true association with a rational and Christian government.

One frequently has charged pastors that they don't want any progress. In many respects that is true because with respect to most things no progress is possible because faith is unchanging.: "Jesus Christ, yesterday and today, the same for all eternity;" and his teaching is not His but the teaching of Him, who sent Him. God's teaching cannot be revised. In the cultus, in liturgy and catechism, one is able to, and will, move forward; but only if properly understood, in the correct sense of forward. Such is better achieved by a mixed synod.

In this manner, fight for eternal truth but in a Christian manner. Overcome the un-Christian world with weapons of the Spirit.

Conclusion

[Trans.: On the Untrustworthiness of the Press]

I have yet a great deal to say! One could write an entire book about the events of recent days. A hundred hearts have been exposed – there will be yet more. The radical press of all the Cantons looks with fury at the events in the Canton of Zurich. They, thereby, demonstrate what the press is. For the press the cry for help of a people whose innermost marrow has been infringed upon is only a blind clamor of clerics. It sees in the commotion only what is corrupt (which often, unfortunately, occurred), but it fails to see the noble foundation. The press shows that, for it, positive Christianity is an institution that no longer belongs in our age. With the leaking of abuses, the press wants to throw out everything with the exception of a few cheerless notions of a falsely enlightened reason. In much that has occurred, the dominance of the flesh is clear that doesn't want to acknowledge anything of a spirit higher than merely the human spirit. The lazy stain of today's modern education is truly clear to all, which clothes humanity in tattered rags, and pleased with them, smugly cries out.: Here is Christ, the true Christ! Others, above all the editor of the St. Gallen newspaper, wants to accept what is comfortable; but God's written Word they no longer need. They want only a living Word (that is, a Christianity generated by scholars and cravings of the noble on the basis of the spirit of our age) without considering that the written Word still can and should be living in every Christian soul, which in turn can create a comprehensive life

of the church. However, what is most sad is that countless persons no longer recognize sin because of delusion, pseudo-education, or Jewish self-righteousness, and they have no need of a savior. The consequence is especially the flattening of Christianity into mere ethics, and thus is proven the deeper wisdom of the Apostle's words [I Corinthians 1:23]: "The gospel of Jesus Christ is a stumbling block to the Jews (the self-righteous) and foolishness to the Gentiles (the educated)." With such there can be no reconciliation. There is nothing in common between Christ and the world. Here, no Strauß can help. The church is not able and may not abandon its positive faith – even the Protestant church can't. Even it is positive! Its foundation is the Holy Scriptures. The standard of its interpretation is not singular, ludicrous capriciousness but the universal mind of the church. Strauß does not come out of this church. He is a representative of modern education that has come into conflict with piety. The common mind of the church is entirely different. With the Reformation arose a time of literal reading of the Bible. New life was stirred, but it was only one-sided. With common sense but not with the complete, full, human being, one engaged the written Word and the documents of religion, which is not merely understanding but inner life. For that reason, the Reformation had to be transformed. In recent decades, a fresh spirit of faith and scholarship has blown through the church. However, it doesn't want to tear down, and Strauß, who is only a man of scholarship, and one-sided scholarship at that, is not part of this wind that builds up. It is now the task of theology to present the eternal truth, which is objective, as also rational, and the church should form it in everyone for life. – This remains certain: If it wants to remain Christian, theology can never surpass Christ as the Son of the living God. That means to say: as He in whom God Himself is completely revealed and manifested to humanity eternally. Church powers and constitutions may want to change it and reform the liturgical service of God, but "the Word you should let stand!" Scholarship is free; when it is authentic, it leads back to faith. This doesn't claim that Zurich should fight over everything in its midst. One could have remained silent, even been able to believe the honest and calm ones in the country whom one wished. However, then one would have had to talk differently in the Upper Council! Conceal it as one now might: the intention was a reformation.

Christ once said.: I did not come to bring freedom but the sword. That is clear today. For that reason, one does not fear the fight. Yet, instead of earthly weapons, one wields the sword of the spirit!

There is a whiff of spring blowing new life into the church of our country. May it bring forth blossoms and fruit! May what is noble not be destroyed by undulating crowds. May the pastors not stir up unlawful actions but preach Christ, the crucified and resurrected in spite of republican and all enemies of free speech and all superficial and half-educated screamers! Easter is near! We all want to celebrate the truthful resurrection festival of Christ, for only each individual can truthfully celebrate that One, the Christ!

Enough for now! The author of these words is armed for the fight and will speak next time, if it is necessary, even more clearly. "Let us not deny the Lord; soon the rooster will crow!"

Scherr – A Free and Instructive Epistle

by the
Superintendent of Schools in Zurich, Scherr
to the
XXII Members
Of the So-called Committee of Faith

Recommended for consideration on the part of all good Christians from a
friend of truth, especially shared from the pedagogical perspective

1839

Translator's Summary of Scherr's Themes

1. Too little attention to religious instruction in the public schools. Real issue: not lack but kind of religious instruction
2. Call for a closer relationship between the schools and religion
3. The amount of time for religious instruction in primary schools ought to be clearly set
4. Call for an instructional book designed to plant deeply the central truths of faith in the hearts of students: the Ten Commandments, Apostles Creed, and Lord's Prayer
5. The Church council is naturally concerned about the religious instruction materials
6. A call for the dismissal of the superintendent of schools (Scherr)
7. If Scherr has engaged in malfeasance, he should pay the price
8. The superintendent of schools possesses an exaggerated power outside of the Education Seminar
9. The director of the Education Seminar should not be a member of the Board of Education
10. More time should be devoted to religious instruction in the Education Seminar for preparing of teachers to teach religion

11. The main allegation: Scherr voted for the calling of Dr. Strauß
12. A call for a public, church synod consisting of freely elected representatives
13. A third of the Board of Education should be chosen by the church synod
14. A two-name shortlist for the religious instructor in each school should be established
15. Zurich is paying disproportionately for the Canton university
16. 40,000 by their universal acceptance of the Committee of Faith's petition oppose the appointment of Strauß and Scherr
17. The Committee of Faith charges Scherr of arrogance, claiming unlimited authority, doubts his religious convictions, and that he acts aggressively
18. The Committee of Faith calls into question the newly established prestige of the teaching profession
19. Misrepresentation of the teaching staff at the university. There is more than one professor on the theological faculty: "One never said that in Zurich there is a pious believer and humble Professor Ludwig Hirzel and an intellectually stimulating Ulrich, and further an Alexander Schweizer, a Hitzig, and even – oh, for those who doubt about piety!! -instructors such as Pastors Schinz, Zimmermann, including one of your special choice, the even so well-educated as active Pastor Usteri, all involved in the training of young pastors. It is a true disparagement of these men that one doubts that so a Schwabian Strauß would not be quickly driven back by them into the desert of unbelief."
20. On questioning Scherr's religious convictions: "Who gives to you the right to elevate yourselves to judge matters of faith? What do you know of my faith? Who among you is capable of examining my thoughts? You don't need to place yourselves between me and my God – I don't need such middlemen for the salvation of my soul. This attempt at heresy-hunting fills me with outrage."

The Text

Epistle

by the Superintendent of Schools in Zurich to the XXII Members
of the So-called Committee of Faith

Gentlemen!

You have delivered a judgment to the entire religious community of the Canton concerning the spirit of the new public education system, about the schools, and about my point of view and objectives. I am exercising the right to respond in kind in that, hereby, I state openly to the world my judgment concerning your actions and statements primarily with respect to those expressed points that fall within the purview of my responsibilities. I do this now in the very moment in which you're

enjoying, unpunished, the glory of grandeur; for it appears to me unworthy to wait to undertake procedures against you when the dishonest flood that you have invoked comes back to clobber you although it won't be able to wash off the stains by which you so unfortunately have been tainted.

You charge the new public-school system with giving too little attention to religious instruction. Empty declamations for and against such things do not lead us to truth. I take up the struggle with you on the field of impartial examination and strict investigation. Thereby, I publicly recommend to you: 1) Let us examine, on the one hand, the required religious curriculum of the new educational system and, on the other hand, the religious curriculum of the old system. Select, then, a commission of pedagogues and pastors from other Cantons, who can decide whether the earlier pedagogical materials are better and more effective or whether the new instructional materials don't conform to the spirit of Protestant teaching. 2) Let us allow this commission to implement the old and the new curriculums by instructors trained for each curriculum respectively. 3) Let us examine the pedagogical sequence of the new curriculum, the distribution of content across the school year, and, then, look carefully at the structure and sequence that dominated in the old system. The commission should then decide between you and me.

Gentlemen, this is my suggestion! I am certain of the outcome. If you desire to call yourselves sincere Christians, you will be left in the end with no other choice but to confess the injustice that you have done to the new public-school system. – Yes, I was able to experience the old school system with its religious orientation that one laudably elevates over today's. I saw how eight- and nine-year-olds spelled out for the instructor and aired dogmatic question that are barely understood by the higher-educated. Do you call this the sowing of religious seeds? – I heard how the older students without exception had no choice over what was to be read in the New Testament: concerning the adulteress, in Paul's letters of prostitution and unnatural lust, and in the Book of Revelations concerning the great Babylonian prostitute. I've seen how two days a week were devoted to memorization of un-understandable passages without a word of explanation from the teacher. This is the sin against the Holy Spirit that was promoted by the followers of the Reformation and tolerated for three hundred years. Listen to what a pastor of the Canton of Bern, a true servant of Christ, said about this form of religious instruction: "Those were the good old days when one learned religion in school and only religion, and when one for the sake of religion didn't know what religions was; when one couldn't see the forest because of the trees; when one embalmed children with catechism and the rod as long as they were in school, convinced that the devil could not gain control over them outside of school, regardless of what they were planning and doing! Yes, that's right! That was a blessed time when adults caned with the rod, the school principal greeted students with the rod, when one had witches rather than angels, when one was terrified of ghosts in the night and had ten times more respect for the devil than for God before whom one either quavered oneself or made others quiver." – (*Baurenspiegel*.)

I now turn to some points from your epistle. You demand "that there be a closer relationship between the schools and religion" (p. 4). How! You dare to generate suspicion among the people of Zurich as if now the schools currently had no religion? – Is that possible? Nonetheless, most of the members of your Committee know that in the public schools we are required by law to use the following as instructional materials: a) a booklet of biblical sayings, b) a booklet of religious songs, c) a school songbook of church music, d) and the New Testament. You know that presently schoolteachers receive special training in the practical skills of religious instruction – in how to catechize. You know that the teachers have printed instructions for the religious pedagogical materials prepared by a Zurich pastor under guidance of the Board of Education! –

My Dear XXIIs, you talk as if there was a complete separation between church and state, and, yet, you know that §1 of the law for public schools identifies the pastor as the chief of the school board; that §1 of the law for the district school system establishes two pastors for this role at the district level; that currently almost only pastors are among the leadership of the district school boards and the secondary school boards. Or can it be that some of you are unaware of that? To be sure, it is possible that there is confusion among some of you. However, most of you know this, and those of you who do know have acted contrary to your knowledge und conscience, which is improper for someone who presents himself as defenders of the Christian religion.

Nonetheless, the petition that you have submitted to the people states what you demand to be the relationship between the church and the schools. You propose to make the free school, once again, a school of slaves. This is your demand. The great incivility and arrogance that the Board of Education has suffered under from some pastors has increased the eagerness for control over it, and what was a convenient pretext, you have turned it into a swift offensive. Oh, don't believe that the people will persist long in such infatuation! The free public schools have accomplished more in eight years than the schools accomplished in three hundred years shackled by the oppression of the church. You might be victorious for a moment. With extremely rare exceptions in this time of hard testing, the Zurich teachers have demonstrated themselves as tremendous, noble, and strong. The parents won't permit them to be stolen from them, and these teachers will not allow themselves to be subjugated.

Perhaps as victors, you yourselves will turn back the clock to when a man, powerful out of respect and trust in terms of his status among teachers, with a strong hand was able here and there to prevent errors of judgment and to nip evils in the bud.

"The amount of time for religious instruction in primary schools ought, also, to be clearly set;" is your demand on page 5 of your epistle. What problem do you wish to solve by egging on the people with such unclear, thoroughly unfounded, demands? Isn't it already determined in the existing regulations and laws: The elementary schools are to have religious instruction 3 hours per week; middle schools 2 hours per week; review students 1 hour per week; religious tutoring 2 hours per week in

a half-year. Is this not a clear determination of time? Actually, you want the church congregations to petition for more time to be devoted to religious instruction. Tell me, though, how long did it take the Lord to convert a thief to Christianity? How long did it take the Apostles to convert a whole community? How long for those pious men of Ireland to convert entire ethnic groups to Christianity?

Is a ten-year education with at least 600 hours of instruction not enough to enliven hearts with Protestant teaching? Such an expectation clearly contradicts the message of our Lord. It constitutes an antagonism against the proliferation of Christianity. Precisely this endless gobbledygook destroys the religious, emotional atmosphere. This thousand-fold repetition dulls attention. This incessant duplication leads to pharisaic mouthing that flares up holy zeal against Christ.

You demand: "Necessary is an instructional book designed to plant the central truths of faith deeply in the hearts of students, namely, the three primary elements of our faith: the Ten Commandments,^[1] the Apostles Creed,^[2] and the Holy Lord's Prayer^[3]!" – (p. 5)

Tell me, now: Where do we find central claims of religious faith? Hopefully, in the Bible! And yet, from the Bible we have, prepared by a Zurich pastor, a collection of biblical sayings that contains primary religious truths – required to be used in our schools –, and we've placed in the hands of the teachers an extensive, printed handbook for this purpose. Out of the Bible we also have a collection of historical truths for obligatory instruction along with a handbook – in this case, too, written by a pastor. Do you really not know this?! – In this respect, you deserve in the eyes of the people a sharp blow of the rod. Listen, Mr. President and Protestant XXII! You are trying to convince the people that the Holy Lord's Prayer and the Ten Commandments are not in our curriculum. Yes, that's what you're doing! And you know that the Holy Lord's Prayer is printed in italics in our obligatory instruction materials and in the obligatory collection of biblical stories, that is, it is found twice in our school materials. – You know that the Ten Commandments are present in their entirety in our curriculum. Why didn't the Educational Committee include the Apostles Creed in the curriculum? For the reason that this confession should be taken only once the confirmees have an understanding concerning, and a conviction regarding it and that the instruction in confession no longer belongs in school but in the church. Are not the pastors themselves in their church synod agreed on this point!! – However, you want a religious instruction of things that won't be understood. How? You could promote a Jewish, mere mouthing of words, against which Christ himself protested;

1. [1] Translator's note: Scherr doesn't ask which set (Exodus 20 or Exodus 34).

2. [2] Translator's note: The so-called 'Apostles' Creed' is not in the Second Testament. It emerged in Rome in the anti-Gnosticism movement around 150 CE.

3. [3] Translator's note: There is more than one version of the prayer in the gospels (Matthew 8:9–13 and Luke 11:2–4).

or you could promote an empty blind faith. No, I don't really believe that you want either!

"That the Church council has raised its voice about the religious instruction materials is natural;" so you say on p. 5 of your epistle.

I ask: Who created the religious instruction materials? Answer: Zurich pastors including members of the Church Council, for example, a Salomon Vögeli. Who checked over the religious instruction materials? Answer: Commissions of clergy members of the Church Council and the Board of Education. – Hence, in fact, the Church Council has already voted on the religious instruction materials. – Cross your heart and ask your conscience: How could you spread the notion in the congregations that the Holy Lord's Prayer and the Holy Ten Commandments are no longer being taught in the schools and that the Church Council has had no voice when it comes to the religious curriculum? Truly, truly, something far worse is going on here than merely ignorance and error!

"However (so it is stated on page 5 of the epistle), the cry has been raised all over the country that the present superintendent of schools should be dismissed from his position." –

Actually, I've heard this call echo through my own apartment. When you wish to say with the claim "all over the country" something other than that certain people and the papers of their party have carried this cry through the entire country, then you are claiming an untruth as a vote in the congregations would confirm. You are speaking, My Dear XXII!, of an earlier, particular aversion to the superintendent of schools. I wish to more carefully describe this to you. Look, I was actually called to my position to serve as the driving force to achieve a thorough transformation of the school system according to the laws of the land. In this respect, for me, office and duty stood above everything else. When I learned that the construction of a school was being hindered by the influence of the thievery of a village official, I undertook everything in my power to remove the hindrances, and when the struggle didn't end in official action, I didn't hesitate to pursue the issue publicly. When I learned that, in this or that community, crude, unconscionable parents wanted to prevent their children from going to school, I pressed for punishment of truancy. When I saw in the course of my inspections that self-interestedness consumed the youth's energy, I raised my voice publicly to protect the suffering children. When I learned that a president of the school board fulfilled none of the obligations of his office and duty, I charged him officially and publicly. – These actions, Gentlemen, are the source of the special aversion, and, in fact, in many places these particular events have been generalized as a complaint. Such is entirely natural. You know yourselves that at the moment those people for whom education and religiosity are foreign to one another are the people screaming the loudest and are the actual, leading voices of the movement. These people with whom you yourselves would be ashamed to be associated now cry out with vehement zeal: "Scherr must go!" and the great masses have joined in. The best example in

this respect you can see in Küsnach⁴ itself. In this church congregation they have not only cried out in the general assembly: "Scherr must go!" – but also on the select committee 9 out of 12 have voted in this way. Do you want to know why!? Those in the church who screamed the loudest were elected to the committee. There were tradesmen who earlier had worked for me whom I had fired because I believed that they were asking too much money for their work. There were neighbors who were angry with me because I, as user of a shared well, claimed access, which they illegally tried to prohibit. There were cooks who hated me because I fulfilled my duty as director. – You see, Gentlemen, these are some of the so-called religious reasons over whose outcome many pastors are pleased. To these results belong also the coarsest, most cowardly nighttime knavery and shameful defamations meant to damage the reputation of most trusted servants. Already, many are ashamed over this cowardly crudeness and childish knavery, and their voices are slowly gaining influence. The time will come when the tables are turned, and then, Gentlemen!, the dark nakedness of your cause will ignominiously hang over many communities. – See, that is what you call now a general aversion, and you won't dare to deny that in every village there is a significant number of men who are filled with indignation over this wild screaming. Who are these men? Doubtless those whose voices have great influence. – If you exclude this large number of educated, noble-minded men, I will gladly put up with you saying of me: "This man has lost the confidence of the people." Office and duty are placed by me incessantly higher than the praise of the uneducated, the selfish, and the power greedy. I will never demean myself just to vie for the praise of the masses; even less, bring offerings of any kind to these tin gods out of conviction or duty.

However, now I come to a point in your epistle that completely justifies a more tough tone and the formulations of a disgusted temper. You say with respect to my person: "If he himself should have engaged in actual malfeasance, he should have to pay the price." (p. 5) What are you doing here? You are spreading among the populous a universal suspicion of the likelihood of malfeasance. You aren't at all ashamed to let this suspicion be read before the entire Christian congregation in the church. The whole affair constitutes a shameful blot on your undertakings. I continue to do what I have always done: I challenge you upon your honor to openly and in detail to back up your suspicions with facts. – It appears that your conscience with respect to these matters is shifting because you seek to redress me by acknowledging "partial merit." In that respect, I say: Seriously, it's as if someone broke into my apartment and stole a part of my possessions and wished to comfort me by acknowledging that he recognizes in part my rights of possession. Do you think that I would find that acceptable? Certainly, not! Now, however, just like someone who is justified in protecting his earthly possessions, I believe that one also should seek to maintain his intellectual possessions with everything in his power. For that reason, I am not satisfied with the

4. [Trans. Note: The reference is to the township where the new Education School is located.].

"partial merit" that you extend to me. I am addressing what I deserve. I possess the proud and sublime sense of self that the reform of your school system is primarily my accomplishment. Let the dark storm of a rebellious reaction steal my official title and external reputation, I take with me an earned title from the treasure of my intellectual accomplishments that sickly jealousy can ridicule but can never take away from me.

The superintendent of schools possesses an exaggerated power outside of the Education Seminar, you say on page 6. – It appears to me that you have no sense of decency and turn mere "gossip" into motives. Indeed, you will have a different opinion when you become acquainted with the laws governing teacher education. I would eagerly greet an investigation of the power of the director outside of the Education Seminar. Surely you do not consider it an exercise of power if the director of the Education Seminar is allowed to visit schools with the older students for practical training? You will not consider it an exercise of power if the director of the is obliged to inspect schools or to conduct examinations on behalf of the Board of Education. – I beg you, Gentlemen! If you're going to speak again to the people, take a look in advance at the situation and the laws before you defend such an important claim. – However, at this point we come to a completely amazing contradiction. You say that, because the director of the possesses an exaggerated power outside of its sphere, he can devote no small part of his time to external affairs. Oh, the poor church congregations, who can solve such a riddle!? I will! However, my voice is no longer even heard in this gathering. With this extraordinary claim, you wish to say nothing other than that the director should be forbidden to participate in the discussion of public issues. The pedagogical observer is for many, many people objectionable. Gentlemen! Yet, visit the Education Seminar and get a report of how many teaching hours the director has been absent! However, should it be that he has fulfilled all of his official duties in his working hours and, then, evenings when others go to the theater, dances, and associations, he gladly writes about pedagogy and other articles on public education – that, Gentlemen!, no one can forbid him to do with any petition. At least, I doubt it.

Yet, you show your true colors when you propose to the church congregations: "The director of the Education Seminar should not be a member of the Board of Education." Had you consulted with one of my most bitter opponents in this matter, a legal scholar and former commissioner of the Constitution Committee, you would have been advised that the fulfilment of this wish is entirely impractical because the constitution says explicitly: "The director of the Education Seminar belongs on the Board of Education" as one of its most important members. This appears to be the strong opinion of the legislators themselves, who mandated that, in the event that the director was not a member, he was required to attend all of the Board of Education's sessions. A director who first needed to ask the entirety of teachers with respect to the needs of each individual school and to ask of the entire school system what its situation and operations were would be no better informed than any other person in the country. In other words, he would be no real director, and, if he fulfills his duties appropriately, it is silly not to want the Board of Education to build on its strongest

supporter. Do you even know when the Board of Education meets? Saturday mid-day after the school day is done! In other words, the director isn't neglecting his duties. In the Cantons of Aargau and Luzern, the director is a member not only of the Board of Education but also the Upper Council, and no one takes any more exception to it other than people who have no understanding, for example, of a business operation wanting to hinder a business. The prohibition of the director's voting participation on the Board of Education is contrary to the principle of the Zurich constitution, and, for that reason, it should not be allowed.

Because I am now speaking of the director, I would like to address one of your most absurd demands: more time be devoted to religious instruction in the Education Seminar itself for proper preparing of teachers to teach religion in the schools. Any more than you know when the Board of Education meets, do you have any idea how much time is devoted to religious instruction in the Education Seminar? If you don't know, then that is confirmation that your demand is a most reprehensible flippancy. If you do know, it is a confirmation of your foolish outlook. The following is a list of religious instruction in the Education Seminar in K nsnach: I Class, four hours of which three are specific to classrooms and one is in an assembly; II Class, five hours, four specific, one in assembly; III Class, three hours, 2 specific, 1 in assembly; and there are extra hours for confirmation students. Visit all of the schools in the world and all schools of education. See if any one of them devotes a similar proportional amount of time to religious instruction. In Karlsruhe's [in Germany] Education Seminar, whose director is a profound Pietist, the totality of religious instruction is six hours in the week; in Lausanne in the same circumstance there are also only six hours per week. – I want to be entirely out in the open with you on this point. I believe that we have too much religious instruction in Zurich's seminar. Remember, the students already have had 600 hours of religious instruction before they start in the Seminar. In the course of the following three years: I year $45 \times 5 = 225$ hours; II year $45 \times 4 = 180$ hours; III year $45 \times 3 = 135$ hours for a total of 530 hours. For heavens sake! What happens if that is not enough religious instruction? Yes, it is more than enough, a great deal too much religious instruction! As a consequence of even more, students would necessarily encounter Jewish archaeology and critical exegesis; where the one appears to be merely didactic, the other allegorical, and the third mythic and, therefore, more doubts are raised than answered. In this respect, I have done something entirely differently when it comes to religious instruction with my, in part, intellectually developed but blind students in Zurich. First, I ensured that they obtain an adequate knowledge of biblical stories so that my hours of religious instruction are more edifying than simply instructive. We pray and sing, and then we read a religious meditation, a good sermon, or (and that happens frequently) a chapter from the *Devotional Hours*, a good religious poem, or the biography of a noble

and pious man. Pastors as well as secular people observed⁵ these religious hours, and every one of them was edified, which had a great, ennobling impact on the students. – However, required instruction by memorization and exams of all kinds of irrelevant information, that is what hinders rather than encourages religious education. Once more, then: There's too much religious instruction at the seminar.

By the way, it is surely noticeable that none of the religious instructors have been able to adequately satisfy the wishes of the pastors. – Take, for example, Mr. Eduard Dändliker, a legally certified professional and a man of unquestionable good repute. However, he was unable to satisfy the demands of the pastors, and in the parish chapter in Andelfingen questions were raised concerning his orthodoxy and competency. – Then comes Mr. Wild, parish vicar, a man of complete faith and enthusiasm, pious enough for even the Protestant church newspaper. However, he appears not to have been satisfactory for the New Protestant party. – Finally, Doctor Haupt, a warm-hearted, scholarly theologian to whom the Zurich Church Council confirmed with highest praise for Confirmation instruction and preaching. However, even this man appears not to have achieved enough. The director did not interfere in the work of any of these men, not one faced any obstacles, and not one complained over the students or the curriculum plan. What, then, was the problem? – The problem was that not enough pastors supported their work, but, rather, they spread seeds of distrust.

By the way, Gentlemen of the XXII! I do not believe that the Education Seminar has achieved perfection. Some of you perhaps remember how I wanted to establish a school in which both teachers and students lived together, and I would have gladly moved the Education Seminar to Embrach, Kyburg, or Greisensee – renouncing the communities on the beautiful shores of the Lake of Zurich and interaction with the educated and enlightened residents there. You know that I engaged in a difficult struggle over the writing of the new education laws and that only the influence of the Upper Council, which I couldn't ignore, kept me committed to the institution. You should know that, for many months, I pressed for an institution that appeared to me essential and necessary for the education of young students and the professional education of older students. Precisely, this ruthless engagement for the institution, precisely this, Gentlemen of the XXII!, in part stirred up the sentiment of opposition to me on the Küsnach committee. Here I remain steadfast in maintaining that the Küsnach Education Seminar accomplished more than any other element of the Canton's schools; more than most in all of Switzerland. Even when I was not happy with everything that happened, all possible pedagogical strategies in every fashion were applied and, as a consequence, with ever more success.

I come now to the main allegation, the real motive, for which you condemn me. This is: "He, the leading teacher of all our public teachers, voted for the calling of

5. For example, frequently, Mr. Muralt in Schönenhof.

Dr. Strauß” (p. 5)⁶ Here, too, you blend together the most disparate elements! I did not vote as Superintendent of Schools but as member of the Board of Education. I voted according to my conscience and conviction and all this uproar has not disturbed my tranquility in the least so that I would vote the same a second and a third time. That is something that you must leave to me and my God. It has nothing to do with the German language and pedagogy in the schools?! I voted for Dr. Strauß for his coming as a teaching scholar, and I am convinced that he would have performed this duty quite differently from that of a penman. However, you have damned the man before you have heard him. I call that a contradiction of true Christianity. One who is portrayed to the unknowing masses as if in Zurich there is only one single master to teach the youth; which is about the same as if one learns to be a wood planer with a master carpenter. As if because of this one professor, Dr. Strauß, it will be possible for future, young pastors only to preach as Strauß preaches to them. That is the trivial opinion of the masses. One never said that in Zurich there is a pious believer and humble Professor Ludwig Hirzel and an intellectually stimulating Ulrich, and further an Alexander Schweizer, a Hitzig, and even – oh, for those who doubt about piety!! -instructors such as Pastors Schinz, Zimmermann, including one of your special choice, the even so well-educated as active Pastor Usteri, all involved in the training of young pastors. It is a true disparagement of these men that one doubts that so a Schwabian Strauß would not be quickly driven back by them into the desert of unbelief.

I have already explained that in my epistle I wanted to restrict myself primarily to the concerns having to do with my sphere of activity so that I touch on other points only briefly. A public church synod of freely elected representatives is a modern institution, and your wish will prove to be popular. Yet, why not take the decisive step at this opportune time to establish a free church? The state should fund every congregation a sum of some 800 Frkn. per year, and, then, the church as an independent institution can set its own goals and train its own servants. That would be the true, meaningful way of salvation [*Heilsweg*]. –

Most of your other desires arise out of error or misunderstanding, and some demonstrate a literal ignorance of our Constitution as I have already demonstrated. You demand that a third on the Board of Education must be chosen by the church synod. – Good, then we demand that a third of the Church Council must be chosen by a school synod. You demand that the school superintendent may not be a member of the Board of Education. Good, then we demand that the professor of practical theology [pastoral training] may not be a member of the Church Council. You demand

6. A correspondent of the Burkli newspaper also leveled this charge against me. As a consequence, he compounded further his lie in that he attributed to me the assertion: The church must be devoured by the school. It is amazing what all ignorance and suspicion can generate. A pious pastor, Harnisch, director of schools in Weißenfels, said to his primary school teachers: If the church does not progress along with the schools, it will be devoured by the latter. I presented this position some seven years ago in the presence of Pastor Koller (i.e., in Basel) – as a report.

on behalf of the Church Council that there be a two-name shortlist for the religious instructor in each school. Good – we demand on behalf of the Board of Education a three-name short list for all catechetical and [pastoral] assistant positions. – By responding to such nonsense with nonsense, we achieve a parallel nonsense. Your zealotness for the preservation of the university is laudable; only you shouldn't have forgotten those improvements that were required in order to establish it on a solid foundation. Yet, you are able to actually say that the elimination of the university doesn't belong to the many of your special wishes? The more it is shouted: "Scherr must go!" or: "the university must go!?" – the university, Gentlemen of the XXII, was stabbed in the back by your efforts. What exceptional teacher will remain there in light of such events or will consider coming? Your calculation has often been misunderstood in a very unfavorable way, namely in such a way that the crowd thought that all the sums listed belong as special items to the expenditures. Here, too, you have been reported to, and have reported, erroneously. The present budget shows this quite clearly. The allocation of the 20.000 Frkn. from Zurich purely to the college is prohibited [*unzulässig*] – and then: have you heard nothing about what Winterthur wanted to do for the Cantonal university?

You will perhaps cry out: How dare this single individual stand up to the opinion of some 40,000 citizens? I answer: I am of the opinion that, with the exception of the removal of Dr. Strauß, actually not even 4,000 citizens have even thought about what you want to have the church congregations to petition. I think that you will actually agree with me. Tell us, though: Have voices of the people even once spoken for an open church synod with free representation? Or have the people bothered about the election of the Board of Education and the Church Council? Or whether or not the school superintendent ought to sit on the Board of Education? – None of these are expressions of the desires of the people. A zealous man from Stäfa spoke out in Mänedorf: "Strauß must go, the university must go, the Education Seminar must go, everything must go!!" Another says: "Beer must go, taxes must go, streets must go!" A third: "Bring on the veto! Pastors and school teachers must be re-elected every six years!" – You see, these are actual desires of the people. What concern is it of the people when it comes to voting principles, etc. Yet, you respond that the people have accepted the petition unanimously. Indeed, but that proves very little. The citizens were stirred up in great agitation. Here one could not speak of careful reflection or discussion. Whoever didn't follow along in the wild storm was cursed or abused. In most congregations, reasonable men stayed away; the shy conceded everything that you wanted because they hoped that the discontent would die down; and, finally, the greatest number didn't even understand the epistle and your petition. To this part of the citizenry at such times one can present what one wants, it will accept everything wholesale.

These are the reasons why I believe one must attribute little weight to perhaps half of the many thousand votes cast. Furthermore, I believe that even the Upper Council

would accept these grounds. – From the whole affair, then, one can expect very little (or very little good) to come out of it. That's my opinion.

I could end here my response because I've spoken to just about everything in your epistle. However, Gentlemen!, you have actually raised more serious complaints against me. You wanted to bring these issues to the church congregations, and they are actually well-known from public pamphlets. I don't know whose conscience you wanted to appease by not including them. It is enough that I know what you were thinking and said. For that reason, I have yet a serious word to address to you.

You wanted to charge me of "arrogance." You can calm yourselves. In this respect there is nothing that is more egregious now than your epistle to the government is published. You have supplied the masterwork of arrogance, and there's hardly anyone who can exceed you. The cry of indignation over you that has been raised by all educated and honest citizens has delivered its judgment of you: You are not capable of speaking about decency and ethics.

You charge me with "unlimited authority." What a laughable, silly phrase. My authority is grounded in lawful regulations, and precisely these regulations limit it.

You spoke about doubts over my "Protestant faith." I leave your doubts to you, but such a generalized suspicion is a disgraceful debasement of the good task that you have set for yourselves. Who gives you the right to elevate yourselves to judge matters of faith? What do you know of my faith? Who among you is capable of examining my thoughts? You don't need to place yourselves between me and my God – I don't need such middlemen for the salvation of my soul. This attempt at heresy-hunting fills me with outrage. Truly, you cannot hold it against me when the most powerful doubt arises in me with respect to your Christian beliefs.

You still want to accuse me of "aggressiveness." Yes: I did fight when in 1832 Dr. Niederer called me and the new school system the most wretched concoction. I did fight when Dr. Bluntschli attacked me with weapons of the crudest injustice. I fought when the schools were pushed in a ruinous direction. I fought and still fight against malice and power grabbers by those who want to rattle and ruin the new school system; who want to steal from me and my charges our honor and good names with the most shameful slander – and be certain of one thing: as long as I am in this position [Trans.: Scherr was appointed school superintendent "for life"], I will fight with all that is in me. Should my opponents ever be victorious, their victory will not be easy.

You also want to stain the new status of teachers. You spoke of the "conceited immodesty" of many Education Seminar students. Gentlemen of the XXII, the present tempest has had at least one good consequence, namely, that the status of the public-school teacher has been legitimated over against the denunciations of its opponents. In this period in which so many pastors have spoken out in such a belligerent way against the schools, the Education Seminar, and the Board of Education, I have insisted upon documentation by official testimonials. Take a look in the law office of the Board of

Education and examine for yourselves these testimonials. Stop offending the status of teachers who at such times and by such testimonials are so meritoriously defended!⁷ Perhaps you have given way to gossiping about rumors as is the case with Mr. Bürkli. I want to help you track down these rumors. Not so many years ago, the schoolmaster in most communities was an uneducated farmer or handworker. The schoolmaster was humbled by his dependence on the favor of the pastor or community leader, the physician, or some other respected individual. He followed the cloak and collar of a pastor, was his day-laborer, and the schoolmistress was the obliging maid of the pastor's wife. The physician, president [of the bank], and the industrialist treated the schoolmaster like a marginal person, and their children berated him. This is how it was in many places.

Then, the new teachers came; dressed like gentlemen – already that was an affront. They could write better than the venerated gentlemen in many cases. They even believed themselves to be true masters in the school. Yes, much more, they believed themselves permitted to speak their own opinion over against the venerated gentlemen. That is when the theme of conceited teachers arose, and it spread like wildfire. Such Philistinism could be found in all countries wherever the status of teachers rose above the status of debasement. It is really sad, my Gentlemen of the XXII, that you have wanted to let yourselves be a voice of such Philistinism. Granted, you have chosen not to broadcast the point, and for that reason I won't rake you over the coals for it. I hope that in the future, though, you won't fail the teachers of Zurich who have proven themselves to be truly responsible through all of this.

I have done what your epistle gave me the right to do. I have no personal hate for you, but I am a long way away from forgiving in the least your violence against the rights that I possess as a free citizen.

In the hope that, when it comes to your drawing conclusions in the future, you will more carefully examine the situation in advance, I conclude with Plato:

Were the mind not free, it would be a great idea,

That a sovereign of ideas rule over the soul.

Küsnach, March 12, 1839

7. I wanted to report the statements with respect to the education school and the reputation of teachers in the general press with measured expressions, but their incorporation was disallowed. When the fight occurs in a way that the exculpation is sealed up, we are concerned with an infamous villainy.

Report on the Activity of the Aid Society for the Good of the Victims of 6 September 1839

Presented
by the Society
to the
People of Zurich

Zurich,
Printed by J.J. Ulrich
1840

The Aid Society, which was established immediately after the events of 6 September 1839, feels itself to be called and required by the Christians of Zurich, whose joy and generosity is marvelously represented by this situation, to present a thorough report on its activities as far as possible.

The crowds of thousands who set out from the countryside for Zurich in a solemn and peaceful manner in the night of September 5th to 6th in order to await the outcome, finally, of the long-brewing sacred aspirations of the people had barely entered the city as suddenly injuries and death catapulted upon them. Immediately after the painful events ceased, all the people were overcome with powerful emotions. First and foremost was the feeling of shock whose consequences could have been devastating were our citizens not to have maintained their indwelling Christian spirit. This was followed in the hearts of all by the feeling of thankfulness to God that the tide toward ruin was transformed into benefit. Especially vigorous was the feeling of sympathy that arose in the hearts of everyone. There are victims: "They died for us, for our sacred cause," everyone said. – "If there ever was a time when persons were worthy of our assistance, it is now with these seriously wounded and the parents, widows, and children of those who have died." Donations were made already on the evening of that first day. The very first charitable gift was 10 Schillings that was handed to a pastor of the city by a shabbily-dressed man.

The enormous, universal willingness to provide aid required without question the formation of an Aid Society. At a meeting in the Neumünster on the evening of September 10th, the citizens of the city established a group consisting of the following six persons to take on the task of fulfilling this purpose:

Antistes Füsli

Dr. Rahn
 Governing Council Member Spöndli
 Deacon Fäsi
 Deacon Pestalozzi
 Martin Usteri

The Society quickly assumed its task of assistance as soon as it was publicly announced. Donations poured into its coffers, especially on the Day of Repentance on which several hundred designated their participation. We express our deep thanks to all who donated! It is not merely the amount dedicated to this goal that is worthy of thanks but, far more, the joy with which you gave it. It is the most certain guarantee of a blessed success. It is the mite of the poor received from the many that makes for a harvest of blessedness; especially, it is what brings benefit to its recipients. Ever since then, the joy of giving was sparked in ever more hearts, the savings accounts of children were opened, small and large donations were made that were dedicated to a social benefit. Clubs sent donations, students delighted their teachers, confirmation students their pastors by the paying of a tax of love for the victims of September 6th. We received one donation from Ottenbach with the following lines from a student:

As expression of our heart, in recognition
 Of your fate, poor orphan,
 This mite is dedicated to you.
 May God grant that it pleases you!
 Fate hit you hard on the day
 Of Struggle, great was your lament.
 Yet the fight was unspeakably sacred
 And that is to our and to your benefit.

May we also strive solemnly,
 To incessantly live according to Christ's example;
 So that the reward of those fallen
 Is received also by us before God's throne.

What especially increased the quantity of donations was the love tax that was sent in by some civic groups and entire congregations. Many poor people donated in this manner! How many households sacrificed their own needs! – Receive our thanks for your generosity, Christian brothers! The one who received blesses the giver! Your mite grew to a large sum. According to the account that follows, this sum added up to 7835 Francs and 5 Schillings.

As its success pleased and inspired the Aid Society greatly, it also can't be denied that this extraordinary trust made the fulfilment of its task more difficult. The task was the distribution and application of the entire amount in a most just and beneficial manner. Only when this goal has been achieved can our country be pleased with its work. However, this is anything but easily accomplished. Where one is concerned with individuals, the task can be achieved, perhaps, with little concern; even more so when these individuals are all adults and established in a profession. This is the case for some of our recipients but not for the majority. Entire families faced the brink of,

or collapsed into, poverty by the sudden death of a father, spouse, son, or brother. One was in the process of building a house when he was torn away by death. In order for his widow with her children to remain in the house, part of the construction costs needed to be covered. The head of the household with huge expenses had his financing terminated at the end of 1839 and had just received the notification when his early death occurred. The Orphan Administration explained that it was not in the position to address the problem without the receipt of immediate and hefty aid. A third person with the assistance of a talented and industrious son had purchased merchandise that promised a lucrative return when suddenly the death of this son brought the collapse of the investment. The Aid Society had to seek a way for this afflicted father to avoid catastrophe. Another man who died on September 6th left behind a sick and psychologically ill widow. Understandably, the unexpected blow made her circumstances even worse. The household collapsed; the only child, a 14-year-old girl, was sent to be cared for by a group of benefactresses, and a place in an asylum had to be arranged for the widow, all of which could not occur without significant financial assistance. Older parents lost the vigorous support of a hard-working and faithful son and underage children their father – and the consequences of their horrible loss had to be addressed. When it came to wounded survivors, there needed to be a scale of aid established that extended from those who recovered completely to those who lost a limb! Right from the beginning, each individual family required unique attention and tailored assistance.

A detailed, official accounting of the individuals and families with their special circumstances can perhaps best demonstrate what the Aid Society confronted. At the head of the list are those honorable, fourteen men and youth who lost their lives in the sacred cause.

1. Hans Jakob Kägi from Plakten, parish Bauma, 56 years old at his death, was a tirelessly industrious, honest, thrifty man who rose out of poverty. He owned a piece of land, but it wasn't capable of supporting cattle or the planting even of potatoes. He was a cotton spinner, and, when he lost that work, he undertook trading with little success. He left behind a four-and-a-half-year, older widow who, like him, was industrious and thrifty as well as a son and daughter both of whom married; and they, too, have an excellent reputation.
2. Hans Jakob Tucker from Haselhalde, parish Bauma, died of a head-wound at 53 years old, without a house but worked the land of his still-living 75-year-old father. He, too, had the reputation of a quiet, industrious, and honest man; he left behind a widow with three children. The oldest son is 25 in the meantime as the consequence of strenuous work as farmhand and chauffeur is unable to work because of an enduring medical condition; the older daughter of 17 is emotionally disturbed and unable to work. The household enjoys the best of reputations.
3. Hans Rudolf Spörri from Allenwyl, parish Bauma did not die in the conflict itself. He died late on the evening of September 6th as a consequence of an abdominal

wound. He was a bachelor of 21 years, the only child of Heinrich Spörri. The shattering death of the courageous son had the consequence that the separated parents were reunited.

4. Jakob Bleuler from Zollikon, 40 years old, bachelor. He survived as a day-worker in Zurich, joined the group from his country people, and died. His body was unrecognizable. He was mistaken for Heinrich Tobler from Hinterbalm, and with this name he was buried. However, the error was quickly learned. On the basis of clothes found at the hospital, it was determined that he could be no other than Jakob Bleuler, who had been missing since September 6th (see the Governing Council's edict of 23 November 1839). His geriatric mother is still living. She lives with an unmarried daughter in the community of Seen.
5. Hans Jakob Weber of Vorderbalm, parish Pfäffikon, 51 years old. He was wounded twice on the back of the head by blows of a sword. He leaves behind a widow with three children, two of whom are underage. He ran a weaving business with his oldest son and was a poor but very virtuous man. As a member of the Brethren church in Hofhalden, he was the leader of a good choral group at their Sunday evening services. He had just built a house that exhausted his economic resources by which there remained debts for construction materials and the payment of workers.
6. Hans Jakob Boshardt from Ohwachs, parish Hittnau, 55 years old, born in Auslikon, parish Pfäffikon. He left behind a wife, who for years was psychologically ill, and a 14-year-old daughter. He was poor but enjoyed a good reputation.
7. Bartholomäus Diem from Hersau, Canton Appenzell Ausserroden. He was shot in the abdomen and died at the age of 27. He worked for many years as a hard-working, devout servant in Metzikon and in the last three years as a cataloger in Robenhausen. His older, deaf, charity-recipient father, whom he had supported, suffered especially with his death.
8. Conrad Marthaler of Oberhasle, was 34 when he died, a bachelor, and worked as a farmworker in Zymikon, in the community of Volkenschweil where he joined the crowd as it moved through his area. His parents are no longer living; his seven siblings are all adults.
9. Hans Heinrich Egli of Robenhausen, parish Metzikon was struck on his left thigh and died on the evening of September 7th at the age of 21. He was the second son of upright but poor parents who took pleasure and comfort in his moral behavior.

These nine men (with the exception of Heinrich Egli, who was laid to rest in his home town) were buried on the evening of September 8th in the cemetery of the Predigerstadt parish. Several thousand participated in this solemn hour. Soldiers of the Fatherland carried the bodies of their fallen brothers. Emotions ran deeply as the hymn "Sacred are Heaven's Inheritors!" was sung. So it was, then.

1. Heinrich Schnurrenberger from Kohlboden, parish Sternenbergr died on September 12th from a shot-wound through his right eye at the age of 20. He was the

sole son of elderly parents. As an obedient, humble young man, he was the joy and support of his poor parents by his ceaseless dutiful efforts. He was buried on September 14th on the evening before the Day of Prayer and Repentance.

2. Jakob Diggelmann of Pfäffikon, 20 years old, was wounded on the right shoulder and died on September 17th. He was a bachelor, lived with his father who earlier faced great difficulties because of the disastrous fire in Pfäffikon, and helped him as cobbler handworker. He was very poor but honest and courageous. He was buried on September 29th along with
3. Jakob Dietliker of Kempten, parish Metzikon, resident of Auslikon. He died on September 18th as the result of a wound in his abdomen. He left behind a widow who is greatly respected by all and three underage children. This is not an entirely poor family because as carpenter he had cared well for his household. As the following table shows [not reproduced here], the [carpenters'] association had already helped this valiant family.
4. Hans Heinrich Müller from Hofhalden, community of Hittnau received a wound in his left leg with the consequence that it was amputated below the knee. He died on September 20 at the age of 54 and left behind a widow and five children, one of whom was underage. He was an industrious man, but his resources were slim. The Brethren congregation in Hofhalden took him to be one of their most important members, a man who edified them with his loving words. His painful hospital time gave moving testimony to the strength of his faith. "And when I," he said on one of the last days of his life as the pain had reached its fevered pitch, "and when I once more must endure all of this pain for the victory that we have won, I would do so again." He was buried on September 22nd.

All of these men with the exception of Heinrich Egli of Metzikon are in a grave in the cemetery of Predigerstadt parish. A simple cross marks the location of their communal rest.¹ One finds on the cross these words:

"Here rest twelve men who fell on September 6, 1839
Revelation XIV, 13"

1. Hans Jakob Lattmann of Uerschen, parish Bauma was shot through the left foot. Although the wound was dangerous, he recovered quickly, and everyone hoped that in a short time he would return home healthy. However, he was hit by a chest-fever, and his condition worsened ever more seriously. He suffered bitterly, as well, from homesickness, and he died. His incessant request to be buried in his home town had to be observed. He died in the hospital at 10:00 a.m. on October 16th and was buried at 9:00 p.m. in his home town three hours after his arrival. The deceased was 25 years old and married. His widow gave birth to a daughter on February 16, 1840, who was baptized in the church in Bauma on February 23rd

1. A collection of funeral addresses has been printed by David Bürkli. 2nd ed. November 1839.

with the name Barbara. He was poor but had a good reputation. His parents are still alive.

The following are the names of the wounded:

1. Heinrich Kreis from Altikon, living in Myla, was hit by a bullet in his right thigh. He was born in 1809, a poor day-laborer and weaver; he is not yet recovered. He will probably need a spa-visit next summer.
2. Johann Jakob Spörri Delers from Lenzen, parish Fischenthal, born in 1819, bachelor. He was wounded on the right cheek and lives with his poor parents. The honest household is maintained by cotton weaving. The victim is now satisfactorily recovered.
3. Heinrich Meier from Hinterwaberg, parish Bärentschweil; born in 1814, was seriously wounded in his right shoulder and is still suffering. He is married and father of an underaged child. He lives with his parents and is employed part-time as a weaver, part-time as an estate gardener. The family is not poor but also not rich. They have a good reputation.
4. Georg Weber from Auslikon, parish Pfäffikon, brother of the fallen Jakob Weber, is married and father of two children. He received a head wound but was released from the hospital already on September 10th without adequately recovering, as it turned out. He has a good reputation.
5. Heinrich Bär from Theilingen, parish Weißlingen, born in 1814, bachelor, lives with his parents on a small estate that is cultivated, primarily, by the son. He was seriously wounded on the right hand and continues to suffer from the injury. He has a good reputation.
6. Conrad Boller from Balm, parish Pfäffikon, thirty years old, is married and lives with his completely impoverished father. He has one child of his own and four step-children. He was released from the hospital on September 27th.
7. Heinrich Keller from Kellersacker, parish Turbenthal, born in 1798, bachelor, father of an uneducated child, is poor. He received a gunshot wound and, as a consequence, his right leg was amputated above the knee. Only by hard work and frugality was this dauntless man and his wife able to endure with honor. He survived the operation. His return home in December was celebrated, movingly, by a large number of friends and acquaintances. According to the latest reports, though, he still suffers greatly.
8. Johannes Gubler from Pfäffikon, bachelor, 32 years old, lives with his impoverished father. He lost his left eye and was released from the hospital on September 27th. He enjoys a good reputation.
9. Johannes Würgler von Uster, living in Hottingen, born in 1787, widower since 1827, father of six grown children. His left leg was crushed, but it quickly healed without lasting consequences.
10. Hans Rudolf Müller, non-commissioned officer, from Hofhalden near Hittnau, born in 1780. As his comrades fell, he attacked the military with his staff and

defended himself bravely until he suffered slashes from his opponent. He received three head-wounds and a bayonet wound in the abdomen. Nonetheless, he was able to drag himself to Fluntern where he stayed in the house of a friend. At the moment, he is convalescing. He is generally esteemed for his religious conviction and impeccable behavior.

11. Johannes Kägi from Seewadel, community of Bauma, born in 1816, married, father of one child. He is without means, works as pamphlet printer and has the reputation of an engaging, thrifty, and honest man. His parents are still living. After he was wounded, he stayed for several days in the community of Neumünster where he received medical attention.
12. Johannes Hofmann from Kloten, born in 1820. He was in the midst of the crowd when he was wounded. The bullet entered in his spine and exited from his right elbow. He lay for several weeks in the house of his foreman, Mr. Kratzer, under the best of care, and then returned to his parents in Kloten. After a very exhausting and painful stay in the hospital, he is now so improved that he can do limited cabinetwork for his foreman.
13. Johannes Boshard from Steinenbach, parish Wyla, received a bullet wound in the thigh on Münsterhof. He was cared for by a physician in a private home and dragged himself home with great effort where he spent the next six weeks recovering. His father is still alive, he has four siblings, and enjoys the reputation of a quiet, industrious, and hearty young man. He is 19 ½ years old.
14. Kaspar Enderli from Bysikon, parish Illnau, 54 years old. On September 6th he was in the midst of the crowd and was lightly wounded by a sword blow on his left hand between the thumb and index finger.²

What is presented here is the true presentation of an official report. What we are able to say from this witness regarding our fallen and wounded brothers contradicts more strongly than all words the hateful claims of vehement pamphlets that the men who advanced from the mountains to the city were a mass of rabble. They were poorly clothed, we grant, but under their shabby clothes beat pious Christian hearts for a Fatherland.

As far as the Aid Society was able to determine, donations came from all sides immediately after the events, some small, others large, according to character and circumstances, in part to the houses of those who lost a father, brother, son, or husband in order to reduce the first needs, in part to make it possible for the wounded to achieve the necessary means for their recovery. What we intended to accomplish, we achieved. Those left behind feel relieved and consoled and request that thanks be expressed to their pastors and church leaders. We have not earned this thanks, but you, this Christian community, made possible the reduction of this need of the

2. Still other citizens were wounded: Jakob Rüscher, cabinet-maker, applicant Wirz from Zurich, and student Freuler from Glarus.

afflicted. The degree of suffering of our wounded has also been diminished. Some are completely recovered; others are on their way to recovery under the guidance of competent and charitable physicians.

The most important question, by the way, that the Aid Society had to answer consisted in what direction to take once all monies had been collected. Two main alternatives came to the fore: One option was to distribute all the funds to the afflicted according to their circumstances, and, thus, close down the society. The other option suggested not completing the complete distribution now but only when the individual and family circumstances of those concerned were determined yet more clearly and with certainty.

The Aid Society has chosen the second form, and, although it is known that there is a desire on the part of some for the distribution to occur now, this wish couldn't hinder the Society from holding to the conviction that would best, essentially increase the effectiveness of its work. When we examine the family circumstances of those who died, they are the ones who have suffered the most. Only in the course of time will it be clear in what respects and in what amount the society should assist them. In other cases, where it is already clearly evident that the best for a family requires that it receive now its portion that conjecturally it should receive, the Society has done so to the best of its judgment as the calculations of its report indicate. With respect to the accumulated interest of the money invested by the Society, it will take into consideration how best to disperse it to equitably assist those families and persons who received only small assistance amounts.

With respect to the wounded, many, of course, are recovered. However, some are at the time of this report still recovering, and it is not yet possible to determine whether and what enduring, negative consequences will arise with respect to their health and professional lives. It is not to be overlooked that some of the wounded whom physicians report as healed will suffer future issues with their wounds in the future.

These are the reasons that bring the Aid Society to postpone the final distribution of its resources until the 1840 fourth quarter endowment assessment and to present a report and new distribution of funds at the end of that year to the affected persons or families.

In the meantime, the amounts that we have not yet expended will continue to collect interest. Those recommended to our custody will not in the least lose anything of what they will receive. The earnings are guaranteed.³

Incidentally, we are convinced that we have acted responsibly to humanity as well as to the Lord with respect to our charge. All donations humbly were made in His name for our wishes and accomplishment! He has given us the insight always to

3. In order to safeguard the entirety of collected funds, we asked the present government whether or not it would assume the cost for the printing of our report as well as some other small expenses, and it readily agreed to our request.

see what and how everything ought to be done that it bring a blessing. He blesses everyone who has worked in the spirit of love and faith on behalf of our sacrificed brothers! With their deaths, they served to achieve victory for a holy cause. Never forget that, brothers in Christ! Pray with us to God that He might send our Fatherland the one thing necessary, the steadfast clinging to His Holy Word. If so, we will preserve freedom, and never again will days return like those that we have had. Never again will a chasm develop between the government and the people. For where for everyone that which is sacred is held sacred, there one is easily reconciled over that which is less important, and with the power of this unity our country's welfare will flourish!

Volume II

Part III:

Strauß' Metaphysics: On the Way from Hegel to Kant

"The true value of man is not determined by his [*sic.*] possession, supposed or real, of Truth, but rather by his sincere exertion to get to the Truth. It is not possession of Truth by which he extends his powers and in which his ever-growing perfectibility is to be found. Possession makes one passive, indolent and proud. If God were to hold all Truth concealed in His right hand, and in His left only the steady and diligent drive for Truth, albeit with the proviso that I would always and forever err in the process, and to offer me the choice, I would with all humility take the left hand."

— Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, "A Rejoinder," Section I

1. Strauß refers to this quote from Lessing in *The Old and the New Faith* :219. Strauß comments about which Strauß wrote: "The saying has always made such a special impression on me because behind its subjective meaning I could still hear an objective one of infinite scope [...]"

If we can no longer defer to God the choice between existence without pain and death, but also without movement and life, and such a one, in which life and movement are bought by pain and death, then the choice arises for us, whether we want to try to understand the latter, or want to persist in fruitless denial of that which is, to prefer the former." *Ibid.*, 219–220

Vol. II: Introduction

Engagement of Strauß facilitates a re-engagement of purloined ‘metaphysics’ in the 21st C. I claim that Strauß is a ‘great’ thinker/theologian but not because he possessed the truth. His career is one of a rigorous seeker of truth. His inadequate understanding of Kant was shaped by the Anti-Enlightenment and anti-Kantian movement at the beginning of the 19th C, which Strauß encountered in Hegel, Schleiermacher, F.C. Baur, and Carl Daub. Their mis-understanding and flagrant distortions of Kant prevented Strauß from drawing upon invaluable resources for philosophical and theological reflection with the result that he represents a crucial, but incomplete, paradigm shift yet to be achieved.

A Call for a Re-engagement of ‘Metaphysics but Not just any and all Metaphysics’

The 20th C prided itself on the destruction (‘De-construction’) of metaphysics as a liberation from capricious authority. Jean-François Lyotard’s dismissal of all ‘meta-narratives’¹ in *The Postmodern Condition* appeared at an opportune moment and engendered a strong echo across disciplines. In addition to Lyotard’s identification of the collapse of all “grand narratives” which primarily for Lyotard meant Hegelianism, the thesis applied, Lyotard claimed, even to science’s “little narrative [...] of imaginative invention.”² Adorno’s one-dimensional reductionism of ‘Enlightenment’ to an instrument of technocracy in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and the shift of focus to the ‘sociological’ for (merely socially constructed) values bundled enough dry tinder for a conflagration. Derrida and Foucault, not to mention Jean Baudrillard, Slavoj

1. See Lyotard’s “Introduction” to *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, trans. (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1985): xxiii-xxiv.

2. See Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*: 60. Lyotard rejects meta-narrative, but he insists that “There has to be a metalanguage to determine whether a given language satisfies the formal conditions of an axiomatic [which retains an echo of Hegel, not echoes Kant’s practical reason]; that metalanguage is logic.” (emphasis added) (*The Postmodern Condition*: 42) He then suggests four criteria for determining the ‘legitimacy’ of logical axioms or the ‘syntax of a formal system:’ 1) consistency; 2) syntactic completeness; 3) decidability (procedure to decide if a proposition belongs in the system); and 4) independence of the axioms in relation to one another. (See *The Postmodern Condition*: 42) Nonetheless, Lyotard acknowledges that “all formal systems have internal limitations” (*The Postmodern Condition*: 43). Cynically, then, Lyotard draws the conclusion that “[t]he games of scientific language become the games of the rich, in which whoever is wealthiest has the best chance of being right. An equation between wealth, efficiency, and truth is thus established.” (*The Postmodern Condition*: 45)

Žižek, Giorgio Agamben, and Peter Sloterdijk fed the flames as did the struggle to 'ground' reason and morality in Rawls 'veil of ignorance' and Habermas' 'consensus discourse theory.' Lyotard notes Martin Heidegger's criticism of metaphysics (especially, what Lyotard calls the 'doubling unfortunate' character of Heidegger's May 27, 1933, inaugural rector address at the university in Freiburg-in-Breisgau for its 'legitimizing knowledge' 'in the realm of politics'³). Heidegger's anti-metaphysical 'fundamental ontology' grounded in 'concealed' possibilities of 'manifest' actualities, in turn, shaped 20th C Hermeneutics in the work, for example, of Paul Ricoeur⁴ and Hans-Georg Gadamer.⁵ Especially, when it comes to the emphasis upon liberation from authoritarianism, one ought not to ignore Karl Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies*,⁶

3. See Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*: 33–37.

4. Particularly important is Ricoeur's work on metaphor, especially "Study 7: Metaphor and Reference" with its analysis of 'metaphorical truth' in *The Rule of Metaphor* but equally important, especially for my project, is his three-volume *Time and Narrative*, Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer, trans. [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984–1985] with its key description of the understanding-shaping of reality in both fiction and non-fiction by means of the three-fold symbolic structure of always and already pre-figured symbols, which are con-figured by the 'new' author, and re-figured by the reader (in the broadest sense of reading that includes political action).

5. Rather than invoke (Hegelian) logic, Gadamer, for his part, invoked the strategy of jurisprudence as a legitimating model for hermeneutics – diverting attention, one must add, from Kant's 'Doctrine of Virtue' to the 'Doctrine of Right': "We are familiar with [...the] function of judgment especially from jurisprudence, where the supplementary function of 'hermeneutics' consists in producing a concretization of law. It is always a question of something more than the correct application of general principles. Moreover, our knowledge of law and morality is always supplemented from the individual case, even productively determined by it. The judge does not only apply the law in concreto but contributes through his (*sic.*) very judgment to the development of the law [emphasis added] ('judges' law'). Like law, morality is constantly developed through the fecundity of the individual case." (emphasis added) *Truth and Method* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975): 36–37. Gadamer returns to this theme in section "(C) The exemplary Significance of Legal Hermeneutics" where he underscores that the jurist does not blindly apply the law to the case at hand, but s/he looks beyond the "historical knowledge of the original meaning" of the law "to take account of the change in circumstances and hence define afresh the normative function of the law." *Ibid.*, 291–292 He concludes: "[t]he hermeneutical situation of both the historian and the jurist seems to me to be the same in that when faced with any text, we have an immediate expectation of meaning. *There can be no such thing as a direct approach to the historical object that would objectively reveal its historical value.* The historian has to undertake the same task of reflection as the jurist" (*ibid.*, 292) to fill in the gap between 'original meaning' and 'new context'. Unfortunately, Gadamer has collapsed Kant's distinction between "Right" (civic law) and "Virtue" that structure Kant's Metaphysics of Morals. Consequently, his hermeneutics is only concerned with what Kant calls theoretical reason, not practical reason and neither of them from the perspective of their *a priori* conditions of possibility, which alone provide a grounding in *necessities* to avoid social, systematic distortion of understanding. See the "Conclusion: John Dewey and the Enduring Need to De-Mythologize the Hegelian/Straußian Reading of Kant." especially the the section "A Blind Spot in Dewey's Hermeneutics."

6. Karl Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, 2 Vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

whose first volume (*The Spell of Plato*) traces fascism to the metaphysics of Plato's *Republic*.⁷

All of these sociological, discourse, and hermeneutical strategies are a reaction to, and locate a false 'authority' in, either the metaphysics of 'revealed' Personal Theism (for example, the strategy of Thomas Aquinas⁸), the metaphysics of meta-narrative in the Hegelian sense, Heidegger's attack on the tyranny of 'actuality' (what Derrida calls philosophy of "presence") and technology, as well as a literary canon, or a political ideology. Lyotard called out at the end of the *Postmodern Condition*: "Let us wage war on totality; let us be witness to the unrepresentable; let us activate the differences and save the honor of the name."⁹

A corollary to the rejection of meta-narratives in philosophy, then, has been the celebration of social, especially religious, pluralism¹⁰ as consisting of the socially constructed discourses of communities and traditions on the basis of a claim that *all forms of diversity deserve respect precisely because of their objective differences*. Perhaps

7. It is actually not unwarranted to claim that both consciously and unconsciously no other text influenced the (Greek/Latin) Western tradition (even more than the bible) than Plato's Similes of the Sun and Line at the end of Book VI of the *Republic*. Alread North Whitehead, for example, claimed that the entire Western tradition is a footnote to Plato. See Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: Free Press, 1969): 53.

8. Thomas Aquinas wrote in his *Summa Theologica* I, 99, 1: "By faith alone do we hold truths which are above nature, and what we believe rests on authority. Wherefore, in making any assertion, we must be guided by the nature of things, except in those things which are above nature, and are made known to us by Divine authority." At *Summa Theologica* I, 32, 1 he had said: "Therefore, we must not attempt to prove what is of faith, except by authority alone, to those who receive the authority; while as regards others it suffices to prove that what faith teaches is not impossible." He had already drawn the conclusion at *Summa Theologica* I, 1, 6: "Whatsoever is found in other sciences contrary to any truth of this science [sacred doctrine] must be condemned as false."

9. Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*: 82. In this same final paragraph, Lyotard refers to Kant as having acknowledged "a chasm" between the faculties of reason [McG: theoretical and practical reason and aesthetic judgment] and Hegel as offering only a "transcendental illusion" [McG: Lyotard's ultimate form of metanarrative]. Unfortunately, what Lyotard overlooks is that the "bridge" for the "chasm" between theoretical and practical reason is the reflecting judgment of aesthetic judgment, which is the focus of Kant's *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*. On the distinction between reflecting and re-producing judgment, see *The Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA VI: 179–180. On the chasm (Kluft) in transcendental consciousness, see AA V: 175–176. Kant suggests at AA VI: 195–197 that it is reflecting judgment that provides the "mediating concept" "through feeling" (!) between theoretical reason (understanding of nature to answer the question 'what is?') and practical reason (exercising of creative freedom above but never separate from nature to answer the question 'what ought to be?'). Why 'feeling'? Because reflecting judgment commits itself to 'lawfulness' as governing both domains out of a 'feeling of pleasure and displeasure' – otherwise, neither understanding nor responsible agency is possible. However, this is not a 'blind' feeling of pleasure and displeasure, but a feeling that is grounded in the universal, necessary conditions for experience, understanding, and responsible agency (that is, lawfulness, which evokes feeling).

10. See my paper on pluralism in Religious Studies: McGaughey, "One World, One Reason, One Faith, but Many Religions: Religious Studies." <https://criticalidealism.org/one-world-one-reason-one-faith-but-many-religions-religious-studies-in-an-age-of-pluralism/>.

the most trenchant formulation of this strategy for understanding religions is George A. Lindbeck's, *The Nature of Doctrine and Theology in a Post-Liberal Age*.¹¹ He is joined by Stanley Hauerwas and Nicholas Wolterstorff.¹² However, social construction, generally, and social construction in theology, particularly, conceals and oppresses in its own way. The social constructivist offers a convenient cover for protecting the self-interest of one's own tradition, which, under the guise of championing pluralism, is employed to justify its own clinging to blind, enthusiastic, dogmatic claims, and, as it claims to avoid cultural and intellectual imperialism, it is left with no basis for constructive criticism of the self or other. Especially Christian theologians frequently applaud pluralism, but they rarely, if ever, examine the theological virtues of the 'other.' Rather, they immediately turn to a defense of their own tradition.

There is absolutely no questioning on my part that all prejudices with respect to the external accidents of life are unacceptable! When it comes to pluralism, the claim to its acknowledgement is grounded not in objective subreptions that claim to know 'reality.' In other words, *as Kant formulated his recognition of religion within the limits of mere reason and as he called for the reining in of philosophical, 'enthusiastic,' speculations, and as he grounded the 'dignity' and absolute worth of individuals not in tradition or cultures of skills but in the imperceptible culture that promotes the moral will, so, too, the 'respect' owed to others, as well as, embracing of pluralism of all kinds, is not rudderless, but governed by what is necessary (in a non-causal sense). In short, taking pluralism to mean all truth is relative eliminates the grounds not only for criticism of the self or the other, but it eliminates the one strategy that protects us from systematic distortion in disciplines of all kinds as well as in conspiracy theories and political ideologies like the the Russkiy mir, "the Russian world."*¹³ One does not overcome prejudices evoked by external accidents (nationality, culture, religious traditions and institutions, race, sex, gender, age, economic status, etc.) by taking them to be beyond critique and to be all of equal value. One overcomes prejudices by *transcendental critique*.

The corrective strategy to such an embracing of 'let a million flowers bloom' is the overlooked strategy that respect for diversity is owed not because all external, perceptible, 'accidental' characteristics, over which one has little (and in many cases, no) control are of equal value. Rather, one seeks out the imperceptible, *universal* conditions, capacities, and lawful order that makes it possible for there to be an

11. George A. Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine and Theology in a Post-Liberal Age* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984. See Douglas R. McGaughey, "Chapter 5: On George Lindbeck's Cultural-Linguistic Theological Model" in *Strangers and Pilgrims: On the Role of aporiai in Theology* (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1997)

12. See Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Religion in the University* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019) and "Theology and Science: Listening to Each Other" in *Religion and Science: History, Method, Dialogue*, Richardson, W. Mark and Wesley J. Wildman eds. (New York: Routledge, 1996: 95–104).

13. See James R. Cochrane, "The Cosmopolitan Christ: A Contemporary Agenda?" in *Journal of Theology for Southern Africa* 177 (2023): especially, 26.

experience of diversity, in the first place. Rather than absolutizing from the get-go everything that is empirical as of equal value, all empirical phenomena, which include the accidents of culture, religious traditions, race, sex, gender, age, economic status, etc., are *the starting point of 'critique's' Copernican Turn* that lead to imperceptible, *universal structures* of experience, understanding, and responsible agency.¹⁴

For example, without acknowledgement of universal dignity, which is grounded not by the merely empirical assertion of 'rights' but by the Copernican Turn to the set of universal, transcendental conditions and capacities, differences of race, nationality, religion, cultural origin, sexual orientation, etc., not only conceal the universal structures of transcendental consciousness, but also no ground is left for *legitimate* criticism of exploitation (of persons and the environment), persecution, oppression, and injustice. All criteria for such criticism are reduced to socially constructed norms, rules, and values. In other words, the socially constructed accidents of norms, rules, and values leave unexamined their capricious and relative status that can result in devastating destruction of the environment and persons. Rather, virtue and human dignity are grounded in universal capacities as well as universal principles and moral principles that enable responsible engagement of the environment and interaction with all persons.

The choice, though, is not an either/or. It is a both/and. The grounds for celebrating pluralism are not the 'accidents' of individuality (race, gender, sexuality, national origin, religious affiliation, age, physical disability, etc.) and/or the particular and unique, constructed products of the various communities of humanity but, rather, the common transcendental capacities and lawfulness *that make it possible for* individuals to be who they are as individuals and that make it possible for societies and traditions to generate the historical content of their respective social systems and religions that they come to embrace. *It is a profound mistake to simply absolutize the status of historical accidents and simultaneously say that, as social constructions, the external rules and norms of traditions all are equally due respect.* Every (!) social order of what Kant calls 'hypothetical imperatives' depends upon a 'higher' set of internal, universal 'categorical imperatives,' which the individual invokes to 'give oneself permission' to achieve her/his particular, external goals by means of socially constructed hypothetical imperatives. In other words, not all imperatives are categorical!¹⁵

Again, as significant and crucial as *the 'narrow,' external, perceptible accidents* are for the establishment of 'identity,' they are not the key to the respect owed to all. Rather, the key to respect owed to all is *the 'broad,' internal, imperceptible conditions and capacities of transcendental consciousness* with its universal principles and laws that apply at all times and in all places that are the key to the respect owed to all. Martin Luther King, Jr., so much as says the same when he dreams of a day when we will not be judged by the color of our skin but by our *internal* character.

14. On Kant's 'Copernican Turn,' see the "Preface:" 47, n. 35.

15. On 'categorical' and 'hypothetical' imperatives, see Chapter I: "Methodology:" 124, n. 65.

Furthermore, the 'wide' principles of virtue are not external, heteronomous list of 'morals' that one can use to judge the other by her/his appearance or any other accidental aspect of their being (e.g., the consequences of their agency). The 'wide' principles of virtue are internal, imperceptible, and their application is known only to the individual just as only the individual can experience and understand for her-/himself, not for someone else. Transcendental consciousness has little or no control over the visible accidentals even the consequences of personal agency (especially, when it comes to the long-run), but it does have control over the principles that the individual transcendental consciousness self-selects to 'give oneself permission' in the moment of decision taking to act externally in a certain way. In spite of the claim made by Luke 6:43–45, "judging a tree by its fruit" is inappropriate for understanding a human being. Trees have no choice about their fruit because they are the products of 'mechanical,' natural causality. The fruit of an animal with transcendental consciousness is the consequence of its own creative causality. Consequently, this animal, to a degree unlike other animals, is capable of (but, obviously, not required to) *consciously* assuming responsibility for its agency, not merely *instinctually*.

Furthermore, the individual is only capable of awareness of her/his own imperceptible decision-taking that resulted in what became a perceptible action. No one has direct access to the imperceptible decision-taking of another.

In addition, the conditions of possibility of transcendental consciousness require that the individual can never lose her/his capacity of autonomous freedom intentionally to initiate causal sequences that nature on its own cannot. Therefore, as well, the individual never loses her/his capacity to assume responsibility for that agency. Hence, s/he has dignity on the basis of *indelible*, universal capacities.

Society can, and does, hold an individual accountable on the basis of the 'Doctrine of Right' or civic law and socially constructed rules. When it comes to the 'Doctrine of Right,' then, one can and must judge by objectively observable 'fruits' of behavior. However, when it comes to the 'Doctrine of Virtue,'¹⁶ dignity is established not by means of the 'objective fruits' (or 'accidents') of action (governed by the 'Doctrine of Right') but by the universal, 'subjective conditions and capacities' of the individual.

Just as Consequentialism can only measure effects in the short run without the faintest awareness of the long-term effects of one's own or society's actions, so too with individual decision-taking. Judging by appearances is a popular game. However, we acknowledge the dignity of the 'other' *not because* all that is objectively accidental in life is of equal 'worth' *but because* dignity is subjectively grounded in the *universal autonomous freedom* of every transcendental consciousness.

When it comes to 'respect,' though, consequences do matter. However, one is owed respect not because of the 'objective' accidents of one's person or circumstances, and

16. Kant's *Metaphysics of Morals* consists of two parts: the "Doctrine of Right" and the "Doctrine of Virtue."

respect is not 'owed' to the individual simply because s/he acts on the basis of merely socially constructed rules/norms. Rather, respect is owed *to the degree that* one has acted on the basis of a universal, imperceptible moral principle even when contrary to one's own self-interest. Respect is grounded in the overall character¹⁷ of the individual, not merely the particular effects of the individual's agency. In short, respect is owed to only those who make an effort to act not merely through the *power* of instrumental, technical reason but also according to the universal, subjective, imperceptible, lawful, moral order of practical reason.¹⁸

Whereas 'dignity' is absolute because of the capacity of autonomous freedom itself, 'respect' is relative to the degree one reins in one's self-interest as the sole motivation for one's agency. However, it is the imperceptible, subjective moral order of practical reason that makes it possible for one to act contrary to self-interest (but never independent of self-interest).¹⁹ 'Relative worth' is a matter of exchange of 'accidents' or 'fruits' (objects, money) of the public marketplace. The worth of something is determined by that for which it can be exchanged. However, there is one, and only one, 'absolute worth,' and that is human dignity because it is inalienable and no thing or no other can be substituted for it.²⁰

In other words, there are legitimate grounds for critiquing one's own and another's religious tradition (or pluralism, generally) *without succumbing to intellectual or cultural imperialism. We overcome enthusiastic, speculative metaphysics and dehumanizing prejudices neither by ignoring and discounting nor by absolutizing the differences and identities of particularity* but by *focusing on the universal conditions and capacities that make responsible creativity possible.*

When it comes to religious, metaphysical claims, particular, literal, anthropomorphic analogies are incapable of grounding theistic claims because the analogies constitute a vicious circle. We cannot be certain which of our grounding, human characteristics is the appropriate base for our analogies (e.g., thinking, planning, willing, creating, loving, etc.) used to describe God. Nonetheless, we project them onto God, and we declare that, whatever we've chosen among anthropomorphic characteristics to ground our claim, they were originally created by God. A vicious circle ensues: God *must have* intentionally created the human characteristics that are, in turn,

17. On 'physical' and 'moral character', see 801, n. 310.

18. For example, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin possesses dignity, but they are entirely undeserving of respect.

19. See the opening paragraphs of Section II of Kant's, *Groundwork* AA IV: 406–408.

20. On 'absolute worth' and 'human dignity', see Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 434–43, 449–450. In *Religion*, Kant distinguishes among animality (Tierheit) or merely instinctual agency, humanity (Menschheit) or pursuit of social status and prestige, and personality (Persönlichkeit) or degree of self-selecting of moral principles to govern one's autonomous freedom. On the individual as 'self-selecting' (not 'self-legislating') agent, see Chapter 7: 790, n. 265. On Kant's notion of 'respect', see *Religion* AA VI: 26 ff. Respect is a matter of 'humanity' (social status and prestige) whereas dignity is a matter of 'personality (imperceptible, responsible exercising of autonomous freedom)'.

projected upon Him [!]. For example, Scholastic 'Occasionalism'/'Voluntarism' denied the universal lawfulness of nature and morality claimed by Scholastic 'Intellectualism.' 'Occasionalism'/'Voluntarism' preserves God's exercising His [!] power to perform miracles but destroys the possibility of coherent understanding of the world by finite consciousness.²¹

When it comes to the social construction of morality thesis, it substitutes hypothetical imperatives for categorical imperatives without acknowledging any differences between them.²² Racism, misogyny, homophobia, child abuse, human trafficking, agism, prejudice over national origin, religious allegiance, etc., are taken to be wrong because they violate relative values of social construction. In fact, though, these socially constructed values are 'wrong' when *they substitute capricious accidents over which the individual has no control* (race, sex, gender, childhood vulnerability, economic exploitation, age, place of birth, even status and prestige in the eyes of others etc.) *for universal conditions and capacities* (dignity) *governed by universal laws* (categorical, not hypothetical imperatives).²³ Among such categorical imperatives, for example,

21. On Kant's rejection of miracles precisely because they make any and all understanding impossible, see in Chapter 8: 826.

22. On the difference between 'categorical' and 'hypothetical' imperatives, see Chapter 1: "Methodology:" 124, n. 65.

23. See Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 467–468: By pointing out that the recognition and identification of all prejudices is based on the 'accidents' of appearances, Kant's statement here constitutes an explicit rejection not only of racism, ageism, sexism, power or weakness, status and prestige (e.g., aristocracy) as criteria for judging others, but it is also an implicit rejection of homophobia, nationalism, populism, and any other criteria for judging others, which are all based on merely empirical criteria of 'theoretical reason' to the entire neglect of the capacities and moral significance of 'practical reason'. Kant writes in this "Remark:" "Given the title to what has just been discussed [in this section entitled: "On Vices that Violate the Duty of Respect Owed to Other Persons"], it is clear that what has been said here does not so much extol virtues as, more importantly, condemns their contrary. However, this lies in the concept of respect [*Achtung*] that we are obliged to demonstrate toward others, which is only a negative duty. -I am not [!] obliged to venerate others, positively [!], by demonstrating my esteem for them (merely observable as people). The only respect to which I am obligated by nature is that for the law (*reverere legem*) [respect's condition of possibility], and this, not to esteem others generally (*reverentia adversus hominem*) or to render some particular obligation to them, is the universal and unconditional duty owed to other persons, which can be expected from everyone as the original respect [*Achtung*] owed to all.

"Other forms of respect, which need demonstration, that is, with respect to human nature [*Beschaffenheit der Menschen*] or the individual's particular circumstances, namely, age, sex, genealogy [*Abstammung*], strengths or weaknesses, or even the individual's status and prestige [*Standes und Würde* mean "status and prestige" because "*Würde*," in the sense of human dignity from Section II of the *Groundwork*, is absolute, not capricious], which in part are due to capricious dispositions, have no place and require no classification in the presentation of the first principles of the doctrine of virtue [when it comes to the transcendental conditions and capacities of practical reason] because here one is concerned only with the pure principles of reason [not with the accidents of perception]." *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 468 (McGaughey translation). Especially to note is that Kant is no misogynist simply because, when he talks of women, he refers almost always to the 'Frauenzimmer' ('women's parlor'). On the 'Frauenzimmer' in the 18th C, see Christiane Brokmann-Nooren, *Weibliche Bildung im*

are that we not allow ourselves to be, or treat others as, mere means to ends but acknowledge all as ends in themselves,²⁴ the obligation of the maxims of the understanding that we think from the perspective of the other,²⁵ and the recognition that the preservation of the material conditions of life as the foundation for any and all experience, understanding, and exercising of responsible agency.

Put succinctly, philosophy can only point out ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news. The ‘good’ news is that it is possible to believe any and all causal explanations that one wishes! Because we only experience the effects of causes, our causal *explanations* of events come from us. They are not directly given with the appearances that are to be ‘explained’. Consequently, no one can prove us wrong. We always have the escape hatch of secondary causality or the illusion of grasping the most comprehensive totality of coherence that justifies our causal explanations even when parts are suspect. The ‘bad’ news, though, is that no one can prove us right! Because reason is limited by finite circumstances and the finite conditions of possibility and capacities of transcendental reason, we do not and cannot have access either to causes or to ‘all times and all places’ to establish the truth of the causal explanation we offer. The philosophical theologian draws the conclusion: We cannot establish with certainty the objective truth claims of our causal explanations of any given set of effects, but we can establish what the *necessary*, subjective conditions of possibility are for us to experience the phenomena that challenge us to provide a causal explanation. The touchstone of those

18. Jahrhundert. „Gelehrtes Frauenzimmer“ und „gefällige Gattin“ (Oldenburg: BIS Verlag, 1994). The ‘Frauenzimmer’ was the socially constructed institution for women of the upper classes and their maids that, parallel to the ‘men’s parlor’, constituted the environment for the ‘education’ of women. Kant’s own discussion of the ‘Frauenzimmer’ is neither a criticism of women universally nor a critique of the ‘women’s Parlor’ to establish its universal, transcendental conditions of possibility. He examines it as a very particular social institution of upper class women and their maids entirely in conformity with his understanding of a species as possessing a common ‘nature’ (seeds/Keimen), which must be cultivated and does so by means of interacting with its various, particular environments. In short, Kant does not judge what is worthy about women (or men, for that manner) on the basis of the particular products of their development or their achievements in the ‘Frauenzimmer’ but on the basis of their universal, transcendental capacities and potential.

Kant’s mother was no ‘Frauenzimmer’ either as a participant in a ‘women’s parlor’ or according to the pejorative dismissal of an individual woman. August Schreiner writes of Kant’s mother in Immanuel Kant, der Königsberger Weltweise (Königsberg, von Emil Rautenberg, 1861): 2-3: „For that time, she, as the wife of a craftsman, had a rare education, for which a house bible also serves as a certificate of this, in which she has written family news by hand according to the custom of that time [...]” Kant himself remembers his mother: as “ [...] a loving, sensitive, pious and righteous woman and a tender mother, who guided her children to the fear of God through pious teachings and by setting a virtuous example. She often took me outside the city, drew my attention to the works of God, [...] planted and nurtured the first seed of good in me, she opened my heart to the impressions of nature, she awakened and broadened my concepts, and her teachings have had a lasting, salutary influence on my life.” In Immanuel Kant. Ein lebensbild nach Darstellungen der Zeitgenossen Borowski, Jachmann, Wasianski, Hermann Schwarz ed. (Halle a.S.: Hugo Peter, 1907): 168-169. Such a description by no means conveys the conviction of a misogynist.

24. See Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 429.

25. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* V: 293–294.

necessary, subjective conditions of objective experience is lawfulness. Where there is no lawfulness, there is no understanding, and the call to shut down understanding to allow for a causality that contradicts lawfulness is equivalent to putting a bullet through one's head.

Where there is no lawful order, there is no incentive to seek understanding. What we have learned, though, is that, if we assume lawfulness, we achieve a 'sovereignty' over (not a capricious subordination of) phenomena that enhances understanding the more our investigations lead to ever greater comprehension and coherence of the two lawful systems required for us to experience, understand, and exercise responsible creative agency (physical and moral laws).

This finite 'faith' is no absolute denial of the afterlife, Kant well understood.²⁶ However, he does strenuously question any conception of the afterlife that undermines our transcendental capacity to govern our decision-taking by self-selecting (not self-created),²⁷ universal moral principles, which are 'right because they are right,' not because they serve self-interest (see below). To be sure, we can never be certain that our motivation is not self-interest, but, if we consciously give ourselves permission to act on the basis of a moral principle that we would want to be universal like a law of nature, we can be certain that we have not acted merely on the basis of self-interest.²⁸

Lest the reader be tempted to respond in light of Paul's dismissal of human reason (I Corinthians 1:18–21) that "the philosopher is elevating human reason to the throne of God,"²⁹ by telling us what God is or is not and surreptitiously fostering some set of external, heteronomous (divine or culturally relative) system of ethical norms to privilege the self-interest of some social group (culturally, religious, economic, or political), it must be pointed out: It is not the philosopher who has elevated humanity to occupying the throne of God. Theology itself in all of its forms (with the exception of Kant's philosophical theology!³⁰) has from its very beginning placed humanity and not merely reason on the divine throne because all forms of theism require anthropomorphic analogies and apply anthropomorphic characteristics to God. We require analogies whenever we speak of God precisely because of the *limits to reason*. Even the Christian Platonist, Jonathan Edwards, warned against taking internal voices

26. See "5) Kant claimed no role for the resurrection and ascension of Christ." 836 ff.

27. On translating *selbstgesetzgebend* as 'self-selecting' rather than 'self-legislating', see 790, n. 265.

28. See the beginning of the Second Section of the *Groundwork* AA IV: 406–408.

29. This is the charge against Strauß made by Eschenmayer. See Strauß, "Die Herren [Carl August von] Eschenmayer und [Wolfgang] Menzel" (1837). In *Streitschriften* II: 37. It is also Karl Barth's claim in *Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert. Ihre Vorgeschichte und ihre Geschichte* (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1981): 40, 53–56, 85 100 ff.

30. Kant calls his philosophy 'philosophical theology'. See the "Preface to the First Edition" of *Religion* AA VI: 9.

to be God's voice or angels' voices,³¹ which can be confused for God's voice or angels' voices only because we have already experience voices as finite beings.

The issue here is not a contradiction between philosophy and theology in which human hubris challenges God. Both philosophy and theology must, and only can, use anthropomorphic analogies when speaking of God, and, given the fact that, especially theological systems tend to view humanity as the pinnacle of finite reality, it perhaps appears natural to attribute what we experience as finite capacities to an infinite deity (to be sure 'perfectly') because that deity 'created' us. As Kant pointed out in the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, though, the issue is not analogies or no analogies but 'literal,' anthropomorphic analogies and 'symbolic,' anthropomorphic analogies.³²

Without embracing 'symbolic' anthropomorphic analogies for understanding of God, we cannot understand experience (especially, our experience of top-down causality of biological systems that are 'more than the sum of their parts' but, nonetheless, adheres to lawfulness). However, those 'symbolic,' anthropomorphic analogies are of value not for what they objectively say about 'God' but only to the extent that they give us an insight into the subjective conditions that allow us to be the responsible, finite creatures that we are capable of being, but not required to be.

The same is true of the afterlife. Denial of the afterlife would be a re-producing (*bestimmende*) judgment beyond our finite limits.³³ However, the fact that we cannot deny the afterlife is no justification for our conceiving it, again, on the basis of anthropomorphic analogies, as a physical location beyond this world reached by the apocalypse and/or the grace of God. Such anthropomorphic analogies, in fact, undermine humanity's moral efforts.

In addition to the 'culture of skills,' Kant speaks of the 'culture that promotes the (moral) will,' morally but not heteronomously.³⁴ A 'culture that promotes the (moral) will' fosters human creativity and the conducting of one's life on the basis of an internal moral order, knowable only to the individual, that emphasizes moral effort on the basis of 'what is right' and shared with all transcendental consciousness as a 'moral culture.' However, the goal of moral effort is not moral perfection³⁵ in this or the 'next' life or winning divine praise, nor does it consist of heteronomous moralism that seeks external imposition of a socially constructed ethic on the individual. Rather, moral

31. See the "First Sign" in Jonathan Edwards, *Religious Affections*, Vol. 2 of *The Works of Jonathan Edwards* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959): 210–211.

32. See Kant, *Prolegomena*: AA IV: 356–357.

33. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 769–770 where he rejects Johann Georg Sulzer's confidence that one day there will be a proof of God and the afterlife. Kant equally recognizes that there cannot be a disproof of God and the afterlife, either. The importance of these ideas (along with the other ideas of pure reason) is their role with respect to what we know is necessary for us to exercise our theoretical and practical reason in this life.

34. See Kant's distinction between the 'culture of skills' and the 'culture that promotes the (moral) will' in the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 431–432.

35. On moral perfection as a capacity not an achievement, see the "Foreword: 28, n. 11.

effort is required in this life to be(come) a finite human being and is anchored in universal dignity (not in external accomplishment, especially not external respect/honor).

A 'culture that promotes the (moral) will' also calls for the pursuit of republican government based on the separation of powers,³⁶ and the establishment of an international order (not world government) to adjudicate international issues for the benefit of all. The only version of 'perpetual peace' that is compatible with our finite, transcendental consciousness is a perpetual peace in this life. Should it turn out that there is an afterlife, there is nothing about the pursuit of perpetual peace in this life that would deny one's being 'rewarded' in the next life.³⁷

20th C anti-metaphysics threw the baby out with the bathwater with its facile rejection of all notions of metaphysics and its embrace of morality as grounded merely in the relative socially constructed rules and norms of individual communities, institutions, and traditions.

Open-ended understanding either in the form of Gadamer's juridical model or Ricoeur's three-fold mimesis of narrative pre-, con-, and re-figuration,³⁸ elevates cleverness (even understanding the author better than her-/himself³⁹) above what *ought to be understood and done* – although Gadamer reminds us that we are accountable to the text.⁴⁰ However, it is not that Ricoeur and Gadamer are wrong with their interpretive claims about the 'text.' The problem is that their focus is on 'objective' knowledge claims, which can never be certain, to the neglect of the 'subjective,' yet universal, conditions of possibility and capacities of transcendental consciousness required for there to be anything like an experience of an 'objective' reality. In other

36. On the requirement of a republican constitution and the separation of powers, see Kant *Perpetual Peace* AA VIII: 352, where he speaks of the administrative and legislative powers. However, see as well, *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 313, 316 where he adds the 'judiciary power' and the subordination of all three 'as moral persons' to the republican constitution AA VI: 316. The first description of a constitution (*politeia*) based on the separation of powers was not Montesquieu's *The Spirit of Laws* (1748) (most likely Kant's source), but Polybius (200 – 118 BCE) who wrote in his *Histories* Book VI: 11–16 of the Roman constitution of his day that had the structure: Consuls (Administration), Senate (Budget, Judiciary), and Tribunes/People (Legislative) with the success or failure dependent upon the virtue of those exercising the different offices. Polybius wrote: "As for the Roman constitution, it had three elements each of them possessing sovereign powers: and their respective share of power in the whole state had been regulated with such a scrupulous regard to equality and equilibrium, that no one could say for certain, not even a native, whether the constitution as a whole were an aristocracy or democracy or despotism. And no wonder: for if we confine our observation to the power of the Consuls we should be inclined to regard it as despotic; if on that of the Senate, as aristocratic; and if finally one looks at the power possessed by the people it would seem a clear case of a democracy." (Book VI: 11) From the Perseus Digital Library (November 13, 2024): <https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/xmlchunk?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0234%3Abook%3D6%3Achapter%3D11>.

37. See Kant, *Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project* AA VIII: 343–86.

38. See Paul Ricoeur, Vol. I of *Time and Narrative* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984): 45–71.

39. See Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975): 323.

40. See Gadamer, *Truth and Method*: 236, 260, and 278.

words, they have appropriately emphasized what Kant called the enthusiasm of 'wit' over what are the disciplined necessities of 'reflecting judgment',⁴¹ but they do so without Kant's metaphysics of transcendental consciousness that consists of the universal, *a priori* synthetic elements of theoretical reason and practical reason. We are left applauding the clever insights of interpreters and being more concerned about whose metaphors are dominating a discipline while leaving ourselves culpable for the injustices of everyone (including our own) because there is only epistemological and moral relativism. Most destructive is that, with the unreflective emphasis in the natural sciences on empiricism, what Kant means by practical reason is entirely eclipsed and understanding becomes exclusively a concern of theoretical (more accurately, *instrumental*) reason driven by 'scientism,' not science.

Strauß' Metaphysics

I will demonstrate that Strauß' own metaphysics across his career employed three, related dialectics from Hegelian metaphysics for his 'Panlogism':⁴²

- a) "The Hegelian, Logical Dialectic of Epistemology" based on a distinction between content (*Inhalt*) and representations (*Form*). This distinction is taken to be that between 'truth and actuality,' knowledge and imagination. It provides the logic of 'husk' (*Form*) and 'kernel' (*Inhalt*), but also is a reversal of Kant's notions of content (*Inhalt*; *sinnliche Anschauung*) and form (abstraction, *intellektuelle Anschauung*), which illustrates the profound difference between rapturist (*schwärmerische*),⁴³ Hegelian Idealism and Kant's Critical Idealism;
- b) "The Hegelian, *a posteriori* Logical Dialectic of Negation" based on 'identity and difference' that distinguishes between 'this and that,' which is claimed to account for creation arising out of Hegel's sole *a priori* synthetic judgment, Absolute Spirit; and
- c) "The Hegelian, Logical Dialectic of Theodicy" based on good and evil that distinguishes between 'morality' (abstract duties) and 'ethics' (concrete life-world attempts of application of abstract duties) that denies moral 'success'.⁴⁴

41. On the difference among 'wit', imagination, and reflecting judgment, see: 20, n. 3.

42. Strauß' biographer, Theobald Ziegler, calls Hegel a 'Panlogist' and 'Arch-Rationalist'. See Theobald Ziegler, I: 257: "For Hegel reason was Logos, the ratio World Principle; he was a Panlogist, which one could translate as 'Arch-Rationalist'." I prefer the label 'Pan-en-theist'. On Hegel as a Pan-en-theist, see: 214, n. 1.

43. On the difference between an 'enthusiast' and a 'rapturist,' see the "Foreword:" 27, n. 10.

44. I will point out, though, that the later Strauß, in addition to Hegel's Logical Dialectic of Theodicy that stresses the unachievability of moral perfection, employs Jakob Böhme's thesis of evil as necessary negation to account for the dynamic process of life.

Although Strauß rejected Hegel's meta-narrative, these dialectics continued to shape his later work. All three illuminate Strauß' *nominal similarity with, but ultimate differences* from, Kant's Critical Idealism.

Kant's Defense of Metaphysics

Kant calls all philosophy that is based on experience 'empirical,' which includes his own metaphysics. Nonetheless, to the extent that philosophy requires *a priori* principles, it is 'pure.' However, *pure* ideas are not *empty* ideas because they occur for finite, transcendental consciousness only in and through appearances. *It would never dawn on us to look for the imperceptible, a priori capacities that make experience, understanding, and agency possible, did we not experience, first, empirical phenomena.*

Logic is *formally* 'pure' because it is concerned solely with *a priori* principles. It is a canon (rules) without an organon of moral principles that govern the canon.⁴⁵ Metaphysics, in contrast, is concerned with *a priori* principles of theoretical reason that are required by the particulars of experience as well as concerned with the moral principles and free agency of practical reason. The quintessential form of metaphysics is mathematics, which is a canon with an organon. Unlike formal logic, mathematics is a set of rules that require phenomena. In short, metaphysics, for Kant, stands between formal, pure logic and reductionist materialism. Its *a priori* elements, which are not given directly in phenomena, are 'pure' yet are required by experience because they are required in order for there to be anything like a conscious (and intentional) experience of, and with, phenomena:

One can call empirical all philosophy in so far as it is based on grounds of experience; one can call philosophy that presents its doctrines solely from *a priori* principles *pure* philosophy. The latter, if it is merely formal, is called *logic*;⁴⁶ but if it is restricted [*eingeschränkt*] to particular [*bestimmte*] objects of the understanding it is called *metaphysics*.⁴⁷

45. On logic as a canon without an organon and mathematics as a canon inseparable from an organon, see: 49, n. 36.

46. For a further clarification of logic as pure philosophy, see Kant's "The Concept of Logic" in *Logic* AA IX: 11–16.

47. Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 388. In the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*, Kant further distinguishes between 'metaphysical' principles of theoretical and practical reason and the 'transcendental' principles of consciousness itself that are the required conditions of possibility for metaphysics. See Section V of the "Introduction:" AA V: 181 ff.

Kant's understanding of metaphysics, then, is profoundly different from either a 'standing'/vertical Platonism (Christianity's Personal Theism) or a 'reclining'/horizontal Platonism (Hegel's Absolute Spirit).⁴⁸

Platonism in both these forms claims to provide *an eminent, efficient, causal explanation* (independent of the causal sequence itself) for all 'that is.' The 'ultimate' cause of 'what is' for Personal Theism is an anthropomorphic deity who creates copies and shadows (λόγος προφορικός) by following a mental plan of ideas (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος (Philo's explanation for why there are two accounts of creation at the opening of Genesis)).⁴⁹ The *ultimate, efficient, causal explanation* of 'what is' for Hegel is the sole *a priori* Concept (Absolute Spirit) for whom all other ideas are *a posteriori* products of dialectic because they are the result of a logic of negation.⁵⁰

Metaphysics for Kant, then, is neither Hegel's epistemological dialectic of content (*Inhalt*) and representations (*Form*), nor Hegel's meta-narrative driven by the 'necessary' (meaning determining) of an *a posteriori* dialectical logic of Double Negation, nor Hegel's dialectical logic of absolute duty and failed ethics whose synthesis, for Hegel, is to escape sensuousness by means of the divinization, that is, the 'turn to indifference' of the Second Negation that 'returns' to Absolute Spirit.

Kant's notion of metaphysics is a 'pure,' intelligible dimension of experience *inseparable from phenomena's sensible dimension* that explicitly dismisses all *ultimate, efficient, causal, explanations* of 'what is' as speculative enthusiasm as enthusiasm if not rapture.⁵¹ In other words, *Kant's 'pure' reason is not Hegel's 'pure thought'*.⁵²

For Critical Idealism, neither the *a priori* synthetic elements of transcendental consciousness nor facts alone drive understanding. *Understanding always begins with appearances (but not merely Hegel's representational images of 'actuality' that are gov-*

48. On reading Plato's Simile of the Line as 'vertical' or 'horizontal', see: 19, n. 1 and Chapter 8: "1) Hegel's Reclined Plato and Kant as a 'Subjectivist'." 811 ff.

49. Philo of Alexandria employed this 'two-step' conception of creativity to account for the two accounts of creation at the opening of the Book of Genesis. See paragraph 16 of *de opificio mundi* and, especially, the clarifying footnote concerning the "double" creation of humanity in "Über die Welterschöpfung," [*de opificio mundi*] in Band I of *Philo von Alexandria. Die Werke in deutscher Übersetzung* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1962): 53, n. 2.

Max Pohlenz acknowledges that it is not clear whether the distinction between λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λόγος προφορικός comes from the Platonic Academy or the Stoics. See Pohlenz, *Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung*. 7. Ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992): 39, 185. It appears to be what structures Plato's account of the Demiurge's creation of the world in the *Timaeus* (27d ff; 69b-70a). Unquestionably, it is a foundational distinction for the Stoics (see Polenz, *op. cit.*, 35-47. It is a distinction ubiquitous in the Western tradition (e.g., see Pohlenz, *ibid.*: Philo of Alexandria (373-375), Areios of Alexandria (435), Justin Martyr (412), Tertullian (439), Augustine (451)).

50. On Hegel's sole *a priori* Concept, see above "Preface:" 61. On Kant's rejection of dialectic for grounding the ultimate, causal ground of 'what is,' see *Critique of Pure Reason* B 697 and Chapter 6: 670.

51. For Kant's understanding of enthusiasm (*Enthusiasmus*) and rapture (*Schwärmerei*), see: 27, n. 10.

52. See Chapter 6: "Grand Narratives of Theoretical Reason:" 654.

erned by the ‘cunning of reason’). However, *understanding must add elements* (universal, *a priori* synthetic judgments/assumptions) *that are not in the appearances*. These elements must be distinguished from elements that are only wishful thinking and serving of merely self- and communal interest. The assumptions that drive not only proper understanding of ‘what is’ (theoretical reason) but also for properly seeking to achieve ‘what ought to be’ (practical reason) ‘rise above’ merely sensuous interest – *even as they are inseparable from sensuous interest*.

The distinction between ‘what is required to make sense of appearances (theoretical reason) and to exercise responsible agency’ (practical reason) in contrast to ‘what is merely sensuous self-interest’ makes all the difference between a creature mechanically determined by natural causality and a creature capable of assuming responsibility for its agency.

In other words, what is required of a creature to be able to assume accountability for its agency (practical reason) is grounded in a paradoxical ‘requirement:’ the capability of autonomous, creative freedom-for intentional, creative agency that is an inseparable freedom-from nature’s ‘blind’ causality. Freedom-for, then, is never experienced independent of nature but not reducible to nature. Autonomous freedom is a finite, eminent *cause* that is incapable of proof/disproof because it can never appear directly in the senses (as the case with all causal ‘explanations’/accounts) but is capable of defense.⁵³

Kant provides a defense of autonomous freedom on the basis of the *a priori* synthetic necessities of theoretical and practical reason already in the *Critique of Pure Reason* when he rejects Platonic Idealism in support of his claim that the *necessities* of reason are inseparable from perception (*sensible Anschauung*).⁵⁴ In short, his defense of Critical Idealism is that the necessities of reason are inseparable from perception (*sensible Anschauung*) and that all causal explanation for transcendental consciousness is inseparable from space and time. In contrast, Platonic Idealism not only claims that there is a dimension of ideas independent of space and time but also claims that they have causal efficacy in themselves. Kant points out that ‘everything actual is possible;’ “some possibilities are actual;” “there is much that is possible that is not actual.” However, it is impossible for understanding “to grasp the totality of the possible” because all understanding requires coupling with perception (*sensible Anschauung*).⁵⁵ Therefore, ‘ideas’ are no causal realm independent of perception in space and time, but autonomous freedom is an appropriate deduction of one of the necessary conditions of possibility that are required in order for us to experience, understand, and exercise responsible agency in a world of space and time – along with all other finite, *a priori* synthetic judgments of causality.

53. See Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 459.

54. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* the “Explanation” and “Refutation of Idealism” in “4. The Postulates of Empirical Thought in General” B 266 – B 294.

55. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 283- B 284.

Despite the misleading label for reason as the capacity of 'desire',⁵⁶ which gives the impression that reason was defined by its objective goals, Kant provides, in addition to his defense (absent an explanation) of autonomous freedom in the *Groundwork*,⁵⁷ a 'negative method' in his 'philosophical anthropology' by which he distinguishes himself from the Stoics, Epicureans, the Cynics, Sophists, morbid melancholy, alcohol as well as mystical escapism, and passively waiting on divine grace.⁵⁸ Furthermore, in his *Menschenkunde*, section "36) The Capacity for (Rational) Desire (*Begehrungsvermögen*)," he gives an account of the role of the 'formal inclinations' (*Hänge*) of reason, which has no particular object but is, nonetheless, always related to objects, in contrast to the 'material inclinations' (*Hänge*) of sense perception, which are driven by their objects.⁵⁹ Rather than *Lust und Unlust* (pleasure and displeasure or happiness and pain) recommending a 'turn inward' to 'escape' from (or to achieve a status of 'equanimity' with respect to) the world as with the Stoics, Epicureans, Cynics, etc., when it comes to the *Lust/Unlust* of reason, Kant shifts the focus, from such 'material inclinations' to concentrate on 'formal inclinations.' In his philosophical anthropology, freedom-from (*Unlust*) and freedom-for (*Lust*) have a function in addition to their being deduced causalities out of perception (*sensible Anschauungen*) and 'unique' (to be sure in degree) to transcendental consciousness.

Pleasure and displeasure motivate human agency as a set of internal capacities whose ultimate goal is moral culture. Moral culture, though, aims to act not only as individuals but also as a society, and a species on the basis of a universal (wide) moral principles, not narrow self-interest. However, this is no 'reduction' of the human condition to the pursuit of ethical consequences Kant defines 'taste' as 'judgment about what pleases universally.'⁶⁰ Taste is not mere enjoyment (*Genießen*),⁶¹ not fashion (which is a matter of barbarism),⁶² not the proclivity of savoring (*Geschmacksneigung*) (which is weakness),⁶³ not a proclivity to sensuous 'goodness',⁶⁴ but a 'matter of reason'⁶⁵ in that "[t]aste promotes ideal pleasures and makes us capable of pleasures that we could not have through the enjoyment of the senses."⁶⁶

Taste is a consequence of sociability, and its formation is an education of the human being, in view of its true perfection, which brings one closer to morality.

56. See the "Introduction" to the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 198.

57. See Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 459–460.

58. See "Kant's 'Negative Method':" at 45, n. 28.

59. See Kant, *Menschenkunde* XXV,2: 1140–1142; Olms ed.: 334–336.

60. On taste as what 'pleases universally,' see Kant, *Menschenkunde* XXV,2: 1095; Olms ed.: 279.

61. On taste as not mere enjoyment, see Kant, *Menschenkunde* XXV,2: 1098; Olms ed.: 283.

62. On taste as not fashion, see Kant, *Menschenkunde* XXV,2: 1099; on fashion as barbarism, see Kant, *Menschenkunde* XXV,2: 1105; Olms ed.: 284, 291.

63. On taste as not savoring, see Kant, *Menschenkunde* XXV,2: 1099–1100; Olms ed.: 285.

64. On taste as not sensuous 'goodness,' see Kant, *Menschenkunde* XXV,2: 1100; Olms ed.: 286.

65. On taste as a matter of reason, see Kant, *Menschenkunde* XXV,2: 1100, 1102; Olms ed.: 286, 288.

66. On taste promoting ideal pleasures, see Kant, *Menschenkunde* XXV,2: 1102; Olms ed.: 288.

The more a person's taste is developed, the more receptive and capable one is of transitioning into good thinking [= the pleasure of thought/reason].⁶⁷

Another example of pleasure motivating agency is studying, which Kant calls 'pleasure pleasing itself'.⁶⁸

However, the purpose of displeasure/pain is to motivate agency, also. Rather than pain and suffering leading to the conclusion that they are the fundamental condition because all 'happiness' is transient and presupposes pain, which justifies escaping from (or seeking a state of equanimity with respect to) the world (a form of *autonomous freedom-from*) and rather than leading to ennui as well as to suicidal depression, Kant points out that pain and suffering are a motivation to responsible agency (*autonomous freedom-for*).⁶⁹ In other words, displeasure/pain stimulates self-conscious, creative agency in order to escape displeasure/pain. Only a creature with such a transcendental consciousness can exercise, intentionally, creative agency, and only such an intentionally, creative agent can (but is not required to) hold itself accountable for its actions. Displeasure/pain, then, is a stimulus to morality.

Humanity achieves it morally, highest aim in that culture which 1) promotes the moral will, not merely in a culture of technical skill,⁷⁰ and such a moral culture 2) seeks a 'republican' government with its separation of the administrative, legislative, and judiciary powers⁷¹ and, possibly, even cosmopolitanism of the human community beyond national states.⁷² All this is only possible because "[r]eason must employ the law of association [reflecting judgment] so that [the deduction of] rules lead to their laws and provide reason with its goals [...]. This law of association (not to be confused with the 'shared understanding' of *sensus communis*) must always serve understanding in order to provide fantasy with guardrails."⁷³ Kant does not deny that happiness/pleasure presupposes pain/displeasure, but he maintains that "[...] a great happiness [...]. is good when we can extract a consolation from all adversities [...]."⁷⁴

Only for a creature that both is determined and, to a degree, is 'free' of external determination is it left up to that creature to decide whether or not it will assume responsibility for its agency. In other words, only a creature possessing autonomous

67. Kant, *Menschenkunde* XXV,2: 1096; Olms ed.: 281.

68. Kant, *Menschenkunde* XXV,2: 1093; Olms ed.: 277.

69. See Kant, *Menschenkunde* XXV,2: 1069–1072; Olms ed.: 249–252.

70. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 431–432.

71. See Kant *Perpetual Peace* AA VIII: 352, where he speaks of the administrative and legislative powers. However, see as well, *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 313, 316 and the subordination of all three 'as moral persons' to the republican constitution AA VI: 316.

72. See Kant, *Conflict of the Faculties*, AA VII: 85–94. See as well, Kant's *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* AA VIII: 17–31. In *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project*, Kant proposes a "federation of free states" (AA VIII: 354 ff.) at the minimum a "peace alliance" (*ibid.*, 356, 385). See as well, *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (AA VIII: 24 ff.) and §54 of the "Doctrine of Right" in the *Metaphysics of Morals* (AA VI: 344).

73. Kant, *Menschenkunde* XXV,2: 948; Olms ed.: 110.

74. Kant, *Menschenkunde* XXV,2: 1095; Olms. ed.: 279.

freedom, which is the capacity intentionally to do things that material nature on its own could never accomplish, has the capacity (but is not required) to assume personal responsibility for what it does. This shift in perspective from external achievement to internal capacity, then, is crucial for understanding the human condition as capable of being a moral creature. *We are not moral beings because we 'should be' but because we 'can be.'*⁷⁵

"The Moral View of the World"

The "Moral View of the World is Hegel's account of Personal Theism's moral duty: God as a Person, the 'absolute, other consciousness' over against 'finite, individual consciousness' bound to the world of sensuality. The moral world of Personal Theism," according to Hegel, is divided into 'Morality' and 'Ethics.' The former is the absolute, perfect, and abstract, divine, moral command 'in-and-for itself' whereas the latter is the actual fulfilment (or lack of fulfilment) of the abstract command limited by the circumstances of natural, sensuous aims of individuals 'in-and-for themselves.'⁷⁶ 'Morality' (*Moralität/Pflicht*) itself consists of ideal, abstract duty. Yet, according to Hegel, moral consciousness "cannot renounce happiness [which comes with the actualization of morality by means of the natural, sensuous aims that is ethics]. Nonetheless, the harmony of morality and happiness (ethical fulfilment) is a postulate, not an actuality."⁷⁷ In actuality, ethics (*Sittlichkeit*) is an unobtainable, abstract consciousness of moral duty in conflict with the impulses evoked by sensuality.⁷⁸ With sensuality

75. See Kant, *Conflict of the Faculties* AA VII: 43–44 although he acknowledges a possible role of 'grace' here to assist our ability to act according to the moral law, he immediately qualifies that grace is no necessary doctrine. Not to be overlooked, of course, is that Kant's notion of 'moral improvement' does not demand external perfection but internal effort. See Kant's "General Remark" in at the very end of Part IV of *Religion* AA VI: 191–202. Kant's formulation in the *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 4* is that "[...] freedom, indeed, is the moral law's *ratio essendi*, but the moral law is freedom's *ratio cognoscendi*." In other words, autonomous freedom is the reason for there being anything like a moral law, whereas the identification of even a single moral law 'requires' that there be a species capable of autonomous freedom. *Every causal system* (in this case, autonomous freedom) *presupposes a lawful order that governs it*. In the case of physical nature, material causality requires physical lawfulness whereas, the causal system of autonomous freedom requires wide, moral laws – above socially constructed rules and civic laws. Consequently, the identification of merely one such moral law (for example, 'one should not lie,' 'one should keep one's promises,' 'one should not take advantage of the ignorance of others,' 'one should not bear false witness,' 'one should develop one's talents,' 'one should respond to the suffering of others') is sufficient to illuminate the causal system of autonomous freedom that such a moral law presupposes.

76. Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 442–443 (Baillie trans: 615–616).

77. Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 444–445 (Baillie trans: 617).

78. Hegel had stressed the unattainability of ethics (*Sittlichkeit*) already in 1803 in "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten:" GW II: 484–485.

as the opposite to, and negation of, pure duty and with the abstract unity of moral duty as the ultimate essence of morality, "[...] it seems as if the unity [that resolves the opposition between morality and sensibility/ethics] can be brought about only by doing away with sensuality."⁷⁹

However, sensuality is the moment of actuality [*Wirklichkeit*], which ensures that moral duty is no 'empty abstraction', so that unity *must be* brought about by "sensuality being in conformity with morality."⁸⁰ "Concrete action" which connects the two "final purposes" of morality and sensuality ("pure" duty" of morality and the 'substantial duty' of ethics).⁸¹ "Pure duty" is sacred and "indifferent"⁸² towards all specific content."⁸³ The other, ethical 'substantial existence' of concrete sensuality] "[...] contains the equally essential relation to the process of action, and the necessity, therefore, of determinant content"⁸⁴ because, otherwise, moral duty would be 'empty'.

In the 'moral' view of the world, according to Hegel, God as the "Absolute" (not Hegel's Absolute Spirit) "[...] distributes ["by means of grace"⁸⁵] happiness according to 'worthiness,' i.e. according to the 'merit' ascribed to imperfect consciousness."⁸⁶ Hegel says the distribution of merit according to worthiness "constitutes the meaning [failure] of the moral attitude."⁸⁷ In this moral world view, morality is freedom as "pure thought" over against sensuality or nature, which for itself "is equally free."⁸⁸ Given the disharmony between these two 'freedoms,' there is always a "want of harmony between the consciousness of duty and actual reality" of ethics with the consequence that "there is no actual existence which is moral"⁸⁹ although it "ought to be."

Hegel writes at the conclusion to "The Moral View of the World:"

[...][T]he first proposition, that there is a moral self-consciousness, is [...] bound up with the second that there is none; that is to say, there is one, but merely in idea. *In other words,*

79. Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 446 (Baillie trans: 619.)

80. Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 446 (Baillie trans: 619).

81. Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 447–448 (Baillie trans: 620–621). Duty as 'wholly and absolutely' 'sacred' 'falls outside' 'concrete action'. GW III: 449.

82. Note Hegel's use of 'indifference' here is exactly as it is used in the "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten." On 'indifference' as both a turn to non-difference (One-ness) and affectless (irrelevant) as the 'point of indifference,' see the "Preface:" 50.

83. Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 448 (Baillie trans: 621–622). Hegel says of duty that it "[...] falls outside actual consciousness[:]; this latter [...] stands altogether on one side as incomplete moral consciousness" (GW III: 449 (Baillie trans: 623) because duty is perfect in opposition to actuality (GW III: 449 [Baillie trans: 623]).

84. Hegel, *Phänomenologie*: GW III: 448 (Baillie trans: 622).

85. Hegel, *Phänomenologie*: GW III: 449–450 (Baillie trans.: 623).

86. Hegel, *Phänomenologie*: GW III: 450 (Baillie trans.: 624).

87. Hegel, *Phänomenologie*: GW III: 450 (Baillie trans.: 624).

88. Hegel, *Phänomenologie*: GW III: 451 (Baillie trans.: 625).

89. Hegel, *Phänomenologie*: GW III: 452 (Baillie trans.: 626).

*there is indeed none, but it is all the same allowed by some other consciousness [the God of Personal Theism] to pass for one.*⁹⁰ (emphasis added)

In contrast to "The Moral View of the World," Hegel's own resolution to the impossibility of ethical fulfilment of moral duty is achieved not by a notion of divine grace but by 'God' (now, as Hegel's non-Personal Absolute Spirit) working Itself out by means of a dialectical logic of Double Negation to achieve Its Self-awareness in spite of the moral efforts of humanity. In the "Introduction" to his posthumously published *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, Hegel asserts that the actual world is not an ethical abomination. Rather,

[t]he insight [...] to which [...] philosophy is to lead us, is that the real world is as it ought to be – that *the truly good – universal divine reason – is* not a mere abstraction, but a vital principle capable of *realizing itself*. This Good, this Reason, in its most concrete form, is God. God governs the world; the actual working of his government—the carrying out of His plan—is the History of the World.⁹¹ (emphasis added)

Hegel had written earlier in the "Introduction" that this plan is never

[...] exposed to danger. It remains in the background, untouched and uninjured. This may be called the *cunning of reason* [...] The particular is for the most part of too trifling value as compared with the general: individuals are sacrificed and abandoned [...] [I]ndividuals come under the category of means to an ulterior end, – there is one aspect of human individuality which we should hesitate to regard in that subordinate light, even in relation to the highest; since it is absolutely no subordinate element, but exists in those individuals as inherently eternal and divine. I mean, morality, ethics, religion [...] That is to say, *man is an object of existence in himself only in virtue of the divine that is in him*, – that which was designated at the outset as *reason* [...] ⁹² (emphasis added)

In short, Hegel's understanding of religion is not concerned with morality and ethics but the achievement of Self-awareness on the part of God 'Itself' (by Absolute Reason or the Concept Itself) under the finite conditions of history. The purpose of all finite conditions of history, including the purpose of morality and ethics, is not the consequentialist aim of what they can and cannot accomplish in themselves. Rather, their purpose is the extent that they are understood as *the veil of the truth of Reason* (non unlike the 'veil of Mithra'), working Its aim out in the background. All else is subordinate to this ultimate goal – even the frustrations of ethics by humanity's inability to live up to the absolute standards of morality. In short, ethical failure, which is the individual's failure to fulfil its moral duty in order to achieve the merit of being

90. Hegel, *Phänomenologie*: GW III: 452 (Baillie trans.: 626–627).

91. Hegel, "Introduction" to *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*: GW XII: 53. (Sibree trans.: 38).

92. Hegel, "Introduction" to *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* GW XII: 49 (Sibree trans.: 34–35).

"well-pleasing" to God, is subordinated to Reason and sacrificed as of too trifling value compared with the achievement of Reason. *Ethical failure is only a signal of the achievement of Reason.*

Hegel on "I should, but I can't" in Contrast to Kant's "If I should, I can"

According to Hegel, morality is naïve if taken to mean "If I should, I can" because one can't be ethical. Ethical perfection is an illusion. Nevertheless, 'the world is still good' – not because of the individual's ethical achievements but because of Absolute Spirit's 'cunning of reason.' Hegel maintains the absolute demand of moral perfection, but he relativizes the failures of ethical achievement by subordinating all finite experience to the meta-narrative of Reason coming to awareness of itself. *The world is good because Reason is good!*⁹³

In dramatic contrast to Hegel, morality, for Kant, is not driven by 'should' but by 'can.' Whether there is another species that can or not, we experience ourselves as capable of exercising autonomous agency over against nature, and it is the degree to which we exercise an autonomy *above our naturally determined capacities*, not that we possess a degree of freedom over against social institutions, that defines our autonomous freedom.

Equally significant, autonomous freedom is not a matter of mere degree of spontaneous choice. This shift from 'content' or the 'should' of moral laws to 'capacities' or the 'can' of autonomous freedom is the crucial (required, but not determining) condition for there to be a creature capable of assuming responsibility for its agency. Furthermore, the distinction between 'what is required' for us to be responsible agents and 'what is merely wishful self-interest' (or between capacities and giving ourselves permission to exercise those capacities) is what allows us to distinguish between: "If I *can*, I should;" and "If I *should*, I can!"⁹⁴

93. Hegel is taking Plato's ἐπικείνα τῆς οὐσίας (the 'above' Being/ideas) of the *Republic* 509b to be the Good in a moral sense (*It is perfection*), not in the Kantian (and Plato's?) amoral sense of the 'good' is the transcendental conditions of experience (which include the Noumenon) without which nothing could be.

94. Kant's formulation (,If I should/I can') was reversed (,I can/I should') already by Johann Gottlieb Fichte's "Über den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung" in the *Philosophisches Journal einer Gesellschaft Teutscher Gelehrter*, hg. von Johann Gottlieb Fichte und Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, Bd. VIII, Erstes Heft, Jena und Leipzig (1798): 1–20. See in Johann Gottlieb Fichte's *Sämmtliche Werke*, J.H. Fichte, hrsg. (Berlin; Verlag von Veit und Comp., 1845): 183–184.

Nicholas Wolterstorff, consciously or unconsciously following Hegel's understanding of "The Moral View of the World," places Kant's formulation ("ought implies can") in the context of the goal of moral effort is "to be well-pleasing to God." See Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, "Conundrums in Kant's Rational Religion" in *Kant's Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered*, edited by Philip J. Rossi and Michael Wreen (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991): 42. Wolterstorff takes "can" to mean that moral

'If I can, I should' can be taken as a free pass to pursue unbridled self-interest. There are no reasons to curtail oneself. If one has discovered that one has the capacity to do something – better do it before someone else does and takes advantage of one in the short and/or long run.

However, 'if I can, I should' can also be taken as a heteronomous, moral imperative: 'If I have the capacity to be moral, I must be moral.' Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" in the *Phenomenology* takes the 'If I can, I should' to be the naïve expectation that I 'can' be *morally perfect*.⁹⁵ In Hegel's "The Moral View of the World," though, humanity is incapable of fulfilling ethical obligations because it is limited by its external circumstances. Yet, rather than compensate with grace the failures of humanity's ethical efforts made known by the absolute duty of abstract moral principles to achieve the status of being morally "well-pleasing" to God, Hegel subordinates all finite activity to the 'cunning of reason' that is the hidden plan of Absolute Spirit working its way out through history – even *in spite of humanity*.

However, according to Kant, "if I should, I can" means that I am able to exercise a form of finite, eminent⁹⁶ causality (autonomous freedom) that is capable of accomplishing, intentionally, things that nature on its own cannot. In short, one's creative actions are under the control of the subject her-/himself⁹⁷ to the degree that one

perfection is possible but claims that Kant requires divine grace to achieve it. See as well, Chris Firestone and Nathan Jacobs, *In Defense of Kant's Religion* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008): 49–50.

In dramatic contrast, Kant's understanding of 'can' is that humanity possesses an indelible capacity (Anlage), which is more than a mere disposition but is 'autonomous freedom' that is intentionally able to initiate sequences of events that nature cannot accomplish on its own. Kant's 'can' is focused on a rejection of the determinism of Augustinian Christian 'original sin'. Rather, for Kant, humanity intentionally 'can' do things that nature alone cannot do, and humanity 'can' assume responsibility for its agency. Humanity is neither determined by divine dictum (*Machtspruch*) to have inherited an evil for its 'original parents' nor determined by the mechanical determinism of reductionist determinism. Kant is no proponent of "original sin!" See *Metaphysik Mrongovius* (AA XXIX: 771), *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (AA VIII: 1–22), and *Religion* (AA VI: 19–20, 22, 35, 42–43). Kant explicitly says that the origin of evil remains inexplicable for us (*Ibid.*, AA VI: 43).

Schubert Ogden switches to the second person, when he formulates the moral imperative: "You can, so you should" (see Schubert Ogden, *Christ without Myth: A Study Based on the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann* [New York: Harper & Row, Pubs, 1961: 118]). As ultimately heteronomous impositions of a moral order on humanity with the goal of pleasing a 'God' rather than assuming responsibility for one's autonomous freedom to the best of one's ability, both Wolterstorff's and Ogden's formulations turn the Kantian notion of autonomy into heteronomy. Of course, the most blatant violation of Kant's moral theory is Henri Bergson's *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977) in which he turns Kant's categorical imperative into a closed, "static," heteronomous moral system.

95. See Hegel, "The Moral View of the World" in *Phänomenologie*: GW III: 442–452 (Baillie trans.: 615–627). See as well, *Phänomenologie*: GW II: 263–270 (Baillie trans.: 263–270) and Chapter 7: "Practical Reason Elevates Theoretical Reason:" the section "Hegel's Account of 'The Moral View of the World' is not Kant's Morality:" 727 ff.

96. On the difference between eminent and efficient causality, see the "Introduction:" 84, n. 23.

97. See Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 49*.

must give oneself permission, internally, to act whenever one exercises one's agency, externally. Without this capacity of finite, causality the very notion of a moral principle is meaningless. However, the capacity does not depend upon external success or failure to establish one's 'worthiness'. The conscious exercising of one's capacities on the internal selection of a universal, moral principle to give oneself permission, regardless of the consequences, is the foundation of any and all worthiness. Only the individual knows!

Unlike Hegel, morality (and achievement of 'perfection'), according to Kant, is not an 'empty,' abstract idea that requires ethical sovereignty over sensuality. Rather, for Kant, the world of appearances along with the experienced capacity of finite, eminent causality inseparable from the world of appearances provide the 'perfect capacities' that allow for moral effort *in concrete experience*. Morality is not an abstract call to perfection with a Personal Deity dispensing happiness proportional to one's concrete, ethical success by grace or the 'cunning of reason.' Kant's morality is no consequentialist ethic that cowers before a Personal God quivering in anxiety over ethical failure. Morality consists in the internal self-selecting (but not creation) of universal, moral principles that one invokes to give oneself permission to exercise one's finite, eminent causality of autonomous freedom *in the world*. Perfection for Kant refers, then, to a *priori* transcendental capacity whose 'moral improvement' consists in training oneself to reflect and invoke a categorical (not a hypothetical) imperative when giving oneself permission to act. *As with all transcendental capacities, in and of themselves the perfect capacity that is practical reason determines nothing. It requires 'education'/'training' to cultivate it.*

Given that moral principles can exist only if there is a finite, eminent causality to which they apply, the individual's ability to acknowledge a moral 'should' inseparably includes with it the creative, autonomous freedom to act on the basis of *the self-selected* [rather than self-selected], moral principle, which one selects when giving oneself 'permission' to act. Without autonomous freedom, moral principles not only would be empty abstractions, but they also could never arise. Kant expressed this relationship between moral principles and autonomous freedom in the "Preface" to the *Critique of Practical Reason*: "[...][F]reedom is [...] the *ratio essendi* [the essential ground] for the moral law, but the moral law is the *ratio cognoscendi* (the ground of cognition) for freedom."⁹⁸ Just as I can no more explain from where physical laws come, I am unable to explain from where moral laws come. Yet, it is left up to me to understand and to govern (or not govern) my understanding and actions by both sets of laws.

In other words, when it comes to my moral effort, *if I should self-select (but not create) the categorical imperative* required⁹⁹ for me to do 'what is right because it is

98. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 4*.

99. On concepts as 'functions,' neither a priori metaphysical entities nor a posteriori abstractions, see Chapter 5: "Traces of an Intellectual Crisis:" 575, n. 54; and Chapter 6: "Grand Narratives of

right regardless of self-interest' (although never free of self-interest¹⁰⁰), I *must possess the capacity* that makes it possible for me to self-select that moral principle to 'do what is right regardless of self-interest.' In short, for Kant, "If I should, I can' is a rejection of anything remotely like Augustine's Original Sin that prohibits from the get go the effort to act morally. In fact, thanks to his notion of autonomous, creative freedom, Kant explicitly emphasizes that the individual is always 'in a state of innocence' when s/he gives her-/himself permission to act.¹⁰¹

Furthermore, Kant's "If I should, I can" is also a rejection of Hegel's claim that ethics are incapable of realization because of the limits that nature's freedom places on humanity, which leads Hegel to reduce ethical effort to a matter of indifference in the face of the 'higher plan' that is the 'cunning of reason.

The heterogeneous 'should' that is the moral duty of Hegel's "Moral View of the World" dampens passion for lawfulness by stressing 'can't. If taken seriously, the claim that belief in the law is naïve would mean that both theoretical and practical reason are naïve. For theoretical reason, our 'failures' of understanding nature would only confirm that it is naïve to believe that nature is governed by physical lawfulness. For practical reason, the fact that we can do otherwise or that we fail to act according to universal, moral principles would only confirm that it is naïve to believe that we could act according to universal, moral principles.

In dramatic contrast, the 'can' of Kant's autonomous freedom (the capacity intentionally to initiate sequences of events that nature on its own cannot) fires passion to self-select (but not create) lawfulness (physical and moral laws) to understand and act responsibly. In other words, *lawfulness makes possible not only science but also moral effort* – even if moral perfection is impossible given the limits to reason. A commitment to lawfulness makes it possible for transcendental consciousness to experience, understand, and exercise responsibly its transcendental capacities.

Furthermore, the universal, causal capacity of autonomous freedom is what grounds human dignity and requires moral imperatives 'above' technical imperatives.¹⁰² The universality here is not established by means of a dictum (*Machtspruch*) of anthropomorphic speculation about God or Absolute Spirit (either of Personal Theism or Hegel's meta-narrative). This universality has nothing to do with absolutizing culturally relative rules and norms or with wishful thinking (enthusiasm or rapture) about what 'ought to be'. Rather, this universality is established by what is required for transcendental consciousness to be able to experience, understand, and exercise responsible agency in the world, as we do.

Theoretical Reason:" 709, n. 205. On the erroneous claim that Kant's moral principles are capricious self-constructions, see Chapter 8: "Strauß' Reading of Kant Over His Career:" 790, n. 265.

100. See the opening paragraphs of "Section II" in the *Groundwork* AA IV: 406–413.

101. See Kant, *Religion*: AA VI: 41.

102. On the 'dignity' and 'absolute worth' of transcendental consciousness, see Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 434–436, 449–450.

Categorical (not hypothetical) imperatives make it possible to give oneself permission to do (or not do) what one decides one 'ought' to do. If such wide, moral laws are possible, and they are possible only if a creature possesses creative autonomous freedom, then there must be a species with a creative capacity not entirely determined by nature's efficient causality because a creature determined by nature is incapable of assuming responsibility for what it does. If I should, I must have the capacity to decide and act according to categorical imperatives.

For Kant, one's moral status is not established by ethical achievement in Hegel's sense. To be sure, Kant recognizes that individual has little influence, not to speak of control, over the effects of her/his agency. However, *the individual does have control over what moral principle s/he self-selects to govern her/his agency*. In other words, one's moral worth is not established by the consequences of one's agency but by the universal, moral principle that one applied to give oneself 'permission' to act.

Understanding is not Merely Information and Causal Explanations. The Role of Metaphysics in Understanding

There is far more to understanding than either (correct) information transfer (what Kant calls *Schulwissenschaft*/school knowledge¹⁰³) or causal explanation. *Reducing understanding to information sharing*, on the one hand, treats the metaphors of concepts as innate metaphysical ideas (e.g., Plato and Hegel) and leaves to others the task of understanding the imperceptible order of the manifold of perception for us because the individual is flooded with information 'needed to be learned' at all cost. *Reducing understanding to causal explanations*, on the other hand, treats causes as 'given' with their perceptible effects (e.g., materialistic reductionism or 'scientism') and leaves to others the task of grasping the imperceptible the lawfulness (physical laws, statistical significance, and algorithms) that is concealed by the effects of causality because that's the technical skill they have developed.

However, understanding is a process, it is not a pre-packaged product. Understanding is a process because it involves not merely the individual's own lifting of the 'veil of Isis' (though, not Hegel's veil) but also a reading of perceived phenomena as structured by an imperceptible, coherent order of relationalities, which are no merely random aggregate of data. 'Lifting the veil of Isis' to *dis-cover* the order to the manifold of perception is the task of *reflecting* judgment, neither the mere acquisition of always

103. On Kant's notion of *Schulwissenschaft* as merely the 'technical expressions of scholasticism', see his *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 853; Olms ed.: 1. Kant, of course, recognized that there is a proper role for *Schulwissenschaft*, but it is no substitute for the self's own understanding.

and already 'established,' *re-produced* judgment¹⁰⁴ nor transferring knowledge about some Hegelian Absolute Spirit. As Kant points out in the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*, deep satisfaction occurs with the *dis-covering* of the coherent, hierarchy of 'lawfulness' of a set of phenomena¹⁰⁵ within the framework of an ever-expanding intellectual grasp of the architectonic of lawfulness¹⁰⁶ that reins in all fantasies¹⁰⁷ (and makes possible) experience, not merely understanding and responsible agency.

When it comes to understanding, humanity needs much more than mere access to the internet's information of *rep-producing* judgments. In addition, there is much more to understanding than simply 'knowing' either the 'correct' revealed (e.g., traditional Christian Personal Theism) or logical metaphysics (e.g., Platonic or Hegelian), or what the right causal explanation (either of particular, technical skills and pragmatic self-interest, which Kant describes as the 'culture of skills'); or of knowing the ultimate, metaphysical ground of reality (such as the claim of two-step creation of 'original' and 'copy' of *Logos* theology or Hegel's Absolute Spirit's Double Negation), or even what comes from understanding as the "fusion of horizons" by means of concealed possibilities (e.g., Heidegger and Gadamer) between past and present even with its liberating of understanding by being open-ended. Mere information, causal explanations, and shared logical coherence are nowhere adequate to the task of understanding.

Already with experience itself (prior to any acquired 'information,' 'causal explanation,' and 'coherence'), we must add universal, *a priori* synthetic elements to the phenomena of experience *that are not directly given with the manifold of perception*. These are a limited number of *required* (*but not capricious!*) elements, which are arrived at by *reflecting* judgment, not *re-producing* judgments of mere information and causal explanation.

104. On Kant's distinction between reflecting and re-producing judgment, see *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 179 ff and the "Introduction:" 86, n. 26.

105. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 188. Although this is by no means the highest satisfaction capable of being brought about by reflecting judgment. See Kant, *Metaphysik Mrongovius*, AA XXIX: 948: "[...] man finds no satisfaction for his reason [...] other] than striving to recognize and achieve his summum bonum, i.e. the ultimate aim of all his goals, which [consists in] the highest degree of worthiness to be happy combined with the greatest morality."

106. Locating one's reflecting judgments within the framework of an ever-expanding hierarchy of understood order to the manifold of phenomena is a cornerstone of Kant's methodology. See "The Architectonic of Pure Reason" in *Critique of Pure Reason* B 748–763.

107. Kant stresses that it is the task of the philosopher (understanding) to unmask even 'healthy illusions,' such as literal anthropomorphic claims for God on the basis of the necessary assumption of 'teleological purposiveness' for understanding nature. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 462. The strategy of understanding driven by reflecting judgment is to seek out not 'what the object is in itself,' which would be a set of re-produced judgments communicable by merely information transfer, but 'what it is for us,' reflectively, 'according to the necessary rational principles for our judging' (not innate ideas or apodictic causal explanations). See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 462–463.

These insights into understanding allow a *(re-)turn to metaphysics but not a return to the authority of revealed or logical meta-narratives, literary canons, or brute, political power. Rather, it allows a return to an option that has been misunderstood, distorted, and suppressed (paradigmatically, by Hegel!) since its emergence: It requires Kant's Critical Idealism, which I prefer to call 'archaeologist' and 'intentionalist'*¹⁰⁸ in

108. The metaphors moral 'intentionalist' and 'archaeologist' are subject, of course, to metaphorical interference. I do not use them either as a defense of 'intending' chaos or destructive agency in order that nature's 'unsocial sociality' might achieve a greater good beyond the individual's control, nor do I use 'Kant is an intentionalist' in the narrow, Husserlian sense of 'intentional' consciousness.

The metaphor 'Kant is an archaeologist' emphasizes that the focus of moral worth is on the 'origin' of responsible agency. 'Intentionalist', in turn, here emphasizes that the individual consciously gives her-/himself permission to act on the basis of a broad, universal, moral principle (a categorical, not a hypothetical imperative) regardless of the recognized or unrecognized harm to one's own or group's self-interest. In other words, Kant's 'archaeologist'/'intentionalist' moral theory is no encouragement of intending social chaos or nature's 'unsocial sociality' in order to achieve some 'higher goal,' however well-intended or vague. Rather, it means to focus on original, responsible intent to give oneself permission to act on the basis of a categorical imperative that, while hoping that it contributes to the 'higher good,' recognizes that it only has control over the moral principle s/he invoked in giving permission to act – and is not valued for its achievement of a 'good' over which it has no control. Kant expresses this theme in the 'first preface' to *Religion*. See *Religion* AA VI: 4–7, especially the note on page 6. Kant's criticism of consequentialism has the four moments: 1) morality requires self-permission (see also 796); 2) we have control only over the maxim invoked to give ourselves permission; 3) consequentialism requires an impossible omniscience (see also 840); and 4) moral success/failure is recognized internally, not externally (see also 787); all of which are summed up by the understanding that moral faith internally selects its principles (see 832).

As a key representative of the 'Freiburg Kantian School', Husserl's notion of 'constituting consciousness' is limited to Kant's 'theoretical' reason (to the exclusion of 'practical reason'), which is focused on understanding of phenomena. Constituting consciousness treats consciousness as 'constructivist'. It commences with Husserl's 'epoché' (Cartesian Meditations: 18–21, 69–74) or 'bracketing' of the issue of 'existence' to focus on the 'constitutive productivity' of consciousness (Cartesian Meditations: 148–149). In his "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" of 1911, Husserl writes: "Everything psychical which is thus an 'experienced' is [...] order in an overall connection, in a 'monadic' unity of consciousness, a unity that in itself has nothing at all to do with nature, with space and time or substantiality and causality, but has its thoroughly peculiar 'forms'. It is a flow of phenomena, unlimited at both ends, traversed by an intentional line that is, as it were, the index of the all-pervading unity. It is the line of an immanent 'time' without beginning or end, a time that no chronometers measure." Husserl, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" in *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, Quentin Lauer, trans. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965): 107–108. See as well, Husserl's posthumous *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, W.R. Boyce Gibson trans. (London: Collier Books, 1969): 55–56; "The intentional object [...] first becomes an apprehended object through a distinctively 'objectifying' turn of thought" (ibid.: 110); see as well ibid.: 118–119. Martin Heidegger's edition of Husserl's *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1980): 484 claims: "In inner consciousness we [...] have 'intentional experiences,' as there are perceptions, judgments, feelings, desires and the like. These units can function as substrates. Instead of positing and objectifying them [...] a meaning lives into their intentionality, and thus the meaning 'takes' from them the objects implicitly intended in them and makes them intentional in the concise sense of objectifying positing." Husserl adds a page later (485): "It is part of the nature of [...] the object that it is a non-independent thing, that it cannot be without 'its' mode of representation, i.e. without the ideal possibility of making it into an object and passing over to it again [...]" Robert Sokolowski points out that "In providing only subjectivity as a

contrast to the Aristotelian of 'wisdom' as 'consequentialist.' This metaphysical option is, precisely, what is encouraged by Strauß' career as he struggled with the Hegelian meta-narrative and, as of the 1860s, increasingly, if never entirely, turns to Kant to shape his understanding of religion.

By examining carefully both what he does and doesn't say about Kant across his career, I suggest that Strauß exemplifies Lessing's choice of the left hand (what Kant calls 'reflecting' judgment) over the right hand of truth (what Kant calls 'determining' judgments, which, properly understood, were themselves, *originally* 'reflecting' judgments).

condition of possibility, Husserl is left with the content of constitution [the stimulating phenomena] as an unexplained residuum, a pure facticity which escapes the principles of his philosophy," Sokolowski, *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964): 218. Rather than Husserl's dualistic epistemology, Kant's epistemology (theoretical reason) and personal agency (practical reason) are not concerned with the categorical as the determination of objective certainty (e.g., as does Husserl in *Ideas*: 54–55, 61–62). Rather, Kant's concern is with those necessary (in the sense of required, not causality) a priori elements that must be originally added to phenomena in order for phenomena to be experienced and understood (theoretical reason) as well as to exercise responsible agency in the world (practical reason). These a priori elements are 'certain' in that they are necessary, not because they can be empirically 'proved'. Furthermore, Kant distinguishes between 'categorical' and 'hypothetical' imperatives with the latter referring to the 'narrow' necessities of technical skill and pragmatic, personal self-interest and the former referring the 'broader' principles that the individual necessarily invokes to give her-/himself permission to exercise her/his autonomous freedom.

Applied to ethics (practical reason), the notion of 'intentionalist' here is, also, not meant in sense of an 'intentionalist ethic,' which is the consequentialist concern with intent. Rather, it is taken in the sense of Kant's 'archaeological' concern with the moral principle that one applies in the decision process prior to active to give oneself permission to act. I wrote in *Strangers and Pilgrims: On the Role of Aporiai in Theology*: "[... Ricoeur's] definition of 'ethical intention is:' 'Let us define 'ethical intention' as aiming at the 'good life' with and for others, in just institutions.'" (emphasis in the original) (Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, Kathleen Blamey, trans. [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992]: 172) Though he is clear that the "ethical intention" is indebted to the actions and sufferings of those who have gone before: "The ultimate equivocality with respect to the status of the Other in the phenomenon of conscience is perhaps what needs to be preserved in the final analysis ... Although set on the plane of science, psychoanalysis concurs here with innumerable popular beliefs that the voices of our ancestors continue to make themselves heard among the living and in this way ensure, not only the transmission of wisdom, but its intimate personal reception at every stage. This dimension, which could be called generational, is an undeniable component of the phenomenon of injunction and, all the more so, of that of indebtedness" (McGaughey, *Strangers and Pilgrims: On the Role of Aporiai in Theology* [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1997]: 353).

Nonetheless, the metaphor 'intentionalist' is appropriate for Kant's philosophy because, although concerned dualistic epistemology with universal conditions of possibility and capacities, Kant recognizes that no one can experience, understand, and exercise responsible agency for another. However, this no more turns Kant into a solipsist than the natural scientist is a solipsist because s/he can understand physical lawfulness only for her-/himself.

In short, the metaphors 'Kant is an intentionalist' and 'Kant is an archaeologist' are not concerned with individual, subjective construction of subjectively relative, personal meaning and self-interest or with a consequentialist, objective ethical aim but with the universal conditions required on the part of individual consciousness to experience, understand, and act responsibly in the world.

Furthermore, the Copernican Turn from 'historical' to 'pure' religion¹⁰⁹ not only remains incomplete in Strauß but also offers the widest and most comprehensive option for us to achieve a proper understanding of both science and religion yet today.

For its part, science is not merely an exercise in 'opening of one's eyes' simply distinguishing sets of phenomena from one another *a posteriori* on the basis merely of perceptible differences. The lawfulness of nature (physical 'laws,' statistical significance, and/or algorithms) required for 'scientific' understanding is not given with the phenomena of nature. Our grasp of the lawfulness of nature is an example of what Kant calls *a priori* synthetic judgment as opposed to *a posteriori* or *a priori* analytic judgment.¹¹⁰

Critical Idealism is, then, no meta-narrative that explains from where everything comes, where everything is ultimately ending up, and what the ultimate meaning of everything is. Rather, metaphysics is understood within the limits of finite, transcendental consciousness that begins with phenomena not to causally explain them by merely objective certainties but to seek out the subjective, transcendental capacities and conditions of consciousness that are required for us to be able to experience those phenomena, in the first place.

Transcendental metaphysics locates meaning where finite, transcendental consciousness can experience it: in creative, responsible agency in the world whose very capacities and conditions of transcendental consciousness make moral accountability

109. It is unfortunate that the term 'pure' encourages inappropriate, anachronistic conclusions. In the case of the Critique of Pure Reason, 'pure' religion is not defined by a dyadic structure of 'pure' versus 'impure' (incorrupt/corrupt, authentic/inauthentic, better/worse – or any similar dualistic conception). It is especially important to grasp that 'pure' here is not a 'good' will in contrast to 'evil' nature/sensuousness that dominates free-will and drives self-interest, which is the erroneous reading of Kant made especially by F.C. Baur and Carl Daub and which Strauß shared. Both 'pure' reason and 'pure' religion are concerned with what is imperceptible in experience as the universal conditions of possibility for perceptible experience itself. In the case of reason, 'pure' reason is what makes possible understanding of empirical experience whereas in the case of religion, 'pure' religion is what makes possible the appropriate experience not only of perceptible, historical manifestation of religion (ritual, revelation, doctrine, institutional structure) but also, and more importantly, the understanding and agency of humanity's practical reason, which needs the support of a community. In short, neither 'pure' reason nor 'pure' religion is possible or inseparable from the phenomena that require them. In his "Drafts for the Preface to the Second Edition" of Religion Kant makes clear that his use of 'bloßen Vernunft' is meant to acknowledge the 'pure,' subjective conditions of religion, which are necessary for its practical importance (that is, moral culture by no means merely individual moral efforts). Hence, already in the title Kant is speaking of 'pure' religion that as a subset of the religious phenomena that is objective, revealed religion. See "(Aus dem Nachlaß – Phase w2: ca. 1793 -1794) I. Vorredeentwürfe zur zweiten Auflage 1794" AA XXIII: 96.

110. In contrast to analytic judgments, which are "elucidating," "exemplifying" (Erläuterungsurteile), *a priori* synthetic judgments are "enhancing," "ampliative" (Erweiterungsurteile) (see *Critique of Pure Reason* A 7 and *Metaphysik Mrongovius* AA XXIX: 968) because *a priori* synthetic judgments increase understanding beyond the mere appearances. See *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics* (AA IV: 266): 968. In the *Opus postumum* (XXII: 555), Kant points out that analytic judgment is "distributive and logical" in contrast to synthetic judgment, which is "collective and general experience."

possible. *The meaning achieved by the exercising of these transcendental elements is a meaning anchored in an immeasurable satisfaction that needs no external applause.* This goal requires a moral community's encouraging the individual to 'do the right thing' even when it appears to be contrary to her, his, or the community's best interest. The thesis here, then, is *no reduction of religion to individual morality but the encouragement of a creative, moral culture*^{III} that not merely inspires responsible, individual, creativity but also contradicts the materialist claim of a zero-sum game. In addition, a moral culture also responds to the suffering, needs, exploitation, persecution, oppression, and genocide of humanity, as well as, to misogyny, racism, xenophobia, agism, and destruction of the material basis upon which any and all experience, understanding, and exercising of agency depends. There is no historical Indifferentism to the metaphysics of Critical Idealism. This second volume on Strauß provides an accounting of Strauß' intellectual odyssey. It demonstrates that the understanding of experience, including the experience of reading the bible, cannot and does not lead to some final, absolute understanding of God, humanity, and/or history.

Strauß had no alternative limb to crawl onto once he had sawed off most of the Hegelian limb on which he was sitting. His post-*LJ* metaphysical reflections document his attempt to find one. Although he turned to Kant for help, the enduring influence of Hegelianism and his unshakable assumptions about what Kant '*must have meant*' prevented him from grasping anywhere near the strength of the Kantian limb onto which he could have climbed but didn't. However, Strauß clearly articulates the deep background that make recognition of the anomalies (the limits) of the foreground. Most importantly, he allows recognition of the sharp differences of the spectrum that stretches from Judeo-Christian Platonism (which includes Personal Theism, Mysticism, and Rationalism), over Hegelian Immanentism, Kantian Critical Idealism, to Materialism which allows retrieval of Critical Idealism believed by so many to have been left on the trash heap of history – just as contemporary gospel criticism claims to be the case with respect to Strauß.

In other words, Strauß is a 'great' theologian who has left a task for each and all in the yet untapped understanding and life-guiding significance of transcendental consciousness for creatively responding responsibly to today's massive challenges. Quintessentially, then, Strauß demonstrates that the ultimate task of understanding and responsible agency is not in grasping 'what was' or 'what is' but in each individual's responsible *re-figuration* of the *pre-figured* and *con-figured* of what 'can' and 'ought to be.'

III. On the distinction between the "culture of the will/moral improvement" and the "culture of skills," see *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* (AA V: 431–432) and 848, n. 161.

Chapter 5: Traces of an Intellectual Crisis. The Metaphysical Issues

Chapter Overview

Between 1835 and 1872 there is a shift in Strauß' metaphysics away from anthropomorphic centrism to nature centrism by which Hegelian, 'metaphysical science' of Spirit 'returning' to Itself is replaced by the 'physical sciences' as nature 'turning inward on itself' to continue its materialistic creativity. The chapter traces Strauß' efforts to find an alternative to the Hegelian formulation of 'religion' across his corpus from 1837 until 1872. Having dismissed in "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity" of 1838 the Hegelian logical, meta-narrative of Double Negation, Strauß' initial attempt to define religion as an historically immanent experience of 'eternal reason' in every moment was nullified by Feuerbach's anthropomorphic criticism of 'reason' in religion. In the *Glaubenslehre* of 1841, Strauß presents the history of Christian doctrine as having collapsed under the weight of its own internal contradictions with no need of an 'external' philosophical perspective. With a focus on what is 'historically reliable' in the gospels of *The Life of Jesus* of 1864, Strauß follows (half-heartedly) the 'Return to Kant' among his circle of friends in the early 1860s to formulate a 'religion of humanity' devoted to moral improvement by the species, not the individual, in contrast to a 'religion of the Christ.' *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History* of 1865 focuses on Schleiermacher's Christology not with respect to the feeling of absolute dependence, which Strauß had already decimated in "Schleiermacher und Daub" in 1839, but on Schleiermacher's Christology depending upon an absolute, eminent causality¹ of 'Perfect God-consciousness' in order to elevate humanity out of sensuousness. Finally, *The Old and the New Faith* of 1872 formulates religion within the framework of (Feuerbachian), reductionist materialism that views even 'life' as a product of nature (hylozoism) with consciousness constituting that 'place' where nature 'turns inward on itself' to continue its progressive, albeit materialistic, advance. Moral improvement is understood not in terms of ethical achievement by the individual, which is always problematic for Strauß, but by an accomplishment by species with its ever-new discernment of moral principles that are required in its changing historical circumstances.

Textual Analysis of Strauß' Metaphysical Wanderings

1835 *The Life of Jesus*²

History, not Merely Philosophical Metaphysics, Matters:
Universal Christology and Empty Abstractions

Strauß acknowledges that already as a student he and his colleagues were troubled by the Hegelian epistemological distinction between 'content' (idea) and 'form' (sensible representations) that reduced 'form' to a meaningless, logical 'x' because 'truth' was

1. On the difference between eminent and efficient causality, see the "Introduction:" 84, n. 23.
2. See Volume I especially Chapter 2 for an analysis of Strauß' 1835 *LJ*.

the idea, not its representations.³ However, in the *LJ* of 1835, Strauß embraced the Hegelian epistemological distinction between 'content' and 'form' in order to restore Church Doctrine that crumbles under 'mythic' criticism of the gospels. It is the 'idea,' which is already in the mind, that the text evokes that matters, not the literal text as a historical account of events.

Furthermore, in the *LJ*, Strauß defends his version of a universal, *inclusive* Christology in contrast to the *exclusive* Christology of the Right-Wing Hegelians and the *partially inclusive, elitist* Christology of the Left-Wing Hegelians although Strauß' Christology is a claim based on Hegelian 'epistemological and metaphysical logic' rather than 'facts.' His so-called 'break' with the Hegelians in the *LJ* is asserted both by those who want to distance Strauß from Hegel to protect historical-critical biblical scholarship from any taint of Hegel and by those who are blind to Strauß' nuanced Hegelian Christology, which seeks to ensure that Absolute Spirit is no 'empty idea' by 'grounding' It, universally, in humanity's consciousness inseparable from history.

1837 Polemical Writings

*in Defense of my Life of Jesus and on the Characteristics of Contemporary Theology*⁴

In 1837, Strauß published a collection of essays that had appeared in the intervening two years as *Polemical Writings in Defense of my Life of Jesus and on the Characteristics of Contemporary Theology* (*Streitschriften zur Verteidigung meiner Schrift über das Leben Jesu und zur Charakteristik der gegenwärtigen Theologie*). Pamphlet III is primarily where he presents an account of his relationship to the Hegelians, and it illuminates his intellectual distancing from them, the initial step that drove Strauß' search for, initially, a metaphysical substitute for Hegel's Double Negation and, eventually in 1872, to an epistemological alternative to Hegel.

As in the *LJ*, here in his *Streitschriften*, he criticized the Hegelian limiting of the manifestation of an 'idea' to a single (or restricted) set of representations because that would constitute substituting a physical being for an idea contrary to the Hegelian epistemological claim that the physical representation is only a manifestation of the idea.⁵ Strauß sketches the four options for Incarnation⁶ here as: 1) The God/Man is always both 'already' and 'not yet,' which is Strauß' own *inclusive* Christology that

3. See Strauß, "On the General Relationship of Hegel's Philosophy to Theological Criticism" ("Allgemeines Verhältniß der Hegel'schen Philosophie zur theologischen Kritik") in *Streitschriften* III: 57–58. See as well, See Ziegler, I: 51.

4. Strauß, *Streitschriften zur Verteidigung meiner Schrift über das Leben Jesu und zur Charakteristik der gegenwärtigen Theologie* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1980).

5. This is what Kant called 'subreption'. See the "Preface:" 64, n. 84.

6. See Strauß, "Allgemeines Verhältniß der Hegel'schen Philosophie zur theologischen Kritik" in Pamphlet III of the *Streitschriften*: 68–69.

takes all of human consciousness to be, potentially, an event of incarnation. 2) The God/Man is only the 'not-yet,' which would be making a claim of 'empty abstraction' equivalent to: the God/Man only exists as an Idea and has not yet been realized, actually. 3) Whoever affirms that the God/Man exists in history but denies the 'not-yet' would be claiming that the God/Man exists as already identical with all of mankind, which Strauß calls 'enthusiastic pantheism.' 4) If the God/Man is only a particular individual, one might present historical proof (which, given the nature of historical facts, is always questionable⁷), but to present such a historical proof, in fact, would, once again, be substituting an 'actuality' (the sensible representations) for the 'truth' (the Idea), which would constitute switching a physical 'actuality' (physical reductionism) for an Idea – (the 'Absolute Concept') – the very opposite of an empty abstraction. Strauß rejects here the three latter options as erroneous versions of Hegelianism.

It becomes clear in these writings that, for Strauß, there are two issues (the metaphysics of Christology and epistemological status of 'facts') at stake with the Hegelians, which go to the heart of the very role of history in Christianity. Both issues are related to the concern that truth not be a matter of merely 'empty abstraction' given that Hegel maintains that *without the particulars of representation one's thoughts are merely self-constructions, and one has only 'empty abstraction.'*⁸

First and foremost for Strauß is the issue that is the lynch pin to the dogmatic restoration of the *LJ*: the historical issue of the metaphysics of Christology. The Hegelian meta-narrative understood positive history, the sequence of historical events, to be a necessary process that established the finite conditions in order for Infinite Spirit to be experienced in consciousness with the identification of finite and Infinite Spirit constituting the God/Man (Incarnation).

Hegelians across their spectrum from Right to Left took 'the God/Man' to refer to what Hegel called in his "Über die wissenschaftlichen Betrachtungsarten des Naturrechts" 'the point of indifference' where all multiplicity was negated in finite consciousness in order to experience Absolute Spirit.⁹ For the Hegelians, this 'point of indifference' occurred as either a specific, historical individual (Jesus of Nazareth as the Christ, an event *actually beyond history* according to Hegel) or it occurs in those elite, few Hegelian philosophers who themselves experienced the divinity beyond finite consciousness, proleptically, in their finite consciousness by negating multiplicity. In contrast, *Strauß took the notion of 'the truth is the whole' that 'involves the pain, the*

7. See Strauß, "Hegel's Ansicht über den historischen Werth der evangelischen Geschichte" in Pamphlet III of the *Streitschriften*: 94.

8. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten, seine Stelle in der praktischen Philosophie, und sein Verhältnis zu den positiven Rechtswissenschaften:" GW II: 525.

9. Hegel speaks of the significance of the 'point of indifference' in his "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 456,, 465-467, 484, 487-488, 496-497, 499-500. He employed both meanings of the term 'indifference' in the course of the text: 'non-difference' (or unity) and 'affectless' (or meaningless) equanimity when it comes to the actual world. As unity, see GW II: 456, 501; as affectless dream GW II: 496-497, 499-500.

patience, and the labor of the negative' to refer neither to the historical life of a single individual (Jesus of Nazareth, as the Christ) nor to the few Hegelians but to all human consciousness – IN history. Strauß writes in his "Concluding Dissertation:"

If reality is ascribed to the idea of the unity of the divine and human natures, is this equivalent to the admission that this unity must actually have been once manifested, as it never had been, and never more will be, in one individual? This is indeed not the mode in which Idea realizes itself; it is not wont to lavish all its fulness on one exemplar and be stingy towards all others – to express itself perfectly in that one individual, and imperfectly in all the rest : it rather loves to distribute its riches among a multiplicity of exemplars which reciprocally complete each other—in the alternate appearance and suppression of a series of individuals. And (*isic.*) is this no true realization of the idea? Is not the idea of the unity of the divine and human natures a real one in a far higher sense, which I regard the whole race of mankind as its realization, than when I single out one man as such a realization? Is not an incarnation of God from eternity, a truer one than an incarnation limited to a particular point of time?¹⁰

Strauß claimed that one can avoid 'meaningless' truth claims of 'empty abstraction' only if one includes all of human consciousness as concerned with Absolute Spirit becoming aware of Itself.

Hegel himself had stressed in the *Phenomenology* that the process that leads to consciousness of the Absolute involves the entirety of history. Strauß took Hegel at his word, and he was amazed that the Hegelians across the board rejected him.¹¹ Hegel writes, though:

The life of God and divine knowledge, then, may well be pronounced as a playing of love with itself. This idea sinks [...] to blandness if the seriousness, the pain, the patience and labor of the negative are lacking in it [...] Precisely because the form [historical representation] is as necessary to the essence as the essence to Itself, absolute reality must not be conceived of and expressed as essence alone, i.e. as immediate substance, or as pure self-intuition of the Divine, but as form [as historical representation] also, and with the entire wealth of the developed form. Only then is it grasped and expressed as really actual.

The truth is the whole. The whole, however, is merely the essential nature reaching its completeness through the process of its own development. Of the Absolute, it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only at the end is it what it is in very truth; and just in that consists its nature, which is to be actual, subject, or self-becoming, self-development.¹² (emphasis added)

10. Strauß, *LJ*: 779–780.

11. See Strauß, "Hegel's Perspective on the Historical Value of Gospel History" in Pamphlet III of the *Streitschriften*: 126.

12. Hegel, "Preface" to the *Phänomenologie* GW III: 24 (Baillie: 81–82). In his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion* GW XVII: 203u ("3. Die Religion der Wahrheit und Freiheit"), Hegel writes: "Absolute religion is [...] the religion of truth and freedom. For the truth is not related to the objective as to a stranger. Freedom expresses the same thing that truth is by means of a determination of negation. Spirit is for Spirit: this is what it is; it is therefore its own presupposition. We begin with the spirit as subject. He is identical with Himself, is eternal contemplation of Himself; He is thus at the same time

However, if not already at the core of his universal Christology at the time of the writing of the *LJ* then shortly afterwards and clearly in his *Streitschriften*, a second issue with the significance of history in Hegelian philosophy arose for Strauß. Here, the issue is epistemological, not the issue of the God/Man.

If one simply equates intellectual perception (*intellektuelle Anschauung*, which is abstract thought) and sensible perception (*sensible Anschauung*, which is representations in perception),¹³ then the 'truth' of the abstract content of perception is identical with the factual representations of concrete, sensible perception. That leads to the conclusion that only 'true' factual representations can serve as the vehicle for grasping the 'real' truth of abstraction because only the factually 'true' can contain a 'true' idea. In other words, *if the gospel account is factually and historically false, then the gospel account cannot be the vehicle of representations that lead to divine truth.*

For Strauß, the reality of historical particularities was not debatable. However, the issue over the status of historical particularities and Christian faith was the worm that, by the time of his writing of the *Glaubenslehre*, led Strauß to reject the Hegelian attempt to unite 'reason' with religious 'feeling' as expressed in the form (representations) that are the gospel narrative accounts (not to speak of the historical claims of Church doctrine developed on the basis of gospel representations). Identification of mythic elements in the gospels has the conundrum that historically the mythic elements are 'false.' If there must be a factual 'unity' between the gospel representations and Christian 'truth,' then, the mythic representations could not ground the 'truth' of Christianity in actuality. Christianity becomes merely a system of 'empty abstractions.' *Removal of the 'false' representations from their 'true' ideas requires an a priori epistemology as well as metaphysics.* If false representations can preserve the truth, then the decision over their truth is not dependent upon history but upon the privileging of ideas over facts (not only the privileging of a specific metaphysical meta-narrative of Double Negation) and, at the least, the 'mythic' element of the gospels, which mean to confirm the 'truth' of the God/Man, cannot 'ground' the 'Idea' of the God/Man in history.

In point of fact, Strauß says in his *Streitschriften* that Hegel himself placed the turning 'point of indifference' in the resurrection *beyond history*.

conceived only as result, as end. He is the presupposition of Himself and also the result and is only as end. This is the truth, this being adequate, this being object and subject. This is truth: that He is Himself the object, is reality, concept, and idea." (emphasis added)

13. See Hegel, : "Glauben und Wissen" GW II: 305–306; "Die Form A ist [...] dieselbe im Subjekt und Objekt vorhanden." – *ibid.*: 312; "The 'real' [*Reale*] is the absolute identity of the universal and the particular;" abstraction 'needs' the positive of the particular – "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten:" GW II: 521; reason = highest abstraction (Unity, Knowledge, Freedom) but without the particular it is empty abstraction" – *ibid.*: 525; see as well, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 78–79!!; 97–98; 103–104 (Baillie) 142–143!!; 167–168; 174–175.

1838 "On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity"

Religion as
'Rational Order' but a 'Relativized Christ'

The essay "Über das Vergängliche und das Bleibende in Christenthum" ("The Transient and Permanent in Christianity") published a year later in 1838, is not only a complementary text to the third edition of the *LJ*, which was intended to placate those shrill adversaries to Strauß in Zurich who opposed the initial effort in 1837 to call him to the University of Zurich, but also contains a first attempt to present an alternative conception of Christianity in contrast to Hegelian Idealism/Spirit.¹⁴ The entire meta-narrative of Hegel's 'dialectical logic' of 'Double Negation,' which Strauß had employed in the *LJ*, is now absent.¹⁵ Strauß is no longer employing Hegelian epistemology to explain the 'true' kernel of mythic husks.

Equally remarkable, though, is that Strauß insists here that, once one has stripped away the 'unhistorical' (the mythical) in the gospels, there is enough historical evidence to conclude that Jesus was a 'religious genius,' who, equal to all religious geniuses, is, nonetheless, unsurpassable by any other religious founder. Jesus is unsurpassable in that he introduced humanity not to Hegel's Absolute Idea but to the 'idea' of an 'an intimate and lively, internal harmony between all feeling, thinking, and willing *with the 'highest' truth that one can experience, that is, with reason.*' This reason is present in, and capable of acknowledgement by, all human consciousness.

Strauß calls this intimate and lively, internal harmony *the ideational and physical lawfulness that governs the physical world* – again, *not Hegel's negation of the world by means of the 'point of indifference' that leads 'back' to Absolute Spirit.* Furthermore, he calls it the 'essential unity of the truly human and the truly divine.' However, this is far more an echo of Schleiermacher's notion of 'immortality' as 'in the midst of finitude to be one with the Infinite and in every moment to be eternal' of Schleiermacher's *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers*¹⁶ than it is of Hegel's Absolute Spirit beyond history.

14. On my reading of Strauß' distancing himself from Hegel in "On the Transient and the Permanent in Christianity," see above "Chapter I: Methodology," 129, n. 75.

15. In Heft III of his *Streitschriften*, Strauß employs a definition of religion that still echoes Hegel's Double Negation: "ὁμιλία καὶ διάλεκτος θεοῦ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀνθρώπου πρὸς θεὸν" ("Interaction and speaking/communication by God with humanity and humanity with God"). See Strauß, Heft III, *Streitschriften*: 48. However, the formulation is ambiguous. Interaction between God and humanity can refer to the Personal Theism of Logos Theology (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος/thought Logos) and λόγος προφορικὸς/spoken Logos), the Emanation and Influx of Gnosticism, Hegel's Double Negation, as well as Schleiermacher's definition of the experience of the infinite in every moment.

16. See Schleiermacher, *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers* (1799), John Oman, trans. (New York: Harper Torchbooks/Cloister Library, 1958): 101. To be sure, this is not Schleiermacher's later definition of religion as the 'feeling of absolute dependence' that is God-consciousness exclusively made possible for humanity by the new 'eminent causality' of the Christ as Perfect God-consciousness.

It is generally recognized that, along with the third edition of the *LJ* (1838), which re-considered the rejection of the gospel of John as an historical source for historical claims for the Christ, Strauß' essay "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum"¹⁷ ("On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity"), also published 1838, was an attempt to dull the swords of Christian Traditional Theists¹⁸ and to appeal to the Schleiermachians who had opposed his appointment to the University of Zurich already in 1837. It is also generally recognized that Strauß explicitly regretted, shortly afterward, his succumbing to his 'doubts about doubt' with respect to John¹⁹ and his efforts at appeasement with his Schleiermachian opponents in Zurich.²⁰

A deep reading, though, establishes some startling elements that Strauß affirms in this text. These include remarkable claims about the 'God-consciousness'²¹ of the 'historical Jesus' and the limiting of the role of the '*genetic mythical principle*' to the miraculous, non-historical claims for Jesus in the gospels. In other words, the 'mythic' element of the gospels is contrasted with the historical elements,²² and Strauß is here focused on historical claims for Jesus in contrast to Hegelian, speculative metaphysical claims for the God/Man beyond history.

More specifically, in the *LJ* Strauß employed 'Mythic School's' distinction between the 'husk' and 'kernel' of 'mythic' stories to ground the 'truth' of even the 'false,' mythic material of the gospels by his use of Hegelian distinction between the narrative 'husks' and philosophical truth of the narrative 'kernels' – despite the falsehood of the narratives when read literally. Here in "The Transient and Permanent in Christianity," the focus is on historical criticism and 'factual' history. Strauß concludes now that the historical elements of the gospels are sufficient to claim that Jesus was a 'religious genius' who experiences an 'internal harmony' between finite human consciousness and God-consciousness. Nonetheless, Strauß relativizes Jesus' role as a 'founder of a religion' by 'drawing him down from God's throne' to the status of 'one religious leader among others' – even if unsurpassable.

17. Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum" (1839) ("On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity") in *Zwei friedliche Blätter* (Altona: Verlag von J.F. Hammerich, 1839): 59–132. The essay appeared originally in *Der Freihafen. Galerie von Unterhaltungsbildern aus den Kreisen der Literatur, Gesellschaft und Wissenschaft*, Heft 3/4 (Drittes Quartalheft) (Altona: Verlag Hammerich, 1838): 1–48.

18. See above "Chapter 1: Methodology:" 129, n. 75.

19. See Ziegler, I: 271.

20. See Ziegler, I: 287–288.

21. See my discussion of Strauß' use of Schleiermacher's metaphors of 'God-consciousness' and the 'feeling of absolute dependence' in Chapter 4: "Why Schleiermacher was not an option:" 261, n. 43.

22. A broader application of the '*genetic mythical principle*' with respect to the gospels would view the 'mythical' as the general attempt, not to portray the 'true,' factual account of Jesus' 'life and ministry' but to generate the multiple understandings of 'who' Jesus of Nazareth was taken to be and his meaning for the early church based, not on 'history' but on the inherited stories of the Christian community found in their scriptures, the Septuagint. A recognition of the '*genetic mythical principle*' in the gospels in this broader sense would enable an understanding of why there are theological options for understanding Jesus in the four gospels, not a presentation of 'the' historical facts.

It is particularly important, though, to recognize that here, as well, this text confirms the subtle but profound shift in Strauß' understanding of the 'rational order' that anchors theology. The 'rational order' is no longer conceived as a meta-narrative, 'logic of dialectic' of Absolute Spirit that is the causal explanation of the 'creation' of the world/cosmos, but, rather, the 'rational order' here is a '*comforting lubricant that arises out of nature itself*.'²³ In short, *this text is more than an attempt at 'appeasement.'* It is an attempt to grasp the 'essence of Christianity' in a non-Hegelian fashion that at least contains the seed of Strauß' materialism of 1872.

Strauß writings after 1835, then, not only identify an intellectual crisis in his Hegelianism formulated in 1837 in the *Streitschriften*. They also identify, already with "The Transient and Permanent in Christianity" of 1838, the emergence of his materialist 'faith' that reaches its fullest articulation in 1872 with *The Old and the New Faith*. A careful reading of his texts identifies the signals that flag the transition from Hegelian Idealism to Feuerbachian Materialism.²⁴

What is most striking about "The Transient and Permanent in Christianity" is that already here Hegel's meta-narrative, which is based on the dialectical 'logic' of double negation, is gone. Here in 1838, although sounding quite Hegelian, Strauß speaks of religion 'having two sides:' a 'rational' and a 'feeling' side. Whereas Strauß equates 'religion' with reason as the 'rational side' of religion,²⁵ religion, though, now consists in an internal harmony (with God and self) and equanimity over against the world as the 'feeling side' of religion.²⁶ There is no longer a meta-narrative of Double Negation invoked here. A 'religious genius' is one who combines the two sides of reason and feeling in an internal harmony.²⁷

Strauß speaks of genius as two kinds of extraordinary achievement: a genius of 'external skills' and a genius of 'internal harmony.'²⁸ The latter is a 'genius of piety.'²⁹ "[...] [S]triving for inner harmony consists in nothing else than that the lower powers of the soul are subordinated to the higher and all to the highest and hegemonic, which is religious consciousness."³⁰ (emphasis added)

23. See Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 365.

24. Later, I develop my thesis that Strauß' incomplete 'turn to Kant' allows invoking the overlooked perspective of Critical Idealism's *required conditions of possibility for any and all mental and/or physical experience*. When one does, one has a background for profiling the 'objective,' metaphysical shift of Strauß' reflections from Hegel's Idealism to Feuerbach's Materialism, and one can see, as well, that the *transcendental conditions of possibility required for an 'objective' metaphysical shift from Idealism to Materialism* is no retreat into 'subjectivism' or fanciful flight into 'empty abstractions'.

25. Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 108.

26. Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 107–108.

27. See Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 102–103.

28. See Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 109–110.

29. See Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 115–116.

30. Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 116.

Flagging his commitment to the importance of 'empirical history' for establishing truth, Strauß takes Jesus to be an historical example of the 'pious genius' and 'founder' of a religion. Strauß asserts not only that it is 'clearly' portrayed, 'once we remove all that is unhistorical from the gospels,'³¹ that Jesus attained 'this status of internal harmony and equanimity,' which constitutes the *unity of 'truly human' consciousness and God-consciousness*, but also *that Jesus was the first to introduce into humanity this religious idea* of inner harmony between humanity and God.³²

If we subtract the unhistorical, this [idea of inner harmony of human- and God-consciousness] [...] fits most beautifully and consistently the description of Jesus in the Gospels. In him, too, the idea that he first introduced to mankind the consciousness of the essential unity of the truly human with the divine, showed such omnipotence that *his whole life was uniformly permeated and transfigured up to the point that all noticeable dullness vanished*.³³ (emphasis added)

These are startling 'historical' claims. However, no more than Strauß was satisfied with an exclusive Christology in the *LJ* is he satisfied with an exclusive Christology of internal harmony between human- and God-consciousness here in "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity." *In both texts, Strauß places the emphasis on history.* What distinguishes a 'genius' from others is the significance of the 'problem that the genius solves; a 'problem' that had remained unsolved up to that point in history.³⁴ Yet here, he explicitly 'pulls the Christ down' from the throne of God (unlike the Hegelian 'Double Negation' and Schleiermacher's Christ of 'Perfect God-consciousness, which elevate the Christ out of history) and claims that he is 'one among equals'³⁵ – if unsurpassable. Jesus has to step down 'from the throne of the Son of God and the Redeemer' and 'take a seat on the bench of human geniuses.'³⁶ Strauß retains the sense of inclusivity in Christology, but it is no longer '*universal*' but relative, among religious geniuses.

In this respect, it is no degradation to place Christ under a general concept, in which others besides him, each in his own way, have a share. Even in this extension it is still a most worthy concept, and yet the others are compared with Christ only in so far as they show the same concept more or less realized in themselves.³⁷

31. NOTE: Strauß here speaks of a 'life-long' enduring internal harmony in Jesus. Strange, given that at most (John) the gospels only speak of three years of Jesus' life whereas the Synoptics only speak of a one year ministry (all other elements are unhistorical).

32. NOTE: Later in the *Glaubenslehre*, Strauß points out that the God/Man occurs ubiquitously in Indian religion/philosophy to the point that they raise the question, 'why only one incarnation?' *Glaubenslehre* II: 207–208.

33. Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 130–131.

34. See Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 105.

35. See "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 102, 106, 109, 124–125.

36. See Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 104.

37. Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 106.

The concept of 'genius,' then, is not shared equally among geniuses. Particularly, there is a difference between the genius 'of skills' and the genius 'of internal harmony.'

[...] neither the statesman nor the general, neither the philosopher nor the poet, neither the painter nor the musician, neither the inventor of the plow nor of the printing press, [have] rendered so essential a service to mankind as those who have turned the gaze of people upward and taught them *to feel, to recognize, and to revere ever more deeply and ever more correctly the power, wisdom, and love which rules over all existence*.³⁸ (emphasis added)

The 'highest' genius, therefore, is not the practitioner of a particular technical skill but achieves the 'highest' that a human being can achieve.

One is a human being neither by his ear, which is open to harmony, nor by the eye, which is receptive to beauty, nor by the sociability which founds states, nor by the ability to produce and record poetic (107/108) forms, neither by agriculture nor by book printing. Rather, *one is a human being* by that of which all these different faculties are only as many emanations: *by reason*. By means of reason not insofar as it is trained to one-sided theoretical virtuosity [= Hegel's theoretical reason], as with the philosopher; but insofar as it [reason] is the drive and the faculty of the finite subject *to relate itself and everything given to a higher and highest, to make this relationship as intimate and lively as possible, and out of it to determine harmoniously all its feeling, thinking, and willing*.³⁹ (emphasis added)

However, Strauß recognizes that the Christ is not alone with this 'genius.' He especially names Socrates:

As an example of such natures [which an inwardly won harmony has worked on others] I mention Socrates. He was a philosopher, orator, warrior, statesman and he was also no stranger to poetic achievements. In each of these subjects he has certainly been surpassed by many others; in philosophy already by his disciple Plato: but this is not at all the basis of his value; *neither on his achievements in one of these subjects, nor on the versatility of having accomplished something in all of them: but that in which he is so unique, in which even Plato and Aristotle remained deeply below him, is this perfect balance of the inner life* [...] is the basis for his value].⁴⁰

Yet, Strauß overlooks that Socrates' philosophical achievement was grounded in the profoundest of skepticism: In his defense at his trial (Plato's *Apology* 21d) for defaming the gods and corrupting the youth of Athens, Socrates both accounts for the animosity of his enemies and for his reputation as possessing 'wisdom' by demonstrating that 'we don't know what we think we know' (*Apology* 21d, 23b)

Examining his opponents (the politicians, poets, and artisans), Socrates demonstrates that we cannot define the very ideas on which our 'wisdom' depends. A defini-

38. Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 107.

39. Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 107–108.

40. "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 113.

tion requires establishing 'identity and difference:' that which is 'identical' to a set of phenomena as well as that which makes this set 'different' from all other sets. Socrates' examination of his accusers demonstrates that it is next to impossible to establish such identity and difference because there is always the possibility of including under the idea something that is outside of the set, which, of course, is what makes language metaphorical, not literal. Strauß either has forgotten or he doesn't know that Hegel's critique of the 'weakness' of Kant's 'reason' is its skepticism⁴¹ because Kant denied Absolute Knowledge and his 'subjective' philosophy was based on our inability to experience directly 'things-in-themselves.'

To be sure, Socrates was not the founder of a religion, although one might quarrel with Strauß that, by his own definition of 'religion,' it is difficult to say why he wasn't, except that he founded no 'institution' of religion. Here in "The Transient and Permanent in Christianity" Strauß says that:

[...] *reason is nothing other than religion, and the founder of religion is the one who helps humanity to develop reason,*⁴² i.e., religion is that without which the individual would not be human, and thus would know nothing of culture, state, art, and philosophy [...], [...] and] insofar as Christianity is recognized as the most perfect religion, the founder of it is due the first fruits of that worship which we offer to the genius.⁴³ (emphasis added)

Furthermore, Strauß is proposing a different, universally *inclusive* Christology here than his Hegelian, inclusive Christology of the *LJ*. This *inclusive* Christology of "The Transient and Permanent in Christianity" helps *the individual* to 'develop an intimate and lively, internal harmony out of all its feeling, thinking, and willing.' Strauß appeals to the uniqueness of humanity's moral agency and 'aesthetics' to articulate this Christology:

[...]the field of religion is not like, for instance, that of mechanics, [...] but, as in the field of morality and, to a certain extent, also of fine art, in such a way that '*no one can do anything for the other.*'⁴⁴ Rather, the second, third, tenth, who would achieve a pious consciousness in himself (of course, not only to the imagination, but to life in such a way that it penetrates his whole being), would have accomplished the same spiritual work as the first and would

41. See Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen:" GW II: 287–288, 303. He levels the same charge against Fichte. See *ibid.*: 427–428.

42. NOTE: Strauß is neither calling humanity to Schleiermacher's 'Perfect God-consciousness' nor to Hegel's 'point of indifference' where Absolute Spirit becomes aware of Itself. Rather, Strauß is claiming that religion is a call to 'relate to oneself and to everything given to a higher and highest, to make this relationship as intimate and lively as possible, and out of it to determine harmoniously all its feeling, thinking, and willing' in life.

43. Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 108.

44. NOTE: This is not Kant's notion that no one but the individual can self-select a moral principle to govern her/his actions. Much less does Strauß consider Kant's notion that no one can think for another.

therefore not stand lower than the one who had succeeded in this at first.⁴⁵ (emphasis added)

However, the 'first' prototype has an extraordinary status:

[...The 'first' prototype] forms, as it were, *the point of passage through which an idea enters the world of phenomena*.⁴⁶ As such an idea, it tends to prove itself most powerfully; the greater extension which it later gains corresponds in that beginning to an intensity that is all the stronger. Especially that subordination, yes, that absorption of the whole personality in an idea, that this permeates all the veins of man, and moves and directs all his actions, we find most in such individuals in whom an idea first breaks through, as it were, from non-being into being.⁴⁷

Nonetheless, Strauß' Christology here is not Schleiermacher's *ultimate, eminent causality* of Perfect God-consciousness that establishes a new *ontological condition* to correct humanity's imperfect God-consciousness. It is also, obviously, not Hegel's Christology that, after death, finite consciousness is the 'point of indifference' by which Absolute Spirit becomes conscious of Itself In-and-For-Itself. Rather, Strauß' Christology is an 'idea,' yes, the idea of 'religious piety' in this life that is more the planting of a seed, which can 'develop in and throughout all humanity than the product of a 'empty' logic of negation that leads to Absolute Knowledge (awareness of the infinite in the finite) beyond history, but, reading with Cassirer, it is no less mythical. It is the 'idea' that an infinite and lively, internal harmony out of all feeling, thinking, and willing' with the 'highest' reality that one can experience, that is, with reason, *is present in, and capable of achievement by, all human consciousness* (relatively). As with his inclusive Christology in the *LJ*, the inclusive Christology of "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity" does not view the 'idea' as 'stingy' and limited to one exemplar, but 'it distributes its riches among a multiplicity of exemplars which reciprocally complete each other – in the alternate appearance and suppression of a series of individuals,'⁴⁸ although now the 'idea' is not the Idea of Absolute Spirit but an internal harmony within the individual in history.

The concluding line of Strauß' text claims that, as the first and unsurpassable founder of 'religion,' *the Christ is the 'essence of Christianity*: If Christ remains for us

45. Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 129–130.

46. Here the focus is on the 'first' of an historical event in a very Platonic fashion of an idea as archetype that is copied for the first time in history. The 'idea' comes to history rather than history returning to the 'Idea'. The 'point' that is a historical first of an event is not the 'point of indifference' of Hegelianism that turns away from history.

Ernst Cassirer distinguishes between the 'cognitive perspective' of mythology and the 'perceptual perspective'. (See: 41, n. 20) Cassirer would have to say that Strauß, ironically, can be seen here as himself engaging in a mythical reading of Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus is portrayed as an archetypal prototype viewed from the 'cognitive perspective' of myth.

47. Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 130.

48. Strauß, *LJ*: 780.

[...] and if he remains for us as the highest thing that we know and are able to think of in religious terms, as the one *without whose presence in the mind no perfect piety is possible*, then *in him the essence of Christianity remains for us*.⁴⁹ (emphasis added)

This concluding sentence will come back to haunt Strauß as he read Feuerbach. By 1841, Strauß clearly *had* read Feuerbach's criticism of Hegel's anthropomorphic use of reason to define religion because he cites Feuerbach's *Philosophie und Christenthum* (1839) and other writings of the "Introduction" of the *Glaubenslehre*.⁵⁰ It is not inconceivable that he had read Feuerbach's 1841 *Essence of Christianity* [*Wesen des Christentums*] in which Feuerbach specifically dismisses Christian theology for its apotheosis of 'reason.' Although Strauß holds onto a notion of 'reason' as central to 'religion' (but not for understanding Christology), he is able to do so only because he sees the 'new faith' that is at the core of Feuerbach's Nominalist notion of *ectypal* ideas. All of this becomes clear by the end of Strauß' career with his *The Old and the New Faith*.

Strauß made a valiant attempt in "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity" to establish the 'historical' significance of Jesus as the founder of Christianity, the religion. He explicitly says: "[...] *this Christ, insofar as he is inseparable from the highest design of religion, is a historical, not a mythical one, an individual, not a mere symbol*."⁵¹ (emphasis added) Here he views the 'mythic' nature of the gospels as entirely 'unhistorical' having given up on the Hegelian 'husk'/'kernel' or 'idea'/'representations,' epistemology, which had driven his project of the *LJ* to restore dogmatically by Hegelian philosophy what had been destroyed historically by criticism.⁵²

I propose that we follow Strauß' intellectual crisis as a 'metaphysical' search for an alternative to Hegelian Idealism that eventually led Strauß to Feuerbachian Empiricism/Materialism because he failed to adequately understand the option of Kantian Critical Idealism.

Nonetheless, the difference between an Idealist (in this case, Hegelian) and a Material Empiricist (in this case, Feuerbachian) is not as large as one might think. Although

49. Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 132.

50. See the "Introduction" to Strauß, *Glaubenslehre*: 4 and n. 9.

51. Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 131.

52. Had he grasped the breadth and depth of his own 'genetic mythical principle' in the *LJ*, though, Strauß could have discovered the 'hermeneutical key' that unites the gospels and the history of Church Doctrine, his next massive project. Rather than approaching the gospels or Church History as an issue of 'factual history,' he could have viewed both as the deposit of the multiple (!), theological narrative efforts of humanity to understand 'who' Jesus of Nazareth was and 'what' his significance for humanity was. In short, he could have viewed Christianity as a collection of portrayals of the meaning and theological significance of Jesus as the Christ. The virtue of such a hermeneutic investigation would have been to more easily see that what is decisive in a narrative is *not only* its assumptions, which consist of pre-figured narrative elements already in one's tradition, with which it begins to construct the new narrative, *but also* the dependence of all narrative constructions on what Kant identifies as the universal capacities of transcendental consciousness, which make possible the generating of narratives in the first place. In short, he could have grasped the significance of 'religion' for what it means to be human.

the 'object' of their convictions is 180° opposite, they share the same metaphysical conviction over what constitutes 'knowledge.' For the Idealist, knowledge consists in the agreement between an 'idea' and the 'object' that is appropriate to the 'idea' as the *objective cause* of the object. For the Empiricist, knowledge consists in the agreement between an 'object' and the 'idea' that is appropriate to the 'object,' which grounds the *subjective cause* (creation) of the idea. In other words, the required condition for 'knowledge' is the same for both: the knower must be able to experience 'ideas' and 'objects' in *causal* relation to one another. The difference between the Idealist and the Empiricist is which side of the equation carries the *causal* weight of 'truth:' the idea or objects? To be sure, this is no trivial difference, but both ignore the limits to finite, transcendental consciousness.

The thinker who acknowledges as 'true' only 'universal' and 'eternal' ideas with no connection to the empirical world is a fantasizer. Today, such a person, at least indirectly, encourages conspiracy theories. However, the thinker who has only 'objects' and takes ideas to be entirely relative is a reductionist materialist. Today, we could say s/he succumbs to scientism. At their extremes, both the Idealist and the Empiricist are caught in determinism.

With respect to the Idealist's determinism: On the one hand, if everything is the product of 'universal' and 'eternal' ideas (e.g., Platonism and Hegelianism), then the empirical world of concrete events has no contribution to make to 'knowledge.' Physical events are only the 'husk' for their 'truth,' which is their 'idea.' In the language of Platonism: the world is 'mere copy and shadow,' and the copies and shadows themselves are a 'prison' or 'tomb' of the soul⁵³ with no enduring meaning. On the other hand, *divine determinism* or Predestination is the logical conclusion drawn for those who think through the consequences of a Personal Deity as the ultimate origin of 'eternal' ideas – in Christianity expressed most consistently by Augustine of Hippo and Calvin of Geneva as 'double' predestination either to salvation or to damnation.

With respect to the Empiricist's determinism: On the one hand, if everything is the product of 'particular' matter combining and separating into a statistically infinite system with 'ideas' only the transient, abstract grasp of the impermanent order in the present, then the intelligible world of ideas has no contribution to make to 'knowledge.' Ideas are only 'abstractions' generated by nature out of nature because consciousness itself is a product of 'mere' nature. On the other hand, *material determinism* is the logical conclusion drawn by those who think through the consequences of 'reductionist materialism' as the generator of even ideas.

Furthermore, there is a fly in the ointment of both Idealism and Empiricism. Idealism is the product of an analogy that is grounded in finite conscious experience projected anthropomorphically onto an infinite consciousness. In other words, Idealism takes the human mind to provide the 'ultimate' explanation of all that is. In contrast, Empiricism takes ideas to be the product of conscious abstraction 'after' it

53. See Plato's *Cratylus* 400b-c and *Gorgias* 493a.

has experienced empirical phenomena. Whereas Idealism presupposes ‘consciousness’ as the key to knowledge and truth, Empiricism presupposes the inexplicable presence of an order in matter, which consciousness is capable of ‘abstracting’ out of the phenomena. Consequently, abstractions don’t create ideas, they merely describe the order of ideas that is already in the phenomena of perception.

Whereas Idealism and Empiricism define themselves as alternative ‘explanations’ of knowledge, they share the assumption of ‘consciousness.’ For Idealism, consciousness is either taken to mean the subjectivity of an individual’s mind, or it refers to a ‘logic’ of ideas, for example, Hegel’s notion of Double Negation, that governs all events. For Empiricism, consciousness is a capacity that is capable of abstracting, that is, creating, ‘ideas’ out of its experience of particulars. To the extent that this shared assumption of consciousness involves the metaphysical assumption that there is some objective ‘substance,’ mind, that is different from the objective ‘substance’ (matter), Idealism and Empiricism would be forms of dualism that leave us only with mud-slinging over which ‘substance’ is dominant – as if we somehow had access to one or the other (or both) substances in order to ground our explanations in one or the other. To the extent that the shared assumption of consciousness is not an objective ‘substance,’ then we are also left only with a dictum (*Machtspruch*) to decide between them.⁵⁴

There is nothing about the mere ‘appearance’ in consciousness of ideas that *requires* the conviction that there are ideas that exist independent of consciousness. There is nothing about the mere ‘appearance’ of objects that *requires* the conviction that the objects that we experience are as we experience them to be. Because both ideas and objects are mental or physical ‘appearances’ and because we experience neither directly but only indirectly as a consequence of our experience of them as appearances, neither set of appearances of ideas or objects requires that we experience them as they

54. The middle option is Critical Idealism. Rather than a ‘substance,’ consciousness is understood by Critical Idealism to be a transcendental capacity to grasp concepts as ‘relationalities.’ On the “functional” nature of concepts that are deduced by ‘association’ (*Vergesellschaftung*), which are necessary to understand objects (not direct perception of substances), see the “Introduction:” 86, n. 26 as well as Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 66–67 (*Verhältnisse in der Anschauung*) and B 93 (all sensible perception is effects, whereas concepts are functions). See as well, *Metaphysik Mrongovius* XXIX: 889 (A concept arises as a consequence of the experience of appearances because “I imagine the identity of my apperception in many representations.”). See as well, Ernst Cassirer, *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff* (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1910) The paradox of appearances is that, although we are incapable of experiencing, hence, we are incapable of knowing, their ‘causes’ or ‘substances’ directly, appearances confirm that there is a sub-set of appearances *that is required* in order for there to be an experience of (and understanding of) appearances, in general. This sub-set is transcendental consciousness, which is irreducible but inseparable from its ‘content:’ capacities and appearances. Although this appears to be a vicious circle of appearances accounting for appearances, there is an element in this paradox that checkmates the viciousness of the circle. That element is flagged by the italicized *that is required*.

'really are.' We 'can have an incorrect idea' and/or we can be 'deceived by' the physical appearances.⁵⁵

In other words, the required (or necessary, but by no means *determining*) conditions of possibility of experience are incapable of being objectively 'known.' Rather, they are an assumption of subjective requirements in order for us to experience anything like appearances – *although they are not a creation of the subject itself*. Precisely because they are only capable of indirect experience as the conditions for experience of appearances, they are incapable of objective proof in experience – because these conditions don't and can't appear in appearances, which alone constitute the direct content of experience.⁵⁶

Absent an understanding of the paradox of appearances as inexplicable in themselves but as *requiring transcendental conditions of possibility for the experience of appearances that can neither be proved nor disproved in appearances*, humanity is merely a drunken sailor staggering from one side of the street to the other – from Mental Idealism to Material Empiricism. Given that finite consciousness can directly *experience* only appearances, for finite consciousness, any claims for 'knowledge' of either Intelligible ideas or Empirical objects in themselves involves a *speculative* (even *enthusiastic*) leap of 'faith' because neither of these metaphysical options is capable of proof or disproof. Both treat as an 'explanation' something that is a 'description,' which is the committing of the classic error of a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος.

55. In contrast to mental and physical 'appearances,' Critical Idealism stresses that what we undoubtedly experience are appearances, out of which all experience arises and to which all accountable reflection returns. In order for us to experience appearances, there are *certain, required* to possess universal, mental capacities in order for us to experience appearances. These mental capacities are not *directly* experienced as appearances, but, rather, they are *indirectly* experienced as the *required conditions of possibility for any and all experience of appearances* (mental or physical).

Whereas this account of Idealist and Empirical epistemology is framed by the 'correspondence theory' of truth that views truth as the interface between 'actual' ideas and 'actual' phenomena, Kant's account of the conditions of possibility of experience *anticipated* the Heideggerian theme of truth as *a dynamic of concealed and revealed possibilities*, which are not merely nothing. See already in 1755 Kant's "A New Exposition of the First Principles of Metaphysical Knowledge" AA I: 395–396, English trans in *Kant's Latin Writings. Translations, Commentaries, and Notes*, Lewis White Beck ed., John a. Reuscher translator (New York: Peter Lang, 1986) 70–72: and in his *Metaphysik Mrongovius* AA XXIX: 960 ff. Heinz Happ points out that Heidegger's theme of *Sein as Möglichkeit* is at the core of Aristotle's understanding of 'matter' (ύλη). See Happ, *Hyle. Studien zum Aristotelischen Materie Begriff* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971): 287 "[...] ύλη ist das, der Möglichkeit nach' (δυνάμει), was das τόδε τι 'der Wirklichkeit nach' (ἐνεργεία) ist." (287). Later Happ adds: 687: "Alle Einzelfälle von ἐνεργεία gründen im *Actus purus*, von δύνανμις in der 'reinen Möglichkeit,' die als 'Urgegensatz' Dynamis/Energeia einander gegenüberstehen."

56. The paradox is that appearances provide *required* conditions of possibility for them to be experienced, but those *required* conditions are neither merely 'ideas' (Idealism) nor merely 'matter' ('Empiricism'), which would require access to ideas and objects as they are in themselves and distinct from one another. Rather, these *required* conditions of possibility are 'metaphysical' in the strict sense of 'beyond-the-physical' as *required condition* for experiencing and understanding, but NOT the content of, or explanation of, either ideas or objects.

1839 "Schleiermacher und Daub"

In 1839, Strauß no longer is interested in reconciliation with his opponents. The fourth edition of the *LJ* returns to the original. The first text, "Schleiermacher und Daub, in ihrer Bedeutung für die Theologie unserer Zeit" ("Schleiermacher and Daub. Their Significance for the Theology of our Age") in the volume *Characteristics and Criticisms. A Collection of Various Essays out of Theology, Anthropology, and Aesthetics* (*Charakteristiken und Kritiken. Eine Sammlung zerstreuter Aufsätze aus den Gebieten der Theologie, Anthropologie und Aesthetik*), is an unequivocal break with the Schleiermachians. It also confirms the break with the Hegelians, represented by Carl Daub, the Right-Wing Hegelian who was Ludwig Feuerbach's professor in Heidelberg.

In "Schleiermacher und Daub" Strauß attacks, especially, along with a long list of other themes in him,⁵⁷ Schleiermacher's notion of 'Perfect God-consciousness' as the 'feeling of absolute dependence.' Furthermore, he ridicules Daub's attempt to use the Hegelian distinction between 'content' (the Idea) and 'representations' (sensible forms) to portray the God/Man as the point of indifference that negates multiplicity and 'returns' to Absolute Spirit as the true 'kernel' of the gospel accounts with the gospels themselves as individual texts being mere 'husks' of eternal truth.

What made Hegelianism 'modern' was Spinoza's attempt to give a metaphysical account of a non-Personal God. As F.C. Baur pointed out, Hegel's novelty was that he combined Spinozian Pantheism with a 'horizontal' conception of Gnostic salvation,⁵⁸ which I map onto a horizontal reading of a reclined version of Plato's simile of the line.⁵⁹

Hegel's 'science' was framed by the Medieval Scholastic, 'Intellectualist' tradition in an all-out rejection of the Medieval Scholastic, 'Occasionalist'/'Voluntarist' tradition. In short, Hegelian 'science' means 'Rationalism' in the sense of a teleological project of an Intellectualist logic of dialectic, and it is an example of Medieval Scholasticism.

To be sure, Hegel was not a 'Rationalist' in the sense of 18th and 19th C biblical critics such as the 19th C. H. E. G. Paulus, whom Strauß ridiculed in the *LJ*, and, to a great extent, as Schleiermacher. The 'Rationalists' sought to protect the 'truth' of the gospels by insisting that physical events are governed by an eternal, lawful order and must be adhered to even by its 'creator' – the Personal God of Platonic-Christian 'Intellectualism.' Hegel's 'Rationalism' was equally 'Intellectualist,' but, following Spinoza,

57. In Chapter 4: Why Schleiermacher was not an Option," see "A Fragile Edifice Built on the Sand of Feeling:" 267 ff.

58. See F.C. Baur, "Die Hegel'sche Religions-Philosophie" in *Gnosis*: 668–740.

59. Plato's account of the Simile of the Sun (*Republic* 507b–509c) and Simile of the Line (*Republic* 509c–511e) define Christian Platonism. The Simile of the Line was taken to be a 'stick figure' of a standing human being. On reading Hegel's account of reason, understanding, and Double Negation as a reclining version of Plato's two similes, see Chapter 8: "Hegel's Reclined Plato and Kant as a 'Subjectivist'" 811 ff. and Chapter 9: "Hegel on Beauty:" 868 ff.

he rejected the notion of a Personal, creator God. *Hegel's God created according to the 'necessity' of (empty) dialectical logic.*

The 18th and 19th C Rationalists were biblical critics. They were concerned to establish that those biblical texts, which appear to contradict the physical laws of 'modern' science, were actually in conformity with physical laws – only that they were mis-perceived and/or mis-understood in an age that had no conception of physical laws. However, as Strauß pointed out in his "Hegel's Perspective on the Historical Value of Gospel History" ("Hegel's Ansicht über den historischen Werth der evangelischen Geschichte") in Pamphlet III of his *Streitschriften* of 1837, Hegel was not a 'biblical critic' if by 'criticism' one means that one is concerned with the historical status of the 'entire account of Jesus as it is portrayed in the gospels.'⁶⁰

For Hegel, God does not appear as an agent communicating in sensible forms like the 'burning bush.'⁶¹ Furthermore, Hegel rejected attempts at historical proof of the miracles because 'God's power in nature is manifest by eternal laws, which means that the 'true miracle' is Spirit Itself,⁶² not some particular historical event. The sole purpose of history is to create the physical conditions that allow for the God/Man Jesus, who "awakened a representation of a new heaven and earth as the manifestation of God's love."⁶³ God's love works its way through all events in empirical history in order to establish the conditions for 'reconciliation with God' (the restored atonement as the 'at-One-ment') that occurs by the Oneness that is Absolute Spirit's becoming aware of Itself 'In-and-For-Itself.'⁶⁴ Hegel did not need 'sensible facts' to establish spiritual certainty. The sensible world is only the 'husk' for the spiritual truth of the God/Man that is the 'true' 'kernel' of history. In other words, the relationship between the divine and the sensible realm is 'negative.'⁶⁵ The physical universe is the product of Spirit's negation of Itself in the sense of negating the Spirit's 'merely abstract' 'In-Itself.' The 'return' to Spirit requires the negation (nullification) of physical phenomena at the 'point of indifference.'

According to Hegel, then, the sensible realm was not created by means of the two-step process of a Personal Deity for whom creation is a conscious, intentional act. God did not, first, 'think' the archetype (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, internal reflection) followed, second, by 'speaking' God's thoughts (λόγος προφορικὸς, external technical agency) by copying the archetype in matter as in 'classical' Neo-Platonic Christianity. Rather, creation is caused by a 'necessary,' dialectical logic.⁶⁶ Awareness requires 'twoness' (a

60. Strauß, "Hegel's Ansicht über den historischen Werth der evangelischen Geschichte:" 90.

61. See Strauß, "Hegel's Ansicht über den historischen Werth der evangelischen Geschichte:" 77–78.

62. See Strauß, "Hegel's Ansicht über den historischen Werth der evangelischen Geschichte:" 91.

63. See Strauß, "Hegel's Ansicht über den historischen Werth der evangelischen Geschichte:" 83.

64. See Strauß, "Hegel's Ansicht über den historischen Werth der evangelischen Geschichte:" 85.

65. See Strauß, "Hegel's Ansicht über den historischen Werth der evangelischen Geschichte:" 89–90.

66. On Kant's rejection of dialectic for grounding the ultimate, causal ground of 'what is,' see *Critique of Pure Reason* B 697 and Chapter 6: 670.

‘this’ and a ‘that’). By definition, an Absolute Oneness contains no ‘twoness.’ Starting from an Absolute Oneness, a ‘this’ and a ‘that’ can only be the product of the dialectical ‘negation’ of It’s own Oneness by Absolute Spirit in order to establish by the First Negation the initial ‘two-ness’ required by the logic of dialectic in order to achieve ever new syntheses that ever so slowly and cumulatively results by the on-going process of negating ‘what is’ to generate ‘newness.’ This logical process of negation eventually creates the physical conditions for the emergence of consciousness. In its ‘highest’ form, consciousness has the capacity to perform the ultimate, Second Negation. It is this Second Negation that negates all multiplicity to think the original Absolute Oneness, the Absolute Knowledge, and the Absolute Freedom above all negation that is Absolute Spirit. This Second Negation is the God/Man who, negatively, overcomes ‘sin’ (sensuousness) by negating it by, positively, divinizing consciousness.

The ‘proof’ of Christianity is ‘an internal witness of finite Spirit’ to its ultimate, *a priori* Infinite Spirit, which is the ‘task of philosophy to elevate Christian truth in Spirit,’⁶⁷ above all history. The ‘fact’ that historical nature and consciousness exist ‘proves,’ logically, that Absolute Spirit negated Itself to generate them because nature and consciousness could not have come about if the ultimate starting point of Oneness did not negate Itself. In other words, the ‘proof’ of the Christian faith cannot be established by anything particular and finite, which includes both physical nature and the scriptures – all of which is a product of ultimate causality. Its proof is the ‘fact’ of Spirit necessarily presupposed by all particulars and finitude.

Specifically, for Hegel, because the attempt to establish facts in an ‘historical, juridical sense’ is subject to endless qualifications and doubt,⁶⁸ the question of determining the truth of such ‘facts’ as the resurrection and ascension was meaningless.⁶⁹ Faith in Jesus as ‘the God/Man’ occurs only after the death of Jesus, that is ‘only after the cessation of his [historical] physical presence,’⁷⁰ and occurs as the recognition that ‘the God/Man’ status transpires ‘beyond history’ (as Karl Barth⁷¹ and Wolfhart Pannenberg⁷² continued to claim in the 20th C).

According to Hegel, the cosmos is ordered by ‘Reason,’ but not as the ‘thoughts’ of a Personal God. Rather, ‘Reason’ is the eternal structure of ‘ideas’ and its necessary logic of dialectic that imperceptibly and silently shape all events and the attainment of all knowledge. *Just as what natural sciences ‘knows’ are the ‘eternal’ laws of nature*

67. See Strauß, "Hegel's Ansicht über den historischen Werth der evangelischen Geschichte:" 89.

68. See Strauß, "Hegel's Ansicht über den historischen Werth der evangelischen Geschichte:" 89, 94.

69. See Strauß, "Hegel's Ansicht über den historischen Werth der evangelischen Geschichte:" 91–92.

70. See Strauß, "Hegel's Ansicht über den historischen Werth der evangelischen Geschichte:" 80–81 (see as well, 83 84 86 92, 93).

71. See Karl Barth, *The Word of God and the Word of Man*, Douglas Horton, trans. (New York: Harper & Row, 1957): 90.

72. See Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Jesus—God and Man*, Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe trans. (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1974).

(generated, in actual experience, by dialectic), which are 'beyond' empirical facts and not directly given with them, knows' so, too, in the scriptures. True knowledge of the gospels is not concerned with the 'historical facts' of the gospels but consists of the 'truth' of the 'idea' of the God/Man (Absolute Knowledge of the Absolute Spirit) beyond transient history. 'Nature' and 'historical facts' are only logically necessary in order that 'knowledge' not be 'merely empty' abstractions. However, neither nature nor historical facts contribute anything to the 'true content' of knowledge.

Strauß' "Schleiermacher und Daub" from 1839 indicates even further distancing from Hegel with Strauß embracing the ectypal, rather than archetypal, character of ideas. I have discussed the Schleiermacher elements of this text in Chapter 4: "Why Schleiermacher was not an Option." Here, I examine Carl Daub, the Right-wing Hegelian theologian in Heidelberg. Forgotten today, Carl Daub, theologian and university rector in Heidelberg, was a prominent Right-Wing Hegelian theologian in the first half of the 19th C. During his first term as rector in 1816 and along with the theologian, Henrich Paulus, he obtained Hegel's appointment to the faculty of the University of Heidelberg in 1816 where Hegel taught for two years before going to Berlin.⁷³ Ludwig Feuerbach's acquired his understanding of Hegel from Daub, his professor in Heidelberg.

In the course of presenting the work of Schleiermacher and Daub, *Strauß emphasizes that Daub's Hegelianism is 'correct'* in that it places 'reason' above feeling – although not separated from feeling! Speaking of Schleiermacher, according to Strauß:

[According to Schleiermacher], [r]eligion is mediated [...] by thinking; but, therefore, its own essence⁷⁴ is not thinking but feeling. Thinking expands the conception of the world in various stages; feeling joins thinking, and recognizes the more completely or more incompletely imagined world as a purely dependent one; thinking, in turn, reflects on this feeling, and from this reflection forms the conception of a fetish, of a circle of gods, or of the unified God: but the religious thing here [in Schleiermacher] would always be neither the preceding nor the following thinking, but only the feeling that lies in the middle. Namely, although pious feeling, on the one hand, owes to thinking both its greater or lesser purity and extension and, on the other hand, its representation of God in general, it should nevertheless have to thank its specifically religious moment to feeling as such, according to which it *sets the entire content of sensual consciousness at every level as being solely dependent on feeling*. This is also expressed by Schleiermacher as follows, 'God is given to us in feeling in an original way' (*Glaubensl.* 1. p. 23 [see the final paragraph in § 4

73. See *Hegel-Lexikon*, Cobben, P.G., Cruysberghs, P, Jonkers, P.H.A., & de Vos, L, eds. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftlichen Buchgesellschaft, 1006): 10.

74. NOTE: Schleiermacher speaks of feeling as the 'essence' of religion. An 'essence' is an imperceptible 'idea' shared in common by a set of particulars. As the translator of Plato, Schleiermacher surely knows that. In Christian Platonism, essences are the eternal thoughts (Reason) of God that are the ground for any and all reflection. Clearly, though, here Schleiermacher is taking 'reason' to mean merely *the activity of reflection, not the eternal order of ideas/essences (Logos)* required for any and all activity of reflection to occur. Abstract reflection is *always accompanied by a feeling*. However, feeling is an *a posteriori* affect, not the *a priori* condition of reflection.

of Schleiermacher's *Glaubensl.*]); besides this, however, it is not denied that thinking can contribute in an original manner the formation of the idea of God. *The only qualification is that both original feeling and equally original knowledge of God should remain each for itself; none should have anything to do with the other, and especially the former should not be derived from the latter.* [Strauß now turns to Daub's criticism of Schleiermacher's emphasis on feeling:] This separation of the various spiritual spheres is no more natural[, though,] than if it occurred to a naturalist to say that ice is something in itself, water something in itself, and steam something in itself, that none comes from the other, but has its own principle in itself; because they are all only different metamorphoses of one and the same substance, just as thinking, feeling, and willing are different phases of the one spiritual life. That man is capable of becoming aware of God, he owes to his spiritual, intelligent nature, as is evident from the fact (*to which Hegel rightly draws attention again and again*) that animals lack the ability of such awareness; man raises the indeterminate possibility of awareness of God to reality, and forms it into a definite, more or less perfect, conception through thinking; he takes this conception back from himself, makes it the living definiteness of his being, through feeling. – Thus, [the Hegelian] Daub is correct here, in contrast to Schleiermacher, when he understands piety as feeling and acting accordingly, but religion as faith and cognition, thus as thinking.⁷⁵ (emphasis added)

Strauß unequivocally expresses his own commitment here to thought (cognition) above feeling. However, he indicates his distance from Hegelian 'reason' just eight pages later when he contrasts two ways by which thought (philosophy) engages church faith and dogmatics:

Philosophical thought becomes theologically dogmatic thought, in that at every turn it is both reflection on ecclesiastical faith and biblical content; whereby a double course can be taken: [1]) either one can descend from the concept to the dogma, to prove immediately what is speculatively recognized [to be true] to also be the teaching of the Bible and the consciousness of the church; or [2]) or one can ascend from the given positive, the individual article of faith, to the philosophical concept, to derive the philosophical concept out of this positive element through the dialectic of the dogmatic material. I consider the latter method to be the correct one.⁷⁶

Here Strauß rejects the speculative metaphysics of Hegelianism, which takes the idea to be the explanation of the particular phenomena to which it belongs and claims the idea as archetype. Strauß now is claiming that ideas (abstractions) are *a posteriori* ectypal constructions that first arise out of the experience of particulars. Although he doesn't specifically cite Feuerbach at this point in "Schleiermacher und Strauß," his "Introduction" to his *Glaubenslehre* indicates that he was engaging Feuerbach (see Strauß' *Glaubenslehre*: 4, footnote 9).

Strauß repeats his commitment to ectypal ideas in his concluding criticisms of Schleiermacher and Daub. Schleiermacher succumbs to feeling whereas Daub embraces uncritical historicism of the scriptures:

75. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 155–156.

76. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 172–173.

One finds in both Schleiermacher and Daub the 'scientific principle of their age,' the Absolute Concept, but diametrically in a one-sided fashion. Both know that substance is subject. However, one in the lopsidedness of substance, the other in the lopsidedness of subjectivity. The unity of divinity with humanity was achieved by Schleiermacher only in the subjective form of feeling and reflection concerning this subjective form. Daub claimed that one has not attained a complete unity of divinity with humanity when the believer has not selflessly sunk into the substance of Church faith. If Daub's thinking is submerged in the substance of belief, Schleiermacher's substance is absorbed in the feeling of the subject. Schleiermacher, as a dogmatist, does not seek the idea at all, because he is assured of its absolute content in inner experience. Daub has found the Idea, but in and with it he also believes to have assured himself of the experiential truth of sacred history. *Both lack the true mediation of dogma with the concept, of the historical with the ideal.*⁷⁷ (emphasis added)

The mediation of the historical with the ideal takes ideas to be generated 'bottom-up' out of history and the material order rather than ideas constituting a 'top-down' Idealist explanation of history and the material order. Strauß avoids 'empty abstractions' by grounding the possibility of ideas in the experience of the historical, material world. History is the domain of truth so that, if the historical account is false, so too, the dogmatic convictions that claim their 'anchoring' in such perceptible representations is both false and 'empty.'

It is possible that Strauß already in 1839 anticipates his conclusion in 1872 or at least is on the way to thinking of the origin of ideas/laws as arising as a 'lubricant of solace' in the midst of the mechanical cogwheels of nature from out of an internal source ('*Quelle*')⁷⁸ that is nature reflectively 'turned inward on itself.'⁷⁹ Yet, Strauß is either unaware or chooses not to acknowledge, that this is precisely the account of ideas that is proposed by Kant. Contrary to Hegel, who in "Glauben und Wissen" asserts that Kant's notion of 'reflecting judgment' claims to be a *causal explanation* of the origin of the judgment's *content*.⁸⁰ Kant, however, is only presenting a *description* of how finite consciousness goes about 'making sense' of a set of phenomena that it doesn't yet understand by means of a deductive search for the concept, which it employs to classify phenomena.⁸¹ Hegel, in contrast, is an Absolute Idealist who takes ideas to be 'top down,' *a priori*, and derived from Absolute Spirit/Absolute Unity. Strauß/Feuerbach take ideas to be 'bottom up,' *a posteriori* constructions of finite consciousness.

However, there remains a crucial difference between Strauß/Feuerbach and Kant. The former two take their *a posteriori*, causal account of ideas to *explain their origin* as 'bottom up' creation by abstraction whereas Kant maintains that reflecting judgment,

77. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 208.

78. See Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 365.

79. See Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 240, 366.

80. See Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen:" GW II: 322–323.

81. On Kant's distinction between the capacities of *reflecting* and *re-producing* judgment, see the "Introduction:" 86, n. 26.

or the process of subsuming a set of appearances under a (universal) concept, is a *heuristic process* by which transcendental consciousness *deduces, presupposes, and applies* an *a priori* concept to a set of phenomena in order to understand the phenomena. In other words, *Kant doesn't offer an ectypal, causal explanation of concepts. He only describes* what is required in order for transcendental consciousness to 'make sense' of phenomena. *Strauß and Feuerbach succumb to a μετάβασις εις ἄλλο γένος because they substitute an explanation of the origin of concepts for what can only be a description of how concepts are deduced and applied by transcendental consciousness.*

History: Constitutive or Merely a Place Holder of 'Indifference'?

When it comes to Hegel, the central issue for Strauß is history: What significance do the particulars of historical events possess in relationship to 'eternal' truth? In his *Glaubenslehre* of 1841, Strauß identifies Daub as the point where Hegelian, speculative theology not only denounces biblical criticism, but also Daub enables the recognition that history for Hegelian speculative metaphysics is, ultimately, a matter of irrelevant indifference.⁸² In the face of the limits to speculative arguments for God, Daub embraces an uncritical, 'historical' reading of the text to ground theological claims.

Daub's exegetical strategy is framed by the Hegelian distinction between 'true' content (*Inhalt*) and the vehicle of representations (*Form/Vorstellungen*). The 'truth' of the text shines through the scriptural narratives but is not literally identical with the narratives. Nonetheless, the task of exegesis is not to 'critically' sort out what were the 'true' historical events of Jesus' ministry and/or the legitimacy/illegitimacy of factual truth in the gospel narratives as accounts of 'historical' events in relationship to Church Doctrine. Rather, the task of exegesis is to embrace the 'revealed truth' of the God/Man mediated by consciousness and 'shining through' the scriptures.

Strauß writes of Carl Daub: "[...] because only Absolute Knowledge is true in the full sense, man seems to be denied knowledge of absolute truth. However, if not absolutely true Spirit itself, man nevertheless recognizes it by virtue of its eternal revelation in the human spirit; thus, the theological element of human knowledge is a given."⁸³ Strauß then cites to Daub's "Über das theologische Element in der Wissenschaft" where Daub clearly invokes Plato's heliotrope of the Simile of the Sun in the *Republic*, Book VI:

82. Hegel, as well, speaks of 'indifference' in two senses: 1) non-difference as a metaphor for the Absolute One ("Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 456, 501) and 2) irrelevancy (*affektloser Traum*) (*ibid*: 496–497, 499–500). Of course, Hegel doesn't acknowledge the irrelevancy of the particulars of history because they are 'logically' relevant as the actual place holder of ideas so that ideas are not 'empty'.

83. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 101.

As light is to the earth and to life, as religion is to the state and its members, so is the theological element to the sciences: as the principle of their origin, reason of their preservation, and impulse of their growth and completion. From this theological element humanity derives a knowledge in which truth and certainty, consequently all knowledge, are founded. We call it an element because in it every science has its existence, and it itself rules in it and all its parts, like the soul in its body and its members, and affirms them" ("Über das theologische Element:" 3). Ascribing this cognition to itself and exploring in it, reason does not exalt itself so that it falls into the Kantian accusation of transcending its limits because 'man's knowledge of God is not his, but God's, as God's wise revelation in finite spirit' ("Über das theologische Element:" 8).⁸⁴

Writing of the miracles in the gospels and historical claims for Jesus' moral 'purity' however, Strauß observes of Daub: "We see already [... with] Daub that, where the issue is the realization of the idea of the God/Man in the historical person of Jesus, he returns to historical-critical grounds, above which he had proudly wanted to elevate himself."⁸⁵ Daub's dogmatic claims for Jesus as the God/Man allow him to conclude

[...] that Jesus of Nazareth was the God/Man is neither certain from the miracles that the evangelists tell about him, nor from the moral purity that [...] is attributed] to him. On the contrary, because the idea of God necessarily continues to be that of the God/Man, we attribute these attributes to Christ.⁸⁶

Strauß immediately asks:

But why him of all people? – Daub asks in return: Who else? From his life and teachings, his deeds and sufferings, there shines forth a glory of the Son from the Father; we see this glory as his contemporaries saw it.⁸⁷ We see it; from the evangelical narratives: in this way alone is the God/Manhood of the historical Christ to be proven; or, if not in this way, then it cannot be proven at all.⁸⁸

Although knowledge of God comes from revelation, nonetheless, the texts prove the God/Man status of the historical Christ. Daub places the truth beyond history but insists that the text provides the proof of the truth beyond history.

However, increasingly for Strauß, already in the *LJ* but also with growing emphasis in his writings of the 1830s, theology hangs on the value of 'historical criticism' by which Strauß means the objective analysis and conclusions of empirical investigation of the scriptures – not on God's revelation of Himself to Himself.

84. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 101. In this judgment that Kant has elevated humanity to the throne of God, Daub articulates Barth's accusation in *Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert. Ihre Vorgeschichte und ihre Geschichte* (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1981): 40, 53–56, 85 100 ff.

85. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 211.

86. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 211. An amazing hermeneutical circle, I would add.

87. Strauß footnotes to Daub's *Judas Iscariot*, II: 310 and his own "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 119 ff.

88. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 211–212.

As I pointed out above, already in his articles from *Die Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* in his *Streitschriften*, Strauß demonstrates that Hegel himself was not interested in historical conclusions. Hegel's very Christology is exposed as an event that occurs 'beyond history.'⁸⁹ Strauß addresses the theme as formulated in Daub's *Judas Ischariot* published between 1816 and 1818.⁹⁰ In what just could be a reference to Kant's 'dove' dreaming of flying in a vacuum in the "Second Introduction" to the *Critique of Pure Reason* (B 7) Strauß writes in "Schleiermacher und Daub.":

[...] a displeasure with criticism [was] unequivocal, but [for Daub] it came to open renunciation of criticism only in *Judas Ischariot*. Riding on the wings of the idea, speculative theology thought it did not need the laborious cleansing of the earthly path from its impulses. Because they disappeared from its bird's-eye view, it thought they had really been cleared away. In the end, however, those will have come farther, who, paving the way stretch after stretch, moved forward only at a snail's pace, than those who flew in a race with the eagles and cranes – in dreams.⁹¹

If this is a hint of influence from Kant, it is the only indicator that Strauß saw any value in Kant's Critical Idealism – other than a weak form of Kant's moral theory viewed through the lens of Hegel's "The Moral World View," not Kant himself. With his focus on the significance (for Strauß himself) or lack of significance of history (for Hegel and Daub), Strauß was never interested in undertaking a defense of Kantian 'metaphysics' in this text on Daub or elsewhere.

Given the absence of Hegelian metaphysics already in "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity" of 1838, Strauß' *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People* of 1864 attempts to appropriate Kant in the latter. Daub's readings of Hegel and Kant as summarized by Strauß in "Schleiermacher und Daub" in 1839 are crucially important for following the trajectory of Strauß' metaphysics from Hegel to Feuerbach.

Daub's 'Argument for God:'

Strauß' wrestling with his personal theological perspective is no more clear than in his comments on Daub's treatment of the arguments for God in "Schleiermacher und Daub." As I point out above, already in "On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity," Strauß no longer employs Hegel's logic of Double Negation in order to talk about God as he had in his "Concluding Dissertation" of the *LJ*. Rather, *he 'reduced' Hegel's metaphysics to its 'Intellectualist' core for which 'reason' is the imperceptible order that governs nature and humanity – in line with traditional, Christian Platonism.*

89. See Strauß, "Hegel's Ansicht über den historischen Werth der evangelischen Geschichte" in *Streitschriften* III: 80–84, 86, 92–94. See Chapter 5, "Traces of an Intellectual Crisis:" 579, n. 70.

90. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 103 ff.

91. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 120–121.

In his discussion of Daub's *Theologumena* in "Schleiermacher und Daub," Strauß praises the thoroughness of Daub's 'comprehensive' examination of the proofs for God (although he emphasizes that Daub's analysis is 'even more strenuous' in a posthumously published lecture). Daub includes Kant's criticisms of the cosmological, ontological, teleological, and moral arguments for God. However, 'even for Daub' the conclusion is "[...] that the proofs are neither sufficient individually nor all together, but rather already presuppose the idea of God in the human mind."⁹² Strauß then adds: Daub maintains in the *Theologumena* that God is 'absolutely' knowable.⁹³ Strauß points back to Daub's earlier employment of Double Negation for turning 'doubt' into 'absolute certainty.' "*Because the dogma was first negated by your doubt, but now the doubt itself is doubted, through this second negation what was first negated, the dogma, is restored, just as it was and had been before the first doubt.*"⁹⁴ (emphasis added) According to Daub,

[...] the Bible and Church ought not to have any authority over us anymore [...]. [T]ruth itself ought to be your authority. However, the scriptures contain the truth. The negation consists in being free from the church but true to the church. It is not because it is stated in the biblical text or the confession that it is true [... Rather], *it is true because it is true.*⁹⁵ (emphasis added)

Strauß points out, though, that it is precisely the last claim that we doubt. Daub responds: "[...] [Y]our initial doubt is one-sided and incomplete. Let your doubt become absolute doubt: then you doubt your own insight, and faith is quickly restored."⁹⁶

Strauß corrects Daub's logic: *Truly absolute doubt can no more forget that it is the doubt of a finite consciousness than it can forget that dogma is a finite form. Rather, doubting the finitude on both the objective and the subjective side, the doubter strives to escape the finitude of both sides.*⁹⁷

Rather than having constructed his dogmatic certainty on the basis of metaphysical arguments for God and a logic of doubting, double negation, both of which only refer to certainty with respect to predicate claims for finite consciousness either as anthropomorphic projections or as Cartesian doubt, Daub insists on the divine revelation of the scriptures to establish historical certainty.

Given his acknowledgement that finite spirit is not itself Absolute Spirit, that Absolute Knowledge is dependent upon revelation, and that metaphysical arguments for God are inadequate with theological 'certainty' based upon a logic of negation that results in affirmation of its dogmatic starting point by faith (rather than acknowledge-

92. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 178.

93. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 178.

94. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 145.

95. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 145.

96. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 145.

97. See "Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 145.

ment of the appropriateness of Cartesian skepticism being limits to finite consciousness itself), Daub's theological arguments are built on sand.⁹⁸

Strauß' Criticism of Daub's 'Argument for God:'

Strauß writes:

As correct as Daub is [with his logic that doubt leads to faith], the further and even more satisfying thing would have been to understand them at the same time as the necessary mediations through which thinking, consciously or unconsciously, arrives at the thought of the absolute, and to grasp this mediation as a negative as well as an affirmative one in itself: as Hegel did better and more sharply, namely, in the short note of the *Encyclopedia* than in the expansive lectures on this subject that therefore did not reach their goal.⁹⁹

Strauß doesn't explicitly identify here in "Schleiermacher und Daub" where in Hegel's *Encyclopedia* one finds this 'short note,' but he does indicate two passages from the *Encyclopedia* in the *Glaubenslehre*. Here in the *Glaubenslehre*, though, Strauß emphasizes the dualistic circularity of Hegelian logic :

Those (including Anselm and Kant), Hegel says, who are convinced that absolute Being in thinking is not thought itself, speak of God as over against (*jenseits*) consciousness. They take thought to be the Concept (*Begriff*) of Him but whose existence or reality is something distinct from this Concept (*Begriff*). As in the case when we represent and think of an animal, [...] our concept of it or our representation is something entirely different than the animal itself. Even with respect to sensed objects, by the way, its essence (*Wesen*) as a universal (*in der Allgemeinheit*) as pure essence is present only in our thinking as our thinking whereas *in itself it is united with its sensed particularity*. Consequently, *our Concept (Begriff) of an absolute essence (Wesen) is this essence itself, when it really is [only] the Concept of the absolute essence and not of something else.*¹⁰⁰ (emphasis added)

According to Hegel, the concept of this absolute Being is not thereby entirely established because it is not merely essence and concept but also existence. As pure essence it is our thought of it; but its real existence is nature.¹⁰¹ In this real [*reale*] existence, the I is a

98. "In his *Theologumena*, Daub addresses "[...] the essence of God, and asserts his knowability, which he even determines as absolute; although over the latter point, if one remembers what was said earlier [page 145], no little vacillation occurs." Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 178. Strauß repeats this criticism later (*ibid.*: 195): "Everything is quite indeterminate and fluctuating, as you can see. Therefore, there is no need of closer examination."

99. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 178.

100. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 399.

101. That is, the concept is not merely an *a priori* synthetic judgment, which would be 'empty,' but it is also actually present in empirical phenomena *analytically*.

particular thinker; it [the "I"] belongs to this existence as a moment of it but does not exhaust its existence.¹⁰² (emphasis added)

Nonetheless, there is a circularity here.

Hegel's ontological argument is a proof only to the extent that for him the existence of God, which he wants to prove, is nothing other than the idea of God from which the argument commences. As far as the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum* ("I think, therefore I am") is from being a conclusion [about God], far more immediately, *cogitare* (thinking) is the *esse* (being) of an individual as [universal] Spirit (*Geist*). Precisely for this reason, for him [Hegel] the ontological conclusion with respect to the immediate being of God in human thought coincides with the individual's thought of Him.¹⁰³ (emphasis added)

It is with respect to Hegel's claim that the Cartesian *cogito* is actually Absolute Spirit thinking Itself in finite spirit that Strauß cites to §§ 64 and 76 of the *Encyclopedia*. Yet, Hegel skims past Descartes' 'ontological argument' for God based on infinite, eminent causality and the Principle of Sufficient Reason as he stresses that, with the very idea of God, finite consciousness is God thinking Himself. However, Hegel writes:

[...]the principle of immediate knowledge is knowledge that arises from comparison with Cartesian philosophy returned to in recent times. In both [Descartes and recent philosophy] is asserted:

the simple inseparability of thinking and being of the thinker, – *cogito ergo sum* is the same [as] that being, reality, existence of the I directly revealed to me in consciousness (at the same time, *Descartes expressly declares* in his *Principia philosophiae* I, 9, *that by thinking he understands consciousness in general as such*) and that this inseparability is the absolutely first (not mediated, proven) and most certain knowledge;

the inseparability of the conception of God and his existence, so that *God's existence is contained in the conception of God itself*, that conception includes *par excellence* the determination of its existence, the latter is thus necessary and eternal.* (emphasis added)¹⁰⁴

The asterisk is to Hegel's footnote, which says:

Descartes, *Principia philosophiae* I: 15: "It [the soul] will be the more convinced (that a supremely perfect being exists) if it observes that in no other of its ideas is this necessary existence contained in the same way; for it will see from this that this idea represents only a true and unchangeable nature, *which must exist because necessary existence is contained in it*." A subsequent addition, which reads like an arbitration and proof, adds nothing to this initial grounding.¹⁰⁵ – With Spinoza it is quite the same that God's essence, i.e., the abstract

102. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 399–400.

103. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 400.

104. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie* II: GW VIII: 165.

105. This is a remarkable comment by Hegel. In the *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Hegel argues that the Absolute Concept contains its sufficient ground within Itself – or else it is not a ground. He

conception, includes existence in itself. The first definition of Spinoza is that of *causa sui*, that it is such a thing "whose essence includes existence in itself, or that whose nature can only be conceived as existing," *Ethics* I, Def. 1. – *the inseparability of the concept from being is the basic determination and presupposition*. One may ask, though, which concept is it to which this inseparability from Being belongs? Not that of finite things, for these are precisely those whose existence is accidental and created. – Spinoza's 11th proposition: that God necessarily exists, is followed with a proof, in the 20th proposition: God's existence and his being are one and the same, – is a superfluous formalism of proof. *God is the (and only) substance; but substance is causa sui, therefore God exists necessarily – means nothing else than that God is this, whose Concept and Being are inseparable*.¹⁰⁶ (emphasis added)

Descartes' argument, which Hegel skims over, presupposes that the soul has a perfect concept of perfection in addition to its ability to conceive imperfect objects of perception external to the soul (*Principia philosophiae* I: 12). In other words, Descartes takes the content of the soul's 'thinking' to consist of 'representations' of things distinct from the soul (external objects, which includes God as an objective Being).

However, in § 64 of the *Enzyklopädie*, Hegel proposes that Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* does not constitute a conclusion about the existence of the individual soul but about God. Rather, the conclusion of existence presupposes that '*thinking is existing*'.¹⁰⁷ For Hegel, the major premise of Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* argument is that "everything that thinks 'is' (that is, 'exists')." He draws from this that the thought of God by definition proves its existence because *the thought of God is not a conclusion of a syllogism but the very condition of thinking itself. God thinks Himself in all thinking*. In other words, Descartes takes God to be other than the soul (that is, *jenseits von der Seele*), precisely the erroneous position that Hegel attributes to Anselm and Kant, above. In other words, for Descartes God is a 'perfect Being' over against and in contrast to humanity. Hegel's shift of focus from Descartes to Spinoza in § 76 of the *Enzyklopädie* is a clear and shrill indicator that Hegel reads Descartes through the lens of Spinoza. *Hegel tries to squeeze Descartes into a Spinozian mold in which substance is 'thinking' and thinking substance is universal to all events and all thought*.

overlooks that his Absolute Concept is a cause, and all causal 'explanations' (accounting) is a matter of a *a priori* synthetic judgment because causes are 'known' (understood) only through their effects. See Chapter 6: "Grand Narratives of Theoretical Reason:" 702, n. 190. What follows in Descartes' text is his argument for God based on the idea of perfection in finite consciousness. For Descartes this argument presupposes the 'Principle of Sufficient Reason' (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*) (*Principia philosophiae* I: 18: 'something cannot come from nothing').

106. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie* II: GW VIII: 165.

107. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie* II: GW VIII: 155: "Descartes himself explicitly stated that the proposition *cogito, ergo sum* is not a conclusion. Descartes first says that we are thinking beings is 'a certain basic notion that is not inferred from any syllogism,' and continues, 'when someone says, 'I think, therefore I am or I exist,' he does not infer existence from thinking by a syllogism.'" Because Descartes knows what belongs to a conclusion, he adds that if a derivation by a conclusion should [... occur with *cogito ergo sum*], then the major premise would belong to it: 'everything that thinks is or exists.'" This latter conclusion, however, would be one that one derives from the first conclusion [which 'is not inferred from any syllogism']" (emphasis added) Hegel, *Enzyklopädie* II: 154–155.

Strauß points out Hegel's 'vicious' circle:

Just as the *cosmological argument* proves the existence of all things, the *physico-theological argument* proves the life in all living things, the *historico-teleological* and *moral arguments* prove the ethical world order, so for Hegel the *ontological argument* proves the Spirit in all spirits, the thought in all thinkers.¹⁰⁸

Far from constituting proofs, though, Strauß observes a vicious circle: "*the existence of God, which he [Hegel and Daub, as well] wants to prove, is nothing other than the idea of God from which the argument commences.*"¹⁰⁹ This idea of God is that God thinks Himself in all thinking – whether acknowledge by the individual or not, whether historical events have significance or not.

1841 *The Glaubenslehre*. An 'Epistemological' Conclusion

By 1841, Strauß was reading Feuerbach as Strauß himself confirms in *Glaubenslehre* wherein he cites Feuerbach's earliest work, the 1830 *Thoughts on Death and Immortality* (*Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit*) and Feuerbach's works that appeared prior to the *Glaubenslehre*. Is it possible that he had read Feuerbach's *Wesen des Christentums* (*Essence of Christianity*) even though it, too, was published in 1841? Strauß would not have had to, though, in order to have acquired Feuerbach's key criticisms of Hegel's anthropomorphic theological reflections because those reflections are clearly present in Feuerbach's earlier writings.

After wrestling with all of the controversies generated by his *LJ* and the erosion of his Hegelian convictions, Strauß gave up on his original aim of a history of Church Doctrine (*Glaubenslehre*). Before the *LJ*, he spoke of writing an account of such a history to be the same as his aim in the *LJ*: to 'retore' by means of Hegel's meta-narrative what had been destroyed by historical criticism.¹¹⁰ That aim was no longer an option for Strauß by 1841. The task became one of demonstrating that "the criticism of Church Doctrine is its own history."¹¹¹ F.C. Baur's (1838) *The Christian Doctrine of Atonement and its Historical Development from Most Ancient Time Down to the Present*) provided Strauß with a solid illustration of the thesis. Furthermore, here in the *Glaubenslehre*, the enduring influence of F.C. Baur is in the foreground, not Hegel or Schleiermacher.

108. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 400.

109. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 400.

110. On the aim of restoring what is destroyed by historical criticism, see the "Preface:" 54, n. 56.

111. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 71. Already in "Schleiermacher und Daub," Strauß pointed out that "[...] the true criticism of a thing [can] only lie in its history," Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 30.

Significance of Baur's work on Atonement for Understanding Church History

Baur's son-in-law, Eduard Zeller wrote that "[i]f Strauss came to his work from philosophy, Baur comes to his from history."¹¹²

Strauss [...] turns his criticism against that in the writings [of the gospels] which disturbs him most, the miraculous and improbable, partly because it is most concentrated here [in the gospels], partly because it hits the center of the Christian religion, the person and history of Christ himself; Baur [...] prefers those books from early Christian times of the New Testament collection, the genuine Pauline letters, which, as the most direct and oldest documents are preferably suitable for this purpose [of establishing the center of the Christian religion].¹¹³

In his "Required Clarification against an article in the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*" (1836) ("Abgenöthigte Erklärung gegen einen Artikel der evangelischen Kirchenzeitung"), Baur stressed in his personal defense over against those who attacked him because of his student's (Strauß') *LJ* of 1835 that the primary focus of his historical work on the Second Testament was Paul, not the gospels and asked:

Who developed the entire depth and completeness of Christian faith more superbly than the Apostle Paul in his letters? Did he fixate on the details of Jesus' life, [did he] prize particular miracles and incidents, when he looked back at Jesus' historical life, was it not the entirely, general events of the gospel story, *which everyone must presuppose and recognize in some fashion and which are established without the gospels*, that he presupposed and from which he exclusively builds upon?¹¹⁴ (emphasis added)

Already in his *Christian Gnosis or the Christian Philosophy of Religion in its Historical Development* (1835) (*Die christliche Gnosis oder die christliche Religionsphilosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*), Baur had developed the core teaching that he found to anchor Christianity in actuality, not empty, abstract ideas, precisely, in Paul's notion of the church as the 'body of Christ.' As I have said,¹¹⁵ Baur takes Paul's claim that the church is the 'body' of Christ (, I Corinthians 12:12 ff., Ephesians 3: 3–6, and Colossians 3:24–28) to mean that the 'historical' God/Man refers not to a single individual or limited set of individuals but to that growing number of those who grasp

112. Eduard Zeller, "Die Tübinger historische Schule." In. In *Vorträge und Abhandlungen, Erste Sammlung and Zweite Auflage*, 267–353. Leipzig: Fues's Verlag (R. Reisland): 310.

113. Zeller, "Die Tübinger historische Schule:" 311.

114. Baur, "Abgenöthigte Erklärung gegen einen Artikel der evangelischen Kirchenzeitung, herausgegeben von D.E. W. Hengstenberg, Prof. der Theol. an der Universität zu Berlin. Mai 1836." *Tübingen Zeitschrift für Theologie*, III (1836): 214.

115. See Chapter 1: "Methodology:" 109, n. 21, Chapter 3: "Academic Controversy:" 225, n. 41, and Chapter 4: "Why Schleiermacher was not an Option:" 289, n. 154.

the significance of Absolute Spirit in finite spirit over the entire course of history that is the Christian Church (*Gemeinde*).¹¹⁶

In his *Christian Doctrine of Atonement* (1838), Baur defines religion¹¹⁷ as an essential relation between finite and Absolute Spirit,¹¹⁸ but not as Hegel's dialectic of Double Negation that leads to the 'point of indifference' beyond history.

Rather, the historical dialectic is that of the 'objective' dialectic of atonement theories found in Church doctrine. The thesis of this dialectic is the 'ransom theory' of atonement in the Early Church; the 'anti-thesis' is Anselm's 'substitution theory' of atonement; and the 'synthesis' consisting of Baur's notion the Body of Christ as the Christian community in history.

From the Early Church down to Anselm of Canterbury, this thesis of Atonement was taken 'objectively' to account for what Baur calls the 'myth' of ransom.¹¹⁹ The 'objective thesis' of myth consist of paying the ransom was taken to mean a ransom 1) owed to Satan although Satan had deceived humanity to sin¹²⁰ (on the basis of Colossians 2:15 and Hebrews 21:14¹²¹) or 2) owed to Satan by Christ's having broken

116. See Baur, *Gnosis*: especially, 721 but also 685, 696, and 734–736. To the 'left' of Baur, though, is Strauß in the *LJ* of 1835 with his universally, inclusive Christology that is not limited to the Christian *Gemeinde*.

117. For Baur's criticism of Strauß' 'failure to appreciate history in the *LJ*, see "Ferdinand Christian Baur's Criticism of Strauß" in Chapter 3: "Academic Controversy:" 222 ff.

118. See Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 287, 690.

119. According to Baur, 'myth' insists on objective representations (*Form*) being the actual content (*Inhalt*) of a teaching. See *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 142–143. This is not the 'husk' (narrative representation)/'kernel' (historical fact, idea, or symbol) of the Göttingen 'Mythic School'.

According to Baur, the teaching of the Atonement based on 'ransom' for a 'debt' is an objective 'mythic' portrayal of what, for Baur, is a subjectively, internal, essential union between finite and Absolute Spirit. (*Ibid.*: 142–143).

120. Baur documents that there was little agreement over the role of deception employed to trick Satan. Gregory of Nyssa even spoke of a double deception (*Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 75, see 68): Satan's deception of humanity to sin on the basis of sensuous desire to eat the fruit of the tree that gives knowledge of good and evil, and God's deception of Satan on the basis of Satan's mistaken belief, left uncorrected by God, that the perceived God/Man was only a human being under his sovereignty (Irenaeus in *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 36). Although Baur points out that as soon as the doctrine of deception of Satan was established, it fragmented into different explanations both of the nature of the deception and whether deception was reconcilable with God's nature (*Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 87ff.). Gregory the Great went so far as to claim the reason why Jesus had to die for the sins of humanity did not lie in Satan (the need for a ransom to free humanity from an Evil Kingdom) but in God (to repair the damage of His punishment of humanity for violating the command not to eat from the tree of good and evil). His death must be a sacrifice brought by God in order that humanity be reconciled with God (*Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 93). In short, God asserts the condition that brings death (violation of the commandment not to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil) and provides the 'cure' of death (sacrifice of the Divine/Man). Reconciliation is concerned with God, not Satan because reconciliation's necessity is internal to God, whereas in relation to Satan reconciliation's necessity is a debt owed to a power other than God.

121. See Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 27. Origen formulated the claim of a contract between God and Satan in which both God and Satan knew what they were getting with his

into Satan's home and robbing him of his power over death (Matthew 12:29).¹²² Baur points out, though, that this 'mythic' account is a dualistic struggle between two realms (the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the Devil). Not only does this 'objective' account of reconciliation depend upon God's deception of the Devil,¹²³ but also, as Baur reminds his reader, Origen points out that this *mythic*, 'objective' account of reconciliation based on deception was incompatible with the *doctrinal Idea* that the Logos has always and already reconciled all that is 'external' to God.¹²⁴

Baur views Anselm as the initiator of the 'second stage' or as 'antithesis' to the doctrine of Atonement as a 'ransom.' This antithesis focuses on *the logical necessity* of the sacrifice of the God/Man to pay a debt owed by humanity to God *for having violated God's honor with its sin rather than on objective sacrifice in order to pay a debt owed to the devil.*

Anselm offered a 'more satisfactory' 'objective' account of divine/human reconciliation than the 'mythic,' ransom alternatives. *Anselm's Atonement theory is based on the notion of 'perfect obedience' owed to God. Given the universal lack of obedience, though, not only was God's honor violated, but also there was no means by which the individual could 'make up' for her/his lack of obedience in the past.* Given the fact that the commencement of perfect obedience can occur at a specific point in time and perfection is unsurpassable, the individual cannot generate a surplus of perfection to 'pay the debt' of past disobedience. Hence, Anselm views the sacrifice of Christ with his infinite surplus of perfection to be the requirement to establish the condition for humanity's reconciliation with God.¹²⁵ However, Baur points out that Anselm's theory of atonement is also governed by a 'Manichaean' dualism¹²⁶ with the reconciliation being 'physical' rather than 'essential' (Spirit).¹²⁷

According to Anselm, subjectively, humanity owes God perfect obedience so that sin is a subjective affront to the honor that is owed to God. Anselm's account of God necessarily having to provide the superabundant perfection needed to repay 'the debt' of humanity's sin that humanity itself could never repay, places Anselm in the 'Intellectualist' tradition in which God had to act as He did in conformity with His own *eternal* reason (Logos).¹²⁸

account of Origen's dualistic conviction that 'good' is stronger than 'evil'. See *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 47–48.

122. See Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 34, n. 3.

123. See Baur's discussion of Origen in *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 43–48.

124. See Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 59–61.

125. See, especially, Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung* II: 542, 628, and 674.

126. See Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung* II: 675.

127. See Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung* II: 676–677.

128. This 'Intellectualist' thesis was countered by the 'Occasionalist'/'Voluntarist' antithesis of Duns Scotus. Baur takes Thomas Aquinas as an unsuccessful attempt to establish a mediating synthesis between these two options. See Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 260. In the end, Baur

According to Baur, Thomas Aquinas followed Aristotle's distinctions among the various relationships in which the notion of 'necessity' applies: to what by nature can be nothing other than what it is, which would mean that the crucifixion was necessary either from the perspective of God or the perspective of humanity. However, for Aquinas, no external determination applies to the crucifixion. 'Necessity,' according to Aquinas, is concerned with what is required to achieve a specific, divine goal. The crucifixion was not determined externally by coercion but was necessary in order to achieve the specific goal of demonstrating God's mercy. However, according to Baur, unlike Anselm, *Aquinas gives no satisfactory accounting for the interface between subjective, human necessity (sin) and objective, divine necessity (reason and will)*.¹²⁹

Baur takes, then, the 'third stage of the doctrine of Atonement' not to be the actual 'synthesis' of Atonement. Rather, the 'third stage' commenced with Kant's radical 'turn to the completely self-determining, finite subject.'¹³⁰ Baur attributes this turn to the subject to Kant's "absolute legislation of the law of practical reason."¹³¹ Kant's 'law' is not the objective law of the Decalogue that is at the core of Lutheranism,¹³² but the objective law of subjective, moral duty personified in the Christ.¹³³ Baur emphasizes that, although the 'objective' moment in Kant is the law of moral duty, the law of moral duty is 'subjectively,' entirely contained within reason.

This 'subjective' formulation of divine/human reconciliation occurs through subjective moral effort alone (Baur's incorrect reading of Kant)¹³⁴ in which he reads Kant's account of 'radical evil' as original sin by assigning a dominant place to 'evil principles' prior to autonomous, creative freedom.¹³⁵ In Schleiermacher, Baur finds a 'subjective' acquisition of the 'Feeling of Absolute Dependence' by the individual only through the influence of the Christian community,¹³⁶ that is all Christian truth is mediated through history with the emphasis on the individual's conviction of subjective certainty.

insists that logical necessity (Intellectualism) dominates in Aquinas. See Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 264.

129. See Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 231. Baur asks whether the ultimate consequence is that Aquinas' teaching is docetic. See *ibid.*: 234, n. 2, and points out that *Aquinas leaves unclear what in salvation is dependent upon human subjectivity (sin) and what is dependent upon God's objective will and plan*. See *ibid.*: 241–242. Christ's suffering is 'a matter of convenience and expedience (i.e., Occasionalist/Voluntarist), not the necessity of logic (i.e., Intellectualist)'. See *ibid.*: 247, 269, n. 1.

130. Baur's reading of Kant's notion of 'autonomy' as completely subjective self-determination is a distortion of Kant's notion of 'autonomous freedom,' which is thoroughly dependent upon a world of appearances but capable of initiating sequences of events that nature, left on its own, could never achieve. See Chapter 7: "Practical Reason Elevates Theoretical Reason:" 705, n. 198; and 766, n. 171.

131. Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 14.

132. See Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 359.

133. See Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung* II: 578.

134. See Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung* II: 575–589.

135. See Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung* II: 576–577; 579.

136. See Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung* II 628–629.

When it comes to the doctrine of Atonement, Baur reads Kant's notion of the 'worthiness for happiness' to mean that the goal of Kant's moral theory is to achieve the happiness that is objectively, well-pleasing to God.¹³⁷ Kant, according to Baur, is a Pelagianist.¹³⁸ Kant's 'subjective' religion of reason is incapable of achieving the awareness of the unity between finite and Absolute Spirit and constitutes a rejection of Christian Atonement because it turns religion into an infinite, open-ended process of moral effort seeking perfection that it can never achieve.¹³⁹ Kant is only looking towards the future and has no genuine resolution for the 'debt' of sin owed for past offenses demanded by the Anselmian Satisfaction Theory.¹⁴⁰

However, Baur ignores Kant's Copernican Turn¹⁴¹ to finite, transcendental conditions of possibility for experience, understanding, and responsible agency and treats the moral status of humanity exclusively on objective actions (Consequentialism), not the individual's task of self-selecting the universal moral principle to give her-/himself permission to act. Although he acknowledges 'objectivity' in Kant's notions of God as Noumenon and the moral law as personified in the Christ, *both God and Christ are treated by Baur as ultimate causalities*, not as 'pure' ideas, which are not discussed by Kant as the cause (!) of finite, transcendental consciousness but are required for finite, transcendental consciousness to experience, understand, and exercise responsible agency in the world. Baur completely ignores the *a priori* synthetic judgments of finite, transcendental consciousness that humanity *must add* to its sensuous experience in order to understand and act responsibly in the world as it does. In other words, Baur's Consequentialism is an objective subreption¹⁴² that cannot grasp the necessities of finite, transcendental consciousness otherwise than from the issue of causality. *His concern with morality is with the causes of sin and redemption as consequences, not with the task of identifying the a priori capacities that enable a responsible (!), finite,*

137. See Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung* II: 567 and the theme of the 'proportionality' of between morality and happiness on 569. Strauß shares with Baur this erroneous reading of Kant, which claims that achieving (consequentialist ethic) happiness objectively pleasing to God.

138. Humanity has the 'subjective power' to save itself. See, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 576, as well: 569. He cryptically acknowledges that there are those 'strict Kantians' who claim that Kant rejected the notion of the 'moral goal of the world' as a 'proportionality' between 'worthiness' and 'happiness' (*ibid.*, 567–568), but nowhere does he present their reading of Kant. Rather, he turns only to those who read Kant as a Pelagian with all focus on the individual's 'earning' the blessedness of moral 'proportionality' between 'worthiness' and 'happiness' with the 'Pelagian presupposition' "running through the whole of Protestantism in this period." (*Ibid.*: 561). Furthermore, Baur claims that Kant's faith of reason can only see impurity of pure religion in the Christian doctrine of atonement. Christianity is an 'objective' story (myth) whereas Kant's religion of reason is 'subjective'. See Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 630.

139. This claim by Baur (and many others) is an attempt to squeeze Kant's moral theory into the framework Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" in the *Phenomenology*.

140. See Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung* II: 567.

141. On Kant's 'Copernican Turn,' see the "Preface:" 47, n. 35.

142. On the notion of 'subreption' and its presence in Kant's earliest writings, see the "Preface:" 64, n. 84.

intentionally (not merely instinctually) *creating transcendental consciousness in the world*. Contrary to Baur (and many other readers of Kant), being human does not mean achieving perfection.¹⁴³ *Being human means to be a finite understanding that is capable of assuming responsibility for its agency by means of moral effort* (not certain achievement) *in a finite world*.

Baur's own Christology is the 'fourth stage,' for him the actual synthesis, of the doctrine of Christian Atonement. It replaces the 'objective' law (as well as Kant's subjectively, personified moral duty) by an emphasis on the 'subjective' experience of Absolute Spirit with the goal of religion the recognition of the essential unity between finite and Absolute Spirit. *'Blasphemy of the Spirit is what offends God'* (Matthew 12:30–32; Mark 9:40, Luke 11:23, 1 John 3:16), *not violation of the law*. What grounds the actuality of Baur's Christology is not a proof or conviction that the perfect God/Man occurred at a specific time and place in history. Rather the actuality of Christian Atonement is the history of the Christian Church as the Pauline 'body of Christ.' Finite Spirit finds its unity in the Infinite, Perfect, Free, Unity of Absolute Spirit *only in the history that is the Christian congregation*. Here humanity achieves sovereignty over the sinfulness of sensuality. Baur claims that his Christology avoids all the limitations of the objective and subjective theories of reconciliation as well as avoiding turning reconciliation into an 'empty idea' devoid of actual history.¹⁴⁴

However, as the case with the entire sweep that is the history of Christian Atonement, Baur's Christology is an 'empty idea' desperately seeking its 'actuality' in phenomena. In other words, Baur's history of the doctrine of Atonement not only demonstrates the internal inconsistencies between the 'objective' and 'subjective' moments of its two main stages (down to Anselm and from Anselm to the end of the 18th C), but it also demonstrates the Gnosticism and Docetism of the entire discussion of the doctrine, including Baur's own Christology.

The 'mythic,' 'objective' narrative of 'ransom' and Christ's 'paying the debt for sin' or 'substitution for humanity's sins' with its assumption that humanity can achieve moral perfection turn out to be merely 'abstract, empty ideas' that may (or may not) be true.. Schleiermacher's 'new' Perfect God-consciousness, like Anselm's 'perfection', requires a new event of ultimate, eminent causality that is far more than the effect that it achieves. The Hegelian Second Negation that turns from finitude to Absolute Spirit turns out to be merely an 'abstract, empty idea' that even Hegel acknowledged occurs 'beyond history' with the 'resurrection.' The identification of the 'historical Jesus' with the historical community that understands itself to be the body of Christ turns out to be dogmatically relative and merely an 'abstract, empty idea' that may (or may not) be

143. See the discussion of Kant's notion of 'perfection' and rejection of moral 'purism' in the "Foreword:" 28, n. 11.

144. See Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung* II: 738–752. See, as well, Baur's account of his Christology in Chapter 3 "Academic Controversy and Reaction to Strauß" *LJ*: Text of n. 41 on page 225.

true in light of the fact, as with Hegel, it is a 'certain necessity' grounded in logic, not objective reality. Baur himself claims that the 'new philosophy' (i.e., Hegel) is different from Gnosticism (and Docetism) only in form, not in content.¹⁴⁵ In all cases the determination of the presumed truth (or falsehood) of the theological options depends upon finite, transcendental consciousness ignoring its limits and soaring into the vacuum of speculative conjectures that not only deny our limitations but undermine our efforts at proper exercising of our capacities in the world.

In short, not even a careful reading of the history of Church Doctrine (and Strauß presents in his *Glaubenslehre* an astonishingly detailed reading) is required to demonstrate that Christian theology's own internal incoherence and inconsistencies make its doctrine anything but certain and more wishful thinking than plausible. In other words, one does not need anything like an 'external,' secular philosophy to demonstrate the collapse.

Nevertheless, Strauß' methodological structure for the investigation of Church teaching in the *Glaubenslehre* is the same that he employed in the *LJ* to investigate the gospel accounts of Jesus' ministry: First, he provides an account of the various and inconsistent positions of traditional teaching. Then, he presents the criticisms of traditional teaching among Christians in the Protestant Reformation (the 'Supernaturalist' reading); followed by the criticisms of 'modern science,' that is, metaphysics, not the physical sciences, principally, Spinoza, Böhme, the Rationalists/Schleiermacher, and the Hegelians (by no means reducible to, but analogous to the position of the 'Rationalists' in the *LJ*) that lead to Baur's 'true' Christology that restores Church doctrine devastated by 'criticism.'

However, unlike his employment of Hegel in the "Concluding Dissertation" of the *LJ*, the 'restauration' of Church Doctrine by means of Hegelian metaphysics is not even attempted. Rather, strewn across the two volumes in those sections devoted to 'modern science,' Strauß presents a running criticism, at times extremely detailed, of Hegelian philosophy. He ends the second volume with the doctrine of 'immortality.' Here, he explicitly quotes Schleiermacher's notion of immortality echoed in "The Transient and Permanent in Christianity," but, as I pointed out in the last chapter,¹⁴⁶ Strauß is referring not to Schleiermacher's account in *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers* of the transcendent Oneness that is always concealed by the emergence of multiplicity in our experience in the world. Rather, as in "The Transient and Permanent in Christianity," *Strauß is referring to the 'eternal' ideational and physical lawfulness of the world* – on the way to his Materialism in *The Old and the New Faith*.¹⁴⁷

145. See Baur, "Die Hegel'sche Religions-Philosophie:" 735–736.

146. See in "Chapter 4: Why Schleiermacher was not an Option:" the section "Strauß' Theological Position at the Conclusion of the *Glaubenslehre*:" 293 ff.

147. See my comments on Strauß' use of Schleiermacher's metaphors of 'God consciousness' and 'the feeling of absolute dependence' to speak of humanity's 'dependence' on nature's lawfulness in

Strauß' *Glaubenslehre* is an achievement that marks a crucial turning point in Christian theology. On the one hand, its 1,500 pages present a strikingly broad, deep, and demonstrably devastating historical criticism of Church Doctrine *from within the Christian tradition*. On the other hand, Strauß' *Glaubenslehre* is a monument to the collapse of any significant influence on Christian theology by Hegelianism. However, the impact of his *Glaubenslehre* was blunted because there was no 'community' either within the church or among philosophers for whom it mattered. Those already 'committed' to the traditional narrative of Christianity had no interest in its internal contradictions. Those who were dismissive of Christianity had their own alternatives either turning to other religious traditions or to empiricism. Those open to an engagement of Christianity's internal contradictions did not constitute a critical mass to accomplish any significant change from 'within the faith' so that they either remained silent in order to be able to participate in the 'social' function of the institution, or they simply left the church. It is precisely this 'social' function of religion that led Strauß at the end of his life to shift his attention to the 'community' committed to the physical 'order' of reality rather than a spiritual 'escape' from reality.

Neither philosophy nor theology is prepared even in our age to benefit constructively and creatively from Strauß' work. When it comes to philosophy, it is viewed as an intellectual contrast and alternative to religion rather than a complement to religion. When it comes to religion, our epoch is one in which cutting-edge thought is driven by superficial notions of pluralism as blind acceptance of 'difference,' and 'progressive religion' consists of cherry picking theological elements that one (emotionally) finds attractive from a number of theological currents within one's own tradition and/or among the other religions of the world. The Kantian threads of Strauß' limited reading provide an opportunity to learn from Kant that any understanding of 'reality' requires inclusion of the imperceptible, conditions of finite, transcendental consciousness that are required for us to experience a world (much less understand it), in the first place, and to recognize that those *a priori* elements consist of an internally, 'coherent totality' rather than a merely capricious aggregation of elements or merely a pluralistic, fragmented, and capricious aggregation of 'approaches' to reality.

Yet more is at stake here than the fact that the 'blind' who define the elephant from the anatomical part that the individual touches have forgotten that the elephant is a 'whole,' not a single part of the whole. Perception requires imperceptible elements that have to be *added to* phenomena and that make possible perception in the first place. These imperceptible elements are always and already possessed even by the 'blind.'

These imperceptible elements, especially, require for their understanding more than a merely, explanatory, factual 'narrative' of objective 'truth' either physical or spiritual. Furthermore, the truth that includes transcendental consciousness is 'open-ended' because it includes the creative capacity of finite consciousness to initiate se-

Chapter 4: "Why Schleiermacher was not an Option:" the section "Schleiermacher's Feeling, Hegel's Absolute Knowledge, and Kant's Morality:" 264, and page 261, n. 43.

quences of events that are 'more' than merely factual. Without this 'more' there would be no creativity, and there would be no possibility for the creative individual to assume responsibility for her/his agency. Without this 'more,' transcendental consciousness would be physically determined, to be sure, in contrast to the spiritual determination of Christian predestination but, nonetheless, a mere automaton.

For example, the 'truth' of Christianity or any other religious tradition is not reducible to a narrow set of objective teachings that claims to consist of a non-existent, narrative thread that holds together all of reality past, present, and future. Such a search for a narrow thread consists in picking and choosing those elements to one's liking and combining them together into an arbitrary assemblage that is substituted for 'reality.' Consequently, the Christian tradition (or any other religion) that understands itself to grasp the 'totality' that is 'reality' in this life and/or beyond is by no means likely to be open to an investigation, such as Strauß' *Glaubenslehre*, which demonstrates that the tradition is an aggregate of doctrine combined into a capricious 'totality' of teachings that includes inescapable and devastating, internal contradictions.

When it comes to the criticism of Church Doctrine of Strauß' *Glaubenslehre*, there is simply no substitute for the actual reading of his text. Unfortunately, the text is not available in English, but it should be. Strauß' careful presentation of the themes and clarifications of the issues at issue are a gift to anyone with the remotest curiosity over 'just what is Christianity.' Foremost, one quickly sees that Christianity is no 'single, consistent doctrine' that serves as the 'red thread' running through its various theological claims and controversies. Rather, Christianity is a collection of teachings shaped as much by its multiple cultural contexts and the unique (although grounded in universal capacities), particular experiences of individuals as it is by its actual, objective teachings. Strauß saves the reader the enormous task of collating and evaluating the broad spectrum of Church teaching.

When it comes to the philosophy of our age, we are no better off. We live in an epoch in which even 'progressive' thought is committed to merely capricious 'aggregations' of relative 'takes' on reality. Postmodernism and Deconstruction have given up on the project of 'truth' as if truth were exclusively defined by the 'correspondence theory' of subjective judgments fitting objective facts. For Postmodernists, reality is correctly understood as no 'meta-narrative' either 'Christian' or 'Hegelian.' However, for Deconstruction and Post-Modern thought, 'reality' is a set of merely arbitrary traces 'all the way down' that completely ignores the imperceptible, subjective (but universal, not merely relative) capacities that make any and all experience of 'reality' possible, in the first place.

The devastating consequence of reducing our understanding of 'reality' to an alternative between 'mere' traces, which denies anything like facts, and 'positivist' empiricism, which proclaims its imperceptible, physical laws to be facts, is that we are helpless in the face of fanciful illusions of Conspiracy Theories because of the erosion of any 'grounding' of experience. 'Criticism,' which means a negative dismissal

between and among empirical differences, has eclipsed ‘critique,’ which means the identification of the imperceptible, required conditions for any and all possible experience by a finite, transcendental consciousness. The result is that there is no basis on which to evaluate the adequacy of understanding and agency either by oneself or one’s tradition, not to speak of the ‘other.’

Equally dangerous, religious pluralism has become a cover for reactionary, religious conservatives to claim their right to proclaim the truth of their ‘community’ in the name of ‘tolerance’ while, conveniently, continuing to ignore the ‘other.’ Everyone and everything is acknowledged to have the ‘same’ right to her/his/its ‘truth’ as my and my community’s grasp of truth so that I am free to proclaim and proselytize my truth with impunity. Such ‘blind’ pluralism eliminates both criticism of the self and other as well as transcendental critique, the one strategy that can protect against systematic distortion in any and all understanding.

Strauß’ *Glaubenslehre* remains an extremely valuable resource for post-religious religion. It sharply profiles the confusing, inconsistent mixture of institutionalized doctrine that, along with the historical criticism of the gospels in the *LJ*, indicates the impossibility of determination anything approximating a ‘true,’ objective history of Jesus’ life, ministry, or teaching much less an ‘eternal,’ objective teaching of Christianity. The scriptures and the history of doctrine present us with an on-going process of narrative construction that articulates human ‘understanding’ and wishful thinking but is incapable of establishing the objective truth. What is ‘objectively’ true about Christianity is that it is not ‘*the truth*.’ What is ‘subjectively’ true about Christianity (or any religion) is not its fulfilment of objective fantasies and wishes. Rather, its ‘*subjective*’ truth consists of the imperceptible, universal conditions of transcendental consciousness that make it possible for anything like the experience, genuine understanding, and responsible agency of our species.

On the Metaphysics of the Glaubenslehre

With the *Glaubenslehre* of 1841, Strauß undertook the project in Church dogmatics that he had spoken of writing even before the *LJ*.¹⁴⁸ Far more ambitious than his cryptic ‘Concluding Dissertation’ of the *LJ*, which was meant to address the effects of *gospel criticism* on Church dogmatics by a Hegelian restoration of Christology, the original aim of Strauß’ dogmatics was to write the Hegelian ‘restoration’ of *Church teaching* that repaired the devastation of historical criticism of the history of Church Doctrine.¹⁴⁹

148. See Ziegler, II: 326.

149. See Strauß’ *Streitschriften* III: 58–59. F.C. Baur’s *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung* essentially accomplished what Strauß and his friends sought in a Church dogmatics.

In his, admittedly brief summary of the project, Strauß' biographer, Theobold Ziegler, skips the first 350 page section on 'Apologetics' that is devoted to examination of crucial themes of biblical revelation, miracles and prophecies, development of Church teaching, the doctrine of inspiration, and the interpretation of the scriptures followed by an account of their 'dissolution.' This section ends with a discussion of 'Faith and Knowledge' that demonstrates both Roman Catholic and Lutheran rejection of 'reason'¹⁵⁰ to the advantage of 'feelings' in Christianity¹⁵¹ with a 'slow' transition in the 'modern' world to valuing reason.¹⁵²

Nevertheless, Ziegler's summary of the books overall project gives an indication of its depth and breadth as well as its structural similarities to the *LJ*:

Following the scheme of the old Protestant dogmatics, the individual "loci" are: the existence of the triune being and attributes of God; of the creation and the most distinguished creatures and their original state; of the fall and redemption, whereby first the person and then the office of Christ is addressed; of providence and evils; of sin and grace; of the means of grace and the church, of the last things, and immortality. Each time 1. the traditional doctrine is presented a) as biblical, b) as ecclesiastical, and this again α) as patristic-scholastic, β) as orthodox protestant. This is followed by 2. the criticism that consists of the dissolution of the ecclesiastical doctrine by Rationalism, which Strauß places with the Socinians (and Arminians), which he once called "the watershed" between the old orthodoxy and the newer, already rationalistically frail Supernaturalism. Their attacks on the orthodox system are treated, therefore, in particular detail, but, then, above all, the blows by Spinoza in his *Tractatus theologico-politicus* and the criticism of the English

150. Two illuminating examples, one on Aquinas, the other on Luther: First, Strauß writes of Aquinas: "Reason cannot positively establish the truths of faith but at the most negatively establishes that they [the truths of faith] are not impossible. In contrast, rational grounds that one tries to draw from other sciences in opposition to particular, theological claims have so little [convincing] power that, far more, everything from other disciplines that opposes revealed teaching is demonstrated to be false by the very fact [of their lack of convincing power]." (*Glaubenslehre* I: 309.) Strauß cites to Aquinas' *Summa* I, 99, 1. See http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/Summa_Theologiae/Part_I/Q1 [September 2020]) See, especially, *Summa* I, 1, 6 replies to Objections 1) (sacred doctrine comes from divine, not human knowledge) and 2) (the knowledge of this [sacred doctrine] comes through revelation and not through natural reason. "Therefore, it [sacred doctrine] has no concern to prove the principles of other sciences, but only to judge them"). Second, Strauß quotes Luther: "There is no more dangerous thing on earth among all dangers than a supreme, sensible reason, especially when it falls into spiritual things that affect the soul and God. For it is more possible to teach an ass to read than to blind your reason and lead it to what is right. It must be blinded and destroyed." (*Glaubenslehre* I: 313, n. 34) Luther continues: "Reason serves in matters of faith not before but after faith, as do the tongue and all human powers and limbs. Reason, after being enlightened by the Holy Spirit, serves faith." (*Glaubenslehre* I: 314, n. 38)

151. Significantly, Strauß employs Feuerbach's framework of religion as 'feeling' and philosophy as 'reason' in Feuerbach's *Pierre Bayle nach seinen für die Geschichte der Philosophie und Menschheit interessantesten Momenten* (Ansbach: Verlag von C. Brügel, 1838).

152. For example, Strauß quotes from Spinoza's *Tractatus*: "Is there a greater perversion than that the human spirit should be subordinated to the shadow image of [...] the Word of God, to the dead letter? [...]. Can faith be defended, if men deny all their knowledge and give up their reason? Verily, he who is of this opinion has more fear for the Scriptures than faith in them." (*Glaubenslehre* I: 341.

and German Enlightenment are brought to the fore. The conclusion of these remarks and the transition to the third section is, normally, the reformulation of Church teaching in Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*. Finally, 3) conceptually-speculative thinking is addressed. Strauß begins with Kant and ends with Hegel and the Hegelian school. *In the original plan, Strauß had, of course, thought of it differently – as the reconciliation between faith and knowledge, as the restoration of dogma to a higher potency, as the proof of the identity of the content of Church Doctrine with the thoughts and concepts of Hegelian speculation. However, the belief in this identity was now abandoned, and, therefore consequently, this speculative treatment and reinterpretation was essentially conceived according to its destructive and dissipating aspect in contrast and in opposition to Christian dogma.*¹⁵³ (emphasis added)

In his *Streitschriften* I of 1837, Strauß suggests what the 'doctrinal restauration' based on Hegel's meta-narrative would have looked like. Consistent with Hegel's "The Moral View of the World"¹⁵⁴ in which ethical perfection is impossible and with the Hegelian meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit and the goal of divinization of the Christian, Strauß rejects Traditional Theology's notion of 'personal sin' and eternal damnation. Hegel/the early Strauß shift the focus from personal sin and eternal judgment to the eternal blessedness that is the internal experience of the 'point of indifference' to Absolute Spirit, which negates and 'rises above' all sensuousness. In *Streitschriften* I,¹⁵⁵ Strauß emphasizes that, according to Matthew 12:32 *there is only one 'sin' that cannot be forgiven. That 'sin' is speaking against the Holy Spirit*. Strauß points out¹⁵⁶ that when speaking of 'eternal life,' the NT refers to a state of an open-ended future. Furthermore, when it comes to 'judgment' of the individual, the text gives two options that are treated distinctly and are 'in no relationship to one another:' 1) judgment of each individual (Matthew 16:27; II Cor. 5:10) at the Last Judgment or 2) judgment of the individual immediately after death (Luke 16:19 [esp. v. 22], 23:43; see Phil. 1:21; II Cor. 5:8; Revelation 14:13) either with the individual in fellowship with Christ or with other persons, spiritual beings, and Christ with the resurrection that occurs at death.¹⁵⁷ That is, the text is ambiguous about the point at which and the ontological status of the individual at the time of 'judgment,' but it is unequivocal about the eternal, spiritual duration of the status of blessedness and with respect to dismissal of an eternal damnation. Hence, *Strauß apparently took the 'restauration' of Church Doctrine to be concerned not only with the individual's awareness of Absolute Spirit but also with that awareness constituting the aim of all consciousness in history as he described in the "Concluding Dissertation" of the LJ (§ 150: The Speculative Christology) and*

153. Ziegler, II: 344–345.

154. See Hegel's "The Moral View of the World," see Vol. II "Introduction:" "Hegel on 'I should, but I can't' in Contrast to Kant's 'If I should, I can':" 550 ff. and Chapter 7: "Practical Reason Elevates Theoretical Reason:" the section "Hegel's Account of 'The Moral View of the World' is not Kant's Mor:" 727 ff.

155. See Strauß, *Streitschriften* I: 151.

156. See Strauß, *Streitschriften* I: 150.

157. See Strauß, *Streitschriften* I: 148–149.

in his quarrels with the Hegelians presented in the *Streitschriften* III: "The Various Perspectives on Christology within the Hegelian School."

Strauß asks:

Is there really a difference concerning the concept of the thing, whether I say: God has always decided the redemption of mankind, and from the beginning of its history has exercised an influence on it, preparing the full redemption; or: God has put a principle into mankind, which pulls it up again and again out of all ruin, and just when the ruin has become deepest and most general, consequently also most felt and mature, develops most freely and perfectly? Is there really a difference between these two versions because, in both cases, it is God to whom salvation is attributed?¹⁵⁸

If Strauß no longer intended to 'restore' Church Doctrine 'destroyed' by criticism, how did he view the interface between religion and philosophy/science?

The aphorism that succinctly summarizes Strauß' *Glaubenslehre* is: "The true criticism of Church Doctrine is its history"¹⁵⁹; Ziegler points out that "[...] this critical process [is] not a product only of today's theologian, but it is already present in the whole history of the development of Christianity. The theologian today has only to watch it and to summarize it comprehensively."¹⁶⁰ Ziegler cites from Strauß' *Glaubenslehre*: "All the crucibles and retorts in which dogma is melted and distilled [...] are not first to be made and put into operation by us, but we may only take them as they are already given as ecclesiastical parties and disputes, as heresies and synods, as rationalism, philosophy, and so forth."¹⁶¹

Although the objective negativity of this judgment, perhaps, is what is most striking, it also includes Strauß' own metaphysical crisis. As noted, his original intention for a history of Church Doctrine was to portray how Hegelian metaphysics 'saved' Christian teaching. Absent of any other metaphysical option, then, Strauß was left with nothing more than a historical criticism of Christianity. The sliver of Church teaching that remained at the end of the documentation of the internal collapse of Church teaching was a notion of 'immortality.' However, it was not the Christian immortality of an after-life but an echoing of Schleiermacher's aphorism from *On Religion* (not Schleiermacher's later *On Christian Faith* with its emphasis on 'feeling') that speaks

158. Strauß, *Streitschriften* III: 164. This is the Hegelian claim that Strauß came to see as 'Gnostic' (*Glaubenslehre* I: 501) and that turns the particularities into a logical moment of 'indifference' (ultimate irrelevance) in the name of the 'point of indifference' (to Absolute Spirit) (see Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 456, 465-467, 484, 487-488, 496-497, 499-500) by which Spirit only touches history with the wingtips of a dove. (see "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 128) It is the realization that led to the rejection of his earlier aim to write a history of Church Doctrine that restored the 'truth' of Christian Doctrine despite the destruction of criticism (see *Streitschriften* III: 59) to focus, instead, on the history of Church Doctrine as merely an account of its collapse out of its internal contradictions – without the aid of an 'external' philosophy. (*Glaubenslehre* I: 71.)

159. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 71.

160. Ziegler, II: 342.

161. Ziegler, II: 342. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 71.

of immortality as 'the eternal' experienced in every moment of finite, conscious experience in history. However, unlike Schleiermacher, for Strauß the immortality of the 'eternal in the present moment' refers to the 'rational' lawfulness to nature and the cosmos.

How did Hegel attempt to unite 'feeling' and 'reason' in his philosophy of religion? This is arguably for Strauß the central issue of the *Glaubenslehre*. Hegel's epistemology sought to resolve any tension between feeling and reason by distinguishing between feeling as 'representations' (form) and reason as 'content' (idea). Although Hegel claimed that representations and their content are 'one and the same,' he also wished to claim that the 'content' was independent of its representations.¹⁶²

Strauß' "Introduction" to the *Glaubenslehre* opens with a characterization of the current status of theology (specifically, the Hegelian Philosophy of Religion) as *a failed attempt to unite 'faith' and 'knowledge' or 'feeling' and 'reason.'* Despite Hegel's optimism with respect to the philosophical achievement of finally having unified religion and philosophy, especially, in his various articles in 1802–1803 written in collaboration with Schelling in their self-published *Kritische Journal der Philosophie*, Strauß concludes that the attempted resolution is merely 'cunning' 'self-deception.'¹⁶³

In a letter to Märklin on November 3, 1839, Strauß employs the two examples of the virgin birth and the resurrection as Hegelian attempts to retrieve 'eternal truth' out of gospel representations: "[I [confess] openly that I no longer represent the Hegelian standpoint and that I no longer wish to speak of the virgin birth of Christ, His resurrection, etc. as eternal truths."¹⁶⁴

Feuerbach maintained that, when it comes to religion, Hegel's speculative philosophy reverses the very relationship between what is 'essential' and the 'non-essential.' Hegel takes the Idea or ideas as the essential whereas he takes perceptible forms as representations to be non-essential. This allows Hegel to identify ideas with 'reason' and their forms with 'feeling.' In "Lecture 2" of his Heidelberg lectures from 1848/1849 published as *Das Wesen der Religion*, Feuerbach writes: "

Already in 1830, [...] I pointed out in verse form to a Hegelian dogmatist, who claimed that there was only a formal difference between religion and philosophy, that [Hegelian] philosophy only raised into concept what religion had in the form of representation: 'Being is Itself the form. Therefore, *you erase the content of faith when you erase the representation*,'¹⁶⁵ I, therefore, reproached Hegelian philosophy for *making the essential of religion into the unessential*, and vice versa, the unessential into the essential. The

162. See Strauß, *Glaubendlehre* I: 11–13.

163. See Ziegler, II: 333.

164. Ziegler, II: 333.

165. This passage appears in the 1830 edition of Feuerbach's *Gedanken über den Tod und Unsterblichkeit aus den Papieren eines Denkers, nebst einem Anhang theologisch-satyrischer Xenien* (Nürnberg, Johann Adam Stein, 1830): 202.

essence of religion is precisely that which [Hegelian] philosophy turns into a mere form [representation].¹⁶⁶ (emphasis added)

According to Feuerbach, religion is essentially feeling, wishful thinking, and fanciful anthropomorphic projections onto an 'ultimate' reality, God. Hegelian speculative philosophy succumbs to the same illusion. According to Feuerbach, Hegel is claiming that the essence of religion is concerned with an abstract realm that is itself a human construction. In other words, for Hegel 'truth' as abstract thought is substituted for concrete experience. Hegel takes the representations (forms) of the scriptures that express feeling, wishful thinking, and fanciful anthropomorphic projections to have their 'true' content in Absolute Spirit. Consequently, Feuerbach views Hegel as engaged in the same 'reversal' of the non-essential for the essential that religion, especially Christianity, made.

Hegel, though, was convinced that the identification of the ideal content and representational form in Religion preserves the equation of 'feeling' and 'thought' because *the 'idea' and its 'representations' have the same 'form'* (albeit, one version of the form is an 'intellectual perception [*intellektuelle Anschauung*] whereas the other version is a 'sensuous perception' [*sinnliche Anschauung*]¹⁶⁷).

When it comes to religion, Hegel distinguishes between 'theoretical reason' (disinterested *θεωρία*/contemplation that is Spirit: called 'higher' consciousness) and 'practical reason' (self-interested 'feeling,' 'imagination,' 'wishful thinking' that drives teleological agency in the world: called the 'lower' appetites).¹⁶⁸ Following Feuerbach, Strauß points out that, when it comes to religion, this Hegelian portrayal of 'intellectual' and 'sensuous' perception is 'inverted' (*verkehrt*) in contrast to their relationship in philosophy. In religion, "the non-essential [religion] is made essential, and the essential [philosophy] is turned into the non-essential."¹⁶⁹

Hegel, too, recognizes a form of 'revelation' that is 'subjective.' It is the activity of finite, subjective consciousness that emerges out of the 'urge to knowledge' of Absolute Spirit *following* (!) the 'first' revelation of the 'First Negation' and prior to the 'third' revelation of the 'Second Negation.'¹⁷⁰ However, Hegel's notion of 'subjectivity' here (and in his criticism of Kant) is not Feuerbach's understanding of religion as subjec-

166. Feuerbach, "Lecture 2" in *Das Wesen der Religion* (Deutsche Bibliothek, 1913): 12. The 'essence' of religion, according to Feuerbach, is fantasy and wishful thinking, not Hegel's abstract content of Absolute Spirit.

167. See Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen:" GW II: 305–306. Although Hegel and Strauß are unaware of it, this is a classic example of what Kant calls 'subreption.' Substitution of sense perception (*sinnliche Anschauung*) for intellectual perception (*intellektuelle Anschauung*), that is, the belief that sense perception gives one access to the thing-in-itself. For the definition of subreption, see the "Preface:" 64, n. 84.

168. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 17.

169. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 17.

170. See the "Addendum" (*Zusatz*) *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaft* (1830) § 384: GW X: 30–32.

tive, wishful thinking and imagination, but the dualistic, subject-object epistemology that Hegel calls the 'illusion' of 'constructivism'.¹⁷¹ Hegel goes so far as to say that this subjective 'understanding' is 'separated' from reason.¹⁷² Hegel calls the 'skepticism' of subjective thought a doubt not over whether it creates its categories but whether there is any ultimate metaphysical necessity to 'reason'.¹⁷³

Hegel claims in "On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right" that "*only philosophy can determine if something is a subjective opinion or objectively true*"¹⁷⁴ and that it is possible for sensible form to "fully lose its truth."¹⁷⁵ Hegel acknowledges a validity to religious 'forms' (representations) as 'feeling' not because they are objectively true. They can be 'false' and are only objectively true to the extent that one knows their 'true,' Idealist content. In other words, whereas Feuerbach concludes that religion is 'mere feeling,' 'wishful thinking,' and 'fantasy' because its 'positive' claims are enthusiastic, anthropomorphic analogies, Hegel concludes that religion is presented in the representations (form) of feeling, but its truth, its ultimate concept, is Absolute Spirit, *regardless of the forms of its representation*. Religion as subjective feeling contains the 'true.'

Feuerbach's claim is that both *Christianity and Hegel substitute a fantasy realm of wishful thinking (Christianity) and a fantasy realm of abstraction (Hegelian speculative philosophy) for the 'real,' concrete world of human experience*. In short, the non-essential replaces the essential. Feuerbach articulated his criticism of both Christianity and Hegel in his original text, but *his explicit 'reproach' of Hegelian philosophy* appeared not in the 1830 but in the 1847 edition of *Gedanken über den Tod und Unsterblichkeit*: "Speculative philosophy, therefore, has done exactly what Christianity did: It substitutes consciousness [*Bewußtsein*], appearance, for essence, and in its theological perversity has made essence out of appearance, out of pure speculation."¹⁷⁶

In other words, as Feuerbach observes, as well as others,¹⁷⁷ both religion and Hegel make human wishes and fantasies 'essential' whereas, according to Feuerbach, philosophical, theoretical understanding is 'non-essential' *for religion*. Referring to

171. Hegel ignores Kant's explicit rejection of 'constructivism' (*Erfindung*) in the *Critique of Pure Reason* B xxxix*.

172. See the "Preface to the First Edition" of the *Science of Logic* GW V: 16–17.

173. See *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* GW XX: 121–122. This is a criticism that he raised already in "Glauben und Wissen" ["Faith and Reason"] in 1802, where he especially ridicules Fichte, the arch-Kantian (see *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* GW XX: 415–416).

174. Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 511

175. Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 516–517.

176. Feuerbach, *Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit* (Leipzig: Verlag von Otto Wigand, 1847): 403.

177. Strauß cites to Georg Friedrich Daumer, *Andeutung eines Systems speculativer Philosophie* (Nürnberg: Verlag von Friedrich Campe, 1831), who graduated from the Gymnasium in Würzburg during the time of Hegel's directorship, and Bernhard Heinrich Blasche, *Philosophische Unsterblichkeitslehre. Oder. Wie offenbart sich das ewige Leben?* (Erfurt und Gotha: Flinzer'sche Buchhandlung, 1831). See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 17, n. 17.

Feuerbach's *Darstellung, Entwicklung und Kritik der Leibnizischen Philosophie*,¹⁷⁸ Strauß summarizes:

The doctrine of Hegel's philosophy of religion that there is only an unessential difference between philosophy and positive religion, insofar as this point of view [taken by Feuerbach, Daumer, and Blasche] declares as wrong that *the same content there [in philosophy] is only elevated to the form of the concept, which here [in positive religion] exists in the forms of feeling and imagination because it makes the unessential essential, but the essential unessential*. It is precisely imagination and feeling/sentiment [*Gemüt*] that constitute the essence of religion, these formal determinations make up the specificity of its content; *nothing is said by insisting that the Absolute is the common content of philosophy and religion because the content of religion is the absolute not as such* ([‘as such’] it is only the content of philosophy), *but as the object of feeling/sentiment [Gemüt] and the imagination [...]*. The standpoint of theology is practical [agency in the concrete world]: that of philosophy the standpoint of *θεωρία* [abstract contemplation].¹⁷⁹ Theoretically, I conduct myself objectively [in abstract contemplation]. However, practically, I conduct myself subjectively [in the concrete world].¹⁸⁰ Thus, *the foundation of philosophy is the [essential] nature of the [objective] thing: the foundation of religion and theology is the [particular] needs of the subject*. The subject makes itself a God, as it needs one, or rather desires one [...]. When it comes to the [abstract] impersonal, general activity of cognition, God is substance, monad, idea. However, in religion, where man behaves as a personal agent, God is also determined as a person. The acts of God's creation, redemption etc. are not free-necessary developments of His being, but arbitrary-free resolutions of His will. The laws of human action are not relations flowing from the nature of the thing, moral categories based on themselves, but commandments of the Lord, who does not prescribe it because something is good but only his approval makes it something good.¹⁸¹ (emphasis added)

178. Ludwig Feuerbach, *Darstellung, Entwicklung und Kritik der Leibnizischen Philosophie* (Ansbach: Verlag von Carl Brügel, 1837).

179. On Plato's notion of contemplation (*θεωρία*, *theoria*), see: 24, n. 7.

180. NOTE: Strauß is employing Hegel's distinction between ‘theoretical’ (contemplatively abstract) and ‘practical’ reason (teleologically concrete), which faults Kant for ignoring Absolute Freedom. However, Kant and Strauß ignore entirely the significance of what Kant calls ‘autonomous freedom’ (creativity). In other words, they fail to grasp what Kant stresses are ‘pure’ reason's *a priori* capacities (*Anlagen*) that make it possible for transcendental consciousness to experience, understand, and exercise agency in the world. On Hegel's understanding of theoretical and practical spirit, see his “Zusatz” (“Addendum”) *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaft* GW X: 237. See as well, in “Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten” Hegel's portrayal of practical reason's laws as analytical’ (GW II: 460) and governed by the ‘negative’ of physical necessity rather than the ‘absolute freedom’ of Absolute Spirit (GW II: 457–458, see as well, *ibid.*: 463, 466). Furthermore, Hegel takes Kant's practical reason to consist of subjectively constructed, ‘empty abstractions’ (GW II: 451). See as well, Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* GW XX: 346.

181. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 17–18. Note that Feuerbach and Strauß are defining religion under the Medieval Scholastic category of ‘Occasionalist’/‘Voluntarist,’ not ‘Intellectualist.’ Strauß is also distinguishing between the morality of philosophy and the ethics of religion according to Hegel's distinction in “The Moral View of the World” of the *Phenomenology* between abstract, ‘moral duty’ and concrete ‘ethics,’ not, as with Kant for whom moral principles (as the *ratio cognoscendi* of freedom) are inseparable from the practical agency of autonomous freedom (as the *ratio essendi* of morality). See Kant, *The Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 4*. Without autonomous freedom, there is no encounter-

Strauß points out that Hegel offers a comforting vision of history under the tutelage of Absolute Spirit. Equating philosophical 'reason' and religious 'feeling' by insisting that idea (the true content) and form (the representations of perception), properly understood, complement one another claims that there is an ultimate harmony accomplished by Absolute Spirit throughout all history – even accounts for the development of 'levels of religion' in history that stretch from materialism to Spirit. However, that vision of ultimate harmony overlooks Spirit's determinism, ridiculed by Strauß as humanity's and God's 'dark urge',¹⁸² and overlooks that erroneous representations, supposedly having the same content as true ideas, cannot account for the development of the alternative, true (!), scientific materialism out of those erroneous forms.

Strauß himself remains caught on the horns of a dilemma that consists of Idealism and Materialism. Strauß contrasts these two 'philosophical' alternatives as represented by the Hegelian meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit and Feuerbachian Materialism. Hegel's meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit is an appealing siren call because it offers a vision of the diversity and conflict in and among religions as the manner by which Absolute Spirit works its way through history – despite and in spite of humanity. Strauß, contrasts this vision of harmony with the 'elitism' that is 'the alternative philosophy' of scientific materialism that calls for the cultivation of the 'technical skills' of science. The horns of this dilemma that leave only a choice between Idealism and Materialism accompany Strauß for the rest of his life, and in *The Old and the New Faith* he commits, unequivocally, to the latter. Unfortunately, again, Strauß' failure to engage rigorously Kant's Critical Idealism left him with no choice but to embrace Feuerbachian Materialism given the illusions and self-deceptions of Hegelianism.

Strauß' presentation of the dilemma begins:

There is a beautiful humanity in Hegel's view to determine religion as the form in which truth is for all men: *if it remains*, even according to its content, not unclouded by this form, it is nevertheless also in this refraction that its rays are poured out on all; *if the religions and churches have often been about shells, they have nevertheless been the shells of truth*. Mankind, "in its obscurest urge [*dunkler Drang*] was nevertheless aware of the right way."¹⁸³

ing moral principles. Therefore, the experience of a single moral principle is sufficient because there is no other purpose for a moral principle than to be applied by a transcendental consciousness who possesses autonomous freedom although autonomous freedom as a causality is incapable of proof or disproof but only capable of 'defense.' See the *Groundwork* AA V: 458–459.

182. On Strauß' ridiculing of Hegel's notion of the 'cunning of reason,' see the "Preface:" 89, n. 35 and the following n. 183.

183. Strauß has this aphorism from the "Prologue" of Part I of Goethe's *Faust. Der Tragödie*: God says to Mephistopheles (lines 328–330:

"Ein guter Mensch in seinem dunkeln Drange
Ist sich des rechten Weges wohl bewußt."

A good man, through obscurest urge,
Has still an instinct of the one true way.

Strauß equates this 'dark urge' with Hegel's 'instinct of reason' [*Vernunftinstinkt*] that Hegel calls the opaque urge of Spirit. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 19, 75.

According to the opposing view, truth would be found only among philosophers [scientists], and the history of religion and the church would have to turn [...] into a history of human folly. It is not possible to imagine, how from this point of view a satisfying philosophical view of history would be possible.¹⁸⁴ (emphasis added)

The Feuerbachian et al. point of view makes impossible a ‘satisfying philosophical view of history’ as a meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit. However, Strauß proceeds to point out that, in fact, the Hegelian meta-narrative also is an ‘unsatisfying view of history.’ Hegel’s meta-narrative requires the claim that ‘true’ ‘philosophical’ theses are derived from ‘false’ Church teaching because the false physical science of the Bible has the same truth as philosophical ideas. Such a claim not only leaves no satisfactory account of the emergence of understanding of truth by the empirical sciences because what matters for them is not the empirical evidence but the metaphysical claim that Absolute Spirit is the truth; but also the actual history of Church teaching indicates clearly that philosophical ‘truth’ is corrupted by the false religious ‘representation.’

As little as the Hegelian claim is grounded by an identity of content [*Inhalt*] between religion and philosophy (when it comes to philosophy’s connection to religion); so certain is it that religion, as the essential form of representation (or feeling and fantasy) is also affected by the content [*Inhalt*] and makes the content into something else and less perfect than the philosophical content [*Inhalt*] engendered by pure reason.¹⁸⁵

The Hegelian thesis, if correct, would mean that today’s ‘philosophical’ (that is, for Hegel, scientific) understanding arose out of the biblical representations. Strauß points out that this is contradicted by history.

[...] [W]hether philosophical propositions may at the same time be a derivation of the doctrines of faith is another question. *If it should be said that the philosophical doctrines emerged from the ecclesiastical dogmas as pure developments from within, without foreign, external influences: then such a derivation would certainly contradict the appearance, according to which [...] physics, geography, astronomy, etc. [...] influenced the biblical and ecclesiastical ideas [...]* Rather, it was [...] physics, geography, astronomy, etc., which gradually brought the biblical and ecclesiastical ideas of heaven and earth, God and creation, etc., into the form in which they exist in the philosophically educated consciousness of our

Elsewhere when speaking of the ‘cunning of reason’ as ‘dark urge’ (*dunkler Drang*), Hegel employs it as a metaphor for ‘Double Negation’ but does not explicitly say that it functions in humanity unawares much less does he acknowledge that it is his substitute for ‘grace’ and leads to the particularities of history in themselves having no meaning. See for example, Hegel’s *Wissenschaft der Logik* II (1832) GW VI: 452 and *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*: § 209 GW VIII: 365; s. ≈ 1 §159: 109. On Hegel’s use of ‘Drang’/‘Trieb’ des (Welt) Geistes, see *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* GW XII: 73–74; *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, “Begriff des Geistes” § 384 GW X: 29–30; the “Appendix” (Zusatz) GW X: 237; GW VIII: 31 *Vorlesung über die Philosophie der Religion* GW XVII: 29–30; and Hegel’s review of *Solgers nachgelassene Schriften und Briefwechsel* GW XI: 255.

184. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre*: 21–22.

185. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre*: 22.

time. On the other hand, there is no reason to object to the derivation in question, if it understands the religious conception as only one factor among others, and if it sets itself the task of showing how, under changed educational conditions, the ecclesiastical way of solving the designated tasks is no longer sufficient, and which other one is to be put in its place.¹⁸⁶

Strauß then recognizes that the task of 'changing the educational conditions' by which religious representations were taken to be one among many elements influencing the quest of human understanding makes it likely that the 'educated' would cease to embrace 'positive Church teaching' although the exact determination of the question is irresolvable.¹⁸⁷ Strauß stops the examination of the relationship between 'reason' (philosophy) and 'feeling' (religion) at this point. Although it is clear: Religious 'feeling' (representations) are not able to stand against the challenges of philosophical 'reason,' and the 'false' representations (sensuous perceptions/*sinnliche Anschauungen*) of biblical and Church teaching would not generate the 'true' content (intellectual perceptions/*intellektuelle Anschauungen* of abstraction).

The logic that Hegel fails to address, though, is that, as a consequence of their ambiguity the sensuous representations (form) of religion are ultimately irrelevant. Hegel's 'hierarchy' of religions from 'natural' over 'subjective' to objective Spirit is a misapprehension because it refers only to a hierarchy of representations (the perceptible forms) while ignoring that the 'truth' of those representations is, in fact, the Spirit Itself. The hierarchy of religions is only the veil that conceals Absolute Spirit seeking to be not only 'In-itself' but also 'For-Itself' by means of the imperceptible 'cunning of reason' through all of history.¹⁸⁸ In short, *Hegel's reconciliation between religious representations and their true, philosophical content is an illusion.*

Despite all claims to the contrary by Hegel, *the content is indifferent with respect to its form.* In his *Encyclopedia* (1830), Hegel himself maintains that "[...]it has been rightly said of the true that it is index sui et falsi [indicator of 'what is' true and what is false], but from the false the true is not known, so the Concept is the understanding both of itself and of the conceptless form, but the latter does not comprehend the former."¹⁸⁹ Here Hegel's Idealism is in sharp focus, but the exact relationship between the concept and its form is left unclear. He had claimed in "Faith and Knowledge" (1802) that there is an identity between the content (concept) and its representations

186. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 23–24.

187. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 24.

188. See Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* (1837) "B" GW XII: 49. Hegel's three-fold account of 'revelation' in his 'Addendum' [Zusatz] to *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaft* (1830) § 384 in GW X: 30–32 makes it clear that the process of revelation is Absolute Spirit's revealing Itself to Itself under the presupposition of the 'cunning of reason'. See above 605, n. 170.

189. Hegel, "Vorrede zur zweiten Ausgabe" in *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaft* (1830): GW VIII: 31.

(form) so that he can say that the 'truth' of both is the same.¹⁹⁰ However, here in the *Encyclopedia*, form (sensible representations) does not grasp its 'inner truth.' 'Inner truth' can only be achieved by its content (concept). It turns out, as in "On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right" (also from 1802), that the *form is a matter of indifference to the content. Truth is established by the content (concept/Concept) irrespective of the representations (form) that is its vehicle.*¹⁹¹

Strauß addresses this profound 'indifference' to representations (historical events/texts) in the *Glaubenslehre* (1841):

[...] in order that the deficiency between the appearance of the individual with her/his essence be offset, *Hegel does not refer to the divine view of infinite progress [of the individual] as completed, but to the concept of the Idea, in which externality, finiteness, imperfection, the otherness in general, is an unessential, disappearing moment [...]* [I]n Hegel's sense, one could say as well: *[the disappearing moment] is essential and lasting; or it is unessential only in the sense that it belongs to the side of the appearance of the essence, and it disappears only insofar as it is, like every moment, nothing fixed, but a point of passage, however inevitable, in the process of the Idea.*¹⁹²

In stark contrast, Feuerbach rejected any harmony between religion (feeling, wishful thinking) and philosophy (thought) by pointing out that not only are the positive claims of ecclesiastical faith grounded in wishful, anthropomorphic analogies but also Hegel's 'speculative' philosophy of Absolute Spirit as the 'true' content of religion is equally a set of anthropomorphic analogies. In other words, *Feuerbach's claim is not only that religion is the projection of anthropomorphic predicates onto 'God' but also that the whole spiritual superstructure of Absolute Spirit, specifically Hegelian philosophy, is an anthropomorphic projection that reduces appearances to an non-essential indifference.*¹⁹³

Strauß formulates his task in the *Glaubenslehre* to consist not in demonstrating the 'truths' of Hegel's meta-narrative but in the more pressing need to engage the consistency of Church dogmatics regardless whether it is to serve a 'future church of rational believers' (granted, a limited few) or only 'the present and future congregation of the

190. See Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen:" GW II: 305–306.

191. I address the issue of 'indifference' in its two senses of 'non-differentiated' unity and 'apathetic meaninglessness' in the "Preface: 50.

192. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 494–495.

193. See for example, Feuerbach's discussion of ectypal (not archetypal) ideas in Lecture 14 of the *Das Wesen der Religion*: 134–135: "[...] (T)he generic concept, however, exists in thinking and for thinking; hence it is that man comes to think and believe that the world has sprung from ideas, from the thoughts of a spiritual being. From the point of view of thought, which abstracts from the senses, nothing appears more natural than this course; for to the spirit, which abstracts from the senses, the abstract, the spiritual, the merely thoughtful, is nearer than the sensuous; it is for it earlier and higher than the latter, therefore quite natural for it to let the sensuous spring from the spiritual, the real from the thoughtful. We find this course even among the modern, speculative philosophers [Hegelians]. They still create the world out of their head, like once the Christian God."

knowingly adept.¹⁹⁴ The 'knowingly adept' in the natural sciences may become the far wider audience but, of course, it may be an audience uninterested in its conclusions with respect to biblical and church teaching, a fate that Strauß' work encountered.

Ziegler's summary of the *Glaubenslehre* raises the question: To what extent did Strauß remain a Hegelian? Ziegler views the *Glaubenslehre* of 1841 as Strauß' writing himself out of theology.¹⁹⁵ Strauß remained silent, theologically, for twenty year after its publication, but Ziegler maintains that Strauß remained Hegelian to the very end because, Ziegler correctly recognizes, Strauß is no 'consistent' materialist.¹⁹⁶ According to Ziegler, Strauß remained a 'religious' 'pantheist'.¹⁹⁷ Furthermore, Ziegler claims that, despite his acknowledgement of 'feeling' in religion along with Hegel,¹⁹⁸ for Strauß 'intellectualism' dominated.¹⁹⁹ Nonetheless, although Ziegler reports Strauß' own dismissal of the 'illusions' of Hegel(ianism),²⁰⁰ Ziegler maintains that there was a 'whiff' of Hegel in Strauß to the end.²⁰¹

While I agree with Ziegler that Strauß was 'no consistent materialist,' I disagree with him that he remained a Hegelian 'to the end.' 'Panlogism'²⁰² is not 'pantheism.' In fact, when it comes to Hegelianism, it is more appropriate to speak of 'pan-en-the-ism,' than 'pantheism.' However, already in the *LJ*, Strauß placed emphasis on the eternal, rational order of physical lawfulness of historical events that no miracle can

194. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 24.

195. Ziegler, II: 337.

196. Ziegler, II: 337

197. Ziegler, II: 352.

198. See Ziegler, II: 339.

199. Ziegler, II: 340.

200. See Ziegler, II: 336–337.

201. Ziegler writes in II: 690: "The universe reasonable and itself reason and goodness, the universe full of life and reason the highest idea – it is clear [McG: really?] where Strauss took this from. It is nothing else than Hegel's optimistic panlogism [McG: or Schleiermacher's Platonism?]. We are the beings in whom the sensible becomes personal, – that sounds like a sentence from the Preface to the *Phenomenology*, where it says: "The true is the whole; but the whole is only Being that completes Itself through Its development; it is to be said of the absolute that It is essentially result, that It is only in the end what It is in truth." So Strauss at the end of his life is still so far a Hegelian as he had been at the time of the *Glaubenslehre*. However, by translating the concept of the All into religious absolute dependence, he links Schleiermacher with Hegel and thereby gains a concept of religion [...]. [Just as correctly] he is quite right with the, again, Hegelian-sounding proposition that every true philosophy is necessarily optimistic, because otherwise it saws off the tree branch on which it sits." (emphasis added) Ziegler himself footnotes to his own Vol. II: 337 where he finds Strauß' Hegelian continuity 'explained' because *Strauß is unable to be a 'consistent' materialist*. Is Ziegler's take on Strauß as an enduring 'Hegelian' influenced by his own Hegelian commitments? See Ziegler's comments on what he takes to be a 'printing error' in Hegel's *Philosophie des Rechts* in "Zu Kants Rechtslehre." In *Kant Studien* 14 (Nov. 1909): 494.

202. Ziegler, calls Hegel a 'Panlogist' and 'Arch-Rationalist.' See Ziegler, I: 257.

contradict.²⁰³ This notion that physical lawfulness is what governs ‘modern science’ stands in tension with Hegelianism to the extent that, unlike Hegelianism which is a version of archetypal Idealism, ‘modern science’ is Nominalist (ideas are ectypal as defended by Feuerbach) and its method is the hypothetico-deductive investigation of phenomena. Hegelianism takes ‘science’ to refer to the ‘logic of dialectic’ that governs ‘reality’ towards the teleological goal of Absolute Knowledge. Already with the *Glaubenslehre*, Strauß had confronted the anthropomorphism of Hegelianism and especially, out of his encounter with Feuerbach, came to embrace ectypal Nominalism. Although committed to the ‘rational order’ of the physical sciences, Strauß no longer embraced Hegel’s meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit in his *Glaubenslehre*, and he was troubled, especially, by the implications of Hegel’s epistemology that subordinates ‘form’ to ‘content,’ which for Hegel was the key to uniting ‘feeling’ and ‘reason.’

My reading of Strauß, though, claims that Strauß’ theological crisis with respect to Hegelianism arose even before the writing of the *Glaubenslehre* (already in “The Transient and Permanent in Christianity”) and clearly shaped his presentation of the history of Church Doctrine in the *Glaubenslehre*. Ziegler, however, suggests not only that Strauß remained in the Hegelian, ‘Intellectualist,’ metaphysical camp but also that he managed to hold together the tensions between ‘feeling’ and ‘knowledge.’

Strauss did not fail to recognize the emotional²⁰⁴ side of religion, he tried to unite Schleiermacher and Hegel by combining feeling and imagination (*Gefühl und Vorstellung*). However, as in the master, that is in Hegel himself, intellectualism and panlogism strikes again and again, so also [it remains] in [... Strauß], and makes his concept of religion more one-sided and narrower, makes the enduring contrast between religion and philosophy more tense and dangerous.²⁰⁵

In his last book in 1872, Strauß concurs with Feuerbach et al. that Hegel’s speculative philosophy of Absolute Spirit is anthropomorphic, wishful thinking. Yet, before turning to Strauß’ *The Old and the New Faith*, it is valuable to take a look at the work that marked Strauß’ re-entry into the theological fray and his re-engagement of Schleiermacher in 1865.

203. See Strauß, *LJ*: 78. However, Strauß nowhere acknowledges or remarks that Kant in a “General Remark” at the end of Section II of *Religion* rejects any role of miracles because it would ‘paralyze’ reason. See AA VI: 86–87.

204. Strauß here, at least, equates ‘feeling’ with merely emotions, not Hegel’s understanding of ‘feeling’ as part of practical reason’s *self-interestedness*, ‘imagination,’ and ‘wishful thinking’ that drives *teleological agency in the world*. See above: 605, n. 169.

205. Ziegler, II: 340.

1864: *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People*. 'Natural' Moral Duty

After a twenty-year silence in which Strauß devoted his attention to biographies, Strauß returned to theological writing with his work on Reimarus (1862) and with his own theological reflections in *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People* of 1864.

Strauß' *Hermann Samuel Reimarus und seine Schutzschrift* [*Herman Samuel Reimarus and his Protected Writing*] was an important milestone on the way to Strauß' 'return to theology' after the *Glaubenslehre*. Similarly to Reimarus, Strauß had concealed his religious convictions for twenty years. Strauß understood full well why Reimarus never published his criticisms of Christianity. Strauß, above all, was sympathetic with Reimarus' bitterness. Strauß writes: "So what else is to blame for the hypocrisy of so many published, reasonable people than the constraint of faith, linked to so many temporal misfortunes, which the theologians and preachers by means of their insults and persecutions impose on the confessors of a rational religion until their death?"²⁰⁶ Strauß concludes: "He [Reimarus] would rather not speak at all than, once he had spoken, not speak fully and frankly."²⁰⁷ Strauß was ready to 'speak fully and frankly' with his second *Life of Jesus*. To be sure, in 1862 Strauß was fully and frankly clear about what he opposed although it is not until 1872 with *Der alte und der neue Glaube* that he expressed fully and frankly that for which he stood. See the final two poems in Appendix IV.

In his *Reimarus* work,²⁰⁸ Strauß signaled key shifts away from his theological convictions down to 1841, which he articulated more fully in his second *Life of Jesus* of 1864. For example, he points out that, according to Reimarus, Moses established a 'theocracy,' not a 'revealed' religion. Reimarus took the key to 'revealed' religion to be the 'afterlife.' However, Reimarus emphasized that the notion of the afterlife arose in Judaism only with the Maccabees after the return from the Babylonian Exile. In fact, earlier, the Hebrews viewed the soul as 'material' and took 'reward and punishment' to consist of 'success or failure' in this life. Furthermore, Reimarus demonstrated as unfounded the Christian teaching that connected the 'First' Testament notion of messiahship with resurrection and the afterlife. Whereas Reimarus' understanding of 'revealed religion' was solidly anchored in the afterlife, Strauß already here distances himself both from Reimarus and the 'Spirit' *Weltanschauung* of the 19th C.²⁰⁹

206. Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 248–249.

207. Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 249.

208. See Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus* §21: 330–334.

209. This is another clear indication that Strauß had not studied Kant with any rigor. In *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason*, Kant claimed that 'any religion without a notion of the afterlife' was not a real religion. To be sure, Kant's focus for the afterlife was not the attainment of blessedness in the next life but the effect that the afterlife can have on one's responsibly exercising one's creative talents in this life. Furthermore, Kant's concern was not 'success' in one's efforts but 'satisfaction'. See "5) Kant claimed no role for the resurrection and ascension of Christ." 836 ff.

We in the nineteenth century take a different attitude to this point; from our side it would be the last reproach we would make to the Old Testament that it lacks the doctrine of immortality. It is true that the New Testament is superior to us in that it contains this doctrine, for we know that the way from the external to the internal, from the sensual to the spiritual, is through the hereafter. Man first necessarily becomes aware of the Spirit as the power over matter in the form that his (*sic.*) soul continues after the dissolution of the body; of the mind as that which determines the value and destiny of man independently of the course of the world *only in such a way that he promises himself a redemption in the hereafter*. Behind this standpoint of the New Testament the Old is as much behind as we are beyond it: we know that one only begins to think about all questions concerning human destiny and human destiny when one has renounced the fantasy of a continuation after death; that *morality only stands on solid ground when it no longer needs a future retribution because it finds its reward in itself*. And we see with satisfaction how even a man of so high a mind and so noble a disposition as Reimarus falls into the inevitable fate of all those who seek to prove immortality from the standpoint of a future retribution: *namely, to contradict himself and to utter vulgarities*. The tenth of his treatises on the noblest truths of natural religion, in so far as it is devoted to this proof, stands in direct contrast to the ninth, in which he had set aside the doubts against divine providence, and had resolved with much subtlety all those alleged contradictions between worthiness and happiness in this life, from which he now seeks to extract proofs of retribution in another. However, when Reimarus in his *Protected Writings* [*Schutzschrift*] also thinks that without a future life the animals would be happier than man; when he exclaims: 'If we are only born for this life, what good is the knowledge of the highest being, from whose perfections we are completely cut off? what the moral precepts which restrain our sensual pleasures, and yet are connected with no certain or long-lasting reward? what the foresight of an inevitable death, the mere idea of which makes our whole life bitter?' -- with such commonplaces and vulgarities Reimarus sinks still deeper beneath himself than the apostle Paul in the well-known passage I Cor 15:19, 32.²¹⁰ (emphasis added)

Nonetheless, what Strauß shared with Reimarus was incredulity over God's having waited so long before introducing 'revealed' religion and the blessedness of the afterlife to humanity.²¹¹

In *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People* of 1864, there is, now unsurprisingly, no mention of Hegelian metaphysics. What comes as a surprise is Strauß' invoking Kant in his new portrayal of Christianity. In the early 1860s, his circle of friends were calling for a 'return to Kant.' It is clear, though, that he did not share, entirely, their enthusiasm for Kant. Strauß' understanding of morality remains stuck in Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" from the *Phenomenology* and in Baur's reading of Kant in *Gnosis* and *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*. Moral duty remains an 'empty abstraction' distinct from the 'real world' limits on ethics and retains Baur's

210. Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 333–334.

211. See Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 334. Strauß himself ignores Paul's claim that until Jesus' coming God had patiently tolerated humanity's affront to 'His' honor (Romans 3:25–26) – as if 'blessedness' was a matter of God's honor, not His 'love' or His concern for the oppression, persecution, exploitation, and suffering of humanity.

emphasis on Kant's 'radical subjectivity'.²¹² 'Salvation' here is formulated in terms of Jesus, the 'savior,' sowing the 'seed of internal awareness' of the moral capacity of 'I can,' which I 'must' but am unable to achieve perfectly.²¹³ In other words, Christianity was founded, according to Strauß in 1864, by a 'moral teacher' who (like others before him and those after him, who had or will have addressed a different social context) was concerned with 'the heteronomous, moral improvement of humanity as a species in this world, not by objective, open-ended exercising of perfect, moral capacities on the part of the individual in this or the next life.'²¹⁴

To be sure, Jesus is a model teacher, but he is neither the first nor the last. As one among the educators of ideal humanity, he is clearly at the forefront. However, from the way Jesus is portrayed in the gospels, one can say that, whereas certain elements of human experience were completely developed, others were not (for example, family life is overlooked; the relationship to the state is passive; pursuit of a career in all its variables is absent; and everything concerned with the arts and enjoyment of life remain completely outside his concern).²¹⁵ Here it is not merely that he partially addressed certain aspects of human experience by only providing, sketchy, governing principles, but the very concepts appropriate for them are not to be found.²¹⁶ These elements require various cultural contexts as well as other epochs of history yet to come, and not merely models from the past.²¹⁷ All such improvements in understanding humanity fit entirely, according to Strauß, with the ideal of humanity found in Jesus. They don't require that Jesus introduce something so perfect and new into the course of history that the fundamental conditions of human experience are transformed.²¹⁸ In short, Strauß places the notion of 'moral improvement' within the framework of the historical development of the human species, not as merely a concern with the individual's assumption of personal responsibility, however limited by circumstances, for the exercise of her/his agency.²¹⁹

212. On Baur's reading of Kant, see the "Preface:" 51, n. 47.

213. This is entirely unlike Kant's notion of 'if I should, I can.' Kant's aphorism is a criticism of 'original sin,' and is directed at confirming humanity's *autonomous freedom* to initiate sequences of events that nature on its own cannot achieve. Autonomous freedom as the *ratio essendi* of morality is acknowledged because we experience universal, moral principles – in contrast to hypothetical imperatives that govern how to properly do an specific activity. There is no other ground for a moral principle than an agent of autonomous freedom. Without autonomous freedom the agent would be determined by nature without any genuine responsibility for her/his agency. See Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 4*.

214. See Strauß, *LJEGP* (1864). Leipzig: 'F.A. Brockhaus, 1864: 626–627.

215. See Strauß, *LJEGP*: 625–626.

216. See Strauß, *LJEGP*: 626.

217. See Strauß, *LJEGP*: 626.

218. See, Strauß, *LJEGP*: 626–627.

219. Although the theme of the 'moral improvement of the human species' is central to Kant's moral theory, the *ground* for Kant's claim is not that changing historical circumstances call for newly created ethical rules but, in dramatic contrast, the enduring creativity of humanity's 'autonomous freedom' is self-governed by universal, that is 'wide,' *categorical* imperatives. Without autonomous

Unlike his portrayal of the 'unsurpassability' of Jesus in "The Transient and Permanent in Christianity," here any teacher of ethics must *necessarily* be surpassed because humanity's ever-changing and new historical context requires the discovery of the appropriate ethical principles of the new context. There is a degree of surpassability of Jesus, for example, because he could not have encountered the demands of family life and the subsequent developments of economics and politics, which require other ethical principles than those encountered and taught by Jesus.

The crisis that the *Glaubenslehre* represents for Strauß is that *both* faith and reason are in tatters, not merely 'traditional' faith as a consequence of an attack on it by secular reason. Strauß had no adequate 'religious' alternative to Hegelianism in 1841, which is, in my judgment, the best explanation for his remaining silent with respect to religion for twenty years. He devoted his energies to the 'geniuses' of 'culture' and education, especially German culture with the writing of biographies of '*Andersdenkenden*' (dissenters and dissidents).²²⁰ When he returned to his own theological reflections in 1864, his reentry was shaped by what was for him the core issue of his initial entry into theology, Christology. However, this time the Hegelianism of 1835 is gone, and there is an effort to substitute a modified Kantian Christology for his Hegelian Christology.

Feuerbach's work was an unqualified rejection of 'God-consciousness' in all its forms: as a Personal Deity, a Hegelian 'Double Negation,' and a Schleiermachian 'Perfect God-consciousness.' At the end of his *Glaubenslehre*, Strauß clung to his own, thin-thread notion of God-consciousness formulated in "The Transient and Permanent in Christianity" as the sense of a subjective, internal harmony with eternal reason within consciousness, to be sure, *in history*. With his *Life of Jesus Examined for the German People*, not only is there no longer any Hegelian meta-narrative and Schleiermacher plays as good as no role, but also Strauß' own notion of internal God-consciousness of a rational order is barely recognizable. Rather, he formulates a 'religion of humanity' in contrast to the 'religion of Christ' that draws on aspects of Kant's moral philosophy as it had become popular among his circle of friends in the 1860s. Religion means the 'moral improvement' of humanity as a species, not as individuals, in this world.

freedom there is no reason for there to be anything like a universal, categorical imperative. Yet, given that there are such imperatives, they confirm the 'reality' of autonomous freedom. See Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 4*.

220. Strauß wrote biographies beginning already in 1836 with a collection of lectures on *Voltaire*. 6 *Vorträge* (Leipzig: Kröner, 1836); *Christian Märklin: ein Lebens- und Charakterbild aus der Gegenwart* (Mannheim: Bassermann, 1851); *Nicodemus Frischlin* (Frankfurt a.M.: Literar. Anst., 1856); *Ulrich von Hutton*, 2 Vols. (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1858–1860); *Herman Samuel Reimarus* (1862; Bonn: Verlag von Emil Strauß, 1877); and essays on Justinus Kerner. This focus on *German* 'geniuses' is reflected in the two 'encores' (*Zugaben*) that conclude *Der alte und der neue Glaube* in which Strauß reviews the achievements of 'our poets (*Dichtern*), Lessing, Goethe, and Schiller as well as 'our musicians,' Gluck, Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven.

However, this Kantian moral philosophy is itself a watered-down version of Kant's practical reason. Strauß continues to take 'practical reason' in the Hegelian sense to be concerned with teleological agency that is concerned, ethically, only with consequences, not with transcendental conscious' capacity for autonomous, creative freedom and *a priori* synthetic judgment of lawfulness that governs the two 'domains' of understanding of nature (theoretical reason) and of assumption of responsibility for one's creativity (practical reason).

Furthermore, as in "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity," the 'life of Jesus' presented here is the 'bare bones' of history that is discernable in the gospels in an attempt to 'ground' Christianity in factual claims. No more than he grasped Kant's understanding of practical reason has Strauß tapped into the implications of the Kantian, creative element of *autonomous freedom* that is at the core of his own 'genetic mythical principle' in the original *LJ*.

The first Appendix. "Likely 'Historical' Elements of Jesus' Life"²²¹ present a summary of that material that Strauß considered as 'historical' in *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People*. I do not repeat that account here but focus on the Kantian elements that accompanied Strauß across his career, beginning with the *LJ*, that shape his understanding of Christianity in 1864.

In the *LJ* of 1835, Strauß presents what he calls Kant's 'symbolic' Christology. Salvation does not require the belief that "[...] there was once a man who by his holiness and merit gave satisfaction for himself and for all others [...]"²²² Rather, "[...] it is the duty of men universally to elevate themselves to the ideal of moral perfection deposited in reason, and to obtain moral strength by the [McG: ... remonstrance (*Vorhaltung*)] of this ideal. Such moral faith alone man is bound to exercise, (*sic.*) and not historical faith."²²³ *The key elements to Strauß' understanding of Kant's 'symbolic' Christology are: 1) 'salvation' is concerned with elevating oneself to the 'ideal of moral perfection' that is 2) inwardly present as 'reason,' which in turn motivates agency.*

Only humanity's reason alone makes the "[...] world the object of divine Providence, and the end of creation. This idea of a humanity well-pleasing to God, has existed in God from all eternity; it [the idea of a humanity well-pleasing to God] proceeds from his essence, and is therefore no created thing, but his eternal Son, the Word, through whom, that is, for whose sake, all things were created, and in whom God loved the world."²²⁴ This ideal of moral perfection well-pleasing to God does not come from humanity, its presence in humanity is inexplicable. Symbolically, it can be said "[...] to have come down to us from heaven, and to have assumed human

221. See

Part II:

An Historical Reader for the 1839 Zurich Revolution: 319 ff.

222. Strauß, *LJ*: 773.

223. Strauß, *LJ*: 774.

224. Strauß, *LJ*: 774.

nature, and this union with us may be regarded as the condition of God's [... emptying (*Erniedrigung*, kenosis)] of Himself as the God/Man."²²⁵ *The ideal of moral perfection is only possible for a creature possessing needs and inclinations, which leads us to the ideal of a human being who was willing to and overcame all obstacles and suffering, even the most shameful death.* "[...] [T]his idea has its reality completely within itself, and it needed no exemplification in experience, since [*sic.*] such an example would not fully disclose the inward disposition, but would only admit of our forming dubious inferences thereupon."²²⁶ For that reason, the ideal resides 'only in reason' because no example in the senses is adequate to have fulfilled its expectation. "[...] [B]esides the moral faith in the idea, nothing further is requisite than the historical perception [*historische Wahrnehmung*] that [... a person's] life conformed to that idea, in order to accredit him as its personification."²²⁷

Anyone aware of such a moral disposition to perfection has no need of an historical example but "[...] he would adhere unalterably to this exemplar, and faithfully follow his steps" and "[...] such a man alone is entitled to consider himself an object of divine pleasure [*Gegenstand des göttlichen Wohlgefallens*]."²²⁸

To elevate himself (*sic.*) to such a state of mind, man must depart from evil, cast out the old man, crucify the flesh; a change which is essentially connected to a series of sorrows and sufferings [...] [T]he regenerated man [...] physically and in his empirical character [...] he remains the former man [...] but morally, with his changed disposition, [he has] become a new man. Having [...] taken [...] on] the disposition of the Son of God, that which is [...] the new man [...] may be represented, by a personification of the idea, as a substitution of the Son of God [...] [T]he suffering which the new man, in dying to the old, must perpetually incur through life, being conceived in the representative of mankind, as a death suffered once for all.²²⁹

The only thing recognizable in this account of Kant are the metaphors. Strauß has either not understood Kant's text and its irony, or he has purposefully distorted it. Strauß presents only a caricature of Kant through the Hegelian lens that portrays Kant as a 'subjectivist' whose 'ideas' and 'ideals' are merely 'empty abstractions' with humanity by its own (always unsuccessful) efforts rising above sensuality to achieve the ideal of moral duty to which it aspires merely by the subjective means of 'awareness of the ideal' – an obviously impossible achievement from the perspective of Hegel's "The Moral View of the World."

225. Strauß, *LJ*: 774.

226. Strauß, *LJ*: 774.

227. Strauß, *LJ*: 774.

228. Strauß, *LJ*: 775.

229. Strauß, *LJ*: 775. Strauß cites to Kant's *Religion*, "Part Two: Concerning the Battle of the Good Against the Evil Principle for Dominion over the Human Being," "Section One" and "Part Three: The Victory of the Good Principle over the Evil Principle, and the Founding of a Kingdom of God on Earth," "Division One."

Without Kant's notion of *autonomous freedom*, which consists of the capacity intentionally to initiate sequences of events that nature cannot accomplish on its own, there can be no accounting for how one gets from 'moral duty' to 'concrete agency.' The Hegelian 'solution' claims that the gap between 'ought' and 'is' is accomplished by Absolute Spirit Itself (*as a form of divine predestination*) working Its way to self-awareness through the finite world with the consequence that the restrictions that are the limits of concrete experience prohibit the individual's fulfillment of moral duty. If this caricature of Kant were correct, his moral teaching is incapable of fulfillment and a silly illusion.

Strauß says precisely these things as he concludes:

This [Kantian] view was met immediately on the part of the church by the reproach, that instead of the riches of divine reality which faith discovers in the history of Christ, it palmed upon us a collection of empty ideas and ideals; *instead of a consolatory work effected, an overwhelming obligation*. [...] By this system, man is thrust out of the reconciled world in which Christianity places him [McG: 'properly' understood by Strauß in 1835, of course, as the reconciliation of Absolute Spirit by means of Double Negation], into an unreconciled world, out of a world of happiness into a world of misery; for where reconciliation is yet to be effected, *where happiness has yet to be attained, there is at present enmity and unhappiness*.²³⁰ And [*sic.*], in truth, the hope of entire deliverance from these conditions is, according to the principles of this system, which admits an infinite approximation towards the idea, deceptive; for that which is only to be reached in an endless progression, is in fact unattainable.²³¹ (emphasis added)

Strauß now rallies 'science' against Kant:

Science has perceived that to convert ideas simply into an obligatory possibility, to which no reality corresponds, is in fact to annihilate them; just as it would be to render the infinite finite, to present it as that which lies beyond the finite. *Science has conceived that the infinite has its existence in the alternate production and extinction of the finite*; that the idea is realized only in the entire series of its manifestations; that *nothing can come into existence which does not already essentially exist* [McG: Intellectualist Idealism]; *and, therefore, that it is not to be required of man [sic.], that he should reconcile himself with God, and assimilate his sentiments to the divine, unless this reconciliation and this assimilation are*

230. Strauß reads Kant as a 'consequentialist,' who is supposed to have claimed that the goal of moral effort is happiness. Strauß clearly has not read Kant at this point. Kant frequently rejects the notion that happiness (*Glückseligkeit*) is the goal of morality. An example, from the 'Preface' to the *Metaphysics of Morals*. "[W]hen eudaimonia (the happiness principle) is established as precept rather than eleutheronomy (the principle of freedom and its internal legislation), the consequence is the *euthanasia* of all morality." (parentheses from Kant) (AA VI: 378). See as well: 28, n. 11.

Although Kant's *Menschenkunde* was published in 1831, Strauß is unaware of Kant's account of his 'negative method' with its response to pain and suffering with a 'positive' passion for the lawfulness that motivates theoretical and practical understanding and brings satisfaction (not necessarily happiness) when one responsibly creates on the basis of one's autonomous freedom. See "Kant's 'Negative Method'" in 45, n. 28.

231. Strauß, LJ: 776.

already virtually effected [by the 'predestination' that is the Double Negation of Absolute Spirit].²³² (emphasis added)

Strauß' Kantian morality in the *LJ* is a system of empty, abstract, overwhelming obligation to elevate oneself to moral perfection by departing from evil and rising about sensuousness.²³³ Absent an understanding that 'nothing can come into existence which does not already essentially exist, Kant's moral obligation remains an unrealizable, empty illusion. Kant had simply failed to grasp the predetermining 'necessity' of Absolute Spirit as the single, *a priori* synthetic judgment that has always and already reconciled God and humanity.²³⁴

Strauß' 'Kantian,' 'religion of humanity' in *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People* presents a subtle but profound re-working of the 'symbolic Christology' of the *LJ* that focuses more on the 'historical facts' of Jesus' ministry and teaching.

'Salvation of humanity' [*Seligkeit des Menschen*] is no longer a reconciliation between Hegel's finite spirit and Absolute Spirit that has 'essentially always and already occurred.' Rather, salvation consists of

[...] the possibility of its fulfillment of its condition by the development of its in-born powers and the experience of the corresponding quantity of satisfaction that arises from that development. The old Reimarus recognized that salvation cannot depend upon the acknowledgement of facts with respect to which among thousands hardly anyone can submit to a thorough investigation that would arrive at a conclusion of certainty. Rather, *as certain as it is that the human condition is universal and achievable by all, the conditions of their achievement must also be capable of achievement*.²³⁵ *apart from and before the will*

232. Strauß, *LJ*: 777.

233. Kant explicitly rejects the notion that evil is grounded either in sensuousness or in reason. See Kant, *Religion* VI: 34–35: "Sensuous nature [...] contains too little to provide a ground of moral evil in the human being, for, to the extent that it eliminates the incentives originating in freedom, it makes of the human a purely animal being; a reason exonerated from the moral law, an evil reason as it were (an absolutely evil will), would on the contrary contain too much, because resistance to the law would itself be thereby elevated to incentive [...] and so the subject would be made a diabolical being."

234. Hegel claims that "[...] the Concept [...], without the variety of perception, is empty and without content, although Hegel's own Concept is *the singular a priori synthesis*. Because it is this, it has determination and difference in itself. As the determinateness of the Concept, absolute determinateness, the uniqueness, the Concept is *the basis and source of all finite determinateness and multiplicity*" (*Wissenschaft der Logik* II [1832] GW VI: 2619; and Hegel claims that the 'I' and the Concept (One) are an *a priori* unity: "That I am the One and that I am active as thinking, setting unity, is, however, not so precisely stated in Kant. That which thinking produces is unity; thus, it produces itself, for it is the One [the Concept]. (The unity can also be called relation; insofar as a manifold is presupposed and this remains on one side as manifold, it is called related). This is transcendental apperception; *the pure apperception of self-consciousness is the synthesizing function*." *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* GW XX: 344.

235. This sentence might be taken to be a seismic difference from Strauß' understanding of morality in his earlier writings that are governed by Hegel's "I should, but I can't." However, Strauß is not claiming anything differently than Hegel. He is only saying here that 'moral duty' is known 'apart and before the will'. in the *LJ* and the *Glaubenslehre* where Strauß' morality is shaped by the Hegelian 'I

[!], which sets itself in motion towards the goal, the *knowledge of this goal itself, given to everyone, must not be an accidental knowledge of history coming from outside, but must be a necessary knowledge of reason, which everyone can find in himself.*²³⁶ (emphasis added)

Strauß retains his focus on Kant from the *LJ* that emphasizes Kant's dismissal of the 'factual history' of an individual savior and emphasizes the significance of the 'rational ideal' of morality:

Like Spinoza, Kant also distinguished the historical person of Jesus from the ideal that is found in human reason, of a humanity pleasing to God, or of the moral disposition in all its purity to the extent possible in a world dependent on needs and inclinations. It is the general duty of man to rise to this ideal [McG: by objective achievement]; but although we cannot imagine it otherwise than in the image of a perfect man, and, although it is not impossible that such a man once lived, because we should all resemble that ideal, it is not important that we know of the existence of such a man or believe in it, but only that we hold that ideal before us, recognize it as obligatory for us, and strive to make ourselves like it.²³⁷ (emphasis added)

However, here in 1864, Strauß profoundly modifies his position on morality from the *LJ* and the *Glaubenslehre*. For example, in the *LJ* he insisted that the individual is powerless over sensuous desires²³⁸ and in the *Glaubenslehre* he claims that Kant's moral theory only offers an 'empty, abstract obligation'²³⁹ whereby "[...] humanity, as long as it has sensualism struggling with its reason, that is, as long as humanity exists, [...] is incapable of salvation [*Seligkeit*] [...]"²⁴⁰ Philosophy, that is, Hegelianism, Strauß maintains, is, at least in part, to blame for mis-understanding t humanity's moral capacity, which is no perfectly achieved archetype either historically or philosophically but arises in and through the experience of the individual:

[... *Philosophers are in part to blame for mis-representing the archetype of human perfection because they*] speak as if the archetype of human perfection, according to which the individual has to orient himself, were *given in reason once and for all*; [...] as if this archetype, that is, the ideal Christ, could exist in us just as it does now, *even if no historical Christ had ever lived and worked.*²⁴¹ However, this is not at all the case in reality. The idea

should, but I can't'. Here in the *LJEGP*, Strauß continues to emphasize a universal knowledge of moral duty independent of the will, but its 'fulfilment' consists in the continued growth in knowledge of 'moral duty' *on the part of the community* (!) as it generates new moral principles to govern its new context. On the difference between Hegel's 'I should, but I can't' and Kant's 'If I should, I can,' see "Vol. II: Introduction:" "The Moral View of the World" 547 ff.

236. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 624.

237. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 624–625.

238. See Strauß, *LJ*: 774–776.

239. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 719.

240. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 719–720

241. In the *LJ*, Strauß insisted that the 'ideal Christ' in reason must already exist as an achievement of Absolute Spirit.

of human perfection, like other ideas, is *initially given to the human spirit only as a capacity [Anlage],*²⁴² *which gradually receives its formation through experience.*²⁴³ (emphasis added)

Although Jesus is in the front row when it comes to those who have cultivated the ideal of reason,²⁴⁴ the full meaning of the significance of his moral teaching was anything but pure among his followers. "However, *the traits of tolerance, gentleness, and love of mankind, which Jesus made the dominant ones in [his teaching], nevertheless were not lost to mankind, and it was precisely from them that all that we now call humanity could germinate.*"²⁴⁵ (emphasis added) The Christ is neither an 'empty abstraction' as Strauß now understands the LJ, nor a 'genius' of internal piety as in "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity," nor is humanity powerless to achieve moral improvement as in the *Glaubenslehre*. Rather, *the Christ is a farmer planting seeds capable of sprouting in every individual.*

Jesus remains here in 1864 for Strauß a moral teacher of immense significance but no longer an unsurpassable,²⁴⁶ moral teacher as Strauß claimed in "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity." Nevertheless, Jesus as a moral teacher is no source of external, heteronomous principles. He is an instructor of humanity's moral capacity that all of humanity must cultivate, internally:

[...] [T]he critic lives with the conviction [...] that he is doing a good and necessary work when he [sic.] removes all that which makes Jesus a superhuman being as a well-intentioned and at first perhaps charitable, but in the long run harmful and now downright corrupting delusion, and [when the critic] restores the image of the historical Jesus in his simple human features as much as possible, *but refers mankind for its soul to the ideal Christ, to that moral model image, in which the historical Jesus first brought several main features to light, but which as a capacity [Anlage] belongs just as much to the general dowry of our species as its further development and completion can only be the task and the work of the whole of mankind.*²⁴⁷ (emphasis added)

In *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People*, Strauß remained true to his theme of the significance of factual history for grounding of faith that had required him to distance himself from the Hegelian 'indifference' to facts in order to emphasize the 'historical Jesus.' However, now it is not a 'historical Jesus' who had achieved God-consciousness as internal, rational piety but the 'historical Jesus' as agrarian, seed planter who 'sows' the 'moral ideal' not as an already accomplished achievement in

242. This formulation appears to be a reference to Kant, who spoke of transcendental consciousness consisting of capacities (*Anlagen*), which must be exercised and cultivated.

243. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 625.

244. See Strauß, *LJEGP*: 625.

245. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 626. One would think that one was reading Charles Taylor's *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989) with its praise of Christianity as the formulator and preserver of rationality (*Logos*).

246. See Strauß, *LJEGP*: 626.

247. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 626–627.

a unique Christ figure but as a set of internal capacities capable of cultivation by each individual. Although this emphasis on internal capacities (*Anlagen*) in need of development by the individual sounds Kantian, *the focus of moral effort, according to Strauß, is external achievement, which is always imperfect. Hence, moral improvement shifts from focus on the individual to focus on the species as it incessantly seeks to negotiate new historical circumstances. Clearly, Strauß breaks dramatically here from any and all forms of Idealism. 'Essence' (Idea -perfection) does not precede 'actuality' (historical forms) as the case with Idealism (with the exception of Kant's Critical Idealism) but arises out of actuality by means of the cultivating of universal capacities.*

1865 *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*:

In 1865 Strauß turned, once again, to examine Schleiermacher's theology with his *The Jesus of History and the Christ of Faith*. In addition to repeating the criticisms of "Schleiermacher und Daub," here he adds the crucial rejection of Christ as a new event of ultimate, eminent causality. This work, when combined with "Schleiermacher and Daub" is a devastating dismissal of Schleiermacher's theology.²⁴⁸

No Ultimate, Infinite, Eminent Causality

In light of the thorough investigation and dismissal of Schleiermacher in the 1839 "Schleiermacher und Daub" essay, the return to a study on Schleiermacher in *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History* initially appears to be redundant and even ignores crucial aspects of Strauß' criticisms of Schleiermacher in the earlier work. From the perspective of *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People*, though, it is crystal clear why Strauß 'needed' to return to the core theme of 'Perfect God-consciousness' in Schleiermacher.

Strauß had cultivated a Christology of 'genius' in "The Transitory and the Permanent in Christianity' that already had strong echoes of Schleiermacher's Christology of 'Perfect God-consciousness.' In 1838, Strauß had skirted *the relational, causal question* of why an instance of 'Perfect God-consciousness' was required by focusing on religious 'piety' as internal awareness of *the divine, eternal, rational order within the self and in history* of Schleiermacher's *On Religion*,— not the 'feeling of absolute dependence' in Schleiermacher's own *Glaubenslehre (The Christian Faith)*. The issue of the 'feeling of absolute dependence' in contrast to 'reason' is the central theme of Strauß' criticism of Schleiermacher in the 1839 article on "Schleiermacher und Daub." With *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*, though, *the relational, causal question was clearly front and center.*

248. See "Chapter 4: Why Schleiermacher was not an Option:" 249 ff.

How is it possible for Jesus (or any other religious teacher) to *cause* a religious transformation in others? Unaddressed in "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity" as well as in "Schleiermacher und Daub," now it was inescapable because Strauß had not only left his archetypal (Hegelian) Idealism behind but also had come to embrace the Nominalist notion of ectypal ideas that arise out of empirical experience. Having come to understand the 'error' of Idealist philosophers that 'essence' must precede 'particularities' (a 'perfect' Idea precedes its 'imperfect' copies and shadows), Strauß now understood 'essences' to be entirely *a posteriori* as an achievement of abstraction on the part of the individual.

The slow-burning question that emerged for Strauß became: What, then, is the role of a 'savior' or 'founder of a religion' as the cause of 'salvation' if essences are a product of a universal, human capacity to generate reason out of empirical experience? Having already rejected the Hegelian account of 'ultimate causality' of the meta-narrative of a logic of Double Negation, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History* is no 'return' to old Schleiermachian alley ways but far more the rejection of one of two options of 'ultimate' causality that Strauß considered in an attempt to answer this question.

The striking theme in *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History* that did not appear in his earlier criticism of Schleiermacher is the causal function of the Christ as Perfect God-consciousness for the attainment of Perfect God-consciousness by finite consciousness.²⁴⁹ While Strauß embraces the notion of the creator God as ultimate, eminent causality, he rejects Schleiermacher's claim for a novel exercising of ultimate, eminent causality at a point in time after the creation.²⁵⁰ Viewed from the perspective of this question, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History* is not only an underscoring of faith grounded in factual history, the 'Jesus of History,' but also it is Strauß' dismissal of a 'new' event of eminent causality in the form of the 'Christ of Faith' as the requirement for the arising of Perfect God-consciousness in history. Schleiermacher is a representative of the option that 'essence' must precede 'particularities': perfection is what provides the ground for novelty²⁵¹ because it, alone, can rise above the limitations of finite reality to initiate something so radically 'new' as the possibility of achieving 'Perfect God-consciousness.

Strauß concludes *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History* by observing with respect to Schleiermacher's emphasis on the need for a historical occurrence of Perfect God-consciousness that 'expunges sin:'

249. On Schleiermacher's Christology of Perfect God-consciousness as a new act of creation (event of eminent causality), see: 277.

250. Schleiermacher's Christology of Perfect God-consciousness as the condition required for the cultivation of God-consciousness in humanity is a classic example of a miracle: the intrusion in, and disruption of, the natural order of events.

251. Indirectly, this is Strauß' criticism of Anselm's 'vicarious atonement' by the perfectly moral Christ for sinful humanity. The role of a novel event of ultimate, eminent causality is shared by both Schleiermacher and Anselm.

Redemption, says Schleiermacher, consists in the fact that sin is expunged from our consciousness; therefore, sinlessness must become visible to us in the person of Christ. Only when we appropriate his sinlessness in the most intimate fellowship with him, 'the way everything is common to friends,' will we become participants in redemption and in its fruits. This is, as Schleiermacher furthermore expresses it also as God's seeing the redeemed in Christ,²⁵² *only the old doctrine of the vicarious atonement*, even if weakened to a mere manner of speaking, His whole theory of redemption can be conceptualized to a certain extent only if one surreptitiously substitutes once more the dissolved church dogma for it [...]. Schleiermacher's zeal for the personal Christ-ideal who existed was precisely only a personal one; it changed nothing in substance. *The ideal of the dogmatic Christ, on the one hand, [of Perfect God-consciousness] and the historical Jesus of Nazareth, on the other hand, are separated forever.* That, independently of one another, the one is to be evermore basically and relentlessly researched,²⁵³ while the other is to be ever deeper and more perfectly recognized and made ever more fruitful for human life—therein consists the task of theology for the immediate future, and therein lies the summons which humanity, in its present struggles to develop, awaits from it. It remains to be seen whether it awaits in vain.²⁵⁴ (emphasis added)

Strauß calls for a continued fundamental and adamant criticism of 'the ideal of the dogmatic Christ' as well as the ever-more 'deeply and perfectly recognized' investigation of empirical nature with the aim of the latter's contribution consisting in the enhancement of human life. Unfortunately, as is clear with *The Old and the New Faith* of 1872, he limited the investigation of nature to empiricism and ignored the significance of finite transcendental consciousness not only for the understanding of nature (theoretical reason) but also for the assumption of personal responsibility for one's creative agency (practical reason).²⁵⁵

252. Strauß footnotes to Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*: par. 104, sec. 3.

253. This is Karl Barth's take on the historical study of the gospels. Historical scholarship has an open season for textual analysis because its conclusions can have nothing to do with the Christ of faith.

254. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*, Leander E. Keck, trans. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977): 168–169.

255. Here, again, Strauß failed to grasp the significance of Kant's philosophy. The relational, causal essence of practical reason, according to Kant, is the notion of *autonomous* freedom, which as a cause, Kant insists, is incapable of proof or disproof. Material nature is a closed system of merely, mechanical causality with one exception of which we are aware: transcendental consciousness. Because 'all human beings think of themselves as having a will that is free' (see Kant, *Groundwork*: AA IV: 455), the closest one can come to a 'proof' of creative freedom is to deny it, but, absent a proof, one must defend it or else deny the very capacities of transcendental consciousness that make one human. (See Kant, *Groundwork*: AA IV: 459) Kant's 'Ode to Freedom,' Section Three of the *Groundwork*, is a whole symphony that celebrates that 'place' in the order of things where a finite, 'super-' or 'above-natural' causality, although not separable from nature, is able to accomplish things that nature cannot achieve on its own. In other words, Kant's *autonomous freedom* is no Hegelian Absolute Freedom that is a denial (negation) of nature. Rather, *autonomous freedom* is complementary and non-contradictory of nature's 'determinism'. The system of nature, then, is not entirely a closed circuit. Autonomous freedom is the point of nature's open-endedness, not Hegel's 'point of indifference'. Wherever there is transcendental consciousness, there is the possibility of novelty. Furthermore, only where there is the possibility of novelty is it possible for there to be anything close to an expectation of moral

1872 of *The Old and the New Faith*

‘Descriptive Naturalism’

A bottom-up Grand Narrative of Materialism

Replaces Hegel’s Top-down Meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit

It took Strauß 30 years to come up with an alternative to Hegel’s top-down meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit becoming aware of Itself in finite spirit. In *The Old and the New Faith*, Strauß embraces a bottom-up meta-narrative whereby nature (not Absolute Spirit!) turns inward on itself by finite consciousness to continue nature’s (not Absolute Spirit’s or finite spirit’s) *creative process*. In this bottom-up meta-narrative, finite spirit serves nature; not nature and finite spirit serving Spirit.²⁵⁶ Strauß ‘grand materialistic narrative is step-for-step a *materialistic mirror* of Hegel’s meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit. The time will come when the world will no longer sustain life and finite consciousness will cease to be,²⁵⁷ but finite consciousness has the satisfaction of serving nature’s creative advance.

Strauß has awakened from the ‘fantasy dream of the dove’ that history is for the service of Absolute Spirit’s Self-awareness, but now he fails to recognize that humanity is trapped in the mechanical, cold, dark, abasement of a mere servant of nature as nature allows. In Kantian vocabulary, Strauß is trapped in a different dream – the dream of subreption wherein objective nature is the explanation of all reality. History is no longer God playing with Himself, but now history is nature playing with itself. A grand narrative of pessimism replaces Hegelian optimistic spiritual divinization of humanity. Yet, this service is defined by its own indifference. To be sure, the non-difference of

responsibility, not to speak of its voluntary attainment. To be sure, the possibility of novelty by definition eliminates any heteronomous notion of responsibility. The individual must not only ‘think’ for her-/himself (Kant’s notion of ‘Enlightenment’) but also ‘self-select (or not!) the moral principles to guide her/his agency. Transcendental consciousness no more creates its moral principles than it creates nature and the system of causal lawfulness that governs nature. However, through experience, transcendental consciousness can learn of the requirement of lawfulness for both understanding and agency. Subsequently, transcendental consciousness can self-select (not self-create) the lawfulness that fits the world in order to achieve appropriate understanding as well as the lawfulness that governs one’s assumption of responsibility for one’s actions.

256. In light of his own acknowledgment of the epistemological gaps and their allowance on the basis of dictums (it must be so!) in this new grand narrative and given the meticulous and extensively detailed wrestling with, and, eventually, rejection of, Hegel’s meta-narrative, one is even tempted to take this formulation in 1872 to be a parody of Hegel as much as the formulation of a seriously materialist option to Hegel. Instead of consciousness being the point of indifference where Absolute Spirit becomes aware of Itself, consciousness is the location where nature turns inward on itself to continue its material advancement.

257. See Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 541.

Absolute Spirit has been rejected. However, remarkably, the affectless, equanimity of historical events remains.

Limited Knowledge and Limited Reason: A New Faith

When it comes to *The Old and the New Faith*, Strauß acknowledges limits to human reason²⁵⁸, and insists that he offers no new knowledge in contrast to faith (that is, he offers epistemological certainty grounded in materialism) but, rather, a new faith. This new faith is materialistic not only with 'ideas' generated ectypally by human consciousness but also with an insistence on hylozoism, the teaching that life is a bottom up, emergent property of matter. Strauß speaks of humanity as that place in the order of things where nature 'turns inward' on itself to continue its intellectual development with the confidence that 'one day, yet to come' the physical sciences will provide an *explanation of how everything occurs naturally*.

Humanity is 'absolutely dependent,' but now its dependence is on nature and bottom-up causality. Humanity is the crucial 'turning point' of reality, but now it is the point where nature 'turns in on itself' to consciousness in order for nature to continue its on-ward progress. In other words, Strauß has turned Schleiermacher and Hegel upside down to reverse what is essential and what is accidental. Essential is no longer Schleiermacher's 'Perfect God-consciousness' for which humanity is a bundle of feelings focused on mystical union in consciousness. Essential is no longer Hegel's Absolute Concept, Absolute Knowledge, and Absolute Freedom with humanity being the accidental place where Absolute Being becomes aware of Itself. Now, for Strauß, essential is nature out of which everything arises – even the organic and consciousness. Consciousness is not for the service of Absolute Consciousness but for the service of nature's historical progress.

Furthermore, all of the portrayals of Jesus in the tradition are called into question: Jesus is not the founder of a new Jewish Messianic order in Palestine to re-establish the Davidic monarchy. He is not the rejuvenator of Judaism who shifted the focus of theonomy away from external observance of divine law to an internal piety (Ebionism, Peter & James in Jerusalem, and/or Matthew's gospel). He is also not the prototype of martyrdom as in Mark's gospel. He is not the temporal center-point of history as an event in Jerusalem to which all history led and from which all of history will be transformed throughout the ages as in Luke-Acts – either establishing a perfect, material order in the next life or as the lynch-pin to achieve mystical union with Christ/God in this life. He is, therefore, not the incarnated Logos Messiah of Christian Platonism as in John's gospel or the spiritual Christ of the pre-gospel 'apostle Paul. He

258. Although again, this affirmation of reason's limits ignores Hegel's dismissal of rational limits as 'weakness' precisely because it fails to acknowledge Absolute Knowledge.

is no longer the Early Church's new event of divine, eminent causality who serves as a 'ransom' either of deception of the Devil²⁵⁹ to free humanity from captivity in sin or a 'ransom' as an act of justice owed to God in order to restore God's honor violated by humanity's failure to exclusively honor God.²⁶⁰ Jesus is not a new event of divine, eminent causality as the source of Perfection (complete fulfilment of divine law) as the superabundant source to pay the debt that is the result of humanity's imperfect obedience to God, which, even if there could be an achievement of lawful perfection by an imperfect individual as of a specific point in time, cannot generate the surplus to cover the imperfection of the past (Anselm of *Cur deus homo*). Yet, for Strauß in 1872, Jesus is surely no longer taken to be the savior of 'speculative philosophy' who is Absolute Spirit's 'point of indifference' by which Absolute Spirit comes aware of itself in the God/Man (either beyond history with the resurrection – Hegel, or in the 'historical body of Christ' that is the singular 'people' of the Christian church – F.C. Baur, or Strauß's own universal, inclusive Christology of all of humanity in the world in the *LJ*). Also for Strauß, Jesus is not the new event of divine, eminent causality of 'Perfect God-consciousness that all humanity seeks to achieve (Schleiermacher) in and through the Christian community. Finally, for Strauß in 1872, Jesus is not even the prototype of the "religion of reason" that celebrates the eternal in every moment (Strauß' "Transient and Permanent in Christianity" of 1838); or who is merely a teacher among teachers but whose teaching is unsurpassable if yet capable of being supplemented as the founder of a new 'religion of humanity' (Strauß' *LJEGP* of 1864).

Here in *The Old and the New Faith* of 1872, Jesus is not the source of any objective knowledge about God, salvation from sin, achievement of human divinization, Absolute Spirit, or Perfect God-consciousness. Jesus, at the most, as one among many is a teacher of morality. Unlike the Jesus of the *LJEGP*, who was an example of humanity's task of discerning the 'moral order' of reality that society must construct in order to respond appropriately to ever new, historical circumstances (religious, but also among social contexts, political circumstances, and economic realities), here in *The Old and the New Faith*, Strauß emphasizes that the moral improvement of humanity is not merely a matter of individual moral development, which is always imperfect from the perspective of his retained Hegelian "The Moral View of the World." Rather, Strauß expands the meaning of the role of the *species* (*Gattung*) to be more than the source of the social construction of 'moral' principles to guide human agency in a changing world. Now, moral improvement applies to the *species* (*Gattung*) as the necessary community for supporting the sustainment of moral effort.²⁶¹

259. On the theme of the deception of the Devil in a cosmic dualistic world-order, see the summary of F.C. Baur's analysis in Chapter 5: "Traces of an Intellectual Crisis:" 592, n. 120.

260. See the summary of F.C. Baur's Christian atonement theories in Chapter 5: "Traces of an Intellectual Crisis:" the section "Significance of Baur's work on Atonement:" 591 ff.

261. See Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 236, 246–247.

One might be tempted to view this social dimension of moral improvement to be what Kant calls 'culture that promotes the (moral) will' that is complementary to the 'culture of skills' in the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*.²⁶² However, Kant's 'culture that promotes the (moral) will' could not be more different than Strauß' identification of the role of the species (*Gattung*) for moral improvement although Kant prizes the role of the species (*Gattung*) for morality, as well. Strauß' appeal to the 'idea of the species' (*Gattung*) to serve as a supporting environment to imperfect humanity's efforts at achieving objective moral aims as it encounters ever new, historical, social, political, and economic contexts reflects more the 'sociological,' Hegelian notion of 'people' (*Volk*) in relation to 'religion' than it does to Kant's 'culture that promotes the (moral) will.'

Hegel and Carl Daub employ a pre-'scientific disciplinary,' nonetheless 'sociological' notion of religion not merely as a set of doctrines or rituals but as a people (*Volk*) or community (*Gemeinde*), which places external expectations (and pressures) on the individual to conform to the community's social expectations.²⁶³ This is precisely how Strauß speaks of the species' (*Gattungs*) role in ethics. He speaks of 'the *concept* of species,' not merely as a '*feeling for one's species*' that distinguishes humanity from other animals.²⁶⁴

The idea of the species works as a feeling also in the animal, as it works in man; but only humanity has it at the same time as a thought in his consciousness. The feeling of the species does not prevent the predator from tearing others of his kind to pieces, the tomcat from occasionally eating his own young; just as it does not prevent men [*sic.*] from murdering each other. Admittedly, consciousness of the species does not prevent humans from doing so either. If we were always sure of our lives with every human being who is capable of forming the generic concept, human being, and of understanding ourselves by means of the generic concept as human, then all would be good. However, there are different ways of thinking this concept, and it is precisely for this reason that humanity must think it in the right way. At first, it is only an [...] hollow sound, which can have no effect at all. It must first be filled with its entire content in order to be effective. In the generic concept of humanity occupies its[...] position at the pinnacle of nature; its ability to resist the sensual stimulus by comparing and thinking. Further, however, the unity of the human species lies not only in the way that every animal species belongs together by means of descent and equality of organic unification. Rather the unity of the human species lies in the way that only through the cooperation of humans can humanity become human. *The human species forms a community of solidarity in a completely different sense than any animal species. Only with the help of fellow human beings has humanity risen above nature. Only in so far as humanity recognizes and treats others as beings equal to itself can it maintain and further itself on its pinnacle of nature. Whoever thinks of the generic*

262. See Kant, *The Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 431–432.

263. For a discussion of Hegel's and Daub's notion of 'Volk'/'Gemeinde' and religion, see below: 647, n. 324 and 648, n. 326.

264. On the distinction between *hypothetical* and *categorical* imperatives, see, especially, the "Preface:" 56, n. 61.

concept of humanity in this way, and understands it according to its full content, has a firm basis for moral conduct.²⁶⁵ (*emphasis added*) (Note: 'rising above nature' means to 'resist the sensual stimulus')

The 'concept of the species' is the abstract idea for the significance of social interaction and the source of social pressure for 'making humanity human' that *rises above nature by resisting sensual stimuli*. The ethical principles that the species constructs in response to its ever-changing historical contexts are the necessary social rules and technical imperatives that are required to achieve specific, objective ends, and the individual's success or failure is empirically obvious by the achievement or non-achievement of the end toward which the agency aimed.

Strauß' and Hegel's account of ethics begins right where Kant's leaves off: at the moment of establishing a teleological goal of agency. Kant turns his eyeglass around to examine the conditions and capacities required for the individual, in the first place, to be able to aim to accomplish a goal. In dramatic contrast to Strauß in *The Old and the New Faith*, for Kant the 'culture that promotes the (moral) will' is *neither* merely, *heteronomous*, external pressure on the individual to act on the basis of a solidarity with others because of the 'idea of humanity' that unites the species *nor* merely a set of *a posteriori* socially constructed rules that govern success or failure empirically or ethically through one's agency. For Kant, the 'culture that promotes the (moral) will' is concerned with the *cultivation of internal capacities* through education's (*Bildungs*) negative discipline and culture's positive encouragement to examine and take responsibility for one's agency.²⁶⁶

Already in his *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie* of 1774/1775, Kant distinguished between education (*Bildung*) and art (*Kunst*) with both required for culture.²⁶⁷ The former is the 'development of *internal*, natural capacities' whereas art involves an *external* 'addition' to the individual. Whereas education (*Bildung*) requires discipline, discipline teaches a child nothing new but only limits lawless freedom that the individual already possesses. However, discipline is only to be applied to the extent that autonomous freedom, which as a causal system presupposes a lawful order, and the development of all of the individual's internal, natural capacities are preserved and exercised responsibly.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, 'discipline's' negative function is formulated not in terms of external impositions. Kant writes: "Towards the development of a talent, which has already in itself an impulse to manifest itself [by autonomous freedom], discipline will [...] contribute in a negative, whereas culture and doctrine contribute in a positive, fashion."²⁶⁸ In the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*, education's

265. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 246–247.

266. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 738.

267. See Kant, *Moral Verlesung*: 360 ff.

268. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 737–738.

discipline (*Bildung*) is called a 'Theory of Epigenesis' 'on top of' raw nature on account of autonomous freedom that is a 'formative drive' (*Bildungstrieb*) in humanity.²⁶⁹ The culture that promotes the (moral) will, "[...] which could be named the culture of training (discipline), is negative, and consists in the liberation of the will [NOTE: Kant doesn't call for their annihilation²⁷⁰] from desires."²⁷¹ *Its purpose is to encourage "[...] education to make us receptive to higher ends than nature itself can accomplish [CUP gives: 'can afford']*".²⁷² (emphasis added) Culture is

[...] the production of the aptitude of a rational being for any and all ends (as a product of its freedom). Thus only culture can be the ultimate end that one has cause to ascribe to nature in regard to the human species (not its own earthly happiness or even merely being the foremost instrument for establishing order and consensus in irrational nature outside of him).²⁷³ (Parentheses from Kant) [McG modification of CUP]

In other words, whereas Strauß takes the purpose of the idea of the species in *The Old and the New Faith* to be restraining of sensuous interests through external, social pressure, Kant takes the culture that promotes the (moral) will to be the understanding and encouragement of the imperceptible conditions (autonomous freedom and a *priori* synthetic judgment) possessed by every transcendental consciousness because of its capacities, which include not merely instrumental reason but the moral capacity to give oneself permission to exercise one's agency. All of these *a priori* elements are 'above' nature and make humanity the '*ultimate goal of nature*' – although not as capricious exploiter of nature solely for its self-interest.²⁷⁴

269. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 429.

270. Kant no more calls for the annihilation or escape from sensuous desires than Plato in the *Republic* 439c-3 (see as well, 580d-e) called for reason's snuffing out of the appetites or rage [θυμὸς θυμοειδής (hot-tempered, passionate Republic Book IV 441a) in his 'hypothesized' account of the soul's three parts. His 'mythic' account in Book IX IX 588b-e of the multicolored, many-headed beast (gentle to savage) (appetites), lion (θυμὸς), and human being (νοῦς) makes it clear that the task of 'reason' is to obtain an ordered balancing among the three elements, not escape any of them.

271. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 432.

272. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 433.

273. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 431.

274. Kant describes the steps that lead from animality to humanity as: 1) governed by *animal instinct*; 2) the discovery of its *freedom above animal instincts*; 3) the *reflective expectations over the future*; and, finally 4) discovery that *this animal is the 'goal of nature'* accompanied by the recognition that no human being can be treated as mere means, which leads to *limiting of one's freedom to establish a society*. See Kant, *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* AA VIII: 111–115. See as well Kant's discussion of humanity as the 'final end of nature NOT because it successfully acts in accordance with the moral law (*Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 488*), that is, not because it has achieved 'contentment, but because its culture is above contentment as a culture that promotes the moral will (AA V: 431–432). In other words, the goal of nature requires more than the mere 'setting of goals' (AA V: 453–454), which is the culture of skills not the culture that promotes the moral will. Rather, *the final end of the world/cosmos is an 'as if' concept of practical reason* that embraces the capacity (not the actual achievement) on the part of transcendental consciousness to act according to moral principles. See AA V: 454–455. Humanity as the 'goal of nature' is a challenge to transcendental consciousness that arises

The species cannot be a substitute for the effort of moral improvement on the part of the individual. As important as the hypothetical imperatives of teleological agency (Kant's 'Doctrine of Right') are, they are distinct from the broader, categorical imperatives (Kant's 'Doctrine of Virtue')²⁷⁵ that the individual must employ to grant her-/himself permission to act. Strauß' emphasis on the ideal of the species as the necessary communal element that makes it possible for a human to be human overlooks that only the individual for her-/himself can experience, understand, and grant her-/himself permission to act.

Kant's Critical Idealism remains a neglected option for *understanding* the human condition and religion. Strauß, though, never undertook a serious study of Kant²⁷⁶ so that he cannot be said to have rejected him in any adequate sense. Even though he rejected Hegelian, archetypal Idealism and ectypal Nominalism itself is a form of 'constructive idealism,' *Strauß retained the conviction acquired from Hegel and his other early mentors that Kant was a 'subjective constructivist' for whom humanity creates the 'empty' ideas that it capriciously applies to, phenomena.*

More explicitly: for the anti-Kantians of the 19th C, Kant's *a priori* 'ideas' of synthetic judgment were either *a priori* archetypal absolutes or *a posteriori* ectypal constructions that arise *after the encounter with phenomena*. In other words, they accused Kant of taking ideas to be either merely 'empty abstractions' independent of any and all experience or subjectively, relative, *a priori* constructions arbitrarily *imposed on* experience. This criticism of Kant is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of what Kant means by an *a priori* synthetic judgment,²⁷⁷

To take ideas to be *archetypal* is to claim that ideas are *a priori* as the eternal thoughts of a 'God.' To take ideas to be *ectypal* is to claim that the individual subject creates the 'idea' as a 'merely *a posteriori* abstraction' *only after having experienced phenomena*. Archetypal ideas is a claim that, with our ideas themselves, we experience

within transcendental consciousness by its awareness of it's *a priori* conditions and capacities, which depend upon 'pure' religion. On 'pure' religion, see Vol. II: "Introduction:" 558, n. 109.

See the concluding two paragraphs of Vol. II: "Appendix III: Grounds for Skepticism in Christian Doctrine."

275. On Kant's distinction between the "Doctrine of Right" and the "Doctrine of Virtue," see Chapter 7: "Practical Reason Elevates Theoretical Reason:" 739, n. 63, as well as, Chapter 8: "Strauß' Reading of Kant Over His Career:" 835, n. 114 and 845, 152.

276. Acknowledged both by his biographer, Theobald Ziegler, II: 701), and by his superficial opponent, Nietzsche. About the only accurate conclusion that Nietzsche draws regarding Strauß is that Strauß didn't really read Kant. See Friedrich Nietzsche, "David Strauß. Der Bekenner und der Schriftsteller:" 164.

277. Hegel astonishingly mis-represents Kant's notion of synthetic judgment. Hegel takes 'synthesis' exclusively to mean a 'dialectical synthesis,' which obviously can only be *a posteriori* because it presupposes a thesis and an antithesis – with, of course, the one exception for Hegel of the *a priori* synthesis of Absolute Spirit. See for example, Hegel, "Glauben und "Wissen" GW II: 304–305. For Kant, *a priori* synthetic judgment is 'supplemental' and 'elucidating' (or an *adding to* phenomena) unlike analytic judgments that are merely 'clarifying.' See for example, Kant, *Metaphysik Mrongovius* AA XXIX: 968, 970.

the mind of God. Ectypal ideas is a claim that all that is 'real' in experience is objectively empirical, and ideas are merely subjective abstractions. When it comes to ectypal ideas, though, we only experience appearances of particulars, not ideas-in-themselves. In order for us to abstract the ideas out of particular phenomena, not only must ideas already have to be structuring the phenomena in order for us to 'abstract' the idea out of the phenomena but also imperceptible, *a priori* capacities of finite, transcendental consciousness are required to experience phenomena, in the first place.

Critical Idealism points out that it is a wild, speculative 'leap of fantasy' (*Schwärmerei*) to claim either that ideas are 'in' God archetypally (Idealism) or that they are derived out of phenomena ectypally (Materialism). Rather, for Critical Idealism, whereas the 'pure' ideas of God, freedom/the cosmos, and enduring identity of the self (soul) are entirely imperceptible assumptions, concepts of understanding *can only be understood by the individual subject as an always and already 'given,' objective, imperceptible order that governs phenomena*. Only when confronted with phenomena is it possible for a transcendental consciousness to seek out (mathematically or conceptually) the order that governs the phenomena and only *subsequently apply it to phenomena*. As far as we have experienced, no other form of consciousness than finite, transcendental consciousness is able to 'see what is not directly given in the phenomena,' that is, the conceptual order that governs the phenomena. Much less deduce the 'pure' ideas of reason. Only a transcendental consciousness is capable of *adding an imperceptible order* to phenomena. The possibility cannot *a priori* be denied or confirmed that there is not transcendental consciousness elsewhere in the universe. However, if it is capable of understanding and acting responsibly, then it's a *a priori* capacities 'must' be the same as ours because without them there can be no understanding and responsible agency.

Transcendental consciousness' understanding of phenomena is driven not by the certainty that Absolute Knowledge is achievable but by *a conviction that* imperceptible ideas (or causes) are able to be grasped *a priori* and added to the phenomena. A *a priori* understanding is grounded in a 'required' faith in an imperceptible, lawful, causal order both physical (theoretical reason) and moral (practical reason). This is no wild, speculative fantasy that ignores phenomena and/or the limits to finite, transcendental consciousness. This faith that is theoretical and practical reason is required because without it there can be no finite experience, understanding, and/or intentional, responsible agency.

Kant's Critical Idealism, then, is not claiming to provide an empirical *explanation* of reality. Rather, it is a *description* of the conditions required for a finite, transcendental consciousness to exist. Our inability objectively to be prove or disprove those inescapable, imperceptible capacities is what makes transcendental consciousness and it's a *a priori* synthetic judgment a matter of *metaphysics*, neither merely subjective speculation or abstract logic nor merely objective materialism.

Two themes, especially, in *The Old and the New Faith* stand in stark contrast to "The Transient and Permanent in Christianity" although the shift to materialism is already clear in the latter.

1) Strauß' commitment to the physical sciences is unequivocal here, but it is indicated, ironically, by a citation that he makes to Tertullian. Speaking of the 'soul,' Strauß writes:

[...] [S]ouls are [...] immaterial beings, whose persistence after death has been proven precisely from the fact that they are not composed and do not occupy any space, thus they will not find themselves confined by the native inhabitants of other world bodies. However, then they could just as well remain on earth; or rather they have no relation to space at all and are everywhere and nowhere. In short, [souls are] no real, but imaginary beings. For in this respect the word of a somewhat mad but equally spiritual church father²⁷⁸ has become *the principle of the most modern science: 'Nothing is incorporeal but what is not.'*²⁷⁹ (emphasis added)

The touchstone of truth for Strauß in 1872 is (historical) corporality. All that is, was, and will be is the product of material processes, and this 'all' includes living things and consciousness.

The new perspective of *The Old and the New Faith*, though, is not to establish certain, historical knowledge but to articulate a new understanding of 'faith.' In "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity," Strauß claims to 'know' on the basis of 'historical knowledge' of the Christ that there is no chance that "humanity will ever be without religion any more than it will be without Christianity."²⁸⁰ This kind of historical certitude based on the gospel evidence is now indefensible because the text doesn't live up to the standards of empirical science.

278. Strauß appears to be quoting Tertullian here. F.X. Dieringer says: "[...] Tertullian [...] uses the word 'body' in different meanings, and the same generally designates to him everything that has reality in contrast to nothing, which is why also of God it is not said that he has a body, but that he is a body. In this sense he teaches: 'Its own substance is the body of every thing; 'Everything that is is a body in its kind, and nothing is incorporeal except what is not'. [Dieringer footnotes to: *De carne Christi* c. 11]."

(F.X. Dieringer, *Lehrbuch der katholischen Dogmatik* (Mainz: Verlag von Franz Kirchheim, 1858)

279. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 130–131. The reference to Tertullian as a 'spiritual church father' is a reference to Tertullian's adherence to The New Prophecy Movement (the 'Pentecostal,' spiritual enthusiasm) of Montanus, Maximillia, and Priscilla.

280. Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum." 131.

2) Strauß is even more clear at the end of his life that, historically, little is known of Jesus:

[...] in earlier writings [...] I took a lot of trouble to put together the features scattered in the Gospels into a picture that could give us a humanly appealing idea of the nature and will of Jesus [...]. I [would have to] say that in relation to what we really know about Jesus, I had still drawn much too bold and determined [conclusions]. That is why I complained in the Concluding Dissertation of that book [the LJ] about the deficiency and uncertainty of our historical knowledge about Jesus, and meant that *no knowledgeable and sincere person would contradict me when I said 'that we are so insufficiently informed about few great men of history as we are about him.'* Also, at that time the speeches of Jesus about his resurrection in the clouds troubled me, and, therefore, I knew I could only with difficulty and artificially ward off from him the reproach of enthusiasm and self-conceit. When I now explain in my latest writing that we should continue to recognize in Jesus the center and point of reference of our religious life, we find ourselves held back mainly by two circumstances: For the first, we know far too little coherent about him, and for the second, in what we know about him, we notice a rapturous-fantastic [schwärmerisch-phantastischen] trait. This conclusion is, obviously, not apostasy, but merely the quite normal result in the development of scientific convictions that *I have now given complete room to certain doubts, which I thought I could still avoid earlier.*²⁸¹ (emphasis added)

As is clear in *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People*, Strauß' emphasis on empirical history led him to identify the 'probable' historical elements in the life and teaching of Jesus. On the foundation of those 'historical' elements, he saw in 1864 the construction of a 'religion of humanity' in contrast to the 'religion of Christ'. In 1872, he no longer defends either.

By the time of *The Old and the New Faith*, the historical evidence with respect to Jesus is taken to be too sparse to ground any faith in a 'religion of Christ,' and Feuerbach's criticism of equating religion with reason has undermined Strauß' notion of a 'religion of humanity.' If "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity" was aimed at establishing the historical foundation of Christianity as a 'new religion' grounded internally in the 'religious genius' who lived out of a God-consciousness that consisted in an internal harmony with eternal reason, *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People* insisted that the 'historical' evidence in the gospels was sufficient to ground a Christianity no longer in 'reason' but in the cultivation and assumption of moral responsibility by the individual. However, the 'moral religion' of *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People* becomes in *The Old and the New Faith* a new 'faith' in the bottom-up, ultimate source of all rationality and communal (not individual) moral responsibility. *The new 'faith' is a faith in nature itself.*

Seven years after the publication of *The Life of Jesus for the German People*, Strauß offers his alternative account of 'ultimate' causality that is neither Hegelian Idealism, rejected already in 1841, nor Schleiermacher's eminent causality of Perfect

281. Strauß, "Epilogue" to *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: "Epilogue:" 33–34

God-consciousness, rejected emphatically in 1865. The 'ultimate' cause of all 'that is' is 'bottom-up' Materialism even if we cannot explain how ..., yet.

The Feuerbachian criticism of religion as 'feeling' and 'wishful thinking' as well as Feuerbach's questioning any and all equation of 'reason' with 'religion' left Strauß with little option. He had concluded "The Transient and Permanent in Christianity" by praising 'reason' and the significance of the religious 'genius' who 'turned inward' to concentrate on the internal harmony between humanity and God. To be sure, there was no hint of the Hegelian meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit in this text. Yet, Strauß equated the 'essence of Christianity' with reason as an objective, imperceptible, lawful order in nature and emphasized the significance of the call of the religious genius to seek an inward harmony with that 'eternal order.'

In "Schleiermacher und Daub" of 1839, as well, Strauß embraced a Feuerbachian, ectypal notion of reason in which reason itself is the product of an *a posteriori* abstraction by human consciousness that ultimately arises in, and out of, nature as a natural product of nature. What, then, is left for a 'religion of reason'? Other than a sense of awe that there is something enduringly 'eternal' in the natural order of physical laws, *there is very little left!*

In Hegel (and Daub), 'religious faith' was equated with a 'people' (*Volk*) as the manifestation of an 'idea.' In light of the collapse of the faith that is the objective 'religion of the Christian people,' for Strauß the only option was to contribute to articulating the 'Idea' that serves as the self-identification of a 'people' (*Volk*) who embraces 'faith' in the lawfulness of nature and in humanity's extraordinary 'location' as the awareness of physical lawfulness. This is why Strauß used 'we' in *The Old and the New Faith* as the moniker for the 'new faith.' This is not the subjective, imperial 'we' by which Nietzsche derisively chides Strauß.²⁸² Strauß' 'we' is a new religion/faith in the natural order. Strauß experienced personally with the limited reception of his *Glaubenslehre* that without a community, the significance of any insight into the presence of the 'eternal' in experience evaporates in dry desert sands. There were very few in the Christian community that he sought to address in the *Glaubenslehre* who were open to the new 'faith' that was increasingly Strauß' focus.

Here in *The Old and the New Faith*, Strauß ridicules the anthropomorphisms of 'the new philosophy,' that is, Schelling and Hegel.

In the context of questioning creation as a free act of the will by a 'Personal Deity' whose goal is the 'glorification of God' and the 'delight of His creatures' while simultaneously emphasizing that God's perfection and holiness require no 'addition,'²⁸³ Strauß turns to what he, ironically, calls the 'new philosophy's' portrayal of 'highest perfection.' Schelling said

282. See Nietzsche, "David Strauß. Der Bekenner und der Schriftsteller:" 150, 166, 171, 173.

283. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 217–217.

[...] [God] would have had no reason for creating so many things on account of which He could only become less perfect because they prevented attainment of a higher stage of perfection. One cannot explain how such a strangely confused whole as the world, although brought into order, could arise from such a clear and transparent intelligence as ordinary theism conceives of the divine being before the creation of the world.²⁸⁴

Strauß, then, turns to Hegel where the anthropomorphic portrayal is even more transparent: "According to Hegel, [...] the World Spirit has had the patience to take on the immense work of world history only because It could not achieve consciousness of Itself through any lesser work."²⁸⁵

Schopenhauer spoke even more coarsely of Hegel as Strauß points out:

[... It] would have to be an ill-advised God [...], who would have to seek no better fun of Himself than to transform Himself [according to the conception of Hegel's Double Negation] into such a hungry world as this one, in order to endure the form of numerous millions of living, but tormented and anxious beings, who all exist, only transiently because one eats up the other, in misery, hardship and death without measure and aim.²⁸⁶

Strauß, then, offers Schopenhauer's conclusions with respect to Schelling's and Hegel's anthropomorphism:

[...] if God had had a consciousness before creation, then this would have been an inexcusable crime: [1]) Only as the result of a blind will would creation be pardonable. [2]) The whole world process would also be a bottomless folly if its sole goal of an independent consciousness had already existed before creation. *The first statement reminds the reader more of Schelling's doctrine of world creation as the work of God's dark reason, whereas the second reminds the reader more of the Hegelian statement about the meaning of world history.*²⁸⁷ (emphasis added)

In addition to the anthropomorphic element of divine consciousness as the framework for the formulations of the 'personal theism' of Personal Theism as well as for Schelling's and Hegel's 'immanent theism,' Strauß addresses in this context the theodicy issue.

Whereas in his *Glaubenslehre* Strauß drew from Jakob Böhme for his take on theodicy,²⁸⁸ here in *The Old and the New Faith* he turns to a lesson from Schopen-

284. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 217.

285. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 217.

286. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 217–218.

287. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 218.

288. Strauß introduces his discussion of Böhme's theodicy in the *Glaubenslehre* so: "With Jakob Böhme's help, who also here forms the natural complement to Spinoza, we want to try to avoid it [the conclusion of evil's meaninglessness and Indifferentism] in a scientific way." Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 378–379. The core theme for theodicy that Strauß identifies in Böhme is that: "Evil belongs to formation and movement, and Good belongs to love, and rigor and loathing belongs to joy. Namely, evil or loathing causes good as the will, that it urges against its original condition as well as against God and that the

hauer and its 'correct' understanding in Lessing. The lesson from Schopenhauer is that worldly experience teaches us that 'fermentation' is required to bring about 'all movement and progress.'²⁸⁹ 'Overcoming obstacles is complete pleasure.'²⁹⁰ Lessing had pointed out, though, that "[a]ll movement [...] develops and destroys, brings life and death; brings death to this creature by bringing life to another one: shall there be no death and no movement? or, rather, death and movement?"²⁹¹

Strauß's answer to the rhetorical question is clearly that there should be death because it enables movement, development, progress. He, then, turns to Lessing's aphorism on truth: "If God were to hold all Truth concealed in His right hand, and in His left only the steady and diligent drive for Truth, albeit with the proviso that I would always and forever err in the process, and to offer me the choice, I would with all humility take the left hand."²⁹² Strauß writes that the aphorism always fascinated him because he "[...] heard in it the echo of an objective meaning of infinite importance behind its subjective meaning."

If we are no longer able to misplace in God the choice between existence without pain and death (but also without movement and life) and existence in which life and movement are bought by pain and death, then we are confronted with the choice whether we want to try to understand the latter [a life bought by pain and death], or, in unfruitful denial of what is the case, insist on preferring the former [a life without pain and death].²⁹³

Rather than God's Absolute Spirit playing with Himself by an anthropomorphic logic of Double Negation as Hegel claimed, the universe for Strauß now is taken to consist of endless matter in motion, which develops by means of distinctions and combinations to generate the greatest abundance of life of ever higher forms and function that consists in an eternal cycle of emergence, reformation, and restructuring. "This life

Good, as the good will, desires; for a thing, which is only good in itself and has no torment, desires nothing because it knows nothing better in itself or for itself after which it could lust. (Strauß, *ibid.*: 379–80; see the entire discussion of Böhme's theodicy in Strauß, *ibid.*: 378–381.

289. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 218.

290. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 219. Whereas Schopenhauer emphasizes the 'pleasure of overcoming obstacles', Kant speaks of a 'negative method' that views all pain as the prod to responsible creative agency. On Kant's 'negative method' in contrast to Stoic indifference, Epicurean concupiscence, Cynic view of pain as a lesson to toughen oneself, 'melancholy' (the belief that 'pain is fundamental to all life'), Strauß' indifference to truth with the sole aim of 'winning' mystical escapism from the world, drunkenness as illusory hope, as well as warning against passively waiting on divine grace, see "Kant's 'Negative Method' at 45, n. 2828.

291. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 219. Strauß does not give the citation for this quote, but it comes from Lessing's *Anti-Göze*, Vierter (Braunschweig; 1778): 12–13.

292. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 219. Lessing's quote comes from Section I of "A Response" (*Eine Duplik* [Braunschweig: Buchhandlung des Fürstlichen Waisenhauses, 1778]): 11.

293. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 220.

appears to us to be incessantly developing, extending, and rising, and, even in the decline of the individual, as only preparing a new ascent.”²⁹⁴

Nonetheless, Strauß does not hesitate to say that the time will come when ‘the earth no longer will sustain life,’ and when consciousness will disappear. However, the earth has always and already achieved its goal even if the earth ceases to be: “Either the earth failed to achieve its end [...], or the goal of its preservation was not to be part of what is to endure, but *its goal is already achieved in every moment of its historical development*.”²⁹⁵ (emphasis added) Strauß concludes:

If we have to hold on to the fact that every partial whole in the universe, such as the life of our earth, achieves its purpose in ever higher manifestations, but in itself in every moment, then the latter applies to the universe as an infinite whole just as well. *The universe is not more perfect in any following moment than in the preceding one, nor vice versa, there is no such difference between earlier and later in it at all, because in it all stages and phases of development and re-development, of ascending and descending, becoming and passing away exist next to one another and complement one another infinitely.*²⁹⁶ (emphasis added)

As much as here there remains a whiff of Schleiermacher in Strauß’ employment of the aphorism of ‘experiencing eternity in the present’ for understanding immortality, Strauß is expressing allegiance neither to Schleiermacher’s mysticism nor to Hegel’s meta-narrative of Double Negation. Rather, *The Old and the New Faith* is precisely a statement of ‘faith,’ not a knowledge claim, as Strauß himself insisted,²⁹⁷ rather, a faith that fully recognizes the ‘limits’ to our present understanding of the world.²⁹⁸ In other words, Strauß remains committed to a non-epistemic faith, not mystical (Schleiermachian) or metaphysical (Hegelian) certainty. For Strauß, the experience of ‘eternity’ in the ‘present moment’ is the claim/belief that the universe is always a completed totality as it undergoes constant change. In other words, Strauß’ faith is an objective claim about the nature of the physical universe.

This faith is ‘Nominalist’ in that, like Feuerbach, Strauß already in 1839 and now in *The Old and the New Faith*²⁹⁹ takes ideas to arise out of nature, not as the eternal, archetypal Logos of Christianity or the ‘new speculative’ philosophy of the 19th C. That

294. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 220.

295. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 222.

296. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 223.

297. See Strauß, “Nachwort als Vorwort” to *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 38.

298. See Strauß, *Ibid.*: 43. In light of the fact that Hegel attacked the ‘weakness’ of reason for Kant because Kant acknowledged the limits to reason (Hegel, “Glauben und Wissen:” GW 287–288; “pure madness,” *ibid.*: GW: 304) and in light of the fact that Hegel calls Kant a ‘dogmatist’ because he acknowledges that there are some things that we cannot know (Hegel, *ibid.*: GW II: 313), this recognition of gaps in human understanding by Strauß is by no means insignificant.

299. Consciousness and thought arise out of matter. See *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 206–207; 208–209; 210–213; 222–223. “Life is only a special and, to be sure, the most complicated kind of mechanics [...]” *Ibid.*: 171; see as well, 173, whereas ‘spirit’ (consciousness) is only a difference in degree from animals, who themselves have arisen out of the mechanics of nature (see *ibid.*: 202).

is, ideas arise *a posteriori* out of the material world.³⁰⁰ Although Nominalism appears to be compatible with Strauß' objective claim for the perfection of the universe in every moment, these two claims involve serious conundrums because they are merely descriptive claims that are taken to be explanatory.

Strauß' physical 'eternal' in every 'present moment' is grounded in a conviction based on a description of the way the universe is in-itself. However, it is a subreptive claim about the universe whose 'reality' is forever inaccessible to us because we can experience the universe only as a set of appearances, not as it is in itself. Furthermore, although his Nominalism appears to be an explanation of the origin of ideas, it, as well, is ultimately a descriptive account of how finite consciousness comes to *experience* the imperceptible physical and moral orders, by no means an explanation of the origin of the organic and moral orders. Nominalism only pushes the relational, causal question of the origin of ideas and laws off the screen because in order to 'abstract' ideas out of sets of particular phenomena, the phenomena have to already be ordered by the ideas and laws that we abstract 'out of them.' Both in the case of claiming to 'know' the way the universe is in-itself and of claiming to give an account of ideas/laws as 'merely' human abstractions, Strauß and Feuerbach are caught in a *μετάβασις εις ἄλλο γένος* (the substitution of one category for another).³⁰¹ In their case, they are substituting a description for a causal explanation.

Strauß writes of *The Old and the New Faith*: "It was not a question of what Christianity has done for mankind? Rather, it may have worked what it wants – and it will continue to work in any case – but can one, with certain conviction, still belong to it as a church?"³⁰²

300. In 1839, Strauß flagged his ectypal/Nominalist conviction. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 172–173 as well as his complaint with respect to both Schleiermacher and the Hegelian Daub that "[b]oth lack the true mediation of dogma with the concept, of the historical with the ideal." (*ibid.*: 208). See also, Strauß' *Glaubenslehre* I: 389–390.

301. Ironically, Feuerbach accuses Hegel of succumbing to a *μετάβασις εις ἄλλο γένος* by his turning the essential into the unessential and the unessential into the essential. In the 1847 edition of his *Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit* (Leipzig, Verlag von Otto Wigand), he presents sequentially two aphorisms:

God's Incomprehensibility

"God is incomprehensible," of course, he is only the steam.

Of the powder, which was unfortunately! Shot in vain (146)

μετάβασις εις ἄλλο γένος

Away with you, boring priests, you dry philistines!

To you, O beautiful humanity, I consecrate spirit with love. (147)

These aphorisms apply especially to Hegel in Feuerbach's judgment. God's incomprehensibility is the Hegelian essentialization of the unessential. It is a *μετάβασις εις ἄλλο γένος* that Feuerbach 'overcomes' by emphasizing the essential (finite predicates apply to finite subjects).

Yet, Feuerbach's materialism and Nominalism equally succumb to *μετάβασις εις ἄλλο γένος* because they are a claim to explain matter and of ideas when in fact they are merely a description.

302. Strauß, "Epilogue" to *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: "Epilogue:" 38.

Ziegler reports that Strauß rejected the option of equating Christianity (or religion in general) with morality (practical reason) as a path to overcome the conflict between (traditional Christian) faith and knowledge in that traditional Christian faith is world denying and 'our world-oriented life' is world affirming:

It has often been believed, and still is, that the gap between faith and knowledge can be filled by practical reason [ethics], and that one would do well to substitute a practical Christianity for dogmatic Christianity by which faith and knowledge would be conveniently united. Strauß has shown, and the history of Christian ethics has proved him right, that the same opposition between faith and knowledge exists in ethics as in theoretical reason. Our world-oriented life practice and culture is diametrically opposed to the world-negating direction of Christian morality. Only by acting like an ostrich and forcibly closing one's eyes against theoretical reason can we make the dichotomy [between secular ethics and Christian ethics] subjectively bearable and pretend that their difference does not exist. However, may we worldly people [...] rejoicing over victory and triumph and busy with worldly work, day after day, still call ourselves Christians? [In 1872], Strauss had the courage to deny it. "My conviction is," he says, "if we do not want to look for excuses, if we do not want to twist and deceive, if we want to let yes remain yes and no remain no, then we must confess: We are no longer Christians."³⁰³

The question then arises, "Do we still have religion?:" 'We' today no longer believe in the old theistic sense of a Personal God and personal immortality.³⁰⁴ Strauß' 1872 *The Old Faith and the New Faith* presents Strauß' 'resolution' to the intellectual crisis that accompanied his theological project in 1864, *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People*. In 1872, Strauß writes:

What remains for us in any case is the fundamental element of all religion, the feeling of an unqualified [*unbedingten*] dependence. Whether we speak of God or the universe: we feel ourselves absolutely [*schlechthin*] dependent. With respect to the latter, we know ourselves as 'part of a part' [*Teil des Teils*], our power is nothing in relationship to the omnipotence of nature, our thought is able only slowly and with effort to grasp the smallest part of that which the world presents to us as knowable."³⁰⁵

Strauß identifies the 'enduring' in religion to be "the feeling of unqualified dependence," but this dependence is not on a mystical union, as with Schleiermacher. Rather, it is a dependence on nature. Just as Strauß substitutes nature's 'turn inward on itself' for Hegel's 'point of indifference to Absolute Spirit,' so, too, he substitutes *absolute* dependence on nature for Schleiermacher's *absolute feeling of dependence* on God. Strauß uses the term *unbedingte* (unqualified) as well as Schleiermacher's *schlechthinige* (absolute) dependence. Is this terminology significant? I think so. However, *this recognition that we are not merely a part of a whole but also our knowledge is limited to*

303. Ziegler, II: 685–686. The quote from Strauß comes from *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 90–91.

304. See Ziegler, II: 687.

305. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 138–139.

*a fragment is not Schleiermacher's claim that our 'feeling of absolute dependence' shuts down reason and mystically unites us with God in God-consciousness.*³⁰⁶ Rather, we become aware of physical and ethical lawfulness that is the material universe:

This recognition [... of our being a part of the whole] leads us to another result. We perceive in the [physical] world a ceaseless change. Quickly, however, we discover in this change a lasting, order and law. We perceive in nature tremendous contrasts, terrible struggles; but we find how through them the continuance and harmony of the whole is not disturbed but is preserved in its entirety. We continue to perceive a gradual development, an emergence of the higher from the lower, of the subtle out of what is coarse. Furthermore, we find ourselves promoted in our personal as well as in our social life that the more we succeed in subjecting the capricious to an [ethical] rule in and around us the more we develop what is superior out of the inferior, what a tenderness out of brutality.³⁰⁷

Quoting from Strauß' *The Old and the New Faith*, Ziegler writes that Strauß' response over against those who want to 'reduce' religion to morality or identify religion with Schleiermacher's mystical 'feeling of absolute dependence,' that

[r]eligion flows from an even deeper source, goes back to an even more primal ground [than Schleiermacher's mystical feeling of absolute dependence or Hegelian meta-narrative]. "Do not forget at any moment that you are a human being and not a mere natural being; do not forget at any moment that all others are also human beings, i.e., with all individual differences, nonetheless, the same as you, with the same needs and demands as you – this is the epitome of all morality. Do not forget for a moment that you and everything you perceive in yourself and around you, *what happens to you and to others*, is not an incoherent fragment, not a wild chaos of atoms or coincidences, but that it *all emerges according to eternal laws from the one source of all life, all reason and all good – that is the epitome of religion*. Whether all this together does not really give the full concept of religion in the subjective sense of the word? I don't know what is missing."³⁰⁸

Can one, with certain conviction, still belong to it as a church?"³⁰⁹ Strauß had already answered:

In the title [*The Old and the New Faith*] [...] I have not contrasted the old faith with a new knowledge, but with a new faith. For the formation of a comprehensive world view, which is to take the place of the equally comprehensive faith of the church, we cannot be content with that which is to be proved strictly inductively, but must add many things,³¹⁰ which from this basis result for our thinking partly as a prerequisite and partly as a conclusion. In the same sense, I have called my writing a confession [...] ³¹¹

306. Unlike Ziegler, who sees Strauß combining Schleiermacher and Hegel. See footnote 201.

307. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 139.

308. Ziegler, II: 688. The quote from Strauß comes from *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 238–239.

309. Strauß, "Epilogue" to *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: "Epilogue:" 38.

310. The 'adding of many things' is no reference or embracing of Kant's *a priori* synthetic judgment that *adds things* to perception not directly given in perception.

311. Strauß, "Epilogue" to *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: "Epilogue:" 31–32.

Strauß' formulation here is intriguing. A 'worldview' cannot be unequivocally established by inductive knowledge 'but must add many things' both with respect to prior assumptions and when it comes to its conclusions. This formulation is neither a denial of materialism nor an affirmation of his 'enduring Hegelianism,' but it recognizes that 'reductionist' materialism, as with any other worldview, involves assumptions and conclusions that are not empirical.

Ziegler claims that Strauß remained a Hegelian/Schleiermachian down to the end of his career.³¹² Ziegler's formulation of Strauß' worldview in the end was:

He saw in materialism [...] "the equal brother of Hegelian idealism, the truth was therefore only attainable through the conflation of the two;" the former saw the world from below and from the outside, the latter from above and from within, and so they were basically only two views of one and the same, which must finally meet and coincide. He also remained faithful to the Hegelian panlogism, as the belief in the *reason ruling in the universe*.³¹³ (emphasis added)

However, Strauß' position is more complicated than Ziegler wants to acknowledge. The quotation that equates Hegelian idealism and materialism as 'brothers,' comes from Strauß letter to Alois Emanuel Biedermann from 21 January 1869.³¹⁴ Ziegler takes the quote to mean that Strauß embraced both Idealism and Materialism. That is not what Strauß actually says. Strauß writes:

Where my inner perception leaves me, I also run out of thoughts. Now there are without doubt areas where nothing can be looked at anymore, even inwardly, but still should be thought: and in those areas nature fails me. To your [Biedermann's] construction of the concept of God, I can only say: "I hear the message, but I lack faith." Perhaps what has contributed to this inability is that *I was not secured against the siren voices of materialism as you are by the firm support of a philosophical system*. As an unskilled vineyard worker, as an involuntary drifter, I fell into all kinds of traps. *Materialism often wanted to appear to me [wollte mir erscheinen] as the equal brother of our Hegelian*

312. See Theobald Ziegler, "David Friedrich Strauß. a) Zum 27. Januar 1908" in *Menschen und Probleme. Reden, Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Berlin: Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1914): 235: In 1872, Ziegler claims: "In this book [*The Old and the New Faith*] he [Strauss] denied that we still have the right to call ourselves Christians. However, that we still have religion he held to tenaciously *as a Hegelian and Schleiermachian, which he always remained*." (emphasis added) I take Ziegler's claim that the later Strauß was a Hegelian, a Schleiermachian, or both to be a serious error. See as well, Ziegler II: 338: Strauß "[...] broke with one of Hegel's basic views and yet did not cease to be a Hegelian; that is why he was able to be a materialist and a Hegelian at the same time in his last book and thus return to his first love here, as well." The issue, as I will demonstrate, hinges on what the later Strauß means when he speaks of 'reason ruling the universe.' I maintain that it has nothing to do with Hegel's pure reason of Absolute Spirit, which is archetypal, and the later Strauß' ectypal understanding of reason from Feuerbach.

313. Ziegler, "David Friedrich Strauß. a) Zum 27. Januar 1908:" 236.

314. See Ziegler, II: 697. Alois Emanuel Biedermann was the 'liberal' theologian who, after the Liberal government returned to power in Zurich, was appointed to the Chair of Biblical Theology, Church History, and Dogmatics that Strauß has been given in 1839.

idealism with *the truth appearing* [*die Wahrheit erscheinen*] to be attainable only by conflation of both. In any case, with Darwinism I welcomed the first real liberator from the concept of creation. I throw this out only in such a way so that you know approximately in which area of the spiritual sea map you have to look for the 'retired' veteran.³¹⁵ (emphasis added)

Strauß' formulation is in the *subjunctive*, not *declarative* mood, and Ziegler misses the point that Biedermann himself saw clearly. Especially with his eye on Strauß' 'materialism,' Biedermann wrote to Vatke in 1872 shortly after the publication of *The Old and the New Faith*: "I would cut off a finger on my right hand, were Strauß not to have written this ominous book."³¹⁶

Although Ziegler acknowledges that others read Strauß as a 'materialist,' he himself takes the later Strauß to be a 'monist' who combines Hegelian 'Idealism' and 'materialism':

Strauß is a monist [...]. [He] sees in the universe, as naturalistically as he grasps it, not merely a raw superior power,³¹⁷ but at the same time order and law, reason and goodness.³¹⁸ In such a life- and reason-filled universe, however, there is still the *Logos*, an ideal and spiritual, thus Strauß remains here again faithful to idealism and Hegelian panlogism, remains also as a materialist still a Hegelian [...].³¹⁹

Ziegler complains, though, that Strauß 'didn't articulate [his monism] more clearly,' and he acknowledges that there are passages in Strauß' text that make his monism 'really look like materialism:'

[...] [I]t is not a lapse [...] when he talks about 'our' Hegelian idealism in that letter to Biedermann. Only that this idealist and logical side of the new faith did not express itself clearly and strongly enough, that, of course, cannot be denied. Strauss was blinded by the new light emanating from the natural sciences [...]. His idealism was no longer firm enough to protect him against the siren voices of materialism. His monism really looked like materialism in some places.³²⁰

315. From J. Websky, "Zu Theobald Zieglers Strauß-Biographie" (Part V) in the *Protestantische Monatshefte* (1909): 244–245. J. Websky provides the complete letter.

316. Ziegler, II: 722.

317. Strauß calls this materialist aspect "the monstrous world machine with its iron toothed wheels." See Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 365.

318. Strauß speaks of 'lawfulness,' not the *Logos*, and he refers to the lawfulness *internal* to nature, not *eternal* either in the 'mind' of a Personal God or as the anthropomorphic, logic of dialectic that brings about the material order in order for Absolute Spirit to become aware of Itself 'above' the material order: "Not only merciless wheels move in it [nature], but also soothing oil pours out. Our God does not take us in his arms from the outside, but he opens up sources of comfort within us." Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 365.

319. Ziegler, II: 698.

320. Ziegler, II: 698–699.

Ziegler follows this quote by turning to §66 of *The Old and the New Faith* where Strauß calls the ‘common enemy’ of both Materialism and Idealism to be dualism, especially the dualism of Christianity’s Personal God.³²¹ Yet, Ziegler fails to see that what he calls Strauß’ Spinozan/Hegelian ‘Panlogism’ stands in the same corner with the anthropomorphic, ‘Intellectualist’ wing of Medieval Scholasticism although the Spinozan/Hegelian ‘Panlogism’ denies the Personal God of Medieval Scholastic, Platonist Christianity. Both the ‘dualistic,’ *Logos* tradition of Christian Platonism as well as the ‘*logic of dialectic*’ of Hegelian ‘Panlogism’ claim to explain ‘creation’ *based upon analogies to human capacities*. As such they both succumb to a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος that substitutes explanation for description. Furthermore, Ziegler appears to have no grasp of the Nominalist *ectypal* account of the ‘origin’ of ideas that drives Feuerbach’s criticism of Hegel.

However, Feuerbach (and Strauß) equally succumb to a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος when they take the *ectypal* account of ideas to be an *explanation* of the creation of ideas rather than as a *descriptive* account of how finite consciousness comes to be aware of ideas. Consequently, wherever Ziegler reads ‘reason’ in Strauß, he can only hear Hegelian ‘Panlogism.’

Strauß’ Ethics in 1872

Strauß’ this-worldly morality/ethics in which moral duty arises out of nature and nature, for its part, limits the ethical achievement of the individual remains consistent with Hegel’s “The Moral View of the World” in the *Phenomenology*. Hegel’s understanding of morality is that it is not to be simply identified with empirical ethics measured by consequences. In contrast to ethics as concrete ‘Form,’ morality is the awareness of the absolute duty that is the ‘Content’ or abstract ‘Idea’ demanded by the moral law. Ethics is the always inadequate and insufficient effort to apply the abstract, moral law to one’s concrete situation.

However, Strauß’ understanding of Hegel’s notion of ‘morality’ was transformed into the relative, social construction of ethical norms the more Strauß distanced himself from Hegel’s ultimate goal of the meta-narrative of Double Negation. Hegelian Absolute Knowledge ‘conquers’ the short-comings of ethical failure by the negation of sensualism (phenomenal experience in the world) by means of the Second Negation of ‘the point of indifference’ in finite consciousness. As of *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People*, Strauß emphasized the cultural *development* of ‘moral’ duty as reflected in the *changed social condition* of the moral ‘geniuses’ who articulate the moral insights required for the ‘new’ age.³²²

321. See Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 267.

322. See Strauß, *LJEGP*: 626 where Strauß emphasizes that Jesus ‘laid the foundation’ (626–627) but did not comprehensively address all aspects of human moral life. For example, he ignored family

Although Strauß also discarded his own universal, *inclusive* Christology that takes all of finite human consciousness to be the historical actualization of the God/Man, which he defended in his early writings before the *Glaubenslehre*, his 'new faith' of *The Old and the New Faith* is a commitment to that lawfulness (both physical and moral) that 'flows out of the ultimate, material source of all' and governs human agency in this world.

The later Strauß offers no metaphysical 'explanation' for the origin of this lawfulness, and he never embraced Hegel's substitution of the 'cunning of reason' for the 'grace' of the Personal Deity of traditional Christian theology.

To be sure, Strauß unequivocally rejects the label 'Christian' in *The Old and the New Faith*. However, his rejection of the label 'Christianity' involves more than merely turning away from the notions of a Personal Deity from whom Immortality is made possible by a unique sacrifice of the life of God's only Son. This is because Strauß' definition of the 'Christian' religion involves more than Church teaching but a 'religion' is taken to refer to a 'people' (*Volk*).

Hegel employs an anthropomorphic analogy to talk about a 'people' (*Volk*) as 'sociological,' 'ethical totality.' A 'people' is *the concrete agency of a community as a whole*.³²³ Anticipating the framework that he unpacks more fully in "The Moral View of the World" in the *Phenomenology* of 1807, Hegel proposes already in 1802 in his "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" that the abstract principles of duty, the 'true' content (*Inhalt*) that is 'morality,' is distinct from the 'actual' concrete actions (*Form*, actual representations) for which humanity is capable of assuming responsibility as 'ethics'. He describes a people (*Volk*), 'sociologically' not just as an aggregate of individuals but as the 'actual,' concrete events of its particular 'history.' In other words, *peoples as an ethical totality are analogous to 'individuals*. Their 'ethical totality' is what distinguishes them from other individuals (*Völker*, peoples). Without the identification of an ethical totality, a people would be *an empty abstraction* (an 'empty identity' / *leere Identität*).³²⁴

It is important to note, though, that Hegel's definition of a people as an 'ethical totality' is a classic example of what Kant means by subreption³²⁵ (*Verwechslung*), which treat 'appearances' as if they were the 'thing itself'.

life and economic development (e.g., the industrial revolution), not to speak of the human arts. However, already in his "On the Transient and Enduring in Christianity, Strauß not only identifies Jesus as a 'religious genius' (109), but he places him as 'one among many' (124–125).

323. Hegel is employing an anthropomorphic analogy for a *people* just as he has employed an anthropomorphic analogy for his meta-narrative dialectic of Double Negation. Whereas the former anthropomorphic analogy explains the emergence of an ethnic culture that arises out of the tension between 'moral duty' and 'ethical context,' the latter anthropomorphic analogy he uses to explain the causal origin of all 'that truly is' (the realm of ideas) and 'actuality' (the realm of sense perception).

324. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 481.

325. For the definition of subreption, see the "Preface:" 64, n. 84.

In "Schleiermacher und Daub," Strauß presents the Hegelian Daub's definition of religion from Daub's 1805 article "Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy: A Contribution to the Teaching of Christian Confessions" ("Orthodoxie und Heterodoxie. Ein Beitrag zur Lehre von den Symbolischen Büchern"). Daub's definition appears to draw on Hegel's understanding of a people (*Volk*). Religion, according to Daub, is not merely a 'teaching' but is a 'people' (*Volk*) or 'sociological' group (*Gemeinde*). *One can be an apostate or a disbeliever, but one cannot but 'participate' in the religion of one's 'people' (Volk): "The individual has the option to decide to participate or to remain unfaithful and superstitious, but, given that it is the possession of a community, the individual has no option other than to participate in a religion."*³²⁶ Both Daub and Strauß employ this notion of an 'ethical totality' for their understanding of the 'religion' of a particular 'people.' However, in *The Old and the New Faith*, Strauß finally shatters this parochial notion of a merely 'sociological,' 'cultural' religion. However, his new 'universalism' is not his, granted narrow, universal, *inclusive* Christology of the *LJ* but now is *the universal 'religion' of the 'new' faith in nature.*

Immediately following his claim that "we are no longer Christian"³²⁷, Strauß begins his Chapter II of *The Old and the New Faith* with the question: "Do we still have Religion?" by echoing the Hegelian Daub, that: "[...] the formation of religions goes hand in hand with the cultural values of peoples."³²⁸ When he concludes, then, that 'we are no longer Christian,' he is making an observation about a relationship to a people (*Volk*) not merely to a set of doctrinal teaching: "We cannot seek support for our actions in a faith that we no longer have, in a community whose premises, whose moods we no longer share."³²⁹ In short he is rejecting his understanding of religion as inseparable from a people as was articulated by the title of Strauß' 1864 work, *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People (Volk)*.

Strauß is consciously addressing a new 'people' (*Volk*) as he rejects the community of Christians and turns to his 'new understanding of faith' (religion). He views the new faith to be as much, if not more, a worldview of a new human community than a set of religious doctrines. In his "Afterword as Foreword," Strauß stresses:

My writing [...] is [...] a confession, not a historical treatise. It was not about the question: what has Christianity worked in mankind? but about the question: it may have worked

326. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 60. In his "Über die Theologie und ihre Encyclopädie, im Verhältniß zum academischen Studium beider. Fragment einer Einleitung in die letztere" of 1806, Daub stressed that theology requires "a sense of a living rootedness in [...] its] community [*Volk*] and [...] respect for its religion;" that theology "does not view the church as a means to some goal (for example, education of the people, morality, etc.), but views the church as the external reflection of the highest culture of a people [*Volkes*] as its own goal; and is "as instrument [*Organe*] for the life of the people [*Volksleben*]." (*ibid.*: 68)

327. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 90.

328. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 92.

329. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 85.

what it wants – and it will continue to work in any case – but can one with certain convictions still belong to it as a church? [...] [I]n a large number of our contemporaries, the force of new insights, on the one hand, and the weight of old convictions and habits, on the other, balance each other out precisely with the standpoints of Old Catholicism and Protestantism. If I do not place myself on one of these sides with those who think alike, then this can only have its reason in the fact that I do not grant them the logical right to exist, i.e. that I consider them only as points of passage [...] beyond which the development of our insights has already actually progressed.³³⁰

However, [I seek no] dispute with dissenters, only understanding with like-minded people [...].

Nonetheless, *I did not only want to make those like-minded people aware of what we have but also to make them aware of what we do not have, yet.* By presenting to them our current state of insights and views, impulses and reassurances, I also wanted to draw their attention to the points where we are still lacking, and to urge them to help us cultivate those resources, as well. Not only our conception of the world still has its gaping holes, but *we are even more behind when it comes to the construction of our grasp of duties and virtues.* Here I have only been able to point to the places where the foundation stones are to be laid, rather than being able to point to something that has been completed [...]. [W]e must be clearly aware of the untenability [...] of our old] ideas in order to force us to search for and find the solid points of reference for our moral behavior on the basis of our new worldview, i.e. in the recognized essence of man, instead of in a supposed superhuman revelation.³³¹ (emphasis added)

Strauß' 'new' people (*Volk*) is not limited to a particular culture but is humanity as a totality:

In the generic concept of humanity lies its [...] position on the pinnacle of nature, its ability to resist sensual stimulus by comparing and thinking. Further, however, the unity of the human species lies not only in the way that every animal species belongs together, through descent and similarity of organic structure; but in the way that only through the cooperation of humans is a human being capable of becoming human. The species forms a connected community of solidarity in a completely different sense than any [other] animal species. Only with the help of other human beings has the individual human being risen above nature; only in so far as the individual recognizes and treats others as beings equal to her-/himself can s/he maintain and further cultivate her-/his skills. Whoever thinks of the generic concept of humanity in this way, understands humanity according to its full idea [*Inhalt*] and has a firm basis for moral conduct.³³²

Humanity is 'religious,' according to Strauß, because it is an incomplete, objective project in the world that requires a community. Strauß has universalized religion in that the

330. Strauß, "Ein Nachwort als Vorwort" of *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 38–39.

331. Strauß, "Ein Nachwort als Vorwort" of *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 42–44.

332. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 246–247.

people (*das Volk*) of 'religion' is the entire human species with all of its creative capacities that distinguish it in the natural order.

Yet, Strauß continues to define religion objectively under the category of subreption. 'Practical reason' is taken by him in the Hegelian sense of the consequences of actions or the external effects of agency.

When it comes to Strauß' new grand narrative of bottom-up nature, Lyotard is correct! Grand narratives are dreams that need to be rejected in all their forms. Here is where Kant's Critical Idealism offers an otherwise overlooked optimism. Granted, it is no blind optimism! It is an optimism grounded in an *a priori* set of capacities and, especially, a creative, efficient causality (autonomous freedom), that the individual can ignore. However, it is a set of conditions and capacities that elevate humanity 'above' nature, make humanity the 'ultimate end of nature,' and constitutes a break in the blind, mechanical causality of nature. Here in finite, transcendental consciousness nature is open, not closed! The price, though, is that, unlike any other species we've encountered at least in degree, finite transcendental consciousness is capable of taking responsibility for its agency – although it can choose to ignore it and act lawlessly. Humanity's maturity (Enlightenment) is no demand of either Absolute Spirit or nature. It is a self-imposed Enlightenment that rises to the challenge of be(com)ing the understanding and responsible (!) agency that we find, in degree, nowhere else in nature.

When finite, transcendental consciousness exercises its *a priori* capacities by its own effort, it experiences a satisfaction not always of successful achievement but of an internal awareness unavailable to any other being that can come only because one has attempted to do something oneself out of one's autonomous freedom. That satisfaction becomes immeasurable when one knows that one has done one's best not out of merely self-interest but on the basis of a 'wide,' categorical imperative to give oneself permission to act and to guide one's application of 'narrow,' hypothetical imperatives to achieve a particular end. Here nothing is over until its over. As long as finite transcendental consciousness exists it is not helpless or determined by either nature or Absolute Spirit's 'cunning of reason.' Rather, finite transcendental consciousness is its own sovereign. Again, though, the cost of this sovereignty is that no one can experience, understand, act, give permission to act, or accept responsibility for anyone else *but the self*. Optimism here is grounded in a very precarious position.³³³

The task now is to examine just what Strauß' mentors as well as Strauß himself got so wrong about Kant, and why it matters. Critical Idealism offers an ignored, profound option for understanding the human condition in terms of a new 'faith.'

333. For Kant's description of this 'precarious position,' see the "Introduction:" 92, n. 42.

Chapter 6: Grand Narratives of Theoretical Reason Nullify Practical Reason

Nullify Practical Reason

Chapter Overview

Following an examination of Hegel's notions of 'theoretical' and 'practical' reason, I contrast Hegel's 'theoretical' Spirit' with Kant's 'theoretical reason' by first addressing the theme of '*critique*' along with an account of Strauß' own shift in metaphysics in the *Glaubenslehre* from Hegel's cataphatic/apophatic circular metaphysics to a linear, historical metaphysics based on Spinoza and Böhme. I then turn to an examination of the meaning of '*Absolute Knowledge*' for Hegel and the early Strauß. This is accomplished by addressing a) Hegel's anthropomorphic analogy, b) his 'flight of the dove in a vacuum, and c) a contrasting of Hegel's/ Strauß' Absolute Knowledge with Kant's 'reflecting judgment.' The theme of 'reflecting judgment' constitutes the bridge to Chapter 7's investigation of the meaning of 'practical' reason in Hegel and Strauß. The chapter includes an "Addendum: On 20th C 'Critique' and the 'End of Metaphysics'"

Strauß maintained in the *Glaubenslehre* that "the criticism of Church Doctrine is its history,"¹ which he understood as its internal faults eliminate any need for an 'external,' philosophical perspective for its collapse. The same may be said of his own life project. Rather than Kant needing to be invoked as an *external* perspective on Strauß' work, an internal *criticism* of Strauß arises within his own corpus once it is recognized that, although he himself embraced certain Kantian themes as of 1864, he, clearly, never undertook the task of a serious investigation of Kant as he had, for example, of Böhme, Spinoza, Baur, Hegel, Schelling, Schleiermacher, and Daub but remained satisfied with a general, 'cultural' understanding of Kant that 'everyone' took to be Kantianism. In other words, his own efforts at finding a philosophical framework for his understanding of the human condition collapse from within not because he ignored Kant but precisely because he claimed allegiance, in part, to Kant without a *rigorous* understanding of him. He wrote in the "Foreword" to his *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*, a year after the publication of the *Life of Jesus Examined for the German People* in which Strauß found inspiration, in part, from Kant's ability to contribute to the 'religion of humanity:'

1. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 71. Already in "Schleiermacher und Daub," Strauß pointed out that [...] "*the true critique of a thing [can] only lie in its history.*" Strauß, "Schleiermacher and Daub and Their Significance for Theology in our Age" ("Schleiermacher und Daub in ihrer Bedeutung für die Theologie unserer Zeit") in *Charakteristiken und Kritiken* (Leipzig: Verlag von Otto Wigand, 1839): 30.

Today it is with Schleiermacher's theology exactly as it was sixty years ago with Kantian philosophy. While true scholarship had already moved forward with Fichte and Schelling [McG: Note the absence of Hegel] to deepen and develop the principle established by Kant, *Kantian philosophizing* had spread abroad, had entered general consciousness, and *had become the average wisdom of the era.*² (emphasis added)

An '*internal critique*', in contrast to an *internal criticism*, of Strauß' work requires doing what he failed to do by undertaking a careful examination of Kant's theoretical and practical reason. This current chapter examines Strauß' understanding of theoretical reason. Chapter 7 looks at Strauß' understanding of practical reason.

Hegel and Strauß on 'Theoretical Reason'

Theoretical and practical reason, according to Hegel, are both activities of finite spirit subordinate to Absolute Spirit. (Hegel's God) However, their purposes are different. According to Hegel, theoretical reason is the contemplation (Plato's θεωρία, *theoria*)³ of abstract Spirit whereas practical reason is concerned with concrete desires and appetites that drive agency in the world.⁴ Consequently, for Hegel, theoretical reason ultimately originates from the single, *a priori* synthetic judgment, which is Absolute Spirit⁵ that is knowable by theoretical reason. Absolute Spirit is *synthetic* because it *must be an ultimate Oneness* out of which all difference arises. Absolute Spirit initiates the diáresis (διαίρεσις),⁶ that is, the distinguishing between 'this' and 'that,' which dialectically generates a world of appearances in which practical reason (ethics) is doomed to failure because of nature's freedom limiting the individual's freedom.

According to Hegel, although theoretical reason commences *experientially* as a bottom-up activity of finite reason that begins with what are merely 'apparently,' independent objects as 'representations,' theoretical reason is concerned with the true 'content'/'idea' of any and all 'representations' (*Form*). The 'true content' of representations is *the* Concept or Absolute Spirit. Theoretical reason's aim is not understanding of particulars but the ultimate *causal explanation* of all 'that is.' Theoretical reason,

2. Strauß, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*, trans. by Leander Keck (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977): 4.

3. Hegel takes the reflecting judgment of theoretical reason to be 'contemplation' in Plato's sense of *theoria* (*Republic* 511c: θεωρία, *theoria*), which employs dialectic to contemplate the Absolute Good 'above Being' (*above unchanging ideas*) (*Republic* 509b: ἐπείκεινα τῆς οὐσίας). On Plato's notion of contemplation (θεωρία, *theoria*), see: 24, n. 7.

4. See Hegel on practical reason as the concern of the 'lower appetites' of self-interest, imagination, and wishful thinking in the "Preface:" 47, n. 32 NOTE: Absent is autonomous freedom!.

5. On Hegel's sole *a priori* Concept, see in the "Preface:" 61 and below 718, n. 245.

6. On diáresis (διαίρεσις), see Chapter 3: "Academic Controversy:" the section "Academic Controversy Based on Criticism (*diáresis*):" 219 ff.

according to Hegel, is 'scientific' in that is Absolute Knowledge of the 'true' content (*Inhalt*) of 'what is'.

Theoretical reason for Hegel, then, is *metaphysically* a top-down, causal account of 'reality' (the *Reelle*) on the basis of absolute 'ideality' (the *Ideelle*). It is not 'representations' (*Form*), which are particular phenomena, that govern 'truth' but universal 'ideas' (*Inhalt*). The 'philosopher' is able to discern the difference.⁷ 'Representations' are merely 'place holders' in actuality (*Reelle/Realität/Wirklichkeit*) that are what anchor the dialectical Double Negation that is 'becoming'. By serving as the anchor to the 'becoming' of Absolute Spirit, representations are taken by Hegel to insure that Absolute is no mere 'empty idea'. The combination of representations (*Form*) and ideal content (*Inhalt*) are what Hegel means by 'science'. In other words, the function of actuality (the *Reelle*) is that it assures that theoretical reason's ideas are not 'empty abstractions'.

Theoretical reason, according to Hegel, has one capacity that is superior to all others: the capacity of reflecting judgment. He takes his definition of reflecting judgment from Kant: the search for the concept under which a set of phenomena are subsumed in order to understand them.⁸ However, Hegel turns the focus of reflecting 180° from Kant's focus. For Hegel, reflecting judgment's sole concern is the grasping of the single, *a priori* synthetic judgment required for the causal explanation of all 'that is.'⁹ All other synthetic judgments are *a posteriori* in accordance with the 'negative' logic of dialectic. The single, *a priori* synthetic judgment that reflecting judgment grasps is Absolute Spirit. Finally, theoretical reason is the segue to Absolute Freedom for finite consciousness. Absolute Freedom is above all limitations, pain, and suffering in the world. However, for Hegel, the cunning of reason, silently working in the deep background of all reality of the appearances, ensures that Absolute Spirit's goal of Self-awareness is achieved regardless of its recognition (or non-recognition) by finite consciousness.¹⁰

In contrast, practical reason, according to Hegel, is a finite, top-down, subjective concern with teleological, 'subjective interests' that are the self-created representations of its agency. Practical reason's aim is concrete agency in the world. Practical reason, therefore, is 'subjective' for three reasons. *First*, as the case with theoretical reason, practical reason is subjective because *it is 'limited' to understanding the world in*

7. On Hegel's claim that the philosopher is one who distinguishes 'truth' from 'falsehood,' see Chapter 1: "Methodology:" 148, n. 141.

8. On Kant's distinction between reflecting (*reflektierende*) and re-producing (*bestimmende*) judgment, see the "Introduction:" 86, n. 26.

9. Hegel takes the reflecting judgment of theoretical reason to be 'contemplation' in Plato's sense of *theoria* (θεωρία, *theoria*) (*Republic* 511c), which employs dialectic to contemplate the Absolute Good 'above Being' (*Republic* 509b: ἐπὶκεινα τῆς οὐσίας). On Plato's notion of contemplation (θεωρία, *theoria*), see 24, n. 7.]

10. On the 'cunning of reason,' see the "Preface:" 89, n. 48; the "Introduction:" 89, n. 35; Chapter 1: "Methodology:" 168, n. 210; and Chapter 5: "Traces of an Intellectual Crisis:" 608, n. 182.

and through the imagination,¹¹ not reason which is 'above' understanding (see Plato's discussion of 'understanding' and its relationship to 'imagination' in the Simile of the Line¹²). Second, it is subjective because *it is governed by personal, teleological interests in the world, not the 'truth' of ideas*. Third, it is subjective because *it is anchored in the 'maxim of arbitrariness'* by means of which it capriciously declares its principles to be universal. Practical reason's principles, according to Hegel, then, are *metaphysically* a bottom-up, *relative* construction of individual and social values. Finally, practical reason only exercises a restricted, relative freedom because nature and its social conditions limit the realization of subjective interests. Practical reason achieves Absolute Freedom only when it grasps that its ultimate purpose as an agent is to be 'the point of indifference' of the Second Negation, which eclipses all phenomena.

According to Hegel, 'theoretical Spirit' (or theoretical reason) and 'practical spirit' (or practical reason) both suffer from the same 'shortcoming' (*Mangel*), according to Hegel, in that both assume

[...] the apparent separation of the subjective from the objective [...] and that the unity of these opposite determinations is to be produced first, – a defect that lies in the nature of Spirit because *Spirit is not an existing, immediately completed thing but rather that which produces Itself, the pure activity*, the abolition of the conditions of the subjective and the objective that Spirit has made for Itself is the prerequisite of the opposition of the subjective and the objective.¹³ (emphasis added)

The dialectical structure that governs all 'that is' takes Absolute Spirit to be the sole *a priori*, Absolute Unity (absolute synthesis) of 'pure reason'¹⁴ 'elevated' above the 'shortcomings' of 'sundered consciousness' (individual subjectivity), which is perception in the world:¹⁵

Spirit as alienation from Itself has its existence in the world of development [Bildung]; but because the whole [McG: that is the 'world of development/process'] has been alienated from Spirit Itself, the unactual¹⁶ [unwirkliche] world of pure consciousness or thought [pure thought] stands beyond the world of development. The content [Inhalt] of pure consciousness

11. Especially for Hegel, Kant's practical reason is subjective because Kant explicitly recognizes that although there are 'ideas of reason' 'above' understanding, the 'ideas of reason' are regulative, not constitutive ideas. Because Kant's ideas of reason are not given directly in experience, they are quintessentially 'empty ideas' according to Hegel.

12. See the opening paragraph of the "Foreword:" 19, n. 1.

13. Hegel, "Addendum" to the *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaft* (1830) GW X: 237–238.

14. See Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen:" GW II: 304–305 and Hegel's discussion of 'pure reason' as Absolute Unity/synthesis in "Reason's Certainty and Reason's Truth" of the *Phänomenologie* GW III: 178–185 (Baillie: 272–280).

15. See Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 184–185 (Baillie: 280).

16. For Hegel, the 'actual' is perceptible representations (*Form*) and the 'true' is the imperceptible content (*Inhalt*) of Spirit.

is pure thought, thinking is its absolute element. However, because thought is first an element of this world, pure consciousness has only its thoughts, but it does not yet think them or know that they are thoughts; rather, they are for it in the form of the imagination. [Finite] consciousness steps out of actuality [*Wirklichkeit*] into pure consciousness, but it is itself still in the sphere and definiteness of actuality [*Wirklichkeit*]. Sundered consciousness [*zerrissenes Bewußtsein*] is in itself only the self-sameness of pure consciousness for us, not for itself. It is, therefore, only the immediate elevation, not yet completed In Itself, and has its opposite principle [McG: perception of representations as development], through which it is conditioned, still in itself, without having become master of it through mediated movement. Therefore, the essence of [McG: 'pure'] thought does not apply to sundered consciousness but only as an essence in the form of the abstract in-itself, but in the form of a common actuality [*Gemeinwirklichen*], an actuality [*Wirklichkeit*] that has only been elevated into another element without having lost in it the determinateness of an unthought actuality [*Wirklichkeit*].¹⁷

As the finite, synthetic unity of all distinction between subjective consciousness and objective perception, the individual employs its 'theoretical Spirit' in the bottom-up activity of individual, abstract consciousness. 'Theoretical Spirit' starts with the investigation of phenomena by distinguishing 'this' from 'that' as 'thesis' and 'anti-thesis' of diairesis (διαίρεσις) to then identify the 'idea,' that is, "the [intelligible] form of the remembered, subjective, general, necessary and reasonable"¹⁸ that is shared between an individual subject (consciousness) and its perceptions. In short, 'thinking' is the abstract application of the *synthesis of finite 'thought'* that processes perceptions/representations. Therefore, according to Hegel, absent the apparent separation that is sundered consciousness, the subjective and the objective, the 'idea' is merely 'empty abstraction.'

Hegel proceeds to explain in the "Addendum" to the *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaft* that 'practical spirit' in contrast to 'theoretical spirit,' is concerned with the achievement of teleological goals in the *external* world whereas 'theoretical spirit' is concerned with a process *internal* to consciousness.

Practical spirit takes the opposite starting point; it does not begin, as the [McG: finite] theoretical spirit does, from the apparently independent object [McG: bottom-up], but from its purposes and interests [McG: top-down], that is, from subjective determinations of finite consciousness, and only proceeds to make these into an objective reality. In doing this, [McG: finite] practical spirit reacts just as much against the one-sided subjectivity of self-consciousness closed in on itself as [McG: infinite] theoretical spirit does against consciousness dependent on a given object. Theoretical and practical Spirit, therefore, integrate each other precisely because they are distinguished from each other in the manner indicated. This difference, however, is not absolute, because [McG: infinite] theoretical Spirit also has to do with Its own determinations, with thoughts as a top-down dialectic; and conversely, *the purposes of the rational will are not something belonging to the particular subject, but something that exists In and for Itself.* Both kinds of Spirit are forms of

17. Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 391 (Baillie: 549).

18. Hegel, "Addendum" to the *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaft* (1830) GW X: 237.

reason; because *in both theoretical and practical spirit*, although differently, *that in which reason consists is produced: a unity of the subjective and the objective* [McG: a unity always and already achieved by Absolute Spirit, not independently by theoretical and practical spirit themselves].¹⁹ (emphasis added)

When it comes to his criticism of Kant, there are two core themes for Hegel: empty ideas and mere subjectivity. Kant's ideas are 'empty' because they are merely 'subjective constructions,' and his philosophy is 'subjective' because he 'fails to acknowledge' the objectivity of Absolute Spirit. The latter, subjectivity, Kant conceals by his 'purported' humility that insists upon recognizing the 'limits to reason.' Hegel writes of abstract subjectivity closed in upon itself²⁰ in his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*:

[When it comes to Kant's abstract subjectivity], [...] the [McG: subjective] I [is] absolutely idealizing, as for which all difference, determination, content is abolished and [determined] as one set only by itself. [Abstract subjectivity is the] determining 'I am,' and only I am it as this individual, as the immediate self, as I who am immediately.

All content has an immediate relation to me, i.e. Being, and I am it as singleness, as the relation of negativity to itself. That which is established by me is, as set apart from me, as the negated, which is only set [by me]. I am thus the immediate negativity. Thus I, this excluder, am the affirmative of all, good because I am immediately – i.e., according to my feelings, opinions, according to the arbitrariness and randomness of my sensation and volition –. *All objective content, law, truth, duty, disappears for me, I acknowledge nothing, nothing objective, no truth; God, the infinite is to me a beyond, kept away from me. I alone am the positive, and no content is valid in and for itself, it has no more affirmation in itself, but only in so far as I set it; the true and the good is only my being convinced, and to the fact that something is good, only this my being convinced, this my recognition belongs. In this ideality of all determinations I alone am the real.*²¹

Having shut the individual within its subjective self, Hegel takes Kant's rejection of any attempts to speak of an objective Absolute (as God, Spirit, Knowledge, and Freedom) as unwarranted fancies beyond the limits to reason. Hegel continues:

19. Hegel, "Addendum" to the *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaft* (1830) GW X: 237. The italicized clause underscores Hegel's Absolute Idealism that 'ideas' exist 'in and for themselves' and are only 'recollected' in a Platonic sense. Note the thundering silence with respect to Kant's notion of autonomous, creative freedom that is the core of Kant's 'practical reason.'

20. F.C. Baur equated Kant and Schleiermacher with this Hegelian notion of abstract subjectivity closed in upon itself: "[...] all objective content disappears, only what is established out of myself is valid, I alone am positive, real [*Reale*]. From this perspective, the highest is not truth, not knowledge of God but objective content [*Inhalt*] has disappeared into formal subjectivity. No religion is possible on the basis of this contentless [*inhaltslosen*] perspective because I am the affirmative. All content [*Inhalt*], agency, and life comes from me; I have only a dead, empty God, a so-called highest essence, and this emptiness, this representation remains only subjective and never comes to true objectivity." See Baur, *Gnosis*: 666–667.

21. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion* GW XVI: 181–182.

This point of view [of Kantian abstract subjectivity] now first presents itself as that of humility, and this humility consists in the fact that the I excludes the infinite, knowledge and cognition of God from itself, renounces it and determines itself as finite against it. However, this humility refutes itself and is, rather, arrogance because I exclude just the true from me, so that I as this one in this world am only the affirmative and the in and for itself existing, against which everything else disappears. *True humility would rather renounce itself [...] and recognize only the true [Absolute Spirit] and that which exists in and for Itself as the affirmative.* On the other hand, false humility, by recognizing the finite as the negative, limited, makes itself simultaneously the only affirmative, infinite and absolute: I, this one, am alone the only essential being, i.e. I, this finite, am the infinite. The infinite as otherworldly is only set by me [...] Because knowledge of something higher falls away and only the subjective emotion, the desire remains, nothing objectively common unites individuals, and, in the arbitrary diversity of their feelings, they are hostilely directed against each other with hatred and contempt.²² emphasis added)

These are by no means new themes for Hegel here in the *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*. They are the core themes of his article "Faith and Knowledge or the Philosophy of Subjective Reflection in its Comprehensive Form Found in Kantian, Jacobian, and Fichtean Philosophy."²³ Strauß refers to this article in his response to the criticisms of his *LJ* in Pamphlet III of his *Streitschriften*²⁴ and in his article on "Schleiermacher and Daub."²⁵

Hegel presented a formulation of his definition of 'theoretical reason's 'synthesis' in distinction from 'practical reason's 'analytic' in his "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" of 1802 and maintained it across his career. 'Synthesis' is the identification of the unity (idea) in common to multiplicity (a set of phenomena) that consciousness accomplishes by dialectic. Here in the "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten," he defines Kant's 'moral law' as a maxim of subjective arbitrariness (constructivism):

[...] [W]hat Kant recognizes very well, as the one who has presented the[...] abstraction of the concept in its absolute purity, is that practical reason lacks all the material of law, and that it can make nothing more than make its supreme law *a maxim of arbitrariness* the form [representation] of appropriateness [*Tauglichkeit*]. A maxim of arbitrariness has a content [*Inhalt*] of abstraction, and includes a determinateness in itself; pure will, on the other hand, is free of the determinations of particularities. The absolute law of practical reason is to raise these particular determinations into the form of pure unity, and the formulation of this determinateness is the law [...]. However, the matter [*Materie*] of the maxim remains what it is, a determinateness or particularity; and *the generality which grants it admission into the form is thus an absolute, analytic unity*; and if the unity granted

22. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion* GW XVI: 182–183.

23. See Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen oder die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjektivität in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen als Kantische, Jacobische und Fichtesche Philosophie" (1802) in *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie*, F.W.J. Schelling and G.W.F. Hegel, eds., I/1 (1802): GW II: 287–433.

24. Strauß, (1837), *Streitschriften* III: 149

25. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 126.

to it is expressed purely as what it is, in a proposition, then the proposition is an analytic and a tautology.²⁶ (emphasis added)

For Hegel, Kant's "principle of a universal legislation of the law" of practical reason is an 'analytical' generalization from particulars, and Hegel claims that a generalization from particulars *can never result in an [absolute] moral law*.

According to Hegel, 'theoretical reason's' abstract content [*Inhalt*] is an 'idea' of 'pure reason,' 'practical reason's' 'abstract content' [*Inhalt*] is a capricious, subjective *construction*, a 'maxim of arbitrariness.' Practical reason variably elevates an analytical maxim to be a tautological (I say it, so it is so), absolute moral law.²⁷

I address in greater detail Hegel's claims for 'practical reason' in Chapter 7. However, for my purposes here, it is important to present succinctly just what Hegel means by 'pure reason' (Absolute Spirit), 'theoretical reason' (bottom-up thought that is grounded in but recollects/re-members an 'idea' of Absolute Spirit as the 'true' synthesis of all representations), and 'practical reason' (top-down, arbitrary, analytical, and tautological declaration of a 'law' as a subjective, 'arbitrary maxim'). *According to Hegel, 'pure reason' In-Itself is Absolute Spirit's 'thought' without the imagination; 'theoretical reason' is 'true' thought that identifies the 'idea' of Absolute Spirit that is the 'correct' synthetic unity of in the midst of the dialectical differences that arise in the imagination; and 'practical reason' is the activity of the imagination to generate a law by means of the 'maxim of arbitrariness' (not an 'idea' of Absolute Spirit as with 'theoretical reason') to govern finite consciousness' agency in the world.*

When it comes to 'pure,' 'theoretical,' and 'practical' reason, the only thing that Hegel and the early Strauß share with Kant are their labels. They take their own 'dead metaphors' (concepts) to exhaust the meaning of *what are in Kant 'living metaphors.'* *What now follows demonstrates the narrow, anachronistic, and vicious hermeneutical circle that shapes their reading of Kant's far broader, open-ended philosophical reflections.*

I examine Hegel's 'theoretical Spirit' and contrast it with Kant's 'theoretical reason' by means of two themes: I. Critique and II. Absolute Knowledge.

I. Critique

Kant's Critique is Discernment of Conditions for Understanding

As necessary and valuable as such an *analytical, a posteriori* criticism is (and Kant, too, acknowledged its value), 'criticism' is far narrower than Kant's 'critique'. By

26. Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 460.

27. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 460.

‘critique’ Kant means the investigation of the *a priori* conditions that are required in order for a set of phenomena to be experienced, whatsoever.

Plato and Hegel/Strauß take reason to be ‘absolute’ whereas Kant takes reason to be a deduction drawn from finite experience in the world. In short, Kant defends neither Plato’s system of eternally unchanging ideas nor any form of Hegelian, absolute, meta-ontological Absolut Spirit as the alpha and omega of causal explanation of history. Kant’s concern with intellectual capacities in general (and reason in particular) is that they are required in order to understand finite experience in the world. Kant says:

We count three abilities among the higher powers of cognition: understanding, judgment, and reason. These three are manifested in the three propositions of the syllogism of reason (*Sätz des Vernunftschlusses*). Understanding is the faculty of the rule, *major propositio*; judgment is the faculty of the *subsumptio* under the rule, *minor propositio*; reason is the conclusion, where I apply to the given case what the rule says in general.²⁸

There is nothing said here about humanity’s cognitive capacities as justification for invoking an eternal order of ‘Being’ above ‘Becoming’ as the case with Plato or as justification for embracing a meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit as the case with Hegel. Humanity’s finite, transcendental capacities are required not as a source of ultimate explanation but as the conditions for there to be conscious, finite experience in the world.

Given that we don’t experience ‘things-in-themselves’ but only their appearances (and NOT, originally, as formed images), *what is most certain* (given our experience of appearances!) is not any judgment we might draw about the ‘object’ of investigation. Rather, we have *certainty* only with respect to whatever conditions and capacities are required in order to experience the appearances of the ‘object’ of investigation as we do. Remove these conditions and capacities, and we cannot experience.

In *Metaphysik Mrongovius* Kant distinguishes between dogmatic and critical ‘science:’

A method is dogmatic when I take indemonstrable grounds to be the basis of knowledge upon which I construct other knowledge.

A method is critical when I investigate the grounds themselves with respect to their manner of formation – with respect to the mental potency from which they arise and according to their possibility of how they could arise *a priori*.²⁹

Succinctly, Kant says in *Metaphysik Mrongovius*: “Critical method is not concerned with knowledge itself or its object but with understanding.”³⁰ (emphasis added) In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant pointed out that “The dogmatic solution is [...] not only uncertain, but impossible. The critical solution, which allows of complete

28. Kant, *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1036; Olms ed.: 209.

29. Kant, *Metaphysik Mrongovius* AA XXIX: 938.

30. Kant, *Metaphysik Mrongovius* AA XIX: 939.

certainty [because it identifies what is *required* for understanding] does not consider the question objectively, but in relation to the foundation of [the conditions required for] knowledge [...].”³¹

For that reason, it is not objective but [universally] subjective. When I assume a principle in philosophy, I must be able to provide evidence of it [*muß ich es erst bewiesen haben*]. If I am unable to provide evidence [*kann ich nicht beweisen*], it is questionable and of no use. *If it contains a contradiction, I am unable to use any knowledge drawn from it because its metaphysics takes us beyond experience, and I am unable to test a the philosophical principle.* When it comes to this form of metaphysics, critique is most crucial [...] *To the extent that metaphysics is constructed on the basis of critique, it safeguards us from error.* Consequently, critique is a bulwark in religion against all speculative doubts [...] [...] When I separate pure knowledge of reason from empirical knowledge in the science of understanding, this [separated] collection is a metaphysics of [...] the science of reason]. It is incredibly useful in science to distinguish knowledge of reason from empirical knowledge in order all the more clearly to see mistakes. *Metaphysics is philosophy's spirit. Metaphysics is related to philosophy as wine spirits [spiritus vini] is to wine. It refines our elementary concepts and makes it easier for us to understand all sciences. In short, metaphysics is the greatest culture of the human mind.*³² (emphasis added)

Kant is not saying here that one's philosophical principles must be capable of a *posteriori* or a *a priori* 'proof'. He commences with 'assumptions' that are *required* for theoretical and practical reason to be possible *in this world*,³³ not with an insistence on absolute, logical necessity as the case with Hegel, and says that one must provide evidence both perceptible (empirical) and imperceptible (metaphysical) for one's philosophical assumptions. One must deduce them out of the relationalities within the appearances of experience. Furthermore, neither the perceptible nor the imperceptible 'evidence' may involve contradiction. Otherwise, there can be no certainty – although non-contradiction in itself is no guarantee of certainty. One's deductions must fit into the entire 'architectonic' of reason.³⁴

For example, the Copernican solar system's substitution of a heliocentric for a geocentric assumption is incapable of proof merely on the basis of a *posteriori* appear-

31. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 512.

32. Kant, *Metaphysik Mrongovius* AA XXIX: 939–940.

33. See, for example, Kant's rejection of Johann Georg Sulzer's claim that one day there will be a proof for the existence of God and the afterlife in *Critique of Pure Reason* B 769–770. Kant also recognizes that there will also never be any disproof of God and the afterlife. For transcendental consciousness the only issue here is how God and the afterlife function for the furthering of theoretical and practical reason *in this world*, not as a motivation for one's moral effort in this life for fear over God's judgment in the afterlife.

34. See Section 3: "The Architectonic of Pure Reason" of "The Transcendental Method" in the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 860–879.

ances because it is 'contrary to perceptible experience.'³⁵ There is no position that one can take on this planet that the sun doesn't 'appear' to circle the earth. What one 'empirically experiences,' however, is precisely a set of appearances, not the sun in-itself, the earth in-itself, or the imperceptible, causal relationality between them. Although empirical appearances alone cannot guarantee adequate understanding, understanding of the empirical appearances requires that the concepts used to make sense of them not be incompatible with the appearances – again, a key difference with Hegel, who maintained that truth of even false, *sensible perception* is the idea of *intellectual perception that is 'appropriate' to them*, which effectively eliminates representations of having any effect on 'truth.'³⁶

When it comes to the appearances of the Copernican system, then, they can be accounted for by two different philosophical assumptions: dogmatic or critical. Kant claims that, whichever assumption I take, I must demonstrate not only its consistency with the empirical appearances but also with the imperceptible *a priori*, coherent, metaphysical, lawful elements that ground understanding. In other words, although the starting and ending point of all reflection is appearances, understanding of appearances requires a 'metaphysics' that must be *added to* the appearances, which, in turn, must be compatible with the appearances for proper understanding. It is this metaphysics that constitutes the required, imperceptible, yet internally consistent, 'architectonic' of lawful order³⁷ to adequately account for the appearances. Copernicus (as well as the Islamic world) provided the imperceptible (hence, metaphysical) mathematics that demonstrated the consistency of the heliocentric system. Without the imperceptible metaphysics of mathematics, though, the appearances are accounted for only by a mere aggregate of indemonstrable, contradictory, dogmatic principles. "*In short, metaphysics is the greatest culture [which is concerned with the cultivation of the universal capacities] of the human mind.*"

A bit later Kant adds:

Therefore, it was, to be sure, necessary to examine the capacity of understanding, its scope, limits, and barriers as well as to find a benchmark or criteria of truth according to which one can demonstrate the validity of such pure³⁸ concepts, which correspond to no object in experience. Were they to be derived from concepts in experience they, correctly, would raise doubt. The task of examining the capacity of understanding] is the business of critical philosophy.³⁹

35. See McGaughey, "The Incomplete Copernican Revolution in Popular Legend, the Natural Sciences, and in Practical Reason (Morality)." <https://criticalidealism.org/incomplete-copernican-revolution-27-october-2016/>

36. Hegel claims in the "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" that "only philosophy can determine if something is a subjective opinion or objectively true" (GW II: 511) and it is possible that the sensible form can "fully lose its truth" (GW II: 516–517).

37. See the methodological conclusion to the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 860–879.

38. On Kant's meaning of a 'pure' concept, see: 558, n. 109.

39. Kant, *Metaphysik Moronovius* AA XXIX: 954–955.

Analytical, *a posteriori* criticism of empirical phenomena *presupposes* everything involved in transcendental critique of the conditions of possibility and capacities upon which it depends. Critique is *a priori* and *synthetic* – to be sure, distinct (but never separated) from *a posteriori*, *analytical criticism*. In other words, Strauß' notion of *a posteriori* criticism (as well as Foucault's – see below) presupposes the *a priori*, imperceptible conditions and capacities of the human mind that make it possible for the historian to encounter the empirical phenomena, in the first place, which s/he then analyses *a posteriori*. A *a posteriori* critique is always shrouded with doubt because it has no foundation other than a dogmatic dictum – even before we begin to consider the Heideggerian notion of the Being-of beings (and possible, naturalistic Negative Theology⁴⁰) of concealed possibilities in all manifest actualities.

Evidenced by his focus on 'understanding' as the crucial moment of dis-closure of possibilities in §32 of *Being and Time*⁴¹ and the failure of science and technology to think beyond actuality in "The Question Concerning Technology"⁴², Heidegger is concerned only with what Kant calls 'theoretical reason' (nowhere does he address Kant's 'practical reason' of morality). He takes finite 'Dasein' to be the location where Being "shatters against Being,"⁴³ and, as "[...] the site of openness, the there [*Da*]," is the

40. See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, trans. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962): 499, n. xiii (German: 427, n. 1). I would translate the decisive final sentence of the footnote: "Whether the *via negationis et eminentiae* [influx and emanation] could offer a possible way to do this is anyone's guess.

41. See Heidegger, *Being and Time*: 188–195 (German: 148–153).

42. See Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, William Lovitt, trans. (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1977): 3–35.

43. See Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Ralph Manheim, trans. (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1961) 137. The circularity that is Being coming to awareness of itself in Dasein is obvious. Heidegger even articulates the circle as a '*must be the case*' in "Vom Wesen des Grundes" in *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978): 132–133: "The un-concealment [*Aletheia*/truth as *Un-verborgenheit*] of Being [...] is always the truth of the Being of being, may this [ontic] being be real or not [an echo of Hegelian 'indifference']. Conversely, in the unconcealment of Being there is always and already, as such, the truth of its Being. Ontic and ontological truth concern differently *being in its Being* and the *Being-of being*. They essentially belong together because of their relation to the *difference of Being* and [ontic] *being* (ontological difference). Hence, the necessarily ontologically bifurcated essence of truth in general is only possible with the opening up of this difference. Stated differently, if now that which distinguishes Dasein lies in the fact that it relates the understanding of Being to [ontic] being, then *this being-able-to-distinguish*, in which the ontological difference becomes factual, *must have its very possibility* because its roots arise out of the ground that is Dasein's essence. We call this ground of the ontological difference, anticipatively, Dasein's *transcendence*." (partial emphasis added)

"[...] site for the disclosure of Being [*Sein*]"⁴⁴ as "the place-holder of No-thing,"⁴⁵ which is the "ontological difference."⁴⁶ Heidegger criticizes Kant's use of the terminology of 'transcendence' in Transcendental Consciousness precisely for Kant's having presupposed the 'ontological difference.' Heidegger's reading of Kant is that his concern for the *conditions of possibility* of experience of a world limits Kant to the 'ontic' absent the 'ontological' revealing/concealing of the deeper, *transcendental possibilities* that are the Being-of beings:

For Kant, transcendental concerns the "*possibility*" (the enabling) of [critical/*kritische*] cognition, which, not unjustly, "flies over" experience as experience itself but not as "transcendence." The transcendental thus provides [...the] definition of non-transcendental human being as [concerned with] *possible* ontic cognition. With a more radical and universal version of the essence of transcendence [obviously, with Heidegger's investigation grounded in the ontological difference], however, a more original elaboration of the idea of ontology and thus of metaphysics is necessarily required.⁴⁷

According to Heidegger, humanity experiences a profound circularity in its temporality that it cannot escape.⁴⁸ To be sure, this circularity is not a representation of forms emanating out of Oneness to return to Oneness of Gnosticism (and Hegel) or the Negative Theology of Pseudo-Dionysius, but, nonetheless, one has here with Heidegger a horizontal circularity similar to Hegel's reclined Plato. The difference between them is the difference between a 'Absolute Spirit' and 'concealed possibilities'. Hegel is a Pan-en-theist⁴⁹ for whom ultimate reality is 'beyond' historical nature, whereas Heidegger is a Pan-naturalist, for whom ultimate reality is 'concealed' in nature. Neither Hegel nor Heidegger have any interest in morality. Hegel seeks to

44. Heidegger writes in "Vom Wesen des Grundes" in *Wegmarken*: 157: "Entering the world is not a process of a thing's entrance, but something that "happens with" a thing. This happening is the existing of Dasein, which transcends as existing. The hour and day of entrance in the world of a thing occurs only if in the Allness of things, a thing exists in the way of the temporality that is Dasein. *Only when this primal history that is transcendence happens, that is, when a thing with the character of Being-in-the-world [Dasein] breaks in, is there the possibility that an [ontic] thing reveals itself.*" (emphasis added)

45. Heidegger describes Dasein as the 'place-holder' of the ontological difference in "Was ist Metaphysik?" in *Wegmarken* 117 as follows: "Dasein's holding itself in the nothingness that is the ground of hidden anxiety makes a human being the placeholder of nothingness. We are so finite that we are not able to bring ourselves originally before nothingness by our own will and decision. So abysmally does finitude dig into existence that our freedom is denied its own and deepest finitude."

46. See Heidegger, "Vom Wesen des Grundes" in *Wegmarken*: 123 describes the ontological difference as follows: "The ontological difference is the not between things [*Seiende*] and Being [*Sein*]. As little as Being is a nothing as a not to things is a nothing in the sense of the *nihil negativum*, so little is the difference as the not between thing and Being only the figment of a distinction of the understanding (*ens rationis*).

47. Heidegger, *Vom Wesen des Grundes*: 138.

48. See Heidegger, *Being and Time*: 362–364 (German 314–316).

49. On Hegel as a Pan-en-theist, see; 214, n. 1.

escape the pain and suffering of the world (not sin), and Heidegger passively sits on his hands waiting for the Being-of beings to 'come'.

Heidegger's horizontal circularity, though, consists of the No-thing that is concealed possibilities in the midst of things that only Dasein, as far as we know, is capable of understanding as an ambiguous 'revealing'/'concealing' of possibilities in the encounter with actuality. It is a circularity, however, that presupposes Kant's *a priori* synthetic structures⁵⁰ not only of 'theoretical reason' concerned with understanding, but also overlooks the *a priori* synthetic structures of 'practical reason' (moral responsibility on the part of the individual⁵¹), as well as Kant's emphasis on the significance of aesthetic judgment in which beauty is a 'symbol of the moral' and the sublime elevates humanity to its moral capacity).⁵² Unfortunately, ignoring morality (Kant's practical reason), Heidegger never grasped more than a theoretical reason of subreption with its emphasis on the 'objective,' passive, causal nature of the 'event'⁵³ of the Being-of beings as manifesting concealment.⁵⁴

50. In fact, Heidegger reverses Kant's labels of 'synthetic' and 'analytic'. See Chapter 6: Grand Narratives of Theoretical Reason:" 700, n. 178.

51. See Heidegger's discussion of 'culture' as what 'man' prizes as driving motivation in "Science and Reflection" in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*: 135

52. See Kant, *Anthropology in a Pragmatic Sense* AA VII: 243 and below Chapter 9: "Missing Aesthetic Judgment:" the section "4) On the Relationship of Beauty and the Sublime to the **Moral**:" 905.

53. Dasein's 'passivity' is clear, for example, in Heidegger, "Über den 'Humanismus'" in *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit: Mit einem Brief über den 'Humanismus'* (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1975): 79: "Man [...] is not only a living being who possesses language among other abilities. Far more, the language is the house of the being. Dwelling in it, humanity *ek-sists* [as the clearing in which the Being-of beings becomes aware of itself], by belonging to the truth of Being and guarding it." See as well, Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, Vol. 65 of the Gesamtausgabe, Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann, ed. (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 2003).

54. Martin Heidegger claims in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington.: Indiana University Press, 1968): 40–42, that, Kant is trapped in a dualism between 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity'. Heidegger's claim is that, having identified in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* the centrality of the imagination in reason as 'the common, unknown root' uniting Kant's dualism of perception and understanding, Kant recoiled in horror over the irrationality upon which reason was grounded so that in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the imagination is absent. (See Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 173–174.) This is a ridiculous ignoring of the continued presence and functioning of the transcendental imagination in the second edition as it is a mis-reading of Kant's grounding of transcendental reason in autonomous freedom, which is the condition of possibility of the imagination. Ernst Cassirer pointed out the absence of any psychological trauma on Kant's part in "Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Bemerkungen zu Martin Heideggers Kant-Interpretation," *Kant-Studien* 36 (1931): 1–26. In fact, in *Metaphysik Mrongovius* (AA XXIX: 960 ff.), one finds Kant speaking of Heidegger's 'one thought' of the 'Being-of beings' as concealed possibilities.

One might be tempted to attribute this theme of concealed possibilities to Martin Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1979), originally published in 1926. However, it was already developed by Paul Natorp in his *Philosophische Systematik (Lectures 1922/1923)* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000) that originated as lectures in 1922/1923 but not published until 1958 (see for example, 276 ff.). Natorp and Heidegger had long conversations on walks while Heidegger taught in Marburg

Kant calls an 'analytic' judgment elucidating (*erläuternd*) and an *a priori* 'synthetic' judgment supplementing (*erweiternd*).⁵⁵ The synthesis that arises out of dialectic is an analytical elucidation [*Erläuterung*] of something in common to the thesis and antithesis. It is an *a posteriori*, analytical elucidation. Kant's notion of an *a priori* synthetic judgment refers to all those required elements that one must *add* (*and have added*) [supplementing/*Erweiterung*] to empirical phenomena in order to experience, understand, and exercise (responsible) agency in the world. Such synthetic elements include our grasp of the 'laws' of nature that govern our understanding of physical events ('what is') and of morality that govern the exercising of our agency ('what ought to be'). Synthetic elements include, as well, the schema of concepts (never a lone concept) that we must employ to classify phenomena. They include, in addition, even more rarified ideas like the non-anthropomorphic (or at least, non-literally anthropomorphic⁵⁶), Noumenal unity (God) that as the presupposed origin of our universe as well as the presupposed enduring identity of the self (soul) and the presupposed extra-

from 1923–1928 so that it is not a stretch to believe that Heidegger has the theme directly from Natorp. Nonetheless, even Natorp is not the origin. Otto Willmann speaks of *aletheia* as *Un-verborgenheit* (un-covering). See Otto Willmann, *Geschichte des Idealismus. Band 1*: 188–189. The theme can be taken, as well, as the claim by Plato that the good is "above being" (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας) as the culmination of his similes of the sun and line in the *Republic* (509b). The theme is also found in Aristotle. See Heinz Happ, *Hyle. Studien zum Aristotelischen Materie Begriff* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971): 687: "Alle Einzelfälle von ἐνέργεια gründen im *Actus purus*, von δύναμις in der 'reinen Möglichkeit,' die als 'Urgegensatz' Dynamis/Energeia einander gegenüberstehen."

As I mention above, it appears to have already been engaged by Kant in *Metaphysik Mrongovius*. A case can be at least proposed that this theme provides a coherent framework for what, otherwise, is taken to be 'wild ramblings' in Kant's *Opus Postumum* (AA XVIII). In *Immanuel Kant. Vernunft und Leben* (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 2007), Volker Gerhardt proposes that the *Opus Postumum* confirms that Kant's project failed (*scheitert*) (342) because only in humanity did Kant (342) overcome the famous "gap" (*Kluft*) announced in the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* (AA V: 195) between reason and the perceptible, material world (288–289). According to Gerhardt, Kant believed that humanity alone constitutes the "middle concept" (*Mittelbegriff*) between God and the world (342–343) as the being capable of grasping the "living activity" (*lebendige Tätigkeit*) to establish the "unity" of an otherwise fragmented totality (342). Gerhardt says that Kant never sought a connecting link between reason and the perceptible world by means of the notion of "Being" (*Sein*) (341–342). However, Gerhardt appears to overlook that the "gap" remains only so long as "Being" is taken to be same kind of substance that connects two ontologically distinct dimensions of experience. However, once one makes the critical turn to conditions of possibility, as Kant appears to do in both the *Metaphysik Mrongovius* and *Opus Postumum*, rather than objective, substance claims, the "living activity" (*lebendige Tätigkeit*) that constitutes the condition for any and all experience of totality is no longer just a necessary assumption (*Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 183) of humanity's reflecting judgment but applicable to all phenomena, not just humanity, as *the horizon of possibility that is the condition for all dynamism both perceptible and imperceptible*.

55. See Kant, *Metaphysik Mrongovius* AA XXIX: 968.

56. See Kant, *Prolegomena* AA IV: 356. See as well, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 724–725; B 728 and *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 353.

ordinary causal system that makes it possible for us consciously to initiate sequences of events that nature could never accomplish on its own (cosmology/freedom).⁵⁷

For Strauß, then, what Kant means by 'critique' was and remains a never examined black hole because Kant's broader notion of critique is concerned with what is required in order for Strauß to encounter his historical phenomena, whatsoever. Transcendental consciousness is not directly perceptible in the senses. However, it is 'pure' not because it is dualistically separate from 'impure,' sinful sensuousness (as Strauß would have us believe) but because it is a set of imperceptible conditions that make sensuous experience possible. We would never think to identify such required, imperceptible, transcendental elements were we not in a world/universe of phenomena calling for our attention, understanding, and responsible agency with respect to them.⁵⁸

Strauß' Metaphysics in the *Glaubenslehre*: The Dialectical Logic of Negation as Ultimate, Causal Explanation

Strauß's disaffection with the Hegelians was not merely because even the Left-Wing Hegelians rejected his Christology but also because he rejected Hegel's reclining Plato, meta-narrative of Double Negation. In the *Glaubenslehre*, Strauß doesn't criticize Hegel for his anthropomorphic projections (as does Feuerbach) but for his 'Docetism':

[...][F]inite things collapse into a commonality [*Allgemeinheit*] because they annul one another [*sich aufheben*] by an endless alternation of becoming and passing away whose commonality no longer behaves as their cause but as their substance. [According to Leibniz] the cosmological argument proves a necessary Being but as an eternal being/substance [*Grundwesen*], not as a Being external to the world [as with Personal Theism].

57. Rather than focus on 'synthesis' as supplementing ('*erweiternd*'), Heidegger focusses on the function of Kant's notion of 'synthesis' as apprehension (*Apprehension*). See Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*: 340 ff. He offers an elucidation (*Erläuterung*) of 'synthesis' as the activity of the imagination as a unifying grasping (*Auf-greifen*) of phenomena. See *ibid.*, 345–346. His discussion focuses on the empirical phenomena, not on the supplementing ('*erweiternde*'), synthetic activity of a *a priori* judgment. In other words, he presupposes Kant's notion of a *a priori* synthetic judgment. This results in his giving an account of apprehension as 'Syndosis' (his term, *ibid.*: 347) not 'Syn-thesis' as the 'givenness' of phenomena by means of a 'gathering together' (*Zusammennehmen*) of phenomena, not Kant's synthetic 'adding to' the phenomena. See *ibid.*, 347. Consequently, Heidegger focuses, of course, on his own 'pre-ontological' notion of temporality as simultaneous future, past, present. He engages Kant's 'synthetic judgment,' then, as an example of 'anticipatory resoluteness'. See Heidegger, "¶ 62. Anticipatory Resoluteness as the Way in which Dasein's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole has Existentiell Authenticity," 352 ff (German 305 ff.) and "¶ 68. The Temporality of Disclosedness in General," 384–401 (German 335–350).

58. Kant wrote in the *Prolegomena* AA IV: 293: "My idealism concerns not the existence of things (the doubting of which, however, constitutes idealism in the ordinary sense), since it never came into my head to doubt the existence of things" (McG: translation)

This transformation of the causal relationship between God and the world into a relationship of substance appears in Hegel in such a way that the usual opinion of a positive relation between the starting-point as well as the end-point of the conclusion are converted into a relationship of negation. According to Hegel, we aren't required to think of God as existing because the world exists but because the world does not correspond to true Being, can't calm thinking, and must advance thought through its imagining of the world to determine the idea of God. The negation of the Being of the World is the bond of elevation. This means that *the world, to be sure, comes into being but only as appearance, not absolute truth*. Rather, *Absolute Truth is beyond appearances* and is only in God. God alone is true Being. Thinking worldly existence means to strip away the particularities of form and accidents to grasp it as a universal and necessary Being, which is different from worldly existence: to think of worldly existences as God [footnote to Hegel's Encyclopedia, § 50]. What else does this mean but that for common understanding the world is an aggregate of particular, randomly accidental things under laws. [Proper] *knowledge negates these things as existing particulars and ascends to a universal Unity, which goes out of Itself and returns to Itself (that is, a Unity that is related to particular things as substance to accidents)*.⁵⁹ (emphasis added)

In the *Glaubenslehre*, Strauß turned to Jakob Böhme and Spinoza to justify his own divine Immanentism by substituting a Böhmean understanding of linear negation for Hegel's account of the meta-narrative of Negation. In short, Strauß rejected the cyclical, meta-narrative Metaphysics of Negation, but he retained a linear Metaphysics of Negation for explaining the creative process of the historical world.

The difference between Hegel and Spinoza is that Spinoza's 'substance' has neither thought nor Spirit but only 'nullification of finitude' (influx without emanation):

What distinguishes the Hegelian Absolute as substance, which is simultaneously subject, from Spinoza's mere substance? The difference with respect to whether the Absolute is determined to be only substance or Spirit, Hegel says [...], depends entirely on whether thought, which annihilates [*vernichtet*] its finitude and mediations (negates its negation) and, thereby, grasps the One Absolute, is conscious of that knowledge of absolute substance or isn't conscious of it. *Substance must be the nullification [Aufgehobensein] of finitude*. One says with this that substance is the Negation of Negation because only negation is allocated to finitude. *As Negation of Negation, substance is absolute Affirmation and, equally, unmediated freedom and self-determination. God is not a dead but a living God. He is even more as living, He is Spirit and eternal love [...]; ([T]he teacher [... Hegel] continues:)* and is this [living Spirit and eternal love] only because *His Being is not abstract but in Itself moving difference, and in that person different from Him is His self-knowledge*.⁶⁰ (emphasis added)

59. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 382–383.

60. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 514–515. True to his own inclusive Christological convictions, Strauß asks here: "Do we think [this Person] as God's Son, according to Church claims, or as humanity to the extent that God is conscious of Himself?"

Strauß agrees with Hegel's criticism of Spinoza's substance:

Hegel explains that Spinozism is an inadequate philosophy that takes reflection and its inadequate definition to be an external thought in that substance includes thought only with respect to its unity with extension (that is, not as separated from extension), thereby neither as defining and forming nor as the returning out of itself as the origin of movement. That is, Spinoza thinks of substance only with respect to its nullity [Aufhebung] of established determination, not as the determiner of determinedness. He acknowledges only the return of all things to it [substance]; not, equally, the recurring emanation out of it. [Figuratively], he speaks only of its system of veins, not its arteries so that he doesn't conceive of substance as a life cycle⁶¹ [...] Hence, his substance is [...] neither Person nor Spirit.⁶² (emphasis added)

However, rather than embrace Hegel's notion of Spirit as a cyclical process of emanation and influx (cataphasis and apophasis), Strauß turns to Jakob Böhme's conception of finite negation to account for a linear, open-ended historical process that involves an inseparable interface between Spirit and matter.

Tertullian's nihil est incorporale nisi quod non est [there is nothing incorporal unless it is not] is not so inconsistent as it is usually taken to be. If Absolute Affirmation (actus purus) [...] is thought simultaneously as Absolute Negativity, it contains, as well, the First Negation or the placing of matter as well as the physical world. Except that this First Negation, as J. Böhme claimed, is neither the holy light of God Himself nor God's body but the self-determining presupposition for the realization of Him as Spirit.⁶³ (emphasis added)

Strauß affirms Böhme's metaphysical 'logic' of Negation. *Logic is Spirit and it is inseparable from matter. Yet, the One is unmovable without repulsiveness.* Böhme's Theosophy constitutes the 'essential complement' to Spinoza.⁶⁴

Whereas Spinoza taught that all things return to the eternal One and as true as this is: Böhme shows us [...] why the multiplicity of [particular] things emanate out of this eternal One rather than that the Being of this One were a Not-Being. Böhme developed an endless number of metaphors [...] in order to graphically portray the Negativity of the illimited [One]. This great breadth without end – he said, entirely sensorily – desired limitation and comprehensibility by which it could reveal Itself. *A breadth without limit could not reveal Itself. In order for Its revelation to occur, an attraction and enclosure had to occur. [...], [W]ere the will to belong to only a Single Unique Being, the mind would have only a single quality, an unmovable thing that was eternally still, and could do nothing but remain One Thing.* It would have no joy, no knowledge, neither art nor science of more than One, and would be no truth. Everything would be a Nothing, and there would, in fact, be neither a mind nor will to do something because everything would be only the One.

61. In fact, Spinoza's substance "[...] is abstract, not yet concrete; is rigid and dead, without living movement in itself." Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 508

62. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 515.

63. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 558.

64. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 508–509.

Consequently, one can not say that God is One Will and Being [...] *No thing without repulsiveness can reveal itself* [...] It can no nothing of its original state. Almost completely finitely, Jakob Böhme expresses these thoughts [...]: the reader should know that *everything consists of 'Yes!' and 'No!' – whether godly, diabolical, earthly, or whatever. The One as 'Yes!' is vain power and love and is divine truth and God Himself. In itself, this 'Yes!' would be unknowable to itself and would have no joy or relevance or sensibility without the 'No!' 'No!' is the alternative to 'Yes!' or truth by which truth is revealed and is something within which there is a contradiction (Contrarium) by which eternal love is operative, sensitive, and desiring. The One has nothing in itself that it can desire.*⁶⁵ *Therefore, it doubles itself that it is two. In One-ness, it cannot experience Itself, but in Two-ness it can experience itself.*⁶⁶ (emphasis added)

Strauß takes Böhme's account of the First Negation to be the metaphysical logic driving the on-going *linear, creative process* that is the world. However, where Böhme was shocked by the infinity of finite endlessness, Strauß was taking a step on the path to his materialism at which he arrived by *The Old and the New Faith* of 1872:

[Böhme says in his *Deutsche Theologie* Kap. 29:] "*God [...] in Himself without creatures is original and essential, but not formed and actual; and God desires that [what is in Him] be experienced because it is in Him for the purpose that it should be experienced and actualized.*" Kap. 49: "*The eternal will that is original and essential and without all creation and actuality, that same will is present in a human being or in a creature actually and operatively. Because to the will belongs and is in itself that it should desire; what is it otherwise? [...] [F]or that purpose the creature ought to be, and God wishes it to have [this] desire in order that this will have, and effect through it His [God's] own works – Were there to be no works or effects and such, what ought [...] God Himself to be? or what would He be? [Shocked by his own question, the author (Böhme) adds:] One must here turn back, stay and stand still; otherwise, one would want to come and crawl so far and wide that one no longer would know where one was or from where one must turn back.*"⁶⁷ (bracketed material from Strauß) (emphasis added)

Strauß claims here in the *Glaubenslehre* that divine creativity is not a docetic circular (Absolute Spirit's cataphatic emanation and apophatic influx) but a linear process of finite negation that is always on the way to the full realization of God: "This work [of negation], can it be other than the (development of nature) and world history, which the World Spirit [World Soul] assumes for itself because it is unachievable by any lesser consciousness? In this respect, *the Absolute is essentially a consequence [Resultat], is only at the end [of history] what it truly is. This is what constitutes its nature, actuality, subjectivity, or its self-development.*"⁶⁸

65. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 489: : "God, the Father, is not something itself, but only a desire to something, as the dark urge to self-revelation [...]" (emphasis added)

66. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 509–510.

67. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 638, n. 24.

68. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 513–514. He finds a compatriot in this thought, again, in Böhme: "[...] what kind of God is it whose body, essence, and power consists of fire, air, water, and earth? [...] I will

Nonetheless, for both Hegel's cataphatic/apophatic Docetism and Böhme's open-ended history, the narrowness of the metaphysical logic of negation takes logic to be a causal explanation of concrete events, which consists in an *a posteriori*, descriptive claim that insists that it is an abstract system of rules that governs thought, generally. Yet, logic is a canon without an organon,⁶⁹ Kant points out. An *a posteriori* logic of dialectic (Negation) is a descriptive account of events (a narrative), not a causal explanation of them.⁷⁰

In fact, in contrast to Plato's contemplation (θεωρία, *theoria*) by means of dialectic that claims to 'know' the ultimate 'Good' (and proleptically rejecting Hegel's dialectical logic for Absolute Spirit, Kant explicitly rejects the employment of dialectic to establish (prove) the ultimate elements that make possible experience, understanding,

give you a correct ground for divinity. Wherever this entire Being is not God, you are not the image of God [...] For you are created out of this God, and live in Him, and He gives you blessing, food, and drink incessantly out of his power. All of your science [*Wissenschaft*] is grounded in this God, and when you die, you will be buried in Him." (emphasis added) *Glaubenslehre* I: 555–556 (Strauß footnotes to Aurora, c. 22, 35, 23, 1 ff) "[...] [T]he sun and stars [...] are not sacred God but His body. The sacred God Himself is in the midst of all these things, and you can't see or conceive Him, but the soul conceives Him. He is concealed in His heaven, but this heaven is everywhere, even in you yourself." 556. (emphasis added) See as well, *Glaubenslehre* I: 574–575.

Schelling's formulation on divine personality is: "All consciousness is concentration, gathering, taking together, uniting with oneself. This negating power that is directed toward itself is the true power of personality [...]" *Glaubenslehre* I: 510–511; Strauß adds: "It's a pity that Böhme explicitly denied such a formulation. He says literally that God is no Person other than in Christ, but He [God] is the eternal birthing power and the kingdom of all beings [...] Böhme understands this negativity by means of which God experiences *Itself*, where he [Böhme] is scientifically clear, as the externalizing of God into the World of Nature and finite spirits. God lets Himself be personal only in the latter, or in the Church's representation, in Christ." *Glaubenslehre* I: 511 (emphasis added)

Speaking with Böhme, Strauß asks: If love is the basic determination of the divine will: In the divine relationship to the λόγος [Logos] love could realize itself eternally. If God is unthinkable without revelation of His Being, this revelation is eternally given in the begetting of the Son and the pouring out of the Spirit. However, to speak with Jakob Böhme, what is left to be said of the more brilliant light, the more powerful sound, the sharper perception which is only to be achieved by means of actual separation and finalization of divine power, that is, by means of the creation of a world? Or, with Lessing, *would the divine self-perception be complete in itself, were God to perceive His perfection only with respect to one of two possible ways; [1] Namely, everything together and mixed up [= Absolute Unity], not also as the case of the other way, [2] namely, each for itself and distinguished from the others [= Absolute Aggregate], that is, if He were to perceive Himself only as God, not also as World?*" *Glaubenslehre* I: 639–640.

69. See page 49, n. 36 and "Speculative Metaphysics and Science" in Chapter 1: 175, 176, and 177.

70. Kant's understanding of metaphysics is concerned, then, with the condition of possibility for even Strauß' divine, linear Immanentism. As such, it is grounded in 'necessity'. On the metaphor interference of 'necessity,' see the "Preface:" 42, n. 22. Kant, of course, usually speaks of the 'necessary' (or required) conditions of possibility of experience. The term 'necessary' can cause confusion by its association with the 'Principle of Sufficient Reason' (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*), which speaks of 'necessity' in the sense of causal determinism. However, Kant's metaphysics is not determining causes; it is enabling (*what is required* for experience) and, thereby, far broader than Immanentism. The latter is grounded in a narrow, naïve empiricism and analogies and subreptions of causal explanation.

and responsible agency in the world, *the three ideas of pure reason* (God, the soul/ enduring identity, and freedom/nature).⁷¹ He points out that they must be ‘deduced,’ but *unlike the categories of the understanding, which are deduced from sensation, the ideas of pure reason are deduced from an idea as necessary/required “[...] to represent to ourselves other objects in an indirect manner, namely in their systematic unity, by means of their relation to this idea.”*⁷²

[I]f they are to have the least objective validity, no matter how indeterminate that validity may be, and are not to be mere empty thoughts (*entia rationis ratiocinantis*), a deduction of them must be possible, however greatly (as we admit) it may differ from that which we have been able to give of the categories. This will complete the critical work of pure reason [...].⁷³

II. Absolute Knowledge

As with Hegel, the early Strauß understands that metaphysics is Spirit knowing Itself “in fully comprehending its substance” by ‘leaving its external existence behind’⁷⁴ grasping itself as “absolute or completely coherent knowledge.” To be sure, Hegel insists that it is *necessary* that Absolute Spirit ‘externalize’ itself in the ‘other,’ but this is a dogmatic, causal necessity veiled with this claim that “[s]cience [*Wissenschaft*] contains in itself this necessity that the form of pure Spirit externalize Itself ...”⁷⁵ This internal origin of ‘process’ remains a pure mystery in Hegel because it is a circular, logical argument for an ultimate cause of which, at best, one only experiences its effects. Nonetheless, it would seem that one can hardly have a ‘broader,’ more comprehensive, epistemology than one that is absolute. However, there are legitimate

71. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 697.

72. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 699.

73. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 197–698.

74. See G.W.F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie*: “Spirit that knows itself [...] grasps its own notion, immediate identity with itself; and this [...] is [...] the beginning from which we started.” GW III: 589–590 (Baillie trans.: 806) and, “[s]ince its accomplishment consists in Spirit knowing what It is, in fully comprehending its substance [McG: *seine Substanz, vollkommen zu Wissen*], this knowledge means Its concentrating Itself on Itself (*Insichgehen*), a state in which Spirit leaves Its external existence behind [...]” GW III: 590 (Baillie trans.: 807) See as well, Hegel’s account of the ‘absolute suffering or speculative Good Friday’ by which Absolute Spirit ‘restores Itself’ by arising ‘from Its deepest depths, at the same time all-embracing and in the most cheerful freedom of Its form.” Hegel, “Glauben und Wissen” GW II: 432–433.

75. Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 589 (Baillie: 806). This is a ‘necessity’ driven by dialectical logic, not reality itself. Logic, though, is a ‘canon,’ not a causal explanation. Hegel is insisting that he knows that his logic (canon) of absolute synthesis is a *necessary*, *a priori* causal explanation whereas an organon “requires that I already know the object of the knowledge to be brought about according to certain rules.” See Kant’s *Logic* AA IX: 13 ff. Hegel’s *necessity* of Absolute Spirit’s Double Negation is a vicious hermeneutical circle.

reasons to question the adequacy of their notion of ‘absolute’ reason (Absolute Spirit and theoretical reason). I will examine *four issues* with respect to its usage by Strauß:

- a) An Anthropomorphic Analogy: Hegel’s metaphysics is not grounded in Absolute Knowledge of causality but in an anthropomorphic analogy that places humanity on the throne of Spirit/God. As a claim for Absolute Knowledge, Hegel’s metaphysics is nothing remotely appropriate to Kant’s theoretical reason of finite, conscious understanding in the world. In the end, Hegel’s metaphysics is world-denying in the name of asserting the ‘truth’ of Absolute Spirit.
- b) A Flight of Fantasy in a Vacuum: Hegel’s Metaphysics’s absolute content [*Inhalt*] is claimed to be required for human knowledge. This metaphysics is no guarantee of ‘truth’ despite its claim for Absolute Knowledge, and it draws humanity *out of history*.
- c) In contrast to Hegel and the early Strauß, Kant’s ‘broader’ account of theoretical reason rests not on Absolute Knowledge of causality but on the interacting of ‘reflecting’ and ‘re-producing judgment [*reflektierende und bestimmende Urteilskraft*]. Reflecting judgment unites theoretical reason (understanding) and practical reason (responsible agency) in a creative, open-ended process of understanding and agency to the extent graspable by finite, transcendental consciousness *in history*. In other words, Kant’s transcendental necessities have nothing to do with a call *out of history*.
- d) Hegel and Kant on Nature and Freedom

I examine each of these four themes in detail:

a) Theoretical Reason’s Anthropomorphic Analogy rather than Absolute Knowledge:

The Hegelian meta-narrative and the early Strauß’ Immanentism of ‘theoretical reason’ are structured on a metaphysical dictum (*Machtspruch*) of Absolute Spirit, Absolute Unity, Absolute Freedom, and Absolute Reason. Although they reject the Personal Theism of Platonic Christianity, in fact, they share with Personal Theism that *Spirit means consciousness with its eternal Ideas, which are the true content of the world of particulars*,⁷⁶ which, in turn, are nothing but interchangeable ‘copies and shadows’ (logical place-holders) of the ‘true.’

Specifically, Strauß’ account of the creative process of the world in the *LJ*, taken from Hegel, as a process driven by the logic of ‘negation’ is grounded in the same metaphysical understanding of Logos (the divine thoughts of God) found in Person-

76. This was explicitly articulated by Feuerbach in his *Wesen der Religion* (1848–1849) (Berlin: Deutsche Bibliothek, 1913): Lecture 14: 134–135.

al Theism. Granted, Personal Theism employs the Logos for a top-down meta-narrative initiated by a Personal God outside of history and leading to fulfilment of creation and atonement of the individual with God in the next life. Granted as well, in dramatic contrast, Hegel's Panlogism is a 'horizontal' emanation and returning influx (but not top-down). Nonetheless, *Hegel's meta-narrative is a Gnostic cycle of expansion (ἐκστασις) and contraction (συστολή); cataphasis/κατάφασις and apophasis/ἀπόφασις*.⁷⁷ For his part, Strauß formulated a horizontal, linear Immanentism in 1835 as an *inclusive* Christology that consisted of an open-ended process of Spirit becoming aware of itself in and through the lives of all persons as the realization of the eternal Idea in history under the assumption that humanity as a species is eternal.⁷⁸

In other words, although the metaphysical order is the same, Personal Theism understands the Logos to be contained in the mind of an *external* deity over against the world with the world itself a copy and shadow of the Logos. Hegel and Strauß, in contrast, speak of the creative process of Spirit as *internal* to the natural order. Nonetheless, the process of creation is not random for either external Personal Theism or internal Immanentism. However, with Personal Theism the relationship of consciousness to the world of appearances is one of 'ideas' to their 'copies' with 'eternal thought,' Logos (Logos endiathetos; λόγος ἐνδιάθετος) preceding the 'transient copied' Logos (Logos prophorikos; λόγος προφορικὸς) that one finds already in Plato's *Timaeus* (27d ff; 69b-70a) and the Stoics.⁷⁹ Again in contrast to Personal Theism, according to Hegel and the early Strauß, the relationship of consciousness to the world of appearances is not 'ideas' to their 'copies' but that both ideas and their copies are the product of a dialectical logical process of causal explanation emanating out of Absolute Spirit. Nonetheless, the functional relationship of 'content' (*ideelle Inhalt*) and 'representations' (*reelle Form*) is the same for both Personal Theism as well as Hegel and the early Strauß.

The relationship of the Platonic 'thinker' to its thoughts is at the core of the claim in Christian Platonism that God is an Absolute Person, and it shapes the portrayal and criticisms made by Strauß of Hegel in §33 of the *Glaubenslehre*.

What does it mean to say that God is a Person? It can mean an enduring identity over against others from which it is separated, or it can mean the inward, all-compass-

77. Hegel's Gnostic emanationism is clear from the very notion of the First Negation that 'creates two-ness' to initiate the logical dialectic of negation that leads to the material order that is the condition for the emergence of consciousness. Hegel's Gnostic influx is clear from the "knowledge" (Gnosis) that 'returns' to Absolute Spirit by means of the Second Negation in individual consciousness.

78. See § 150 of the *LJ*: "The Speculative Christology:" especially, 780. By 1864, though, the linear Immanentism of Strauß' inclusive Christology is no longer labeled 'Christology' ('Spirit'/'Man') but has been replaced by humanity as the location of an open-ended process of the human species' moral improvement as demanded by its requiring ever new moral principles appropriate to its changing historical circumstances.

79. See above "Vol. II Introduction:" 543, n. 49.

ing, unlimited exclusion of everything external that thinks nothing.⁸⁰ Rosenkranz, the 'centrist' Hegelian,⁸¹ claimed that divine subjectivity "[...] is absolute subjectivity because [...] absolute subjectivity] is the concept that is identical with absolute substance."⁸² Strauß asks: "How is this otherwise than an: I want this to be the case, so it is the case?"⁸³

Hegel distinguished himself from Spinoza's system by claiming that for Spinoza God as a substance is "abstract, not yet concrete, [...] rigid and dead."⁸⁴ Strauß points out that for Hegel:

[...][w]hether the Absolute is determined only as substance, or as spirit, depends solely on whether the thinking, which has [...] negated its negations, and thereby grasped the One Absolute, is consciousness of what it did [...] or whether it is not [...] Substance is said to be the abolition of the finite; thus one says that it is the negation of the negation of the negation. [...]. As negation of negation, substance is herewith the absolute affirmation, and just as directly [absolute] freedom and self-determination. God is not a dead but a living God; he is even more than the living, he is spirit and the eternal love.⁸⁵

Furthermore, Hegel complains of Spinoza that he only gives an account of divine influx without an account of divine emanation:

Spinoza understands with respect to substance only how it negates set determinations, not how it sets them,. Thus he does not understand it as self-determining. He recognizes only the return of all things back into it, not likewise the emanating of things from it [...] and] thus not as in *itself a life circulation* [...].⁸⁶

Strauß emphasizes that Neoplatonism provides "the crucial insights of Hegel's teaching concerning God."⁸⁷ Hegel suggests that those who make the absolute *ideale* (as *absolutes Wesen*, eternal ideas) the object of the divine thinker "speak as if God were a source beyond consciousness."⁸⁸ However, Hegel claims (although it remains unclear whether he is reporting about Neoplatonism or maintaining for himself⁸⁹) that God is not "[...] a Spirit which is outside the world and outside self-consciousness, but that Its existence as a Spirit conscious of Itself is precisely real, self-consciousness

80. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 504–505.

81. Strauß identified him as the 'one centrist' in "Vereschiedene Richtungen innerhalb der Hegel'schen Schule in Betreff der Christologie" in *Streitschriften* III: 120.

82. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 505.

83. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 505. This is a classic 'ought'/'is' fallacy.

84. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 508.

85. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 514.

86. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 515. Spinoza has a vein but not an artery system – metaphysically, a cataphatic but not apophatic system. See as well, *ibid.*: 508 (Spinoza's substance is abstract, not concrete, rigid and dead) and 512 (Spinoza's substance is an unconscious generality).

87. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 516.

88. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 516.

89. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 516.

Itself.”⁹⁰ Strauß claims that this, in fact, is Hegel’s position. This would mean that what Platonism calls ‘universals’ (absolute essences) which constitute thought, are Absolute Being Itself, not that the thinker is ‘above’ the essences that it thinks.⁹¹

Hegel maintains that with his philosophy a ‘new epoch’ has begun:

*The world spirit has now succeeded in disposing of all alien, objective being and finally grasps Itself as Absolute Spirit. The struggle of finite self-consciousness with Absolute Self-consciousness, which appeared as apart from It, has come to an end. Finite self-consciousness ceased to be finite [is spiritually divinized], and thereby, on the other hand, Absolute Self-consciousness received the reality (Wirklichkeit) which It lacked before.*⁹² (emphasis added)

What has changed that Hegel can speak of a ‘new epoch?’ The change is the emergence of ‘science’ (*Wissenschaft*),⁹³ which, according to Hegel, is humanity’s grasp of essential, true Being! Strauß asks, does this mean that:

[...] according to Hegel, God has only [...] His] ideal existence as thinking [by finite spirit]? Nothing less! Our concept of Absolute Being [...] is indeed Absolute Being Itself. However, God is not exhausted by [...] the thinking of finite spirit] because He is not only Being or *ideal (ideale)*, but also *real (reale)* existence.⁹⁴ His existence as Being is our thinking of Him; but His *real* existence is nature to which the thinking individual belongs at [its present] moment.⁹⁵

God’s existence (the divine *ideale*) as Being (Spirit) is dependent upon finite consciousness, but God’s actually (the divine *reale*) is the natural world as a historical totality. Therefore, finite, theoretical reason serves Absolute Spirit as the necessary ‘point of indifference’ where Absolute Spirit becomes aware of Itself – not, though, by the individual’s complete identification with God’s reality (*Wirklichkeit*), which involves all of history.

This claim by Hegel generated much criticism, correctly in Strauß’ judgment,⁹⁶ because it implies that in order for God to be fully Spirit, God requires humanity. Hume’s criticism of the use of anthropomorphic analogy for God-talk reaches its pinnacle here. It is not merely an act of hubris for humanity to think that human consciousness is the key to God-consciousness as Hume pointed out,⁹⁷ but here the

90. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 516.

91. Strauß cites to Hegel’s “Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie:” III. Here is a tip that Hegel is Athanasian in contrast to Strauß, who is Arian.

92. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 517.

93. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 517.

94. God is not only the ‘true’ content (*Inhalt*) but also the ‘actual’ representations (*Form*) that are nature.

95. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 517–518.

96. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 518.

97. See David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1982): 14–19.

claim is made that God can't be God without human consciousness. Furthermore, this would mean that in the long duration prior to the emergence of finite consciousness, God was not God as Spirit but only a 'blind, natural, dynamic power'.⁹⁸

Strauß points out that conservative Hegelians responded that : "[...] temporal revelation of God in man already presupposes the eternal revelation of God"⁹⁹ as the eternal, inseparable circularity of Spirit and nature. However, Strauß also points out that this is an ambiguous formulation. The claim could refer to a God who is *complete and independent of the world* [...] with no need of the mediation of finite spirits [...] or that *God is dependent upon an external determination of 'Himself'* [nature and, especially humanity, for Spirit to become aware of Itself]¹⁰⁰

Strauß quotes from Immanuel Hermann Fichte (J.G. Fichte's son), who observes that Hegel, 'properly' understood, takes God to be "[...] *not merely [a] substance [...] nor a dull-colored indifference or the dead identity of subject and object but the living process of subjectivity* [...]" He [God] is never exhausted in one of these self-presentations [...] Consequently, *God is here the eternal observation of Himself in the other, the unceasing creation as unlimited Subjectivity-Objectivity*.¹⁰¹ (emphasis added) In this formulation, Hegel's God, though, remains entirely indifferent to the particularities of nature and humanity for his 'eternal observation of Himself in the other.'

Granted that out of love, God establishes the historical actuality that is required for humanity to be the location for God to 'think' (that is, experience) Himself, to the extent that divine love is "a play of love with Himself,"¹⁰² *what does this really say about the meaning and significance of the concrete, subjective experience of individuals? Are not humanity's creative achievements, sufferings, inflicted injustices, etc., a matter of indifference to this lover of Himself?!*

One can palpably hear the exasperation in Strauß' comment in 1841:

"[...] [M]y dear Hegel, have you invented your profound categories of differentiation and externalization, negation and negation of negation, of annulment [*Aufhebung*] of these moments into a higher moment that the crudest births of an ill-bred imagination, of which the most far-out Gnostic would not be ashamed, should let themselves [the crude thoughts] be grasped with them [these profound categories]? [...] Where is the *Symbolum Quicunque* [the Athanasian Creed: "God became man that man might become God"]? Give it to me! I would rather confess it ten times before I take the propositions of our Philosopher only once to be other than superstition."¹⁰³

98. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 518.

99. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 520.

100. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 520–521.

101. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 522. The citation is to Immanuel Hermann Fichte's *Die Idee der Persönlichkeit und der individuellen Fortdauer* (Elberfeld: Büschler'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung und Buchdruckerei, 1834).

102. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 513. See *Phänomenologie* GW III: 386 (Baillie trans.: 542–543).

103. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 500–501. F.C. Baur connected the dots here when he wrote in 1838: "[...] [T]he long period from the Ancient [Church] to the end of the eleventh century [is] characterized

The notions that 'God needs humanity to become Spirit' and that 'humanity needs God to become Spirit' constitute a circularity, but it is not a circularity of metaphysical, causal 'necessity' but, rather, the circularity of an 'ought'/'is' fallacy: It 'ought' to be that God is engaged in a cataphatic/apophatic emanation and in an influx that involves Spirit and finitude as two sides of the same coin, but this 'ought' is a vicious circle. Strauß himself writes: "[...] what is this other than: I would like it to be like that, that's why it is like that?"¹⁰⁴ This is a classic 'ought'/'is' fallacy.

Christian Personal Theism as well as Hegel and the early Strauß assume that infinite Spirit is the same as finite spirit: ideas are the universal, unchanging essences (spirit) of consciousness that are manifest in particular, changing particulars (matter). Yet such an account is narrowly and literally anthropomorphic. It is human beings (or more accurately, finite, transcendental consciousness) who classify phenomena by means of ideas/concepts related to particulars, and we have encountered such a capacity only in finite consciousness.

Furthermore, unlike Spinoza's limiting substance to a process of divine influx with no account of divine emanation, Hegel views all of history as a pulsating of Double Negation, with the 'new epoch' that comes after Spinoza consisting of Absolute Knowledge of the Concept that is finite consciousness' grasp of Absolute Spirit. In this 'new epoch' we not only know who the God/Man is, but also we know ourselves what actual, world history 'truly' is. *The 'point of indifference' has two meanings: 1) Absolute Unity as a point of non-difference, which claims that God can't be God without humanity; and 2) complete equanimity on the part of Absolute Spirit when it comes to the actual particularities of history because what matters is Absolute Knowledge of Absolute Spirit, not the details of actual history that are the condition of its Self-awareness.*¹⁰⁵

In short, where there is a spectrum of Right-, Left-, and, at least, one individual in the Center of Hegelianism,¹⁰⁶ with significant major ambiguities among the most

by nothing more than the mythical form that it has received in the most viable imagination. [...]. The form of dogma is rightly to be called mythical if the image [Form/Representation] takes the place of the Concept [Inhalt]. As Gnosticism shows, the docetic is closely related to the mythical. Once Spirit succumbs to the mythical, once it lives in a world of figurative representations that it has created for Itself, then the world of reality [Wirklichkeit] can easily transform itself into a world of mere and deceptive appearance, as we see in the Gnostics, in whom the mythical direction prevailing in them also led to the understanding of the historical appearance of Christ in a purely docetic way." (emphasis added) F.C. Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung* (1838), Bd. I (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2004): 142–143.

104. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre*: I: 505.

105. Hegel calls this event in finite consciousness the 'point of indifference.' On 'the point of indifference' as both a turn to non-difference and affectless equanimity, see Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 456, 465–7, 484, 487–8, 496–97, 499–500. The actual world is only an (*affektloser Traum*) (*ibid*: 496–497, 499–500).

106. This "at least" refers to Strauß' account of the Hegelian spectrum in "Verschiedene Richtungen innerhalb der Hegel'schen Schule in Betreff der Christologie:" 120. The differences here between Göschel and Schaller make clear that at stake is the core Hegelian epistemological conception of concept and representations, not just the notion of the God/Man.

‘conservative’ of Hegelians, the language of ‘Absolute Knowledge is inappropriate. Any language of ‘consciousness,’ ‘personalism,’ or of the relationship between ‘concepts’ and ‘representations,’ as well as ‘substance’ and ‘identity’ and ‘difference’ language are all anthropomorphisms. When it comes to the dependence of an argument on analogies and an assumption as, in this case, the Principle of Sufficient Reason (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*), the claim to Absolute Knowledge is a *petitio principii*.

b) A Flight of Fantasy in a Vacuum:

Hegel’s and the early Strauß’ understanding of Absolute Knowledge is established on the basis of the difference between ‘content’ [*Inhalt*] and ‘representations’ [*Form*]. Content refers to the ‘idea,’ which, in turn, corresponds to the forms given in representations/perception. This epistemological structure of mental ‘idea’ and perceived ‘form/image/representations’ mediated by the imagination¹⁰⁷ is at least as old as Plato who employs it in his Simile of the Line in Book VI 507b of the *Republic*. Plato distinguishes between ‘the many’ that are ‘seen but not known’ and ‘the ideas’ that are ‘known but not seen.’ Plato describes at 510a the things ‘seen but not known’ as only representations (τὸ δοξαστὸν, *das Vorstellbare*, the imaginable) occurring in the intellect, which are distinguished from what is ‘known’ (τὸ γνωστὸν, *das Erkennbare*, the known). The objects of the senses must be ‘converted into representations’ or images/forms (αἱ εἰκόνες, *Bilder*, images, forms) because we can’t put the physical world directly into the mind. *Forms are imagined in the mind whereas ideas are already present in the mind and are applied by thought to representations in the imagination.*

107. Hegel uses here with respect to mental experience itself the notion of ‘form, (more like Aristotle) which for Plato ‘form’ refers to the ‘representation’ of the external world in the mind by means of the imagination. I take form in the sense of exclusively mental form to refer to *the manner in which ideas/essences are given in thought*. We think ideas, but what they are in themselves is as inaccessible to us as the in itself of the objects of sense perception. Hegel appears to be drawing an analogy between our perception of objects of sense by means of representations (images in the imagination) and our thinking of ideas/essences. Plato speaks of these two points of transition 1) from external objects to mental ideas and 2) from mental ideas to the Good ‘above Being’ as follows: “There are two subdivisions [in the mind], in the lower of which [understanding of sense perception] the soul uses the figures [objects] given in the former division [of physical objects in the world] as images [in the imagination = φαντάσματα (Republic 510a) = “an image presented in the mind by an object;” φαίνεται (i.e., φαντασία) (Sophist 264a-b – see Liddell and Scott)], the inquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle [the Good, above Being] descends to the other end [in the direction of sense perception]; in the higher [subdivision in the mind, that is, in reason], the soul passes out of hypotheses [ideas], and goes up to a principle [the Good] which is above hypotheses, making no use of images as in the former case [of understanding sense phenomena], but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves.”

Hegel and the early Strauß employ the Platonic/Cartesian distinction between understanding (intellection) and imagination (perception).¹⁰⁸ For Plato, the imagination (*Republic* 510a: φαντάσματα, "an image presented in the mind by an object") is the imaging or representations that constitute sense perception. Descartes then distinguished between understanding and imagining by saying: I can 'understand' by intellection a chiliagon, which is 'known but not seen,' even though I cannot 'imagine' it, that is, even though I cannot see it in sense perception.¹⁰⁹ In Hegel's terminology, I can have an empty idea without representations. In the case of Hegel's Absolute Knowledge, then, I can understand the Absolute Idea abstractly and embed it in a logic of Double Negation to account for a horizontal, immanent, divine creativity, even though I cannot imagine it, that is, even though I cannot experience it in sense perception. *What this really means is that the Absolute Idea Itself is by no means, as the sole, a priori synthetic judgment,*¹¹⁰ necessarily the Absolute Causality of all 'that is' but, rather, by its own criterion is an 'empty abstraction.' Hegel's and Strauß' understanding of 'science' (*Wissenschaft*) is that 'knowledge' can only occur where there is *both* intellection and imagination (content/*Inhalt* and representations/*Form*). Nevertheless, despite this insistence by Hegel and the early Strauß that imagination/representations are required for knowledge to be *actual* (*Wirklichkeit*), the 'true' content of knowledge is the appropriate 'idea' of intellection.

This insistence by Hegel of the *necessity* of both intellection and imagination drives the logic of his Double Negation meta-narrative that he claims accounts for the necessary causality of creation. However, Hegel wants to have his cake and eat it too: Although finite imagination is supposedly what ensures that 'ideas' are not merely 'empty abstractions,' nevertheless, the physical world, which includes finite imagination, is subordinate to, and 'opposed to,' the truth of Absolute Spirit.¹¹¹ The 'cunning of reason' is Absolute Spirit's silent and imperceptible governing the dialectical process of Double Negation to achieve Absolute Knowledge and Absolute Freedom in Absolute Spirit – despite and 'behind the back' of events and agents.¹¹²

108. Plato's Similes of the Sun and Line are not only valuable for an understanding of Hegel's epistemological distinction between content (*Inhalt*) and representations (*Form*), but they are a crucial aid to understanding why Hegel (and Strauß) call Kant a 'subjectivist.' See Chapter 8: "Hegel's Reclined Plato and Kant as a 'Subjectivist'" 811 ff. and Chapter 9's section entitled "Hegel on Beauty" 868 ff.

109. See Descartes. *Meditations on First Philosophy in which the Existence of God and the Distinction of the Soul from the Body Are Demonstrated*. Translated by Donald A. Cress. 1641. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., Inc., 1983.

110. On Hegel's Absolute Concept as the 'sole' *a priori* synthetic judgment, see the "Preface" 61, n. 78.

111. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 456.

112. See Hegel, "Introduction" to the *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*: GW XII: 45–46, 53 (Sibree trans.: 31–32, 38). See as well, Strauß' take on the cunning of reason in Chapter 1: "Methodology:" 168, n. 210.

The Idea/Concept, which is Absolute Knowledge, is incapable of appearing directly in actual representations, but Hegel and the early Strauß claim that it is ultimately, the single, and necessary universal "[...] Idea [that] *can emerge from everything* because it is always the Idea that is reflected in these infinitely many droplets."¹¹³ (emphasis added) What one experiences in the imagination as representations (*Form*), 'the infinitely many droplets' which *serve to 'guarantee' the 'reality' of the Absolute content (Inhalt)*, are taken to have been caused by the logic of negation arising from the Absolute Idea Itself. However, Kant had already pointed out that, rather than grounding the causal explanation of events, logic is a 'canon' of rules for thought independent of an 'organon' (the agency of practical reason that is inseparable from sense perception and governed by moral principles), rather than a causality of phenomena.¹¹⁴

The claim that the Absolute Idea, 'beyond the imagination,' as a 'pure' logical Idea for which its 'grounding form' is the entirety of the imaged cosmos turns out to be nothing but a fantasy of the understanding as a mere 'empty idea.' Kant spoke of such flights of understanding in his "Introduction" to the *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is as if Kant was anticipating Hegel:

Misled by such a proof of the power of reason, the demand for the extension of knowledge recognizes no limits. The light dove, cleaving the air in her free flight, and feeling its resistance, might imagine that its flight would be still easier in empty space. It was thus that Plato [as the case with Hegel] left the world of the senses, as setting too narrow limits to the understanding and ventured out beyond it on the wings of the ideas, in the empty space of the pure understanding. He did not observe that with all his efforts he made no advance—meeting no resistance that might, as it were, serve as a support upon which he could take a stand, to which he could apply his powers, and so set his understanding in motion. It is, indeed, the common fate of human reason to complete its speculative structures as speedily as may be, and only afterwards to enquire whether the foundations are reliable. All sorts of excuses will then be appealed to, in order to reassure us of their solidity [...] But [*sic.*] so far as the matter or content is concerned, there has been no extension of our previously possessed concepts, but only an analysis of them. Since [*sic.*] this procedure yields real knowledge *a priori* [e.g., as the case with Hegel's Absolute Spirit], which progresses in an assured and useful fashion, reason is so far misled as surreptitiously to introduce, without itself being aware of so doing, assertions of an entirely different order, in which it attaches to given concepts others completely foreign to them, and moreover attaches them *a priori*. And [*sic.*] yet it is not known how reason can be in position to do this. Such a question is never so much as thought of.¹¹⁵

113. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 14–15. This is a misapplication, if not unintentional then a major distortion, of Kant's Copernican Turn, which shifts the focus from objective judgment to subjective conditions of possibility and capacities that make possible the experience of objective phenomena, in the first place. The crucial difference is that Kant is talking about the finite conditions of possibility for experience, understanding, and responsible agency in the world. Hegel and the early Strauß are talking about the ultimate, eminent, causality that brings about any and all experience (or the infinitely many 'droplets' of actual reality as well as their true ideal content).

114. See Kant's *Logic* AA IX: 11–12; 15–16 and 49, n. 36.

115. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 8–9.

For Hegel/the early Strauß content [*Inhalt*] (ideas) occurs only in consciousness. It is only in consciousness that the representations of form have meaning, that is, make sense and are truly known. Content [*Inhalt*] is freed from inadequate form and elevated into consciousness. In Strauß' account of Hegel that follows, note, especially, what he means by content [*Inhalt*] and form which I will then contrast with Kant's use of the terms below. Strauß writes:

[...] as with Homer who [...] said that [...] things] have two names; one in the language of the gods, the other in the language of humans on the earth's surface: there are, then, for every substance two languages; one of the feelings, representation, and communication, in finite categories and one-sided abstraction-nestled thought, the other of concrete concepts. Here is where the difficulty lies: to separate in a content [*Inhalt*] what is the content [*Inhalt*] as such, of thought, from that which belongs to the representation [Form], as such. Philosophy is charged with stripping off the forms that are representation [to emphasize only content]. Everyday thought has no awareness of this distinction [between form and content]. Because truth is connected to this (form-) determination [in the senses], everyday thought believes that the [mental] content [*Inhalt*] has no role to play.

*Is it, therefore, true that [mental] content [*Inhalt*] is so indifferent to the form according to the principles of [everyday] philosophy from which this determination of the relation between content and form arises? Are they really so externally related to one another that, with change on one side the other continues to persist unchanging? It is the case in Hegel's Logic¹¹⁶ that content [*Inhalt*] is not raw but formed matter; that the falsehood of the distinction between form and content [*Inhalt*] is recognized in the higher sphere of speculative thinking. [In this higher sphere] it is pure form itself which becomes content [*Inhalt*] so that the content [*Inhalt*] is nothing other than changing form into content [*Inhalt*] and form is nothing other than the changing of content [*Inhalt*] into form.¹¹⁷ (emphasis added)*

In the higher sphere of speculative thinking (that is, consciousness), one must distinguish between the 'thinker' and her/his thoughts/ideas so that ideas *in the mind* for their thinker are analogous to representations (forms) in sense perception. Yet, thoughts themselves are not imagined, that is, external representations, but are themselves inseparable from the 'true' content (*Inhalt*) that is internal to the mind. Consciousness as Absolute Spirit, then, thinks its thoughts in the mind as a relationship between the Absolute Concept (of the unified 'I') and the multiplicity of ideas so that in the mind, although there is a distinction between the Absolute Concept and ideas, they together constitute the content (*Inhalt*) of consciousness – both Absolute and finite.

However, *in the lower sphere of everydayness*, Hegel clearly subordinates perceived form to mental content.

116. Strauß footnotes to Hegel's *Logik* here.

117. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 11–12.

[...] [W]hen Hegel unhesitatingly calls the form of representation subordinate [and] inadequate, which for him results in religion's absolute content [*Inhalt*], *one must ask whether the content [*Inhalt*] can be absolutely present in a finite form? Is it not, rather, that this form as finite is inappropriate to the [absolute] Idea?* Hegel himself claims that there is a difference whether reason is explicit or only vaguely present in religion [...] *He himself claims that an inexplicit, only vaguely present reason is not yet actual [keine wirkliche] and, in the inadequate forms of concealed speculative and moral content [*Inhalt*], reason is not yet speculatively [truly] and morally present.*¹¹⁸ (emphasis added)

Nonetheless, Hegel claims that 'truth' is not identical with 'representations' but is always and already at the core of representations because representations are a manifestation of 'true' content.

[...] Truth, he [Hegel] says, can appear to direct consciousness in multiple sensory ways because the Idea is One in All, is *universal necessity* [...] Hence, *the Idea can emerge from everything because it is always the Idea in these infinitely many droplets, which reflect the Idea.* The Idea is represented, presaged in the seed that is simultaneously the fruit of the tree as its final determination. The seed dies in the earth and the plant can only emerge with this negation. Such a narrative, perception, and appearance can be elevated to universality by Spirit. Thereby, *the history of the seed, the sun, are a symbol of the Idea, but only a symbol: they are forms [Gestaltungen] that are not adequate to the Idea that is their actual content [*Inhalt*]; awareness is external to them, their meaning does not exist in them as meaning. The object that exists in itself as concept [Begriff] is the spiritual subjectivity of the individual [der Mensch]. [S/]he is in [her-/]himself meaning; meaning doesn't occur external to [her/]him. [S/]he is all-interpreting, all-knowing, not a symbol, [her-]his consciousness is essentially the narrative itself, and the narrative of Spirit is not the narrative of an existence inappropriate to the Idea [...] [H]egel's speculative interpretation consists precisely in [the claim] that [...] the content [*Inhalt*] of Christianity must be freed and lifted out of an inappropriate form.*¹¹⁹ (emphasis added)

According to Hegel, only the philosopher in possession of the knowledge of the difference between *content* and *form* is able to grasp the truth of *forms*.¹²⁰

The insistence that Absolute Truth is grounded by representations regardless of their factual validity reduces representations to the status of a mere 'place marker' of Indifference. I can understand what a unicorn is although I can't experience it in the imagination, and insisting that a horse, a donkey, a mule, or whatever are equally sufficient representations to ground the 'truth' of my idea of a unicorn means that it really doesn't matter whether I am perceiving a horse, a donkey, a mule, or a unicorn. All that 'truly' matters is what I'm thinking.

After the publication of the *LJ*, Strauß came to view this account that both insists on the imagination as the establishment of 'actuality' while simultaneously dismissing the imagination as having anything to do with 'truth' to mean that the particularities,

118. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 13.

119. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 14–15.

120. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 516–517.

the pain and suffering, of history was ultimately meaningless for Hegel. As a student in the Protestant Seminary (Stift) in Tübingen, Strauß met weekly under his leadership with a group of students. The student in whose room they met, Gustav (von) Binder, already in those discussions found Hegel's insistence on the historical problematic. Whereas, Ziegler reports, Strauß was enamored with what Hegel said "about religion, its essence, and its relation to knowledge," "Binder was primarily interested in the historical impact of the work, *which admittedly only touches on the historical as if with swallow's wings*."¹²¹ Within two years of the publication of the *LJ*, it is clear that Binder's insight did not fall on deaf ears.

Especially when it comes to miracles, Strauß points out, the distinction between content and form is especially trenchant. A literal miracle reverses the relationship between form and content (*Inhalt*). *Rather than a rationally necessary content (Inhalt) governing a set of accidental forms, when it comes to a miracle, a set of fantastic, accidental forms determines the rational necessity of their content (Inhalt)*. A miracle, then, would be a fantastic representation (form), which would require that its content (*Inhalt*) was rationally, necessarily true. Should acceptance of a miracle as a factual event be essential to faith, then such a faith "[...] is belief in a content [*Inhalt*] that is accidental [*zufällig*, not absolute], that is, it is not true because true faith has no accidental content [*Inhalt*]."¹²² *Not only would the philosopher/theologian be put out of business, but also all rational order collapses under the weight of fantasy.*

We have here an epistemological conundrum and a vicious, hermeneutical circle driving the understanding of Hegelian Absolute Knowledge. First, the epistemological conundrum: By definition the Absolute Idea cannot appear directly in perception (as a representation or form in the imagination), which would require imagining the totality of the 'infinitely many droplets' of representation that we are no more capable of doing than imagining a chiliagon. Consequently, a finite, 'accidental' set of representations (a selected portion of the whole) is taken by Hegel to be the basis for the claim that a unity of an Absolute Spirit was the rationally necessary content (*Inhalt*) of that finite, accidental set of representations.

The question becomes: How is one to determine that Absolute Spirit is not a 'fantasy' just as a unicorn is a 'fantasy' if it is the content (*Inhalt*) of the judgment that determines its 'truth' and, as with the case of a unicorn, there is no representation of Absolute Spirit in the imagination? What would prohibit our taking an imaginary, finite set of accidental representations as the form that anchors our truth claim of an absolute unity to experience (Absolute Spirit)? Such a conclusion would mean to claim to know absolutely that the universe is a miracle, which would be belief in a content (*Inhalt*) that is accidental and not true because truth has no accidental content. In fact, though, Hegel's notion of Absolute Spirit is merely a dictum (*Machtspruch*) that everything comes from Absolute Spirit negating Itself only to return to Itself by a

121. Ziegler I: 51.

122. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 252.

Second Negation. It is a dictum that overlooks that it rests upon the assumption of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the denial of an infinite regress.

Second, the vicious, hermeneutical circle here is that the metaphysical claim of Hegelianism is that Absolute Spirit generates the finite representations (form) that are then taken to be sufficient ground to claim the truth of a rationally necessary content (Inhalt) for the unity of Absolute Spirit. In fact, though, the purported truth claim is only a judgment based on accidental representations (form) asserted to have originated, of course logically ‘necessarily,’ in Absolute Spirit in the first place. When this vicious, hermeneutical circle is placed on the back of the turtle of what turns out to be Hegel’s anthropomorphic analogy grounded in finite consciousness and its experience of ‘reason,’ we end up with an enthusiastic-rapturous elephant on the back of the representation of a fantasy, that is, an anthropomorphic turtle, with everything being turtles from there all the way down.

Hegel’s and the early Strauß’ Idealism is no more illuminated and its limits no better identifiable than in their account of Absolute Knowledge as the top-down, true content [*Inhalt*] of Spirit, which, in turn, is *the ‘explanation’ why there is a world and establishes the ultimate goal of the world as Spirit’s awareness of Itself.* In short, there is no ‘form’ for Absolute Spirit so that, *according to their own criterion,* determines whether or not the content (*Inhalt*) is ‘merely empty,’ Absolute Spirit is an enthusiastic-rapturous judgment of ‘merely empty abstraction,’ not a true, ‘scientific’ judgment.¹²³

In contrast, according to Kant, all experience, understanding, and agency occur (but are not caused) because *we are immersed in a world of empirical appearances.* To be sure, experience, understanding, and agency are not reducible to empirical phenomena. Empirical phenomena without concepts are blind (an organon without a canon), and ideas without appearances are *empty* (a canon without an organon).¹²⁴ An empty canon can be a system of logic, but it can also be fantasies (conspiracies). Finite, transcendental consciousness must necessarily add *lawful* elements to appearances in

123. In his discussion of the history of the Church’s acceptance of the notion that revelation in the scriptures is incomplete and needs supplementation by new revelation, Strauß employs his distinction between the two epistemological components of content (*Inhalt*) and representations (*Form*). It is possible to experience an “enthusiastic-perceptible” kind of content (*Inhalt*) grounded in a “fantastic” form, which one would call wild speculation without any legitimate truth. See *Glaubenslehre* I. 258. In other words, fantasy representations in form are no guarantee that their content (*Inhalt*) is true. Fantasy representations in form can lead to content claims (*Inhalt*) of the truth that are enthusiastic raptures. What determines the truth of a representation (form) is the ‘rational necessity’ of its content (*Inhalt*). Strauß established this principle a few pages earlier when he discussed Lessing’s formula: “The accidental truths of history [= accidents of form in representations] can never be the absolute truths [the rationally necessary content] of reason.” For Lessing the claim that one must believe in a miracle as the confirmation of the truth of Christ, then, consists in requiring that an ‘accidental’ (rather than only a ‘rationally necessary’ content *Inhalt*) can establish truth). Such a claim would contradict true faith, which has no ‘accidental’ content (*Inhalt*). See *Glaubenslehre* I: 251–252.

124. On ‘canon’ and ‘organon,’ see 49, n. 36.

order to experience, understand, and act as we do. These elements are necessary, but they are not causally determinative.

It is the task of *Critical Idealism* to identify the *a priori* elements that transcendental consciousness requires (but does not create) in order to process appearances. The *content* of experience is appearances without which we could have no ideas about elements not directly present in the appearances that are required in order for us to experience appearances. In short, *content* is 'bottom-up' for Kant that anchors humanity in a world of appearances but, obviously, requires imperceptible, finite, transcendental elements in order for finite, transcendental consciousness to experience, understand, and act as it does. Kant is fundamentally an empiricist. Succinctly, Kant understands (finite epistemology), he doesn't claim to give certain, causal explanations!

In *On a Discovery* (1790), Kant responds to Johann Augustus Eberhard's review of Kant's 'critical philosophy' in the *Philosophisches Magazin* in which Eberhard

takes Kant's "Thoughts without content [perceptions, *Inhalt*] are empty, perceptions [*sinnliche Anschauungen*] without concepts are blind" to mean that Kant's notion of a 'thing-in-itself' is empty because the thing-in-itself cannot appear in representations (perception). Eberhard reformulates Kant's aphorism as:

All representations that are not appearances are empty of sensible perceptual forms [...] – All *representations of things-in-themselves* are representations that are not appearances [...] Hence, they are absolutely empty. [Eberhard claims Kant should have concluded:] Things-in-themselves are representations empty of sensible perceptual forms.¹²⁵ (emphasis added)

Kant protests Eberhard's interpretation as "an improper formulation not found in the *Critique*" and responds that the last sentence "is actually the only conclusion that one can draw out of the *Critique* whereas the first two are made up additions."¹²⁶ Kant, then, points out that representations of things not in appearances are empty of perception and, hence, as Kant claims, *they are empty of knowledge – but that does not mean that they are 'empty abstractions.'* They are necessary *additions to perception*, which itself is a 'peculiar receptivity of the mind' to search for a concept to understand when it is affected by sensation.

In other words, we cannot know things-in-themselves directly. However, that does not mean that they are empty with no role to play in understanding. *It is precisely their inability to be known directly that calls for transcendental consciousness to add a priori synthetic judgments to phenomena in order to adequately understand them; not that we absolutely can know (or prove) the thing-in-itself.* Kant adds: "The reason for the possibility of sensory perception is [...] neither a limit of the cognitive faculty [the imperceptible thing-in-itself] nor an image [in the mind]; it is the mere peculiar

125. Kant, *On a Discovery* AA VIII: 214.

126. Kant, *On a Discovery* AA VIII: 214.

receptivity of the mind, when it is affected by something (in the sensation), to get an idea according to its subjective constitution."¹²⁷ Understanding occurs neither by a direct grasp of the thing-in-itself as a substance¹²⁸ nor by a capriciously constructed, mental abstraction,¹²⁹ which would be brute, Nominalist skepticism. Rather, understanding (not Absolute Knowledge) occurs by the application of *a priori* synthetic elements to appearances by means of an *a priori* conceptual scheme that fits into an architectonic of lawfulness applicable to a set of given phenomena.¹³⁰

For Kant, flights of intellectual fancy always are reined in by sensations and the assumption of their lawful order. Without sensations, one is only a dove dreaming that it can fly in a vacuum.

According to Hegel (and Strauß down to 1837), content is 'top-down' for Hegel (and the early Strauß) that anchors humanity in Absolute Spirit, Absolute Knowledge, Absolute Freedom over against the relative spirit, knowledge, and freedom experienced in nature. Hegel is fundamentally an idealist. Succinctly, Hegel explains (absolute causality)!

In dramatic contrast to Hegel, then, when Kant speaks of form, he is talking *not* about the representations (images or *Bilder*) of external phenomena but of the processing of sense phenomena in consciousness. Kant writes two pages after the above passage in the *Critique of Pure Reason*:

There are two rules which logicians must always bear in mind when dealing with pure general logic:

As general logic, it abstracts from all content of the knowledge of understanding and from all differences in its objects and deals with nothing but *the mere form of thought*.

As pure logic, it has nothing to do with empirical principles, and [...] it must be [...] entirely *a priori*.¹³¹ (emphasis added)

Again clearly, here *form* refers to 'the mere form of thought,' not to external representation but to the intelligible realm and its functions.

127. Kant, *On a Discovery* AA VIII: 222.

128. See Kant, *On a Discovery* AA VIII: 215: Critical Idealism "[...] says: The objects as things in themselves give the material for empirical views (they contain the reason to determine the imaginative faculty according to its sensuality), but they are not their matter [Stoff]."

129. On Kant's rejection of conceptual 'constructivism,' see his comments on the "functional" nature of concepts (*Verhältnissvorstellungen*), which are necessary to understand objects (not direct perception of substances), see Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 66–67 (*Verhältnissvorstellungen*), 93 (all sensible perception is effects, whereas concepts are functions), especially; see as well, *Metaphysik Mrongovius* XXIX: 889 (A concept arises as a consequence of the experience of appearances because "I imagine the identity of my apperception in many representations.").

130. See Kant's discussion of the methodology of pure reason that is the final section of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

131. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 78.

We can say that Hegel/Strauß have turned Kant on his head and that Kant is here shattering any sense that he's a Platonic idealist.¹³² Furthermore, confirmation that Kant is no Platonic/Hegelian Idealist, who is some kind of a 'dualist' who claims that Spirit/consciousness can generate matter, is nowhere clearer in Kant's writings than in the 'Preface' to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*: "I am just as surely conscious that there are external things which are related to my senses as I am conscious that I myself unequivocally exist in time."¹³³

In the *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*, he confirms his conviction that as 'idealist' as philosophy must be, it is nothing but *a concern to understand experience in the world*. Kant, therefore, insists that it never occurred to him to doubt the existence of things, which constitutes idealism in the ordinary sense.¹³⁴ Kant's goal is not to provide an ultimate, causal *explanation* of, but to *understand*, the world of appearances!¹³⁵

There isn't a more forceful rejection of what Hegel and Strauß call Absolute Knowledge, than the opening lines of the "Introduction" to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*:

There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience [...] In the order of time, therefore, we have no knowledge antecedent to experience, and with experience all our knowledge begins.

But [*sic.*] though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience. For it may well be that even our empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive through impressions and of what our own faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions serving merely as the occasion) supplies from itself.¹³⁶

*The pure insight of Absolute Knowledge for Hegel/the early Strauß is Absolute Spirit*¹³⁷ (the World Soul/Spirit, the Absolute Idea), empty of all content (*Inhalt*) and representations (*Form*):

132. Kant explicitly rejects Platonic Idealism in "Refutation of Idealism" of the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 275 ff.

133. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B xxxix*. One should read the entire footnote and look, as well, at B 273: "[...] that the concept precedes perception signifies that the concept is a mere possibility. The perception that supplies the [empirical] content to the concept is the sole mark of actuality. One can, however, know the existence of the thing prior to its perception and, consequently, comparatively speaking, in an *a priori* manner only if it occurs along with perception in accordance with the principles of their empirical connection (that is, analogically)."

134. See *Prolegomena* AA IV: 293.

135. Understanding involves 'explanation,' but nowhere does Kant claim to provide ultimate and absolute explanations.

136. Kant *Critique of Pure Reason* B 1 (Norman Kemp Smith trans.)

137. Note the difference in usage of the term 'pure' by Hegel and Kant! For Kant's contrasting meaning, see 558, n. 109.

Pure insight has [...] no content [*Inhalt*] within it because it exists for itself by negating everything in it; to faith, on the other hand, belongs content [*Inhalt*], but without insight [that is, without pure consciousness] [...] [Faith] is, then, pure consciousness of essence, that is, of ordinary inwardness and is, therefore, thinking [...] The immediacy by which the essence is in faith consists in its object as essence, that is, pure thought. However, this immediacy [...] consists in the significance that is objective being that lies beyond consciousness. It is by means of this significance [of objectivity], which contains the immediacy and simplicity of *pure thinking* in *consciousness*, that the essence of faith falls out of thinking as *representation* and becomes a supersensible world, which is essentially an *other* to self-consciousness.¹³⁸

Absolute Spirit (pure insight) negates Itself to establish the conditions for multiplicity in the first of two, ultimate negations.

[...] the first and foremost moment is Absolute Being, spirit absolutely self-contained, so far as it is simple eternal substance. But [*sic.*] in the process of realizing its constitutive notion [the Concept that thinks Absolute Being], which consists in being spirit, that substance passes over into a form [First Negation] where it exists for an other; its self-identity becomes actual [*zum wirklichenden*] Absolute Being, actualized in self-sacrifice; *it becomes a self, but a self that is transitory* [...] Hence the third stage is the return of the self [Second Negation] thus alienated, the substance thus abased, into its first primal simplicity. Only when this is done is Spirit presented and manifested as Spirit.¹³⁹ (emphasis added)

Absolute Knowledge's awareness, according to Hegel, is dependent upon finite consciousness being able to 'imagine' and, then, 'negate,' a 'given,' empirical world of sense perception created by Absolute Spirit. However, Hegel is not interested in illuminating the conditions of possibility for the experience of a world of sense perception. Rather, his sole intent is to provide *the absolute, causal explanation* of the world of sense perception as a product of Absolute Spirit on the basis of a descriptive, causal logic of Double Negation (dialectic) that finite consciousness must 'negate' to experience truth. In short, *the only significance of multiplicity for Hegel is that it serves as the occasion for 'the point of indifference' that liberates from multiplicity.*

In contrast, Kant anchors understanding in the 'content' (*Inhalt*) of sense perception (*sinnliche Anschauung*), not intellect (*intellektuelle Anschauung*). Furthermore, Kant explicitly distinguishes between dogmatic and metaphysical speculation. *Dogmatic speculation* is fanaticism and rapturist (*Schwärmeret*)¹⁴⁰ that elevates conscious-

138. See Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 394 (Baillie trans.: 553).

139. Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW II: 395 (Baillie trans.: 554–555).

140. Kant rejects 'Platonic idealism' [including, implicitly, Hegel's dogmatic speculations] in the "Appendix" to the *Prolegomena* AA IV: 375*: "Actual idealism always has a rapturous [*schwärmerische*] intention and can have no other. My idealism, however, is only to understand the possibility of our *a priori* knowledge of objects of experience, which is a problem that has not yet been solved, not even raised. Thus, [in my idealism] the whole of rapturist [*schwärmerische*] idealism, which always (as can already be seen from Plato) proceeded from our *a priori* knowledge [...] to another (namely intellectual) perception than that of the senses, falls away because it never occurred to anyone that the

ness to a 'higher' dimension above and independent of *the world* of concrete agency. *Metaphysical speculation* of transcendental consciousness (not metaphysics of Absolute Knowledge as ultimate origin of any and all things), is the product of transcendental critique, which identifies the required conditions and capacities for experiencing, understanding, and exercising agency responsibly *in the world*.¹⁴¹

As if anticipating Hegel and the early Strauß, Kant speaks in the "Introduction" to the *Critique of Pure Reason* of the "[...] demand for the extension of knowledge" as "knowing no limits."¹⁴² He employs an analogy to the flight of a dove that in its soaring flight experiences the resistance of the air and believes it would be easier to fly in a vacuum of empty space. Kant refers to Plato as venturing out beyond the world of understanding "on the wings of ideas." However, in a vacuum there is no support "upon which [...] one] could take a stand." Ideas may be eternal and unchanging, but we experience them only under the 'resistance' of particulars whereas the claim that ideas exist independent of and separate from particulars is pure conjecture (as if trying to fly in a vacuum):

It is, indeed, the common fate of human reason to complete its speculative structures as speedily as may be, and only afterwards to enquire whether the foundations are reliable. All sorts of excuses will then be appealed to, in order to reassure us of their solidity [...]¹⁴³

As far as we have ever experienced, though, ideas occur only in a finite consciousness. An individual is not even able to prove that some other consciousness other than her/his own employs them. Once I leave the 'air resistance' of my limited mind, I am employing more or less, speculative analogies. However, *an analogy that denies its own primary analogate (here, the finite human mind) as having any 'truth' because*

senses should also perceive *a priori*." Speaking of rapture (*Schwärmerei*) Kant writes in the *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 86–87: "There can be nothing more meaningless than that which raises man above himself (as a part of the sensory world), which ties him to an order of things that only the intellect can think, and which at the same time has the whole sensory world, with it the empirically determinable existence of man in time and the whole of all purposes (which alone is appropriate to such unconditional practical laws as the moral one) beneath it." He defines 'solely rapturous' (*baare Schwärmerei*) as 'sensory insanity' in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* AA VII: 145: "If, however, certain judgments and insights are assumed to arise directly from the inner sense (not by means of the intellect [McG: that is, not by means of a *a priori* synthetic judgment]), but the latter is assumed to be self-commanding, and sensations are assumed to be valid for judgments, then this is solely rapturous (*baare Schwärmerei*), which is closely related to sensory insanity."

141. Kant writes in the *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* AA IV: 472: "All true metaphysics is taken from the nature of the faculty of thought itself and is by no means fictitious because it is not borrowed from experience, but contains the pure actions of thought (that is, *a priori* concepts and principles), which bring the multiplicity of empirical ideas into the lawful connection in the first place – by means of which it can become empirical knowledge, i.e. experience."

142. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 8–9. See the use of the metaphor of the impotent flapping of wings in empty space in the *Groundwork* AA IV: 462.

143. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 9.

truth only occurs in the empty space of pure ideas, is perhaps the wildest, fanciful speculative judgment that it is possible to make. It may appear to be a powerful exercise in self-humility that there is a realm of ideas independent and 'above' finitude,¹⁴⁴ but it ultimately is a claim of the highest hubris because it assumes that the universe is constructed on the basis of the same 'idea'/copy, teleological structure as finite human consciousness.

In short, all assertions with respect to the status of ideas without the 'air resistance' of finite consciousness is human hubris. Furthermore, the claim that ideas exist in 'empty space' (in a vacuum) is not only speculative but also fantastic enthusiasm. Rather, agreeing with Kant, one must rein-in one's speculation to say that 'ideas' of pure reason and categories/concepts of the understanding are *a necessary assumption* for us (as finite, limited reason) to be able to experience, understand, and act responsibly the world of finite things and events as we can/do, but as far as we experience we do not possess them 'by birth' (as innate from an 'empty space'/a vacuum brought into the world). Rather, they must be learned (acquired in 'air resistance').¹⁴⁵

A further indication of Strauß' stepping back from Hegel is that in 1841 Strauß himself embraces a claim of an Absolute Idea as the origin of history from Descartes (as well as Spinoza) on the relationship between the dualism that is taken to be understanding and imagination.

The difference between understanding and imagining, according to Descartes and Spinoza, is that the former is intelligible and the latter is sensible. Whereas I can imagine a pentagon (image it in my mind) and understand it to be five-sided, I am unable to imagine a chiliagon (image it in my mind) although I can understand it to be a 1,000 sided figure.¹⁴⁶ *When the mind understands, "[...] it turns itself toward itself and gazes upon one of the ideas that are in it. But [sic.] when it imagines, it turns itself toward the body, and intuits something in the body similar to an idea* either understood by the mind *or perceived by sense.*"¹⁴⁷ (emphasis added) On the basis of understanding as non-extended and imagination as extended, Strauß concludes rather remarkably given that Hegel and the early Strauß' claim that the imagination is (representations are) what ensures that an idea is not merely an 'empty abstraction':

144. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion* GW XVI: 182–183. See above the citation of this passage from Hegel: 657, n. 22.

145. See Kant, *On a Discovery*: AA VIII: 222–223.

146. See Descartes, "Sixth Meditation" in *Meditations on First Philosophy* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1983): 45–46 (72–73). The citation numbers in brackets here refer to the Charles Adam and Paul Tannery *Oeuvres de Descartes*. Vol. VII: *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia* (Paris: Léopold Cerf, Imprimeur-Éditeur, 1904). It is not relevant For Strauß' of the use of this distinction between understanding and imagination, but it is important to note that Descartes' argument is to make a case for the existence of bodies, which the mind is capable of doubting (unlike the *cogito ergo sum* that is demonstrably proved to especially when it doubts itself – in order to doubt the *cogito* must exist – see Part IV of Descartes' *Discord on Method*). In short, Strauß is employing Descartes' distinction between understanding and the imagination to 'prove' that ideas/the Idea exists.

147. Descartes, "Sixth Meditation:" 46 (73).

[Speaking with Spinoza,] [w]e must and can think [in non-extended consciousness] [...] that eternity can only be construed as a beginningless and endless time sequence, God can only come into being in an endlessness of creatures next to and after one another. However, we can so little imagine an endless time as we can a limitless space as long as the attempt to imagine them is tangled up in an endless alternation of setting and removing of limits [in the realm of extension]. However, in as much as we recognize that this impossibility is grounded in [...] the imagination, [...] it would be incorrect were we [...] to not desire to think [understand] further, than we are capable of representing to ourselves [in the imagination]. It is so with respect to eternity to say, as Spinoza said of God, that we say of eternity: *non imaginari, sed quidem intelligere possumus* [we don't imagine (eternity), but we can, indeed, understand (it)].¹⁴⁸

In the next sentence, Strauß adds the key theme that drives his inclusive Christology over against the Hegelians: "*The positing of the finite with the Absolute as well as the inseparability of both constitutes a fundamental conviction (!) of speculative philosophy in our age.*"¹⁴⁹ This is by no means a trivial claim, but neither has Strauß formulated the conviction by means of the absolute certitudes of Hegel's meta-narrative of Double Negation nor has he provided an accounting for his Idealism here. As I present in the next chapter on practical reason, unlike Kant who claims that concepts are required *a priori* assumptions of lawfulness (we would now add statistical significance and algorithms) of reflecting judgment as justifying our efforts at understanding and responsible agency, Strauß appears here to embrace Scholastic Intellectualism absent the Personal Theism that grounds it for the Scholastics. Strauß appears here to have forgotten the theme of 'empty abstraction' that was a central pillar of his earlier rejection of Kant.

Returning to Hegel's Absolute Knowledge, if understanding or thinking the 'truth' of Absolute Knowledge requires, according to Hegel, a Second Negation that nullifies multiplicity (the imagined) 'back into' consciousness, then, understanding of the Absolute One of Absolute Spirit occurs only by denial of the imagination, which Absolute Spirit created. In other words, although Absolute Spirit is the source of the very structure of imagination and understanding, which allows, then, for the Second Negation of the imagination and in order to think the Absolute One, which the Absolute One by Itself cannot think, then he is clearly caught in a vicious hermeneutical circle that reduces the particularities of history and individual consciousness to insignificance in themselves. The particularities of history and individual consciousness are only a logical 'point of indifference.'

Furthermore, the claim that the finite and the Absolute are inseparable presupposes that Absolute Spirit generates a world of images (of the imagination) by means of a logic of Double Negation. Yet, as I've noted, logic is a 'canon' without an 'organon.' It is a system of rules that is not tied to any specific phenomena unlike mathemat-

148. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 656.

149. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 656.

ics, which is both a 'canon' with an 'organon' of agency inseparable from physical sensation and governed by moral principles.¹⁵⁰ *Logic can't causally explain anything! It is a description of how we 'ought' to think. The claim that logic can explain the world is an 'excuse' to fly in empty space (a vacuum) without any resistance.* Absolute Knowledge constitutes an understanding "further than we are capable of representing to ourselves" in the imagination. Consequently, at least with respect to its claim for Absolute Knowledge, *Hegelian speculative philosophy soars into empty abstraction (!)* beyond the resistance of the air 'because we must and can' think it so – without being able to imagine it.

Hegel and the early Strauß committed an error of logic and surreptitiously introduced a causal account that silently assumes the Principle of Sufficient Reason so that they end up with substituting a mere logic of *causal description* for a metaphysical *causal explanation* (a classic μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος) to ensure that Absolute knowledge is no merely 'empty abstraction.'

When one adds to the epistemological, logical, and causal conundrums the literal, anthropomorphic projection that contaminates every theology of 'reason'¹⁵¹ and goes on to insist that finite, human consciousness is required in order that God becomes God, the response can't be to say that this 'speculative metaphysics' is absolutely false. However, neither may it be said by a wide margin that it is remotely, Absolute Knowledge and Truth, and it increases the likelihood that humanity is only worshipping itself.¹⁵² It is at best a literal, anthropomorphic wager of non-epistemic faith grounded in unlimited human hubris.

c) Kant's Reflecting judgment, not Hegelian Absolute Knowledge

The capacity of reflecting judgment (*reflektierende Urteilskraft*) is far broader than establishing the (believed) 'certainties' of re-produced judgment (*bestimmende Urteilskraft*) or the metaphysical dictums of the Hegelian Concept and ideas just as the physical world of 'actuality' is far more than merely the finite condition for a 'point of indifference' from the world to think Absolute Spirit by the elite few who are fortunate to understand it. Furthermore, the physical world is far broader than Spirit's ultimate, hidden hand of God in history as the 'cunning of reason' seeking to experience only Itself to the neglect of history, and understanding is far broader than claiming to grasp one Absolute Truth. In fact, the key to understanding is not its possession by innate metaphysical ideas or absolute causal explanations, but, as Lessing proposed, by the search for it.

150. See page 49, n. 36 and "Speculative Metaphysics and Science" in Chapter 1: nts. 175, 176, 177.

151. See Feuerbach, *Wesen der Religion* (1848–1849) (Berlin: Deutsche Bibliothek, 1913): Lecture 14: 134–135.

152. On the limits to anthropomorphisms, see: 34.

Autonomous freedom as finite, eminent causality 'above' (freedom-from), while never experienced as separable from, nature is capable of intentionally accomplishing things (freedom for-) that physical nature on its own can never accomplish. Without autonomous freedom, Hegel would be correct. Morality would only be an abstract duty that consists of a heteronomous, external, finger-waging authority but would be incapable of governing agency by moral principles because moral principles would be merely 'empty abstractions' of an unrealizable duty. For Hegel, 'I should, but I can't.' For Kant's broader moral theory, though, his aphorism is 'If I should, I can' precisely because the ground of morality is autonomous freedom.¹⁵³]

Kant calls reflecting judgment¹⁵⁴ the search for the concept appropriate for subsuming a specific perceptible manifold. However, in contrast to Hegel, this is no meta-physical 'deficiency.' In fact, Kant maintains that all 're-producing' (*bestimmend*) judgment, which consists in applying an already acquired concept to understand phenomena, was at some point a reflecting judgment. Hence, *rather than reflecting judgment flagging Kant's metaphysical deficiency, reflecting judgment is the incredible, heuristic strategy that transcendental consciousness employs to acquire new understanding.* Kant stresses, in fact, the pleasure that is associated with the success of finding an appropriate concept.¹⁵⁵

Kant initially refers to the 'gap' overcome by 'reflecting judgment' as

[...] the great gap (*Kluft*) between the supersensible and appearances.[McG: Note that both 'sides' of the 'gap' are in the mind!] Kant adds, immediately: "The concept of freedom determines nothing in regard to the theoretical cognition of nature; the concept of nature likewise determines nothing in regard to the practical laws of freedom [....] [A]lthough [...] the sensible cannot determine the supersensible in the subject, nonetheless the converse [the

153. On the distinction between Hegel's 'I should, but I can't' and Kant's 'if I should, I can,' see "Vol. II: Introduction:" "The Moral View of the World" 547 ff.

154. On Kant's notions of 'reflecting' and 're-producing' judgment as well as his distinction between broad, positive wit and the narrow, negative, capacity of judgment, see Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 179 ff. On my preference for translating 're-producing' rather than 'determining' judgment' for '*bestimmende Urteilskraft*,' see "On Imagination, the Law of association, and Reflecting Judgment" at: 86, n. 26.

155. Kant writes that the conformity "[...] of perceptions with laws in accordance with universal concepts of nature (the categories [of the understanding]) we do not encounter the least effect on the feeling of pleasure in us nor can we encounter it, because here the understanding proceeds unintentionally, [...], by contrast the discovered unifiability of two or more empirically heterogeneous laws of nature under a principle that comprehends them both is the ground of a very noticeable pleasure [...]. To be sure, we no longer detect any noticeable pleasure in the comprehensibility of nature and the unity of its division into genera and species, by means of which alone empirical concepts are possible through which we cognize it in its particular laws; but it must certainly have been there in its time, and only because the most common experience would not be possible without it has it gradually become mixed up with mere cognition and is no longer noticed." (emphasis added) Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 187. Kant does not equate reason and feeling, but he identifies the 'passion for order' to be the fundamental motivator for reason. See Kant, *What does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?* ("Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren?") AA VIII: 136 and 139*.

supersensible can determine the sensible] is possible (/not in regard to the cognition of nature of course, but in regard to the consequences of the former on the latter) and is already contained in the concept of a causality through freedom, whose effect in accordance with its formal laws is to take place in the world [...]¹⁵⁶

Speaking of nature and freedom, then, Kant talks of their 'concepts,' not the ontological difference between body and mind: "[T]he capacity of judgment [...] provides the mediating concept between the concepts of nature and the concept of freedom."¹⁵⁷

Kant's 'gap' is not Hegel's gap between nature and freedom: Hegel jumps on Kant's claim that the 'capacity of reflecting judgment' "[...] provides the mediating concept between the concepts of nature and the concept of freedom"¹⁵⁸ to mean that 'reflecting judgment' is concerned with establishing the ultimate bridge of Absolute Identity between 'objective' nature and 'subjective' freedom.

[...] *the middle link between the concept of nature and the concept of freedom*, that is, between the objective variety [of judgment] determined by concepts [with respect to nature], which is understanding in general, and the [variety of judgment that is] pure abstraction of understanding [with respect to freedom]. *The region of Identity that elevates Itself in absolute judgment above the sphere of the theoretical as well as above the practical, this Identity, which is true and exclusive reason, has, according to Kant, nothing to do with reason but only with reflecting judgment.*¹⁵⁹ (emphasis added)

Hegel takes Kant's reflecting judgment to mean a judgment 'without a determinate idea' in contrast to a re-productive judgment (*bestimmendes Urteil*) that already possesses ideas for objective phenomena. In other words, for Hegel, *a reflecting judgment is one without a 'determinate idea,'* and, according to Hegel, there can only be one: the Absolute Concept. Having overlooked/intentionally ignored the Absolute Concept, "[w]here Kant comes to reason as the key to unraveling the taste antinomy [between freedom and nature], it is nothing but *the indeterminate idea of the supersensible* in us, which cannot be made comprehensible any further [...]"¹⁶⁰

Hegel defines reflecting judgment, then, merely as a negative, specifying judgment (*bestimmendes Urteil*) that, already in possession of the ideas for objective phenomena, merely specifies the appropriate idea to a given set of phenomena. In other words, for Hegel, *a reflecting judgment is one without a 'determinate idea.'* "Where Kant comes to reason as the key to unraveling the taste antinomy [between freedom and nature], it is nothing but *the indeterminate idea of the supersensible* in us, which cannot be made comprehensible any further [...]"¹⁶¹

156. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 195.

157. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 196.

158. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 196.

159. Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen" GW II: 322.

160. Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen:" GW II: 323.

161. Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen:" GW II: 323.

Whereas Hegel takes the 'gap' to refer to a *metaphysical gap* between two substances, mind and body, which are separated in the sense of Descartes' mind and body dualism in *Meditation II*, Kant takes the gap to be an *epistemological gap* between (passive) perception and (active) understanding. He refers to the gap as arising between two kinds of mental activity: "[...][R]eflecting judgment *mediates* between the concepts of nature [perception] and the concept of freedom [understanding]."¹⁶² (emphasis added) The experience of transcendental consciousness of a 'gap' is *internal to the mind* between 'given' appearances and understanding. *The issue at issue is: how does the mind get from appearances to understanding because these are, obviously, two very different mental states?*

Kant takes reflecting judgment to be the 'third moment' that overcomes the gap by its 'adding to' the appearances the concepts that it has deduced out of the imperceptible 'association' (relationalities) among the appearances. By the deducing of concepts it grasps the its grasp of the imperceptible relationality (the concept) that turns an aggregate of appearances into a rational order, *which results in understanding*. Kant is definitely not talking about a dualistic gap between substances and causes, and he is not talking about concepts as metaphysically innate always and already in the mind waiting to be applied to an aggregate of appearances.

As an Idealist, Hegel cannot fathom the notion that consciousness doesn't already possess ideas (including the indeterminate idea of *the Absolute Concept*) for all that it might and could encounter. Hegel's innate ideas are a not even what Ricoeur calls 'worn out' metaphors "[...] replaced by the production of a concept that erases its trace [...]."¹⁶³ According to Hegel, ideas were never tensive metaphors but always and already metaphysical dictums (*Machtsprüche*) of absolute 'truth.' In dramatic contrast to Hegel's metaphysical dictums, Kant's reflecting judgment is the heuristic strategy that transcendental consciousness employs in order understand new phenomena with which it has not had any prior experience.

Rather than understand Kant's notion of 'reflecting judgment' as the heuristic search for an appropriate concept for a perceptible manifold of appearances, Hegel takes reflecting judgment to mean the lack of knowledge of the 'idea' of the specifying judgment that is always and already given, even if unknown. The only issue for Hegel is the application of the 'true' concept appropriate to the phenomena, which is always and already innate in the mind. He has no conception of the pleasure that Kant emphasizes that comes from dis-covering the conceptual and lawful order of nature. Hegel's *specifying judgment* (*bestimmendes Urteil*) is not Kant's *re-producing judgment* (*bestimmendes Urteil*). Hegel's *specifying judgment* is eternal, absolute (causal) truth as the imperceptible 'content' of perception, and there is only one indeterminate, causal truth (the Absolute Concept). Hence, there is only one *reflecting judgment* for Hegel.

162. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 196. NOTE: Kant's notion of 'freedom' is not Hegel's Absolute Freedom of Absolute Spirit!

163. Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor*: 286.

Kant's *re-producing* judgment can be apodictic necessity when it comes to 'meta-physical' and 'transcendental principles,' but, when it comes to perceptible appearances, Kant's *re-producing* judgment, in principle, is always open to revision given the inaccessibility to 'things-in-themselves' and the relationalities that are 'concepts' of understanding. Hegel would surely be shocked to hear that originally all that he means by re-producing judgment (*bestimmendes*), according to Kant, was originally not the determination of always and already innate, eternal 'ideas,' which are the ultimate cause of phenomena, but the product of reflecting judgment, or what Hegel calls 'indeterminate ideas.'

According to Hegel, the Concept is *above both theoretical and practical reason*, that is, above finite cognition and analytical, technical/pragmatic agency.¹⁶⁴ This Concept is Absolute, 'Pure' Reason and, for Hegel, constitutes the necessary connecting link between nature's freedom and Absolute Spirit's Freedom.

However, according to Hegel, *the Idea/Concept of ultimate causality above theoretical and practical reason is absolutely necessary*. It is the Absolute Concept that is the causal origin of all 'that is.'¹⁶⁵ Here Hegel speaks of the sole, *a priori* synthetic judgment,¹⁶⁶ but he means the *synthesis* of dialectic, not Kant's *a priori* synthetic judgment that '*adds to*' phenomena elements not given directly in perception. Rather, Hegel's *a priori* synthetic judgment is the *necessary* synthesis of Absolute Spirit's Absolute Oneness prior to any and all twoness that *must have* dialectically negated *Itself* in order to commence the dynamic of dialectical negation that brought about all 'that is.'

Not having grasped Kant's insight that understanding is a genetic process of deductive understanding, which consists of the imperceptible relationalities that unite sets of phenomena,¹⁶⁷ Hegel insists that understanding is a matter solely of specifying (*bestimmendes*) judgment of Absolute Causality.

Rather than applying innate, true ideas to phenomena under the umbrella of the synthetic unity of Absolute Concept above theoretical and practical reason, the very

164. For a 'spatial' portrayal of the hierarchy understanding (practical reason), cognition (theoretical reason), and Absolute Spirit, see the discussion of Hegel's 'reclining' of Plato's Simile of the Line in Chapter 8: "Hegel's Reclined Plato and Kant as a 'Subjectivist'" 811 ff. and Chapter 9: "Hegel on Beauty:" 868 ff.

165. Whereas it is true that, although he recognized the inescapability of 'symbolic' anthropomorphism when it comes to claims beyond the limits of finite, transcendental consciousness (*Prolegomena* AA IV: 356), Kant was reticent to assign predicates to the Noumenon. However, his reticence is not because he took the Noumenon to be an 'indeterminate concept' but because such predicates, unless relevant to what can be known as *necessary* for the functioning of finite, transcendental consciousness, are dangerous flights of fantasy. Kant's reticence, then, is to avoid illusions. See, for example, Kant's *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 461–462.

166. On Hegel's sole, *a priori* synthetic judgment of Absolute Spirit, see the "Foreword:" 61.

167. On concepts as deduced relationalities/functions rather than Platonically innate or Nominalistic constructions, see the "Foreword:" 20, n. 3, Chapter 5: "Traces of an Intellectual Crisis:" 575, n. 54; and Chapter 6: "Grand Narratives of Theoretical Reason:" 709, n. 204.

‘weakness’ of Kant’s philosophy, according to Hegel, is precisely because Kant stresses reflecting judgment and does not speak of Absolute Knowledge.¹⁶⁸ Unable to think otherwise, for Hegel Kant *must be* a dualist with consciousness locked into subjectivity and constructing its own subjective understanding.

Where Kant comes to [... the true and sole] reason as the solution [that is, absolute identity], *reason for him is nothing but the indeterminate idea of the supersensible in us*, which cannot be made comprehensible further, – as if he had not himself given a concept of the same in the identity of the concept of nature and freedom.¹⁶⁹

Here Hegel chides Kant for ignoring his own concept of the ‘connecting link’ between nature and freedom. However, the only thing that Hegel shares in common with Kant with the concepts of nature and freedom are their labels.

d) Hegel and Kant on Nature and Freedom

Hegel views nature and Spirit as governed by two separate and separable freedoms: physical nature’s freedom restricts Absolute Freedom as it ‘grounds’ in ‘actuality’ (*Reelle*) the ‘true’ (*Ideelle*) freedom of Absolute Spirit. These two freedoms stand in opposition to one another.¹⁷⁰ The goal of Absolute Freedom is to escape from the restrictive suffering, pain, and passions of physical nature and to achieve finite spirit’s unification with Absolute Spirit.

In contrast, Kant views nature and freedom as distinct but complementary: physical nature is by no means free but exhaustively governed by ‘blind,’ mechanical, efficient causality. Freedom (autonomy) is only possessed by transcendental consciousness (not a speciesism claim because not necessarily possessed merely by human beings), which is capable, intentionally, of creating things that the blind, mechanical, efficient causality of nature cannot create on its own. Autonomous freedom, according to Kant, is both *freedom-from* the efficient causality of nature and, simultaneously, *freedom-for* its own creativity in and through nature. In short, autonomous freedom is no escaping from nature into Absolute Spirit.

The distinctions between Hegel’s and Kant’s understanding of nature and freedom lead to Hegel’s inappropriate insistence upon squeezing Kant into Hegel’s own system. The crucial difference between them is that *Hegel is an Absolute Idealist already in*

168. See Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen" GW II: 287–288.

169. Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen" GW II: 323.

170. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 455–456. On Hegel’s distinction between the real (*reelle*) and ideal thought (*ideelle*) see the "Preface:" 46, n. 31. See as well, Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaft* GW X: 237; Hegel, "Addendum" to the *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaft* (1830) GW X: 237–238.

*possession of Absolute Knowledge beyond the world whereas Kant is an Archaeologist Intentionalist*¹⁷¹ *seeker of understanding and responsible agency in the world.*

In the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*, Kant proposes that concepts to the extent they are related to objects have a field (*Feld*), territory (*territorium*), or domain (*ditio*).¹⁷² A 'field' is a set of phenomena to which we can apply concepts regardless of our ability to achieve a genuine understanding. Nocturnal dreams are a 'field' in which we apply concepts to the phenomena with clarity and distinctness, but we have no genuine understanding because there is no causal order to the phenomena.¹⁷³ A 'territory' is a set of phenomena to which we can apply concepts *for which it is possible* that the phenomena are governed by lawfulness, but we have not yet established a lawful order for them. An example of such a territory is the experimental laboratory, which is governed by one's commitment to discernment of lawful order, but, until one has brought the experiment to a 'successful' conclusion, the lawfulness remains a hope. A 'domain' is a region of experience in which our concepts 'govern' the phenomena because we can and have discerned an imperceptible, lawful order of the region. Kant employs the Latin label '*ditio*' here, which literally means 'dominion' or 'sovereignty.'

In this context, the terms 'dominion' and 'sovereignty' do not mean 'subjugation' in the sense of at the disposal of capricious, willful self-service. *Kant identifies two domains of lawfulness:*¹⁷⁴ *the domain of theoretical reason (understanding of nature, not Platonic/Hegelian contemplation of reason beyond nature) and the domain of practical reason (responsible, moral agency).* Although Kant refers to a 'gap' (*Kluft*) between these two domains of nature and freedom, they are not metaphysically, separated regions of subjectivity and objectivity. Because *they are both experienced as appearances in transcendental consciousness, the 'gap' is an epistemological gap between appearances and understanding.*

According to Kant, then, reason is 'limited' and consists of two domains: theoretical reason and practical reason. Theoretical reason is concerned with understanding 'what is' (of materially determined appearances) whereas practical reason is concerned with 'what ought to be' (of autonomous freedom's generating of new, yet always within, appearances). Furthermore, although practical reason requires the understanding of 'what is' that is theoretical reason, theoretical reason is subordinate to, although not separated at any point from, practical reason. Hence, 'dominion' and 'sovereignty,' according to Kant, are not limited to the domain of theoretical reason. Rather, 'dominion' and 'sovereignty' are always answerable to practical reason, the issue of 'what ought to be.'

171. On Kant as an 'Archaeologist'/'Intentionalist,' see Vol. II: "Introduction:" 556, n. 108.

172. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 174 ff.

173. On Kant's notion of 'field' (*Boden*) as clarity and distinctness of perception without any hope of causal explanation and nocturnal dreams, see: 116 and, especially, n. 39

174. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 174.

A being capable of exercising practical reason must, by definition, be 'free' to ignore its moral responsibility because without 'freedom' there would only be material determinism, hence, no morality. However, *the capacity to ignore one's responsibilities is no license to do so*. The passion for, and faith in, lawfulness in understanding is a constant reminder that 'if one should, one can' although, unlike Hegel's "The Moral View of the World," there is no heteronomous, absolute 'one must'!¹⁷⁵ Self-governing of one's creative agency by this passion for lawfulness is what makes one 'worthy of respect.' However, deeper than respect is 'dignity' or the 'absolute (not merely relative) worth' of the individual because transcendental consciousness innately and indelibly, *universally* possesses *autonomy* (autonomous, creative freedom).¹⁷⁶

It is one thing merely to assert that theoretical and practical reason are inseparable as do Hegel/the early Strauß with their invocation of Absolute Spirit that unites abstract content (*Inhalt*) and concrete representations (*Form*). It is another thing to understand their relationship as a required condition of experience in a finite world by transcendental consciousness. The merely 'logical,' dogmatic claim that theoretical and practical reason are united by Absolute Knowledge and the Absolute Freedom of Absolute Spirit, 'logically' reduces all experience, understanding, and agency to illusory meaninglessness (*maya*).

Both *theoretical reason*, which seeks to understand 'what is,' and *practical reason*, which seeks to achieve 'what ought to be,' require a transcendental critique to identify the conditions of possibility, which are their respective capacities, as well as to identify what unites the two lawful systems of freedom and nature – far below the lofty unity of Hegel's Absolute Spirit. Unification of the two lawful systems of nature and freedom,

175. This 'If one should, one can' is dramatically in contrast to Hegel's 'I should, but I can't' in "The Moral View of the World" in the *Phänomenologie*. See "Vol. II: Introduction:" "The Moral View of the World" 547 ff.

176. On Kant's discussion of 'dignity,' which is incapable of substitution for or by an other, and 'relative worth,' which is capable of substitution for or by an other, see Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 434–436, 249.450. On 'respect' owed to others, see Kant, "Remark" to "On Vices that Violate the Duty of Respect Owed to Other Persons" in the *Metaphysics of Morals*: "The only respect to which I am obligated by nature is that for the law (*reverere legem*) [and its conditions of possibility], and this, not to esteem others generally (*reverentia adversus hominem*) or to render some particular obligation to them, is the universal and unconditional duty owed to other persons, which can be expected from everyone as the original respect [*Achtung*] owed to all.

"Other forms of respect, which need demonstration, that is, with respect to human nature [*Beschaffenheit der Menschen*] or the individual's particular circumstances, namely, age, sex, genealogy [*Abstammung*], strengths or weaknesses, or even the individual's status and prestige [*Standes und Würde* mean "status and prestige" because "*Würde*," in the sense of human dignity from Section II of the *Groundwork*, is absolute, not capricious], which in part are due to capricious dispositions, have no place and require no classification in the presentation of the first principles of the doctrine of virtue [when it comes to the transcendental conditions and capacities of practical reason] because here one is concerned only with the pure principles of reason [not with the accidents of perception]." *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 467–468.

according to Kant, is accomplished by reflecting judgment with its wrestling with the interface between theoretical and practical reason *in a world of appearances*.

Of course, it is possible to claim dogmatically, as do Hegel and the early Strauß, that the unity of theoretical and practical reason, which Hegel divide into Absolute Freedom and nature's freedom, consist of the absolute, ontological 'ground' of Absolute Spirit. Such a dogmatic claim is possible (but not provable) because every causal explanation involves a degree of speculation given that only effects are experienced, not causes themselves. However, Hegel's/Strauß' absolute, ontological unity of Absolute Spirit does not serve understanding and responsible agency in the world. Rather, Absolute Spirit is taken to be not only *the ultimate, causal origin* but also *the ultimate spiritual* (idealist) *goal of all events that take humanity beyond nature*.

It is only because one takes the capacities of theoretical and practical reason to be unique to each of them that gives the impression that they are separated by an unbridgeable metaphysical 'gap.' Kant says that it is precisely this false impression that required his writing of a 'third critique,' the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*.¹⁷⁷

First, the 'gap' between nature and freedom, according to Kant, is itself only apparently ontological. The gap is only apparent because it acknowledges that there are *two imperceptible, lawful orders*, not two kinds of substance. However, *these two imperceptible, lawful orders govern the seamless, unified flow of appearances that are experience*. In other words, we're concerned only with an apparent gap, which emerges only if one insists that knowledge is causal explanation, rather than the concern to understand the conditions of possibility for experience, understanding, and exercising of responsible agency in the world. There are no gaps in experience.

Second, *what bridges the apparent 'gap' between the two imperceptible functions of reason (theoretical and practical reason) is not what Hegel/the early Strauß call Absolute Spirit as the sole 'substance' or even what Martin Heidegger called the 'unknown common root' of the imagination that would mean that Kant 'grounded' reason in the irrational*.¹⁷⁸ Rather, *what theoretical and practical reason have in common is what Kant calls 'reflecting judgment', not to be confused for Hegel's notion of a 'sole' reflecting judgment: Absolute Spirit*.

According to Kant, the common element in both freedom-from nature and the individual's freedom-for creativity is the world of appearances. *How is it possible that appearances both can be 'mechanically' determined and, simultaneously to a degree, be independent although never separated from mechanical determination?* However, rather than the question being concerned with the ultimate, causal explanation for two systems of complementary causalities as is the case with Hegel, the 'critical' question

177. See the "Introduction" to Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*: "III. On the Critique of the Capacity of Judgment as a Means for Combining the Two Parts [theoretical and practical reason] of Philosophy into One Whole:" AA V: 176–179. Their union is not metaphysical but the epistemological capacity of reflecting judgment. See the next section "IV. On the Capacity of Judgment as an *a priori* Legislative Faculty:" AA V: 179 ff.

178. See Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*.

for Kant is: *What capacity must eminent, finite, transcendental consciousness possess in order to experience a coherent world that contains these two complementary causalities?* Kant's answer: reflecting judgment!

Both theoretical and practical reason are concerned with 'judgment.' Judgment consists in subordinating a sets of phenomena under concepts.¹⁷⁹ When we already possess the appropriate concepts for judging a set of phenomena, we are able to make a 're-producing judgment' (*ein bestimmendes Urteil*): For example, 'This is a computer,'¹⁸⁰ 'that over there is an oak tree.' However, given the limits to reason and our limitation to phenomena as appearances, we can encounter phenomena for which we, as yet, have no appropriate concepts. This is a situation that awakens our desire for grasping order, and we can set out to discover/learn the appropriate concepts for the un-understood phenomena. As an indicator of the role of desire here, Kant points out that the *discovery of a "[...] unifiability of two or more empirically heterogeneous laws of nature under a principle that comprehends them both is the ground of a very noticeable pleasure [...]"*¹⁸¹ Simply memorizing re-produced judgments is boring!¹⁸² Most importantly, though, Kant points out that there was a time when what is now taken to be a re-produced judgment was originally arrived at through the learning process of reflecting judgment.¹⁸³

Reflecting judgment precedes re-produced judgment and is at the heart of both theoretical and practical reason! Rather than grasping Absolute Knowledge in its singular activity of uniting Absolute Freedom and nature (as Hegel maintained), *reflecting judgment is the strongest form of denial of Absolute Knowledge that one can make.* However, this is *no sign of reason's weakness*, as Hegel asserts in his dismissal of Kant. Reflecting judgment widens understanding/knowledge because it opens up the entire cosmos to consideration as a 'domain' of reason's understanding and responsible agency, and it is possible because transcendental consciousness possesses a form of open-ended causality that we've experience nowhere else but in humanity: autonomous freedom. In fact, rather than a weakness, autonomous freedom in principle contains the possibility to destroy nature.¹⁸⁴

With their metaphysics of Absolute Spirit, Hegel and the early Strauß take the world/cosmos to consist of the multiplicity of things ("infinitely many droplets, which reflect the Idea"¹⁸⁵) and which subordinates the world/cosmos to an indifference of

179. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*, AA V: 179 ff.

180. Note, though, that judgment is not a simple correspondence of 'a concept' with a set of phenomena. Kant's twelve 'categories of the understanding' in the *Critique of Pure Reason* indicate how complex judgment is.

181. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 187.

182. See Ernst Cassirer, *Kants Leben und Lehre* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1977): 322–323.

183. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 187.

184. See Kant, *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie (Lecture on Moral Philosophy)* (1774/1775): 177.

185. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 14–15.

Absolute Spirit that is both the non-difference of an Absolute Oneness and a reduction of particularity to the indifference of meaninglessness. With their epistemology of Absolute Knowledge, Hegel and the early Strauß *assume the givenness of the Idea (Spirit) and ideas in the mind*, metaphysically prior to particulars. Ideas, for Hegel and Strauß, are the ‘canon’ of the mind for measuring the truth (mental content/*Inhalt*) of actuality (the representations of perception/*Forms*). Strauß succinctly formulated this epistemology in the *Glaubenslehre*. What it means to think is to apply an already existing idea as the standard for grasping the multiplicities of representations:

*In nature, an idea only pours itself out in the multiplicity of existing things. In the mind, the idea thinks itself [reflectirt (sic.)] in itself out of this externalization. That is, the individual person [itself an externalization of the idea ‘humanity’] thinks the idea ‘humanity’ and refers to this idea. By means of this relationship [between internal idea and external multiplicity], everything is essentially brokered mentally and ethically.*¹⁸⁶

In short, the mind is an internal location of a system of eternal ideas, which serve as an absolute canon¹⁸⁷ for processing the external world of phenomena.

However, this system of ideas is an anthropomorphic projection onto Absolute Spirit. Neither Hegel nor the early Strauß offer anything close to a causal explanation for the origin of the canon of ideas¹⁸⁸ except to say that they are a consequence of a logic of negation. Hegel dogmatically invokes explicitly the ‘infinite’s principle of motion and change’¹⁸⁹ and Absolute Spirit as fulfilling the ‘principle of sufficient reason,’ not by a synthetic, heuristic, ‘adding to’ of the principle of sufficient reason to Absolute Spirit but by Absolute Spirit being Absolute Cause.¹⁹⁰ However, *if the claim for Absolute Spirit as a cause is grounded only in the canon of logic, then its ‘containing’ of the principle of sufficient reason within Itself ‘is equally an assumption*. Clearly, one cannot legitimately ground an absolute explanation, much less Absolute Knowledge, in a set of assumptions. Absolutes are unequivocal truths (κατ’ ἀλήθειαν);

186. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 383.

187. Strauß employs the notion of a ‘canon’ (measure, standard) in his presentation of Spinoza’s invocation of ideas for measuring the universal character of human nature is an ‘empty abstraction’. See *Glaubenslehre* II. 382. However, he quickly adds that Spinoza’s system, like Hegel’s, requires that ideas be ‘grounded’ for the actuality in historical phenomena. Strauß doesn’t recognize that logic is itself a ‘canon’ without an ‘organon’ so that invoking logic to causally explain anything is a fanciful wishing of the dove to fly in a vacuum. On logic as a ‘canon’ without an ‘organon,’ see Chapter 1: 49.

188. See Hegel’s account in “Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten” GW II: 455–456 of the emergence of ideas out of the ‘divisible-I’ of Absolute Spirit in conformity with infinity’s ‘principle of motion and change’. See as well: 160. Along with the appearance of ideas in the divisible non-I of nature as actuality/representations, and their ‘formal reality’ (but not ideal origin) in subjective consciousness, we are given a description, not a causal explanation anything close to Absolute Knowledge. In short, Hegel has engaged in a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος.

189. See, for example, Hegel, “Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten.” GW II: 454.

190. See, for example, Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logic* GW VI: 82–83.

reflecting judgments *grounded in appearances and assumptions are tentative truths* (κατ' ἀνθρώπων) of faith (*Fürwahrhalten*).¹⁹¹

Despite Hegel's claim that his canon of ideas requires representations in order that the ideas not be 'empty,' reality (*Realität*) is, nonetheless, supposedly grounded, metaphysically, in eternal ideas with representations only providing their appearance in the actual (*Wirklichkeit*) as fleeting forms. In other words, 'truth' is 'above' and ultimately indifferent to the actuality of representations. This is what makes Hegel's/the early Strauß' metaphysics 'Idealism.' This 'Idealism' is an absolutizing of *re-produced* judgment (actually, *specifying* judgment) that has 'forgotten' its origin in *reflecting* judgment.

In contrast, Kant places humanity as an autonomous, free transcendental consciousness squarely in the world/cosmos with a set of finite, yet incredibly powerful capacities to understand and to exercise responsible agency *in a world of appearances, not a realm merely of abstract ideas*. Far from any dictum (*Machtspruch*) of Absolute Spirit's externalizing of ideas in representations, for Kant the world/cosmos *in-itself* matters. Without a world (phenomena), we would have no transcendental consciousness. Without the domains of nature and autonomous freedom, there would be no instance that could drive reason's passion: the application of reflecting judgment to discern order. Transcendental consciousness' capacity for discernment of the imperceptible relationalities in phenomena is what constitutes our creative potential both to understand (theoretical reason) and to creatively and responsibly act in the world/cosmos. Transcendental consciousness' capacities are what establish the human species as an unequivocal location in nature that denies reality as a zero-sum, materialistic game nor as indifferent to the suffering, exploitation, persecution, and oppression in the world.

In a nutshell: we gain understanding of the world/cosmos not by applying metaphysical, eternally existing ideas of *specifying* judgment to transient phenomena and claiming it is 'knowledge' but by means of *reflecting* judgment's *deduction of the imperceptible, relational order that appears to govern the world/cosmos*. *Reflecting* judgment drives the living metaphors of ever-expanding discernment of imperceptible order. In dramatic contrast, the dead metaphors of *specifying* judgment are readily buried in the graveyard of dictionaries awaiting poetic rejuvenation although in the meantime venerated as absolute when, in fact, they originate out of the dynamic of *reflecting* judgment.

Nonetheless, *concepts arrived at by reflecting judgment are also not a form of Nominalism*.¹⁹² Nominalism is grounded in a materialistic metaphysic that is as much

191. On the difference between κατ' ἀλήθειαν and κατ' ἀνθρώπων, see Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 767–768 and *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 462–463. Kant speaks of the distinction between an argument κατ' ἀνθρώπων and κατ' ἀλήθειαν and without reference to the importance of the distinction in Kant. See Strauß, *Streitschriften* II: 52.

192. On 'Nominalism,' see the "Foreword:" 20, n. 3.

enthusiastic and fanciful as spiritualistic Logos metaphysics. Nominalism claims to provide a causal explanation to concepts as merely abstractions drawn from an empirical metaphysics and known *κατ' ἀλήθειαν*- just the opposite of Logos metaphysics *κατ' ἀλήθειαν*. It no more gives an account of how the world of appearances is governed by concepts and laws/rules any more than Logos metaphysics can give an account of why concepts are eternal.

It may appear as if Kant's reflecting judgment is Nominalism as the path to subsuming a set of phenomena under a conceptual scheme. However, Kant's reflecting judgment is an exercise in *epistemological* 'faith' [*Fürwahrhalten*] that is grounded in feeling/desire to understand, not a *metaphysical* claims to causally explain the origin of 'true' concepts (either according to Nominalism or Idealism). It is not grounded in a dictum that reality is the way humanity conceives it to be, which is, in the end, the claim of Nominalism and Idealism. Rather, truth *κατ' ἀνθρώπον* is driven by *the desire to understand phenomena* (theoretical reason) *and moral imperatives* (practical reason) as governed, epistemologically, by imperceptible laws/rules, which are ultimately, incapable of proof, yet necessarily apply at all times in all places *if there is to be the kind of theoretical and practical experience that we have in this world*. In the case of theoretical reason, these laws/rules are physical laws, statistical significance, and algorithms. In the case of practical reason, these laws are the wide, categorical (not merely hypothetical) imperatives of morality.¹⁹³

In dramatic contrast both Hegel and Strauß formulate the relationship of humanity to nature as "subjugating nature"¹⁹⁴ This is strikingly different from Kant's understanding of the 'domains' of nature and freedom. To be sure *ditio* (Kant's Latin for 'domain') *literally means 'sovereignty' or 'dominion,' but it does not mean 'subjugation.'* Ultimately, *ditio* is grounded in imperceptible capacities of transcendental consciousness as a consequence of a capacity to discern relationalities in appearances that are required for the world/cosmos to be experienced *and the domain of creative, responsible agency*, not just pursuit of personal or social gain through subjugation. This capacity for the deduction of the order of relationalities in experience is a form of transcendental consciousness' causal capacity of autonomous freedom, intentionally to bring concepts into play and things into existence that nature on its own cannot. Nature cannot 'think' or 'intentionally act' anywhere like the degree to which a transcendental consciousness 'above' but 'in' nature can), which serves as the very condition of possibility for humanity to assume responsibility for its agency. The autonomous freedom of transcendental consciousness is the location for an open-endedness to nature that is not exhaustively the consequence of merely physical causality.

193. See the *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 390–391.

194. Strauß, *LJ*. 780. See Strauß, "Einige Bemerkungen über die Recension meines Lebens Jesu von Herrn Dr. J. Müller" ["Remarks on the Review of my *Life of Jesus* by Dr. J. Müller"] in *Streitschriften* III: 167.

In the *Streitschriften*, Strauß addresses the theme of 'subjugation' of nature in the *LJ* by saying that his detractors took his comment to be concerned with 'external' nature. For that reason, to the sentence on page 780 of the *LJ* that reads "[...] the spirit more and more completely subjugates nature" he inserted as of the second edition "both within and around man" and continues with "until it lies before him as the inert matter on which he exercises his active power [...]"¹⁹⁵ To the sentence on page 781 of the *LJ* that questions "shall we interest ourselves more in the cure of some sick people in Galilee, than in the miracles belonging to the history of the world," he added after the word "miracles" "of intellectual [*Gemüthsleben*] and moral life" and continues, or "—in the increasing the almost incredible dominion of man over nature—in the irresistible force of ideas, to which no unintelligent matter, whatever its magnitude, can oppose any enduring resistance?"¹⁹⁶ In addition, he rebukes those critics for their 'shallowness of imagination' (*Seichtigkeit der Vorstellung*) who take his praise for the invention of the compass and the steam engine "as higher than the perfection of a virtuous character."¹⁹⁷

Nevertheless, Strauß' attempt to address criticism of his statements on the subjugation of nature doesn't begin to come close to Kant's notions of reflecting judgment as the 'sovereign (not subjugating) link' between freedom and nature¹⁹⁸ that is the required condition of possibility for responsible agency in the world. *Hegel and the early Strauß are concerned, metaphysically, to divinize humanity in Absolute Freedom beyond nature. Kant is concerned to keep humanity human as an agency of autonomous freedom in nature.*

In short, the issue of Absolute Knowledge beyond nature turns out to be a speculative illusion.¹⁹⁹ In a reversal of content and form as found in Strauß/Hegel, Kant underscores that there is no *a priori* synthetic judgment (autonomous freedom) without a world of phenomena (nature). Furthermore, a speculative metaphysical logic of Double Negation is a *non sequitur* because logic is 'formal' and independent of sense perception. Understanding (or knowledge) that is 'higher' than imagination (representations of form) provides no guarantee of Absolute Knowledge/Truth, which is claimed to be the ultimate cause of understanding and imagination by means of a vicious, hermeneutical circle. Logic is a 'canon' without an 'organon.' The 'empty

195. Strauß, *Streitschriften* III: 167.

196. See Strauß, *Streitschriften* III: 167.

197. Strauß, *Streitschriften* III: 167.

198. See Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 4* as well as 29–30. Already here in the "Preface" Kant establishes the centrality of creative, autonomous freedom-from nature as the "condition" required for any notion of morality, which requires a capacity of freedom-for initiating a finite eminent causality under the conditions of nature's formal causality.

199. Strauß came to realize the speculative illusion. In a letter to Märklin, this time from November 3. 1839, Strauß invokes the question that was to become central in his *The Old Faith and the New*: "Are we still Christians?," which he now answers by dismissing unity of content and form as an "illusion." There is "nothing essential to history." (Ziegler II: 333)

space' of a 'non-resistant' vacuum that is Absolute Spirit is a fantasy. *Rather than a broad Absolute Knowledge that take us out of the world and treats history with profound indifference,*²⁰⁰ Kant's narrowing application of reflecting judgment to experience,

200. Hegel's dialectical logic that results in profound historical indifference (events as merely place markers of Absolute Spirit) also governs his sense of morality (Kant's practical reason). This is nowhere more clear than in their respective accounting for 'great' and/or 'good' persons. According to Hegel, 'great' leaders are to be valued as events of Absolute Spirit regardless of their pursuit of merely self-interest. According to Kant, 'good' leaders are of greater significance than 'great' leaders because 'good' people have moral character.

Hegel writes of the 'great' leaders of history: "It is different when we come to great historical personalities. Here it is precisely where the great collisions arise between the existing, recognized duties, laws and rights and the possibilities which are opposed to this system, which violate it, even destroy its foundation and reality, and at the same time have a content which can also seem good, advantageous on the whole, essential and necessary. These possibilities now become historical; they include a universality of a different kind than the universality that forms the basis of the existence of a people or state. This universality is a Moment of the Producing Idea, a moment of Truth striving and driving towards Itself. Historical men (*sic.*), the *world-historical individuals*, are those in whose purposes such a universality lies.

Caesar essentially belongs here, who was in danger of losing the position, if not of supremacy, at least of equality, to which he had risen alongside the others who stood at the head of the state, and of succumbing to those who were about to become his enemies. These enemies, who at the same time intended to further their personal ends, had the formal constitution of the state and the power of legal appearance for themselves. Caesar fought in the interest of preserving his position, honor and security, and the victory over his opponents, in that their power over the provinces of the Roman Empire, was at the same time the conquest of the entire empire: Thus, leaving the form of the state constitution intact, he became the individual ruler in the state. What thereby acquired for him the realization of his initially negative purpose, the sole rule of Rome, was at the same time a necessary destiny in Rome's and the world's history so that it was not only his particular gain but also an instinct that accomplished what was in and of itself the time. *These are the great men in history whose own particular purposes contain the substantial which is the will of the world spirit.* They are to be called *heroes* inasmuch as they have drawn their purposes and their vocation not merely from the calm, orderly course of things, sanctified by the existing system, but from a source whose content is hidden and has not flourished into a present existence, from the inner spirit, which is still subterranean, which throbs against the outer world as against the shell and bursts it, because it is a different kernel from the kernel of this shell, – who thus seem to draw from themselves and whose deeds have produced a state and world conditions which seem to be only *their* cause and *their* work.

Such individuals did not have consciousness of the Idea at all in their purpose, but were practical and political men. However, at the same time they were thinkers who had an insight into what was necessary and what *was timely*. That is precisely the truth of their time and their world, the next species, so to speak, which was already present within them. It was their business to know this universal, necessary, next stage of their world, to make it their purpose and to put their energy into it. World-historical men (*sic.*), the heroes of an age, are therefore to be recognized as the insightful ones; their actions, their speeches are the best of the time. Great men (*sic.*) have willed to satisfy themselves, not others. What they would have learned from others in terms of well-meant intentions and advice would rather have been the more narrow-minded and crooked, because they are the ones who understood it best and from whom everyone learned it and found it good, or at least joined in. The advanced Spirit is the inner soul of all individuals, but it is an unconscious inwardness which the great men bring to consciousness. That is why the others follow these guides of the soul because in such great men they feel the irresistible force of their own inner Spirit confronting them." Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* GW XII: 44–46

understand, and exercise responsible, creative agency anchors humanity squarely in the world.

Reflecting judgment plays the key role of transcendental consciousness not only for theoretical reason's understanding of 'what is,' but it is also central to practical reason to which I now turn. The following chapter demonstrates how Hegel entirely distorted Kant's notion of practical reason.

Addendum: On 20th C 'Critique' and the 'End of Metaphysics'

On this side of the 20th C, the meaning of the term metaphysics is lost in a shroud of myths (narratives). Jean-François Lyotard's *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*²⁰¹ reflected the long-established opinion of many that we are in a 'post-metaphysical' world. 'Everyone' talks about metaphysics as if the term was univocal. Language is not univocal but consists of a plurivocity of living and dead metaphors (literally dead, not merely worn-out and awaiting new poetic rejuvenation).

As polyvalent plurivocity is, it does not eliminate distinguishing between and among metaphors. Those who reject metaphysics are trapped, paradoxically, in a 'metaphysics' that rejects 'essences' but distinguishes between 'identity' and 'difference' (the very definition of 'essence') because, presumably, the univocal metaphysics that is rejected is 'identifiable' and 'different' from non-metaphysics. Stated otherwise: chaos presupposes order; non-Being presupposes Being – *without Being having to refer to*

The contrast with Kant couldn't be greater. Kant writes over 'great' and 'good' leaders: "There is a difference between a good and a great prince. The greatness concerns the talent, the goodness the way of thinking, and the use s/he makes of Her/his talents. Because the sensible greatness does not so much depend on the talents as on the good use of them, we are more moved by the greatness of talent, by untiring diligence, than by another who does not have all these talents in greatness, but has the best will. – We may applaud the latter, but we will not feel the same admiration for him that we feel for the former. History does not praise the good princes, but the great ones; for the good ones were like a cheerful day that will soon pass; but the great ones, who showed talent and waged bloody wars, have been preserved in history; this must lie in the nature of humanity, which is not yet completely moralized. Men are not yet so far advanced that all the education of which we are capable is already present in human history, and we are childishly moved only by the great. Great princes are sometimes given the title of good when they have done so much evil that there is no more evil left for them to do. Now they begin to show themselves good, because they have no opportunity of appearing otherwise. We have an unconditional respect for such a character. People of real sentiments, who are moved by good, and take an interest in it, are interested in speaking of morality. Our conversations have all sorts of material, e.g. city news, political news, etc., then comes a matter that concerns the human heart, but rarely. There are people of great intellect who never have such a conversation and feel no pleasure in it at all. However, the original good principles can hardly be deeply rooted in such a person. Kant: *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1106–1107; Olms ed.]: 292–293

201. Jean-François Lyotard wrote in *The Postmodern Condition*: 77: "Modernity, in whatever age it appears, cannot exist without a shattering of belief and without discovery of the 'lack of reality' of reality, together with the invention of other realities'.

enduring/eternal substances. However, at the end of the 18th C, when ‘modernism’ supposedly commenced, Kant already describes a metaphysics that is necessary but ‘grounded’ in relationalities, not substances or absolute causes.

Kant spoke of twelve ‘categories of the understanding’ in a table consisting of three categories each in four divisions. His labels for the four divisions are: Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality.²⁰² Under the items of ‘Relation,’ he lists the three fundamental relations that are required for there to be experience and understanding of phenomena: the relation between ‘substance and accidents;’ the relation between ‘cause’ and ‘effect;’ and the relation of ‘reciprocity between agent and recipient.’ He does not speak of substance, causality, and reciprocity as either ‘eternal ideas’ or ‘enduring things’ but as ‘relations.’ In other words, both substance and cause, according to Kant, are relations capable of being understood only by a transcendental consciousness able to grasp relations. Our experience (hence, understanding) is not of enduring ‘things themselves’ or of ‘abstract essences’ independent of things but of relations of appearance.

In a footnote to the second “Preface” of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant explicitly addresses the issue of the ‘representation of something that endures in existence’ [*Vorstellung von etwas Beharrlichem in Dasein*] and the ‘representation of permanence’ itself [*Vorstellung des Beharrlichen*]. He stresses that they are not equivalent but also not separable. The first is an ‘appearance,’ and the other is ‘matter.’ He then acknowledges that nothing in our experience of appearances is enduring, which includes matter! However, he adds, for us to experience as we do, ‘appearances’ must be grounded in a simultaneously, ‘transient’ permanence:

[...] though the representation of something permanent may be very transitory and variable like all our other representations, not excepting those of matter, it [our representation] refers to something permanent. This latter must therefore be an external thing [McG: as ‘thing-in-itself’] distinct from all my representations, and its existence must be included in the determination of my own existence, constituting with it but a single experience [McG: not a dualism!] such as would not take place even internally [*innerlich*] if it were not also at the same time, in part, external [*äußerlich*]. How this should be possible we are as little capable of [McG: causally] explaining further as we are of accounting for our being able to think the abiding in time, the co-existence of which with the changing generates the concept of alteration.²⁰³ (emphasis added)

Nonetheless, we have no direct access to ‘permanence,’ ‘matter,’ which doesn’t appear. Its understanding is a product of adding the notion of permanence to our experience

202. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 106.

203. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B xli a.

of transient appearances that we arrive at only through discernment of enduring relationalities between and among the appearances.²⁰⁴

Kant writes in the *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe* from 1786, the year before the publication of the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, that the only manner by which matter is capable of being properly understood is by means of mathematically calculable, relational forces. In "Remark I" to "Explanation 4" he stresses that matter "[...] must be regarded only as relative impenetrability" because matter is understandable by the interaction of two causal forces: expansion and contraction. In his "Remark II," Kant maintains that his account of matter is not trapped in the 'vicious circle' that 'matter is impenetrable because it is impenetrable.'

The appeal to the repulsive [expansive] force is free from this reproach. For *even if this force cannot be further explained according to its possibility, and must therefore be assumed as a basic force*, it nevertheless gives a concept of an acting cause and its laws, according to which the effect, namely the resistance in the filled space, can be estimated according to its degrees.²⁰⁵ (emphasis added)

204. Cassirer attributes the epistemological shift from 'substances' to 'functions' (relationality) to Kant even as he documents how the concept of function was developed further over the course of the 19th C to lead to 'general relativity.' See especially chapters seven and eight of Ernst Cassirer, *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff* (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1910): 410–459, as well as, Cassirer, Section V. of "Achttes Buch. Die kritische Philosophie" in *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit*, Band II (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1994): 638–647 and Cassirer's discussion of Kant in *ibid.*, 662 ff., esp., 672–678. See as well, Cassirer's *The Problem of Knowledge*: 74–76. Finally, see Cassirer, *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, Dritter Teil: Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis*, Band 13 of Cassirer's *Gesammelte Werke* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2002): 328 ff, esp., 358–361.

205. Kant, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe* AA IV: 502. Kant wrote already in 1755: "If something is, then it is. However, how it comes about that the concepts of the sides of the enclosed space etc. are at the service of thinking, that is, that there is something at all that can be thought, from which then later, by connecting, limiting, and determining, the concept of every conceivable thing results could not be understood if not in God, the source of all reality, whose reality is contained in His concept. I know, however, that Descartes himself took the proof of God's existence from God's inner concept itself; but how much he erred in doing so can be seen from the "Addendum" [Zusatz] to the preceding paragraph. God is of all beings the only one in which existence is earlier to or, if one prefers, identical with possibility; and there remains no concept of the latter, if one departs from this existence of the same." "A New Exposition of the First Principles of Metaphysical Knowledge" AA I: 395–396. The "Addendum" to the preceding paragraph" points out that an *a posteriori* 'explanation' "does not create the truth, but only explains (that is 'gives an accounting for') it" (*Ibid.*: AA I: 394). Kant takes Descartes' 'proof of God' as absolute, causal explanation to be an *a posteriori* conclusion that perhaps 'explains' (accounts for) the notion of God, but it does not establish the truth of God's existence. It is clear that what Kant means here by 'explanation' is not a certainty of 'causal explanation' (κατ' ἀλήθειαν) but is an *a posteriori* accounting for (κατ' ἀνθρώπων) an unperceived cause. On the difference between κατ' ἀλήθειαν and κατ' ἀνθρώπων, see Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 767–768.

With the suggestion that "God is of all beings the only one in which existence is earlier to or, if one prefers, identical with possibility," Kant is proleptically anticipating Natorp and Heidegger!:

"Proposition 4" [*Lehrsatz 4*] that follows states: "Matter is infinitely divisible into parts [*Theile*], which parts, in turn, are matter."²⁰⁶ However, this 'matter' is not the 'substances' of things-in-themselves. Substance is a judgment of appearances. Nonetheless, the 'something' that is 'matter' is not no-thing. Already in *Metaphysik Mrongovius* (1783), Kant speaks of nothingness as 'possibility,' which is not 'actuality' but also not no-thing.²⁰⁷

Although Ernst Cassirer correctly attributes the notion of 'function' ('relationality') to Kant's theoretical reason, he erroneously claims that Kant defends a 'conceptual dualism' of appearance and matter that he derived from 'classical mechanics' (that is, Newton):

[... Kant] explains²⁰⁸ [...] the material substance as that in space, which is movable for itself, i.e. separated from everything else, what exists in space apart from it. [Cassirer footnotes here to *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe* (1786): AA IV: 502 f.] The axiom that space itself and the space-filling, the materially real in it, are separated from each other *in such a way that they can be split conceptually*, so to speak, into two sharply separated modes of being, is taken from the system of 'classical mechanics' [McG: Newton]. However, with this, Kant's doctrine of 'pure perception' and with it the whole relation, which he assumes between 'transcendental analytics' and 'transcendental aesthetics,' is afflicted with a difficulty, which had to become clearly apparent as soon as this very axiom itself began to waver – as soon as the transition from classical mechanics to the general theory of relativity took place.²⁰⁹ (emphasis added)

In light of the fact that Kant explicitly rejects the claim that there can be an 'explanation' of 'matter,' he is just as likely to have his notion of 'matter' as 'possibility' (NOT actuality) from Aristotle and is not inescapably anchored in Newtonian mechanics. Heinz Happ's thesis is that for Aristotle "[A]ll individual cases of ἐνέργεια are founded in *actus purus*, of δύναμις in 'pure possibility,' which are opposed to each other as 'primordial opposition' dynamis/energeia."²¹⁰ Although one may appropriately speak of 'differences' here, even in Aristotle the 'opposition' is no unbridgeable dualism. However, particularly for Kant, he explicitly emphasizes that the conceptual differences between and among appearances, things-in-themselves, and matter are relational conceptions and that experience consists only of appearances.²¹¹

206. Kant, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe* AA IV: 503.

207. See Kant, *Metaphysik Mrongovius* AA XXIX: 960 ff. See, for example, as well as the *Opus Postumum* AA XXII: 195–197. *Motion is not a thing but also not no-thing*.

208. Kant explicitly rejects the notion that transcendental consciousness can give an *a priori*, causal 'explanation' for 'matter' in the very text to which Cassirer himself cites. See above: 709.

209. Cassirer, *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*, Band 13, *Gesammelte Werke*: 532–533.

210. Heinz Happ, *Hyle. Studien zum Aristotelischen Materie Begriff* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971): 687.

211. See, again, Kant's emphasis on a 'single experience' in *Critique of Pure Reason* B xli a, referred to above: 203.

Granted, following Derrida's formulation of the 'two strategies of deconstruction'²¹² as a result of Heidegger's "destruction of metaphysical humanism," the Deconstructionists reject the very notion of 'identity'/'essence' as a remnant of an illusory philosophy of 'presence'.²¹³ There are no essences, and reality is 'traces'/'ghosts'²¹⁴ all the way down. Yet the Deconstructionists, as well, fall into the paradox of a philosophy of 'presence.' To claim that *everything* is a 'trace' is to claim that there is at least one 'enduring essence' distinguished from everything else: trace. Furthermore, and far more importantly, by failing to distinguish among the polyvalent meanings of 'metaphysics,' Deconstructionists throw all meanings of metaphysics into the same basket as if their differences make no difference. A de-mythologization of metaphysics is surely appropriate.

In Greek, the term metaphysics is already polyvalent. The term 'meta' can mean 'after' as well as 'beyond.' 'After' refers to an asymmetrical, linear sequence, whereas 'beyond,' especially when combined with 'physics' suggests a 'reality' beyond physical reality.

The term 'physics' is, of course, itself polyvalent. 'Physics' can refer to 'all of physical reality' or to a specific 'thing' (e.g., a manuscript by Aristotle). Whereas, usually, 'physics' refers to the totality of reality, (meta-)physics can refer to the 'accidental' fact that, in Aristotle's sequence of manuscripts, the manuscript of the "Physics" was followed by a manuscript labelled the "Metaphysics" or "After the Physics."

In common parlance today, the 'meta-' of metaphysics, though, refers to something that is 'beyond' physics and that is 'objectively' independent of physics. However, the 'beyond physics' of meta-physics is itself polyvalent. It can refer to a dualism in 'reality' that separates the physical world of perception (finite matter) from some dimension that is totally beyond the physical universe (e.g., infinite Spirit with Its eternal ideas). It can also refer to a monism of reality that distinguishes (but does not separate) the physically perceptible from the intangible, imperceptibly intelligible within that monism (e.g., Kant's Critical Idealism or Process Theology's Dipolar Theism). Here, though, even the term 'monism' raises ambiguities. Is the 'monism' an aggregate of physical 'substances' (e.g., Critical Realism), does the 'monism' claim to be a causal explanation of reality (e.g., Process Theology) or does it merely refer to ubiquitous

212. In the section "Reading Us" of "The Ends of Man" in *Margins of Philosophy*, Alan Bass trans. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), Derrida describes these two strategies as: "a. To attempt an exit and a deconstruction without changing terrain [he attributes this strategy to Heidegger], by repeating what is implicit in the founding concepts and the original problematic [...], which] risks sinking into the autism of the closure." (135) "b. To decide to change terrain in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion [he attributes this strategy to the 'French'] [...] by affirming an absolute break and difference." (135)

213. See Jacques Derrida, "4. The Pharmakon" in *Dissemination*, Barbara Johnson trans. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981: 114.

214. Derrida speaks of the ,trace' as a 'ghost' "[... that] can no longer be distinguished [...] from truth, reality, living flesh, etc. One must accept the fact that here [...] to leave a ghost behind will [...] be to salvage nothing." *Dissemination*: 104.

‘appearances’ as ‘what is’ and as the required condition for agency to establish ‘what ought to be’ (e.g., Kant’s Critical Idealism)?

If one takes the ‘physical’ to refer ‘merely’ to appearances, then one must decide if the appearances mean that experience of them is simply an illusion (*maya*) with no enduring significance (e.g., as in mysticism or Hegelianism), or are the appearances manifestations of individual, intangible essences that, as intangible, are ‘the same yesterday, today, and tomorrow’ (e.g., as in Platonic Realism’s ideas and Process Theology’s ‘eternal objects’), or do appearances indirectly require assumption, but no proof, of a schema of categories for making sense of particular sets of appearances and to guide agency (Kant’s Critical Idealism)?

There are further ambiguities when it comes to ‘metaphysics’ (e.g., Heidegger’s possible, ‘Negative Theology’ of the event of the Being-of beings as concealed possibility²¹⁵), but for my purposes these noted ambiguities already suffice to point out the ridiculousness of lumping all ‘metaphysics’ into the same pile. To claim that we live in a post-metaphysical world presupposes that we know what a metaphysical world is. Without teasing out the polyvalent meanings of ‘metaphysical,’ we are no better than a magician waving a wand over illusions.

I take it to be crucial to distinguish between metaphysics as ‘objectively, the beyond of everything physical’ and metaphysics as the ‘beyond of appearances.’ The former is only a dogmatic exercise of unbridled speculation. The latter is a reflective exercise of identifying just what the assumed, imperceptible conditions have to be in order for there to be anything like an experience of appearances.

Kant was a monist, not a dualist. Kant pointed out that experience is a ceaseless flow of appearances. We experience only relationalities between and among perceptible appearances and don’t have direct access to ‘substances’ (or ‘matter,’ as I pointed out above) any more than to ‘causes’ because substances, matter, and causes can only be experienced indirectly through their effects. Yet, and this is the crucial step of his ‘metaphysics,’ he points out that ‘appearances’ are not merely a random aggregation of a phantasm. They are ‘ordered’! However, that order (or those orders) is not directly given with perceptible appearances any more than are substances, matter, and causes. Appearances are the effect of order, but not order itself. As appearances, they are merely an aggregate. The grasp of their ‘order(s)’ *requires adding imperceptible elements to the appearances*. These imperceptible elements Kant calls a *priori* synthetic judgments that constitute ‘metaphysics.’

These imperceptible elements are the elements and capacities of *finite*, transcendental consciousness. They consist of the ‘pure intuition’ of space and time because we never experience space and time directly, only ‘things’ ‘in’ space and ‘in’ time;²¹⁶ the

215. See the enigmatic footnote in Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1979): 427, n. 1.

216. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 37 ff, and B 46 ff.

schema of the categories of the twelve 'categories'²¹⁷ of the understanding; the ideas of 'pure' reason (God, the enduring identity of the 'soul,' and a cosmological order that allows for autonomous freedom);²¹⁸ reflecting judgment that 'unites' theoretical and practical reason as the crucial activity of consciousness to seek out 'concepts' among the relationalities of appearances,²¹⁹ which leads not only to the ability to understand 'what is' (theoretical reason)²²⁰ and 'what ought to be' (practical reason)²²¹ but also to the ability to make aesthetic judgments. The latter consist of judgments of beauty that employ the capacities of transcendental consciousness in a 'free play' of those transcendental capacities *without a concept*²²² and of judgments of the sublime that elevate reason above the perceptible to grasp its infinity and limitless power of its imperceptibility.²²³

The imperceptible 'order(s)' of experience are what indicate that there is something 'more' than merely appearances.²²⁴ Nonetheless, this 'more' is nothing that we have ever experienced unrelated to appearances. In other words, opening the door to 'more' than appearances is no license to introduce wild speculations.²²⁵

Of course, humanity has generated such dogmatic speculations based on anthropomorphic projections with devastating consequences for our fellow human beings and for nature. It is not philosophy that elevated humanity to the throne of God. Rather, religion long before 'critical,' reflective thought emerged placed humanity on the throne of God by means of anthropomorphic analogies. However, Kant provides the strategy for avoiding such wild, metaphysical speculations a set of anthropomorphic analogies. He does so, though, *without rejecting metaphysics but by limiting*

217. The categories of the understanding are not Platonic ideas, and they involve a set) of *a priori* synthetic judgments with respect to the categories that an individual, finite, transcendental consciousness must *add* to its experience of appearances, which together constitute a schema (*Critique of Pure Reason* B 177–178, B 181) (in a in order to understand them. Concepts are never merely singular, according to Kant. They arise only in the context of appearances, and they are applied by reflecting judgment by means of the table of categories (*Critique of Pure Reason*: B 106 ff.) Furthermore, Kant does speak of three 'ideas' of *pure* reason (God, the enduring identity of the self, and cosmological order/creative freedom), but these, as well, are neither *constitutive*, Platonic ideas, nor merely a capricious aggregate, but *regulative* (assumed) ideas that can nowhere appear in perception but must be assumed in order to experience, understand, and exercise responsible agency as we can.

218. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 395*.

219. See the distinction between reflecting (*reflektierende*) judgment distinguished from re-producing (*bestimmende*) judgment in "IV. On Judgment as an *a priori* legislative faculty" in the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 179 ff.

220. See the "Introduction" to the *Critique of Practical Reason*: AA V: 15 ff.

221. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 830.

222. See "§ 16. The Judgment of Taste through which an object is declared to be beautiful under the condition of a determinate concept is not pure" in *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*

223. See the discussion of the 'mathematical sublime' (*Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 248 ff.) and the 'dynamical sublime' (*Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA. V. 260 ff.).

224. See Kant, *Prolegomena* AA IV: 292–293.

225. On the imperceptible (subreptive claims) as no license for wild speculation, see the "Preface:" 64, n. 84.

metaphysical claims to what is required of imperceptible elements by perceptible appearances in order for finite, transcendental consciousness to be able to experience those perceptible appearances. In short, rather than metaphysics opening the speculative door to the ‘more’ that leads away from appearances, Kant insists on always returning to appearances as the litmus test for any and all claims about the ‘more.’ The question is simply: do the appearances, themselves, *require* and *adhere to a lawfully ordered* (!) ‘more’ for them to be experience?

Kant’s strategy is as remarkable as it is ‘simple.’ It allows for the identification of certainties in the very midst of non-substantial, uncertain perceptible appearances.²²⁶ What is certain, though, are not judgments about the ‘objective’ appearances themselves. Rather, what is certain are judgments about the imperceptible elements that are *required* for any and all transcendental consciousness (including non-human transcendental consciousness were there to be such a thing) to encounter perceptible appearances as relationalities. In turn, though, these *required* elements are nothing capriciously or spontaneously created by finite, transcendental consciousness – contrary to Hegel’s claim. To be sure, finite, transcendental consciousness has the capacity for fanciful capriciousness, but recognition of this *required* capacity holds the key to reining in its fancies. Transcendental consciousness *requires* its imperceptible capacities only so long as it is anchored in the lawful order(s) of perceptible appearances. Fanciful, capricious, subjective constructions are like the dreams of a dove that wants to believe that it would be easier to fly in a vacuum.²²⁷

Although the *required*, imperceptible capacities of finite, transcendental consciousness are driven by the experience and conviction of order, ‘order’ is itself an ambiguous metaphor. Among the options for understanding ‘order’ is to claim that it is a denial of liberty or, in dramatic contrast, as a condition and facilitator of finite, creative freedom. The former is succinctly summarized by the claim that education only means ‘just another brick in the wall’ as Pink Floyd maintained. However, Pink Floyd could not have created his music without ‘order.’ Music itself is an ordered system as anyone who has studied music theory will attest – even when music is used as the vehicle for chaos precisely because communicating chaos presupposes order. Education involves no simple alternative between external determinism and internal liberty to do whatever one wishes.

Both dogmatic religion and the natural sciences have too frequently succumbed to determinism and the rejection of liberty. Dogmatic religion does so, for example in Christianity, with the teaching of (double) predestination: It is predestined (that is, pre-determined) by God’s plan that only some are saved. However, the natural sciences frequently fall victim to determinism, as well, when ‘scientism’ insists that everything is determined by material causes. Both versions of determinism fail to

226. See Kant, *Metaphysik Mrongovius* AA XXIX: 939–940 quoted as note 32 on 660.

227. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 8–9. See as well, *Groundwork* AA IV: 462–463.

recognize that there is no such thing as direct access to causes. Causes are experienced only through their effects.

Retrospectively, when it comes to understanding, everything is determined – even the consequences of one's creative novelty! Prospectively, though, there is one place in the material order of which we are confident that is not determined by merely material causality. That one, *partially open-ended* location, is finite, transcendental consciousness that is capable of initiating *intentionally*, sequences of events that material causality on its own cannot initiate. This open-endedness is what allows us to speak of *autonomous freedom*, not merely the liberty to do indiscriminately and spontaneously do whatever one wishes.

Nonetheless, the one place of partial open-endedness in nature that is autonomous freedom, paradoxically, is itself what makes possible the generating of wild, speculative fantasies based on anthropomorphism about ultimate causality. Again, humanity's partial, open-endedness has led, ever again, to the enslavement of humanity by itself.²²⁸ The only pathway out of enslavement is education, not the rejection of education. This is neither an education demanded by an authoritarian power, which determines what must be learned because it serves the interests of the authoritarian power, nor is education a mere set of fanciful dreams that privilege and/or make humanity an exception to 'the order of things.' Rather, it is the kind of education that recognizes that only a finite, transcendental consciousness can acquire and apply imperceptible, symbol systems in order to *grasp the order(s) that govern appearances in the world and to act responsibly on the basis of its understanding*. Education is necessary because finite, transcendental consciousness is not born in possession of imperceptible, symbol systems that are *required* to grasp 'order.'²²⁹ Those symbol systems must be learned, and a finite, transcendental consciousness must also learn that it is the only place in the 'order of things,' so far as we have experienced, that can ask the question 'what ought to be.'²³⁰

Raising the question 'what ought to be?' illuminates a second 'order' to appearances. It is a moral order of 'wide' moral principles (the categorical imperatives) that govern the 'proper' achievement of the 'narrow,' particular goals (governed by hypothetical imperatives) of finite creativity. Note: *not all imperatives are categorical*, according to Kant. Remarkably, *only the individual can grasp* the two imperceptible systems that are the inseparable, physical and moral orders of experience. *Nonetheless, neither order is merely the capricious construction/creation* of the individual. We no more can causally explain from where physical laws come than we can causally explain from where moral laws come.

228. Kant defines 'Enlightenment' as the overcoming of one's self-imposed immaturity. See *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?* (*Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?*) AA VIII: 35.

229. See Kant, *Pädagogik* AA IX: 441, 443.

230. This observation Kant made already in his *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie* (1774/1775): 29.

Remarkably, as well, *only the individual knows* whether the orders of experience have been invoked to govern (give permission for) one's agency. A metaphysics of eminent,²³¹ finite, transcendental consciousness is necessary in order for transcendental consciousness to be, and to become, responsible, if there is to be responsible agency. In other words, a metaphysics of transcendental consciousness is required in order for it to be(come) what it is in the perceptible order of things. One can *symbolically* say, the imperceptible order of things constitutes an imperceptible 'commonweal of God' as *the unknown and unknowable origin* of 'what is' and its 'orders.' Recognizing that such a label is grounded in an anthropomorphism, its legitimacy is not because it is a literal, 'objective' claim independent of a perceiving subject but, precisely, *a symbolic, heuristic claim* on the part of an eminent, finite, transcendental consciousness for such a species to become responsibly what it is capable of becoming.

Michel Foucault wrote dismissively of transcendental critique in reference to Kant.

Critique no longer consists of the search for formal structures with universal validity but is, preferably, the historical investigation of events that have led to the constitution and acknowledgement of ourselves as the subjects who do, think, and say what we do. In this sense, critique is not transcendental, and its goal is not the possibility of a metaphysics: critique is in its intent genealogical and in its method archaeological.²³² (emphasis added)

Foucault is calling metaphysics "formal structures with universal validity," which sounds very 'Kantian' However, Foucault is employing Kantian metaphors to reject Platonic and Hegelian 'metaphysics' and hasn't begun to reject Kantian metaphysics. In fact, Foucault presupposes Kantian metaphysics.

Yes, Kant means by 'metaphysics' 'formal structures with universal validity,' but his metaphysics is not a speculative, transcendental, 'objective' claim about reality independent of, and explanatory of, the empirical world as well as the 'subject.' According to Foucault, critique (more correctly from a Kantian perspective, 'criticism') is not transcendental because it can only be empirical, and its goal is not the possibility of a metaphysics but the end of metaphysics: critique is analytical 'diairesis' (διαίρεσις) and it achieves its archaeological method by the analysis of strictly empirical origins. For Foucault *we have before us an either/or*: Either 'critique' searches for 'formal structures with universal validity' taken *in the sense of an objective, metaphysical dimension beyond experience*, or critique is 'genealogical and archaeological' occurring in, and limited to, empirical experience: That is a paralogism that is clever, but, applied to Kant, it is both a distortion and ridiculous.

231. On the difference between eminent and efficient causality, see the "Introduction:" 84, n. 23.

232. Michel Foucault, "*Was ist Aufklärung?*" ["*What is Enlightenment?*"] was published in Eva Erdman, Rainer Forst, Axel Honneth (eds.): *Ethos der Moderne* (Frankfurt a.M.-New York: Campus Verlag, 1990): 49. See McGaughey, "Enlightenment: Reflections on Michel Foucault's 'Was ist Aufklärung?'" ["What is Enlightenment?"] at https://criticalidealism.org/enlightenment-reflections-on-michel-foucaults-was-ist-aufklarung-what-is-enlightenment-7-february-2016/2/#_ftn2 (31 October 2023).

Kant's notion of *transcendental consciousness* is neither concerned with a metaphysics in the sense of an *objective* dimension 'beyond experience' nor does its metaphysics consist in a 'causal explanation of experience.' Finite, transcendental consciousness is aware of itself only because it is in the world. Its metaphysics consists of those *a priori* synthetic elements that must be added to appearances in order to experience and understand them. Yet, finite, transcendental consciousness does not create the content of experience (the empirical), and its understanding occurs in a supersensible realm that we are aware of only because we experience empirical appearances. The metaphysical anchors in the world. It does not call us out of the world.

In other words, Kant's 'critique' does not prescribe²³³ (*vorschreibt*) 'what is' and/or 'what ought to be' from some speculative dimension beyond the world but deduces²³⁴ the schema of the categories and the laws of nature and morality. *The deduction of the law is no metaphysical absolute of 'universal validity' beyond the world but the product of discernment of what is required as the conditions of possibility in order to experience the 'order' of the world and the 'order' of autonomous freedom* in that world. Especially the transcendental consciousness' "structures and universal validity" of 'pure reason,' Kant explicitly and frequently says, are *regulative* (a 'hypothetical,' not an 'apodictic' exercise of reason²³⁵). They constitute a presupposed 'as if' that is required *for discernment of 'the greatest unity and breadth'*²³⁶ that makes possible experience, understanding, and agency. They are a metaphysically, *presupposed, heuristic* necessity but are not metaphysically, absolutely necessary.²³⁷ Their origin is not known²³⁸ and cannot be known – contrary to the claims of traditional metaphysics (e.g., Plato, Hegel), but they also cannot contradict the laws of nature.²³⁹

Experience and understanding can only occur in a world/cosmos. The identification of conditions and transcendental structures that make possible experience and understanding constitute *regulative ideas, not constitutive ideas*. *Constitutive* 'apodictic' principles are mathematical, whose elements are connected by an '=' sign, in contrast

233. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 185–186: "Judgment [...] prescribes [*vorschreibt*] a law, not to nature (as autonomy) but to itself (as heautonomy) for reflection on nature, which one could call the law of the specification of nature with regard to its empirical laws, which it does not cognize in nature *a priori* but rather assumes on behalf of an order of nature cognizable for our understanding [...]."

234. See Kant's discussion of the difference between 'reflecting' and 're-producing' judgment in the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 179–181. See as well, the "Introduction:" 86, n. 26. Kant does not claim that transcendental consciousness *creates* or *prescribes* the concept or law for nature for that, of course, would be radical solipsism.

235. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 675.

236. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 672.

237. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 644, see B 725–726 on use of anthropomorphic analogies as regulative.

238. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 704.

239. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 708.

to philosophy's regulative, dynamic principles,²⁴⁰ whose elements are open to change because they are not absolute.²⁴¹ Kant claims that taking regulative principles to be constitutive principles is "lazy reason"²⁴² and is the very 'perversion' (*perversa ratio*) of reason²⁴³ because it takes an assumption to be a substantial (*hypostatic*), actual ground. In short, the totality that is transcendental consciousness is not a *hypostatic* axiom but a *hypothetical* 'problem' that denies 'an infinite regress' but is a required condition for there to be any understanding, whatsoever.²⁴⁴

Foucault echoes Strauß' definition of critique as *diairesis* that leaves a black hole at the core of understanding *without any accounting for how* an empirical, genealogical critique's archaeological method is possible. Most importantly, *we are left with theoretical description of 'what is' as a merely relative, aggregation of elements* – not to mention our being left *with no ground for determining 'what ought to be.'* A *theoretical description* is only a vicious circle of appearances of a relative, aggregate and has, other than appearances, nothing in common with Kant's notion of *theoretical reason* that is concerned with understanding 'what is' as a lawfully ordered system grasped by understanding's schema of imperceptible categories. With Foucault and Strauß theoretical reason fails to understand itself and practical reason (what 'ought to be') is eclipsed in the name of description and 'social constructions.' Foucault's liberation from authority is purchased with relativism and mutual culpability without any moral criteria to guide either theoretical or practical reason.

Kant's critique, in dramatic contrast, illuminates a distinction (but, absolutely, no separation) between *theoretical reason* that understands phenomena ('what is') and *practical reason* that governs responsible agency ('what ought to be'). However, for Kant, both theoretical and practical reason include required, *a priori*, transcendental elements that can never appear in the senses directly. In this respect, *Kant's notion of 'critique' involves the greatest unity and is far broader than Hegel's, Strauß', and Foucault's notion of critique.* Hegel, Strauß, and Foucault are narrowly concerned with *a posteriori* theoretical reason without investigating the transcendental, *a priori* elements²⁴⁵ of theoretical reason that make theoretical, much less, practical reason

240. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 222–223.

241. This insight is especially important in light of the fact that frequently (e.g., see for example, Alisdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984:266) insist that Kant has been left on the trash heap of history precisely because he was Euclidean and Newtonian. Such a claim says more about the claimant's superficial reading of Kant than it does about Kant's understanding of science.

242. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 717.

243. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 720.

244. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 536–537.

245. Hegel has one, single *a priori* synthetic judgment that is a dogmatic claim for the existence of Absolute Spirit as the objective, ultimate, causal source of all that is. Hegel claims that "[...] the Concept [...], without the variety of perception, is empty and without content, although it is *a priori* a *synthesis*. Because it is this, it has determination and difference in itself. As the determinateness of the Concept, absolute determinateness, the uniqueness, the Concept is *the basis and source of all*

possible for us to investigate phenomena, in the first place. Hegel, *Strauß*, and *Foucault* are practicing the criticism of a posteriori analytic diairesis. They have little in common with Kant's *a priori synthetic critique of transcendental consciousness*.

finite determinateness and multiplicity" (*Wissenschaft der Logik* II (1832) GW VI: 261); and Hegel claims that the I and the Concept (One) are an *a priori* unity: "That I am the One and that I am active as thinking, setting unity, is, however, not so precisely stated in Kant. That which thinking produces is unity; thus, it produces itself, for it is the One [the Concept]. (The unity can also be called relation; insofar as a manifold is presupposed and this remains on one side as manifold, it is called related). This is transcendental apperception; *the pure apperception of self-consciousness is the synthesizing function.*" *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* GW XX: 344. Hegel's 'I' here is not the 'I' of finite consciousness. It is Absolute Spirit. Absolute Spirit is the Absolute Unity of the 'divisible I' that is mental ideality (*Idee*) over against perceptible phenomena'. Perceptible phenomena are the 'unreasonable many' of the 'divisible non-I' that is empirical actuality (*Realität*). See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten:" GW II: 455–456.

Chapter 7: Practical Reason Elevates Theoretical Reason within Reason's Limits

Chapter Overview

Whereas the *Life of Jesus Critically Examined* of 1835 is shaped by a 'gnostic' escapism from the material world, as of "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity" of 1838, Strauß' understanding of religion down to the end of his career is shaped by the two themes of linear history and moral philosophy.

The chapter begins with a presentation of Hegel's two accounts of morality, which thoroughly shaped Strauß' understanding of practical reason. The first is Hegel's version of Kant's bottom-up 'constructivist,' practical reason in "Über die wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts" of 1802. The second is his version of Pauline, Augustinian, and Lutheran 'top-down' account of morality in "The Moral View of the World" of the *Phänomenologie*. One finds these two, very different versions of practical reason conflated in Strauß' reflections on morality.

Five themes are examined with respect to Strauß' grasp of 'practical reason:' 1) Kant's 'Subjective' Philosophy; 2) Kant's 'Empty Ideas' – "I should, but I can't;" 3) Freedom is only Freedom-from; 4) Evil as a Causality; 5) Moral Consequentialism.

The same five themes are employed to establish the contrast with Kant's understanding of practical reason.

When it comes to the core issue of practical reason, "what ought to be," Strauß follows two key elements of Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" in the *Phenomenology*:¹ morality is concerned with 'overcoming sensuous desire' (hence, a matter of 'consequences' of agency) and consists of the two dimensions of moral duty (empty ideas of obligation) (*Moralität*) and ethical (failed!) fulfilment (*Sinnlichkeit*).² Whereas he early on rejected Hegel's meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit that eclipses practical reason in favor of theoretical reason's Absolute Knowledge (gnosis), he engaged in various attempts to articulate a meaningful theme of 'moral improvement' that is formulated in terms of the species, not the individual, and, eventually, is anchored in hylozoism.

The section "Hegel and Strauß on 'Theoretical Reason' in Chapter 6 provides an overview of Hegel's distinguishing between 'theoretical spirit' (theoretical reason) and 'practical spirit' (practical reason).³

1. See Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 442–452 (Baillie trans.: 615–627) and Vol. II "Introduction:" "Hegel on 'I should, but I can't' in Contrast to Kant's 'If I should, I can':" 550 ff.

2. These two themes (morality as the overcoming of sensuousness and morality as 'empty abstraction') Strauß also encountered in F.C. Baur. On overcoming sensuousness, see Baur's *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 114–115, 135. On 'empty abstraction' and Baur's reading of Kant as 'subjectivist,' See the "Preface:" 51, n. 47.

3. See in Chapter 6: "Grand Narratives of Theoretical Reason" the section "Hegel and Strauß on 'Theoretical Reason'" 652 ff.

Kant's Practical Reason: A Contrast To Hegel's Account of Kant

Kant's understanding of practical reason is completely unrecognizable in both Hegel's account of Kant's practical reason in "Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts" of 1803 and in Hegel's account of "The Moral View of the World" of 1807. Hegel employs Kant's metaphors for 'theoretical' and 'practical' reason, but he takes 'theoretical' reason to be the contemplation of the sole *a priori* synthetic element that is *Absolute Spirit*⁴ and 'practical' reason to consist of relative, *a posteriori* analytical constructions subordinate to Absolute Spirit with the latter consisting of Absolute Knowledge and Absolute Freedom. Kant and Hegel share the same metaphors, but their meanings couldn't be more different.

Hegel presents two approaches to 'practical' reason. His first account is found in "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" (1803) in which he presents his understanding of what he calls Kant's 'practical' reason as 'constructivist'.⁵ His second account in "The Moral View of the World" of the *Phenomenology of Spirit/Mind* (1807) presents a formulation of 'practical reason' on the basis of absolute, heteronomous 'duty' from the perspective of the Apostle Paul, Augustine of Hippo, and Martin Luther.⁶

In 1802, Hegel takes theoretical reason to refer to the 'contemplation' (θεωρία, θεωρούμενος) of *a priori* Spirit (the intelligible realm),⁷ and he takes practical reason to refer to the *a posteriori* 'construction' of moral principles/ideas out of appearances (the perceptible realm). As relative and the opposite of the Absolute, practical reason, for Hegel, is only a 'mimicking' of the Absolute.⁸ In other words, theoretical reason and practical reason are labels for the dualism of mind and matter (Spirit and representations),⁹ which Hegel takes to be a dualism of Freedom and Nature¹⁰ (otherwise stated, a dualism of Absolute Freedom that is Spirit and the relative freedom that is animality and the pursuit of self-interest in social institutions¹¹). Hegel accuses Kant

4. On Hegel's sole *a priori* Concept, see above "Preface:" 61.

5. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten:" GW II: 459–461. See as well: 657 and in Chapter 6: "Grand Narratives of Theoretical Reason" in section "Hegel and Strauß on 'Theoretical Reason:'" 658.

6. See Vol. II: "Introduction:" "The Moral View of the World:" 547 ff.

7. On Plato's notion of contemplation (θεωρία, theoria), see 24, n. 7 Hegel takes the reflecting judgment of theoretical reason to be 'contemplation' in Plato's sense of *theoria* (θεωρία, theoria), which employs dialectic to contemplate the Absolute Good 'above Being' (above unchanging ideas) (*Republic* 509b: ἐπικρίναι τῆς οὐσίας).

8. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten:" GW II: 468–469.

9. See Hegel's account of Kant's dualism in "Glauben und Wissen:" "A [...] formal idealism, which [...] puts an absolute point of egoism and its mind on the one hand and absolute manifoldness or sensation on the other, is a dualism." "Glauben und Wissen" AA II: 314.

10. See Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen" AA II: 322.

11. See Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* GW XIII: 30–31, 34–35.

of attempting to overcome dualism only 'dogmatically,' whereas Hegel claims that his Absolute Spirit overcomes dualism 'rationally.'¹²

In contrast, according to Kant, theoretical and practical reason are not two sides of a dualism between mind and matter, Spirit and representations, and/or freedom and nature. Both theoretical and practical reason are concerned with *a priori* synthetic elements that must be *added to* phenomena. Neither is derived *out of* phenomena. Theoretical reason is concerned with the *a priori* elements that are necessary to understand appearances ('What can I know?'). Practical reason is concerned with the *a priori* elements that are necessary in order that I can assume responsibility for my agency in a world of appearances ('What ought I to do?').¹³

In 1807, Hegel's account of "The Moral View of the World" maintains his dualism of intellectual perception (*intellektuelle Anschauung*) and sense perception (*sinnliche Anschauung*) and insistence that, whereas intellectual perception is 'truth,' it requires sense perception for it to be 'actual' and not merely 'empty ideas.' In light of the ethical impossibility of fulfilling the expectations of moral duty, "The Moral View of the World" is that "I should, but I can't" and the fault lies with sense perception (*sinnliche Anschauungen*) whose conditions make the fulfilment of perfect moral duty impossible.

In contrast, Kant's aphorism for morality is "If I should, then I can."¹⁴ His aphorism is a rejection of any form of absolute determinism of the self (materially or by Original Sin). Moral principles arise only because there is a transcendental consciousness capable of autonomous freedom, and autonomous freedom is what establishes the *degree of independence* from all kinds of external determinisms.

What Hegel's two accounts of morality have in common is Hegel's distinction between 'intellectual perception' (*intellektuelle Anschauung*) and 'sense perception' (*sinnliche Anschauung*). 'Theoretical' reason is concerned with 'intellectual perception' (*intellektuelle Anschauung*) whereas, dualistically,¹⁵ 'practical' reason is concerned with agency in, and sovereignty over, the seductions of the world of 'sense perception

12. See Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen" AA II: 313.

13. See Kant's formulation of the questions of philosophy in the three-fold version of the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 832–833 and four all four-fold version in the *Logic* AA IX: 24–5.

14. See "Vol. II: Introduction:" "The Moral View of the World" 547 ff.

15. Hegel had written in "Glauben und Wissen:" "In explaining the coexistence (*Gemeinschaft*) of the soul with the body, Kant rightly finds the difficulty (not of explaining, but of understanding) in the presupposed dissimilarity of the soul with the objects of external senses. However, if one considers that both kinds of objects [soul and body] do not differ from each other in this respect internally, but only insofar as one appears externally to the other, consequently *that which lies at the basis of the appearance of matter, as a thing in itself, should perhaps not be so dissimilar*, then the difficulty disappears, and none remains but that of how a coexistence (*Gemeinschaft*) of substances is possible at all (it was superfluous to conceal the difficulty here), which to solve – without doubt – also lies outside the field of human cognition [because it is solved only by Absolute Spirit]. One can see that it is for the sake of beloved humanity and its cognitive faculty that Kant does so little honor to his thought that [...] the coexistence of the soul and body] are perhaps not so dissimilar in themselves, but only in appearance,

(*sinnliche Anschauung*). However, the primary focus in 1802 is epistemological: How do practical reason's moral principles come about when one 'neglects' theoretical reason's Absolute Spirit as ultimate, eminent cause¹⁶ of 'what is'? In 1807, the primary focus is the presumed distinction between abstract (hence, 'empty') 'moral duty' and failed concrete 'ethical' effort. The two foci of these two engagements of practical reason are crucial for understanding Strauß' moral theory.

Hegel's Issue with Sensuality in Contrast to Kant's

For Hegel, the ultimate issue is not human sinfulness but the failure to grasp the significance of Absolute Spirit. The common denominator to ethical failure and failure to grasp the significance of Absolute Spirit is sense perception (*sinnliche Anschauungen*). Humanity's 'blessedness' can only be achieved by overcoming (gaining sovereignty over) sensuousness.

Whereas Hegel's immanentism rejects the notion of the Personal God of Traditional Theism and rejects that ethical perfection would be the achievement of moral perfection in sensuousness capable of achievement only by the grace of God, Hegel's understanding of 'blessedness' is acquisition of Absolute Knowledge of Absolute Spirit and Its Freedom 'above' sensuousness. Hegel's 'blessedness' is always and already contained in the very condition (Absolute Spirit) that creates sensuousness so that 'blessedness' is achieved by 'turning inward' by means of 'the point of indifference' by which Absolute Spirit is 'known.' Hegel's notion of the 'cunning of reason' maintains that this blessedness is being accomplished by Absolute Spirit even 'behind the backs' of humanity.

Hegel points out, correctly, that this form of 'blessedness' that is achieved by turning attention to Absolute Spirit is nowhere to be found in Kant. However, the reason that it is absent is not because Kant is a relative, moral (or epistemological) constructivist or because Kant dogmatically limited understanding to sense perception (*sinnliche Anschauungen*) to the neglect of absolute intellectual perception (*intellektuelle Anschauungen*) of Absolute Spirit, as Hegel claims that Kant did.

However, Kant's anchoring of his philosophy, generally, and practical reason, in particular, in the perceptible (*sinnliche Anschauungen*) means neither that the moral concern of Kant's practical reason is to 'overcome' or 'subjugate' sensuousness nor that moral 'success' is defined by Kant to consist of the degree that practical reason has conquered sensuousness. Kant explicitly rejects the notion that either sensuousness or reason are the ground of evil:

and considers this thought to be the mere conceit of a maybe and not rational." (emphasis added) "Glauben und Wissen" GW II: 313–314

16. On the difference between eminent and efficient causality, see the "Introduction:" 84, n. 23.

Sensuous nature [...] contains too little to provide a ground of moral evil in the human being, for, to the extent that it eliminates the incentives originating in freedom, it makes of the human a purely animal being; a reason exonerated from the moral law, an evil reason as it were (an absolutely evil will), would on the contrary contain too much, because resistance to the law would itself be thereby elevated to incentive [...] and so the subject would be made a diabolical being.¹⁷

Kant's aim is neither to escape from sensuousness nor is he a consequentialist ethicist.¹⁸

Kant's philosophy is anchored in sense perception because that is what we experience. We seek understanding only because we experience phenomena. His philosophy, granted, is not concerned to give *ultimate, causal explanations*. His theoretical reason seeks to identify those imperceptible elements that are required in order for us to experience phenomena.

Furthermore, Kant's practical reason is not concerned with achieving the goal of ethical sovereignty in nature, much less with perfectly fulfilling the demands of merely abstract, 'moral duty.' Whereas Hegel's practical reason is thoroughly *consequentialist*, Kant proposes that moral duty has a worth "*without regard for the ends*" because ends and their objects inspire *inclination* but never *respect* in light of the fact that ends and their objects are "effects and not an activity of a will."¹⁹ The key to Kant's understanding of moral 'worthiness' is moral intent (whether or not a moral principle was consciously invoked to give oneself permission to act),²⁰ which can be known only by the individual, not the determination of empirical consequences of one's ethical efforts.

Kant by no means denies the importance of the consequences of agency.²¹ Rather than in 'moral worth' consisting in the achievement (or non-achievement) of a moral goal, Kant locates 'moral worthiness' in one's internal disposition to act on the basis of a moral principle:

"[...] *an action from duty* has its moral worth not in the [external] purpose that is to be attained by it, but in the [internal] maxim according to which it is resolved upon, and thus

17. Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 34–35.

18. See Chapter 8: "4) Sensuousness is evil:" 832 ff. and "6) Strauß misunderstands moral perfection in Kant:" 839 ff.

19. See Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 399–400.

20. Kant is an 'archaeologist'/'intentionalist', not a 'consequentialist'. On reading Kant as an 'archaeologist'/'intentionalist' rather than a 'Consequentialist', see 556; n. 108.

21. Although the ground for morality is not the good or bad ontological status of our soul (see *Religion* AA VI: 39–44) or the consequences of our actions (see *Groundwork*: AA IV: 399–400, Kant does suggest in the "First Preface" to *Religion* that our hope is that there is a connection between the categorical and the contingent. It is precisely this connection, which, among other elements to be sure, requires belief in (but no proof of!) God (see *Religion* AA IV: 6*). Explicitly though, Kant speaks of religious hope not (!) in terms of receiving divine assistance (grace) but in terms of maintaining our moral attitude (see *Religion* AA VI: 68–69).

it does not depend on the actuality of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of willing according to which – regardless of any object of the desiderative faculty – the action is done [...] [T]he [external] purposes that we may have when we act, and their effects, as ends and incentives of the will can bestow on actions no unconditional and moral worth [...] In what, then, can this worth lie, if it is not consist of the will with reference to their hoped-for effect? It can lie nowhere else than in the principle of the will, regardless of the ends that can be effected by such action; for the will stands halfway between it's a priori principle, which is formed, and it's a posteriori incentive, which is material, as it were at a crossroads, and because it must [...] be determined by something, it will have to be determined by the formal principle of willing as such when an action is done from duty because every material principle has been eliminated.²²

What is in our control is our internal disposition to determine the moral principle that one gives oneself to grant one permission to exercise autonomous, creative freedom.²³ Couched in the language of Christology as the internal 'prototype' of a *a priori* moral principles always and already in every individual, Kant writes

[...] only a human being conscious of [...] a moral disposition in her-/himself as enables her/him to believe and self-assuredly trust that he [...] would steadfastly cling to the prototype of humanity and remain similar to its example in faithful discipleship [...] only such a human being, and he alone, is entitled to consider her-/himself not an unworthy object of divine pleasure.²⁴ (emphasis added)

Worthiness is known only to the individual because only the individual can know the maxim that was prescribed to give the individual permission to exercise its agency. "[...] [I]n fact we can never, even by the most strenuous [empirical] examination, get entirely behind our covert incentives, because when moral worth is at issue what counts is not the actions, which we see, but their inner principles, which one does not see."²⁵ Emphasizing the criterion of the moral principle over the action itself, Kant writes that cultivation of morality consists in doing 'duty from duty' (that is, the determination of the 'moral disposition') not consequences:

At first sight this looks like a narrow obligation, and the principle of duty seems to prescribe with the precision and strictness of a law not only the legality but also the morality of every action, that is, the disposition. However, in fact the law [...] prescribes

22. Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 399–400.

23. Kant writes in *Religion* AA VI: 62: "only faith in the practical validity of the idea that lies in our reason has moral worth. (emphasis added)

24. Kant, *Religion*: AA VI: 62. In contrast to Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" in the *Phenomenology*, whose portrayal of moral duty and ethics was shared by Strauß, the issue of fulfilment of moral duty is not defined by Kant in terms of ethical consequences with subsequent achievement of divine pleasure but with the self-selection of the moral law. In short, Hegel/Strauß are ethical consequentialists whereas Kant is a moral archaeologist/intentionalist. On Kant's moral theory as 'archaeologist'/intentionalist', see: 556, n. 108.

25. Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 407.

only the maxim of the action, that of seeking the basis of obligation solely in the law and not in sensible impulse (advantage or disadvantage), and hence not the action itself [...] [For when it comes to the action alone], it remains hidden from the agent her-/himself how much pure moral content there has been in her/his disposition.²⁶ (parentheses from Kant)

Speaking of 'pure' religion as grounded in (but not exhausted by) morality#, Kant writes: "[...] [R]eligion is not a public condition; each human being can become conscious of the advances which s/he has made in this faith only for her-/himself."²⁷ In the "General Remark" at the end of *Religion*, Kant adds:

The *true (moral) service of God*, which the faithful must render as subjects belonging to His kingdom but no less also as its citizens (under laws of freedom), is itself just as invisible as the kingdom, that is, it is in a service of the heart (in spirit and truth) and can consist only in the disposition of obedience to all true duties as divine commands, not in actions determined exclusively for God. Yet for humanity the invisible needs to be represented through something visible (sensible) [...]; which, although it is a not an entirely dispensable means, it is at the same time very much subject to the danger of misinterpretation. That is, to make us only imagine our duty in the service of God, which is nevertheless easily taken for the service of God itself, by a delusion that overtakes us [...]²⁸ (parentheses from Kant)

Hegel's Account of 'The Moral View of the World' is not Kant's Morality

Although not infrequently proposed that "The Moral View of the World" in the *Phenomenology* (1807) is Hegel's reading of Kant on morality,²⁹ what Hegel presents as Kant's 'practical reason' in his "Über die wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts" (1802) is irreconcilable with Hegel's description of morality in "The Moral View of the World" in the *Phenomenology* (1807).

In the "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten," Hegel writes unambiguously of Kant's account of the source of practical reason's 'moral law' (ideas) as a bottom-up construction of a 'maxim of arbitrariness' that is applied top-down by the individual to serve its self-interest.³⁰ If Kant's 'moral law' arises out of representations as he describes here in the "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten," then Hegel takes Kant to

26. Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 392–393.

27. Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 124.

28. Kant, *Religion* AA 192.

29. See for example, Kenneth R. Westphal, "Hegel's Critique of Kant's Moral World View" in *Philosophical Topics*, 19/2 (1991): 133–76. Westphal claims "that Kant holds virtually all the tenets Hegel ascribes to 'the moral world view'."

30. On Hegel's description of Kant as a moral constructivist, see in Chapter 6: 657 and 658.

be a moral relativist,³¹ not a top-down moral absolutist as he portrays morality in "The Moral View of the World."

Speaking of the individual's self-selecting of moral principles as subjective, hence, relative constructions of the individual (in contrast to what Kant claims), Hegel writes in 1802:

[...] [A] maxim of your will [must] at the same time be regarded as a principle of a universal legislation [...]. This fundamental law of pure³² practical reason expresses that some determinacy [according to the maxim of arbitrariness], which constitutes the content of the maxim of the particular will [= constructivism], is set as a concept, as a universal. However, every determinacy is capable of being taken up into the conceptual form and set as a quality, and *there is nothing at all that cannot be made a moral law in this way*.³³ (emphasis added)

In other words, Hegel portrays Kant as drawing a moral law out of experience of particularities *a posteriori*, which allows one to capriciously declare anything one wishes to be a moral law.

Hegel, apparently, is taking the term 'synthesis' to mean the *a posteriori* product of a dialectic that determines a common element between two, otherwise, disparate thesis and antithesis. He, therefore, has no framework for understanding 'synthesis' as an *a priori* adding of elements to phenomena.³⁴ In short, for Kant *a priori* synthetic does not mean the *a posteriori* synthesis of dialectic and analytic that occurs by means of the diairesis of discursive, empirical thinking.

31. Hegel had written of Kant in "Glauben und Wissen:" "[T]he objectivity of the categories in experience and the necessity of these relations themselves [becomes] again something accidental and subjective. This understanding is human understanding, a part of the cognitive faculty understanding of a fixed point of the ego. *Things, as they are known by the understanding are only appearances, nothing in itself, – which is quite true.* The immediate conclusion, however, is that *an understanding which recognizes only appearances and nothing-in-itself is itself an appearance and nothing-in-itself.* However, the *discursive understanding*, which recognizes in this [Kantian] way, is regarded as in itself and absolute, and dogmatically the recognition of appearances is regarded as the only way of recognition, and knowledge of reason is denied. If the forms, through which the object is, are nothing in themselves, then they must also be nothing in themselves for a recognizing reason; but *Kant seems never to have had the slightest doubt that understanding is what is absolute for the human spirit, but understanding is the absolutely fixed insurmountable finiteness of human reason.*" (emphasis added) "Glauben und Wissen" GW II: 313

32. One must wonder what Hegel means by 'pure' here. It appears to mean independent of theoretical reason's contemplation of Absolute Spirit, not Kant's notion of 'pure' as independent (but inseparable from) sense perception.

33. Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 461.

34. On Hegel's reading of On Kant's notions of 'canon' and 'organon,' of dialectic, see: 49.

In dramatic contrast to Hegel's presentation of Kant's 'practical reason' in "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten," in "The Moral View of the World,"³⁵ 'moral duty' consists in the heteronomous insistence on morality as an external expectation of the perfect fulfilment of 'moral duty' and the impossibility of its actual, 'ethical' fulfilment means that the individual is incapable of achieving 'moral worthiness.'

According to Hegel here, morality is the struggle between theoretical (*intellektuelle Anschauung*) and practical reason (*sinnliche Anschauung*), but it is a 'false' struggle because it is concerned with only an 'apparent' opposition that is overcome only from the perspective of 'theoretical' reason's Absolute Spirit, not individual, moral effort. Therefore, humanity's problem is not 'sin,' according to Hegel, but ignorance about Absolute Spirit that clings to the merely 'apparent' opposition between intellectual perception (*intellektuelle Anschauung*) and sense perception (*sinnliche Anschauung*).

Hegel treats 'moral duty' within the epistemological framework of contemplative, 'theoretical' reason, not 'practical reason'. Abstract 'moral duty' consists of 'empty ideas' that are incapable of realization in the concrete world of representations.³⁶ As 'the' system of absolute moral imperatives (not the plural systems of relative moral principles of 1802), 'moral duty' is incapable of ethical realization in the world because of the limitations placed on the individual by nature and social context. Nature is responsible for ethical failure, not Spirit. Hence, in this account of morality, humanity's successful achievement of the consequentialist goal of its ethical efforts, that is, its achievement of 'happiness according to worthiness,'³⁷ is dependent upon divine grace of a Personal God.³⁸ In other words, in contrast to the relative constructions of 'practical reason' of "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten," moral principles here are not, relative constructions derived bottom-up out of representations. Rather, in "The Moral View of the World" of 1807, moral principles are a top-down set of *abstract, absolute* moral principles (of 'theoretical reason's' contemplation (*intellektuelle Anschauung*)) in stark contrast to the 1802 account of practical reason's *concrete, relative* 'representations' in the actual world of 'practical reason's' sensuousness (*sinnliche Anschauung*).³⁹

35. See Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" in *Phänomenologie* GW II 442–452 (Baillie trans. 615–627). For a summary of "The Moral View of the World," see Vol. II "Introduction:" "Hegel on 'I should, but I can't' in Contrast to Kant's 'If I should, I can':" 550 ff.

36. See Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 442–444 (Baillie trans.: 615–617).

37. Hegel defines "worthiness" [*Würdigkeit*] as proportionate to the degree one has earned happiness, "which completes the meaning of the moral attitude." See Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 450 (Baillie trans.: 623–624).

38. See Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 449–450 (Baillie trans.: 623).

39. Of course, from the perspective of 'theoretical' reason's Absolute Spirit, the 'opposition' between 'theoretical' and 'practical' reason is 'only apparent' because they are ultimately united by/in Absolute Spirit. See Hegel, "Addendum" to the *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaft* (1830) GW X: 237–238. However, the 'appearance' of difference between 'content' (*Inhalt*) and 'representations' (*Form*) is, in fact, a necessary opposition because it is required, according to Hegel, both for the awareness of 'theoretical' reason and for ensuring that 'theoretical' reason's ideas are not 'merely empty'. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 453–456.

However, Hegel's portrayal of Kant's practical reason (moral theory) of "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" cannot possibly be the target of Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" in the *Phenomenology*. Whereas "The Moral View of the World" dismisses moral duty as merely a top-down 'empty idea' (*Inhalt*) because it is incapable of achievement in actuality (representations/*Form*) and, therefore, dependent upon grace dispensed by a Personal God, Hegel's presentation and dismissal of Kant's moral theory of practical reason in "Wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten" is that it is bottom-up constructivist and socially relative – by no means either universal, absolute imperatives of 'moral duty' or 'Ideas' of Absolute Spirit.

When it comes to Kant, Hegel's primary concern in "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" in 1802 is to assert that *Kant backs away from acknowledging the significance of Absolute Knowledge as the 'true' goal of human agency, not to speak of humanity's 'true' goal as the 'point of indifference' to 'think' Absolute Spirit*. However, Hegel's primary concern in "The Moral View of the World" is the impossibility of ethical success and worthiness without the aid of a Personal God. The ultimate aim of ethical achievement is the '*measurable*' fulfilment of universal, moral imperatives based on observation and depends upon applause and assistance by God.

What the two accounts of 'practical reason' have in common is that, in Hegel's judgment, both neglect the conscious 'point of indifference' that negates multiplicity to think Absolute Spirit. In the case of Kant, Hegel claims, he 'knew' of Absolute Spirit but brackets it, whereas "The Moral View of the World" remains ignorant of Absolute Spirit. The achievement of awareness of the 'point of indifference' is not a matter of grace, Hegel eventually claims, but the consequence of the 'cunning of reason.'⁴⁰

In short, in 1802, Hegel claims that Kant's 'practical' reason is bottom-up *constructivist and relative* and demonstrates that Kant 'failed' to grasp the significance of Absolute Spirit/Absolute Knowledge. In 1807, Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" claims that morality is concerned with top-down, *absolute, moral duties*, and the goal of morality is to be morally 'well-pleasing' to God, which can only be possible by the aid of divine grace of a Personal God.

Hegel's Deeper Conundrum than Ethical Failure

A close reading of Hegel, though, recognizes in Hegel's two accounts of practical reason a far deeper dilemma than the conundrum of absolute morality and failed ethics. Whether or not practical reason (morality) is concerned with moral principles as

40. See Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* (1837) "B" GW XII: 49. Hegel's three-fold account of 'revelation' in his 'Addendum' [Zusatz] to *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaft* (1830) § 384 in GW X: 30–32 makes it clear that the process of revelation is Absolute Spirit's revealing Itself to Itself under the presupposition of the 'cunning of reason'.

relative constructions and/or with absolute, 'empty ideas,' the devastating conundrum for Hegel is with respect to his claim to ground Absolute Spirit ('true' content/*Inhalt*) in 'actuality' (representations/*Form*), not the moral status of the individual. *How does one determine whether the representations that are taken to assure that one's ideas are not 'merely empty' are not, rather, generating merely relative, false constructions of 'ideas'?*

If moral principles are relative constructions, they arise out of representations. Hegel's dismissal of moral principles as relative requires him to claim that Kant's moral principles of practical reason are 'false'/illusions. *Although representations can't guarantee that one's thoughts are 'true' (they can be merely relative, 'false' constructions), representations without their 'true' ideas are definitely relative, 'false' illusions.* Where do ideas come from?

Theoretical reason, according to Hegel, is the top-down guarantee of 'true' content regardless of the truth, relativity, falsehood, or illusoriness of representations. Hegel claims by way of Kant that principles of practical reason (the ideas of morality) are generated out of representations 'bottom-up.' Hence, they are 'false' and illusory *because they don't acknowledge the Idea of Absolute Spirit as the ultimate, eminent causality of ideas and 'all that is.'* It turns out that whether one embraces an 'empty idea' or an 'actual' idea has nothing to do with representations but with the 'knowledge' (or lack of knowledge) of Absolute Spirit *by the one judging. It is the 'philosopher' who possesses Absolute Knowledge who knows whether or not the idea is 'empty.'* Anyone who doesn't know (for example and especially, Kant) is a relative 'subjectivist.'⁴¹

More directly: The issue is the status of ideas in terms of their ultimate origin/cause, not whether they are 'empty' or 'actual.' Hegel's Idealism ('science') claims that the ultimate origin and cause of ideas is Absolute Spirit (*intellektuelle Anschauung*). It is Absolute Spirit's dialogical logic of Negation that brings about 'representations' (*sinnliche Anschauung*). If the idea does not emerge in and through representations, it is 'empty.' However, the *representations (sinnliche Anschauung) do not guarantee their own 'truth' as perceived phenomena because their 'truth' is the intellectual content (the 'idea') that is appropriate to them.* Whether sense perception is a hallucination, a conspiracy theory, or 'truth' is dependent on the judger's *a priori* knowledge, not the 'facts' of representations. *Hegel's Idealism (both theoretical and practical) throws the barn doors wide open to illusions and conspiracy theories.*

Consequently, according to Hegel, whether or not a moral principle is an 'analytical' construction out of objective appearances of perception (*sinnliche Anschauung*) is irrelevant. The 'truth' of moral principles has always and already been determined by their 'true' content, Absolute Spirit, which can be experienced only subjectively (*intellektuelle Anschauung*).

Hegel's criticism of Kant's 'practical' reason in "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" is not that the abstractions drawn out of sense perception (*sinnliche*

41. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 516–517.

Anschauung) are in principle false/illusory because they are merely representations. Rather, his criticism of Kant's 'practical' reason is that it is not 'theoretical' (Kant doesn't embrace Absolute Knowledge). Kant, according to Hegel, fails to grasp that the 'true' content (*Inhalt*) of 'representations' (*Form*) is the proper 'idea' of intellectual perception (*intellektuelle Anschauung*) not sense perception itself (*sinnliche Anschauung*).

However, this leads to the devastating consequence for Hegel that: Because truth (*intellektuelle Anschauung*) is independent of appearances (*sinnliche Anschauung*) and the actuality of appearance in sense perception is irrelevant when one possesses the truth, then *Absolute Spirit and its intellectual perceptions (intellektuelle Anschauungen) are, themselves, 'empty' and nothing 'actual.'* Hegel is caught in an inescapably vicious, hermeneutical circle. *Absolute Spirit (pure intellektuelle Anschauung) is 'true' because Hegel thinks that it is true, and its actuality is confirmed because Absolute Spirit must be (!) the ultimate, causal source of all sense perception (sinnliche Anschauung).*⁴²

Strauß on Kant in the LJ in Agreement with Hegel

In agreement with Hegel's "The Moral View of the World," Strauß claimed in the LJ that Kant required an 'ought' that can never be an 'is:' "I should, but I can't!" We 'ought' to achieve moral perfection that makes one worthy of happiness, but it is ethically impossible. Therefore, Hegel and Strauß claim that Kant confronts humanity with 'empty ideas and ideals'⁴³ that consist in the idea (content/*Inhalt*) of moral imperatives but without actuality (representations/*Wirklichkeit*).⁴⁴ Strauß repeats the theme in § 51 "The Last Dilemma" by anchoring the final end of history in the inclusive, eternal incarnation (the becoming of the God/Man in the species, not in an individual). In point of fact, though, it is Hegel and the early Strauß who are defending what Kant calls a 'canon' (logic) without an 'organon' (appearances).⁴⁵

The following passage confirms that Strauß' Christology (not merely his moral theory in the *Life of Jesus*) consists in overcoming the consequences of sensuousness, again in agreement with Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" and F.C. Baur. I have

42. Kant pointed out in the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 630, 643 that simply thinking something doesn't make it true or confirm its existence. Granted, Kant also adds in the *Groundwork* AA IV: 419 that simply because we don't perceive a cause does not mean that it doesn't exist. However, the appropriateness of one's 'causal explanation' is not that it is unequivocally grounded in 'things-themselves' but for its heuristic success in furthering understanding within an ever-developing, imperceptible, architectonic of 'lawfulness'. See Kant's 'transcendental methodology' of Critical Idealism at the conclusion of the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 823 ff. Once again, this is conformation of Hegel's Platonic Idealism.

43. See Strauß, LJ, 776.

44. See Strauß, LJ, 779.

45. On Kant's notions of 'canon' and 'organon,' see: 49.

translated the passage because the Elliot version suppresses the dynamic between *the truth* [*Inhalt*] of the Idea and *the actuality* [representation by form] of the incarnation:

[...] [F]rom *the truth that the suppression of natural existence* [that is, sensuousness/*sinnliche Anschauung*] *is the resurrection of the spirit*, the bodily resurrection of the individual will never follow.

Were that to be the case, we would have sunk back again into Kant's position, which we have found to be unsatisfactory, which is: Were the Idea to have no corresponding actuality [*Wirklichkeit*], then it is an empty obligation and ideal. However, does this, then, deprive the idea of all actuality [*Wirklichkeit*]? By no means! We reject only that which does not follow from the premises. If the Idea of the unity of the divine and human nature has reality [*Realität*/actuality] attributed to it, does that mean that the Idea of the God/Man unity must have actually occurred only once in a single individual like at no time before or after? That is simply not the way that the Idea realizes Itself; emptying its entire fullness in a single exemplar. Rather it realizes itself in a multiplicity of exemplars, which supplement one another. It loves to distribute its fullness by the alternation between establishing and annulling of individuals. Is this not the true actuality [*Wirklichkeit*/reality] of the Idea? Would not the Idea of the unity of the divine/human nature be real [*reale*] in an infinitely higher sense than were I to select out a single person for this unity? Would that not be the true, incarnation of God from all eternity rather than at a single limited point in time?"⁴⁶ (emphasis added)

Morality as the (unsuccessful) struggle with sensuousness, is at the core of Strauß' understanding of humanity across his career. Especially, for the early Strauß for whom *the ultimate aim of humanity is not the achievement of 'moral perfection' in conformity with 'moral duty' but the elevation above sensuousness*. Furthermore, what ensures that the 'Idea' above sensuousness is not an 'empty obligation/idea,' according to Strauß, is not dependent upon a single set of representations as the 'historical' God/Man of a single place and time. Rather, what ensures that the 'Idea' is not an 'empty obligation/idea' is that its representation includes all of human consciousness.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, the fly in the ointment is the *a priori* assumption that one knows that the 'truth' is the 'resurrection of the spirit' (*intellektuelle Anschauung*) that 'suppresses natural existence' (*sinnliche Anschauung*). Divinization of the entire species is Strauß' version of Hegel's cunning of reason that is limited either to a specific individual (the resurrected Christ) or to those philosopher's who attain Absolute Knowledge.

46. Strauß, *LJ*: 779–780 (First German edition: 734).

47. Formulated with Kant's language of canon and organon of which Strauß, apparently, was unaware, Strauß' universal Christology could have been defended by the claim that what prohibits the God/Man from being a mere logical canon (empty Idea) is its *universal realization in humanity* (all of human consciousness is the God/Man). (On Kant's notions of 'canon' and 'organon,' see: 49.) However, Strauß defended his universal Christology on the basis of the epistemology of Idealism: an idea is 'present' in all of its particulars, which, according to Kant, is a claim of subreption. See the discussion of Strauß' Christology in the section "History or Myth?: On the Role of Hegelianism in the *Life of Jesus*:" 127 ff.

Strauß on Kant's Practical Reason

In the *LJ* of 1835, Strauß embraces the following elements of *Hegelian practical reason*: He takes God (Absolute Spirit) to be the ultimate source of the logic of negation that enables creation. Spirit is the 'true,' conscious content (*Inhalt*) of all phenomenal 'actuality.' However, according to Hegel and the early Strauß, the goal of humanity is not moral perfection (the overcoming of sin). Therefore, they have no need of a Personal Deity dispensing grace. Rather, the goal of humanity is to attain knowledge (gnosis⁴⁸) of Absolute Freedom in Absolute Spirit 'over against nature's freedom,'⁴⁹ which seduces the individual with sensualism and makes her/him un-free. It is not violation of the 'law' that condemns humanity but 'blasphemy against the Spirit' (Matthew 12:30–32, Mark 9:40, Luke 11:23, 1 John 3:16).

Thematic Analysis of Strauß' Reading of Kant' Practical Reason

Strauß' explicit reading of Kant's practical reason (as pure moral religion) addresses the following five themes:

I) Kant's 'Subjective' Philosophy:

Kant's philosophy, generally, and particularly his moral theory are taken by

48. Hegel's Gnostic emanationism is clear from the very notion of the First Negation that 'creates twoness' to initiate the logical dialectic of negation that leads to the material order that is the condition for the emergence of consciousness. Hegel's Gnostic influx is clear from the "knowledge" (Gnosis) that 'returns' to Absolute Spirit by means of the Second Negation in individual consciousness. Strauß cited F.C. Baur's *Gnosis*. See Strauß, *LJ*: 775, n. 5. In this massive study of Gnosticism, Baur presents Hegel as a Gnostic: "Already this general overview of the Hegelian system as a whole brings us to the point where its close relationship to the systems of ancient gnosis is clearly visible." (*Gnosis*: 675) "The similarity between Hegel's philosophy of religion and the old gnosis [...] consists [...] mainly in the fact that here, as there, it is the same process by which Absolute Being mediates Itself with Itself, the process of distinguishing itself, of separating, and going back into itself, in the three moments of being in itself, for itself, and with itself, or the moments of the substantial absolute unity, which is the Idea in its self-same affirmation, of distinguishing, and of the going back of that which was distinguished to the absolute affirmation (Th. I [*Phil. der Rel. I*: Part I]: 131). In addition, gnostic systems are based on the assumption that God is only in this process a living God, Absolute Spirit or thinking reason, because life is not without movement, thinking not without mediating activity; true knowledge is only the Concept itself, as far as It explicates Itself in the three moments as a Concept in itself, as a determined concept, and as the concept coming to itself from the determinateness and restoring itself from limitedness (*Phil. der Rel. I*: 32). Without the world, therefore, God is not God, either. At the same time, however, the great difference is already evident between the purely logically determined concept of the process [Hegel], and the purely posited, only postulated, Platonic-Gnostic idea of an apostasy from the Absolute, as it still has a very essential and profound meaning even in the earlier representations of Schelling's philosophy (cf. especially *Philos. u. Relig.* 1804. p. 34. F)." (*Gnosis*: 681–682).

49. In "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten," Hegel distinguishes between Absolute Freedom and nature's freedom. See *GW II*: 457–458.

Hegel and the early Strauß to be 'merely subjective.' Kant overlooks what for Hegel and Strauß is 'above understanding:' Absolute Reason. In the *LJ*, Strauß maintains that Kant's moral principles are relative and come from his own reflections and the social convictions of his day.⁵⁰ He faults Kant for not providing an account of the origin of moral principles in the scriptures (either as social constructions or by means of the 'genetic mythical principle'⁵¹).

- II) Kant's 'Empty Ideas' – "I should, but I can't":
Strauß reads Kant as representing Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" and F.C. Baur in that Kant was only concerned with 'empty ideas' (abstractions) incapable of realization in 'reality' (the concrete world of experience) The Hegelian/Straußian mantra of morality is: "I should, but I can't!"⁵²
- III) Freedom is only Freedom-from:
Strauß takes 'freedom' to be 'freedom-from' sensualism; completely ignoring Kant's notion of autonomous freedom as 'freedom-for' creativity as the condition required for responsible agency.
- IV) Evil as a Causality:
As of the *Glaubenslehre* of 1841, Strauß takes 'evil' to be the driving force of all living things, not merely moral progress to the neglect of Kant's notion of 'radical' evil.
- V) Moral Consequentialism:
Strauß' understanding of 'progress' shifts from the 'spiritual progress' of his *inclusive*, Christology in 1835⁵³ that elevates humanity out of history, to his understanding of religion as fulfilled in reason's recognition of the 'eternal in every moment' in 1838, to the 'moral improvement' of humanity *as a species* in 1864⁵⁴ and, finally, to 'nature' 'turning inward' on itself to continue its advancement as the condition for the moral improvement of the species in 1872.⁵⁵

50. See Strauß, *LJ*: 52.

51. See Strauß, *LJ*: 52. The 'genetic mythical principle,' of course, is the key to Strauß' reading of the gospels. See Chapter 1, "Methodology:" "The 'Genetic Mythical Principle'" 137 ff.

52. On the differences between Kant's "If I should, I can" and Hegel/Strauß' "I should, but I can't," see "Vol. II: Introduction" "Hegel on 'I should, but I can't' in Contrast to Kant's "If I should, I can'." 547 ff.

53. Strauß writes in the *LJ* that Christology is awareness of Absolute Spirit, but, "not in the mind only, as with Kant" but is the "idea of the race [...] Humanity is the union of the two natures—God becoming man, the infinite manifesting itself in the finite, and the finite spirit remembering its infinitude [...]" (emphasis added) *LJ*: 780.

54. See, especially, Section 100 in the "Conclusion" of Strauß, *LJEGP*: 624–627.

55. Strauß, *The Old and the New Faith*: 240, 345. On the transition from a 'Personal God' to nature as 'personal building,' see *ibid.*: 145.

I now examine the five themes in detail:

I) Kant's 'Subjective' Philosophy:

I address Hegel's/Strauß' *general reading* of Kant as 'merely subjective' in Chapter 8.⁵⁶ Here, I examine Hegel's and Strauß' (lack of) engagement of Kant's notion of 'practical reason,' specifically, as subjective. Four themes require examination in order to understand Hegel's and Strauß' claim that Kant's is a 'subjective' philosophy. These themes are 1) that Kant is an epistemological relativist, 2) that Kant has an ontological gap between moral duty and ethical achievement, 3) Strauß' account of Kant's 'revolution of moral disposition' profoundly distorts Kant's 'new creature', and 4) Kant's notion of the 'moral improvement of the species is given a new meaning by Strauß.

I examine the four themes, as follows:

1) Kant is an epistemological relativist:

The claim by Strauß and his mentors that Kant is an epistemological relativist is grounded in their conviction that Kant fails to appreciate what they take to be the key to humanity, which is Absolute Spirit as 'pure, theoretical reason'. Absent Absolute Spirit, everything is relative. Furthermore, Kant's norms for practical reason's autonomous freedom are taken by Strauß and his mentors to be merely 'empty abstractions'.⁵⁷ Absent the the contemplation (θεωρία, *theoria*) (*intellektuelle Anschauung*) and understanding of Absolute Spirit as what unites all perceptible particularity

56. See Chapter 8, section "Hegel's Reclined Plato and Kant as a 'Subjectivist'" 811 ff. and Chapter 9, section "Hegel on Beauty:" 868.

57. The charge that Kant's philosophy, generally, is a system of 'empty abstractions', by its failure to grasp the metaphysical unity of Absolute Spirit, has as its corollary that concepts and moral norms are subjectively, relative constructions. Given that Hegel views Kant as limited to what Plato calls 'understanding' in his Simile of the Line in the *Republic* 509c ff., Kant's epistemology *must be* constructivist because it ignores what Plato calls 'reason'. Furthermore, Hegel describes Kant's moral theory as subjectively ,constructivist precisely in this manner in the "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" (1803). See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten:" GW II: 459–461. However, in his *Phenomenology* (1807), he gives an account of morality in "The Moral View of the World" that is based on a heteronomous, divinely imposed *moral duty*. Given the limits placed on humanity by 'nature's freedom', humanity is incapable of ethical fulfilment of its moral duty. See Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 442 ff. (Baillie trans: 615 ff.). Strauß consistently reads Kant's notion of heteronomous, 'moral duty' through Hegel's narrative of "The Moral View of the World" although in the *LJ* as I point out momentarily, he describes Kant's moral principles as 'derived from the self' and 'the cultivation of an epoch'. In his post-*LJ* writings, especially when referring to Kant, Strauß stresses humanity's inability to live up to 'moral duty' just as Hegel describes in "The Moral View of the World." Moral principles, though, cannot be both a matter of subjective 'construction' and heteronomously, externally imposed 'moral duty'.

(*sinnliche Anschauung*), the world of sense perception is a meaningless aggregate of relative appearances.

Hegel and the early Strauß are concerned with Absolute Spirit, Absolute Knowledge, and Absolute Freedom as the ultimate, causal explanation of all 'that is'. For them, practical reason is only a 'relative' side-show to the center ring, 'pure, theoretical reason.' Their take on human agency, practical reason, involves two moments: 1) relative understanding in a sensuous world and 2) the (unsuccessful) achievement of ethical norms, which are subordinate to merely, self-interested, teleological goals, in the world of sense perception.

F.C. Baur, as well, claimed that Kant as a subjective constructivist, and, at least in the *LJ*, Strauß agrees with Hegel's and Baur's reading of Kant although all of Strauß' reflections on morality subsequent to the *LJ* take Kant's moral theory to be a matter of heteronomous 'moral duty' as in Hegel's "The Moral View of the World:"

[...] [A]ll objective content disappears [in Kant], only what is established out of myself is valid, I alone am positive, real [*Reale*]. From this perspective, *the highest is not truth, not knowledge of God* but objective content [*Inhalt*] has disappeared into formal subjectivity. No religion is possible on the basis of this contentless [*inhaltslosen*] perspective because I am the affirmative. All content [*Inhalt*], agency, and life comes from me; *I have only a dead, empty God, a so-called highest essence, and this emptiness, this representation remains only subjective and never comes to true objectivity.*⁵⁸ (emphasis added)

The first moment of Kant's practical reason, for Hegel and the early Strauß, is that understanding in a sensuous world begins with the 'analytical' activity of the dividing, division, especially of a class into its constituent parts (*diáresis*, διαίρεσις). Therefore, without a 'higher' reason, understanding *must be* a 'bottom-up' reflection that generates itself the higher 'idea' as the unitary element (the 'synthesis') in common to a set of phenomena.⁵⁹ Hegel and the early Strauß take Kant's 'synthesis' of understanding to be a creation of finite consciousness. Strauß concurs in the *LJ* when he writes of Kant's moral principles that they are "[...] derived only from himself and the cultivation of his age."⁶⁰ *Understanding, particularly when it is concerned with the principles to guide agency, consists of relative, abstract constructions generated out of experience in the world by the individual subject.*

The second moment of Kant's practical reason, for them, is that, obviously, the activity that seeks the accomplishment of teleological goals can be pursued only in a world of sense perception, that is, they presuppose sensuousness shaped exclusively by self-interest, not as a 'given world of appearances' that require *a priori* synthetic elements for there to be experience, understanding, and responsible agency. For Hegel

58. F.C. Baur, *Gnosis*: 666–667; see as well, 114, 118, 124.

59. See the discussion of morals laws as 'principles of arbitrariness' above, in Chapter 7: "Practical Reason Elevates Theoretical Reason" the section "Hegel on Practical Reason:" 728 ff.

60. Strauß, *LJ*: 52.

and Strauß, morality is a matter of achieving sovereignty over sensuous interests, and, because they measure that sovereignty by the consequences of the individual's actions, the limitations placed on the individual by the world make it impossible, ethically, for the individual to fulfil the expectations of moral duty.

The two moments of their understanding of practical reason indicate, then, when they are viewed from Kant's perspective, that *Hegel, and the early Strauß, for their part, presuppose without examination what Kant describes as the a priori synthetic capacities and elements of transcendental consciousness, which are required in order not only to experience a world but also to understand it – long before one establishes teleological aims for one's personal agency. Hegel and Strauß' account of morality and their reading of Kant on morality begins precisely where Kant's account of practical reason ends: with the universal conditions of possibility and capacities of transcendental consciousness that make it possible to act in a world, in the first place.* In the absence of a grasp of universal, *a priori* synthetic judgment, Hegel and Strauß relativize phenomenal experience generally and reduce it to a matter of indifference by shifting the focus to Absolute Spirit as the 'true' aim of consciousness. According to Hegel and the early Strauß, what is important for consciousness is not the relative, finite world of sensuousness (and failed ethical effort) but Absolute Knowledge of the ultimate, eminent cause of all 'that is.'

In dramatic contrast, though, for Kant, practical reason or the concern with what 'ought to be' is the central issue for a finite, transcendental consciousness in possession of autonomous freedom. Without the capacity of autonomous freedom, there is, and can be, no distinction between 'what is' (theoretical reason) and 'what ought to be' (practical reason). Other living things are not held responsible, morally or otherwise, for their agency because they do not possess autonomous freedom, the imperceptible, intentional, finite, eminent causality of transcendental consciousness. In short, other living things and non-living elements have no, or very limited, conscious awareness of 'imperatives' that govern their agency. Their imperatives are instinctual skills that they must follow to achieve their ends. They act, overwhelmingly and for the most part on the basis of 'blind' instinct. This ability to distinguish between 'what is' and 'what ought to be' is the core content of Kant's practical reason, and it is entirely overlooked (or ignored) by Hegel, and Strauß.

Not only do Hegel and Strauß fail to recognize (or to acknowledge) the universal, *a priori*, imperceptible capacities of transcendental consciousness, but they also have not recognized (or acknowledged) that *not all imperatives that govern intentional agency are moral imperatives. The determination of 'must be' (in the sense of what one 'must' do to achieve a specific goal) is itself ultimately subordinate to what 'ought to be.'* In short, *not all imperatives (what 'must' be done to successfully achieve a goal) are moral 'oughts.'* This distinction constitutes the difference between a 'hypothetical' imperative and a 'categorical' imperative. It is at the heart of Kant's distinguishing between the 'wide,' 'absolute' character of categorical imperatives and the 'narrow' aspect of

practical reason as well as the 'relative' character of the hypothetical imperatives of technical skills and what he calls the achievement of 'pragmatic' goals of self-interest.

'Hypothetical' imperatives are relative, social constructions. They are the 'rules' that govern what Kant calls 'technical' and 'pragmatic' agency. Technical, hypothetical imperatives are the required steps that are needed to accomplish a narrow, specific task (e.g., the building of a structure in conformity with a building code, rules for driving a car, mandatory vaccinations, that is, the rules constructed to govern behavior that is a society's civic, legal system)⁶¹ whereas pragmatic, hypothetical imperatives govern the individual's 'well-being' (e.g., qualifying to practice a profession, obtaining an education degree, practicing a sport, etc.).⁶² 'Categorical' imperatives, in contrast, are wide, universal, moral principles/laws 'above' hypothetical imperatives. Hypothetical imperatives establish the requirements for accomplishing a specific task; categorical imperatives govern the permission 'to do' or 'not do' a particular activity.⁶³ For example, I can know all the proper requirements for constructing a house and, yet, do a poor job of actually building the house, or I can follow all of the laws in effect at a certain time for governing the pollution of the environment and still know that my actions are destructive to the environment. In short, simply because something is 'appropriate' or 'legal' (hypothetically) doesn't mean that it is 'right' (categorically).

In short, there are two, very different, systems of imperatives, and it is only because transcendental consciousness is capable of intentionally subordinating one system (hypothetical imperatives) to the other (categorical imperatives) that it is even possible for there to be the self-expectation of responsibility for one's agency.

Granted that Kant's account of 'theoretical reason' (the understanding of 'what is') and 'practical reason' (the understanding of 'what ought to be') is an account of the individual's personal, transcendental consciousness, they are by no means 'subjective' as Hegel and Strauß claim. The philosophical task, according to Kant, is not to give an absolute, causal explanation of 'what is' because such an account, even if it were to

61. Kant calls the system of socially constructed, hypothetical imperatives the 'doctrine of right' in the *Metaphysics of Morals*

62. See Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 414–421.

63. Aristotle, Hegel, and Strauß ignore the difference between cultural values and civic laws, which both depend upon the citizenry following a "higher" moral law for the values and laws to achieve virtue, compassion, and justice. Hegel and Strauß ignore that there are two parts to Kant's *Metaphysics of Morals*: the "Doctrine of Right" (*Rechtslehre*) and the "Doctrine of Virtue" (*Tugendlehre*). The "Doctrine of Right" is concerned with a particular society's rules concerned with governing the affairs of the "external mine and yours," that is, the contract rules and laws necessary for public life. Its focus is with *hypothetical* imperatives that are governed by particular situations (for example, driving on the right- or left-hand lane, the rules for an apartment rental, the requirements for admission to a profession, etc.) The "Doctrine of Virtue" is concerned with the individual's internally giving oneself permission to exercise one's autonomous freedom in conformity with the hypothetical imperatives of one's teleological goal. The "Doctrine of Virtue," then, is concerned with *categorical* imperatives that are self-selected by the individual. Categorical imperatives are the wide, moral imperatives that govern one's exercising of agency according to the narrow, hypothetical imperatives of technical skills and self-interest.

somehow be 'correct,' constitutes a flight of fancy beyond the limits of finite, transcendental consciousness, whose certainty is beyond our capabilities. Furthermore, such an account, obvious in the case of Hegel and the early Strauß, diverts humanity's attention away from the world of experience, understanding, and agency to the point of reducing to meaningless indifference historical experience in the world.

Kant's philosophy is profoundly 'objective' in that its focus is not merely on those elements that we 'can do' but also on those elements that we 'ought to do' – and BOTH matter because without addressing both theoretical and practical reason, we cannot be the finite, eminent, causal open-ended agent *in the world* that we are. The *a priori* capacities and elements of transcendental consciousness are universally, that is, objectively shared, by all finite, transcendental consciousness. They are not the capricious or merely spontaneous constructions of 'subjectivity' as Hegel and Strauß maintain.

2) Kant has an ontological gap between moral duty and ethical achievement:'

The moral and ethical ontological gap for Hegel and Strauß is that between the inescapable evil that I am and the good that I wish to achieve. This ontological gap is the core claim of Hegel's "The Moral View of the World," as I presented above,⁶⁴ which takes Kant's practical reason to involve only an 'overwhelming obligation' that is incapable of achievement either in this or the next life.⁶⁵

In other words, whereas Hegel in 1802 and Strauß in 1835 claim that Kant's moral principles are his own construction and the constructions of his 'age,' that is, they are relative constructions, his accusation that Kant's moral theory is ineffectively "subjective" is not based on the *epistemological gap* between content (*Inhalt*) and representations (*Form*) that eventually lead to Strauß' dismissal of Hegel's meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit's Double Negation. Rather, Kant's moral theory offers no solution,

64. See in this chapter, "Hegel's Account of 'The Moral View of the World' is not Kant's Mor:" 727 ff.

65. By reading Kant through the lens of Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" and criticizing Kant for imposing an 'impossible obligation' on humanity that is incapable of fulfilment in this or the next life, the early Strauß is claiming that Kant denies salvation to humanity either according to divine 'Occasionalism'/'Voluntarism' (God's will precedes His thinking) or 'Intellectualism' (God cannot violate His eternal system of ideas).

While themselves scions of Scholastic Intellectualism,' Hegel's and the early Strauß' solution to the impossibility of fulfilling moral duty is to take the realm of sinfulness off the table because a) it is the necessary suffering that God (Absolute Spirit) must endure in order to become aware of Himself by the 'point of indifference' in finite consciousness and b) suffering and pain themselves, in the end, are a matter of indifference when it comes to the ultimate liberation of Absolute Spirit, Absolute Knowledge, and Absolute Freedom beyond sensualism.

The later Strauß never returned to this 'logic' of ontological gap in Kant's moral theory to grasp that Kant's moral theory is NOT consequentialist. There is no ontological gap.

according to Strauß, to the *ontological gap* between the evil that one is and the good that one strives to achieve.

Humanity is not incapable of fulfilling perfect, moral duty because it is limited by 'nature's freedom,' which is nature's historical contexts that limit human finitude, as in Hegel's "The Moral View of the World." Rather, Strauß writes, "[...] the ideal of the person well-pleasing to God (*Gottwohlgefälligkeit*), [...] is "[...] *for us unachievable at any point* [either now or in the future] as a consequence of the *infinite separation between the evil from which we start and the good that we should achieve*."⁶⁶ (emphasis added) Strauß' gap between the evil that we are and the good that we ought to be is profoundly different from Hegel's 'I should, but I can't because of the limitations of finite experience placed upon me by my historical context/circumstances. Strauß' 'I should, but I can't' is internally ontological whereas Hegel's 'I should, but I can't' in "The Moral View of the World" is imposed externally on the individual.

*In light of this dogmatic, ontological gap between the evil that we are and the good that we 'ought to be,' according to the early Strauß, Kant's 'practical reason' "[...] only admits an infinite approximation towards the idea' but also "[...] that which is only to be reached in an endless progression is in fact unattainable."*⁶⁷

In the *LJ* Strauß, then, dismisses Kant because instead of offering consolation for the evil that we are, Kant places an 'overwhelming obligation' to do good on humanity that can never be satisfied:

[To merely substitute] for the certainty [of Traditional Personal Theism] that God once actually united himself with human nature, the admonition that man ought to obtain divine dispositions, offers a poor compensation for the peace which the redemption completed by Christ brings to the believer. [...] The admonition that one ought to obtain a new moral disposition] is not equivalent to putting before the believer the duty of freeing himself from sin. By this [Kantian] system, man is thrust out of the reconciled world in which Christianity places him, into an unreconciled world, out of a world of happiness into a world of misery; for where reconciliation has yet to be effected, where happiness has yet to be attained, there is at present enmity and unhappiness. Additionally, in truth, the hope of entire deliverance from these conditions is, according to the principles of this system, which only admits an infinite approximation towards the idea, a deceptive one; for that which is only to be reached in an endless progression, is in fact unattainable.⁶⁸

In the *Glaubenslehre* Strauß, once again, stresses the failure of Kant's 'practical reason' to achieve 'the highest good' (as if Kant claimed that achievement of moral perfection

66. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 494. F.C. Baur writes of Schleiermacher: "Here [with Hegel] we are not merely talking about an ideal of God-pleasing humanity hovering in the dubious distance [Baur's take on Kant], not merely about an archetype that raises the human to the divine, or about a God-consciousness that has become the being of God [Baur's take on Schleiermacher]." *Gnosis*: 711.

67. Strauß, *LJ*: 776.

68. Strauß, *LJ*: 766.

was the aim) and criticizes as an illusion Kant's 'hope' for the next life as a requirement for achieving it.

If, according to his [Kant's] own confession, the absolute adequacy of the human will to the moral law can be attained by the individual only in endless progress, i.e., never really, then even in infinite continuation no more would come out than can already come out in this life [...]⁶⁹

However, for Kant, *evil and good are not the goal of morality. They are the always and already ineradicable condition for morality. This is the meaning of 'radical' evil AND 'radical' good in Kant. Evil and good are both 'radical' in that they are the condition of 'live option' that allows autonomous freedom to give itself permission to act (either by self-selecting of an evil or a moral principle). Without the 'radical' live option of choice between an evil or a moral principle, there can be no moral responsibility because transcendental consciousness would be ontologically determined either by an 'evil' (or 'good') sensuousness or an 'evil' (or 'good') reason.*⁷⁰ Kant rejects both ontological options of evil determination and inability to achieve the good, which the individual wishes to achieve for understanding 'evil' and 'good':

*Sensuous nature [...] contains too little to provide a ground of moral evil in humanity, for to the extent that it eliminates the incentives originating in freedom [by determinism], it makes of the human a purely animal being. [Likewise,] [a] reason exonerated from the moral law, an evil reason as it were (an absolutely evil will), would [...] contain too much because resistance to the law itself, thereby, would be elevated to incentive (because without any incentive, the power of choice cannot be determined), and so the subject would be made a diabolical being. However, neither of these two is applicable to humanity.*⁷¹

3) Strauß' account of Kant's 'revolution of moral disposition' profoundly distorts Kant's 'new creature.'

In the *Glaubenslehre*, Strauß continues to refer to Strauß claims that, contrary to the way he reads Kant, it *must be possible at least in principle, if not in fact*, to overcome the gap between evil actions and perfection that is 'well-pleasing to God,' but here he points out that overcoming the gap cannot be accomplished by 'the old,' morally defective person. The conditions for achieving the status of being 'well-pleasing to God' require "a new creature," a new subject, who has undergone the revolution in her/his state-of-mind (*Gesinnung*) capable of achieving goodness and able to balance out the 'old,' evil state-of-mind (*Gesinnung*).

69. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 720.

70. Kant's equating of 'radicality' to BOTH evil and good is clear by the title of the section of *Religion* that presents his thesis of 'radical evil'. See "Part One – Concerning the Indwelling of the Evil Principle Alongside the Good or Of the Radical Evil in Human Nature" in *Religion* AA VI: 19 ff.

71. Kant, *Religion*: AA VI: 35.

[...] [M]oral action [is not only] required of us generally [according to Kant], but the *fulfilment of the highest good is demanded by our practical reason. It must therefore be possible to realize it* [NOTE: Strauß' emphasis is on moral achievement, not the moral capacity], and because we can do something directly only for one side of it [as a failure to achieve the highest good], the other [achievement of highest good] must be realized by another creature (*Wesen*), who is able to be sovereign (*bestimmen*) (now according to the new creature's own laws) over nature (in a future life) in conformity with the ethical law, and thus *to balance dignity and happiness with each other*.⁷² (emphasis added) (parentheses from Strauß; square brackets from McG)

However, if God is the cause of humanity's 'revolution of moral disposition', that is, the individual's becoming 'well-pleasing' to God, by God's creating the 'new creature,' then Strauß, like F.C. Baur, is equating Schleiermacher and Kant as dependent upon a new act of ultimate, eminent causality in addition to their both being 'subjective.'⁷³ F.C. Baur, Strauß' professor in Blaubeuren and Tübingen, had written: "Kant and Schleiermacher represent the same *subjective* perspective [...]"⁷⁴

All that is different between Kant and Schleiermacher is only the difference between morality and religion. What for Kant is moral consciousness that comes from the victory of the good principle over the evil principle as *the moral capacity* of humanity, is for Schleiermacher God-consciousness, *the religious capacity*.⁷⁵

Baur writes:

[...] Schleiermacher's *The Christian Faith* is nothing other than the perfect implementation of the opposition between the two principles that Kant calls radical evil and the individual's being well-pleasing to God [*Gottwohlgefälligkeit*]. Their difference consists only in the substitution of God-consciousness by Schleiermacher for Kant's moral consciousness. and Schleiermacher's artificial, as it is indefensible, [causal] connection that is supposed to unify the archetypal Christ with the historical.⁷⁶

Baur stresses that, according to Kant, the 'idea' of humanity becoming morally well-pleasing to God is a "model already in our reason"⁷⁷ although Baur doesn't say, as does Strauß, that the moral transformation of the individual requires a 'new creature.'

However, Strauß' suggestion that Kant's 'revolution of moral disposition'⁷⁸ involves 'a new creature' to replace the 'old creature' is misleading. Strauß implies that, in order for this 'new creature' to balance dignity and happiness, *a divine creative act is required because the 'new creature' cannot be achieved merely as an effect of human effort*, which

72. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 374.

73. See Baur, *Gnosis*: 667–668

74. Baur, *Gnosis*: 666.

75. Baur, *Gnosis*: 665.

76. Baur, *Gnosis*: 666.

77. Baur, *Gnosis*: 666., n. 25.

78. See Kant, *Religion*: AA VI: 47 ff.

would violate the Principle of Sufficient Reason (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*). The Principle of Sufficient Reason requires that an effect must have as its cause something that has as much reality as the effect. Otherwise, something would come from nothing.

Strauß appears to be suggesting the same error in Kant for whom, according to Strauß, the imperfect effect that is the individual's failure to achieve being 'well-pleasing to God' (*Gottwohlgefälligkeit*) means that there is, was, and will be no 'new creature' capable of achieving that perfect goal *unless God creates the adequate conditions as a 'new creature.'*

However, Kant's '*revolution of the moral inclination*' (the 'new moral creature') involves no, literally 'new creature.' What is 'new' is *the dominance of one's commitment to duty out of duty with no other incentive, such as, self-interest.*

The restoration of the original capacity [*Anlage*] to good in us is not [...] the acquisition of a lost driving force [*Triebfeder*] for the good because *we were never able to lose the driving force that consists in respect for the moral law, and were we ever to lose it, we would also never be able to regain it.*⁷⁹ The restoration is, therefore, only the recovery of the purity of the law, as the supreme ground of all our principles, according to which the law itself is to be incorporated into the power of choice, not merely bound to other incentives, nor indeed subordinated to them (to inclinations) as conditions, but rather in its full purity, as the self-sufficient incentive of that power. The original good is holiness of principles in the compliance of one's duty,⁸⁰ hence merely out of duty, whereby a human being, who incorporates this purity into his principles, though on this account still not holy as such (for between maxim and deed there still is a wide gap), is nonetheless upon the road of endless progress toward holiness. When the firm resolve to comply with one's duty has become a habit, it is called virtue [...] Virtue here has the abiding maxim of lawful actions, no matter whence one draws the incentives that the power of choice needs for such actions. Virtue [...] is accordingly acquired little by little, and to some it means a long habituation [...] However, not the slightest change of heart is necessary for this; only a change of mores. A human being [...] considers himself virtuous whenever he feels himself stable in his principles of observance to duty [...] However, that a human being should become not merely legally good, but morally good (pleasing to God [*Gott wohlgefälliger*]), that is, virtuous according to the intelligible character of virtue (*virtus noumenon*) and thus in need of no other incentive to recognize a duty except the representation of duty itself – that, so long as the foundation of the principles of the human being remains impure, cannot be effected through gradual reform but must rather be effected through a revolution in the mindset [moral disposition, *Gesinnung*] of the individual (a transition to the maxim of holiness of mindset).⁸¹ (parentheses from Kant)(emphasis added)

79. McG: Not even God could create it for us.

80. Similarly as with Plato for whom 'reason' must learn to control *but not eliminate or escape* the appetites (see the *Republic* Book IV: 435b-436b, 439d and Book IX 580d ff.), according to Kant 'natural inclinations' themselves are 'good;' we must learn, though, to curb them through prudence. Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 58.

81. Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 46–47. Only then can one speak symbolically of a 'new creature' as a change of heart.

In *The Conflict with the Faculties* of 1798, Kant writes with respect to the slow, moral improvement of humanity that it occurs: "[...] without the moral basis in the human race being increased in the least; because for that to occur a kind of new creation (supernatural influence) would be necessary."⁸² (parenthetical comment from Kant) In short, Kant has already anticipated Schleiermacher's Christology and rejected it.⁸³

4) Kant's notion of the 'moral improvement of the species is given a new meaning by Strauß.

Although in the *LJ* Strauß locates 'moral pollution' in the Individual, not the Species, in his second *Life of Jesus, The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People (LJEGP)* (1864), one encounters a shift with respect to the significance of the species. Whereas in 1835 the species is the location for the elevation of finite consciousness Absolute Spirit/Knowledge/Freedom, in 1864 the species' role is that of moral improvement, which consists in the need in every age to discern new moral principles as the social, economic, political, and religious context changes.

When Strauß turns to his own theology in 1864 with the *LJEGP*, he had heard the call of his friends at the very beginning of the 1860s to 'Return to Kant.' However, he, unfortunately, didn't follow that challenge by diving into Kant's corpus himself. In fact, although Hegel's meta-narrative has long since lost its appeal, it apparently never occurred to him that the Hegelian reading of Kant was fiction. To be sure, in 1864, he stood firmly with his historically *inclusive*, understanding of 'Christology' as a reference not to a single individual at a particular point in time in the past whose achievement had never been matched and could never be superseded. However, now the species is no longer the location of the 'point of indifference' in order to grasp Absolute Spirit. Now, the species has a moral function.

Already in "On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity" of 1838, Strauß was entirely silent about the goal of 'blessedness' in the *LJ* of 1835 as liberation of the species from history. His new focus was on the role of the 'religious genius.' "[...] who strives for inner harmony, [... which] consists in nothing else than in the subordination of the lower forces to the higher ones, and all of them to the highest and hegemonic one, which is religious consciousness"⁸⁴ in conformity with the 'divine reason' that permeates all reality.⁸⁵ Yet, this divine reason involves no escape

82. Kant, *Der Streit der Fakultäten* AA VII: 92.

83. On Schleiermacher's Christology of Perfect God-consciousness as a new act of creation (event of eminent causality), see Chapter 4: 277.

84. Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes im Christenthum:" 116.

85. Strauß writes: "[...] not just theoretical virtuosity, but, in so far as reason is the instinct and the faculty of the finite subject to relate itself and all that is given to a higher and highest one, to make this relationship as intimate and legendary as possible, and from it to determine harmoniously all its feeling,

from history. Speaking of his current age, Strauß writes: "'No sooner had the poet complained about nature being de-deified; others found it necessary to complain about its deification [...], and the most recent philosophy has learned to see the world of the Spirit in art, state, and history as the self-revelation of the divine being.'⁸⁶ The title 'religious genius' applies to one who offered new and deeper insight into the moral principles that govern practical reason in life. "To [... the] historically personal Christ belongs only that from his life in which his religious completion was represented: his speeches, his moral acting and toleration."⁸⁷ Nonetheless, his moral teaching is not unsurpassable: "It is possible that another, higher form of the religious founder will occur in the future."⁸⁸ *Whereas Jesus is unsurpassable with respect to his inward religiosity, there are two respects in which his teaching can be improved over what was preserved in the early Church.* The first is: "[...] the extent that a subsequent religious leader 'purifies' Christianity by removing spiritual beings and the miraculous [...]"⁸⁹ The second is the consequence of subsequent individuals having the advantage of the teaching of previous religious leaders. In terms of inward religiosity, Strauß asks, cannot a later religious leader, if not superiorly, at least be next to Jesus? "As in the field of morality and, to a certain extent, also in the fine arts, no one can do anything for the other, rather the second, third, tenth, who has pious consciousness in himself – understands, not only imagines, but in living, therefore, is not inferior to the one who had succeeded at it first."⁹⁰ (emphasis added)

In every genius and her/his achievements, two components are to be distinguished: a personal and a historical one; every genius stands for her-/himself as much as s/he stands on the shoulders of the past. In the latter respect, however, *the earlier ones, even with the same degree of personal endowment, are at a disadvantage compared to the later ones, who are richer heirs of a spiritual achievement of mankind in general, which has become greater in the meantime, and in particular of the masters of their subject.*⁹¹ (emphasis added)

Whereas in 1838, religiosity already was taken to be the combination of the degree of internal unity of the individual with divine reason and the moral conduct of one's life embedded in history, in *LJEGP* of 1864, blessedness is formulated explicitly in terms of the historical odyssey of humanity's 'moral development.'

Retaining his conviction from the *LJ* that moral 'pollution' applies to the individual, not the species, new in 1864 is his emphasis on *moral improvement itself as applying to the species, not the individual. This does not mean that collectively, the*

thinking, and willing; in this respect, reason is nothing other than religion [...]" "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes im Christenthum:" 108.

86. Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes im Christenthum:" 99.

87. Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes im Christenthum:" 131.

88. Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes im Christenthum:" 119.

89. Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes im Christenthum:" 128.

90. Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes im Christenthum:" 129–130.

91. Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes im Christenthum:" 124.

human species is improving morally. Rather, moral 'improvement' consists in insight into the 'divine wisdom' in all things with the promotion of moral well-being before God (Gottwohlgefälligkeit) requires the species generating the new moral principles required by its ever-changing historical (especially, cultural) circumstance. Although Jesus is no exclusive exception as a moral teacher, he is paradigmatic both of the profundity of his insight into moral principles ('divine wisdom') and of the need for the 'development' of Jesus' contribution by subsequent generations as they wrestle with new social and technological contexts.⁹²

However, Strauß overlooks Kant's emphasis on the individual's efforts at moral improvement on the basis of internal, universal, moral principles, which by means of individual moral effort results in the gradual moral elevation of the species, rather than on the social construction of new, relative, moral principles given the change in historical and social contexts.

Humanity, according to Kant, possesses universal, *a priori* conditions and capacities that make it the one location of open-endedness in the causal nexus of nature, which gives transcendental consciousness the capacity for assuming moral responsibility based on internal, categorical and not merely external hypothetical imperatives. Humanity, according to Kant, is neither portrayed as trapped in Strauß' 'ontological gap,' seduced by sensualism, nor driven by socially constructed principles.

Hegel and Strauß are in agreement with Kant that moral improvement is neither a call to 'overcome sin' nor dependent upon divine grace. However, Kant emphatically rejects the notion that the 'solution' to ethical failure is the acquisition of a 'gnosis' of Absolute Knowledge that releases the individual from 'sensuousness.' Kant's dismissal of 'gnostic' release from sensuousness is not only because such 'gnosis' is analogous to a dreaming dove that thought it would be easier to fly in a vacuum but also because moral improvement is not a call to ethical perfection and, most certainly, not a struggle to overcome the 'evil pollution' of the individual's surrender to sensuousness. Furthermore, moral improvement, for Kant, is also not limited to the individual although without individual effort it cannot occur.

Nonetheless, as a species project it is not the 'moral improvement' that comes with the construction of ever new, relative, moral principles as its social context changes, as the later Strauß claimed in 1872. Rather, it is a species project made possible by nature itself establishing the material conditions, which include, for example, a 'round earth' that drags even the reluctant to 'communality' by means of an 'unsocial sociality' to fulfil nature's goal of the species 'becoming better human beings.'

Finally, 'becoming better human beings' is not measured by the consequences of actions but by what nature does with us when we freely (!) rigorously commit to our internal moral duty rather than instinct and/or merely self-interest. In short, 'focus on the pennies, and the dollars will take care of themselves.'

92. See, especially, Section 100 in the "Conclusion" of Strauß, *LJEGP* (1864): 624–627.

Kant's formulation of 'moral improvement' is concerned with transcendental consciousness' capacity to cultivate an internal, imperceptible 'culture of the will' or 'moral culture' distinct from Rousseau's 'Second Nature,' which measures 'culture' in terms of the products of 'technical skill' on top of First Nature. Speaking of transcendental consciousness as the 'ultimate end of nature' because in the midst of nature's determinism it is an open-endedness, which makes it possible for (but does not require) transcendental consciousness to take responsibility for its creative agency, Kant identifies two forms of culture: one focused on 'technical skills,' the other on moral training that protects finite, eminent causality mere mechanical determinism, NOT to suppress sensuousness.

[...] [N]ot every kind of culture is adequate for this ultimate end of nature. The *culture of skill*⁹³ [Rousseau's 'Second Nature'] is certainly the foremost subjective condition of aptitude for the promotion of ends in general. However, it is still not sufficient for promoting the will in the determination and choice of its ends, which [...] is essential for an aptitude for ends. The latter condition of aptitude, which could be named *the culture of training* (*Zucht*⁹⁴), is negative, and consists in the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires, by which we are made [...] incapable of choosing for ourselves, while we turn the drives that nature has given us merely for guidance into chains (*Fesseln*) in order not to neglect or even injure the determination of the animality in us although we are free enough to tighten or loosen the drives of nature, to lengthen or shorten them, as the ends of reason require.⁹⁵ (emphasis added)

Kant writes in *Opus Postumum*:

From this [distinction between the 'culture of skills' and the 'culture training' that promotes the will], one can also judge the absolute value of mathematics in comparison with practical philosophy [practical reason/ *praktische Vernunft*]. The former [mathematical] is that of technical/practical reason (skill in inventing means for some purpose), the latter is that of *moral/practical reason* and is directed toward humanity's ultimate purpose, which is absolutely (categorically) imperative, namely, to create better human beings.⁹⁶ (emphasis added)

As I pointed out above, the key to Moral Development is not what we do but our moral mindset (*Gesinnung*).⁹⁷ Nonetheless, for Kant, when it comes to moral improvement, *the focus is not simply on the moral mindset of the individual. Rather the focus is on the species* out of recognition that humanity is on a trajectory from cultural

93. On the 'culture of skill,' see as well, Kant's "First Introduction" to the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA XX: 200.

94. In the *Opus Postumum*, Kant labels it the 'culture of training'. See *Opus Postumum* AA XXI: 555** (actually, 556–557).

95. Kant, *The Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 431–432.

96. Kant, *Opus Postumum* AA XXII: 544*.

97. On Kant's concern with moral intention, not consequences, see above: 744.

crudeness over, and by means of, a 'culture of skills' (*Kultur der Geschichtlichkeit*), to attain the ultimate aim of 'creating better human beings,'⁹⁸ that is, to achieve a moral culture.

By no means is he claiming that culture is the social formation of the individual into subservience to the state. Furthermore, Kant is not claiming that one must adopt 'European' civility in order to cultivate morality. European civility is, in fact, a form of barbarism, and, ironically, the knee jerk assumption that Kant means 'European civilization' when he speaks of civilizing is an example of reverse imperialism.

Kant writes of civilizing as follows: Civilizing is a matter of the cultivation of taste (*Geschmack*). Yet, taste is neither merely personal nor even socially relative but is concerned with the cultivation of 'common sense' (*sensus communis*). *Sensus communis*, though, is not a matter of technical talent and felicity. Rather, *sensus communis* is the cultivation of 'shared understanding' of universal principles. Hence, "

Sensus communis is distinguished from the *sensu proprio*, where no care is taken for the judgment of others; the disturbed person judges everything by the *sensu proprio* and can consider nothing from the standpoint of the *sensus communis*; s/he always consults only her/his private sense for other objects.⁹⁹

The maxims of *sensus communis* are 1) think for oneself; 2) think from the perspective of the other; and 3) be consistent with your highest capacities and principles.¹⁰⁰ This, obviously, is far from what popular 'common sense' thinks about civilization!

However, Kant's notion of taste (*Geschmack*) is subject to anachronistic projections. It does not mean for Kant any of the following:¹⁰¹ mere 'enjoyment' (*Gennießen*), fashion (which for Kant is barbarous), a proclivity to savoring (*Geschmacksneigung*) (which for Kant is a weakness), or a proclivity to sensuous 'goodness'. Rather, *Geschmack* is a matter of reason. It is the ability to be sociable; "Taste promotes ideal pleasures [as opposed to merely sensuous, animal pleasures] and makes us capable of pleasures that we could not have through the enjoyment of the senses."¹⁰²

98. See Kant, *Opus Postumum* AA XXII: 545. On Kant's carefully defined (not to be read anachronistically) notions of cultivation, civilization, and moralization, see his *Anweisung*: "The person who is educated is cultivated (*cultivirt*) through school knowledge [*Schulwissenschaft*, civilized (*civilisirt*) through interaction with others, and moralized (*moralisirt*) by union of the two." *Anweisung* Olms ed.: 2 On the relationship between moral culture, beauty, and the sublime, see Chapter 9: 907. For Kant's definitions of cultivation and civilizing, see *Anweisung* Olms ed.: 2.

99. Kant, *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1013–1014; Olms ed.: 184–185.

100. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 294 and *Anweisung* Olms ed.: 25–26.

101. For the citations in Kant of the items on this list, see the discussion of Kant's notion of 'taste' in Vol. II Introduction: 545. Pleasure and displeasure motivate human agency. According to Kant, the ultimate aim of such agency is morality, which means to act on the basis of a universal moral principle, not narrow self-interest. Kant defines 'taste' as 'judgment about what pleases universally'.]

102. Kant, *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1102; Olms ed.: 288.

"The gradual education of humanity, which it reaches civilization and the propagation of taste, is *the preparation for the improvement of humanity*."¹⁰³ but civilization *per se* is not equated with morals. Kant is here in the *Menschenkunde* distinguishing between social propriety (*Sitte*), which is grounded in relative, social norms, and morality (*Moral*), which is grounded in universal, moral principles.

The more civilized people are, the more [...] they assume the appearance of affection, respect, modesty, and unselfishness from others, without deceiving anyone, because everyone knows that it is not meant sincerely, and it is very good that the world is run this way. Because by people playing this role, the virtues whose appearance they have only feigned for quite some time are ultimately awakened little by little, and they become part of their character. However, the deceiver in ourselves (that is, the inclination to deceive) is [with civilizing] a return to obedience under the law of virtue, and [civilizing is] not deception but guiltless deception of ourselves.

Nothing can be achieved by force against sensuality in our inclinations; we must outwit them, and, as Swift says, throw a ton to the whale to play with in order to save the ship.

[...] Good, honorable decency is a pretense that commands the respect of others (without making itself despicable).¹⁰⁴

Far from an indoctrination into civic 'duty,' for Kant civilizing is an open-ended process that is the preparation for morality (practical reason) on the way to a 'republican' form of government (in which the administrative, legislative, and judicial powers are separated) to cosmopolitanism.

Already in his *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie* (1775), Kant acknowledges that our moral situation is difficult "because sensuousness is in conflict with understanding."¹⁰⁵ However, this conflict is no ontological dualism between internally, 'good' intentions and externally, 'evil' actions. Distinguishing between the 'moral law' and 'moral feeling,' Kant writes of *moral feeling not as a struggle of the 'moral law' with 'sensuousness'* but of *the cultivation of the unity of sensuousness with understanding*. Moral improvement, then, does not consist in merely fulfilling the 'legal' requirement of a law but in the cultivation of moral feeling¹⁰⁶ or celebrating the imperceptible lawfulness in perception and agency that 'unites' intellect with the sensible. One can fulfil the law, legally, out of the wrong moral mindset. Achieving an agreement between sensuousness and intellect takes 'long' practice in holding oneself accountable before one's 'inner judge.'

103. Kant, *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1102; Olms ed.: 288.

104. Kant, *Anweisung* Olms ed.: 81–82.

105. Kant, *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie* (*Lecture on Moral Philosophy*) (1774/1775), Werner Stark and Manfred Kühn, eds. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004): 204.

106. Moral feeling here is not to be confused for the notion of feeling as sympathy and/or feeling for the good in Hutcheson and the Scottish Moralists.

Ruling over ourselves is [...] difficult, because the moral law can command but it has no driving force. It lacks the power of execution, which is moral feeling. This *moral feeling is not a distinction of good and evil* [that is established by the moral law], *but a driving force where our sensuousness coincides with the intellect*. People can have good moral judgment but no feeling; they can see that an act is not good and worthy of punishment, but they still commit it. Now *rule over oneself is based on the strength of moral feeling*. However, we can rule well over ourselves if we weaken the resisting power [the power that divides sensuousness and intellect], but this we do if we share in the resisting power [not separate ourselves from it]. Accordingly, *we must first discipline ourselves, that is, in regard to ourselves, by repeated actions, eradicate the inclination that arises from the sensual impulse. He who wants to discipline himself morally must take great care of himself, must often give account of his actions before the inner judge, through long practice he will give strength to the moral motive force and through culture he will get into the habit of showing pleasure or displeasure in regard to moral good or evil*. In this way, moral feeling will be cultivated because, if morality possesses the strength of motive force,¹⁰⁷ he will weaken sensuality and overcome it [not suppress and/or escape it] [...]. Where [...] there is no dominion over oneself, there is anarchy [at least, in part], but even if there is moral anarchy in man, cleverness takes the place of morality and rules instead of it, so that there would not be complete anarchy. [In other words,] the rule over oneself according to the rule of cleverness is an analogue of the moral rule over oneself.¹⁰⁸

‘Culture’ as ‘cultivation,’ though, involves more than just the individual’s ‘training.’ It involves all those who have an awareness of the significance of the ‘inner judge’ of moral feeling anchored in the imperceptible, lawful ‘commonweal of ends’ (*Reich der Zwecke*) that guides the unifying of sensuousness and (moral) understanding. Kant’s ‘commonweal of ends’ is a ‘realized eschatology’ of capacities that are, nonetheless, ‘infinitely removed from us’¹⁰⁹ precisely because it is an activity, not an accomplishment:

[...] [D]ominion of the good principle is not otherwise attainable, so far as human beings can work toward it, than through the setting up and the diffusion of a society in accordance with, and for the sake of, the laws of virtue – *a society which reason makes it a task and a duty of the entire human race to establish in its full scope* [...] In addition to prescribing laws to each individual [...], morally legislative reason also unfurls a banner of virtue as rallying point for all [...] that they may congregate under it and thus at the very start gain the upper hand over evil [...]

[...] [The ethical community] has a special and peculiar unification principle (virtue) and therefore also a form and constitution that is essentially different from that of the [political community]. Nevertheless, there is a certain analogy between the two, considered as two common beings in general, in regard to which the former [ethical community] can also be

107. Kant explicitly rejects the notion that moral feeling is sufficient for morality. In the *Anweisung*, Kant writes: "The more people privilege [*vorgeben*] feeling, the less they think. The more feelings, the fewer concepts. Moral feeling can never take the place of moral concepts!" Kant, *Anweisung* Olms ed.: 24.

108. Kant, *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie*: 204–205. There is no complete anarchy because both the rule of cleverness and moral feeling are governed, ultimately, by lawfulness (theoretical and practical, respectively).

109. See Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 122.

called an ethical state, i.e. a realm of virtue (of the good principle), of which the idea has its quite well-founded objective reality in human reason (as the duty to unite for such a state), even if it could never be hoped subjectively from the good will of men that they would decide to work toward this end with unanimity.¹¹⁰

Speaking of culture as what constitutes the social value of humanity because only transcendental consciousness can be aware of an internal 'commonweal of ends,' Kant writes that

[T]here are human beings, i.e. evil-minded, but nevertheless rational beings endowed with [technical] inventiveness and at the same time with a moral capacity [*Anlage*], who feel the evils they selfishly do to one another only more and more strongly with the increase of culture and, seeing no other remedy against it before them than the private sense (of individuals) united with the common sense (of all), to a *discipline* (of civil coercion), to which they submit only according to laws given by themselves, they feel ennobled by this consciousness, namely, that they belong to a species that is appropriate to the destiny of man as reason presents it to him in the ideal.¹¹¹ (emphasis added)

Furthermore and especially to be emphasized, the 'moral improvement' of humanity that comes with the development of culture is not in competition with nature as an alien sensuous realm over against a 'moral duty' of perfection. Rather, perpetual progress includes *what nature does with us, not simply what we do through our autonomous freedom*. Kant writes:

If we now ask by what means this perpetual progress for the better may be maintained and also accelerated, we soon see that *this immeasurably distant success will not depend on what we do* (e.g., on the education we give to the younger world) and on the method we should use to bring it about; *but on what human nature will do in and with us* to coerce us into a course into which we would not easily submit of our own accord.¹¹² (emphasis added)

In this vein, Kant speaks of nature 'wants' the cultivation of transcendental consciousness' moral capacity (*Anlage*). Writing of the notion of 'nature wants' employing a non-literal, 'symbolic anthropomorphism,'¹¹³ Kant writes:

When I say of nature that she wants this or that to happen, this does not mean as much as: she imposes a duty on us to do it (for only practical reason, free of compulsion, can do that),

110. Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 94–95.

111. Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*: AA VII: 329–330.

112. Kant, *On the Common Saying*: 'That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice' AA VIII: 310.

113. On Kant's distinction between a 'literal' and a 'symbolic' anthropomorphism, see Kant, *Prolegomena* AA IV: 356. See as well, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 724–725; B 728 and *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 353.

but she does it herself, we may want or not (*fata volentum ducunt, nolentem trahunt* ["the fates lead the willing and drag the unwilling"]).¹¹⁴

Nature 'has given' humanity reason and freedom as an indication of her 'intention' that humanity exercise the finite, eminent causality as that location where creativity extends beyond natural instinct through transcendental consciousness' 'lawful' reason.

Nature intended that humanity should bring everything that goes beyond the mechanical order of his animal existence entirely out of itself and should partake of no other bliss or perfection than that which it has procured for itself, free from instinct, by its own reason. Nature does nothing superfluously and is not wasteful in the use of means for her ends. Because she gave humanity reason and the freedom of will based on it, this was already a clear indication of her intention with regard to its capacities. For humanity was not to be guided by instinct, or to be supplied and instructed by created knowledge; but, rather, was to bring everything out of itself.¹¹⁵

The way that nature manifests her 'intention' in a manner that drags the unwilling to exercise their transcendental capacities is through what Kant calls 'unsocial sociality:'

The means that nature uses to bring about the development of all its capacities is their *antagonism in society*, insofar as this ultimately *becomes the cause of a lawful order* for them. I understand by antagonism *the unsociable sociality*¹¹⁶ of persons, i.e., their inclination to enter into society, which is nevertheless connected with a continuous resistance that constantly threatens to separate this society. The predisposition for this obviously lies in human nature. Humanity has a tendency to socialize, because in such a state it feels more human (i.e. the development of its natural capacities [*Naturanlagen*]). However, humanity also has a great tendency to isolate itself: because the individual finds in her-/himself at the same time the unsociable quality of wanting to direct everything only according to her/his own sense, and therefore expects resistance from all sides, just as s/he knows from her-/himself that s/he in turn is inclined to resistance against others. It is this resistance that awakens all of humanity's powers, leads one to overcome one's tendency to laziness and, driven by ambition, lust for power or greed, to gain status and prestige in the eyes of others whom one does not well suffer but from whom one also cannot let go. There, the first true steps are taken from crudeness to culture, which actually consists in the social value of the human. There, all talents are gradually developed, taste¹¹⁷ is formed, and through continued enlightenment the beginning is made for the founding of a way of thinking that in the course of time can transform its crude natural capacities [*Naturanlagen*] into moral definite practical principles and thus be transformed from a pathologically depressed lone individual into a society, and, finally, into a moral totality. Without those qualities of unsociality, which are not in themselves amiable and from which arises the resistance that everyone must necessarily encounter in his selfish presumptions, all talents would

114. Kant, *Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project* AA VIII: 365

115. Kant, "Third Proposition" in *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* AA VIII: 19.

116. 'Unsocal sociality' is not Hegel's 'cunning of reason'. The former leads to the moral improvement of the individual and species *in the world*. The latter calls consciousness *out of the world*.

117. Kant distinguishes between the 'sense of taste' and 'taste' as a 'social sense'. See Kant, *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 916–917; Olms ed.: 72–73.

remain eternally hidden in their germs in an Arcadian shepherd's life of perfect harmony, frugality, and alternating love. Humans [would be] benign as the sheep they feed, would hardly give their existence a greater value than that of their domestic cattle; they would not fill the void of creation with regard to their purpose, as a rational being. *Thanks be to nature, then, for the indiscriminateness, for the begrudgingly competing vanity, for the unsatisfiable desire to have or also to rule! Without it, all the excellent natural endowments in mankind would slumber eternally undeveloped.* Humanity wants harmony; but nature knows better what is good for this species: *nature wants discord. Humanity wants to live leisurely and pleasurably. Nature, however, wants him to throw himself out of nonchalance and idle frugality into work and toil, in order to find means to pull himself by wisdom out of the latter.*¹¹⁸

Again, employing a symbolic anthropomorphism, Kant concludes that nature possesses a 'wisdom' that does not allow it to 'tamper' with its 'glorious institution.' Nonetheless, it is able to achieve its 'intended' ends by 'using' transcendental consciousness:

*The natural impulses for this, the sources of unsociality and of constant resistance, from which so many evils but which, nevertheless, also drive to a new exertion of forces, and thus to a greater development of the natural dispositions, thus betray the order of a wise Creator; and not, for instance, the hand of a malicious Spirit, which has tampered with His glorious institution or has enviously corrupted it.*¹¹⁹ (emphasis added)

II) Kant's 'Empty Ideas:'

In the *Life of Jesus* of 1835 and in conformity with Hegel's "The Moral View of the World," Strauß stresses that morality (*Moralität*) without ethics (*Sittlichkeit*) is merely "an empty obligation and ideal."¹²⁰ "I should (act in accordance with pure, moral duty), but I can't (because of the limitations placed upon me by my historical circumstance/situation)." That fulfilment can only come from God in the form of grace, according to "The Moral View of the World." Nonetheless, for Hegel perfect fulfilment of moral principles is not the goal of religion! Rather, for Hegel and the Strauß of 1835, *religion is the attainment of 'knowledge' (gnosis) of Absolute Spirit, not the overcoming of sin.*

In the *LJ* Strauß writes of this 'gnostic' form of religion whose goal is to attain the 'Hegelian' knowledge of Absolute Spirit, not overcome personal 'sin':

[...] recognition of God as spirit implies that God does not remain as a fixed and immutable Infinite encompassing the Finite, but enters into it, produces the Finite, Nature,

118. Kant, *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* AA VIII: 20–21.

119. Kant, *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* AA VIII: 21–22.

120. I've addressed this theme frequently. See, for example, above, footnote 8: 173; Chapter 2, footnote 19: 79; Chapter 6, footnote 4: 96; and below in Chapter 8, "Religion is Morality Grounded only in 'Empty Ideas': 225 ff.

and the human mind, merely as a limited manifestation of himself from which he eternally returns into unity. As man, considered as a finite spirit, limited to his finite nature, has not truth; so God, considered exclusively as an infinite spirit, shut up in his infinitude, has not reality. *Infinite spirit is real only when it discloses itself in finite spirits because finite spirit is true only when it merges itself in the infinite.* The true and real existence of spirit, therefore, is neither in God by himself, nor in man by Himself, but in the God/Man, neither in the infinite alone, nor in the finite alone, but in the interchange of impartation and withdrawal between the two, which on the part of God is revelation, on the part of man religion.¹²¹

Speaking of the Christ as a symbolic representation of the union of Infinite and Finite Spirit, Strauß in conformity with Hegel says nothing about the 'forgiveness of sins' but writes of the 'cessation of alienation from the infinite and return to God': "*Inasmuch as the death of the God/Man is merely the cessation of his state of alienation from the Infinite, it is in fact an exaltation and return to God [...]*"¹²² (emphasis added)

For Strauß in 1835, humanity is neither defined in terms of Kant's 'theoretical reason,' nor in terms of either the Hegelian or Kantian senses of 'practical reason.' Rather, humanity is defined in terms of the Hegelian (Platonic) 'pure consciousness' or 'pure reason'¹²³ of contemplation (*Republic* 511c; θεωρία/θεωρούμενος), that is, as 'contemplation' of the Infinite (the 'highest Good')¹²⁴ above both Kant's 'theoretical reason' and 'practical reason.' In conformity with Hegel's 'pure reason' of contemplation, Strauß stresses the *suppression of sensible existence* (precisely, the realm to which Hegel claims that Kant restricts 'practical reason'):

The believer, finding himself (*sic.*) environed with the conditions of nature, must, like Christ, die to nature—but only inwardly, as Christ did outwardly, – must spiritually crucify himself and be buried with Christ, that *by the virtual suppression of his own sensible existence, he may become, in so far as he is a spirit, identical with himself, and participate in the bliss and glory of Christ.*¹²⁵ (emphasis added)

The crucial insight here, easily overlooked, is what distinguishes Strauß' Christology from other Hegelians. In order to preserve history, Strauß takes the turning 'point of indifference' to be internal to finite consciousness, not God's Absolute return to Himself. It is also the insight that the early Strauß believes protects his Christology from being

121. Strauß, *LJ*: 777. Where Strauß differs with Hegel and the Hegelians is not about what the God/Man is but with respect to the issue of the *exclusiveness* (as only occurring in one individual or as occurring in the elite philosophers who grasp the gnosis) beyond history or *universal inclusiveness* (as applying to all finite, consciousness) in history of the God/Man event.

122. Strauß, *LJ*: 778.

123. According to Hegel, 'pure consciousness' or 'pure reason' is Absolute Spirit Itself. See Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 391–398.

124. Hegel takes the reflecting judgment of theoretical reason to be 'contemplation' in Plato's sense of *theoria* (θεωρία, *theoria*), which employs dialectic to contemplate the Absolute Good 'above Being' (above unchanging ideas) (*Republic* 509b: ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας).

125. Strauß, *LJ*: 778.

merely an 'empty idea' precisely because it insists upon an historical anchor for Christology. Contrasting his Christology with other Hegelians, Strauß writes:

[...] one can never deduce the bodily resurrection of an individual from the truth that the suppression of natural existence constitutes the resurrection of the spirit.

[... To do so] would have us falling back again to Kant's point of view, which we have ourselves found unsatisfactory: for if the idea have no corresponding reality, *it is an empty obligation and ideal*.¹²⁶ (emphasis added)

Strauß' criticism of Kant as a proponent of merely 'empty ideas' is at the heart of Strauß' *inclusive* Christological formulation of the *LJ*. The key to the whole of Christology is:

If reality is ascribed to the idea of the unity of the divine and human natures, is this equivalent to the admission that this unity must actually have been once manifested, as it never had been, and never more will be, in one individual? This is indeed not the mode in which Idea realizes itself; it is not wont to lavish all its fulness on one exemplar and stingy towards all others—to express Itself perfectly in that one individual, and imperfectly in all the rest. It, rather, loves to distribute its riches among a multiplicity of exemplars which reciprocally complete each other—in the alternate appearance and suppression of a series of individuals. Furthermore, is this no true actualization [*wahre Wirklichkeit*] of the Idea [the 'true' content]¹²⁷? *Is it not to take the Idea of the unity of the divine and human natures to be real [Reale] in a far higher sense, when I regard the whole race of mankind as Its actualization [Verwirklichung], than when I single out one man as such an actualization? Is not an incarnation of God from eternity, a truer [wahere] one than an incarnation limited to a particular point of time?*¹²⁸

This is the key to the whole of Christology, that, as subject of the predicate which the church assigns to Christ, we place instead of an individual, an idea; but an idea which has an existence in reality [*eine reale*], not unactual [as a consequence of the ontological gap between the evil that one is and the good that one seeks to achieve], *like that with Kant*.¹²⁹ (emphasis added)

In the *Glaubenslehre* of 1841, Strauß to follows Hegel's 'Moral View of the World' of the *Phänomenologie* with its dualistic distinction between morality (*Moralität*) and ethics

126. Strauß, *LJ*: 779.

127. The rhetorical question here is formulated in terms of the Hegelian distinction between 'true' content (*Inhalt, das Ideelle*) and 'actual' representations (*Form, das Reelle*). An idea is merely 'empty' without its manifestation in 'actual' representations.

128. Again, the rhetorical question hinges on the different between 'eternal truth' (*Inhalt*) and transient, 'actual particulars' (*Form* as actual representations).

129. Strauß, *LJ*: 780. The dismissal of Kant's 'empty idea' is formulated in terms of the Hegelian distinction between true content (*Inhalt*) and particular representations (*Form*). Strauß takes Kant's Christology to be an 'empty idea' as the prototype of perfect, moral duty. Strauß dismisses Kant for not addressing whether and how this 'empty idea' can be actualized in history because of the restraints placed on human agency by nature and social context. In other words, as I will point out presently, Strauß' focus on actualization prohibits his grasping of the significance of Kant's notion of moral 'state of mind' (*Gesinnung*) for guiding agency.

(*Sittlichkeit*) and claims that the dualistic dimensions of experience place in tension 'higher,' essential consciousness (*Moralität*) and 'lower,' passion driven consciousness (*Sittlichkeit*). In short, moral theory depends upon a dualism between the 'essential consciousness' (*intellektuelle Anschauung*) of moral duty and the inescapable ethical failure because the individual is in a world of sense perception (*sinnliche Anschauung*). It is not insignificant that it is Hegel, not Kant, who wrote in "The Moral View of the World:" "On account of the individual's 'unworthiness,' [...] it cannot look on happiness as something necessary, but as something contingent, *and can only expect happiness as the result of grace.*"¹³⁰ (emphasis added)

In the *Glaubenslehre*, as well, Strauß squeezes Kant's practical reason into the framework of Hegel's 'Moral View of the World'. Strauß acknowledges that Kant's practical reason knows that the mental attitude of morality and human worthiness of happiness depends upon humanity's free self-selection, but Strauß claims that Kant is a moral consequentialist by his recognition that humanity has very limited power over nature upon which its happiness depends.

[...], according to Kant, the moral law [*Moralität*] obligates us to make it exclusively the formal, rational condition for the use of our freedom *independent of all material conditions*. However, the moral law simultaneously establishes as mandatory *a priori* the pursuit of a final goal, which consists in the achievement of the highest good in the world possible by freedom. This is to say, the ethics [*Sittlichkeit*] of all rational beings, on the one hand, includes their worthiness to be happy but with *the actual possession of happiness being proportionate to their achieved 'worthiness.'* [McG: Consequentialism] Now, *as certainly as the former of these two constituent parts of the highest good, namely, the suitability of attitude and conduct to the moral law, or worthiness, depends on man's free self-determination: so little is he able by [...] [ethics] to procure for himself at any time the required complement to it, the corresponding happiness because this depends on nature, over which man has only a very limited power.*¹³¹ (emphasis added)

130. See Hegel, "The Moral View of the World:" III: 449–450 (Baillie trans.: 623). Again, with his shift from humanity's problem as a matter of 'sin' to a matter of 'knowledge', Hegel substitutes the 'cunning of reason' for 'grace'.

Although Kant does speak of grace as *possibly* complementing human moral effort, he rejects the notion because it undermines individual, moral effort by turning moral responsibility into a groveling exercise of personal interest at the feet of God. Furthermore, *if there is any goal inappropriate for morality, it is happiness*. Happiness is a matter of merely capricious self-interest. The goal is not happiness but the 'worthiness of happiness' in the Stoic sense of internal satisfaction over one's effort. See Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 130.

131. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 373–374. Nonetheless, Strauß recognized that Kant did not invoke grace in order for humanity to achieve happiness: "The fact that the connection of some emotions, which are prominent in us, with the rest of our spiritual life is beyond our observation, does not justify the conclusion that such a connection does not exist. However, *wishing to perceive and feel really heavenly influences that they are effects of grace and not only natural* Kant explained as a kind of madness (of the theoretical understanding) and a dangerous self-deception for a truly moral religion (of practical reason) to the extent that the individual claims s/he is able to accomplish the ethically good not by her-/himself but expects it to be a gift of an other Being, consequently to become ethical without doing anything." (emphasis added) Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 457. Strauß footnotes to "§2 The Moral

Here in the *Glaubenslehre*, the contrast between 'moral obligation' and (failed) ethical fulfilment is formulated by means of the epistemological structure of 'true' content (*Inhalt*) and 'actual representations' (*Form*) as idea and reality. Truth is content (*Inhalt*) whereas representations are actuality/reality. "Divine holiness is revealed by the undeniable power with which the ethical law is asserted in human life. This undeniable power in life is the actuality [*Sittlichkeit*] of the moral law [*Moralität*] just as the moral law is the truth of its actuality in life; or both are related to one another as Idea and actuality [*Realität*]."¹³² In the case of the undeniable power (actuality) of the moral law, we indirectly encounter the moral law in consequentialist representations (*Form*), which is what anchors the idea (*Inhalt*) in actuality and confirms that the idea is no mere abstraction. Divine, moral power and ethical actuality are related to one another as idea (God's holiness) is related to the form/representations that are ethical actuality.¹³³

Kant: Ought comes not from 'Holiness of the Law' but Autonomous Freedom

However, Kant points out that it is not the 'holiness of the law', which confronts humanity with an 'ought'. Rather, humanity alone of all species we have encountered encounters an 'ought' because of the degree to which it exercises autonomy 'above nature.' Only 'if' transcendental consciousness is inseparable from a world in which it can intentionally initiate sequences of events that nature on its own could never accomplish is there anything like an ought. *In short, it is not the 'holiness' of a heteronomous, divine law that establishes morality.* Morality is a necessary complement to the extra-ordinary causality exercised by transcendental consciousness. *The concrete application of autonomous freedom demands attention to the lawful order that internally governs its causal system complementary to, but is never reducible to, the causal system of nature with its physical laws.*

Principle of Religion Opposed to the Delusion of Religion" in Part Four of Kant, *Religion*: AA VI: 174. One should also look at Kant's concluding "General Remark".

132. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 596. Finite actuality (*Realität/Reelle/Reale*) is distinguished by Hegel from infinite ideas (the *Ideelle*). The empirical is *Reelle* in contrast to the reality that is the idea (*Ideelle*), which is the true content (*Inhalt*) of knowledge in contrast to representations in perception, which is the *Form* that is actuality as *Wirklichkeit*. In his *Logik*, Hegel writes: "In relation to reality [*Realität*] and ideality [*Idealität*] (...), the opposition of the finite and the infinite is conceived in such a way that the finite applies to the real [*Reale*], the infinite applies to the ideal [*Ideelle*], just as furthermore the concept is regarded as an ideal [*Ideelles*] and indeed as an only ideal [*Ideelles*], concrete existence in general, however, as the real [*Reale*]. GW V: 165–166.

133. This relationship between the content (*Inhalt*) or truth of the moral law and the actuality (*Form*) of the moral law is a claim that *the undeniable power* of moral law (its consequentialist actuality) is taken by Strauß to be the *ratio cognoscendi* of morality and the *ration essendi* of morality is the idea of the moral law (its truth) as *ratio essendi*. This is a dramatic reformulation of Kant's notions of the *ratio cognoscendi* is the moral law and *ratio essendi* is autonomous, creative freedom. See Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 4*.

III) Freedom is only Freedom-from for Strauß:

When it comes to philosophies of immanentism, the freedom of the will is ambiguous, at best. In fact, Spinoza denied human freedom. Only God is free because God is not subject to compulsion.¹³⁴ Strauß summarizes Spinoza as follows:

[...] If *constraint* consists in the determination of a being from without and *capriciousness* [*Willkür*] in determination of a being itself with respect to internal and external indeterminacy, the determination by one's internal nature stands in the middle, which can be called alike necessary determination (but not compulsion) as well as free self-determination (admittedly, not capriciousness [*Willkür*]).¹³⁵

For Spinoza, then, by His internal nature only God is determined by His laws (but not driven by external compulsion) and self-determining (but not capriciously out of indeterminacy).

Whereas Spinoza denied the freedom of the human will,¹³⁶ *the early Strauß and Hegel attempt to defend the freedom of the human will by invoking the logic of 'negation'*. Finite freedom is the individual's distinguishing her-/himself from all other particulars. God is the 'Totality of Spirit' and as such in the beginning is 'not yet true'.¹³⁷ God's 'truth' is the 'totality' that can only include its beginning and end as His eternal process.¹³⁸ This 'eternal process' between the beginning and the end of Totality is driven by 'negation': the One negating itself into the many followed by the open-endedness of distinction and differentiation achieved by the separation of the many within itself in a process of finite negation. This separation is an activity of negation that distinguishes 'this' from 'that,' that is, 'this' is NOT 'that.'

134. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 588; Spinoza writes in his *Ethic.* I, Defin. 7; see Epist. LXII. POS. 2: "I say that a thing is free, which exists and acts solely by the necessity of its own nature. Thus also God understands Himself and all things freely, because it follows solely from the necessity of His nature, that He should understand all things. You see I do not place freedom in free decision, but in free necessity.

[http://www.faculty.umb.edu/gary_zabel/Courses/Spinoza/Texts/Spinoza/let6258.htm#TOP (22 August 2020)], see Ep. XXIII: "God I in no wise subject to fate: I conceive that all things follow with inevitable necessity from the nature of God, in the same way as everyone conceives that it follows from God's nature that God understands Himself. This latter consequence all admit to follow necessarily from the divine nature, yet no one conceives that God is under the compulsion of any fate, but that He understands Himself quite freely, though necessarily." [http://www.faculty.umb.edu/gary_zabel/Courses/Spinoza/Texts/Spinoza/let2375.htm#TOP (22 August 2020)]. See, as well, Spinoza's Letter to G.H. Schaller (October, 1674) Letter 62 (58).

135. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 587–588.

136. See Spinoza's Letter to G.H. Schaller (October, 1674) Letter 62 (58). Strauß does not acknowledge Spinoza's rejection of humanity's free will in this discussion of God's freedom in *Glaubenslehre* I, but he does in *Glaubenslehre* II: 364.

137. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 488.

138. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 488–489.

[For] [...] common understanding, the world is an aggregate of particular, randomly accidental things under laws.¹³⁹ Comprehending knowing, though, negates these things as existing particulars and ascends to the universal. This universal itself has negated itself as it here returns to itself (that is, it is related to individual existing things as substance is related to its accidents).¹⁴⁰

Hegel distinguishes between two notions of freedom: Absolute Freedom¹⁴¹ and freedom in the nation state.¹⁴² Spirit is Absolute Freedom and the ultimate aim of Spirit is the Second Negation of finite phenomena that restrains freedom in negativity but is necessary for Spirit to be conscious of Itself as Absolute Freedom.¹⁴³ However, finite consciousness has to win its freedom.¹⁴⁴ Hegel stresses that finite consciousness is not 'free by nature'. The state of nature is a status of injustice and violence. Hence, the state doesn't limit freedom but limits merely brute emotions and rude instincts as well as caprice and passion.¹⁴⁵ By placing limitation on humanity's brute nature, the state and society are the conditions in which freedom is realized.¹⁴⁶ Hegel claims that it is the state that confers 'worth' on the individual¹⁴⁷ by providing the framework for humanity achieving its '*second nature*'¹⁴⁸ through the discipline and performance of duties for the state and society.¹⁴⁹ *Humanity doesn't 'possess' freedom, innately*, according to Hegel. He acknowledges, nonetheless, the ambiguous status of freedom in the state because the state must impose restrictions on freedom. However, the aim

139. Notice here how for Strauß an 'aggregate' is defined as a random collection of 'accidental things under laws'. *For Kant, a collection of things under laws is the condition of an architectonic, just the opposite of an aggregate!* Once again, the Second Negation 'back' to Absolute Spirit, the universal, is a negation of meaning to history in contrast to Kant's embracing of history as the realm of human creativity.

140. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 383.

141. See Hegel's "Introduction" to his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*: XII: 30 (Sibree, trans.: 18).

142. See Hegel's "Introduction" to his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*: XII: 56 (Sibree, trans.: 40).

143. See Hegel's "Introduction" to his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*: XII: 77–78 (Sibree, trans.: 58–59).

144. See Hegel's "Introduction" to his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*: XII: 58 (Sibree, trans.: 42).

145. See Hegel's "Introduction" to his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*: XII: 58 (Sibree, trans.: 42).

146. See Hegel's "Introduction" to his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*: XII: 59 (Sibree, trans.: 43).

147. See Hegel's "Introduction" to his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*: XII: 56 (Sibree, trans.: 40–41). This is a dramatic contrast to Kant, who anchors the individual's absolute worth (dignity) in autonomous freedom. On Kant's notion of dignity, see: 535, n. 20 and 699, n. 176.

148. See Hegel's "Introduction" to his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*: XII: 57 (Sibree, trans.: 41). NOTE: Hegel here is employing Rousseau's label for culture. This is Kant's 'culture of skills,' but it has nothing to do with Kant's 'culture' that promotes the moral will.

149. See Hegel's "Introduction" to his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*: XII: 56–57 (Sibree, trans.: 41).

of the state's constitution, laws, and institutions is that the restrictions on personal freedom be as few as possible.¹⁵⁰ (emphasis added)

In a nutshell: *only Absolute Spirit is free as 'self-contained existence'*, and individual consciousness is truly free only when it is self-conscious of its union with Absolute Spirit.¹⁵¹ *Individual consciousness, then, is free when it liberates itself from its animality, passions, and self-interest.*¹⁵² In its natural state of individual consciousness, the self is dependent upon the power of the state and society to restrain its animality. *Freedom, then, is predominantly defined 'negatively' as freedom-from: freedom-from animality, freedom-from state restrictions that impose duty, and, ultimately, freedom-from finite phenomena through achievement of unity with Absolute Spirit in the Second Negation. There is a positive, freedom-for only when it comes to conscious 'thinking' of the Absolute Idea of Spirit.*

Although having rejected Hegel's cyclical meta-narrative of Double Negation that annuls history, Strauß, nevertheless, defines the individual's freedom by the logic of negation. Finite 'freedom' is the individual's eternal distinctiveness negatively, *over against* all other things, a distinctiveness that only the conscious individual can experience for itself.

When Spinoza asserts that the particular thing, including the particular individual, is not free because to a particular thing remains as it were only those determinations of its essence and effects that all other things leave to it, it is obvious enough, conversely, that to all other things there remains only what this one (particular) leaves over to them. To speak with Hegel, the particular's determination, which is its negation, behaves as if it were also reality. [Strauß footnotes to *Encyclop.*: § 91 f. 365, n. 33] Or to speak with Schelling, that which the individual does in time, [s/]he has [her-/]himself embraced for all eternity. *This is definitely neither a freedom of choice; nor a coercion; but the determination of the individual externally is only the other side of the determination of it by means of its own nature (truly, freedom is relative whereas with the absolute it consists in the identity of both sides).*¹⁵³

As the case with Hegel, this understanding of freedom established by 'negation' over against all other finite beings is, also, only a 'freedom-from' that establishes that 'this' particular is not 'that' particular.

Hegel and Strauß, then, take moral agency to be defined in terms of an 'opposition' between two regions of freedom: consciousness and nature. The freedom of finite consciousness is defined by the Hegelians as 'freedom-from': freedom-from animal-

150. See Hegel's "Introduction" to his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*: XII: 62 (Sibree, trans.: 46).

151. See Hegel's "Introduction" to his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*: XII: 30 (Sibree, trans.: 18).

152. See Hegel's "Introduction" to his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*: XII: 33–34, 38 (Sibree, trans.: 21, 25).

153. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 364–365.

ty, freedom-from state restrictions that impose duty, and, ultimately, freedom-from finite phenomena through achievement of unity with Absolute Spirit in the Second Negation. Yet, Hegel also speaks of freedom of moral consciousness over against nature as the conflict between reason (pure thought, *reines Denken*) and sensuousness (*Sinnlichkeit*). Moral consciousness is the "freedom" of free thought (*freies Denken* – as the freedom of Being contained in consciousness) over against nature's 'freedom',¹⁵⁴ which in turn resists 'pure thought' and contributes to ethical failure.

1) Kant on Freedom

Kant's practical reason is anchored in individual, *autonomous freedom* to initiate events that nature is incapable of accomplishing on its own, not the determination of 'the' objective truth (*κατ' ἀλήθειαν*) of a set of speculative, metaphysical claims based on an *a posteriori* descriptive logic.

Hegel's and Strauß' understanding of practical reason is that the individual is incapable of fulfilling moral duty because consciousness is limited by 'nature's freedom' whereas Strauß in the *Glaubenslehre* was influenced by Böhme claim that 'life' as requires 'evil' for it to thrive.

Kant describes the capacity of 'reflecting judgment' to be what overcomes the gap (*Kluft*) between freedom (the supersensible) and nature (sensible representations/appearances),¹⁵⁵ Hegel takes Kant to mean that freedom and nature consist of a dualistic division between the supersensible and the sensible, which for Hegel are governed by two kinds of freedom (one of Absolute Spirit and the other of nature);¹⁵⁶ reason and understanding. Hegel claims that Absolute Spirit is what bridges the gap between freedom (the supersensible) and nature (the sensible), whereas Kant employs 'reflecting judgment,' not 'reason' to think this higher identity.¹⁵⁷ Hegel ridicules Kant's neglect of reason by limiting absolute identity (Absolute Spirit) to a merely, indeterminate idea of reflecting judgment:

Where Kant comes to [... the true and sole] reason as the solution [that is, absolute identity], reason for him is nothing but the indeterminate idea of the supersensible in us, which cannot be made comprehensible further, – as if he had not himself given a concept of

154. Hegel, "The Moral View of the World:" GW II: 451 (Baillie trans.: 625): Consciousness' "[...] freedom is that of pure thought, in opposition to which [...] nature has likewise arisen as something equally free."

155. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 195.

156. In "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten," Hegel distinguishes between Absolute Freedom and nature's freedom. See GW II: 457–458.

157. See Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen" GW II: 322.

the same in the identity of the concept of nature and freedom [by means of *reflecting judgment*].¹⁵⁸ (emphasis added)

By ignoring the significance of Kant's notion of *reflecting judgment*, Hegel and Strauß assume an idealist metaphysics without examining the mental conditions of possibility and capacities that are required for such a metaphysics. Their 'Idealism' is a dictum (*Machtspruch*), which ultimately is grounded in a literal, anthropomorphic analogy, not a description of the (granted, limited) capacities and the functioning of reason.

Yet, Kant's acknowledgment of the 'limits' to reason is no narrowing of transcendental consciousness. Without the 'limit' that is appearances, transcendental consciousness could not discover it's a *priori* synthetic capacities and structures, much less its autonomous freedom that makes it possible for a finite agent to understand and act responsibly in a finite world. In other words, the 'limits' to reason do require acknowledgement of a closed horizon to reason, but they empower the exercise of reason to understand its experience, to exercise agency as *the location for an openness in nature's deterministic causality*, and to self-select what ought to be in a finite world.¹⁵⁹

According to Kant, then, *reflecting judgment* is at the heart of 'theoretical reason,' 'practical reason,' and aesthetic judgment. The Hegelian 'content'/'representations' structure is anchored solely in what Kant calls '*re-producing judgment*' (*bestimmende Urteilkraft*) that are taken to be Absolute. Consequently, from the Kantian perspective, ignoring in the midst of nature's determinism the creative freedom that is '*reflecting judgment*', which deduces 'order' out of the relationalities of appearances, Hegelian epistemology is no more grounded in 'the' Absolute Idea than it is grounded in Absolute Knowledge. It is only a system of 'empty', logical assumptions.

2) Kant on the Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason

Not only does Kant distinguish between *theoretical reason* (understanding 'what is') and *practical reason* (understanding 'what ought to be') as both internal capacities of transcendental consciousness that are required to experience and act in the world, but Kant also takes into consideration *the process of understanding itself that unites them*. That is, his concern is not merely broader than Hegel's because he examines these two capacities of transcendental consciousness in terms of their differences in content, but

158. Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen" GW II: 323.

159. In Chapter 9, "Missing Aesthetic Judgment," I demonstrate that reflecting judgment is at the core of aesthetic judgment, which, in turn, is no mere 'frosting on the cake' to the 'factual world'. Rather, especially the moral significance of the judgments of beauty and the sublime indicate that transcendental consciousness has a mental capacity (beauty) and a grasp of infinity and power (sublime) that, in principle, gives it the power to destroy nature. See in Chapter 9: "Missing Aesthetic Judgment" the section "General Remarks on Kant's Beauty and the Sublime" 872 ff.

he also is concerned to understand how the capacities themselves function to enable reason's extraordinary role in the natural world's order. In fact, *that which unites them is a single intellectual function: reflecting judgment or the search for concepts that are not (and cannot be) given directly in the phenomena.*

Kant identifies two domains of lawfulness:¹⁶⁰ the domain of theoretical reason (nature) and the domain of practical reason (responsible, moral agency grounded in autonomous freedom). Although Kant refers to a 'gap' (*Kluft*) between these two domains (theoretical and practical reason), they are not separated domains. *Theoretical and practical reason are two, inseparably complementary, activities of finite, transcendental consciousness. They are two domains of lawfulness, not simply reducible to two substances, experienced indirectly by means of appearances in transcendental consciousness. The 'gap' between and among these appearances is bridged neither by an Absolute Idea nor by a common substance but by a function of transcendental consciousness: reflecting judgment.*

Starting with appearances, transcendental consciousness is confronted with a ceaseless flow of phenomena. In the *Anweisung*, Kant distinguishes 'wit' (*Witz*) from the 'capacity judgment' (*Urteilstkraft*) by defining 'wit' as an 'expanding' capacity of the imagination that sees similarity everywhere in the imagination. The capacity of 'judgment' 'narrows' the understanding by sorting out the similarities in the imagination by means of the concepts appropriate to the phenomena.¹⁶¹ This latter function of the 'capacity of judgment' Kant calls in the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* the capacity of reflecting judgment. It is able to 'sort out' the elements of those appearances by seeking the appropriate imperceptible concepts (and schema of concepts) for various sets of phenomena. In order to accomplish this 'sorting out,' transcendental consciousness must assume that the phenomena are governed by two lawful orders: the imperceptible, mechanical, lawful order of nature and the imperceptible lawful order of its own autonomous freedom. The latter, lawful order of autonomous freedom occurs only under the conditions of the former, the lawful order of mechanical nature. Only transcendental consciousness is capable of identifying the imperceptible, lawful orders of the two domains. The capacity that it employs to do so, Kant calls *reflecting judgment* or "the capacity for thinking of the particular as contained under the universal."¹⁶²

Reflecting judgment is the quintessential capacity of thought that processes perceptible *particulars* by means of the system of imperceptible *universals*. Universals are not directly given in the particulars, but are deducible as imperceptible *functions* of

160. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 174.

161. Kant, *Anweisung* Olms ed.: 123 (see 13). See 20, n. 3.: the discussion of 'wit' and the 'capacity of judgment'.

162. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 179.

the appearances.¹⁶³ 'Freedom' for Kant means the individual's *autonomous freedom* as both a freedom-from nature and a freedom-for¹⁶⁴ in the sense of the freedom to initiate events that nature is incapable of accomplishing on its own. In short, *the unification of freedom and nature according to Kant is an intellectual function, not an ultimate causality or substance*. It is the function that is able to seek out the imperceptible concept (and the schema of concepts) that make understanding of phenomena and responsible agency in the world possible.

In addition to 'freedom-from' that is so central to Hegel's/Strauß' definition of 'freedom', Kant calls *autonomous freedom*¹⁶⁵ a 'freedom-for' intentionally accomplishing things that nature on its own could never accomplish.¹⁶⁶ The term autonomy comes from the Greek, *αὐτόνομος*, and literally means 'living by one's own laws.' Kant writes in the *Groundwork* that "[...] the will is not merely subject to the law but so subject to the law in that the will is also self-selecting [*selbstgesetzgebend*] of the law, and for that reason the will is subject to the law (for which the will can take itself to be the initiator [*Urheber*]) in the first place."¹⁶⁷ (emphasis added) This formulation is ambiguous. However, in the *Metaphysics of Morals* Kant is explicit: There is a difference between establishing 'obligation' and being the actual 'creator' of the law.

Kant writes in the *Metaphysics of Morals* that "[...] the legislator (*Gesetzgeber*) is the author of [...] obligation, but not always the creator of the law."¹⁶⁸ In other words, Kant distinguishes between *categorical* and *hypothetical* obligation. A categorical imperative is a moral 'obligation.' Hypothetical imperatives are heteronomous rules and norms. The former are universal, the latter are concerned with particular (self-interested) goals. Were the individual the 'author of the law' and not merely the 'author of obligation', the law would be arbitrary [NOTE: This is Hegel's ground for dismissing Kant's moral teaching. Hegel, obviously, didn't read the *Metaphysics of Morals*]. Furthermore, Kant says that the 'ultimate' author of the law ('God') only has rights [commandments] and no duties' [obligations]. The 'ultimate' author of the law is no heteronomous author of the individual's self-selected obligation. Kant writes:

A law (a morally practical one) is a proposition containing a categorical imperative ([universal] commandment [unlike a hypothetical imperative, which is concerned with particular goals]). The commander (imperans) [not the creator!] of a law is the legislator (*Gesetzgeber/legislator*). He [*the legislator/Gesetzgeber*] is the author (*Autor*) of the obligation according to the law, but not always the author of the law. In the latter case, the law

163. On Kant's notion of concepts as functional relationalities, see the "Foreword:" 20, n. 3; Chapter 5: "Traces of an Intellectual Crisis:" 575, n. 54; and Chapter 6: "Grand Narratives of Theoretical Reason:" 709, n. 204.

164. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 581.

165. See above: "III) Freedom is only Freedom-from for Strauß 186:" 759 ff.

166. See *Critique of Pure Reason* B 580.

167. Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 431.

168. Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 227.

would be positive (coincidental) and arbitrary. The law that a priori and unconditionally binds us through our own reason can also be expressed as arising from the will of a supreme lawgiver, that is, one who has only rights and no duties (hence the divine will), which, however, only means the idea of a moral being whose will is law for all without thinking of him as the author of that law.¹⁶⁹ (emphasis added)

In contrast to Hegel, according to Kant, nature is not 'free' but is governed by the necessity of 'hypothetical,' mechanical laws.¹⁷⁰ However, even when it comes to understanding of 'freedom-from,' Kant's *autonomous freedom* is a *finite, eminent, intentional* causal agency of 'freedom-for' that involves more than Strauß'/Hegel's definition of freedom, which they define in terms of what is an (empty) logic of 'negation' that establishes individuation among things and over against human institutions, which, ultimately, is all derived from the *infinite*, eminent, even if not intentional, causality of Absolute Spirit driven by logical 'negation'. For his part, Kant acknowledges the creative role of God as *Noumenon*, but radically reins in its predicates not because he knows what the divine *Noumenon* can and cannot do but because of the limits to reason. Ignoring those limits attributes anthropomorphic predicates literally to God. However, when it comes to humanity's freedom, he takes the far broader perspective not merely of freedom-from but also of freedom-for that constitutes 'autonomous' freedom's freedom-to intentionally initiate sequences of events that mechanical nature left on its own could never accomplish.¹⁷¹ Kant's freedom-for is the (one?) place in the natural order that is not determined by the 'blind', 'mechanical' causality of nature on its own. Kant's *autonomous freedom*, then, is 'above' nature (as freedom-from) but (as freedom-for) never separable from nature's mechanical causality.¹⁷² Praxis consists of autonomous freedom combined with empirical laws.¹⁷³

Kant's autonomous freedom is neither won by conquering animal instincts and human passions and self-interest nor concerned with the self's independence from state and cultural institutions. As the capacity *intentionally* to initiate sequences of events that nature cannot accomplish on its own, it is an indelible and inalienable

169. *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 227 (in the CUP translation as AA VI: [222–223] & inserted after AA VI: 214)

170. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 280.

171. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 713: "When [...] reason is itself regarded as the determining cause (in freedom), [...] we have to proceed as if we had before us an object, not of the senses, but of the pure understanding. In this practical sphere the conditions are no longer in the series of appearances; they can be posited outside the series, and the series of states can therefore be regarded as if it had an absolute beginning, through an intelligible cause."

172. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 827: "[...] it is a necessary rule of the speculative employment of reason [that we] not pass over natural causes, and abandoning that in regard to which we can be instructed by experience, to deduce something which we know from something which entirely transcends all our [possible] knowledge."

173. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 828.

capacity (a 'right'¹⁷⁴) that establishes the 'dignity'¹⁷⁵ and 'absolute worth'¹⁷⁶ of the individual regardless of gender, sexual orientation, race, clan/tribe/national identity, religious (or non-religious) affiliation, age, etc. Autonomous freedom, in short, cannot be 'won'; it is possessed as a species marker, which humanity holds to a degree unlike any other species we have ever encountered.

It is difficult to believe that a Hegel or Strauß could have seriously engaged Kant and failed to encounter this central theme of autonomous 'freedom-for' *intentional agency in contrast to their own 'freedom-from' 'sensuous things'* established by a 'logic of negation' or achieved by the annulment of the phenomenal world by the Second Negation."

The theme of freedom is no insignificant element in Kant's work. Already acknowledged as the key ingredient in his earliest writings,¹⁷⁷ one finds the distinction between a negative freedom-from and a positive freedom-for in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (B 581). Kant speaks of two kinds of causality: nature and creative freedom (B 560). The causality of nature is conditional whereas the causality of freedom is unconditional (B 446–447).¹⁷⁸ Section III of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* can be read as Kant's 'ode to freedom.' The *Critique of Practical Reason* is concerned with freedom as the ground of morality precisely because it is an unconditional causality for which the individual must self-select (but not create) the moral laws to govern its application.¹⁷⁹ Furthermore, the third, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* establishes *reflecting judgment* (the search for an organizing universal to an otherwise

174. Otfried Höffe calls it the key to the 'one right by birth.' See Otfried Höffe, "14. Das eine angeborene Recht" in *Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*: 236–251.

175. See Kant, *Groundwork*: AA IV: 434–435.

176. See Kant, *Groundwork*: AA IV: 449–450.

177. See for example, Kant, "A New Exposition of the First Principles of Metaphysical Knowledge" AA I: 399–405.

178. This is a crucial difference that establishes the distinction between 'hypothetical' imperatives of technical skills and the pursuit of pragmatic self-interest (e.g., training for a profession) and 'categorical' imperatives of practical reason. On the distinction between hypothetical imperatives (technical and pragmatic) and categorical imperatives, see *Groundwork* AA IV: 414–421. See as well, Section "VII [Internal] Ethical Duties are of Wide Obligation, whereas [External] Duties of Right are of Narrow Obligation" in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, AA VI: 390–391. Kant distinguished between "narrower" (unrelenting, *unnachlasslichen*) and "broader" (meritorious, *verdienstlichen*) duty already in the *Groundwork* AA IV: 424.

179. In this second *Critique*, Kant establishes already in the "Preface" the centrality of creative, autonomous freedom-from nature as the reason for (the *ratio essendi*) moral principles. See *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 4* and especially the distinction between freedom as the *ratio essendi* of the moral law whereas the moral law is the basis for knowing (*ratio cognoscendi*) of autonomous freedom (AA V: 4*). Kant is clear that moral principles as the *ratio cognoscendi* of autonomous freedom do not constitute a proof of autonomous freedom. As a cause, finite, eminent, autonomous freedom is an *a priori* synthetic judgment that, as with the case of the Noumenon as a infinite, eminent freedom, is incapable of proof or disproof. What transcendental consciousness can do is provide a 'defense' of autonomous freedom on the basis of what is required not to *explain* reality but to *understand* and exercise responsible agency in a world of phenomena. See Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 459.

chaotic set of phenomena) as the 'bridge' that connects *the two systems of causal understanding* (not a bridging of a Hegelian, dualistic subjective-object structured abstract truth/concrete actuality).¹⁸⁰

More is at stake here with Kant's notion of *autonomous freedom* than Hegel and Strauß have begun to imagine. Kant's perspective is broader because it includes transcendental consciousness' *non-zero sum, open-endedness of creativity in the midst of nature's mechanical causality* that acknowledges the unique *importance of virtue in history*.

Strauß' and Hegel's view of history from the perspective of Absolute Spirit is a perspective of indifference toward the particularities of history. Their response to the injustices of persecution, oppression, and exploitation and non-virtuous behavior is that they are annulled (*Aufgehoben*) by Absolute Spirit – in effect, they never *truly* happened. 'Truth' for Hegel and the early Strauß consists in the emanation and influx of Absolute Spirit, not the mere representations/appearances that are the particularities of history.

IV) Evil as a Causality:

According to Hegel, 'evil' is an issue of sense perception (*sinnliche Anschauung*, sensuousness) with the realm in which moral duty is to be fulfilled limiting finite consciousness. Evil is overcome only through 'the point of indifference' that is the final negation of sensuousness and elevation to Absolute Spirit and Absolute Freedom beyond sensuousness:

The pure concept [Absolute Spirit] [...] or infinity as the abyss of nothingness in which all being sinks, has to replace the infinite pain, which before had only a historical form as the feeling upon which the religion of our day is based – *the feeling: God himself is dead* (that which was, as it were, only empirically expressed with Pascal's expressions: "la nature est telle qu'elle marque partout un Dieu perdu et dans l'homme et hors de l'homme"["Nature is such that everywhere, both in man and outside of man, points to a lost God (and to the corruption of nature)"], *purely as a moment, but also not as more than a moment of the highest Idea*, and thus giving a philosophical existence to what was also, for instance, either moral prescription of a sacrifice of the empirical being or the concept of formal abstraction, and *thus giving philosophy the idea of Absolute Freedom and thus giving, as well, absolute suffering or speculative Good Friday, which was otherwise historical, and restore it Itself in all the truth and harshness of its godlessness, out of which [...] the highest totality can and must arise in all its seriousness and from its deepest depths, at the same time all-embracing and in the most cheerful freedom of its form.*¹⁸¹ (emphasis added)

180. See "IV. On Judgment as an *a priori* Legislative Faculty" in the "Introduction" to the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 179–181.

181. Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen:" GW II: 432–433.

Already in "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity" of 1838, Strauß no longer employs the Hegelian 'gnostic' teaching of circularity (emanation and influx)¹⁸² as the ultimate goal of history which treats history with the disdain of Indifferentism. Consequently, Strauß wrestled with the problem of evil in the *Glaubenslehre*. If the Christian faith is not the overcoming of evil (either by means of the 'sacrifice' of God's son to achieve the forgiveness of sin or by elevation of finite spirit to infinity beyond the evil of the world), one is confronted with evil as an inescapable aspect of historical experience.

In the second volume of the *Glaubenslehre* of 1841, Strauß turns to Jakob Böhme for a theodicy that views 'evil' as itself a necessary negation that drives life and moral progress as an open-ended historical process of the human species. Humanity is a creature in and of history, and the successes, failures, and suffering of history are essential (not merely accidental) to humanity. *Individual human consciousness is the 'place' of self-awareness, no longer the location of Hegel's 'Idea of the Race' where the infinite is recognized in the finite.*

Having since 1835 come to agree with Baur that Hegel's circular metaphysics is Gnostic,¹⁸³ Strauß draws on Böhme in the second volume of the *Glaubenslehre* to articulate what Strauß now takes to be an account of theodicy independent of Hegel's meta-narrative of Double Negation (the 'cunning of reason'). Although Böhme speaks of the goal of historical life to be an absorption again in the eternal peace of the one divine will out of which all things¹⁸⁴ have come, Strauß already as the conclusion of the *Glaubenslehre* spoke of this 'eternal peace' as the grasp if the infinite in every moment.¹⁸⁵ This can be read as a hint that the emphasis is on 'every *historical* moment as a indissoluble link in the eternity of history.

182. On Hegel's 'Gnostic emanation and influx,' see, Chapter 7: "Practical Reason Elevates Theoretical Reason:" n. 48.

183. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 500–501.

184. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 379–380.

185. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 738–739. Here he cites Schleiermacher's *On Religion* as the source of this aphorism. Thirty years later, in *Der alte und der neue Glaube*, this 'infinity' is taken in the sense of the 'totality' of nature, not as with Schleiermacher a 'feeling of absolute dependence' much less Hegel's Absolute Spirit. Schleiermacher wrote in *On Religion*: 101: "It is not the immortality that is outside of time, behind it, or rather after it, and which still is in time. It is the immortality which we can now have in this temporal life; it is the problem in the solution of which we are for ever to be engaged. In the midst of finitude to be one with the Infinite and in every moment to be eternal is the immortality of religion." However, in *Der alte und der neue Glaube* the issue is not immortality but 'perfection'. See *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 223: "If we know that every collection of elements in the universe, such as the life of our earth, achieves its purpose in higher and higher manifestations, but its purpose is present in itself in every moment, then the latter applies exclusively to the universe as an infinite whole. *The universe is neither more perfect in any following moment than in the preceding one, nor vice versa.* There is in it no such difference at all between earlier and later, because in it all stages and phases of development and re-development, of ascending and descending, becoming and passing away exist next to each other and complement each other infinitely." (emphasis added)

In the *Glaubenslehre*, Strauß came to Böhme over Spinoza. The problem that Böhme aided Strauß in resolving was that raised by Spinoza's having taken 'substance' to be a 'rigid death'¹⁸⁶ with no genuine development. However, Strauß found in Böhme a logic of negation that drives linear history (not Hegel's Gnostic circularity of emanation/influx on the part of Absolute Spirit). Furthermore, in Schleiermacher he found a logic that avoided the contradiction of Spinoza's claim that, on the one hand, all actuality comes from God whereas, on the other hand, God is not the origin of evil. What is attributable to God, according to Schleiermacher, is free-acting sensual power and God-consciousness, not sin. Sin arises because of 'the weakness' of God-consciousness, and, although certainly arranged by God, this weakness is neither sin itself nor evil, but a driving force 'forward' to the good.¹⁸⁷

Strauß finds in Böhme, long before Hegel's circular logic of negation of the meta-narrative that is Absolute Spirit, the logic of negation that he takes to constitute linear-historical creation. Böhme provides Strauß with an account of linear creation that *affirms the open-endedness and significance/meaning of history* in contrast to Hegel's Indifferentism as the arena in which the cunning of reason governs the significance and meaning of history. Strauß quotes from Böhme:

It is a highest requirement of a person – J. Böhme says – that he [*sic.*] learns to understand, how he is constituted such that good and evil drives come from him; as well, how or in what way *evil is found* in the devil, humans, and all creatures because such aversion is found in all things in that everything bites, beats, pushes, crushes, and creates enemies and there is a repugnancy in all creatures. Every such body is in conflict with itself, which is not only the case in living things but also in stars, elements, earth, stones, metal, foliage, grass, and wood. There is poison and malice in everything. He must also discover that it must be so. Otherwise, there would be neither life nor movement, neither stain nor virtue, thick or thin, or any kind of perception, but everything would be a Nothing. One finds by means of this elevated reflection that this all comes from God, that it is His own essence, which He Himself is, and that He created it Himself out of Himself: *evil belongs to development and movement, and good to love, and harshness and stubbornness to joy*.¹⁸⁸ (emphasis added)

Strauß continues quoting from Böhme regarding evil:

A thing that is good in itself has no torment, desires nothing because it doesn't know anything better in or for itself, which it could desire. [...] [W]e [can] say of a good divine will [...], that He is incapable of desiring internally because He has nothing in or for Itself that could give Him something and could lead Him out of Himself in differentiation [...] by which an offensiveness could occur in what was emanated through which the good would be perceived, effective, and desired in evil. Therefore, conflict and fear, caused entirely by the mind as reflection and personal desire of reflection [...] shatter into pieces,

186. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 383.

187. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 383.

188. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 379. Strauß footnotes to Böhme, *Von drei Principien*, Vorr. 13 f. McG: This is called making a virtue out of vice.

and out of the torment of disgust and conflict, arising out of fear, wants to be absorbed again in the eternal peace of the one divine will out of which they have come.¹⁸⁹

Strauß comments:

In this respect Böhme [although he died eight years before Spinoza's birth] has already progressed beyond Spinoza. As a start, most offensive with respect to Spinozianism [...] is that evil and good remain unchallenged as peacefully lying side by side with each having its rightful place: What, above all, is required is the animating of this dead mass as a process in which the unequal worth of evil is placed over against good and in which evil in a real sense is condemned. Over against Spinoza's rigid tranquility, in J. Böhme we find not only generally everything in fermenting movement but also here especially a process of real negation of evil initiated. *Evil exists solely for the purpose of driving itself out, of abolishing itself. The one, absolute life must manifest itself in particular centers in order to return to itself; but it can return to itself only insofar as it is driven back into itself out of these particularities that are initially its going outside of itself.*¹⁹⁰

Strauß claims that this is what one finds, when properly understood, in Hegel:

Hegelian philosophy articulates the same thing. As certain as it is that the absolute identity of the Idea is mediated as self-affirmation by means of the negation of its negation of an absolute distinction over against Itself, hence an absolute negativity: it is just as certain and necessary that *evil is established by means of the good*. However, *insofar as the first negation must lead to the second in order that the self-identity of the Idea as an absolute affirmation be achieved, evil is both necessary and simultaneously determined to be that which should not be: not that the rupture (Entzweiung) not occur but that it should be subsequently annulled (aufgehoben).*¹⁹¹ [This annulment, I showed above, occurs as the 'cunning of reason' regardless of, or despite, conscious awareness.¹⁹²]

Strauß comments:

Here, the reality of evil [as an idea] is no longer separated from its possibility because *good and the desire for actuality depend upon precisely the actual feeling and consciousness of evil as well as physical suffering*. This stands in contrast to the earlier perspective [of "The Moral View of the World"?!] in which evil was admitted out of consideration for [sensuous/sinnliche] freedom and humanity's moral nature [above sensuousness/Sinnlichkeit]

189. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II, 379–380. Strauß footnotes to Böhme, *Von göttlicher Beschaulichkeit*, 1, 13 ff.

190. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 380–381.

191. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 381. Strauß footnotes to Hegel, "Rechtsphilos., pp. 185 ff."

192. Hegel's account in "The Moral View of the World" maintains that only grace can conquer evil (the imperfect consequences of ethics). Having rejected the notion of a Personal God outside of history who dispenses grace to overcome human sin, Hegel's own cunning of reason, anchored in a circular, logic of negation as a meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit, reduces the pain and suffering of history to indifference.

and the demand that, with the maintenance of humanity's moral nature, God ought to prevent evil.¹⁹³

For Böhme evil necessarily governs linear history even as he acknowledges the goal of being "absorbed again in the eternal peace of the one divine will out of which they have come." Strauß took Böhme's account of history to be superior over-against Spinoza's substance (and one may add Hegel's Absolute Spirit) of 'rigid death.' *There is a general necessity that life requires defect in order to be life, and the good requires evil in order for there to be an awareness of good.* History is not a matter of indifference but the necessary condition for the achievement of good. History is required for humanity to be human. In contrast to Hegel, the goal of life is to be human, not to become God.

Sovereignty over the world itself [...] is [...] not the determination of world events by means of an understanding outside of the world but is to be taken as the sovereignty over cosmic forces and their relationships to one another by an immanent reason. That humanity's skill possessed by peoples and individuals is subordinate to the guidance of providence can only mean that, given the general overlapping of spirit and nature, the development of humanity occurs for the most part under spirit's concepts, and *the accidentalness of individual acts and natural events always is balanced out by general necessity.*¹⁹⁴ However, *the individual can never be put in a situation in which her/his internal spirit is not in control and incapable of processing the circumstance in a unique configuration worthy of her/him.*¹⁹⁵ (emphasis added)

Neither Autonomous Freedom nor Evil in Themselves are Determining Causes in Kant

Whereas Böhme, Schleiermacher, and Hegel take evil to be ultimately positive because it is a causal force that drives the physical universe and the individual onward to the 'good,' this logic of negation that leads to good has nothing to do with Kant's notion of 'radical evil' in *Religion*. F.C. Baur and Daub take the 'principle of evil' in Kant to be ineradicably and inescapably determining of even Kant's notion of autonomous

193. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 381.

194. Note: Necessity here is taken in the sense of the "Principle of Sufficient Reason" (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*) κατ' ἀλήθειαν (according to truth). Necessity, when it comes to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, is what 'must be the case' in order to cause something to occur; otherwise, something could come from nothing! The term 'necessity' here is not Kant's notion of necessity as a 'wager of faith' in the conditions of possibility for humanity to be a creating, responsible agent κατ' ἀνθρώπον (that is, in accordance with the limits to human understanding). On the distinction between κατ' ἀλήθειαν and κατ' ἀνθρώπον, see the *Critique of Pure Reason* AA III, B 767–768.

195. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 383–384. In *Der alte und der neue Glaube*, as I present below (see "A bottom-up Grand Narrative of Materialism:" 627 ff.), Strauß says explicitly that in humanity nature seeks to understand itself. In other words, Strauß no longer speaks of Absolute Spirit wanting to achieve knowledge of Itself through humanity.

freedom.¹⁹⁶ However Kant's 'evil principle' is not to be imagined (*vorgestellt*) as a determining, innate capacity (*Anlage*) from birth as inescapably ontological¹⁹⁷ like Augustine's claim with respect to original sin. Although a both good and evil are capacities possessed since birth, neither freedom nor evil is ontologically determining on its own of the individual.

In *Religion*,¹⁹⁸ Kant calls both evil, as well as the good¹⁹⁹ an 'inclination'²⁰⁰ (*Hang*). In his *Menschenkunde oder philosophische Anthropologie*, he articulates more precisely his meaning of the word '*Hang*' and employs the Latin '*penchant*' (leaning, liking) to indicate *that both good and evil are always a "possibility," acquired, and "brought by the human being upon himself."*²⁰¹ Radical evil, then, is an 'indwelling principle [possibility, not a fact] alongside the good.' He writes in *Religion*, as well: "Whenever we, therefor, say, 'The human being is by nature good,' or 'He is by nature evil,' this only means that he holds within himself a first ground (to us inscrutable) [of autonomous freedom] for the adoption of good or evil (unlawful) principles [...]"²⁰²

196. For a Hegelian reading of Kant's evil principle as original sin, see in Chapter 8: "Strauß' Reading of Kant Over His Career:" "Kant's Internal Contradictions according to Daub" 856 ff. For F.C. Baur's reading of Kant's evil principle as original sin, see the "Introduction:" 79, n. 11. Baur writes of Kant's notion of evil that it "[...] precedes every use of freedom given in experience, and is ingrained in man as a natural inclination which itself corrupts the root of all particular evil principles and actions, the supreme subjective cause of all principles." Baur, *Versöhnung* II: 575–576.

197. On the 20th C reading of Kant's notion of 'radical evil' as ontologically determining of humanity, see McGaughey, "What is 'Radical' Evil? A Reading of Ricoeur on Kant and Religion" at <https://critcalidealism.org/ricoeur-on-radical-evil-and-kant/>.

198. Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 28–29.

199. Overlooked by too many readers, the very title of "Part One" of *Religion* establishes that for Kant the evil and good principles are 'alongside,' one another as options for autonomous freedom. The title is: "Part One: Concerning the indwelling of the evil principle alongside the good or of the radical evil in human nature." After the 'or,' Kant leaves it to the reader to supply 'of the radical good in human nature'. This is surely part of Kant's strategy to obtain approval from the state censors for the publication of this work on religion. He knew that they would read his text without applying 'reflecting judgment' – only take what Kant means to be established by the Christian tradition's conclusions of re-produced judgment.

200. CUP translates '*Hang*' as 'propensity', which implies that it is an innate, inescapable, ontological condition that, specifically and permanently, determines humanity as 'radically evil'.

201. In the *Menschenkunde*, Kant is clear that the only thing 'permanent' about '*Hang*' is that it always remains a possibility, never a pre-determined fact. '*Hang*' is defined by its 'object' (it does not predetermine the relationship to the object), 'does not prevail in a lasting way', and 'can be prevented'. Furthermore, Kant distinguishes among 'desire' (*Neigung*), 'inclination' (*Hang*), and 'instinct' (*Instinkt*) and explicitly says that an inclination (*Hang*) is nothing permanent (and, therefore, has nothing to do with Augustine of Hippo's novel notion of 'original sin'): "Desire (*Neigung*) arises only from acquaintance with the object for which nature has given us the inclination (*Hang*). Inclination can be prevented that it does not become desire (*Neigung*) [...]. Between inclination (*Hang*) and desire (*Neigung*), one can place instinct (*Instinkt*). Inclination (*Hang*) is not a prevailing desire (*Neigung*), but a desire (*Neigung*) that arises in an opportunity, which does not prevail in any lasting way [...]" Kant, *Menschenkunde* XXV,2: 1112; Olms ed.: 299–300.

202. Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 21.

Kant's claim that humanity is essentially 'good' is not an ontological claim that the morally 'radical' good dominates over the morally 'radically' evil of humanity (no more than the morally 'radically' evil dominates over the morally 'radically' good). Autonomous freedom must always and already precede every choice between a 'morally' good or a 'morally' evil principle that confronts, consciously or unconsciously, the individual every time s/he gives her-/himself permission to act.²⁰³

The 'innate goodness' of humanity 'remains inexplicable' because it is the capacity (*Anlage*) of autonomous freedom, which as an *a priori* pure idea of reason is incapable of proof or disproof²⁰⁴ although it is capable of defense:²⁰⁵ "[...] [T]he original capacity [*Anlage* of freedom] (which none other than the human being himself could have corrupted, if this corruption is to be imputed to him) is an asset to everyone [*eine Anlage zum Guten*]."²⁰⁶ (Parentheses come from Kant) Kant explicitly adds:

Humanity is created good, this can only mean nothing more than: He [*sic.*] had been created for the good and the original capacity (*Anlage*) is [an amoral] good; humanity is not thereby good as such but brings it about that he becomes either good or evil, according as he either incorporates or does not incorporate into his principles the incentives contained in that capacity (*Anlage*) (and this must be left entirely to his free choice).²⁰⁷

Kant underscores: "[...] we must presuppose in all this that there is still a germ of goodness left in its entire purity, a germ that cannot be extirpated or corrupted."²⁰⁸ It is not good 'by moral choice' but *amorally* good. In fact, neither 'radical evil' nor 'radical good' in themselves are moral. Autonomous freedom, and 'radical evil' as well as 'radical good' are morally 'good,' but *amorally* good: without the capacity (*Anlage*) of autonomous freedom and the inclination (*Hang*) to invoke an evil or good maxim to give ourselves permission to act, we could not be transcendental consciousness. We would only be able to act by instinct, or we would be mechanical automatons.

In other words, neither 'radical evil' nor 'radical good' are themselves causal, according to Kant. The causality of morality is deeper than either evil or good principles. It is the causality of autonomous freedom.

203. See Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 35: "[...] the relation of the free power of choice (the concept of which is not empirical) must be cognized *a priori* from the concept of evil [... maxims]" as well as *a priori* from the concept of good principles. Hence, it is a 'good asset' for everyone.

204. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 586.

205. See Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 459.

206. Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 43. It is 'good' that humanity possesses autonomous freedom because without it humanity cannot be what it is. However, this is neither a *morally determining* goodness nor is the 'good' an objective goal. Rather, it is an 'asset for everyone' because it is the 'ground' of autonomous, creative freedom-from and freedom-for without which there can be no assumption of personal responsibility for one's agency. Hence, it is a 'good asset' (capacity, *Anlage*) for everyone.

207. Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 44.

208. Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 45.

V) Moral Consequentialism:

The themes of human perfectibility and material progress provide a framework for discerning not only the trajectory of Strauß' metaphysical odyssey but also his understanding of ethics. In the *LJ* of 1835, the traditional Personal Theism theme of perfectibility by means of atonement in terms of the issue of personal sins is replaced by the Hegelian point of indifference of the Second Negation by Spirit that escapes the pain and suffering of this life. We can see the decline of this theory of atonement, though, within a couple of years of the *LJ* as Strauß seeks an alternative metaphysics. What remains constant as of "The Transient and Permanent in Christianity" is the increasing significance of ethics in his understanding of religion. In 1838, Jesus is a 'religious genius' of internal, rational harmony and unsurpassable, if not exclusive, moral teacher. The metaphysical harmony of reason in the universe is retained in 1841 with the *Glaubenslehre*. In 1864 with the *LJEGP*, the 'religion of Jesus' is replaced by the 'religion of humanity,' that is, with history constituting the framework of religion and with the recognition that Jesus as a moral teacher is surpassable because there are crucial moral themes that he never addressed. This results in Strauß' emphasis on moral improvement as an issue of the species in acknowledgement that the individual is and remains ethically imperfect – the ethical theme from Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" that Strauß retains throughout his career.

With *The Old and the New Faith* of 1872, however, we are confronted with the full product of the importance of history for Strauß and the seed of his materialist shift planted in 1838. Strauß' *new faith* (not knowledge) in 1872, which, rather than finite consciousness constituting the inward turn to Absolute Spirit as the 'point of indifference,' now conceives humanity as the point where nature (not Absolute Spirit) turns inward on itself' to continue its creative advance. Strauß retains his ethical pessimism here by acknowledging the unattainability of individual moral perfection, but he stresses the importance of individual ethical effort *for the sake of the species*. The individual cannot be an individual without society so that the influence of the species on the individual assumes moral weight. The species is what grounds moral improvement and saves the notion of moral improvement from being merely an 'empty abstraction.' The species with its capacity to discern ever new moral principles as a consequence of its ever changing historical context(s) *combined with* the communal influence on the individual's agency becomes the historical location of moral improvement.

When it comes to the perfectibility of humanity, a clear shift is discernable within the common thread that 'sensuousness' is the fundamental 'problem for humanity that drives the search for its solution. Strauß' *LJ* of 1835 is concerned with 'spiritual' perfectibility by means of his universal, inclusive Christology that leads to Absolute Knowledge and divinization beyond sensuousness.

In the *LJ*, Strauß asserts that Christology is 'not in the mind alone,'²⁰⁹ but it is the 'idea of the race as "the infinite manifesting itself in the finite and finite spirit remembering its infinitude" in history'²¹⁰ *One cannot achieve ethical perfection (understood as Hegel formulates it in "The Moral View of the World" as consequentialism), but one can achieve Absolute Knowledge and the Absolute Freedom of Absolute Spirit*, again, as a conscious experience in history²¹¹ 'Salvation' is acquiring knowledge of Absolute Spirit. Salvation is a matter of theoretical, not practical reason.

As part of his *inclusive* Christology formulation in the *LJ*, Strauß claims:

Humanity is the union of the two natures—God become man, the infinite manifesting itself in the finite, and the finite spirit remembering its infinitude. It is the child of the visible Mother and the invisible Father, Nature and Spirit [...] It is sinless existence, for the course of its development is a blameless one, *pollution cleaves to the individual only, and does not touch the race or its history*. It is Humanity that dies, rises, and ascends to heaven, for from the negation of its phenomenal life there ever proceeds a higher spiritual life; from the suppression of its mortality as a personal, national, and terrestrial spirit, arises its union with the infinite spirit of the heavens [...] [B]y the kindling within him of the idea of Humanity, the individual *man participates in the divinely human life of the species*.²¹² Now the main element of that idea is, that the negation of the merely natural and sensual life, which is itself the negation of the spirit (the negation of negation, therefore), is the sole way to true spiritual life.²¹³ (emphasis added)

209. F.C. Baur writes: "For Kantian religion itself, regardless of all antipathy against Judaism, is only a religion of the law because it (in accordance with the essence of the law) can never overcome [*aufheben*] the contradiction between the individual with her/his moral 'should', and also, as long as the Savior disappears into an unachievable distant future of an ideal, [Kant's religion] leaves the divine and human as never arriving at a unity." Baur, *Gnosis*: 667–668. These themes of an unachievable 'should' and achievement of the unity of the divine and human are Hegelian. Baur is a Hegelian, and his criticism of Hegel is a matter of Christology, not theology or anthropology. Baur accuses Hegel of ignoring history whereas Baur views Christology as all those individuals (the 'body of Christ') who in the infinite open-endedness of history recognize the unity of finite and infinite Spirit in themselves as the God/Man. See Baur, *Gnosis*: 721; see as well, 736, n. 34 (actually 738).

210. Strauß, *LJ*: 780.

211. In "On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity" three years after the *LJ*, Strauß continues to place humanity's consciousness at the pinnacle of reality based on reason's ability to grasp the 'infinite' in the 'finite' in history, however, *without the denial or 'overcoming' of history as with Hegel*. In the *Glaubenslehre* of 1841, Strauß is still clinging to the anthropomorphic grounding of religion in a human capacity: reason. However, his engagement of Feuerbach and co., though, undermined that ground of anthropomorphic projection and focus on the exceptional role of consciousness and reason, and it took him twenty years before attempting another formulation of 'religion' in *LJEGP* of 1864.

212. This can be labelled an 'Arian' Christology. Strauß writes two pages earlier: "the believer, finding himself environed with the conditions of nature, must, like Christ, do to nature – but only inwardly, as Christ did outwardly, – must spiritually crucify himself and be buried with Christ, so far as the virtual suppression of his own instinctiveness [*Aufhebung der Natürlichkeit*], he may become, in so far as he is a spirit, identical with himself, and participate in the bliss and glory of Christ." Strauß, *LJ*: 778.

213. Strauß, *LJ*: 780.

Here, one sees that the Christological issue for Strauß is *not* a solution to the *negative* failure of the individual's sin but the *positive*, 'divinization' or 'elevation' of humanity into Absolute Spirit achieved by finite consciousness. This can occur, Strauß maintains, because '*pollution cleaves to the individual only, and does not touch the race or its history*.' In other words, in the *LJ*, humanity is 'ontologically' 'pure' because it is inseparable from Absolute Spirit. Christianity is not concerned with the ethical perfection of the individual but with a development of spiritual awareness (gnosis) in the species.

In the *LJ*, Strauß insists that Kant's moral religion of 'practical reason' is concerned only with individual, moral improvement, not spiritual enlightenment.

Science (Speculative Metaphysics²¹⁴) has perceived that to convert ideas simply into an obligatory possibility [e.g., *Moralität*], to which no reality [Being (*Sein*)] corresponds, is in fact to annihilate them; just as it would be to render the infinite finite, [were one] to represent it as that which lies beyond the finite. Science has conceived that the infinite has its existence in the alternate production and extinction of the finite [e.g., *Sittlichkeit*]; that the idea is realized only in the entire series of its manifestations; that nothing can come into existence which does not already essentially exist; and, therefore, that it is not to be required of man, that he should reconcile himself with God, and assimilate his sentiments to the divine, unless this reconciliation and this assimilation are already virtually effected [divinization].²¹⁵

Reconciliation with God in 1835 is an issue of epistemology (consciousness), not morality. Because the Christ is an 'ideal,' reconciliation does not need, and even rejects the claim of, an exclusive, historical event to establish, much less prove, its possibility.

Having given up on the Hegelian meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit within three years of the publication of the *LJ*, he attempts an alternative understanding of 'spiritual perfectibility' of consciousness by the writing of "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity" of 1838.²¹⁶ Here, the ultimate achievement of humanity is 'God-consciousness,' not in the Schleiermachiian sense of 'perfect God-consciousness' anchored in the 'feeling of absolute dependence,' but with respect to the role of reason in history expressed by the notion of immortality as the experience of 'the eternal in every moment.' This intellectual/spiritual moment of humanity's capacity to grasp the infinite in the finite, the eternal 'harmony' within the 'chaos' of history is retained, however increasingly fading, down to *The Old and the New Faith* of 1872. Strauß' final religious formulation was a faith in nature (that is, the material order of history). Nature eclipses consciousness, which, in turn, is only a product of, and (even unintentional) contributor to, nature's historical development.

214. 'Science' here is the system of Absolute Knowledge that is the 'new' Speculative Metaphysics of Hegelianism.

215. Strauß, *LJ*: 776–777.

216. See in Chapter 5: "Traces of an Intellectual Crisis" the section "1838 "On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity" 216 ff.

However, in addition to the formulation of the perfectibility of humanity spiritually/intellectually, there is an accompanying, second notion of perfectibility formulated as a 'moral' perfectibility as Strauß wrestles with the 'problem' of sensuousness. In the *LJ*, as I pointed out above, Strauß viewed 'moral perfectibility' of the individual as impossible because 'moral pollution' is tied to the individual. However, moral pollution of the individual constitutes no limitation *for the species* because the species is the point of spiritual liberation from sensuousness. "It is humanity that dies, rises, and ascends to heaven, for from the negation of its phenomena life there ever proceeds a higher spiritual life; from the suppression of its mortality as a personal, national, and terrestrial spirit, arises its union with the infinite spirit of the heavens."²¹⁷

With the *LJEGP* of 1864, Strauß modifies his understanding of 'moral perfectibility' consistent with his understanding of Jesus as a moral teacher among other moral teachers in "On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity" of 1838. In the *LJEGP*, though, the theme of perfectibility of the species is not understood as a 'spiritual liberation from sensuousness' to unity with the godhead as the case in the *LJ* of 1835 but is clearly formulated in terms of the 'moral development of the species' as the location *in history* where new moral principles are formulated in order to govern human agency in its new historical contexts.

In the *LJEGP* of 1864, one can see the influence of the 'turn to Kant' movement among his friends as Strauß employs Kantian vocabulary of the "idea of human perfection" in history in terms of morality (practical reason):

The idea of human perfection, as the case with all ideas, is *initially given to human spirit only as a capacity* [*Anlage*], which receives its formation [McG: that is, actual achievement] gradually through experience. Among different peoples it appears in different designs in accordance with their natural character,²¹⁸ their climatic and historical conditions,

217. Strauß, *LJ*: 780.

218. Here, obviously, Strauß is viewing 'peoples'/'nations' in terms of Hegelian consequentialism. A 'people' and/or a 'religion' manifest Absolute Spirit in form (representations) as a consequence of each 'nation's' and each 'religion's' particularities. In "Schleiermacher und Daub," Strauß summarized Daub's Hegelian understanding of religion as inseparable from a 'people': "Entering into finiteness, religion cannot but be variously determined according to *the different character of the peoples*. The principle: religion enters into a single people is only the reverse of the other principle: a people comes to the consciousness of its supersensible essence (see in this respect [... Daub's]"Essay on Theology and its Encyclopedia," *Studien*, Vol. II: 58 ff.)" Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub": 60 (emphasis added). "A people as a whole, that is, not only the totality of all its members living at the same time, but also of all successive generations, can only ever be religious, because it is one and the same with its religion, as with its higher self-consciousness. However, when it comes to the individual members of a people, this consciousness can be more or less alive, brighter or duller – according to which they are pious or impious, believing or superstitious and unbelieving. In this fashion those particular organs of religion in their public activity can either agree with the people's religion or be opposed to it: and this difference [...] is [...] the difference between orthodoxy and heterodoxy." Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub": 61. See Hegel's discussion of consequentialist, 'absolute ethics' (in contrast to abstract, moral duty) as the 'totality of a people,' that defines a 'nation' in "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 481.

and enables us to observe progress throughout the course of history [...] Every ethically extraordinary person, every great thinker who made the object of his [*sic.*] concern humanity's practical agency contributed in parochial and expansive spheres to revise, supplement, and mold this perfection. *Among these developers of the ideal of humanity we find, unequivocally, Jesus first and foremost [...]* To be sure, *the Christian community originated out of entirely different concerns than the ethical meaning of its founder [...]* However, *the features of patience, mildness, and love of humanity, which Jesus made prominent, have, nonetheless, not been lost. Out of them could germinate and constitute everything that we now call humanity.*²¹⁹ (emphasis added)

Strauß emphasizes that, from the identifiable, historical features of Jesus' ministry, one does not find the full, Spiritual perfection of humanity as the God/Man, a teaching, which pushed Jesus' ethical teaching into the background and subjected "[...] ethical duties that can have validity only in that they lie in the nature of humanity under the erroneous light of positive, divine commandments."²²⁰

For that reason, the critic [...] does a good and necessary task, when he [*sic.*] clears away all that, which turned Jesus into a superhuman being, possibly with good intention and initially even beneficially, but in the course of time is destructive and now downright pernicious delusion and retrieves a picture of the historical Jesus in his simply human features, as best as he is able. However, when it comes to their salvation, the critic refers to the ideal Christ, to that ethical model of which the historical Jesus first brought several main features to light,²²¹ but which, as a capacity [*Anlage*], belongs just as much to the general dowry of our species as its further development and perfection can only be the task and the work of the whole of mankind.²²²

Here in the *LJEGP*, Strauß employs the theme of the perfectibility of humanity that he had formulated in "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity" as a historically natural, ethical project of the species.²²³ In "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity," the pinnacle of the ascending stages of human development is no longer limited to the individual's self-awareness of eternal Spirit (the divine Idea) in humanity but shifts from the 'religion of Jeus' to the 'religion of humanity' as moral advancement with respect to the species.²²⁴

219. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 625.

220. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 627.

221. In other words, Strauß does not claim that Jesus taught 'the' perfect ethical system. In fact, Strauß points out that vital elements of human life are not addressed in the material that we have from Jesus. These include, family life, the economy, art, and the 'good life'. (See *LJEGP*: 626.) In *Der alte und der neue Glaube*, he adds a discussion of national and international politics, social democracy and inequality, voting rights, the death penalty, and the church as a state institution. See section "IV: How do we structure our life?" in *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 225–296.

222. Concluding lines of Strauß' *LJEGP*: 627.

223. See §§ 29 – 31 of "Vergängliches und Bleibendes" (1838): 126–132.

224. See § 28 of "Vergängliches und Bleibendes" (1838): 123–26.

Having acknowledged in Section 99 of his *LJEGP* that there are surely elements to the gospel narratives that give us historical certainties with regard to Jesus of Nazareth, a theme that he embraced unequivocally in "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity," Strauß immediately qualifies here in the *LJEGP* that these certainties a) are few in number and b) they are by no means adequate to establish anything close to certainty about Jesus as miracle worker and the superhuman deeds of his fate as claimed by Church doctrine.²²⁵ In 'our age,' no rebuttal is required that humanity's blessedness depends upon belief in such things as having occurred as historical facts. He then proceeds to emphasize 'blessedness' is a question of 'achievement' (the consequences of agency):

[...] *blessedness* [*Seligkeit*] [...] (or more reasonably expressed, *the possibility that a person achieves the purpose of his* [*sic.*] *implanted abilities and that a person experiences proportionally the corresponding measure of well-being as a consequence*) cannot depend upon [...] knowledge of facts [about the historical Jesus] about which hardly anyone among thousands is able to make a thorough investigation, and even he [*sic.*] is not able to come to any certain conclusion. Rather, *as certain as the fulfilment of human abilities is generally and for each individual achievable, the conditions for that to occur must be satisfied*. That is, all that is external to and prior to the will, which moves itself to achieve its goal, as well as the knowledge of the goal itself *must be given* to the person. *The goal cannot be merely some accidental knowledge derived from external historical facts. It must be a necessary, rational knowledge, which each person can find in himself.*²²⁶ (Strauß' parenthetical comment in the first three lines) (emphasis added)

Astonishingly absent from this definition of 'blessedness' [*Seligkeit*] is the theme of the assumption of moral responsibility for one's personal agency when it comes to achieving one's purpose in life in correlation with one's abilities. His formulation with respect to 'blessedness' as an ideal of moral duty is deliberately linked to its unattainability as an always yet to be attained goal:

Like Spinoza, Kant also distinguished the historical person of Jesus from the ideal, lying in human reason, of humanity pleasing to God, or of the moral disposition in all its purity to the extent possible in a world dependent on needs and inclinations.²²⁷ It is *the general duty of humanity* to rise to this ideal; but although we cannot imagine it otherwise than in the image of a perfect man, and although it is not impossible that such a man once lived, because we should all resemble that ideal, it is not important that we know of the existence of such a man or believe in it, but *only that we hold that ideal before us, recognize it as obligatory for us, and strive to make ourselves like it.*²²⁸ (emphasis added)

225. In *The Old and the New Faith*, Strauß has given up on the attempt to identify the teaching of Jesus much less the writing of a biography of him based on the gospels. See Strauß, *The Old and the New Faith*: 58 (as well, 53) and the "Epilogue": 33–34.

226. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 624.

227. Strauß' nod to Hegel's "The Moral View of the World."

228. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 624.

In fact, Strauß immediately links the realization of the 'ideal' with 'cultural development,' not with individual achievement:

The idea of human perfection, like other ideas, is initially given to the human spirit only as a capacity [*Anlage*], which gradually receives its formation through experience. It shows in different peoples, according to their natural condition, their climatic and historical conditions, a different formation, and lets us notice a progress in the course of history.²²⁹

Elevation to this ideal is a universal human duty, and it now "constitutes the development from the religion of the Christ to the religion of humanity."²³⁰ T

[...] on the front line of educators of the ideal for humanity, one finds Jesus [...] Admittedly, the religious community [i.e., Christianity] went on to be concerned about entirely different things than the ethical meaning of its founder [...] However, the features of patience, leniency, and human love were preserved and are what out of all that has come down to us could germinate what we now call humanity.²³¹

This distinction of the historical Christ from the ideal, that is, the archetype of man that lies in human reason, as he should be, and the transfer of salvific faith from the former to the latter, is the inevitable result of the newer development of the mind; it is the further *development of the religion of Christ into the religion of humanity*, toward which all the nobler endeavors of this time are directed.²³² (emphasis added)

Strauß claims that, in what is portrayed of Jesus in the gospels, there are gaps when it comes to the moral ideal of humanity. Whereas we find "completely developed" the ideal with respect to love of God and one's neighbor, the purity of the heart and mind of the individual, there is no guidance with respect to life in the family (from a teacher who had no family of his own); the relationship of the individual to the state is relegated to passivity; he rejected all concern with finances as well as his own profession; and everything to do with art and appreciation of beauty in life was left completely outside his scope of view.²³³ Strauß insists that "here supplementation is required not only from other cultures but also from other epochs, states, and educational systems [...]"²³⁴

If one ignores in the teaching of Jesus the seeds of the religion of humanity with respect to the moral ideal and concentrates only on him as the exclusive, moral exemplar,

229. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 625.

230. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 626.

231. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 625–626.

232. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 625.

233. See Strauß, *LJEGP*: 626.

234. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 626.

[...] all that upon which everything depends [for the religion of humanity] is pushed to the back row. The ethical significance of Jesus in its complete potency is stunted, including ethical duties, which have legitimacy only in that they lie in the nature of humanity, and placed in a false light. For that reason, the critic [...] performs a good and necessary task when he [sic.] tries, as best as possible to restore the picture of the historical Jesus in its sober human traits and, therefore, eliminates all that which turns Jesus into a superhuman creature, even when initially well intended and originally even beneficial but in the end is detrimental and, today, is poisonous madness. *When it comes to salvation, though, the critic's task is to refer humanity to the ideal Christ, to that ethical model, which the historical Jesus brought to light in many of its main features but whose capacity [Anlage] belongs as much to the endowment of our species [Gattung] as its further improvement and completion can only be the purpose [Aufgabe] and the work of the whole of humanity.*²³⁵ (emphasis added)

The understanding of moral improvement/perfectibility as a concern of the species as the location for the emergence of moral principles, rather than the moral improvement/perfectibility of the individual is at the core of Strauß' understanding of a non-Christologically centered 'religion' in *The Old and the New Faith* at the end of his career, as well:

In all forms, in innumerable repetitions, humans learned that in a human society no member's life, his fought-for booty, or property is secure, if there are no limits to raw desire in the relationship among groups. From the expensive and bloodily purchased experience of what is harmful and what is beneficial, first customs, then laws, and finally a moral doctrine of duties gradually arises peoples.²³⁶

In 1872, Strauß now embraces an alternative not only to Traditional Theism's exclusive Christology or to Böhme's goal of absorption in the divine will, but also to Spinoza's 'dead substance,' to Hegel's Gnostic and Indifferentist meta-narrative of the Double Negation of Absolute Spirit, as well as to the unrealizable divine standard of morality, of Hegel's "The Moral View of the World," Baur's church as the 'body of Christ that is a singular 'people,' and, finally, to Schleiermacher's 'feeling of absolute dependence.' Moral perfectibility is not associated, though, with the moral improvement of the individual any more than Strauß was concerned with the notion of failed, individual ethical effort in the LJ. Clearly, in *Der alte und der neue Glaube* (*The Old and the New Faith*), becoming human occurs 'only' within linear history. Although the individual's ethical life can only fall short of moral duty because of the limits of the individual and of her/his particular situation, yet, with 'evil' (negation) as the motor that drives 'progress,' the perspective on morality 'must' shift to the trajectory of the history of the species as it cultivates and adapts its moral principles to its ever-changing historical context, not a focus on the mere individual and her/his (failed) efforts.

235. Strauß, LJEGP: 627.

236. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 229.

However, the moral improvement of the species as the capacity to discern ever new moral principles in changing historical circumstances is embedded, in an entirely new theme: *an emphasis on nature's material 'progress'* that accounts for the emergence of consciousness in nature. The moral development of the species is neither on Spirit's Self-Awareness in humanity nor on a development from a Christ-centered religion to the religion of humanity. Nature's material history replaces the exclusive status of consciousness in itself.

"The most important general conclusion [...] that comparative Geology and Paleontology" – and we could add, the natural sciences altogether – "reveal to us is that *nature is ruled by the law of progress* [...], and this progress [...] is perhaps the most comforting truth that science has ever discovered. In it, *natures internal striving according to a tireless progressive improvement and refinement* of its organic forms, might also lie the authentic proof of nature's divinity, a great and beautiful word," [Moriz] Wagner adds, "for, admittedly, the natural scientist gives the term an essentially different meaning from that of the priest of a so-called revealed religion."²³⁷ (emphasis added)

Clearly under the influence of Moriz Wagner, Strauß criticizes what he takes to be Kant's claim that there will never be a material explanation for organic phenomena but also have so-good-as having successfully generated organic phenomena out of mere inorganic matter. Strauß portrays nature in *The Old and the New Faith* as a bottom-up, material process and defends hylozoism, the idea that matter is able to generate organic living things out of itself:

Let us remember here the Kantian aphorism: "give me matter; I will show you how a world can arise from it;" an enterprise, which he claimed could be carried out with respect to the inorganic world but must fail already with "a caterpillar." *Today's science has not only shown us how the caterpillar but even man arises from matter; though granted it has not yet accomplished it, science has found the sure way for accomplishing it in the future.*²³⁸ (emphasis added)

237. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 239–240. Moriz Wagner (d. 1887) was a German explorer, collector, geographer and natural historian.

238. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 216. The reference to a caterpillar means that the ultimate source of Strauß' recollection is Kant's *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, or Essay on the Constitution and Mechanical Origin of the Entire Universe, treated in accordance with Newtonian Principle* because this is the only place where his example is a caterpillar – although Kant includes here 'weeds' and 'insects' as well as the caterpillar. Kant wrote: "Give me matter, I will build a world out of it! In other words, give me matter, I will demonstrate to you how a world ought to arise from it. For, when matter capable of an essential power of attraction is present, it is not difficult to determine those causes that could have contributed, generally speaking, to the shaping of a world system. One knows all that is needed for such a determination [...] However, can one do the same when it comes to the most simple plants or insect? Is one able to say: Give me matter; I will demonstrate to you how a caterpillar can be generated? Is one not left stuck in ignorance with the very first step here when it comes to understanding the true composition of the object and the entanglements of its

Nature has reached "its highest point" with humanity. "Because [... *nature*] *cannot rise above itself, it turns inward on itself*. Reflecting in oneself is quite a good expression from Hegel.²³⁹ Nature already feels itself in an animal, but it also wants to know itself."²⁴⁰ (emphasis added) Note the difference in Strauß' formulation here, though: It is no longer Spirit that wants to 'know itself' (as the case with Hegel) but nature!

Nonetheless, the individual's struggle ethically is with sensuousness. An individual cannot escape animality, but s/he has been endowed with a moral capacity that makes possible its elevation above animal sensuousness:

In the individual, nature has not wanted merely in general to move upwards. She has wanted to go beyond herself. *The individual should not merely be only an animal, but [...] more and something better. The proof that he should is that he can.* [...] [H]e should refine his animality [‘the raw, gruesome struggle of existence’] according to the standards of his higher capacities [*Anlagen*] and soften his animality toward his own kind, especially through the consciousness of the inseparability and mutual obligation of the species [*Gattung*].²⁴¹ (emphasis added)

Remarkable here is the claim that humanity ‘can’ live up to the moral ‘should.’ This is precisely what Hegel had denied in "The Moral View of the World." Yet, Strauß skirts the contradiction, here as well, by shifting the focus from the individual to the species. ‘Over time’ the species is capable of moral progress as it responds responsibly to an ever-changing historical context.²⁴²

The individual's moral capacity is the presence of innate virtues, which are a version of Plato's Four Cardinal Virtues of wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice,

existing multiplicity? It should surprise no one when I require of myself to say: the construction of all the stars and planets, the cause of their movement, in short, *the origin of the entire make-up of the presently experienced world order can be more easily understood, before the generating of a single weed or caterpillar will become completely clear.*" (emphasis added) (AA I: 229–230) Kant addresses the theme in his later works, for example, in the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* he speaks of a *blade of grass* (AA V: 400) and his example in his *Lectures on Philosophical Theology* (Pölitiz) is a moth (AA PR: 125). Strauß' reference here, though, is vague enough that perhaps he has it from some other source than a text from Kant. The *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* was not actually published until 1795, 40 years after its writing. The publisher went bankrupt in 1755 during the production of the text with Kant receiving the only copy. See Volker Gerhardt, *Immanuel Kant: Vernunft und Leben* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2007): 35.

239. Surely, an ironic aside at this point.

240. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 240.

241. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 241.

242. Strauß' belief here is in sharp contrast to Kant's rejection in *Der Streit der Fakultäten* (*Conflict of the Faculties*) of the pessimistic alternative of humanity's permanent decline ("Terrorism"), the optimistic alternative of humanity's gradual improvement ("Eudaimonism"/"Chilianism"), as well as a status of moral stagnation ("Abderitism") to affirm the ambiguous moral rise and fall because morality is grounded in the capacity (*Anlage*) of autonomous freedom, which can only be free if it is inescapably confronted with the choice between a good and an evil principle to govern its agency. See the section "Classification of the concept of what is to be foreseen for the future" in Part II *Der Streit der Fakultäten* AA VII: 81 ff.

without attributing them to Plato²⁴³ or accounting for how they can arise from matter.²⁴⁴ To be sure, Strauß stresses that humanity did not 'fall' from perfection but slowly rises out of the realm of animality.²⁴⁵ He now specifies the moral capacity (*Anlage*) of innate virtues serves as an undeveloped basis for the climb above animality:

[...] we [see] [...] already in their semi-animality two features given [*angelegt*], which appear to us as *two human*, cardinal virtues: *courage and justice*. And where they once occur, there it cannot fail that soon also the *two others*, namely, *perseverance and thoughtfulness*, will branch off from them. At the same time, however, we recognize how moral qualities can develop only in society.²⁴⁶ (emphasis added)

Humanity is to "be master of nature" by which Strauß does not mean exploitation and capricious dominance over nature but dominance in terms of control over humanity's own nature: sensuousness.²⁴⁷ Humanity shares sensuousness with other animals, but

[...] the higher an animal is [in the hierarchy of animals], the less it is shaped directly by every possible attraction. A higher-ordered animal can remember what it did and the consequences of its response to an attraction in the past to adjust its actions in the present. This capacity is what establishes the animal's educational aptitude [...] The animal remembers, compares different occurrences and adjusts its behavior accordingly, but it is not able to form from the experience a general principle, an actual thought.²⁴⁸

The strongest defense against sensuousness, Strauß writes, is humanity's mental capacity.²⁴⁹

One can think of the generic term [*Gattungsbegriff*] humanity in different ways, and, consequently, therein determines how a person is brought to think in a proper manner [...] *Humanity's position at the pinnacle of nature, its capacity to resist sensuous impulses*, lies in the generic term humanity. Further, however, the solidarity of humanity lies [...] in the fact that only through cooperation does the individual become a human being [...] and constructs an interlinked community through solidarity.²⁵⁰

There is no talk here of humanity's definition in terms of an inclusive Christology in which every individual is called to think the content (*Inhalt*) of incarnation as Absolute Spirit for her-/himself in history. Humanity is defined as a social being in

243. See Plato, *Republic* (426–435).

244. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 228.

245. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 225.

246. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 228. Note here that Strauß is suggesting that Plato's Four Cardinal Virtues (from Book IV of the *Republic* 426–435) are inexplicably assumed to be capacities 'given' mysteriously available to humanity but, apparently, no other species.

247. See Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 244.

248. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 244.

249. See Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 245–246.

250. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 246–247.

linear history ever cultivating new moral principles to respond to a changing world and, consequently, moral improvement applies to the species as a whole; a social being who understands the task of a human animal is to resist mere sensuousness in mutual solidarity with others who properly understand what it means to be 'elevated above nature' through education and reflection. Such a conscious, reflecting animal, Strauß claims, 'has a solid ground for his [*sic.*] moral conduct':

Only through mutual assistance is the individual elevated above nature; only insofar as he [*sic.*] recognizes and interacts with others as the same creatures as he, can he maintain and improve himself further. *Whoever thinks the generic term species [Gattungsbegriff] in this manner and grasps its complete content [Inhalt] has a solid ground for his moral conduct.*²⁵¹

Starting from the Hegelian notion of Spirit moving to self-awareness through its externalization in matter in the *LJ*, one can identify a dramatic transformation in Strauß' understanding of 'human development' as a historical, natural 'progress' that already shapes "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity." In the *LJEGP*, Christianity is no longer Christ-centered (a 'religion of the Christ as the God/Man) but has become the 'religion of humanity,' which consists in the moral improvement of the entire human species as it is required to adapt its moral principles to ever-changing historical circumstance as the counter-weight to individual ethical shortcomings. Finally, in *The Old and the New Faith*, Strauß embraces a materialist reductionism that views the 'progress of material nature' to be the cause of, and to consist in, the emergence of the organic out of matter and in human consciousness 'turns inward' to continue nature's onward advance both in terms of sovereignty over nature and in terms of the moral improvement of the species. Nature replaces Spirit, and over his entire career, Strauß is an ethical consequentialist.

1) Kant is no Consequentialist

Hegel and Strauß are ethical consequentialists because they measure moral status in terms of moral perfection defined by external, ethical achievement (rather, non-achievement). On the basis of this consequentialist ethic that distinguishes between perfect moral duty and imperfect ethical achievement, Strauß across his career distinguishes between the ethical status of the individual and the species. To be sure, in the *LJ*, Strauß places emphasis on the species not with respect to failed ethical achievement but as the location of historical consciousness of Absolute Spirit. His Christology in the *LJ* of the species is a universally inclusive Christology grounded in the *positive* achievement of one's divine status *beyond history* (as with other Hegelians) but not as an escape from history. Although the function of 'species' changes across

251. Strauß, *Der alte und der neue Glaube*: 247.

his career, Strauß retains his conviction articulated in the *LJ* that ethics 'pollutes' the individual, not the species.²⁵² Shifting from Christology to morality as of "The Permanent and Transient in Christianity," Strauß locates *objective*, moral improvement as the goal of the *species*, not the individual, precisely because he retains the notion of his consequentialist ethics. Humanity is ethically imperfect because of the limits placed on the individual by nature. Humanity's moral improvement in history is a collective achievement (or non-achievement) by the species.

For Kant, morality is anchored by a 180° opposite perspective to consequentialism. Kant, in contrast, is amoral 'intentionalist' (one could say 'archaeologist').²⁵³ What matters morally for Kant is that over which the individual has moral control: the maxim on the basis of which s/he gives her-/himself permission to act. Kant writes in *Menschenkunde*:

The good is invisible everywhere because it is always present in thinking. We judge everything by the benefit that springs from the action [...]. [However,] that which rewards us for the goodness of character itself is the peace of mind and the applause that one gives oneself. This is the greatest and most excellent reward.²⁵⁴

The individual only has direct access in the senses to a world of appearances – not 'reality' as it is in itself. Even before the individual seeks to gain understanding, her/his transcendental consciousness is limited because its understanding is a matter of non-epistemic 'faith' not epistemic knowledge. *In short, there is no separation between moral duty and ethical achievement/failure according to Kant because the goal of morality is neither to achieve happiness nor perfection.*²⁵⁵ This is what Kant calls humanity's 'precarious position'.²⁵⁶

To be sure, Kant grounds both theoretical and practical reason in appearances. *Appearances matter! Experience always commences with appearances and returns to appearances.* However, in the middle of the process, transcendental consciousness is required by its limited condition to *add to* phenomena elements that are not directly given with the phenomena.

Lest one be tempted to conclude that Kant ignored the issue of consequences, he writes in the "First Preface" to *Religion*: "[...] while morality requires no end but the law sufficient for it to act rightly [...], [I]t cannot possibly be a matter of indifference to reason what the answer to the question may be: What is then the result of this right conduct of ours? or the question to what are we to direct our doings or non-doings,

252. On ethics a matter of the species, not the individual, see Strauß, *LJ*: 780 and above: 776.

253. On Kant's criticisms of moral consequentialism and his moral intentionalism, see the 'four moments' of his rejection of consequentialism in: 556, n. 108.

254. Kant, *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1108–1109; Olms ed.: 295–296.

255. On Kant's rejection of happiness and perfection as the goal of morality, see: 28, n. 11.

256. For Kant's description of humanity's 'precarious position', see Kant, *Groundwork*: AA IV: 425–426.

even granted this is not fully in our control [...]"²⁵⁷ The answer is not the achievement of happiness or perfection, which are not fully in our control, but the self-application of that over which we have control: the moral law that we invoke to give ourselves permission to act. In short, duty alone is the ultimate goal of human agency. He adds in a footnote:

[...] [T]hese laws [of moral duty] command absolutely, whatever their consequences; indeed, they even require that we abstract from such consequences entirely whenever a particular action is concerned, and thereby they make duty the object of *the highest respect*,²⁵⁸ without proposing to us, or assigning, a goal [*Zweck*] (a final cause [*Endzweck*]) such as would constitute some sort of inducement for it and an incentive to the fulfillment of our duty [...] What need have [...] human beings] to know the outcome of their doings and non-doings that the world's course will bring about? *It suffices [...] that they do their duty, even if everything were to end with life in this world and in this life too happiness and desert perhaps never converge.* Yet it is one of the inescapable limitations of human beings and of their practical faculty of reason [...] to be concerned in every action with its result [...] Hence, the law that only inspires respect [...], although it does not recognize this sought-after something as a need, nevertheless is extended for the sake of its result to include the moral end of reason among its determinants. That end is to make the highest possible good in the world your end! *as an a priori synthetic judgment introduced by the moral law itself [...]*"²⁵⁹ (emphasis added)

The goal of moral duty is neither personal happiness nor objective, moral perfection but the hope *that the categorical and the conditional are complementary because there is no categorical without the conditional*.²⁶⁰ The origin and effectiveness of humanity's hope is grounded in the moral capacity (autonomous freedom) of the individual,

257. Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 5.

258. 'Respect' for the laws of moral duty does not mean the objective goal of achieving the fulfillment of the moral law. It means just the opposite: the acknowledgement of the duty on the part of the individual to invoke *internally* a moral principle when s/he gives her-/himself permission to act. See "2) Kant's Respect for the Law:." 797 ff.

259. Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 6*. Joseph Schmucker maintains that the major influence on Kant's thought is Francis Hutcheson and not Shaftesbury or Rousseau. See Schmucker, *Die Ursprünge der Ethik Kants in seinen vorkritischen Schriften und Reflexionen* (Meisenheim: Anton Hain Verlag, 1961): 124–142. Francis Hutcheson wrote in 1726: *We are not responsible for unintended or miscalculated consequences but for weakness of moral character.* See Hutcheson, "Treatise II, Section III: 'The Sense of Virtue and the Various Opinions about It, Reducible to One General Foundation. The Manner of Computing the Morality of Actions'" in *An Inquiry into the Origins of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, In Two Treatises* (London: J. Darby, A Betesworth, F. Fayram, J. Pemberton, C. Rivington, J. Hooke, F. Clay, J. Batley, and E. Symon, 1726): 189. Nonetheless, Hutcheson applies the principle that "[...] the most universal unlimited tendency to the *greatest and most extensive happiness* of all the *rational agents*, to whom our influence can reach" is required for discernment of what is 'most perfectly virtuous.'" *Ibid.*: 180. Hutcheson proceeded to formulate a 'utilitarian calculus' (*ibid.*: 180–190) that anticipates (served as a prototype for?) Jeremy Bentham's hedonistic 'utilitarian calculus.'

260. Kant speaks of religious hope not (!) in terms of receiving divine assistance (grace) but in terms of maintaining our moral attitude (see *Religion* AA VI: 68–69).

which is required for there to be a moral law in the first place.²⁶¹ The capacities of transcendental consciousness, generally, call humanity to respect the moral law and to invoke the moral law to govern its own agency, internally, because they are the conditions that make it possible for us to be human. Kant's morality is defined neither by 'pleasing God' nor by achievement of moral perfection.²⁶²

Without the *addition* of a *a priori* synthetic elements, which each individual must apply for her-/himself, transcendental consciousness could not experience, understand, or exercise responsible agency in the world. No more than the 'truth' of theoretical reason is established solely by appearances, so too with practical reason. Appearances neither determine theoretical knowledge nor moral status. The key to both theoretical and practical reason is the *a priori* synthetic elements that both require in order for transcendental consciousness to be what it is and to do what it does. Especially when it comes to practical reason, it is not only epistemologically limited by theoretical reason, but it is also limited by its lack of control over its external circumstances – *as important as external circumstances are!* That over which the individual has control is the *a priori* elements of its transcendental consciousness, which s/he *adds* to her/his experience of appearances.

In other words, determination of the moral status of the individual (or species) by reduction to external appearances is, paradoxically, not merely an illusion but also a cutting of the tap root of morality, according to Kant. The individual's moral status is established by one's innate possession, and proper exercising, of *the internal capacities of practical reason, not the achievement* (or non-achievement) *of specific, external goals. Although the individual has no control over her/his external circumstances, s/he alone does have control over the moral principle s/he employs in order to give her-/himself permission to exercise agency in the world.*²⁶³

The criteria of moral status, then, are not external appearances (consequences) but internal *moral effort*. Only the individual knows the moral principle that s/he invoked to give this permission to act. T in an imperfect world by a limited transcendental consciousness.

261. See Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 4*: "[...] [F]reedom is, after all, the *ratio essendi* of the moral law; however, the moral law is the *ratio cognoscendi* of freedom."

262. On Kant's rejection of (ontological) 'moral feeling' grounded in happiness and (theological) expectation of perfection for morality, see *Groundwork* IV: 441–443.

263. See the discussion of 'internal freedom' in Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 405, 406–407, 420. That one has control over one's internal freedom, not external circumstances, is illustrated by Kant's two accounts of the 'knock at the door.' Kant gives two accounts of the temptation to lie to someone at the door. One is in his *On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy* AA VIII: 426–427, where the lie to the murderer at the door results in the death on the street of the person purported to be protected by the lie; and in the "Doctrine of Virtue" of *The Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 431, where the lie by the servant to the authorities at the door who have come to arrest the master of the house results in the master leaving the house and committing a murder on the street. Both cases serve to illustrate one's control over the principle one acts on but lack of control over its consequences because consequences are incalculable.

I know of no explicit connection made by either Hegel or Strauß to Utilitarianism (by employment, for example, of Hutcheson's calculus of the 'greatest good for the greatest number'), but Hegel/Strauß stand in the midst of the trajectory of utilitarianism, the grounding of morality in consequences that stretches from Aristotle to Hutcheson/Bentham/Mill Utilitarianism. Of course, one could say that the trajectory goes back to the 'Second' Testament (and surely before) in the saying that "You can judge a tree by its fruit" (Luke 6:43–45 and Matthew 7:16–18; 12:33–35). Whatever its roots, especially for Hegel and Strauß, ethics is a matter of achievement (consequences) with respect to 'subduing' the perceptible world (*sinnliche Anschauung*) based upon abstract moral duty (*intellektuelle Anschauung*) independent of appearances, which are to govern agency in the perceptible world. For both Hegel and Strauß, though, it is impossible for humanity to achieve ethical perfection, which means that moral duty is a set of 'empty ideas.'

As part of the Copernican Turn, in contrast, the Kantian autonomous ethic turns the moral spy glass around from external consequences to internal motivation.²⁶⁴ According to Kant, *the test of moral achievement is not external success or failure but internal determination of the moral principle to govern one's efforts.*

Despite the weight that consequentialism places on external appearances, when it comes to consequences of its actions, transcendental consciousness is limited by it's a *priori* synthetic conditions, but also it is especially limited when it comes to calculation of external consequences. Such calculation is limited to the extremely near future with no control over the long-term consequences of its actions. What looks to be a clear moral choice for the moment can, with a shift in circumstances beyond one's control, turn out to be a moral catastrophe. The aphorism that "the road to hell is paved with good intentions" confirms the 'everyman' awareness of humanity's limits.

Nonetheless, rather than the limits in control over consequences justifying either no moral effort whatsoever or action only on the basis of self- and one's group's interest, autonomous morality places the moral weight on the selection of the *universal*, moral principle that one invokes for oneself to guide one's decision taking and action.²⁶⁵

264. On Kant's 'Copernican Turn,' see the "Preface:" 47, n. 35.

265. Kant is famously ridiculed for turning merely subjective self-interest into a universal maxim, which then allows the individual to gloat over her/his having fulfilled moral duty. In order to reduce the likelihood of the German *selbstgesetzgebend* lead to capricious 'universalizing' self-interest, I prefer to translate 'self-selecting' rather than the more frequent 'self-legislating'.

The attribution of moral, subjective, capriciousness is surely the case for Hegel. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 460 and the quote cited as footnote 26 on page 658 above. However, it is an error committed by many. For example, having acknowledged that Kant rejects self-interest and happiness as the ground for morality, Alasdair MacIntyre focuses primarily on the 'universalization' criterion for the categorical imperative and dismisses it as absolutizing merely what the individual wishes: "It is very easy to see that many immoral and trivial non-moral principles are vindicated by Kant's test quite convincingly [...] 'Persecute all those who hold false religious beliefs'

Categorical, universal, moral principles are distinguished from *hypothetical*, technical and pragmatic imperatives. Technical imperatives are required for the accomplishment of a technical goal (e.g., how to construct a house). Pragmatic imperatives are required for the pursuit of personal welfare (e.g., fulfilling the requirements to enter a profession).²⁶⁶

Morality grounded in the autonomous freedom of individuals to self-select categorical imperatives is far 'wider' than an ethics restricted to sensuousness and empirical interests of achieving particular, technical and pragmatic goals because in this 'wider' morality the dignity and absolute worth of the individual is in play with the motivation of loathsomeness were one to fail to act on anything less than a self-selected, 'wide' categorical imperative to govern one's agency with respect to 'narrow,' technical and pragmatic hypothetical imperatives.²⁶⁷

The will is acknowledged to be 'subject to the law.' However, self-legislating, the frequently used term for translating *selbstgesetzgebend*, can mean that the law is created by the will, or it can mean that the will subjects itself to a law not of its creation by *selecting the law* to which it will conform. The imposition of a law on the self, in

and 'Always eat mussels on Mondays in March' will all pass Kant's test, for all can be consistently universalized." (*After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, second edition [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984]: 45–46) In a projection of piety onto Kant, MacIntyre writes: "[...] Kant never doubted for a moment that the maxims which he had learnt from his own virtuous parents were those which had to be vindicated by a rational test." (*Ibid.*, 44.), which is claiming that Kant merely assumed the moral principles of his Pietist upbringing to be universalizable. That is simply a ridiculous claim as MacIntyre himself points out that Kant rejected a religious grounding of moral principles (see *ibid.*, 44–45). MacIntyre refers to the second formulation of the categorical imperative "Always act so as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of others, as an end, and not a means." (*ibid.*, 46), but, having ignored the grounding of morality by Kant NOT in moral principles but in autonomous freedom (the moral principle is the *ratio cognoscendi* or basis of knowing autonomous freedom, whereas the *ratio essendi* or reason for the existence of moral principles is autonomous freedom [see *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 4*; 29–30]), MacIntyre asserts "This formulation clearly does have a moral content, although one that is not very precise [...]" (*ibid.*, 46). MacIntyre completely ignores Kant's third formulation of the categorical imperative, which anchors morality in the 'good will' that is not to be defined as ontologically good but who acts on the basis of 'duty' grounded in the individual's self-selecting, autonomous freedom: "[...] the supreme condition of [... the practical principle of the will's] harmony with universal practical reason [... is] the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislating will." (*Groundwork* AA IV: 431)

Hegel ridiculed Kant in this manner. See above: 728. On Kant's meaning of 'categorical imperative,' see above: 56, n. 61. On Kant's acknowledgement that, given the limits to theoretical and practical reason, one can never be sure one is acting on the basis of self-interest, see the beginning of the Second Section of the *Groundwork* AA IV: 406–408.

266. See Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 414–421.

267. On the significance of the differences between categorical and hypothetical imperatives, see Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 414–421. On the difference between 'wide' categorical and 'narrow' hypothetical imperatives, see section "VII [Internal] Ethical Duties are of Wide Obligation, whereas [External] Duties of Right are of Narrow Obligation" in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, AA VI: 390–391. Kant distinguished between "narrower" (unrelenting, *unnachlasslichen*) and "wider" (meritorious, *verdienstlichen*) duty already in the *Groundwork* AA IV: 424.

turn, can be either *heteronomous* (demanded externally, e.g., the civic law, God) or *autonomous* (initiated solely internally by the individual).²⁶⁸ *An autonomous moral law doe/s not mean self-created any more than the heteronomous giving of the physical law or the civic law to the self means that the will's employment of the physical or civic law means that it creates them.* Laws (and lawfulness, generally) are relationships within the two causal systems of nature and autonomous freedom,²⁶⁹ and those relationships must be *dis-covered* in experience, *not self-created*.

Whereas physical laws and civic laws are heteronomously imposed on the will, moral laws are not because that would be a denial of the very autonomous freedom to which the moral laws apply. The moral law must be self-imposed, autonomously, as an act of self-determination, but not of the individual's personal creation.

Transcendental consciousness has exclusive and exhaustive control over its legislation of the moral principle that it invokes to give itself permission to do something.

[...] [T]he pure representation of duty, and in general of the moral law, *mixed with no alien addition of empirical stimuli*, has by the route of reason alone (which in this first becomes aware that by itself it can also be practical) an influence on the human heart so much more powerful than all other incentives²⁷⁰ one can summon from the empirical field, that reason, in the consciousness of its dignity, regards the latter with contempt, and little by little can master them in the place of which a mixed doctrine of morals, composed of incentives of feelings and inclinations and at the same time of rational concepts, must make the mind waver between motives that can be brought under no principle [for example, mere self-interest²⁷¹], that can lead only very contingently to what is good, but quite often also to what is evil.²⁷² (emphasis added)

268. On Kant's distinction between 'autonomy' and 'heteronomy,' see *Groundwork* IV: 432–433. See as well, *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 43. "Heteronomy" is the label for externally imposed moral principles. It is contrasted by Kant with "autonomy," which is the label for internally self-selected moral principles. (See *Groundwork*, AA IV: 440–441) Humanity's autonomy, then, is concerned with a form of causality neither separable from nor reducible to physical causality. As a *freedom from* nature, it can initiate sequences of events, intentionally, that nature on its own cannot. As an *internal* causality independent of nature, it's principles cannot be derived *externally*. If they were, they would not be *autonomous* principles. Hence, in his *Groundwork*, Kant distinguishes between *hypothetical* and *categorical* imperatives. (See *Groundwork*, AA IV: 414–415) The former are *necessities* demanded by one's physical circumstance. The latter are *necessities* demanded by one's self.

269. Kant identifies two 'domains' of lawfulness: 'nature' and 'autonomous freedom'. The former is the domain of *theoretical reason*; the latter, of *practical reason*. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 174–176.

270. Kant adds a footnote here that ends: "[...] [T]he commonest observation shows that when one represents an action of righteousness – [...] without aiming at any advantage in this world or another [...] – it leaves far behind and obscures every similar action that was even in the least affected by an alien incentive, that it elevates the soul and stirs up the wish to be able to act like that too. Even children of intermediate age feel this impression, and one should never represent duties to them in any other way." *Groundwork* AA IV: 410*.

271. Kant was well aware that there's no escaping self-interest, but he makes clear that merely acting on the basis of self-interest is immoral. See *Groundwork* AA IV: 206–408.

272. Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 410–411.

In contrast, sorting out the causal elements of our empirical actions with respect to which are "[...] ascribable to the pure effect of freedom, how much to mere nature, that is, to faults of temperament for which there is no responsibility, or to its happy constitution (*merito fortunae*), can never be determined; and upon it therefore no perfectly just judgments can be passed."²⁷³ (emphasis added)

Even more crucial, though, *it is not even the identification of a moral principle that one might invoke to determine what one 'ought to do' that grounds morality*. When it comes to morality and 'what ought to be,' the *ratio essendi* (the reason for morality) is *not the moral law but autonomous freedom*. In turn, the moral law is the *ratio cognoscendi* (the basis for knowing) autonomous freedom.²⁷⁴ The recognition of a single, wide categorical imperative is sufficient,²⁷⁵ though, to acknowledge autonomous freedom as the *ratio essendi* of morality.²⁷⁶ To be sure, the existence of 'moral law' does not prove *autonomous freedom*.²⁷⁷

[...] we can explain nothing but what we can trace back to laws whose object can be given in some possible experience. But [*sic.*] freedom is a mere idea, the objective reality of which can in no way be established according to laws of nature [...] But [*sic.*] where determination by laws of nature ceases, there all *explanation* ceases as well, and nothing is left but *defense*, i.e. warding off the objections of those who pretend to have looked deeper into the essence of things, and therefore boldly declared freedom to be impossible.²⁷⁸

Kant points out that the best 'defense' of *autonomous freedom* one gets when one denies it because "[a]ll human beings think of themselves as having a will that is free.

273. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 579^a. On reason's capacity to act according to its order and not according to the 'order of things,' see the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 576.

274. See Kant's "Preface" to the *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 4*.

275. See Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 26*: "[...] this [moral] law is the only law that makes us conscious of the independence of our power of choice from determination by all other incentives (of our freedom) and thereby also of the accountability of all our actions."

276. See Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 459: "[...] [W]here determination by laws of nature ceases, there all explanation ceases as well, and nothing is left but defense, i.e. warding off the objections of those who pretend to have looked deeper into the essence of things, and therefore boldly declare freedom to be impossible. One can only show them that the contradiction they have supposedly discovered in it lies nowhere else than in this, that in order to make the law of nature hold with regard to human actions, they necessarily had to consider the human being as an appearance, and that now as one demands that as an intelligence they think of him also as a thing in itself, they continue to consider him as an appearance all the same, in which case the separation of his causality (i.e., of his will) from all natural laws of the world of sense in one and the same subject would of course prompt a contradiction; but it vanishes if they were willing to come to their senses and, as is reasonable, admit that behind the appearances there must lie at their foundation the things in themselves (though hidden), and that one cannot demand of their laws of operation [McG: autonomous freedom] that they be one and the same as those under which their appearances stand [McG: natural laws]." (CUP Trans.)

277. See Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 21*.

278. Kant, *Groundwork*: AA IV: 459.

From this stem all judgments about actions such that they ought to have been done even if they were not done."²⁷⁹

Kant gave in the *Groundwork* four examples of categorical imperatives:²⁸⁰ don't commit suicide out of social disgrace,²⁸¹ don't lie,²⁸² cultivate one's talents,²⁸³ and respond to the suffering of others.²⁸⁴ However, are we capable of controlling our self-interest, and do we in fact experience *a priori* such wide categorical imperatives? In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant demonstrates that we are capable of controlling our self-interest and that we do experience circumstances in which we are confronted with a moral principle from within. Not only is transcendental consciousness not exhaustively determined by 'mechanical' physical laws (we are not products of (mechanical) material determinism, but also the moral principle not given by the phenomena (it is an *a priori* synthetic judgment *added to* phenomena). Kant provides examples of our possession of precisely the capacity of self-control over sensuous, self-interest as well as of a compelling categorical imperative.

Kant's example of self-control is the case of a man in a house of prostitution whereby he finds the temptation to sex irresistible. Kant asks, though, if a gallows was erected before the house and he was to be hanged the next day should he succumb to the temptation, would we be surprised if he controlled his inclinations?²⁸⁵ As an example of the power of a categorical imperative, Kant gives the case of a ruler demanding of a subject on pain of death to give false testimony against a person,

279. Kant, *Groundwork* IV: 455.

280. Kant grounds these moral principles in 'internal duties owed to oneself'. Nowhere does Kant attribute these examples to his upbringing in a pious household as Alasdair MacIntyre conjectures. See *After Virtue*: 44.

281. On suicide, see Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 421–422. In "The Doctrine of Right" of the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant grounds the obligation to preserve one's physical life in a 'duty owed to oneself': "... an individual [can] be sovereign over himself, (*sui iuris*) but not the owner of himself (*sui dominus*) (able to treat himself as he pleases [e.g., suicide; McGaughey] – still less can he be the owner of other people ... because he is responsible himself as a person." I take the German to be a clear rejection of the "ownership" ("*Eigentümer*" means "owner") of other persons (e.g., slavery) whereas the CUP translation weakens the statement by translating *Eigentümer* as "own master" and substitutes "disposition over" for "owner" ("*Eigentümer*") of others. Already in his 1773/1774 or 1774/1775 (44) *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie*, Kant condemns suicide as the dominance of animality over humanity (67), a violation of autonomous freedom (174), we have disposition over all things that have no freedom but not over an essence [thing] that itself has choice (e.g., prostitution 180, slavery 181, bestiality 181, suicide 181), and a usage of the self as a mere means (216, 221, 226). See as well, the *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 44, 69–70; "The Doctrine of Virtue" in *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 420 and "§ 9. On Killing Oneself" AA VI: 422–423.

282. On lying, see Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 422. See as well, Kant's *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie*: 33; *On the Supposed Right to Lie Out of Philanthropy* AA VIII: 425–430; *Metaphysik Mrongovius* AA XXIX: 793; as contradicting the duty owed to oneself, see "The Doctrine of Virtue" of the *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 420–421 and "§ 9. On Lying" in *Ibid.*, 429–431.

283. On cultivating talents, see Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 423 and 429.

284. On responding to the suffering of others, see Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 423 and 429–430.

285. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 30.

whom the subject had never met, in order for the ruler to have juridical grounds to execute the stranger.²⁸⁶ Whatever the subject might decide, even a child recognizes the injustice of the ruler's demand, and no one doubts that it is possible for the subject to choose to deny her/his self-interest and be executed rather than violate his duty owed to another.

However, according to Kant and in contrast to Strauß' claim,²⁸⁷ we neither possess moral principles as innate, Platonic ideas nor are they merely social constructions although our awareness of them emerge for us out of the challenge of concrete experience as something to be learned. Yet, *moral 'respect for the law' requires us to assume that there is an objective system of moral principles that governs the exercising of our autonomous freedom just as understanding of physical phenomena requires us to assume that there is a system of physical laws that we must discover through experience.* This is why Kant calls his philosophy 'Critical Idealism'²⁸⁸ and stresses as the third leg of his methodology of pure reason²⁸⁹ *the search for an 'architectonic' of principles and laws that govern transcendental consciousness.*

Rather than any list of moral principles that one would have to somehow establish to be universal,²⁹⁰ which we cannot generate for physical laws, either, Kant offers a three-fold litmus test for 'wide' categorical imperatives for *discerning the internal grounds of duty*: 1) Act as if the maxim you use to give yourself permission to act is universal and not merely serving self-interest.²⁹¹ If one is acting solely on the basis of self- or community-interest, then one surely knows that the criterion of universality

286. See Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 30; see as well, *ibid.*, AA V: 35–36 and AA V: 155–157.

287. On Kant's rejection of innate as well as the construction of ideas, see in Chapter 1: 166.

288. Kant uses the label of 'Critical Idealism.' See *Metaphysik Mrongovius* AA XIX: 928, 938; *Prolegomena* AA IV: 375; and *On a Discovery, whereby Any New Critique of Pure Reason is to be Made Superfluous by an Older One* AA VIII: 210.

289. See Kant, "Chapter III The Architectonic of Pure Reason" in the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 860–879.

290. John Rawls' *Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Belknap Press [Imprint of Harvard University Press], 1971) is concerned with 'distributive justice' and develops a superstructure for the discernment of a fair and equal distribution of resources based on universality and commencing with what Rawls calls the 'original condition' of a 'veil of ignorance' (a 'state of nature') in light of the inequalities of resources and opportunities in society. Whereas Aristotle distinguished between 'retributive justice' (sometimes translated as 'corrective justice') based on 'arithmetic' and 'distributed justice' based on geometry (see *Nicomachean Ethics* Bk V, Chap. 3), Rawls proposes the social structures of universal rules/principles that are necessary to achieve proportionality with respect to merit. What one has in Rawls is a version of Aristotelian calculative, hence, consequentialist ethics, not a Kantian autonomous morality. Furthermore, Jennifer Uleman calls Rawls insistence upon establishing the "universality" of one's ethical framework and moral principles in advance of one's decision-making the "cold fish" version of universalized moral principles because its implementation would so delay the individual's decision-making that, were one to arrive at an appropriate principle (a highly unlikely prospect in itself), it would no longer be applicable to the live situation to which the principle was a response. See Jennifer Uleman, *An Introduction to Kant's Moral Philosophy* (Cambridge University Press, 2010).

291. See Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 421 and 430.

has been ignored. 2) treat oneself and the other only as 'ends' and not merely as mere 'means'.²⁹² This does not claim that we should never be a means to someone else's ends but that we should not allow ourselves to be treated or to treat the other as *only a mere means*. 3) Acknowledge the other as her-/himself an agency of autonomous freedom.²⁹³ This means that we recognize the other as equally an agent capable of self-selecting the wide, categorical principles to govern her/his discernment of what 'ought to be.' In fact, this constitutes acknowledgement of the 'dignity' and 'absolute worth' of each and every transcendental consciousness because autonomous freedom is inalienable and can only be exercised by the individual her-/himself.²⁹⁴

In other words, simply following some list of moral principles by checking off the one(s) one employs to justify one's actions as proper is/would not be sufficient for claiming the morality of one's actions. One can adhere to a moral law out of self-interest (for example, to please God or one's neighbor) or some other inclination rather than out of pure duty because it is right. Simply following a 'list' could be merely serving self-interest. *Transcendental consciousness is never governed merely (!) by self-interest, it is governed responsibly only when it subordinates itself in 'respect for the moral law.'*²⁹⁵

The opening sentence of Kant's *Groundwork* is: "It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be taken to be good without limitation, except a good will."²⁹⁶ The claim, however, is not that a will is either good or evil, but, as in the later *Religion*,²⁹⁷ a good will is a will that self-selects a good maxim in giving itself permission to act. Kant adds on the next page: A good will is "good not because of what it effects, or accomplishes, not because of its fitness to attain some intended end, but good just by its willing, i.e., in itself. Considered by itself, it is to be esteemed beyond compare much higher than anything that could ever be brought about by it in favor of some inclination, and indeed, if you will, the sum of all inclinations."²⁹⁸ *An action has moral worth, then, "[...] not in the purpose that is to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to which it is resolved upon."*²⁹⁹ (emphasis added)

292. See Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 429 and 430.

293. See Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 431.

294. See Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 434–436; 449–450.

295. See Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 400–401. See, especially, the footnote at *ibid.*, AA IV: 401*.

296. Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 393.

297. On Kant on radical good and radical evil, see above: 742. See as well, Chapter 5: "Traces of an Intellectual Crisis:" 621, n. 233

298. Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 394.

299. Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 399–400. Kant's criticism of consequentialism has four moments: See: 556, n. 108.

2) Kant's 'Respect for the Law'

According to Kant, morality is governed by 'respect for the law,'³⁰⁰ not because there is a proof for the law any more than the physical sciences are grounded in proven physical laws. Discernment and self-selecting the law to govern one's agency is also not an exercise in capricious construction of the law (either physical or moral). Practical reason is exercised according to *reflecting* judgment just as in the case of theoretical reason.

All laws are held in the form of a *universal* 'as if' and with the grasp of them in light of their fitting into an ever-expanding understanding of the coherent architectonic of lawfulness. *Our understanding of the law can be modified, but our commitment to lawfulness can never be compromised.* Otherwise, there is no understanding by theoretical reason and there is only self-interest governing practical reason.

One does not deny that nature is lawful simply because one is incapable of proving that physical laws apply to all material phenomena at all times and in all places. Such a proof is impossible. Even when we know the physics is wrong, Newtonian mechanics demands recognition. We don't hesitate to climb into an airplane, an automobile, or an elevator because of doubts over the universality of physical laws because we are incapable of proving them. If we deny that there is lawfulness, including mechanical laws, to the order of nature, we might as well shut down our attempts at understanding the world/universe. Physical lawfulness is an assumption that is required for theoretical reason to understand anything.³⁰¹

When our lawful explanations fail us, as is the case today with the Fermi Lab's confirmation of the existence of 'muons,' which call into question the reigning understanding of physical laws, the challenge is to find a more adequate lawful explanation, not to shut down our efforts at understanding.

300. On the centrality of respect [*Achtung*] for the law not merely as motivation for morality but as morality itself, see Birgit Recki, *Ästhetik der Sitten*: 272–278.

Kant proposes three propositions (*Sätze*) with respect to practical reason. The first is not explicitly formulated but consists, apparently, of the proposition that there is "[...] a law, to advance one's happiness, not from inclination, but from duty, and it is not until then that [...] conduct has its actual moral worth." *Groundwork* AA IV: 399. The second is: "[...] an action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose that is to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to which it is resolved upon [...]" *Groundwork* AA IV: 400. Finally, the third is: "[...] duty is the necessity of an action from respect for the law." *Groundwork* AA IV: 400. See Birgit Recki, *Ästhetik der Sitten. Die Affinität von ästhetischem Gefühl und praktischer Vernunft bei Kant* (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 2001): 272–278.

301. Lawfulness is the criterion for what Kant calls a 'domain'. A region of experience for which we do not yet have a grasp of its lawfulness but for which a lawfulness is possible ('territory'), we explore by means of 'statistical significance' and 'algorithms' in search of lawfulness. We also experience (for example, in nocturnal dreams) 'fields' in which there can be no lawfulness despite clarity and distinction of perception. On 'fields', 'territories', and 'domains', See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 174–176 and in Chapter 1: 160.

Already in the *Critique of Pure Reason*,³⁰² Kant insisted upon the open-endedness of the sciences precisely because of the *a priori* synthetic conditions under which we can know anything, and he proposes the same in the *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*³⁰³ and in his *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*.³⁰⁴ When it comes to his convictions with respect to scientific research, he both embraced its open horizon for both 'scientists' and 'laity':

I myself am a researcher by inclination. I feel a complete thirst for knowledge and the eager restlessness to advance in it, or the satisfaction of every acquisition. There was a time when I believed that this alone could constitute the honor of mankind and I despised the rabble who knew nothing. Rousseau set me right. This deluding preference disappeared, I learned to honor men (*sic.*), and I would find myself more useless than the common laborer if I did not believe that this contemplation could confer a value on all others to establish the rights of mankind.³⁰⁵

In short, Kant's reflections on science were not tied either to the Newtonian universe nor Euclidean geometry³⁰⁶ as is too frequently maintained.³⁰⁷ Knowledge in the sciences is always dependent upon the open-endedness of the variations in phenomena (we experience only appearances) and upon the theoretical framework of *a priori* synthetic judgments (laws) in use at any particular point in time for the understanding of those variations, and it is precisely for this reason that Kant's own reflections are tied neither to Euclidean Geometry nor to Newtonian Physics.

Kant claims that the assumptions, including lawfulness, of theoretical and practical reason are what drive humanity's rational 'desire' to understand and to act responsibly. Our capacity for understanding (*Erkenntnisvermögen*) is driven by the conviction that we can establish an understanding of 'what is' by the internal discernment in transcendental consciousness of lawfulness (*Gesetzmöglichkeit*), which governs physical phenomena, whereas our capacity of desire (*Begehrungsvermögen*) is driven by the conviction that we can determine 'what ought to be' by the internal discernment in transcendental consciousness of the final aim (*Endzweck*) of our autonomous freedom.³⁰⁸ We have control over what laws we apply to our understanding of 'what is'

302. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 508, 641, 684, 708, 720, 786, and 862.

303. See Kant, *Prolegomena*, "§ 12" AA IV: 284–285 and AA IV: 352–3.

304. See the "Preface" to Kant's *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* AA IV: 473.

305. Kant, (Aus dem Nachlaß – Phase h: 1764 – max. 1768) *Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen* AA XX: 44.

306. See Höffe, *Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Die Grundlegung der modernen Philosophie* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2004): 177, 205, 208, and 288.

307. See the "Postscript" to Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*: 266.

308. The identification of the capacity of reason as the 'capacity of desire' (*Begehrungsvermögen*) (see *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 198) can cause confusion because it appears to collapse reason into 'objective interest'. A clear case of such a mis-reading of Kant is C. Daub (see: 855). Daub has taken Kant's label *Begehrungsvermögen* to mean the capacity for sensuous self-interest rather than as the 'appetitive capacity' for 'lawfulness').

and our granting ourselves permission to exercise our autonomous freedom according to 'what ought to be.'

With reference, then, to moral laws (wide, categorical imperatives, not narrow hypothetical imperatives), Kant adds:

[...] [U]nless one wants to refuse the concept of morality all truth and reference to some possible object, one cannot deny that its law has such wide [*ausgebreiteter*] significance that it must hold not merely for human beings but for all rational beings as such, not merely under contingent conditions and with exceptions, but with absolute necessity; then

Kant is neither reducible to a philosophy of self-interest as Daub claims nor a talking head who ignores feelings. In both the 'First Introduction' (1789) AA XX: 246], and the 'Introduction' to the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* (1790) AA V: 198, Kant distinguished humanity's capacities among 1) 'the cognitive capacity' of understanding, grounded in lawfulness (*Gesetzmäßigkeit*); 2) the 'feeling of pleasure and displeasure (*Lust* and *Unlust*) of judgment, grounded in teleological ends (*Zweckmäßigkeit*), and 3) capacity of desire or will (*Begehrungsvermögen*), grounded in humanity's final/highest goal of morals. This is the significance of Kant's 'negative method' in the *Menschenkunde* (see "Kant's 'Negative Method'" in 45, n. 28.) is that: "*Man has not lived so long as in that s/he has savored life, but as long as s/he has exercised [responsibly] her/his agency.*" (*Menschenkunde* XXV,2: 1080; Olms ed.: 261) To exercise agency responsibly requires the third human capacity of reason grounded in humanity's final/highest goal of morals.

In the "Introduction" to the "Doctrine of Right" of the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant distinguishes between 'practical' pleasure (*Lust*) and 'contemplative' pleasure (*Lust*). "The pleasure (*Lust*) which is necessarily connected with the desire (*Begehren*) (of the object whose conception so affects the feeling) may be called *practical pleasure*: it may be the cause or the effect of desire. On the other hand, the pleasure (*Lust*) which is not necessarily connected with the desire (*Begehren*) of the object, and which therefore is not essentially a pleasure in the existence of the object of the imagination, but clings to the imagination alone, may be called merely *contemplative pleasure* or *inactive pleasure*. We call the feeling of the latter kind of pleasure taste (*Geschmack*). *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 212 He further distinguishes between 'desire' (*Begierde*) and 'inclination' (*Neigung*): "[...] [A]s far as practical pleasure (*Lust*) is concerned, the determination of the faculty of desire (*Begehrungsvermögen*), which must necessarily precede practical pleasure as a cause, is called desire (*Begierde*) in the narrow sense, but habitual desire (*Begierde*) is called inclination (*Neigung*) [...]" *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 212 In short, he maintains a distinction between desires for objects and 'a purely rational interest:' "[...] [W]here a purely rational interest must be assumed, no interest of inclination can be imputed to it, yet, [...] we can concede an inclination, even to what can only be the object of an intellectual pleasure, to be a habitual desire from a purely rational interest, which then, however, would not be the cause but the effect of the latter interest, and which we could call *sense-free inclination interest* (*Neigung*) (propensio intellectualis). *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 213 In his *Menschenkunde oder die philosophische Anthropologie*, Kant identifies these two kinds of inclinations (*Neigung*) as 'formal' and 'material': "*All our inclinations (Neigungen) can be divided into formal and material inclinations. Formal inclinations refer, without distinction of objects, to the animation (Bewegung) by which we can satisfy our inclinations in general. They therefore have no particular object [‘contemplative pleasure’]. Material inclinations are those which are determined with respect to the object [‘practical pleasure’]. Formal inclinations are twofold: freedom and ability (Vermögen), which are the first and foremost inclinations (Neigungen) of all. Freedom means the removal of all resistance to act according to one's own inclination: it is a formal negative inclination [freedom-from]; but we also have a positive formal inclination, the possession of the means to fulfil one's inclinations [freedom-for]. With freedom[-from] we seek the state of satisfying the inclinations; with [...] freedom-for] (Vermögen), however, we seek the means to do so.*" (emphasis added) *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1141; Olms ed.: 334–335.

it is clear that no experience can give occasion to infer even just the possibility of such apodictic laws. For [...] how shall laws for the determination of our will be taken as laws of the determination of the [autonomously free] will of a rational being as such and, only as such, for our will as well, if they were merely empirical, and did not originate completely *a priori* from pure but practical reason?³⁰⁹ (McG ed. of CUP trans.)

3) Kant on Future Prognostication

When it comes to the future, Kant sketches out in the opening paragraphs of the second section devoted to the "Conflict with the Law Faculty" of his *Conflict of the Faculties* the usual prognostication alternatives for the future as 1) "moral terrorism" (permanent decline), 2) "eudaimonism" (steady progress); and 3) "Abderitism" (stagnation).

Although Kant warned in his *Lecture on Moral Philosophy* (*Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie*) 23 years earlier that humanity's autonomous freedom gives humanity the power to destroy the earth were it not for its power to restrict its own freedom, he believed in the survival of the human species so that he rejected the notion of "moral terrorism" because that would lead to the elimination of humanity.

Kant writes of the second option, eudaimonism: "The effects cannot exceed the capacity of their cause so that the quantity of good mixed with evil in humanity cannot exceed a certain amount of the evil above which humanity could work its way up and progress to something better. Eudaimonism with its sanguine hope appears to be untenable."

When it comes to Abderitism, he writes: "This opinion probably has the majority on its side [...] In humanity's natural capacity, the principle of evil appears here, as well, not so much to be amalgamated with the good (fused [*verschmolzen*]) but rather one neutralizes the other; with the consequence being inaction (which here would be stagnation) [...], which would result from the perspective of reason in no greater value than other animals have, who play this game with less burden and pursue it without the effort of understanding."

Kant rejects all three prognostications and, true to the Copernican Turn, emphasizes that humanity possesses the capacity for moral improvement, but it is always capable of being compromised by the requirement of the alternative between good and evil principles so that only alone out of the perspective of the tendency of humanity as a whole (the species [*Gattung*]), not on the achievements of individuals, can the issue be decided.

309. Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 408.

Not the actual deeds of individuals but, rather, the "moral character"³¹⁰ of the species [...] confirms at least the capacity [Anlage], which not only allows hope of improvement for the better, but is itself an improvement for the better as far as the capacity is already adequate for such improvement."³¹¹ This confirmed hope is not articulated in the "Conflict with the Law Faculty" as an abstract obligation demanded by the individual of her-/himself in isolation but is the basis for the rejection of political revolution and establishment of democratic, republican government, and a cosmopolitanism in which the sovereignty of nations is reined in by governments themselves by commitment to international agencies (not by a world government) in order to achieve an international, just, economic and political, social order.

Nonetheless, Kant was no blind optimist! His confidence in the long run in the history of a species in possession of transcendental consciousness is grounded in its capacities, not in its certain success. Speaking of the failures and only temporary achievements of political reform, Kant points out:

[...] this philosophical prediction [of eventual, republican government] loses nothing of its power. – The occurrence [of the failure] is too significant, so much interwoven with the interests of humanity, and its impact is so widespread throughout the entire world and revived in memory whenever more favorable circumstances arise and should be awakened for a new attempt of this kind; because then, in a matter of such importance for the human race, the intended constitution must at last at some time attain that firmness which instruction by frequent experience would not fail to effect in the minds of all.³¹²

Here beyond a doubt, Kant challenges those interpreters who take his autonomous moral theory to be concerned merely with the individual and who, as a consequence of his suggestion that pure religion is concerned with morality, claim that he 'reduces' religion to personal morality. Far more accurate would be to say that Kant's autonomous morality includes theoretical reason's understanding of material phenomena without which nothing else can transpire, practical reason's concern for responsible, human creativity, pure religion's goal of encouraging a moral culture (!), a political philosophy of republican government based on the separation of administrative, legislative, and judicial powers, a cosmopolitan philosophy of international cooperation, and a vision of history as an evolving process of success and failure but given the

310. Kant distinguishes between 'physical' character (temperament or the mindset of natural gifts) and 'moral' character (the way of thinking). See Kant, *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1156–1157; Olms ed.: 337). The 'way of thinking' of moral character is to *act on the basis of universal, moral principles*. See *Ibid.* AA XXV,2: 1158, 1169, 1170; Olms ed.: 338, 346, 348). In the *Anweisung*, Kant writes that "Character is what fixes freedom." Kant, *Anweisung* Olms ed.: 58 Character is not innate but "[...] develops late in the individual." Kant, *ibid.*: 58. Kant describes four temperaments: sanguine, choleric, melancholy, and phlegmatic. Kant, *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1158 ff.; Olms ed.: 338 ff. and *Anweisung* Olms ed.: 53–54.

311. Kant, *Streit der Fakultäten* AA VII: 85.

312. Kant, *Streit der Fakultäten* AA VII: 88.

capacities of transcendental consciousness justifies confidence in the human species as a whole.

Kant's shifting of the hope in 'progress' to the species is far broader than Strauß' because it is not limited merely to sovereignty over sensuousness (better, self-interestedness) and over nature but includes constructive progress as a consequence of humanity's creative capacities in theoretical and practical reason, religion, political philosophy, and international cosmopolitan cooperation.

It is accurate to say that Kant's optimism is a matter not merely of advancement of the 'culture of skills' (theoretical reason) but is profoundly an expression of the presence and power of the 'culture that promotes the (moral) will' (practical reason).

What makes homo sapiens human is not understanding (theoretical reason) but morality.³¹³ Theoretical reason's technical, instrumental reason is measurable by an ever expanding quantity of its products as a consequence of its ever expanding understanding of nature. In contrast, practical reason's moral capacity requires no increase in the quantity of capacity but an 'increase in the products of its legality' in order to realize its 'natural' goal³¹⁴ of a society governed by a republican constitution – "even if according to the letter it would not be asked for its consent."³¹⁵

Conclusion

Other than metaphors, there is little, if anything, shared between Hegel/Strauß and Kant when it comes to their understanding of either 'theoretical' or 'practical' reason. Had they not themselves claimed to represent Kant accurately and merely been satisfied to formulate their own version of 'practical reason,' there would be no justification to spill so much ink comparing and contrasting them. However, although Hegel/Strauß claim to be accurate readers of Kant, they, along with the other powerful voices of the anti-Kantian and anti-Enlightenment movement in the first half of the 19th C, sculptured a granite statue of Kant that made it far more difficult to 'return to Kant' for living inspiration – even for 'Kantians.'

Strauß is a paradigmatic example of how, even when understanding himself to be engaged in a 'return to Kant' mid-century, the pre-figured Kant of his predecessors blinded him. Whereas Strauß' epistemological and metaphysical reflections were ignored, the materialistic world view that he articulated in 1872 has come to dominate the hearts and minds of most of humanity today. One might say that Strauß' influence on the subsequent reading of Kant, then, is secondary to his materialism. Yet, his

313. See Kant, *Streit der Fakultäten* AA VII: 72: "[...] Moralität und nicht der Verstand ist es also, was den Menschen erst zum Menschen macht."

314. Kant, *Streit der Fakultäten* AA VII: 91–92.

315. Kant, *Streit der Fakultäten* AA VII: 91.

mis-readings of Kant contributed as much if not more to modern materialism than his mentor, Hegel, who continues to be read as a philosophical 'genius' to this day although he, too, would have failed the Kant seminar.

A quick overview of the themes of this chapter on 'Practical Reason,' illustrate that Kant was never given a chance:

Hegel drove a wedge between theoretical reason and practical that could only be overcome by his dialectical, causal explanation of Absolute Spirit's *a priori* synthesis that generates of all 'that is' both intellectual and actual by means of a dialectical logic of Double Negation.³¹⁶ Whereas Hegel views his philosophy as 'objective,' Absolute Knowledge, he dismisses Kant as a 'subjective relativist,' who elevates subjectivity above the 'truth' of Absolute Objectivity. He, then, accuses Kant of not taking 'pure theoretical reason' (that is, Absolute Spirit) seriously and describes Kant's practical reason as a bottom-up constructivist system of capricious understanding along with individually and socially constructed norms that are all merely 'empty abstractions.'

Yet, Hegel's own meta-narrative involves a circular paradox. Although Absolute Knowledge is the *necessary* condition of possibility for all 'that is,' It, too, also *requires* actual history for It to avoid Its own status as an 'empty abstraction.' The circular paradox is that It avoids the status of an 'empty abstraction' only because it is, ultimately, the author of the very representations that are to ground its actuality. Finally, those very representations, themselves, have no meaning other than as the empty place-setter for Absolute Spirit's Second Negation that is required for Absolute Spirit to experience Its own Absolute Knowledge, Absolute Freedom, and Absolute Truth. Finite history's own pain, suffering, exploitation, persecution, and injustices are meaningless illusions. Meaning is reserved for the Absolute, and finite history is left with only being thankful for having a role in the Absolute Concept's Self-realization.

Furthermore, neither Hegel nor Strauß ever grasped the significance of Kant's autonomous freedom as *both freedom-from and freedom-for*. Hegel, especially, describes the finite, human condition as trapped between subjective freedom and nature's freedom with the role of the state to make possible humanity's winning of its *freedom-from* nature and society, to a degree.

Kant's autonomous freedom is far more profound. It identifies a capacity of transcendental consciousness that makes it the location in the natural, causal order where events intentionally can occur that nature's blind, mechanical (not free!) causality could not begin to achieve. Thanks to the autonomous freedom of transcendental consciousness, nature is open-ended and not a merely zero-sum game of the struggles of interest over limited natural resources and the individual achieves her/his dignity and absolute worth.

Strauß, too, never grasped the significance of autonomous freedom, and he viewed humanity's moral condition as a losing struggle with sensualism that, at least in 1872,

316. On Kant's rejection of dialectic for grounding the ultimate, causal ground of 'what is,' see , see *Critique of Pure Reason* B 697 and Chapter 6: 670.

took solace in the moral development of the species to neutralize the ethical failures of individuals.

Strauß' ignoring of Kant's autonomous freedom is most clear in his treatment of Kant's notion of 'radical evil,' which is taken to be a polished up notion of original sin. Strauß adapts Jakob Böhme's objective notion of evil to account for the driving force of negativity that pushes reality forward in history.

Evil, though, is no version of causality, for Kant. It has the same *amoral* status as the key trilogy of transcendental consciousness: autonomous freedom, radical good, and radical evil with the latter two presupposing the first.

Furthermore, where Hegel and Strauß are dyed-in-the-wool consequentialists, their consequentialism begins where Kant's moral theory arrives as the set of *a priori* conditions and capacities of transcendental consciousness that make consequentialism possible in the first. Place.

To be sure, in 1872 Strauß' materialism views human consciousness no longer as the 'point of indifference' where Absolute Spirit attains consciousness of Itself. Rather, human consciousness is now taken to be the location where nature 'turns inward in itself' to further its materialistic, creative advance. The determinism of Absolute Spirit has been replaced by the determinism of nature. Transcendental consciousness' extra-ordinary *a priori* capacities as the place where there is a genuine open-ness to nature has been entirely eclipsed.

In 1872, Strauß reserves the primary significance of 'moral improvement' to the species. He, thereby, overlooks that any and all experience, understanding, and conscious granting of permission to exercise agency in the world, as well as, rigorous judgment of moral status occurs in the inaccessible inwardness of individual, transcendental consciousness, *not in the consequences of agency or in social pressure*. Consequently, he has no appreciation of Kant's cosmopolitanism, which unites all of humanity on the basis of shared, internal, universal capacities.

Chapter 8: Strauß' Kant Reading Over His Career: Misleading Mentors and Inadequate Influence of Friends

Chapter Overview

After examining key pre-figurations of Kant by his mentors, Strauß' various readings of Kant across Strauß' career are presented.

The Pre-figured Reading that Shaped Strauß' Understanding of Kant

Strauß' philosophical mother's milk was Hegel's 'Philosophy of Religion,' which he acquired at the Gymnasium in Blaubeuren and the Protestant Seminary in Tübingen in the class room of his beloved Professor Ferdinand Christian Baur.¹ Always the bold, clever logician, Hegel unhesitatingly embraced and fueled the popular anti-Kantian and anti-Enlightenment spirit (*Weltgeist*) of his day.² To be sure, Baur located Hegel in the school of pseudo-Clementine Gnosticism and rejected Hegel's accounting for

1. Although not actually published until 1835, in his *LJ* of 1835 Strauß cited Baur's 740 page Christian Gnosticism or Christian Philosophy of Religion in its Historical Development (Die Christliche Gnosis oder die Christliche Religionsphilosophie in ihrer Geschichtlichen Entwicklung).

2. This anti-Kantian/anti-Enlightenment perspective was shared among key figures in Strauß' world: F.C. Baur (see, especially, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 505–506) Hegel (see "Glauben und Wissen" GW II: 287–288 and "4. Aufklärung" in *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* GW XX: 311–313) and, particularly, the vituperative attack of Kant by Carl Daub reported by Strauß in "Schleiermacher und Daub" in which Daub claims that Kant 'despises reason and science' (132) and for whom Kant's understanding of humanity's 'creativity' is merely a manifestation of self-interest (*Selbstsucht*) (94). Included in this anti-Kantian, anti-Enlightenment circle is Schleiermacher, as well. The anti-Enlightenment theme is in *On Religion* of 1799. Andreas Arndt documents that in the announcement of the publication of *On Religion* Leipzig Book Fair, Schleiermacher addressed the "[...] 'enlightened despisers of [... religion]' or 'the enlightened among their despisers.'" Rather than religion's 'cultured despisers,' which Arndt proposes became the sub-title "[...] especially out of consideration for the Atheism Controversy around Fichte." Andreas Arndt, "Schleiermacher und die Religionskritik der Aufklärung:" in *Aufgeklärte Religion und ihre Probleme. Schleiermacher – Troeltsch – Tillich*, Ulrich Barth, Christian Danz, Wilhelm Gräb und Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, hrsg. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2013): 647. correctly points out that "[a] look at the book itself, however, shows that 'despisers' referred to the indifferent rather than the outspoken critics of religion (i.e., those who did not care for the religion in their minds that, according to Schleiermacher, belongs to the *conditio humana*): religion." However, to the extent that Schleiermacher saw science as a threat to religion and his *Glaubenslehre* locates religion in the 'feeling of absolute dependence' (a substitution for Kant's apperception) prior to/deeper than knowledge (Kant's theoretical reason) and morality (Kant's practical reason), he, too, was anti-Kantian and a critic of the Enlightenment.

the 'historicity' of the God/Man,³ yet, he shared with Hegel the meta-narrative of the Double Negation attributed to Absolute Spirit as 'science' (Absolute Knowledge).

For his part, in the opening paragraph of his "Faith and Knowledge or the Reflective, Subjective Philosophy in its Complete Form as Kantian Jacobian, and Fichtean Philosophy" ("Glauben und Wissen oder die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjektivität in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen als Kantische, Jacobische, und Fichtesche Philosophie"), Hegel vituperatively attacks Kant and the Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*) as the 'barbarian' rejection of 'reason' and 'faith':

That reason is a handmaiden of faith, as it was expressed in older times and against which philosophy insurmountably asserted its absolute autonomy, these ideas or expressions have disappeared, and reason, if it is otherwise reason, which gives itself this name, has asserted itself in positive religion in such a way that even a dispute of philosophy against positivity, miracles and the like are regarded as something dismissed and obscure, and that Kant, with his attempt to enliven the positive form of religion with a meaning from his philosophy, did not make anyone happy not because his peculiar [positive] formulations were no longer the same [as had been believed in the past] but because they no longer seemed worthy of this honor of positive claims. *The question is, however, whether the victor, reason, does not suffer the same fate that the victorious strength of barbarian nations tends to have against the defeated weakness of educated ones, namely, to retain the upper hand according to the outward rule, but to succumb to what has been overcome according to the spirit.* The glorious victory that enlightened reason has won over that which, according to the small measure of its religious understanding, it considered itself opposed to as faith, is, when seen in the light of day, no other than that *neither the positive, with which it was struggling, was religion, nor that it, which was victorious, remained reason*, and that the birth of the unifying child of peace, which hovers triumphantly over these corpses as their common element *has as little to do with reason as with true faith.*⁴ (emphasis added)

In other words, what Kant offered as 'enlightened' religion and reason was not only no longer recognizable as traditional Christianity, but it also had little if anything to do with either reason (Absolute Reason) or faith (Absolute Spirit) in Hegel's judgment. Hegel proceeds:

Reason, which in and of itself was already degraded by the fact that *it understood religion only as something positive* [external], *not idealistic*, could not do anything better than to look at itself after the struggle [with faith] and come to its self-knowledge, which acknowledges its own non-being by embracing a belief outside and above it as that which is better than reason itself. This is what has happened in the philosophies of Kant, Jacobi

3. F.C. Baur viewed Hegel as a pseudo-Clementine Gnostic. See "Die Hegel'sche Religions-Philosophie" in *Gnosis*, 679 and 736, n. 34 [actually 738]), and he rejected Hegel's account of the 'historicity' of the God/Man see *ibid.*: 696 (see 697–698, 685, 706, n. 30 [actually 709–710] 721, 734–735) to develop his own understanding of the 'incarnation of the Christ' on the basis of the Gnostic/Hegelian meta-narrative logic of Double Negation but not as a single God/Man but as a singular community, the Christian Church as the body of Christ.

4. Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen": GW II: 287–288.

and Fichte in that philosophy again makes itself the handmaiden of belief. *According to Kant, the supersensible is incapable of being known by reason. The highest idea has no reality [Realität⁵] [...] According to all three [Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte], the Absolute, according to the old distinction between knowledge and faith, cannot be against, as little as for, reason but is above [and inaccessible to] reason.*⁶ (emphasis added)

Kant's philosophy reduces reason, according to Hegel, to 'merely empty ideas' not only because Kant's philosophy is subjectivist construction over against the empirical world but also because already the highest condition of possibility of reason, the highest Idea (Absolute Concept), has no 'actuality'/'reality'⁷ for Kant.

Strauß unequivocally embraced Hegel's anti-Kantianism and anti-Enlightenment reading in the "Concluding Dissertation" of the *LJ* (*Life of Jesus Critically Examined*) where he formulated his 'restauration' of Church dogmatics with his own Hegelian Christology. Nonetheless, he was forced immediately after publication to vigorously defend his Christology against the Hegelians. His *Streitschriften* of 1837⁸ and in his criticism of Carl Daub in his 1839 "Schleiermacher und Daub" article are the documentation of that Hegelian controversy.

In the first volume of his *Glaubenslehre* of 1841, Strauß defends the anti-Enlightenment thesis by drawing an analogy between the use of 'Allegory' in the ancient Church and the 'enlightened,' Rationalist 'Accommodation Theory' of gospel exegesis. He doesn't criticize Kant as a Rationalist exegete who applied the 'Accommodation Theory' to the gospels, but *he surely includes Kant among those of the 'general Enlightenment'*,⁹ who took their understanding of reason to be far superior to the world of the ancient Church.

5. According to Hegel, ideas are 'truth' (*Ideelle*) as intellectual perception (*intellektuelle Anschauung*) whereas representations as sense perception (*sinnliche Anschauung*) are merely 'actuality' (*Wirklichkeit*) as real (*Reelle*), blind without the 'truth' of intellectual perception. Equally, thoughts that are not 'real' (that don't appear in representations) are 'merely empty abstractions.' Hegel's claim is in agreement with Kant's famous aphorism in the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 75 (see as well, B 165–166, 178): thoughts without ideas are 'empty' whereas 'representations' without ideas are 'blind.' Note, though, that Hegel, as Kant does, is taking content to mean sense perception (*sinnliche Anschauung*), not what Hegel normally means with 'content' as intellectual perception (*intellektuelle Anschauung*). Kant takes Kant to mean that the activity of thinking (*Gedanken*) without the 'content' (*Inhalt*) of ideas is meaningless whereas perceptions (*Anschauungen*) without concepts (*Begriffe*) are blind. In other words, As an idealist, Hegel turns Kant's emphasis on the embeddedness of reason in a world of empirical appearances into an elevation of true ideas above the world of appearances (*Wirklichkeit*). See the Chapter I: "Methodology:" 160, n. 186.

6. Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen" GW II: 288.

7. It is not insignificant that Kant distinguishes between 'concepts' of the understanding and the three 'pure ideas of reason' (God, freedom/cosmology, and the soul) in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In other words, 'concepts' are not 'ideas' as, for example, in Platonism.

8. The *Streitschriften* also contain his response to the Conservative Christians.

9. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 147.

[T]he need for a middle link had to become all the more urgent, which [...] in the manner of the old allegory connected together the diverging sides, the literal sense of the biblical writer and that which the interpreter would have liked to have found. The author of the sacred text said something, but he should have said something else. Certainly, he wanted to do so, and would have done so if he had had as his audience *such enlightened scholars as his present interpreters*; the original authors had to submit to the prejudices of their contemporaries. As in Origen's time allegory, so now accommodation, was the link by which the supposed lead and copper of the biblical ideas was transformed into the pure gold of reasonable religious concepts – with the common aim of avoiding prejudice to the appearance of the biblical persons and authors.¹⁰ (emphasis added)

For Strauß 'Enlightenment' means superior rationality. Applied to biblical exegesis here, it resulted in the Rationalists' 'Accommodation' theory of exegesis or 'making the text say what one wants it to say,' which was the 'modern' equivalent of the 'Allegorical' reading in the early Church.¹¹ In this respect, the 'enlightened' Rationalists and ancient Allegorists claimed to be following the example of 'Christ' in Matthew 13:13 ("The reason I talk to them in parables is that they look without seeing and listen without hearing or understanding") and the Apostle Paul I Cor. 3:1–2 ("I treated you as sensual men, still infants in Christ. What I fed you with was milk, not solid food, for you were not ready for it; and indeed, you are still not ready for it since you are still unspiritual").¹²

Hegel concludes that, as with ancient allegory, the Rationalists' and Kant with their 'enlightened reason' suffered the same fate of succumbing to the barbarism of what had been overcome because they were no longer recognizable as traditional belief or satisfying as an alternative, Christian doctrine.

The Hegelian *Weltgeist* that formatively shaped the early Strauß' understanding of Kant divided 'theoretical' and 'practical' reason between the intelligible and the perceptible.¹³ *With respect to 'theoretical' reason, Hegel's primary concern is 'pure thought,' which is imperceptible, Absolute Knowledge and consists of the singular, a priori synthetic judgment of the Absolute One as a causal system that generates 'all that is.' In contrast, Kant's primary concern is 'pure reason,' which is the required, imperceptible elements that make it possible for transcendental consciousness to experience, understand, and exercise responsible agency in the phenomenal world.* These imperceptible elements include the multiple (not merely Hegel's singular) *a priori* synthetic judgments that enable *understanding* phenomena and exercise agency in the world.

10. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 147–148.

11. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 147–148, esp. n. 22.

12. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 149.

13. This summary is drawn, primarily, from Hegel's "Glauben und Wissen" GW II: 287–433; "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten:" 90–178; GW II: 434 – 530, and "The Moral View of the World" in the *Phänomenologie* GW III: 442–452.

With respect to 'practical' reason, Hegel limits 'practical thought' to a *posteriori* analytic judgments.¹⁴ Analytic here means 'distinguishing' (*diairesis/dihairesis/διαίρεσις*), and the thinker's task is to establish the identity of things by distinguishing their differences from other things. Plato called those who engage in this method "dialecticians" (Phaedrus 266b). The identity (synthesis) of 'practical thought' is exclusively *a posteriori*, and, for Hegel, this synthesis is the effect of the bottom-up dialectic between perceived 'representations' (perceptible, *actual form*) and abstract 'concepts' (imperceptible, *true content*). Hegel's 'practical thought' provides the 'actual'/'real' basis for a hierarchical system of dialectic that assures that ideas are not 'empty' by 'grounding' the 'truth' that is ideas in actuality, which, in turn, serve as the ground for the ultimate dialectic's achievement of Absolute Knowledge. In contrast, the primary concern of Kant's 'practical reason' is the required, imperceptible elements that make it possible for transcendental consciousness to exercise responsible, creative, autonomous freedom in the physical world.

Furthermore, Hegel's meta-narrative claims to be a monism with Absolute Knowledge, which consists of the exclusive 'sovereignty' of Absolute Spirit above sensuous experience although he insists on a dualism between Absolute Freedom and nature's freedom as the condition for the Second Negation, results in Absolute Knowledge of the Absolute Concept. In contrast, Kant identifies two 'domains' in which finite, transcendental consciousness is 'sovereign' (in the sense of possessing understanding in the world): nature and autonomous freedom.¹⁵ These are not two, objective dimensions over-against one another as are Hegel's Absolute Freedom and nature's freedom. Rather, they are two systems of lawfulness in a single world of appearances. The 'ground,' then, for Kant's necessary (that is, required, not prescribing) knowledge is 'lawfulness': the imperceptible, physical laws that govern nature as well as the imperceptible, moral laws of autonomous freedom.

Whereas Hegel's philosophy is elitist because Absolute Knowledge is limited either to a single individual (the Christ) or a few persons (those philosophers who grasp the significance of the 'point of indifference,' which is the Second Negation), Kant's philosophy is egalitarian because the conditions of possibility of theoretical (understanding) and practical reason (moral responsibility) are universally shared by all although individuals are different with respect to the skills that each cultivates by means of 'theoretical reason' as well as by the internal permission that each individual must give to her-/himself to allow an exercise of agency. In short, Kant's 'autonomous freedom' of 'practical reason' universally grounds the dignity of all persons. Dignity is owed to all transcendental consciousness. Respect, however, is not based on the bestowal of status and prestige by others but on the degree to which one adheres to the two systems of

14. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten:" GW II: 460, 463, 466–467.

15. See Kant, *The Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 174.

imperceptible lawfulness that govern nature and autonomous freedom in the world.¹⁶ One knows whether one has earned respect or disdain without need of any applause or scorn from others.

Another crucial difference between Hegelian 'pure thought' and Kantian 'pure reason' is that *Hegel calls for the elevation of consciousness out of the world* with a promise of spiritual 'perfection'/'divinization' of the individual by achieving Absolute Knowledge and Absolute Freedom. In contrast, *Kant's sole concern is ever-expanding understanding and pursuit of responsible agency in this world* by any and all species that possess transcendental consciousness. Although Kant doesn't deny or affirm an 'after-life' (because such a judgment is a fanciful claim beyond the limits of reason), he emphasizes that the after-life's significance is its contribution to our efforts at understanding and responsible agency in this world. In short, whereas the exclusive goal of Hegel's system is to achieve Absolute Knowledge (as causal explanation) *beyond the sensuous world*, the goal of Kant's system is to achieve understanding (as an open-ended activity and responsible agency) *in the sensuous world*.

Hegel 'read out' of Kant what he 'read into' him. There is little evidence other than shared metaphors that he came even close to understanding him. The tragedy is that so many (including Strauß) thought that he did understand him.

On Strauß' Understanding of Kant

Six elements account for Strauß' understanding of Kant although he never thoroughly read him:

- I) Strauß' view of Kant in the *LJ*
- II) Carl Daub's Reading of Kant from Strauß' 1839 "Schleiermacher und Daub"
- III) After a twenty year theological silence, a theology treatise nudged by the 'Return to Kant Movement'
- IV) What Hegel Distorted and Strauß Overlooked in Kant: Aesthetic Judgment
- V) On the Significance of Skepticism and the Copernican Turn
- VI) Why Strauß' Failed Kantian Turn Matters

I) Strauß' view of Kant in The Life of Jesus Critically Examined

In 1835, Strauß refers only to Kant's moral "ideals" and Christology while devoting no attention to the philosophical framework of Kant's *theoretical* and *practical* reason that grounds them. His Christology erroneously equates Schleiermacher's Christology of

16. See Kant, *The Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 76–89, esp. 81*; 92, 151–152 and *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 467–468. See Recki, *Ästhetik der Sitten*: 272–278.

"Perfect God-consciousness" with Kant's Christology of "Moral Ideals." Furthermore, he entirely ignores Kant's presentation of the strength (*Kraft*) of reason that is able to grasp the imperceptible order of phenomena even, as in the case of beauty, without concepts as well as reason's sublimity being 'greater' than the infinite universe and more 'powerful' than nature.

I examine nine thematic strands to Strauß' reading of Kant as presented in the LJ:

1. Hegel's Reclined Plato and Kant as a 'subjectivist'
2. Strauß has no grasp of what Kant means by 'critique'
3. Religion is morality that is 'grounded' only in 'empty ideas'
4. Sensuousness is evil
5. Kant claimed no role for the resurrection and ascension of Christ. The afterlife defended by Strauß' Kant is merely the figurative expressions of humanity's embracing of the ideal of the moral order in the sense of Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" and F.C. Baur as merely 'abstract' and 'ineffectual' obligation
6. Strauß misunderstands the role of moral perfection in Kant's moral philosophy
7. Kant's exclusive focus was on the individual, not on the species
8. Strauß claims that Kant a) grounded moral principles in the scriptures and b) that Kant anachronistically projected the morality of his age onto the past.
9. Kant is faulted for not providing an historical account for the rise of religion or the scriptures.

1) Hegel's Reclined Plato and Kant as a 'Subjectivist'

Kant's 'ideal,' Strauß criticizes, is not the Hegelian, 'objective,' Absolute Idea but finite, subjective (and ineffectual) ideas "confined to reason." At least echoing Hegel's "Glauben und Wissen" of 1802, Strauß writes that Kant "[...] as a philosopher, did not concern himself with [...] history [...] [H]e sought the idea involved in [...] history : not, however, considering it as [...] an absolute idea, at once theoretical as well as practical, but regarding it only on its practical side, as what he called the moral imperative and consequently belonging to the finite.¹⁷" (emphasis added)

A helpful strategy for grasping what is meant here by 'objective' and 'subjective' is to employ Plato's *pre-figured* Similes of the Sun and Line:

In Book VI of the *Republic*, Plato employs the 'Simile of the Sun' (*Republic* 507b-509c) and 'Simile of the Line' (*Republic* 509c-511e) to indicate four regions of experience and their significance.¹⁸

17. Strauß, LJ: 51.

18. For a drawing of the Simile of the Line and more detailed analysis, see Douglas McGaughey, *Strangers and Pilgrims: 222–239.* and McGaughey, *Religion Before Dogma: Groundwork in Practical Theology* (New York: T & T Clark International, 2006): 115–126. Available on-line with permission

Pressed by his interlocutors to say what the Good is, Socrates first employs the 'Simile of the Sun' as an introductory formulation of the functions of the Good. With Being consisting of the unchanging ideas of the mind, the Good itself is a 'unity above Being' (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας).¹⁹ Plato speaks of the physical sun as the 'source' of light that is required for any and all perception in the world with the eye the most prized capacity that enables sight. Furthermore, the sun is also the source of (the condition that enables) all life in the world. The sun, then, has two functions: It is the source of light that 'unites' the eye and the object, and it also enables 'generation and growth.' According to Plato, we are to think of the Good in the imperceptible, intelligible realm of the mind as analogous to the physical sun in the perceptible realm: The Good enables intellectual perception and intellectual 'generation and growth.'

In the 'Simile of the Line' that immediately follows the Simile of the Sun, Plato describes experience by means of a 'stick figure' that is divided into four sections. He does not say explicitly that the line is to be drawn vertically, but the tradition took it to be so drawn.

Beginning with the vertical line as a 'whole', undivided line, Plato calls for an initial division between the perceptible realm of 'becoming' and the imperceptible realm of 'Being.' These two divisions, themselves are unequally divided in two, which results in four regions with the lower regions in both the perceptible and the imperceptible realms being larger than the upper regions. Beginning at the bottom, Plato labels these four regions as: 1) copies and shadows, 2) objects of perception, 3) understanding, and 4) reason. These regions get their 'size' because of the quantities they involve (not their 'importance'). Hence, there are more copies and shadows than there are objects of perception, and understanding is concerned with more content greater than reason.

'Imagination' is the key mental capacity that 'connects' the understanding with the 'images' of the objects of perception. The 'appearances' are, at least in principle, infinite. The 'imagination' is necessary because images, shadows, and objects cannot be placed directly in the mind. However, what 'connects' the two imperceptible realms of reason and understanding in the mind is 'ideas' (not 'images' of appearances, obviously) with both understanding and reason using the same ideas but for different functions.

The key to all four regions, according to Plato, is a bottom-up epistemological 'dialectic.' Beginning at the bottom, each of the segments establishes the theses and antitheses, which permits the experience of the segment above it. The differences among copies and shadows (requiring thesis and antithesis to distinguish among them) are 'united' (synthesis) by the appropriate, physical object of which they are a copy. In the second segment of the line, the differences among sets of physical objects (requiring thesis and antithesis to distinguish among them) are 'united' (synthesis) by

of the respective publishers on the home page at <https://criticalidealism.org>. See as well in the "Foreword:" 19 n. 1.

19. Plato, *Republic* 509b.

their appropriate 'idea.' The differences among ideas (requiring thesis and antithesis to distinguish among them) result in the highest form of 'unification' (synthesis), that is, the Good. The Good is the originating unity, which Plato says is 'above Being,' yet inseparable from 'Being.'

Whereas the crucial point of transition between the perceptible and the imperceptible realms is the mental capacity of the 'imagination,' Plato calls 'understanding' the region of experience devoted to comprehending the realm of sense perception 'below' it. Understanding matches up the appropriate 'ideas' with the appearances of the sensible realm that are only experienced in the imagination, in order to 'make sense of' the lower realms of objects and copies/shadows. Understanding, then, constitutes the bulk of the individual's mental activity, according to Plato. Hence, its segment on the line is larger than that of reason above it.

Reason, Plato says, is the mental capacity of 'contemplation' (θεωρία, *theoria*), which employs the same ideas as the understanding but, unlike understanding which 'looks downward' to the realm of becoming, reason 'looks upward' towards the Good. It does so not by matching up an idea with its appropriate phenomena because the Good is 'above' all becoming and even ideas. In other words, *the Good is not the highest Idea*. Rather, reason contemplates the Good by distinguishing between ideas (as thesis and antithesis) as imperceptible, mental 'things' to then think what cannot be directly thought, which is their unity.

Given that the Good is taken to be 'above' Being but is on the unified continuum from shadows and images all the way up to the top of the line, *the Good*, then, is *neither an Idea among ideas nor is it mere nothing*. The Good is the ultimate unity of all ideas and understanding in the mind as well as the ultimate unity of all that is becoming in the perceptible realm. In short, *the Good is no 'thing' (no-thing) yet the imperceptible unity of everything*. Remove the Good, which is not nothing, and the whole system of dialectic collapses into nothingness. Plato's Simile of the Sun challenges his reader to think of this no-thingness of the Good as analogous to the Sun's two functions of light and life in the perceptible realm. The Good, then, is the 'light' of the mind that enables 'all that is.'

In my *Strangers and Pilgrims*,²⁰ I proposed that an option for understanding this two-fold function of the Good as no-thing yet connected to every-thing is to take it to be *the possibilities* that all actuality conceals but presupposes. Remove possibilities, and, like the light of the physical sun, there can be neither mental experience nor experience of perceptions in the world. Furthermore, possibilities, like the sun as source of generation and growth, are what is required for there to be any generation and growth, whatsoever. Plato's Good, then, would may be thought of as *amoral* possibilities, which are inseparably related to *moral virtue* because there is finite

20. See McGaughey, *Strangers and Pilgrims*: 228–229. On Plato's Similes of the Sun and Line, see: 19, n. 1.

consciousness/mind that can assume responsibility for the possibilities that it intentionally actualizes.

Turning now to Hegel: His reading of Kant as a subjectivist can be understood as Hegel having *re-figured* Plato's four 'regions' of experience and their significance in that Hegel *con-figures* Plato's *pre-figuration* by means of new metaphors and adding a 'top-down' dialectical logic based on the ultimate synthesis of Absolute Spirit as the Good to Plato's 'bottom-up' epistemology.

Rather than treat the Simile of the Line as a vertical relationship (a standing stick figure) between the ultimate source and all that is dependent upon it, Hegel can be read as taking the Simile of the Line to be horizontal history (a reclined stick figure) with the ultimate source of all that is in the immeasurable past. Furthermore, Hegel can be read as adding to Plato's *bottom-up dialectical process* of understanding a claim for Absolute Knowledge of the ultimate source of 'all that is' by introducing a *top-down dialectical process of causal logic* to portray the generation of history out of its ultimate source.²¹

Just as Plato is said to have 'de-mythologized' Greek Mythology by substituting his doctrine of eternal ideas (λόγοι) for 'stories' (μῦθοι) about the Greek Gods, Hegel has 'de-mythologized' Greek Gnosticism by substituting his logical meta-narrative of Double Negation (λόγοι) for Gnostic stories (μῦθοι) of cataphasis/κατάφασις and apophasis/ἀπόφασις. Hegel's 'novelty' is that his own anthropomorphic 'stick-figure' is reclined on a chaise lounge (κλίνη), not standing – as Plato's line is usually drawn. Hegel's version represents historical Immanentism in contrast to those who take Plato's line to represent a Personal Theism as 'outside' and 'above' history.

In the *Timaeus* (27d ff; 69b-70a), Plato describes 'creation' of the world as the action of the (anthropomorphic) Demiurge (a Personal Deity) who thinks and then copies her/his thoughts externally. In Philo of Alexandria²² and Christianity (John's gospel and Justin Martyr, especially, as well as the Church Fathers, generally) this is expressed by the 'thought Logos' (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος) and the 'spoken Logos' (λόγος προφορικὸς). Creation by God is a two-step process: first, thinking; second, externalization of her/his thought in matter. Note: creation is described anthropomorphically!

Strauß writes indirectly of Hegel and the two forms of the λόγος in the *Glaubenslehre*:

God is only a Person to the extent that he eternally generates his Son [McG: λόγος προφορικὸς] with whom He is joined in the unity of Spirit [McG: λόγος ἐνδιάθετος]. This would be that relationship in God that Hegel calls a play of love with Himself, which *does not amount to a serious alterity, that is, to separation and a rupture* [Entzweiung, literally, a

21. On Kant's rejection of dialectic for grounding the ultimate, causal ground of 'what is,' see, see in *Critique of Pure Reason* B 697 and Chapter 6: 670.

22. On Plato's/Philo's two-step creation, see the "Vol. II: Introduction:" 543.

twofoldness²³. Yet, amazingly, this is merely an immanent distinction within God Himself and is, according to Hegel, not yet truth. He [Hegel] says that *the life of God* and divine knowledge may well be an externally spoken [= λόγος προφορικὸς] play of love. However, this idea *diminishes to edification, even to blandness when the gravity, the pain, the patience, and the work of negation is not included in it.*"²⁴ (emphasis added)

Whereas Plato employs bottom-up dialectic to 'move up' the four segments of the line from shadows to the Good, Hegel, adds a 'top-down' dialectic of negation (horizontally, left-to-right) that accounts for the 'creation' of the multiplicity of ideas, the phenomenal world, and the emergence of finite consciousness. Finite consciousness as the level of 'understanding' is at least capable of being the location of a 'turn' or 'point of indifference.'²⁵ Those who 'know' are capable of 'reversing' this first sequence of dialectical negation that moves 'downward' from Absolute Spirit to multiplicity by means of the 'Platonic' dialectic that leads 'upward' to Absolute Spirit/Absolute Unity/Absolute Freedom, above multiplicity. A Dialectic of Double Negation (unity negating into multiplicity; multiplicity, in turn, negating into unity) governs Hegel's meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit coming to awareness of Itself in finite spirit (consciousness) at the 'point of indifference' (both as a turn to unity or non-difference and a turn away from multiplicity, which is ultimately affectless) where multiplicity is 'negated' in thought to 'return' to Absolute Spirit's Oneness. Absolute Spirit is the single, *a priori* synthetic dialectical judgment that is 'objectively' necessary for the creation of the conditions that are necessary in order for it to be experienced by 'subjective,' finite consciousness in history.

Therefore, according to Hegel, *Kant's 'limiting' of reason to 'finite consciousness' of phenomena is a decapitation of Absolute Reason.* With respect to Plato's Simile of the Line, then, *Kant limits reason to 'understanding' and he ignores the necessity of Absolute Spirit that is reason 'above' understanding.*

Hegel writes in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (*Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*):

*Reason [...] demands of itself to lead perception, experience, understanding back to the infinite [Plato's 'bottom-up' dialectic]. That would be the most concrete thing, unification of the infinite with the finite of understanding or even of perception.*²⁶ (emphasis added)

23. One can almost here Derrida's discussion of dyads here. The moral ideal, then, i

24. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 513.

25. Hegel calls this event in finite consciousness the 'point of indifference.' On 'the point of indifference' as both a turn to non-difference and affectless, see the "Preface:" 50.

26. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* GW XX: 353.

α) On Hegel's singular, supposedly 'objective' and *a priori*, synthetic judgment:

Although Hegel's/the early Strauß' dialectical account of 'reality' commences with a singular, *a priori synthesis* of Absolute Oneness, this ultimate *a priori* synthetic element is 'dogmatically' necessary not because it can be empirically proved to exist but is logically necessary. Given the 'reality' of history, an *a priori* Absolute One has 'obviously' initiated the creation of all multiplicity that is the condition for finite consciousness to grasp Absolute Oneness as an *a posteriori* syntheses. It is the achievement of Hegelian 'science' or Absolute Knowledge of 'pure theoretical reason' that it can comprehend the entire cataphatic and apophatic process of negation that is 'truth.' In other words, the singular, *a priori* synthesis of Absolute Oneness, is 'scientifically' known only as the product of *a posteriori*, dialectical synthesis that only finite spirit (finite consciousness) is able to comprehend because it can comprehend unity in multiplicity.

However, this Hegelian notion of *synthesis* distorts Kant's pivotal, epistemological element of the Copernican Turn and *theoretical* reason. Kantian *a priori* synthetic judgment is no, objective (!) and absolutely knowable (!) *a priori*, dialectical synthesis that gives finite consciousness Absolute Knowledge and the prideful status of the pinnacle of the universe. Rather, Kant's notion of *a priori* synthetic judgment is a *required supplement* (*Ergänzung*) even to *a posteriori* dialectic's synthesis.²⁷ Kantian *a priori* synthetic judgment is concerned with what humanity *necessarily adds to the phenomena* that are not given with the phenomena themselves *in order to experience, understand phenomena and to exercise responsible agency in the world. Kant is neither speaking of a priori synthesis as an a priori, ultimate, eminent, causal origin and goal of 'all that is' nor even as the consequence of a dialectic that determines a concept in common to a set of phenomena* (hence, *a posteriori*). Kant's understanding of *a priori* is 180° opposite to the goal of Hegelian 'scientific' logic.

β) On Hegel's Bifurcation of *Theoretical* and *Practical* Reason:

According to Hegel, 'theoretical reason' or what he calls 'theoretical philosophy' is concerned with the dimension of *spiritual Absolute Knowledge*, not with the understanding of the domain of *empirical phenomena*, which, in dramatic contrast, is the domain of Kant's 'theoretical reason'.²⁸

27. On the distinction between *a priori* synthesis as supplementary (*erweiternd*) and analytical illuminating (*erläuterend*), see Kant, *Metaphysik Mrongovius* AA XIX: 968.

28. Kant speaks of two 'domains' of reason: nature and autonomous freedom. See the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 175 ff. Both are experienced, as far as we have ever experienced them, only in a world of phenomena. Neither is concerned with rapturous claims (*Schwärmereien*) about 'absolute knowledge' 'above' phenomena, as the case with Hegel.

Whereas Kant distinguishes 'theoretical reason' from 'practical reason' as two complementary domains of empirical experience, which are governed by overlapping systems of lawfulness, Hegel separates them. Hegel's 'theoretical reason'/'theoretical philosophy' is concerned with 'abstraction,' whereas 'practical reason,' what he calls 'practical philosophy' is concerned with empirical experience. The former, theoretical reason, is 'synthetic'²⁹, and the latter, practical reason, is analytic.³⁰ *In contrast to Kant's notion of autonomous freedom that intentionally initiates a sequence of events that on its own nature could never accomplish, Hegel's concept of Absolute Freedom consists in liberation from sensuousness with all of its pain, suffering, and injustice because it is limited to the dimension of abstract Spirit.* Hegel's finite freedom consists merely in spontaneous choice within the confines of nature's own, limiting freedom and the state's social institutions. Neither Hegel nor Strauß have a notion remotely equivalent to Kant's autonomous freedom.

By yoking *theoretical* and *practical* reason and subordinating *theoretical* to *practical* reason, 'science' for Kant is not the route of escape from sensuousness or a license for humanity to capriciously exploit or 'subdue' nature, as Strauß suggests.³¹ *Theoretical reason's subordination to practical reason is demanded by theoretical reason itself as an exercising of autonomous freedom.* Theoretical reason for Kant can only say 'what is.' It cannot begin to answer the highest question of transcendental consciousness: 'what ought to be.' As far as we have experienced, no other species possesses in degree anything like humanity's theoretical and practical 'sovereignty' over nature. Why? – because it is *a sovereignty that is accompanied with the possibility of assumption of moral responsibility for its agency* unlike anything in degree remotely like humanity is capable!

To view the capacity of the mind with respect to nature as a power that subdues nature, as does Strauß, is profoundly different from Kant's notion of *practical* reason grounded in *autonomous freedom*, which involves *freedom-from* nature as well as *freedom-for* consciously creating things that nature cannot achieve on its own.

Without *autonomous freedom*, there is only 'subjugation' of nature by humanity. However, Kant makes clear that merely subduing nature is not the goal of either *theoretical* or *practical* reason. *Autonomous freedom* involves far more than the mere power of subjugation.³² *Autonomous freedom* is the capacity that *makes it possible* for us to hold ourselves morally responsible for our decisions and actions.

29. Hegel's notion of 'synthesis' is that of dialectic, the result (*a posteriori*) of an examination of a 'thesis' and an 'antithesis.' As I have said, his one, singular, *a priori* synthesis is a 'dogmatic' claim for Absolute Spirit as a *creative cause* of all that is.

30. See Hegel's "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 457–58, 460, 463, 466.

31. Strauß speaks of humanity's use of science to 'subdue' nature. Strauß, *LJ*: 778, 779–781.

32. This non-subjugation is clear from Kant's own discussion of the three forms of *categorical* imperatives. Although there is no proof or disproof that one is acting on a universal, moral principle, the first form of the *categorical imperative* offers a criterion to avoid merely acting on the basis of self-interest: We ought to act on the basis of a principle that "we would want" to be universal, like a

Autonomous freedom, then, is no license to destroy nature. Not least because there can be no theoretical or practical reason without a material world, humanity has a fundamental responsibility to preserve the material conditions upon which it depends to the degree that humanity influences those material conditions. This priority of the natural order of things is a crucial, yet ignored, element of the aim of 'subduing nature' that, on the one hand, Strauß values in 'science.' However, on the other hand, the Hegelian goal of 'science' as 'objective,' Absolute Knowledge and Absolute Freedom, as I have stressed, reduces the phenomenal world to insignificance/blandness (that is an indifference in two respects³³) because the 'actual' representations of experience are a matter of indifference in the dual sense of 1) valuing Absolute Oneness over multiplicity and 2) phenomenal experience only serving as an 'empty' X in a logical equation.

However, according to Hegel and Strauß, Kant just didn't 'get it' because he limited his understanding of reason to what is 'understanding' on Plato's line. Hegel claims that Kant was aware of the importance of Absolute Spirit, but he chose to 'ignore' it. "That understanding [not reason] is the absolute of the human spirit, Kant never seems to have a slight doubt about,³⁴ but understanding is the absolutely fixed,

law of nature. However, this is no excuse to turn capricious self-interest into a universal law. It is a commitment to seek universals to rein-in self-interest.

Among these wider, universal principles are what Kant calls the 'maxims of the understanding:' not allowing ourselves or treating the other as merely a means rather than an end, acknowledging the autonomous freedom (hence, dignity) of all other rational beings (see the second and third forms of the *categorical imperative* in Section II of the *Groundwork*, not lying, not taking one's own life because of melancholy, developing one's talents, responding to the suffering of others (Kant's four examples of *categorical imperatives* in Section II of the *Groundwork*), rejection of the exploitation, oppression, and persecution of others (including the rejection of racism, slavery, colonialism, and aristocracies (see "Was Kant a Racist? With an Addendum: On South Sea Islanders in the *Groundwork*" at <https://criticalidealism.org/was-kant-a-racist-with-addendum-on-south-sea-islanders-01-may-2017/> [pdf version has page numbers] 7 January 2022), not intentionally testifying falsely against another (see *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 30, 155–156), keeping promises (see the *Metaphysics of Morals*, AA VI: 219–210), not taking advantage of the inexperience of others (see the *Groundwork* AA IV: 397), and, especially, proper care of animals (see the *Metaphysics of Morals*, AA VI: 443–444), ecological concern for nature (the material basis for all theoretical and practical reason) (see *ibid.*, AA VI: 443). See Georg Geismann, "Kant's Alleged Racism: The Failure of Charles W. Mills (and all too many others)" at https://www.academia.edu/43558508/Kant_s_Alleged_Racism_The_Failure_of_Charles_W_Mills_and_all_too_many_others_. See as well, Geismann, "Why Kant was not a 'Racist': Kant's 'Race Theory' within the Context of Physical Geography and Anthropology – A Philosophical Approach Instead of Ideologically Motivated Ones" in *Annual Review of Law and Ethics – Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik*, 30 (2022): 263–357., and McGaughey, "Was Kant Anti-Semitic? with an Addendum on Duty" at <https://criticalidealism.org/category/was-kant-a-racist/>.

33. On the two meanings of Hegel's notion of 'indifference,' see the "Preface:" 50.

34. Hegel appears to be referencing to Kant's claim that it never occurred to Kant to doubt the existence of things (see *Prolegomena* AA IV: 293) and that the very *a priori* conditions, capacities, and structures of transcendental consciousness could never be experienced were there to be no phenomenal world that requires them for the phenomenal world to be experienced, understood, and for there to be

insurmountable finiteness of human reason."³⁵ Hence, Kant is a 'mere subjectivist' and rejects Hegel's 'objective' Absolute Knowledge.

In other words, were Hegel and the early Strauß to have adequately understood Kant's notion of the 'limits' to reason, they could have grasped that their claims to 'objective' Absolute Knowledge would merely be the ineffective flapping of the Dove imagining that flying in a vacuum would be easier and dreaming that it could do so.³⁶ In the "First Preface" to the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant writes: "[...] the chief question is always simply this: – what and how much can the understanding and reason know apart from all [empirical] experience? Not: – how is the faculty of thought itself possible? *The latter is [...] the search for the cause of a given effect, and to that extent is similar to a hypothetical in character* (although as I shall show elsewhere, it is not really so) [...]"³⁷ (Kant's parentheses) (emphasis added)

the domain of responsible agency. Yet, Kant surely did not ignore either 'noumena' or the Noumenon (God).

On 'noumena,' generally, see *Critique of Pure Reason* B 311: "The division of objects into phenomena and noumena and of the world into a world of the senses and a world of the intellect can therefore not be admitted at all in a positive sense, although concepts do admit the division into sensual and intellectual ones; for one cannot determine an object for the latter and therefore also cannot declare them to be objectively valid. If we abandon the senses, how can one make it comprehensible that our categories (which would be the only remaining concepts for noumena) still mean something universally because, for their relation to some object, something more than merely the unity of thought, namely, a possible perception, must be given, to which they can be applied. [McG: Note: *Kant is rejecting dualism here!*] Nonetheless, if the concept of a noumenon be taken in a merely problematic sense, it is not only admissible, but as setting limits to sensibility [it] is likewise indispensable. However, in that case a noumenon is not a special intelligible object for our understanding, but the understanding appropriate to it is itself a problem. Namely, it is not understood discursively by means of categories but intuitively whose possibility we can't begin to conceive. In this way, our understanding gets a negative extension. That is, it is not limited by sensuousness but rather limits it by calling things in themselves (not considered as appearances) noumena. However, it also immediately limits itself not to recognize them by any categories and, thus, thinks them only under the name of an unknown something."

On the 'Noumenon' (God), see *Prolegomena* AA IV: 356–357: "If we connect the command to avoid all transcendent judgments of pure reason with the command (which apparently conflicts with it) to proceed to concepts that lie beyond the field of its [...] empirical use, we discover that both can subsist together but only at the boundary of all permitted use of reason [...]"

However, we remain on this boundary if we limit our judgment only to the relationship that the world may have to a being whose concept itself lies beyond all knowledge of which we are capable within the world. For then we do not attribute to the highest being any of the qualities in itself by which we think of objects of experience, and thereby avoid dogmatic anthropomorphism; but we nevertheless attribute them to the relation of it to the world and permit ourselves a symbolic anthropomorphism, which in fact concerns only language and not the object itself."

35. Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen" GW II: 313.

36. See *Critique of Pure Reason* B 8–9. See as well, *Groundwork* AA IV: 462–463.

37. *Critique of Pure Reason* A xvii.

2) Strauß has no grasp of what Kant means by 'critique'

Given that Strauß has no grasp of the Kantian notion of *a priori* synthetic judgment, he has no understanding of what Kant means by 'critique.' Strauß engages in "criticism," not "critique" of the gospels. Criticism is *a posteriori* analytical; critique is *a priori* synthetic. Strauß examination of the gospels is literary criticism, not transcendental critique.

Strauß' "criticism" involves an incredibly detailed analysis of the text as an exercise in *diairesis* (διαίρεσις),³⁸ breaking down into its constitutive parts a set of phenomena for the purpose of comparing and contrasting them among themselves and with other phenomena. It is a form of analysis that is concerned with perceptible phenomena, not the *a priori* conditions that make it possible for us to perceive phenomena.

That Strauß' understanding of *Kritik* as empirical 'criticism' has nothing to do with 'transcendental critique' is most clear in his *Hermann Samuel Reimarus und seine Schutzschrift* [*Herman Samuel Reimarus and his Protected Writing*] Nowhere does Strauß refer to the task of identifying the conditions of possibility of transcendental consciousness in any form. Rather, *Kritik* is the objective 'criticism' of *diairesis*, which distinguishes between and among perceptible phenomena. Strauß identifies two levels of *Kritik* in Reimarus' work: the first distinguishes between what is 'supernatural' and 'natural' whereas the second distinguishes between what is historically factual and historically false.³⁹ Because the 'mythical' involves, usually, only the 'critical' distinguishing between the 'supernatural' and the 'natural' (with only a few mythical stories having an historical kernel) and in light of Strauß' criticism that 'First' Testament stories, unlike Classical Mythology, have not benefited from the shift to historical criticism as in the 'pagan' world.⁴⁰ Strauß' focus after the first *LJ* of 1835 is historical criticism to the neglect of the 'kernel' at the core of the *genetic mythical principle*: the presupposed, individual theology that shaped the writings of the scriptural authors.

3) Religion is morality that is 'grounded' only in 'empty ideas:'

A paradigmatic example of Strauß engaging in 'criticism' and not what Kant calls 'critique' as well as illustrative of Strauß' failure to understand Kant, is Strauß' use of the metaphors, but not the content, of Kant's understanding of 'pure' religion.⁴¹ Primarily, Strauß is only concerned to establish from the perspective of Hegelian 'science' that

38. On *diairesis* (διαίρεσις), see Chapter 3, the section "Academic Controversy Based on Criticism (*diairesis*):" 219 ff.

39. See D. F. Strauß, *Gesammelte Schriften von David Friedrich Strauß*, Vol. 5 (Bonn: Verlag von Emil Strauß, 1877): 269–270; see as well, *ibid.*: 252, 269, and 31).

40. See Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 296.

41. Kant uses the label 'pure' religion in the second "Preface" to *Religion* AA VI: 12–14. The following three texts contain the same paragraph on 'pure' religion: *Vorlesungen über Moralphilosophie*

Kant takes religion to be merely 'morality' and that Kant's understanding of morality is merely 'subjective' and concerned with 'empty abstractions.' In short, Strauß takes Kant's moral theory to be a version of abstract, moral duty that seeks, but can only fail, to achieve moral perfection in the world, and Kant's so-called moral theory of religion entirely ignored the 'true' metaphysical significance of the Noumenon.

According to Strauß in *LJ* of 1835, Kant only took religion to consist of the moral significance at the core of religious texts. Strauß took Kant's moral theory to consist of the abstraction of a categorical ideal and is merely "an empty obligation"⁴² because it consists of "[...] a collection of empty ideas [...] [driven by merely] an overwhelming obligation"⁴³ to seek [external], "moral perfection"⁴⁴ without any connection with concrete experience.⁴⁵ "[...] [T]his ideal remains essentially confined to [...] reason, because it cannot be adequately represented by any example in outward experience, since [*sic.*] such an example would not fully disclose the inward disposition, but would only admit of our forming dubious inferences [...]"⁴⁶

Furthermore, Strauß criticizes Kant for not providing an historical account of the development of religion (as did Hegel, in Strauß' judgment) much less attribute his moral reading to the intent of the original authors of the scriptures. In short, a) Kant's Christology is not grounded in an historical theology, and in Strauß' judgment it fails, further, b) to account for how the "historical" text came to be the expression of a moral significance as well as fails c) to show that there is a relationship between the original intentions of the 'Second' Testament authors and the moral insight of the reader.

In contrast, the *LJ* concludes by focusing on Strauß' extreme, Left-Wing Hegelian Christology on the announcement of an epistemological condition for humanity to "know" (i.e., become) God in history. Kant is claimed, to the contrary, to be unhistorical and unphilosophical!⁴⁷

Although Strauß acknowledges that Kant suggested that "long before the existence of these [historical, written] records [of the 'First' and 'Second' Testament], the disposition to a moral religion as the pursuit of moral perfection was 'latent' in the human mind,⁴⁸" Strauß claims that Kant limits the significance of this "latent" moral disposition to a theistic conclusion: "that [... the 'latent' moral disposition's] first

(*Mrongovius*) AA XXVIII 1468; *Moralphilosophie* Collins AA XXVII 326–327; and *Eine Vorlesung Kants über Ethik* (Menser) ME: 128.

On Kant's notion of 'pure', see: 558, n. 109. On 'pure' religion, see: 928, n. 189.

42. See Strauß, *LJ*: 779

43. See Strauß, *LJ*: 776.

44. See Strauß, *LJ*: 774.

45. See Strauß, *LJ*: 51, 776–777.

46. Strauß, *LJ*: 774.

47. See Strauß, *LJ*: 52.

48. Strauß is quoting *Religion* AA VI: 82 although he gives no indication that that is the case or a page citation. See *LJ* 777: "Kant had [...] said that the good principle did not descend from heaven merely at a particular time, but had descended on mankind invisibly from the commencement of the human race [...]" Strauß, *LJ*: 777.

'historical' manifestations were directed to the worship of the Deity [...]" (51), as if Kant's "moral" religion was supposed to provide *speculative* information concerning the divine intention of history, which is not Kant's but is (!) Strauß' theological concern and the reason why Strauß so intently focuses on Christology. For Strauß in 1835, the Christ event is the key for understanding the meaning, purpose, and value of history because the Christ event consists in the awareness of the spiritual divinization of humanity.

As I've shown, Strauß takes the 'key to Christology' to consist, then, not 'in the mind of a unique, single individual,' Jesus of Nazareth, but an idea that "exists in historical reality" as the God/Man label appropriate to all of humanity in history. He contrasts this Christology not only with the church's but also with Kant's, who, according to Strauß, viewed the significance of Christology to be "in the mind only."⁴⁹ However, this is because Strauß erroneously accuses Kant of grounding his notion of reason in mere abstractions as "a collection of subjective, empty ideas and ideals."⁵⁰

Strauß repeats this claim about Kant's abstract, "moral" religion at several points in the *LJ* of 1835 and in his *Streitschriften* published in 1837 shortly after the *LJ*. What does Strauß mean with the assertion that Kant's Christology is in the mind only? He appears to mean that Christology, for Kant, is concerned with the abstract *ideals* of morality as a perfect system, only symbolically incarnated in an individual. That is, Kant's Christology is taken to be the paradigmatic representative of Hegel's 'moral duty' of "The Moral World View" in the *Phenomenology*. Because these ideals are merely abstract, they cannot accomplish the task of overcoming concrete sensuousness, where Strauß in 1835 locates evil.⁵¹

Hence, Strauß wrote that, although Kant had maintained that "the good principle," represented as "[...] the descent of Jesus from heaven [... and], as an imaginative description of the ideal of humanity well-pleasing to God,"⁵² "had descended on mankind invisibly from the commencement of the human race ...," he "understood under that expression only the moral instinct, which, with its ideal of good, and its sense of duty, has been from the beginning implanted in man."⁵³

What this 'reduction to morality' means, according to Strauß, is that Kant failed to reach the Hegelian, *metaphysical* understanding of history as a process of Spirit coming to awareness of Itself⁵⁴ but *limited religion to the pursuit of moral perfection*. Strauß claims: "... if the idea [... has] no corresponding reality (*Wirklichkeit*), it is an empty obligation and ideal," and "we should thus have fallen back again to Kant's point of

49. See Strauß, *LJ*: 780.

50. Strauß, *LJ*: 776.

51. See Strauß, *LJ*: 775.

52. Strauß, *LJ*: 51.

53. Strauß, *LJ*: 777.

54. See Strauß, *LJ*: 777.

view, which we have ourselves found unsatisfactory [...]"⁵⁵ for *the individual's and humanity's achieving meaning, purpose, and value in history as achieving knowledge of Absolute Spirit*.

In contrast, for Strauß, the Christ event provides the *external* (!) account that informs humanity of its *central place in the metaphysical, divine plan of history!*, where 'eternal', Absolute Spirit is experienced in the 'present' as the Hegelian Second Negation that returns to Absolute Spirit only in finite consciousness. Humanity's meaning, purpose, and value is anchored not only in its participation in the divine plan of history but also in humanity being the keystone to history as the location where history is overcome and humanity is "reconciled with God," that is, divinized.

α) Hegel's Athanasianism and Strauß' Arianism: A Difference in 'Level' of Divinization

In the theological world of Eastern Christianity, the alternatives between Hegel's and Strauß' Christology can best be profiled against the backdrop of the Arian Controversy at the Council of Nicaea in 325 CE that shaped Eastern Christian conceptions onward that consisted of a quarrel over the 'level' of human divinization: directly with God (Athanasius et al.) or at the level of the Logos/Christ (Arius).

Given that for Hegel man is the point where God becomes aware of Itself in the second negation of the Concept (where, by means of thinking the One, it becomes possible for God to be aware of Its oneness in that the many is negated back to the One), Hegel can be viewed as representing an Athanasian Christology that in spirit as the Absolute Idea (not in its representation as an historical event) results in the divinization of humanity at the "level" of the Father in accordance with the Athanasian formula: 'God became Man that man might become God.'

In his "The Different Schools of Thought on Christology among the Hegelians," Strauß identifies himself with the "Left-wing" Hegelians,⁵⁶ who themselves are equally representatives of the Athanasian Christological reading of Hegel (at least for 'the few' philosophers). However, Strauß acknowledges that the Left-wing Hegelians reject him because his own Christology is not a metaphysical but a "historical" Christology that views humanity as a totality to be the pinnacle of the historical process by means of which the God/Man is the universal keystone to all of history as God externalizes Himself and returns to Himself only through *individual*, human consciousness.

Therefore, rather than presenting an Athanasian Christology, Strauß' *inclusive* Christology is but an Arian Christology expressed by the formula: 'There was a time

55. Strauß, *LJ*: 779. See as well, Strauß claimed that Kant "[...] palmed upon us a collection of empty ideas and ideals [...]" (*LJ*, 776)

56. See Strauß, *Streitschriften* III: 126.

when the Son was not.' *The divinity of the Son is a created divinity* (albeit, created by a causal logic of negation, not a Personal God as in Christian Platonism) that occurs with the very first 'objectification' of the One in the Many of 'ideas'/Logos (not the historical Jesus portrayed by mere 'representations' in the 'Second' Testament stories). The eternal Logos (the 'ideas' generated out of Absolute Spirit) remains the condition of possibility for humanity to achieve divinization, according to Strauß, but, unlike the Hegelians, for Strauß that divinization occurs *in history* where finite consciousness alone experiences "ideas" (the Logos who is *represented* as incarnated in the Christ). In other words, the individual Christian in history *does not become* 'God the Father' with 'the point of indifference' by which multiplicity is negated. The individual Christian in history is united with 'God the Son,' the created, spiritually 'eternal order' brought about by the First Negation. This moment of divinization occurs in finite consciousness, in history, as the ever-present, spiritual Second Negation. It is a 'turn' to the *created God* of 'eternal ideas' (the Logos' multiplicity). Strauß' *inclusive* Christology affirms humanity's experience as a species.⁵⁷ of the 'eternal Logos' in the 'present' – a theme to which Strauß returns at the very end of volume II of his *Glaubenslehre*.

The early Strauß viewed the fulfillment of religion to be achieved in the individual when the divine idea is grasped spiritually (not simply in a subjective 'representation' of a historical person). Thereby, the idea

[...] has its confirmation no longer in [subjective] history but in [objective] philosophy. *When the mind has thus gone beyond sensible history, and entered into the domain of the absolute, the former ceases to be essential* [!]; it takes a subordinate place, above which the spiritual truths suggested by history stand self-supported; sensible history becomes as the faint image of a dream which belongs only to the past, and does not, like the idea, share the permanence of the spirit which is absolutely present to itself [...]. Thus if we know the incarnation, death and resurrection, the *duplex negatio affirmat*, as the eternal circulation, the infinitely repeated pulsation of the divine life, what special importance can attach to a single fact, which is but a mere sensible image of this unending process? Our age demands to be led in Christology to the idea in the fact [in history], to the race in the [historical] individual: a theology which, in its doctrines on the Christ, stops short at him as an individual, is not properly a theology, but a homily.⁵⁸ (partial emphasis added)

In contrast to the Athanasian and Arian options of the East, Traditional Personal Theism turned the 'spiritual meaning of the text' (Matthew 13:13⁵⁹ and I Cor. 3:1–2⁶⁰) into a 'literal' reading of the text that insisted that the narratives in the gospels were historical facts. According to Strauß of the *LJ*, the literal reading entirely missed the

57. See Strauß, *LJ*: 780.

58. Strauß, *LJ*: 781.

59. "The reason I talk to them in parables is that they look without seeing and listen without hearing or understanding."

60. "I treated you as sensual men, still infants in Christ. What I fed you with was milk, not solid food, for you were not ready for it; and indeed, you are still not ready for it since you are still unspiritual."

spiritual truth of Christianity that finite consciousness is the location for the spiritual divinization of humanity, properly understood.

B) A Misreading of Kant's Religion and Christology

Kant's religion is not only not (!) reduced to 'a mere moral theory' of abstraction as Strauß claimed, but also, precisely because of the limits to reason, it is not (!) a flight of metaphysical fancy that seeks to escape moral imperfection by achieving Absolute Knowledge that consists of 'truly' Absolute Freedom above sensuousness.

Strauß acknowledges Kant's avoidance of the Christological narrowness of Traditional Personal Theism with his 'symbolic' Christ. However, by defining religion as morality and by taking morality to be the expectation of achieving moral perfection (consequentialism), Strauß' Kant ends up with a discouragingly pessimistic, infinitely-open quest to achieve religious 'blessedness'⁶¹ that consists of being well-pleasing to God – with only a sliver of hope in divine grace.

In his presentation of Kant in the *LJ*, Strauß has failed to understand Kant's Christology. To be sure, the Christ for Kant is not an idea seeking its identification with an individual (as Traditional Personal Theism maintained) but is the "Son" of the Creator as the *a priori* synthetic system of moral duty that the individual, only for her-/himself, is able to actualize through ethical effort in the sensuous world. According to Strauß in the *LJ*, though, Kant fails because he gives no account of how this '*a priori* synthetic system of moral principles has been brought about by the meta-narrative of Double Negation. Kant's Christology not only remains detached from concrete history, but also, given Strauß' reading of Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" from the *Phenomenology*⁶² and F.C. Baur's *Gnosis*. Kant's Christology is an abstract duty incapable of overcoming sensuousness and nature's material determinism, which make any and all 'perfect' ethical achievement impossible.⁶³

61. Rather than appreciate the significance of autonomous freedom as the location for an optimistic (even if muted), non-determined 'openness' in the 'blind causality' of the material world, Strauß' reading of Kant on religion views moral open-endedness pessimistically ('I can't' as Hegel formulated in "The Moral View of the World") and is almost exactly the same as F.C. Baur's with the exception of their differences in Christology. See the "Preface:" 37, n. 8.

62. See Hegel, "The Moral View of the World" in *Phänomenologie* GW III: 442–452 (Baillie trans.: 615–627). For a summary of "The Moral View of the World," see Vol. II "Introduction:" "Hegel on 'I should, but I can't' in Contrast to Kant's 'If I should, I can':" 550 ff. and Chapter 7: "Practical Reason Elevates Theoretical Reason:" the section "Hegel's Account of 'The Moral View of the World' is not Kant's Mor:" 727 ff.

63. For an account of the centrality of a Kantian understanding of spirit as constitutive of the human condition, see McGaughey and James R. Cochrane, *The Human Spirit: Groundwork* (Stellenbosch: African Sun Media, 2017).

However, Kant's Christology is concerned with, but by no means reducible to, a moral "ideal," as Strauß suggests in the *LJ*, and it is, also, no "empty obligation."⁶⁴ The 'moral ideal' confirms humanity's possession of an extra-ordinary, *autonomous freedom*, which is the condition of possibility for there to be any need of a moral ideal much less to assume responsibility for one's ethical effort – not to mention that it is *autonomous freedom* that makes it possible for humanity to respond to the anxieties and sufferings not only of one's own but also of others' by seeking the fulfilment of a just and virtuous order present as the imperceptible, Commonwealth of God.

In other words, Kant's moral theory is no reduction of humanity down to a fruitless, pointless, and empty, merely individual moral effort. It requires a world of understanding and personal agency as well as the invisible, Commonwealth of God (Reich Gottes) that is a 'culture that promotes the (moral) will' and not merely a 'culture of skills.' Humanity is the 'place' where there is a 'rupture' in nature's inescapable; 'blind'; material causality. The moral ideal, then, is an ideal grounded in the efforts of the individual and community (the culture of rearing, not simply the culture of skills⁶⁵) committed to moral *faith* that seeks to assume subjective responsibility for decisions and actions, not faith in subjective, *miraculous examples or objective, metaphysically speculative claims* about the ultimate, cause, meaning, purpose, and value of life. Kant wrote of miracles in *Religion within the Limits of mere Reason*:

Should we [...] accept that from time to time, and in special cases, God allows nature to deviate from [...] physical] laws, then we do not have the least conception, nor can we ever hope to attain one, of the law according to which God promotes any such occurrence (apart from the general moral law that whateverf God does will all be good [McG: Scholastic 'Occasionalism'] [...]) Here reason is as paralyzed, for it is held back in its affairs, neither can it ever hope to be thus instructed in the world.⁶⁶

Kant recognizes that only the individual can experience, understand, exercise agency, and assume responsibility for that agency *for itself, not for any other*. However, the individual is by no means solipsistic when it comes to her/his moral effort. Moral effort requires a public community that understands the imperceptible, *a priori* synthetic nature of morality but also provides moral support to 'do what is right because it is right' and not act solely on the basis of self- or communal-interest.

As much as Kant recognized the need for public, sensible religion, he was equally aware that this 'public world' constituted a threat to moral effort as much as moral effort is dependent upon it. In his presentation of the capacities (*Anlagen*) that are 'good' (in an *amoral* sense) at the very beginning of *Religion*, Kant describes three elements that shape humanity: Animality, Humanity, and Personality.⁶⁷ As the case

64. See Strauß' claim that it is in the *LJ*: 779.

65. See Kant, *The Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 431–432.

66. Kant, *Religion*: AA VI: 86–87. See the footnote on AA VI: 85*.

67. See "I. On the original capacities to good in human nature" in *Religion* AA VI: 26–28.

with Plato's three elements of the soul (appetites, rage/ *θυμός*, and reason), the goal for Kant is not to eliminate any one of these three elements but to 'properly' cultivate them. Whereas the appetites of animality can easily, and obviously, be abused, Kant calls the abuse of 'humanity' (*Menschheit*) the blind pursuit of status and prestige in the eyes of others. Plato, too, acknowledges that 'honor,' which is the key to his element of the soul's rage/ *θυμός* (*Republic* 582d; 475a), absent awareness of anything higher (reason) believes it has achieved the pinnacle of morality when it seeks to win honor among its peers (*Republic* 584d). Yet, honor is not the least adequate as a moral criterion. It is not under the control of the individual, but, to the contrary, the decision over what counts as honor is determined by the 'other' and can be extremely capricious. Left to itself alone, it can lead to immorality as the individual seeks to win applause from her/his peers *for the wrong reasons*. Hence, Kant, as well as Plato, speak of a capacity that is 'higher than honor,' which is necessary for moral governance: 'Personality' (Plato: reason). The key to Personality, according to Kant, is "respect for the moral law,"⁶⁸ which is the basis for reining in the appetites and honor. – not the elimination of either!

Here is where the spark jumps from the individual to the community for Kant. 'Personality' requires the support and encouragement (not an external, heteronomous, moral finger-wagging) of a community, not just a single individual, driven by passion for the invisible capacities of humanity. Kant calls this community, the Commonweal of God.⁶⁹ Furthermore, Kant acknowledges that moral effort can be (although when improper, it can be morally corrupting) benefited by public, sensible, ritual.⁷⁰ He speaks of internal prayer and the Church as an institution (again, when properly understood), but he also acknowledges the symbolic value of the two core rituals in Christianity (baptism and communion), which one finds in other religions as well. *Baptism* is not a ritual of objective washing away of sin but of the community's acceptance of responsibility for the moral development as well as the cultivation of technical skills,⁷¹ and communion as an expression of the cosmopolitan moral community. However, Kant entirely rejects all public expressions of religion that are turned into physical means (that is, statutory external rules and actions⁷²) to achieve "blessedness."⁷³ The goal of all such sensible forms of religion is to encourage the 'realization' of the inward Commonweal of God through the moral efforts of the community. In short, the goal is communal, moral virtue anchored in human creative autonomy, not personal 'happiness' or divine 'blessedness.' Kant expresses this symbolically:

68. Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 27.

69. See Kant, *Religion*: "IV. The Idea of a Commonweal of God cannot be realized (by human organization) except in the form of a church:" AA VI: 100–102.

70. See Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 193.

71. See Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 199–200.

72. See Kant, *Religion*: "Part Two: On Counterfeit Service [*Afterdienst*] in a Statutory Religion:" AA VI.

73. See Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 178–179.

[...][It] is our universal human duty to *elevate* ourselves to this *ideal of moral perfection*, i.e. *to the prototype of moral disposition*⁷⁴ [*Gesinnung*] in its entire purity, and for this the very idea [...] can give us force. Precisely because we are not its authors⁷⁵ but the idea has rather established itself in humanity without our comprehending how [...], it is better to say that that prototype has come down to us from heaven [...] This union with us may therefore be regarded as a state of abasement of the Son of God if we represent to ourselves this God-like human being, as our prototype, [...] not bound to submit to sufferings, [...] who] takes these upon himself in the fullest measure for the sake of promoting the world's greatest good [...]⁷⁶

Kant adds shortly later:

From the practical point of view [that is, with respect to 'practical' reason] this idea [of elevation to the ideal of moral perfection] *has complete reality within itself. For it resides in our morally-legislating [re-producing] reason. We ought to conform to it, and therefore we must also be able to conform to it.* If one had to prove beforehand the possibility of being a man according to this archetype, as is inevitably necessary with concepts of nature (*so that we do not run the risk of being held back by empty concepts*), then we would also have to have misgivings about granting even the moral law the status of being the unconditional and yet sufficient determinant of our arbitrariness. For how it is possible that the mere idea of lawfulness can be a more powerful motive for freedom than all conceivable ones derived from [sensuous] advantages, can neither be seen by reason nor proved by examples of experience because, as far as the first is concerned, the law commands absolutely, and as far as the second is concerned, *even if there never had been one human being capable of unconditional obedience to the law, the objective necessity that there be such a human being would yet be undiminished and self-evident.*⁷⁷ *There is no need, therefore, of any example from experience to make the idea of a human being morally pleasing to God a model to us; the idea is present as model already in our reason.* – If anyone, in order to accept for imitation a human being as such an example of conformity to that idea, asks for more than what he sees [that is, we see only imperfection (McG)] [...] and if, in addition, he also asks for miracles as credentials, to be brought about either through that human being or on his behalf – he who asks for this thereby *confesses to his own moral unbelief*, to a lack of faith in virtue which no faith based on miracles (and thus only historical) can remedy, for *only faith in the practical validity of the idea that lies in our reason has moral worth.*⁷⁸ (emphasis added)

74. Moral perfection refers to the disposition to ethical effort, not the consequentialist achievement of ends.

75. ... any more than we are the authors of physical laws!

76. Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 60–61.

77. Kant has anticipated and is criticizing Schleiermacher's Christology of "Perfect God-consciousness" as well as Strauß' critique of Schleiermacher that the imperfect effects of God-consciousness in humanity do not justify an actual example of a perfect cause (the Christ as possessor of Perfect God-consciousness). Kant's claim is that we don't require an *actual* example of perfect fulfilment of the moral law. We only require the self-expectation of perfect fulfilment, and that can only be found as always and already present in the individual. How that is possible is inexplicable, but it is a matter of *moral faith*.

78. Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 162–163.

Even our failure to achieve objective perfection is no limitation because, according to Kant, true moral *perfection consists in the inward 'disposition' [Gesinnung] not the external achievement* (consequences) *of moral purity!* We have control over the disposition (although only the individual can know whether or not s/he has invoked the disposition through the self-selection of a moral principle), but we don't have control over ethical, external achievement. The 'disposition' is the key to perfection, not ethical achievement:

[...] [A] change of heart [...] must itself be possible because it is a duty. – Now the deed is *every time* (not in general [überhaupt], but at each instant) defective? The solution rests on the following: According to our mode of estimation, [to us] who are unavoidably restricted to temporal conditions in our conceptions of the relationship of cause to effect, *the deed, as a continuous advance in infinitum from a defective good to something better,*⁷⁹ always remains defective, so that we are bound to consider the good as it appears in us, i.e. according to the deed, as at each instant inadequate to a holy law. But *because of the disposition from which it derives and which transcends the senses, we can think of the infinite progression of the good toward conformity to the law as being judged by him who scrutinizes the heart (through h is pure intellectual intuition) to be a perfected whole even with respect to the deed (the life conduct). And [sic.] so notwithstanding his difficulty lies here:* How can this disposition count for the deed itself, when this *permanent deficiency, a human being can still expect to be in general [überhaupt] well-pleasing to God* [that is, possessing a perfect moral disposition (McG)], at whatever point in time his existence be cut short.⁸⁰ (emphasis added)

Far from the moral ideal consisting in an ineffectual abstraction or an unrealizable goal, as Strauß claimed Kant to mean in 1835, faith in the moral ideal, according to Kant, is faith in there being moral order that structures the causality that is our autonomous freedom just as there is a physical order that structures the causality of our material experience. This faith gives us confidence in our capacity to act in accordance with the moral order and in harmony with nature. We give up our humanity when we deny this freedom, but, when we embrace this freedom, we also embrace our capacity of a perfect moral disposition to act in accordance with the lawful (moral) order that governs this causality. Rather than 'well-pleasing to God' and ethics consisting of a goal yet to be achieved, they both are an indelible and ineradicable capacity that makes responsible agency always possible. *The only ambiguity about being 'well-pleasing to God' is on the shoulders of the agent – will I or will I not give myself permission to act on the basis of a 'wide,'⁸¹ moral principle?* As a capacity 'in general' (überhaupt), I can, but only the individual can establish for her-/himself what he 'should' allow himself to do:

79. This is the key to Kant's two accounts of the 'knock at the door' (see 789, n. 263) and his invocation of the entire species as the goal of moral improvement, not simply the goal of individual, moral improvement.

80. Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 66–67.

81. Categorical imperatives are 'wide,' universal principles in contrast to the 'narrow' rules that govern technical skills and the civic law. In other words, not all imperatives are categorical imperatives.

[...] only a human being conscious of [...] a moral disposition in himself as enables him to believe and self-assuredly trust that he [...] would steadfastly cling to the prototype of humanity and remain similar to its example in faithful discipleship [...] *only such a human being, and he alone, is entitled to consider himself not an unworthy object of divine pleasure.*⁸² (emphasis added)

γ) Neither Happiness nor Pleasing God, but Worthiness of Happiness in History

Throughout his career, Kant stressed the issue of worthiness as the key concern of humanity, not happiness.⁸³ Morality is at the core of what it means to be human not because it will make us happy. Rather, morality is concerned with *worthiness* for whatever happiness independent of the experience of happiness itself. The worthiness of happiness has nothing to do with the degree of *external* success or failure. It has to do with *internal* decision taking and effort.

Already in his *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie* from 1774/5 (that is, in his so-called pre-critical period), Kant had said that worthiness is the condition of possibility for happiness.⁸⁴ In his *Metaphysik Mrongovius* from 1783 he underscored, again, that "worthiness" is far superior to happiness: "[...] a person finds in so far no satisfaction in his reason [...] than when he makes the effort to know and to achieve his *summum bonum*, that is, the highest final end of all his goals, the highest degree of worthiness to be happy combined with the greatest moral life."⁸⁵ In the *Critique of Practical Reason*⁸⁶ from 1788, Kant had suggested that the goal of morality is not happiness (for example, *the receipt of divine pleasure*) but the worthiness of happiness, no matter how great or small the consequences of one's efforts. In fact, the "principle of happiness," which states "Love yourself above everything else, but love God and your neighbor for your self-interest," is exactly the opposite to the "principle of morality."⁸⁷

However, the issue is not that moral worthiness is what earns or guarantees happiness. We have no control over what brings us happiness, and, in fact, the thing

On the difference between 'categorical' and 'hypothetical' imperatives in Kant, *Groundwork* IV: 414–421. On the difference between 'wide' and 'narrow' obligation, see Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 390–391 and: 791.

82. Kant, *Religion*: AA VI: 62. In contrast to Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" in the *Phenomenology*, whose portrayal of moral duty and ethics was shared by Strauß, the issue of fulfilment of moral duty is not defined by Kant in terms of ethical consequences with subsequent achievement of divine pleasure but with the self-ascription of the moral law. In short, Hegel/Strauß are ethical consequentialists whereas Kant is a moral archaeologist.

83. On the role of happiness in Kant's reflections on morality, see the "Foreword:" 28, n. 11.

84. Kant, *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004): 12, see also n. 10.

85. Kant, *Metaphysik Mrongovius*, AA XXIX: 948: " [...] man finds no satisfaction for his reason [...] other] than striving to recognize and achieve his *summum bonum*, i.e. the ultimate aim of all his goals, which [consists in] the highest degree of worthiness to be happy combined with the greatest morality."

86. See Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 450 – worthy even without attainment of happiness; and *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 130–131.

87. See Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 83*.

that brought us happiness in the past may not bring us happiness today or tomorrow. However, we do have control over whether or not we have committed to moral effort in our decisions and actions, which is alone what would make us worthy of happiness. *Worthiness is nothing objectively measurable. Only the individual can know if, and what, moral principle s/he invoked to give her-/himself permission to act. Hence, only the individual can know whether or not s/he is worthy of happiness.* The necessary constant throughout our lives over which we have control is whether or not we are worthy of whatever happiness we might experience now or in the future.

If Kant's Christology is no mere abstraction, and its goal is not personal happiness – although it does not deny happiness, why is it not just empty ideals, as Strauß proposed in 1835? The answer is as concrete as any answer can be: Kant's Christology is a call to be and to become human in history by exercising and taking personal responsibility for the capacities that are necessary for us to experience the world as we do.

δ) The learly Strauß and Hegel: A Call out of History

Strauß' Christology of 1835 is a version of divinization that seeks identity with God *beyond history* as the realization of the double negation that is the Christ. *Strauß' Christ of 1835 is a turn away from "sensuousness" and history whereas Kant's Christology is concerned with human beings being/becoming human in the world in and through sensuousness and history.*

Contrary to Peter Hodgson and James Livingston that Strauß was not a Hegelian,⁸⁸ it is clear that the *LJ* of 1835 is shaped by Hegel's "absolute philosophy." History is a profound process of "double negation." The goal of history is its own denial in order that the eternal and absolute One (i.e., God) can experience Itself. Humanity's 'failure' with respect to ethical achievement is compensated for by the 'cunning of reason,'⁸⁹ the hidden hand of reason governing Hegel's meta-narrative of Absolute Knowledge. Absolute Knowledge results in moral indifference. Whether as only acknowledging the Hegelian, *partially inclusive* Christology or Strauß' *universally inclusive* Christology,

88. This claim is based on a general rejection by Hegelians of Strauß' *LJ*. Strauß directly addresses their criticism in *Streitschriften* III: 55–126, and expresses exasperation over, particularly, the Left-Wing Hegelians to whom he felt he belonged. See particularly, Strauß' sarcasm Pamphlet III: 126: "[...] I would stand on the side [...] of] the Left in the Hegelian school, if this school didn't prefer to shut me out and throw me into other schools of thought; – only of course, for me to be thrown like a ball by these other schools back to them."

89. On the 'cunning of reason' as silently functioning 'in the background,' see Hegel, "Introduction" to the *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*: GW XII: 49 (Sibree trans.: 34).

the Hegelians and Strauß are squarely on the spectrum of mystical, Greek Christianity, not Latin Christianity.⁹⁰

Contrary to Strauß' claim that "[...] to convert ideas simply into an obligatory possibility, to which no reality corresponds, is in fact to annihilate them,⁹¹" Kant claims that *the feeling for respect of the 'wide,' moral law that is above all social conventions and hypothetical imperatives of technical skills is a matter of moral faith that internally selects the universal moral principle to guide one's efforts to achieve 'what ought to be'.*⁹² The power of respect for the moral law is that it motivates the individual to desire to be and to become human by exercising these highest capacities out of respect for the internal, moral law *in history*. Humanity's "duty" is to grant oneself permission to exercise one's agency according to this internal moral law, and the capacity of autonomous freedom that grounds dignity because of the universality of autonomous freedom is the necessary condition that makes moral effort possible. All those who do make this moral effort are worthy of unqualified respect and have achieved worthiness of happiness (regardless of the success or failure, great or small, of the consequences of one's agency over which one has no control) and have achieved worthiness of being 'well-pleasing to God' (without need of any external divine applause or fear of punishment).

Strauß' presentation in the *LJ* of Kant's religion is an exercise in external 'criticism,' not transcendental 'critique.' He describes what he believes Kant claims about religion and, especially, Christology and compares it with his Hegelian commitments without asking what are the transcendental, *a priori* synthetic conditions required for there to be anything like a description, much less the practicing, of religion, much less without having questioned the sufficiency of Hegelianism. Within three years, though, his Hegelian commitments hit the skids with the exception of his commitment to Hegel's "The Moral View of the World."

4) Sensuousness is evil

Strauß believed that for Kant the abstract moral ideal is set over against sensuousness because sensuous is evil. Speaking of Kant, Strauß writes:

90. See "The Conservative-Liberal Spectrum of the Unification Model" in McGaughey, *Christianity for the Third Millennium*: 136–146.

91. Strauß, *LJ*: 777.

92. Categorical imperatives are 'wide,' universal principles in contrast to the 'narrow' rules that govern technical skills and the civic law. In other words, not all imperatives are categorical imperatives. On the difference between 'categorical' and 'hypothetical' imperatives in Kant, *Groundwork* IV: 414–421. On the difference between 'wide' and 'narrow' obligation, see Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 390–391. For Kant's criticism of consequentialism see his 'four moments' in 556, n. 108.

To elevate himself to such a state of mind [morally well-pleasing to God], man must depart from evil, cast off the old man, crucify the flesh; a change [...] that is] essentially connected with a series of sorrows and sufferings. These the former man has deserved as a punishment, but they fall on the new for the regenerated man, who takes them on himself, though physically and in his empirical character, as a being determined by the senses, he remains the former man; is morally, as an intellectual being, with his changed disposition, become a new man.⁹³

Strauß cites here his professor, F.C. Baur's, "Comparison of Schleiermacher's *Christian Faith* and Kant's *Religion within the Limits of mere Reason*" from Baur's *Gnosis* with respect to the notions of *capacity* [*Anlage*] and *inclination* [*Hang*]. Baur claims that Schleiermacher and Kant share the same understanding of good and evil. "The two principles that Schleiermacher differentiates as sensuous consciousness and God-consciousness, Kant called the good and the evil principle."⁹⁴

Although correct for Schleiermacher, Baur and Strauß have misunderstood Kant's discussion of radical evil in *Religion*. Humanity's status of "radical evil" does not consist in "sensuous consciousness." In fact, Kant says, exactly the opposite: "[...] the ground of [...] evil cannot be placed, as is commonly done, in the sensuous nature of the human being, and in the natural inclinations originating from it."⁹⁵ Rather, "radical evil" is a *necessary* (but not sufficient), transcendental, condition of possibility for us to be *free-from* nature's mechanical causality and for the exercising of our *freedom-for* creating things that nature cannot do on its own. Without this *necessary*, 'radical' *option* between 'good' and 'evil' principles, we could only be mere animals governed by instinct or permanently good or permanently evil.⁹⁶

Furthermore, our capacity for autonomous freedom is "good" in an amoral sense, not ontologically as guaranteeing our always doing what is right. It is "good" because without it we could not be and become human, and, presumably, it is good that we exist. However, the "goodness" of autonomous freedom does not guarantee that we are always morally good. Kant's autonomous freedom is a *capacity* [*Anlage*] that he distinguishes from *inclinations* [*Hänge*].⁹⁷ We can be inclined to do something because, and only because, we have the capacity to do it. The capacity is an amoral good whereas the inclination can be good or evil.

93. Strauß, *LJ*: 775.

94. Baur, *Gnosis*, 660–661.

95. Kantz, *Religion* AA VI: 34–35.

96. Kant points out that sensuousness alone is too little to account for evil in humanity because it would make evil a matter of animality alone. Reason alone is too much to account for evil in humanity because it would elevate evil to a diabolical principle equal to the other ideas of reason: God, freedom, and the soul. See Kant, *Religion*, AA VI: 35.

97. Kant discusses the differences between "capacities" (*Anlage*) and "inclinations" (*Hänge*) in *Religion* AA VI: 26–32.

Therefore, rather than having placed "radical evil" at the foundation of morality, Kant identifies *amoral*, autonomous freedom as the *ground* of morality⁹⁸ with two, in themselves, *amoral* principles as options for autonomous freedom: good and evil principles. Nonetheless, in order for freedom to be exercised, it must *necessarily* be capable of distinguishing and choosing between "good" and "evil" principles. If there were only "good" principles or if there were only "evil" principles, there could be no freedom. Hence, practical reason requires both good and evil principles at its (radical) core. In other words, both good and evil are 'radical.' This is a radical goodness and a radical evil that are *necessary* for, but not determinative of, our freedom. Both radical goodness and radical evil, however, presuppose the amoral goodness of autonomous freedom.⁹⁹

There is absolutely no "crucifying of the flesh" or turn away from "sensuousness" called for by Kant. To be sure, in the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*, Kant discusses the importance of the experience of the sublime for the encouragement of moral awareness and effort because it confirms "[...] a power of the mind to soar above certain obstacles of sensibility [...]"¹⁰⁰ However, even the sublime is no escape from the world. He adds '*tumultuous effect on the mind*' of attraction or repulsion (*Lust* or *Unlust*) "[...] can in no way claim the honor of being a sublime presentation, if they do not leave behind a disposition of mind that [...] has influence on the consciousness of its strength [...] in regard to that which brings with it intellectual purposiveness (the supersensible)."¹⁰¹ (emphasis added) In other words, "[...] the sublime must always have a relation to [...] principles for making the intellectual and the ideas of reason superior to sensibility."¹⁰² Kant adds:

There need be no anxiety that the feeling of the sublime will lose anything through such an abstract presentation, which becomes entirely negative in regard to the sensible, for the imagination, although it certainly finds nothing beyond the sensible to which it can attach itself, nevertheless frees itself to be unbounded precisely because of this elimination of the limits of sensibility; and that separation is thus a presentation of the infinite, which for that very reason can never be anything other than a merely negative presentation, which nevertheless expands the soul.¹⁰³

98. Klaus Konhardt articulates this relationship between freedom and evil as follows: "In [...] Kant's practical philosophy one cannot speak of an insurmountable gap between a free will, under moral laws, on the one hand, and a teaching of radical evil, on the other hand [...]. Far more, the conception of radical evil in *Religion* is due to Kant's insight that human freedom if not the cause nonetheless is the condition of evil." [Author's translation] Konhardt, "Die Unbegreiflichkeit der Freiheit. Überlegungen zu Kants Lehre vom Bösen," in *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 42, no. 3 (1988): 400.

99. See McGaughey, "What is 'Radical' Evil? A Reading of Ricoeur on Kant and Religion" at <https://criticalidealism.org/ricoeur-on-radical-evil-and-kant/> (24 November 20017) (pdf version has page numbers): 12–13.

100. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 271.

101. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 273.

102. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 274.

103. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 274.

Furthermore, he embraces the notion of "apathy" in the "Doctrine of Virtue" of the *Metaphysics of Morals*, but he explicitly distances his understanding of apathy from (Stoic) 'indifference': "[...] '[M]oral apathy' [...] is to be distinguished from indifference because in cases of moral apathy feelings arising from sensible impressions lose their influence on moral feeling¹⁰⁴ [...] because respect for the law is more powerful than all such feelings together."¹⁰⁵ Without the flesh and sensuousness there can be no moral effort, which, for its part, as the very 'strength of soul,'¹⁰⁶ 'strength of one's resolutions,'¹⁰⁷ and 'strength of a human being's principles in fulfilling his duty,'¹⁰⁸ is the very definition of virtue for Kant.¹⁰⁹ Kant goes so far as to say that humanity stands 'under obligation to virtue' *not by escaping from the world but by 'practicing virtue' in the world*

For while the capacity (*facultas*) to overcome all opposing sensible impulses [!] can and must be simply *presupposed* in man on account of his freedom [i.e., on account of the ability to do things that nature on its own cannot do; McG], yet this capacity as *strength* (*robur*) is something he must acquire; and the way to acquire it is to enhance the moral *incentive* [...] both by contemplating the dignity of the pure rational law in us (*contemplation*) and by practicing virtue (*exercitio*)."¹¹⁰

Finally, "the true strength of virtue is a *tranquil mind* with a considered and firm resolution to put the law of virtue into practice."¹¹¹

In fact, there is a danger of turning virtue into 'tyranny,'¹¹² which consists in 'allowing nothing to be indifferent' by turning the heteronomous, hypothetical imperatives of technical and practical agency into autonomous 'duties' of categorical imperatives: "Fantastic virtue is a concern with petty details which, were it admitted into the doctrine of virtue, would turn the government of virtue into tyranny."¹¹³ Virtue is not slavish submission to merely abstract rules that heteronomously demand the 'proper' performance of external skills and choices but to 'wide,' moral principles that govern internal, creative freedom.¹¹⁴ Therefore, *'evil' is not the objective world of sensuousness*

104. Not to be confused for "moral sense" theory. See "Doctrine of Virtue" AA VI: 399–400.

105. Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 408.

106. Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 384.

107. Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 390.

108. Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 394.

109. See Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 394 and 405. On the 'positive methods' of the Stoics, Epicureans, Democritus, etc. as well as Kant's own 'negative method,' see the section "Kant's 'Negative Method':" 45, n. 28.

110. Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 397.

111. Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 409.

112. See Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 409.

113. Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 409.

114. Kant distinguishes between the "doctrine of right" (e.g., civic law) and the "doctrine of virtue" in the *Metaphysics of Morals* as the difference between duties of "external" and of "internal" freedom. (AA VI: 407) "Virtue [...] commands and accompanies its command with a moral constraint (a

but an "inclination" (*Hang*) to self-select subjectively an evil principle although equally primordial is the "inclination" to self-select subjectively a good principle to govern one's decisions and actions. As such both good and evil are "radical" because they always constitute a live (not a merely abstract) option for the exercising of our autonomous freedom *in the world* – precisely, not because they allow for, or even encourage escape from, sensuousness as claimed by Hegel and Strauß. Rather than moral duty illuminating the 'weakness' of reason because it demands a 'should' that 'can't be achieved, the sublime demonstrates the strength of moral duty to 'rise above' sensuousness in order to exercise its moral capacity *in the world* – not to escape from the world.

5) Kant claimed no role for the resurrection and ascension of Christ.

The afterlife, according to Strauß' reading of Kant, is merely the figurative expressions of humanity's embracing of the ideal of the moral order according to both Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" and F.C. Baur's *Gnosis* and is merely an 'abstract' and 'ineffectual' obligation.

Strauß' opinion of Kant's Christology in 1835 was influenced by his professor, Ferdinand Christian Baur¹¹⁵ to whose *Gnosis* Strauß explicitly cites Baur who writes that Schleiermacher's "[...] Christology in many respects recalls that of Kant [...]."¹¹⁶

Strauß maintains that Kant's "religion" involves freeing of the individual from materiality by means of a pure religion of "moral ideas." For this reason, the resurrection and ascension (the afterlife) of the Christ play no role in a religion "within the limits of reason." Strauß writes: "Kant, like Schleiermacher [...], carries his appropriation of

constraint possible in accordance with laws of inner freedom). But [*sic.*] because this constraint is to be irresistible, strength is required, in a degree which we can assess only by the magnitude of the obstacles that the human being himself furnishes through his inclinations. The *vices*, the brood of dispositions opposing the law, *are the monsters he has to fight* [emphasis McGaughey; vices, not sensuousness per se]. Accordingly, this moral strength [...] is called *wisdom* in the strict sense, namely practical wisdom, since [*sic.*] it makes the *final end* of his existence on earth [!] McGaughey] its own end." (AA VI: 405) Furthermore, "[i]n the moral imperative and the presupposition of freedom that is necessary for it are found the *law*, the *capacity* (to fulfil the law), and the *will* determining the maxim; these are all the elements that make up the concept of a duty of right. But [*sic.*] in the imperative that prescribes a *duty of virtue* there is added not only the concept of self-constraint but that of an *end*, not an end that we have but one that we ought to have, one that pure practical reason therefore has within itself. *The highest, unconditional end of pure practical reason [...] consists in this: that virtue be its own end and, despite the benefits it confers on human beings, also its own reward* [emphasis McGaughey]." (AA VI: 396) Virtue is not a slavish external performance in conformity with heteronomous duty but a quiet internal concern for what one *ought to do with one's creative freedom*. Virtue is its own reward.

115. See F.C. Baur, "Vergleichung der Schleiermacher'schen Glaubenslehre mit der Kant'schen Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft" ["Comparison of Schleiermacher's *Christian Faith* with Kant's Religion"] in *Gnosis*: 660–668.

116. Strauß, *LJ*: 775 and n. 5; also in the first edition 725, and n. 5. Strauß cites to Baur's judgment here. See Baur, *Gnosis*, 660 ff. Strauß accepts Baur's reading of Schleiermacher and Kant.

the Christology of the church no farther than the death of Christ. Of his resurrection and ascension, he says, [...] they cannot be available to religion within the limits of pure reason, *because they would involve the materiality of all existences*. Still in another light, he employs these facts as *symbols of the ideas of [...] reason*; as images of the entrance into the abode of blessedness, that is, into communion with [...] the good [...]"¹¹⁷ (emphasis added)

According to Strauß in 1835, then, for Kant the resurrection and ascension of Christ are merely figurative expressions of humanity's embracing of *the ideal of the moral order, again in the sense of Hegel's "The Moral View of the World"* in the *Phenomenology*, as an abstract and, hence ineffectual, obligation.

Kant, surely, does not take the resurrection and ascension of Christ to be historical facts, which would divert focus on the moral effort of the individual to encourage concentration on how one can assure one's participation in the afterlife. In other words, *as historical facts, resurrection and ascension shift attention to personal interest* – away from disinterested embracing of moral principles to govern one's decisions and actions.

Nonetheless, Kant writes in *Religion*: "[...] one cannot think of any kind of religion without faith in an afterlife [...]"¹¹⁸ The notion of the afterlife has a concrete function to play with respect to moral effort in this life.¹¹⁹ The function of the afterlife, though, is not to motivate moral effort out of fear that one's failure will result in divine displeasure and blockage of one's entrance into paradise.

Kant explicitly acknowledges that, when it comes to the afterlife, there is neither proof nor disproof:

My reason recognizes here [when it comes to the afterlife] its weakness to rise above all experience, and is indeed able to show that all objections of the opponents are fruitless and in vain, but on the other hand it is also too weak to even find out something apodictically certain.¹²⁰

Were one to dismiss or embrace the notion of the afterlife as certainties, then one would be engaging in a dogmatic dictum (*Machtspruch*) that is an 'empty abstraction.'

117. Strauß, *LJ*: 775.

118. Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 126. Kant does point out that "[...] reason can [...] neither find an interest in dragging along, through eternity, a body which, however purified, must yet consist (if personality rests on its identity) of the same material which constitutes the body's organic basis and which, in life, the body itself never quite grew fond of, nor can it render comprehensible what this calcareous earth, of which the body consists, should be doing in heaven [...]" *Religion* AA VI: 128* (actually, 129).

119. See Kant's rejection of Johann Georg Sulzer's claim that there will one day be a proof of the existence of God and the afterlife in the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 769–770. Kant also recognizes that there will also never be any disproof of God and the afterlife. For transcendental consciousness the only issue here is how God and the afterlife function for the furthering of theoretical and practical reason *in this world*, not as a motivation for one's moral effort in this life for fear over God's judgment in the afterlife.

120. Kant, *Vorlesungen über die philosophische Religionslehre* (Pölitiz) AA PR: 196.

Rather than commit such an error, Kant insists that the notion of the afterlife is necessary for religion.¹²¹ It is necessary, though, not as a certainty that would turn morality into fear and anxiety, which undermines morality. It is necessary because it motivates one to focus in this life on moral worthiness for happiness or blessedness. Rather than afterlife justifying moral effort out of merely personal interest in salvation in the next life, for Kant the lack of proof or disproof of the afterlife forces us to consider what *positive* function can the afterlife have on autonomous, self-selecting moral effort *in this life*.

Given what we can know of the centrality of moral effort and its conditions of possibility in this life for what it means to be a human being, the *possibility* of an afterlife would consist of the preservation of the conditions of moral effort for all eternity. In short, the afterlife, were it to exist, would permit ceaseless moral improvement (that is, imposing a moral principle to govern one's agency, not achieving objectively moral ends), but, in any event, it encourages moral effort in this life in that it fosters curtailment of discouragement in the face of suffering in this world and the shortness of life as well as the ineffectual consequences of morality and the *apparent* victory of the unjust over the just in this world that can result in diminished moral effort in this life.¹²²

The afterlife is an example of the value of the *critical* Copernican Turn: Rather than focus on the objective reality of the afterlife, Critical Idealism shifts the focus to the *necessary* conditions of possibility that would make the afterlife valuable for moral effort *in this life*. Because self-interest as an exclusive motivator of moral effort is undermining of the very conditions of moral effort that require the self-selecting of a moral principle that one would want to be universal like a law of nature (i.e., not as an excuse for private, particular interest), the productive function of the afterlife for moral effort *must necessarily* be its value for encouraging disinterested (but by no means uninteresting) moral effort in this life.

Kant writes in his *Lectures on Metaphysics* L₁: "*On the Condition of the Soul after Death*"

In general, [...] it is not at all in accordance with our destiny here to worry much about the future world; rather, we must complete the circle to which we are destined here and wait to see how it will be in view of the future world. The main thing is that we behave righteously and morally well in this post and try to make ourselves worthy of future happiness.¹²³

121. For example, Kant writes: "It is true that this opinion of the other world cannot be demonstrated, but it is a necessary hypothesis of reason." *Vorlesungen über die Metaphysik* L₁ (Pöhlitz) AA PM: 257. See as well, Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 126.

122. See the "Final Comment" at the end of Kant's *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* AA VIII: 120–123 as well as the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 769–770.

123. Kant, *Vorlesungen über Metaphysik* L₁: "Über den Zustand der Seele nach dem Tode:" AA PM 260.

The main thing is always morality: this is the sacred and inviolable thing that we must protect, and this is also the reason and purpose of all our speculations and investigations. All metaphysical speculations go to this. God and the other world is the only goal of all our philosophical investigations, and if the concepts of God and the other world were not connected with morality [McG: in this world], they would be of no use.¹²⁴

In his *Reflections on Metaphysics* (From the Literary Remains), Kant adds:

These are matters of faith, in which the morality of forewarning is the essential. The existence of God and of the future world are matters of faith of mere reason. As far as speculation is concerned, they are of no great importance, nor can they be proved apodictically. However, if morality is taken as a basis, these elements of faith are indispensable hypotheses to put faith into practice.¹²⁵

6) Strauß misunderstands moral perfection in Kant

Strauß also misunderstands the role of moral perfection in Kant's moral philosophy. In fact, contrary to Strauß' claim that Kant maintained that moral perfection was attainable,¹²⁶ Kant was not optimistic concerning the perfectibility of the species, and he rejected the notion that perfection was the goal of morality. The goal of the human species, for Kant, is not moral perfection in the sense of external achievement but moral perfection as the ever-increasing dominance of the moral disposition.¹²⁷

In the first footnote to the first Preface of *Religion* AA VI: 4*, Kant maintains that *the determining ground of duty is nothing external and teleological*. Any external, teleological ground of morality would define duty as "natural perfection" in terms of "skill in the arts and the sciences, taste, physical agility, etc." Rather, *the determining ground of duty is internal and archaeological*, that is, it is concerned with "one's own perfection." However, one's moral perfection is no external attainment. It "[...] can only be one thing (namely a will unconditionally obedient to the [moral] law)." Moral improvement, then, is progress in terms of one's obedience to the internal, unconditional moral law, and that, in turn, is obedience to one's *archaeological* capacities, not external, *teleological* achievements either of skill or of happiness.

In other words, one's "moral perfection" is not determined by an external measurement either of ethical "success" or "failure" much less happiness but by one's internal adherence to a universal, moral principle as standard and guide for one's

124. Kant, *Vorlesungen über Metaphysik* L₁: "Über den Zustand der Seele nach dem Tode:" AA PM 261.

125. Kant, *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik* (Aus dem Nachlaß: 1780–1789) Phase ψ AA XVIII: 580.

126. See Strauß, *LJ*: 774–775.

127. See the discussion of moral perfection in the disposition that calls for effort at moral improvement rather than achievement of moral perfection in the section above, "B) A Misreading of Kant's *Religion and Christology*:" 825 ff.

agency and internal satisfaction over one's efforts.¹²⁸ Strauß acknowledges this in his *Glaubenslehre* in 1841. Furthermore, he recognizes that hope for reward in the afterlife as the motivation for doing good is "a crude error"¹²⁹ and is denounced by Spinoza but also by Clement of Alexandria, Calvin, Socinius, Shaftesbury, Lessing, Feuerbach,, Bayle, Wieland, and Schelling.¹³⁰ However, he fails to acknowledge that it is at the heart of Kant's teaching on morality. For Kant, it is not merely egocentrism that is at stake but a contradiction of the very *a priori* synthetic conditions for morality, in the first place.¹³¹ Those conditions may involve (require) a 'symbolically anthropomorphic' notion of God as the 'giver' of the law, but, above all, the concern of moral effort is not 'pleasing' God or a reward in the after-life, but the degree of respect one gives to the moral law within.¹³²

Kant writes:

Natural perfection (consequentialism) is "always only conditionally good" whereas moral perfection "alone commands unconditionally [...]; hence natural perfection cannot be, when made into an end [teleological], the principle of the concerns of duty. The same also applies to an end [teleological] when associated with the happiness of other human beings. For an action must first be weighed in itself according to the moral law before it can be associated with the happiness of others. The action's promotion of [...] happiness, therefore, is duty only conditionally, and cannot serve as the supreme principle of moral principles."¹³³ In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant points out that we "[...] are not able to determine with complete certainty, according to any principle, what will make [... us] happy, because omniscience would be required for this. To be happy, one cannot [...] act on determinate principles, but only according to empirical counsels [...]"¹³⁴

Therefore, it is not the deeds of individuals but a "[...] moral character of the species that confirms at least the capacity that not only allows hope in improvement but

128. This is by no means a novel claim by Kant. Although Strauß doesn't refer to Kant, he points out that it is the meaning of Spinoza's notion of "blessedness is virtue itself" ("*Seligkeit ist Tugend selbst*") (*Glaubenslehre* II, 709) and Leibniz proposal that happiness is "internal moral satisfaction" (*Glaubenslehre* II: 713–714).

129. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 711.

130. See Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* II: 709–714.

131. See Kant, *Metaphysik Moroni* AA XXIX: 776–77 In the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant emphasizes that fear and hope as motivation for morality destroys it (AA V: 129–130), and he stresses that "[...] nothing honors God more than that which is most precious in the world, respect for His commandment, observance of sacred duty" (AA V: 131). On the notion of 'duty,' see McGaughey, "Addendum: On Duty" in "Was Kant Anti-Semitic? with an Addendum on Duty" at <https://criticalidealism.org/was-kant-anti-semitic-with-an-addendum-on-duty/> (22 November 2023): 29–39.

132. On the centrality of respect [*Achtung*] for the law not merely as motivation for morality but as morality itself, see Birgit Recki, *Ästhetik der Sitten*: 272–278.

133. Kant, *Reason* AA VI: 4*.

134. *Groundwork*: AA IV: 418. Special thanks are owed to Prof. James R. Cochrane for calling this passage to my attention!

confirms hope as far as the capacity already is adequate for such improvement."¹³⁵ This *confirmed hope* is the basis for the rejection of political revolution, the establishment of a republican government and a cosmopolitanism in which the sovereignty of nations is reined in by governments themselves by commitment to international agencies (not by a world government) in order to achieve an international, just, economic and political, social order.¹³⁶

7) Kant's exclusive focus was on the individual, not on the species

According to Strauß, Kant's exclusive focus, when it comes to moral improvement, is on the individual, not on the species as a totality. Strauß, in contrast, stressed, especially in *The Old and the New Faith* of 1872 that moral improvement refers to the species not the individual because humanity is incapable of ethical perfection.

Kant frequently emphasized that the focus of moral development (not the achievement of perfection!) is on the *species*.¹³⁷

8) Kant: Claimed moral principles are derived from the scriptures but, actually, projected morality onto the past.

Kant is faulted by Strauß for not providing an historical account for the rise of religion or the scriptures.

According to Strauß, *Kant grounded moral principles in the text, but actually, he anachronistically imputed the morality of his age onto the past without giving any account of how they came to be expressed in the gospels.*

135. Kant, *Conflict of the Faculties*, AA VII: 85.

136. See Kant, *Conflict of the Faculties*, AA VII: 85–94. See as well, Kant's *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* AA VIII: 17–31. In *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project*, Kant proposes a "federation of free states" (AA VIII: 354 ff.) at the minimum a "peace alliance" (*ibid.*, 356, 385). See as well, *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (AA VIII: 24 ff.) and §54 of the "Doctrine of Right" in the *Metaphysics of Morals* (AA VI: 344). There are good reasons to believe that Kant's reflections played a decisive role (although concealed for obvious political reasons) in the development of the League of Nations among Woodrow Wilson's advisers. See Gerhard Beestermöller, "Die Umsetzung der Völkerbundsphilosophie in politische Wirklichkeit durch Woodrow Wilson" in *Die Völkerbunds-idee. Leistungsfähigkeit und Grenzen der Kriegsächtung durch Staatensolidarität* (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1995): 94–142.

137. His emphasis on the species, not the individual is found in *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (1784) (AA VIII: 18, 20), *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* (1786) (AA VIII: 115, 123), *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798) (AA VII: 328–329, On Pedagogy (1803) (AA IX: 445–446), *Conflict of the Faculties* (1798) (AA VII: 84), as well as, the text from Kant most frequently quoted by Strauß, *Religion* (1793/1794) (AA VI: 25, 97–98).

Whilst Kant [...] sought to *educe moral thoughts from the biblical writings*, even in their historical part, and was even inclined to consider these thoughts as the fundamental object of the history [of the texts]: on the one hand, he derived these thoughts only from himself and the cultivation of his age, and therefore could [...] assume [only in rare cases] that they had actually been laid down by the authors of those writings; and on the other hand, and for the same reason, he omitted to show what was the relation between these thoughts and those symbolic representations and how it happened that the one came to be expressed by the other."¹³⁸ (emphasis added) (McG: translation modifications)

Strauß criticizes Kant for not accounting for how the 'moral instinct' for duties 'descended invisibly' at the commencement of the human race.¹³⁹ Absent any accounting for the scriptural formulation of them as valid grounding of the 'duty' required by moral principles is taken by Strauß to justify a charge of anachronism against Kant for imposing ethical principles from a later on an earlier age. A final Kantian failure is that Kant offers no account of how 'abstract ideas' can come to be expressed in 'symbolic representations.'

When it comes to Strauß' criticism of Kant that he does not give an account of the origin of moral principles/laws, Hegel and Strauß have failed to notice that not only does Kant maintain that humanity only selects (under self-obligation) the laws of duty and only creates technical and pragmatic laws. Kant maintains that God (the Noumenon) is the 'creator' of laws but has no duty (obligation) to select among them.¹⁴⁰ According to Hegel/Strauß, the origin of the principles of abstract 'moral duty' as well as even the relative social rules that are generated by a community to govern its citizens are the consequence of an 'empty,' dialectical process of 'negation.' Hegel replaces the 'grace' of a Personal Deity with the 'cunning of reason'¹⁴¹ as assurance of attainment of the ultimate goal of Absolute Knowledge with the consequence that all 'real' significance to 'actual' historical representations, which include ethical systems, is annulled.¹⁴²

Cumulatively, Strauß' charges against Kant appear to be devastating. However, a careful examination of the presuppositions that drive Strauß criticism of Kant discloses that it is Strauß (and Hegel) who are grounding their meta-narrative in empty, abstract ideas and drawing anachronistic conclusions with respect to what Kant 'must

138. Strauß, *LJ*: 51–52.

139. See Strauß, *LJ*: 777 where Strauß says of Kant: "[...] [T]he good principle did not descend from heaven merely at a particular time, [*sic.*] but had descended on mankind invisibly from the commencement of the human race [...]" but only "as a moral instinct."

140. Kant distinguishes between selection among laws/principles (obligation/duty) and creation of laws/principles with the creator (God/Noumenon) having 'rights' but no obligation/duty to select among them. See Chapter 7: 765

141. See Hegel, "Introduction" to *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*: GW XII: 49 (Sibree trans.: 34).

142. See Hegel, "Introduction" to *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*: Heroic and great men know the nascent principles but don't control that the time was ripe GW XII: 45–46 (Sibree trans.: 31–32); "the world is as it ought to be" because "God is reason:" GW: XII: 53 (Sibree trans.: 38).

have meant.' These two criticisms turn out to be one and the same because Hegel and Strauß have no understanding of what Kant means by 'categorical imperatives,' which for them can only be 'empty abstractions.' Given that for Hegel and Strauß moral principles are taken to be merely ineffectual, 'empty abstractions,' it is they who can only speak of the relative construction of ethical norms as arising out of particular historical contexts which, in turn, can only be anachronistically applied to earlier ages.

A crucial key to understanding Strauß' criticism of Kant is found in 'The Moral View of the World' from Hegel's *Phenomenology* and F.C. Baur's *Gnosis* already in 1835 for which 'ethics' is measured by the consequences of agency and 'moral principles' are 'merely empty,' abstract, ineffectual duties that concrete 'ethical' agency cannot fulfil because of physical and social restrictions on the individual. The import of these presuppositions for Strauß is that there is no such thing as 'actual,' universal moral principles that apply to all times and all places. Such universal moral principles by definition, then, are 'merely empty ideas.' According to Strauß, ethical principles are social norms generated in each culture to govern the attainment of the teleological ends of agency. In short, ethical principles guide agency, according to the later Strauß, and they serve as the concrete criteria for adjudicating the degree of one's ethical accomplishments (or, more accurately, failures).

By reducing experience to merely the interface between abstractions (*Inhalt*) and representations (*Form*), Hegel/Strauß accomplish precisely that which they claim to deny. They drive a wedge between transcendental consciousness and the phenomenal world and close off any immediate connection by transcendental consciousness with the realm of agency. *A description grounded in a merely logical, meta-narrative of Double Negation of an interface between Spirit and matter/Freedom and nature is no causal explanation of their connectedness. To claim a causal relationship by means of description is a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος (a substitution of one genus for another).* According to Hegel, 'pure thought' is synthetic abstraction whereas 'practical philosophy'¹⁴³ is the pursuit of analytical, pragmatic aims in the world. *They are united, according to Hegel, by Absolute Spirit, which is a dictum (Machtspruch) as dogmatic as anything in Traditional Personal Theism.*

However, Kant's anchoring of 'pure reason' in the world is achieved not merely by insisting that transcendental reason can only arrive at awareness of itself because the phenomenal world requires a set of *a priori* synthetic elements (God, the regulative idea of the Noumenon, not Hegel's Absolute Spirit) but also because 'practical reason' is only possible if transcendental consciousness exercises 'autonomous freedom' or the ability to initiate a finite sequence of events that nature on its own cannot. In other words, Kant's distinction within 'pure reason' between 'theoretical' and 'practical'

143. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 456, 463; see as well, Hegel's discussion of 'practical reason' as analytic in contrast to 'theoretical reason' as synthetic in *ibid.* GW II: 457–458, 460, 463, 466.

reason is turned by Hegel/Strauß (following Fichte) into an ontological dualism¹⁴⁴ between abstraction and the phenomenal world. Rather than grasping the significance of Kant's autonomous freedom (*Wille*), which is a finite, eminent causality¹⁴⁵ embedded in, and inseparable from, the merely, mechanical, formal causality of nature, Hegel and Strauß take humanity to be subject to nature's 'freedom,' which is really nature's determinism,¹⁴⁶ that it is incapable of morality. For Hegel/Strauß, in the world there is at most only a finite freedom of 'spontaneous choice' (*Willkür*), which must be exercised within the restrictions of social institutions.¹⁴⁷ Absolute Freedom (Note: not finite, individual autonomous freedom!), is located, exclusively, in 'transcendental Reason' as a predicate of Absolute Spirit/Absolute Knowledge.¹⁴⁸

Having turned off the ventilator to Kant's autonomous freedom, Hegel/Strauß take Kant's notion of 'wide,' categorical, moral principles to be 'mere abstractions' unrelated to concrete experience. On the contrary, for Kant moral principles are the strongest indicator that humanity exercises a *extra-ordinary* form of causality found to anything close to the same degree in no other species.¹⁴⁹

144. See Fichte's dualism in *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre*, Gesamtausgabe I,2, Reinhard Lauth and Hans Jacob, eds. (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag (Günther Holzboog), 1965: 217.

145. On the difference between eminent and efficient causality, see the "Introduction:" 84, n. 23.

146. See Hegel, *Phänomenologie* GW III: 450–451 [Baillie trans.: 624–625].

147. Kant makes a distinction between 'choice' (*Willkür*) and autonomous freedom (*Wille*) as follows. In *Reflections on Moral Philosophy*, Kant calls empirical knowledge 'pragmatic' (AA XIX: 284) and contrasts it with practical reason. Kant speaks of the 'pragmatic' as concerned with 'teaching cleverness' (*Lehre der Klugheit*) and 'rules of cleverness' (*Klugheitsregeln*) (AA XIX: 104), which are the direct result of 'arbitrariness'/liberty (*freie Willkür*), not 'free will'/autonomous freedom (*Wille*) (AA XIX: 171). Free will (*Wille*) is the capacity (*Anlage*) of autonomous, creativity 'above' the mechanical causality of nature (*Critique of Pure Reason* B 580), which is not capricious choice but always subject to a moral principle (even if ignored) (*ibid.*: B xxviii–xxix). There are two kinds of freedom: according to nature and according to autonomy (B 560). Succinctly, 'pragmatic' cleverness constitutes imperatives that lead to 'welfare' (*Wohlfahrt*) whereas 'practical' reason is concerned with the application of a moral principle to one's agency. Hypothetical or 'pragmatic imperatives' apply to 'what everyone wants, not what s/he should do.' *Reflections on Moral Philosophy* AA XIX: 104

148. See Hegel, "Introduction: C" to the *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* GW XII: 77: "The history of the world [...] represents the course of stages of the development of the principle, whose content is the consciousness of freedom. The more detailed determination of these stages is logical in its general nature, but in its more concrete nature it is given in the philosophy of mind. It is only to be mentioned here that the first stage is the sinking of the spirit into naturalness, as already mentioned above, and the second stage is its stepping out into the consciousness of its freedom. This first tearing away, however, is imperfect and partial [...] The third stage is the elevation from this still special freedom into the pure generality of it, into the self-consciousness and self-feeling of the essence of spirituality." (emphasis added) [McG translation; see Sibree trans.: 59]

149. This is the significance of Kant's statement that autonomous freedom is the *ratio essendi* of morality (the reason for the existence of the moral law) whereas the moral law is the *ratio cognoscendi* of autonomous freedom (the basis for knowing autonomous freedom). See Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 4*, 29–30. Kant is clear that moral principles as the *ratio cognoscendi* of autonomous freedom do not constitute a proof of autonomous freedom. As a cause, finite, eminent, autonomous

As I stressed in Chapter 7, according to Kant not all imperatives are moral imperatives. Kant distinguishes between 'categorical' and 'hypothetical' imperatives.¹⁵⁰ The latter, 'hypothetical' imperatives are relative, social constructions. They are the 'rules' that govern what Kant calls 'technical' and 'pragmatic' agency. Technical, hypothetical imperatives are the required steps that are needed to accomplish a task (e.g., the building of a structure in conformity with a building code, rules for driving a car, mandatory vaccinations, civic legal system, etc.) whereas pragmatic, hypothetical imperatives govern the individual's 'well-being' (e.g., qualifying to practice a profession, obtaining an education degree, practicing a sport, etc.).¹⁵¹ 'Categorical' imperatives are wide, universal, moral principles/laws 'above' hypothetical imperatives. Whereas 'hypothetical' imperatives establish the requirements for accomplishing a task, categorical imperatives govern the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of the activity.¹⁵² For example, I can know all the proper requirements for constructing a house and, yet, do a poor job of actually building the house, or I can follow all of the laws in effect at a certain time for governing the pollution of the environment and still know that my actions are destructive to the environment. In short, simply because something is 'legal' (hypothetically) doesn't mean that it is 'right' (categorically).

There is nothing about categorical imperatives that makes them merely 'empty abstractions' for two crucial reasons: 1) Were there not to be a capacity of autonomous creativity that makes possible the initiating of sequences that nature on its own cannot accomplish, there could be no categorical imperatives. 2) Were there not a difference between what is 'legal' (external 'right') and what 'ought to be' (internal 'virtue'), there would be no difference between hypothetical and categorical imperatives.¹⁵³ Hegel/Strauß fail to understand the meaning and significance of universal, categorical

freedom is an *a priori* synthetic judgment that, as with the case of the Noumenon as a infinite, eminent freedom, is incapable of proof or disproof. What transcendental consciousness can do is provide a 'defense' of autonomous freedom on the basis of what is required not to *explain* reality but to *understand* and exercise responsible agency in a world of phenomena. See Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 459.

150. On 'hypothetical' and 'categorical' imperatives, see 738.

151. See Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 414–421.

152. Strauß ignores not only the difference between cultural values and civic laws, which both depend upon the citizenry following a "higher" moral law for the values and laws to achieve virtue, compassion, and justice, but he also ignores that there are two parts of Kant's *Metaphysics of Morals*, the "Doctrine of Virtue" (*Tugendlehre*) and the "Doctrine of Right" (*Rechtslehre*). The "Doctrine of Virtue" is concerned with the individual's exercise of her/his internal, moral responsibility for her/his autonomous freedom. The "Doctrine of Virtue" then, is concerned with *categorical* imperatives that are self-selected by the individual. The "Doctrine of Right" is concerned with rules concerned with governing the affairs of the "external mine and yours," that is the contract rules and laws necessary for public life. Its focus is with *hypothetical* imperatives that are governed by particular situations (for example, driving on the right- or left-hand lane, the rules for an apartment rental, the requirements for admission to a profession, etc.).

153. The distinction between 'what is legal' and 'what ought to be' is the focus of Kant's *Metaphysics of Morals* with its two Parts: "The Doctrine of [Legal] Right" and "The Doctrine of Virtue."

principles ('moral duty') and reduce them to merely relative, hypothetical norms (socially constructed, 'ethical norms'). Consequently, Strauß and Hegel accuse Kant of anachronistically imposing 'ethical norms' on a prior cultural age. There could not be a more complete misunderstanding of Kant's moral teaching than this.

It is not Kant who anachronistically imposes an 'ethical order' of his day onto the scriptures, it is Hegel and Strauß, who impose an anachronistic reading onto Kant. They substitute a causal account of ultimate 'reality' for Kant's epistemological account of understanding and agency in the world within the limits of finite reason. On the basis of a system of logic, Hegel and Strauß proffer an absolute, *causal explanation* not only for 'why' there are abstract ideas but also for 'how' the phenomenal world has arisen from them as the sensuous condition for finite consciousness to 'think' ideas in the midst of phenomenal representations.¹⁵⁴

9) Kant provides no accounting for the rise of religion and scriptures

In addition to these two anachronistic criticisms of Kant, Strauß faults Kant for not providing an account of the emergence of the religions and the writing of the scriptures. This criticism is far broader than that Kant merely anachronistically attributes the 'origin' of moral principles to the scriptures.

Kant's attitude toward the scriptures is far more nuanced than that 'moral principles' are historically derived from them. In fact, he claims that, when it comes to 'pure' religion that is concerned with the moral effort of humanity, no scriptures

154. In his *Das Wesen der Religion* [Lectures 1848/1849] (Berlin: Deutsche Bibliothek, 1913), Ludwig Feuerbach attacks the 'new speculative philosophy' (Hegel) of the day. Feuerbach acknowledges that 'the' core issue for philosophy and theology has been (and remains) how universals are related to particulars (Lecture 13: 129–130). In agreement with Traditional Personal Theism but on the basis of a logical account, not the agency of a Personal Deity, Hegel derives particulars out of 'the' Absolute Idea/ideas (Lecture 19: 191–192) by means of a dialectical process of thesis and antithesis with the ultimate aim of the conscious thinking of Absolute Knowledge as an *a posteriori* synthesis. Feuerbach appropriately points out that this is no less an anthropological projection of how the human mind experiences and creates onto a divine mind (Lecture 13: 134–135) than is the case of Traditional Personal Theism's Personal Deity. Feuerbach's alternative account of the relationship between particulars and universals is that the latter are *a posteriori*, ectypal, abstract creations of finite minds (Lecture 13: 124–125, 128, Lecture 28: 289, see Lecture 19: 191, Lecture 20 203–204). From the Kantian perspective, Traditional Personal Theism, the 'new speculative philosophy,' and Feuerbach's materialism all succumb to a logical, μεταβάσις εἰς ἄλλο γένος (a substitution of one genus for another) that takes a description to be a causal explanation. As Kant understood, finite consciousness has access only to effects, not directly to causes. Whereas Kant 'grounds' causal explanations in the *coherence and lawfulness* of appearances, not knowledge, the 'new speculative philosophy' takes representations to present '*things-in-themselves*' (*objective subreption*), although representations can be misleading and/or false, and fails to grasp the significance of coherent lawfulness for grounding understanding both of 'what is' (theoretical reason) and of 'what ought to be' (practical reason).

are necessary.¹⁵⁵ Yet, he also claims that religion requires no other 'norm' than the scriptures.¹⁵⁶ However, he is not claiming that moral 'principles' are derived from the scriptures, but, rather, given that the scriptures are properly understood only from the correct, moral perspective and, to the extent that there are moral principles (and not just heteronomous, social rules) in the scriptures, moral principles are the same for both experience, generally, and for the scriptures. Consequently, there is no difference between 'moral principles' in scripture and the 'moral principles' of practical reason.¹⁵⁷

Furthermore, given that there is no difference among 'true' moral norms in scripture and in practical reason, then there is no need for more than one 'scripture' as "basis for ecclesiastical instruction,¹⁵⁸ but "universal human reason must be recognized and honored as the supreme commanding principle [...] whereas the doctrine of revelation, upon which a church is founded and which stands in need of scholars as interpreters and preserves, must be cherished and cultivated as a mere means [...]”¹⁵⁹ to the goal of 'moral character' – not as revelation/scripture serving as the end of religion.

Strauß' final criticism here is that Kant "omitted to show what was the relation between these [moral] thoughts and those symbolic representations [the biblical writings] and how it happened that the one came to be expressed by the other.”¹⁶⁰ As a Hegelian, the early Strauß explains the generation of the "symbolic representations" of the scriptures to be mythic/narrative constructions by their authors, who portrayed as objective events a new *con-figuration* of meanings out of the pre-figured texts of the 'First Testament.' Strauß called this *the genetic mythical principle*. The gospels are 'representations' as the author's creative, objective "husk" of either a historical event, a philosophical idea, or a poetic element. Yet, given that Strauß never asks 'where the 'First' Testament prototypes themselves came from?', much less that he didn't grasp the significance of the 'genetic mythical principle' as indicator of the gospel writers as 'authors', not 'historians,' he assumed that religion and the scriptures, along with the

155. See Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 133.

156. See Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 114.

157. Kant is carefully looking over his shoulder at the state's religious censors when he writes: "[...] history proves that never could a faith based on scripture be eradicated by even the most devastating political revolutions, whereas a faith based on tradition and ancient public observances meets its downfall as soon as the state breaks down. How fortunate, when one such book, fallen into human hands, contains complete, besides its statutes legislating faith [= 'historical' religion], also the purest moral doctrine of religion [that is, the 'ideal' of moral principles of 'pure' religion], and this doctrine can be brought into the strictest harmony with those statutes [of 'historical' religion] (which [in turn], contribute to its [the purest moral doctrine] introduction). In this event, both because of the end to be attained thereby and the difficulty of explaining by natural laws the origin of the enlightenment of the human race proceeding from it, the book can command an authority equal to that of a revelation." *Religion* AA VI: 107.

158. Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 133.

159. Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 165.

160. Strauß, *LJ*: 51–52.

entire cosmos, are the 'intentional' aim of Absolute Spirit seeking to become aware of Itself, that is, that *everything* is a product of the logic of Double Negation.

Having reduced moral principles/laws to the 'empty abstractions' of 'moral duty' and having misunderstood or intentionally cut the umbilical cord of Kant's notion of creative, autonomous freedom, Strauß failed in 1835 to understand the key significance of what Kant called practical reason. Having ignored the significance of autonomous freedom for understanding humanity's creative capacity that is a species marker, Strauß finds Kant unable to account for the generation of the scriptures out of "merely" abstract reason and moral principles. However, once one understands the significance of autonomous freedom, one can readily understand that the biblical authors are engaged in precisely that activity that is a species marker of humanity's transcendental consciousness: creativity. *As a product of autonomous freedom, their authors have a moral responsibility for their 'products', and the community who employs the 'product' has a moral responsibility for understanding how the 'product' was produced and how the 'product' is embraced.*

Unlike the Hegelians, though, this creative agency is not in the service of an Absolute Idea working its way through history by the *cunning of reason* to its "objective representation" in self-awareness in the individual, Jesus of Nazareth, to reach the teleological goal of divine self-awareness by the philosopher (Hegel) or the species (Strauß). *Rather than the goal of humanity consisting either in being 'reconciled with God' by divinization or by achieving objective, moral perfection, for Kant this creative agency is concerned precisely with what it means to be and to become human.* Being and becoming human requires recognition of the significance and power of *both theoretical and practical reason* in historical experience. That recognition is not achieved simply by the individual but requires what Kant calls moral culture:¹⁶¹ a community aware of the internal, hence, imperceptible, rule-governed orders of physical laws (statistics and algorithms in those 'territories' where physical laws are indiscernible) of *theoretical* reason and self-selected moral laws of *practical* reason.

This community, however, possesses no objective list of moral laws capable of being found in any text (much less the two sets of "Ten Commandments" of Exodus

161. Already in his so-called 'pre-critical' period, Kant spoke in this fashion of *das Reich Gottes* (the Commonwealth of God) as the cultivation of moral culture. See Kant, *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie* (Lecture on Moral Philosophy): 356, 367–68, 367 n. 244. However, the theme is maintained throughout his "critical" writings. Kant distinguishes between a "culture of skills" and a "culture that promotes the [moral] will." See *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 431–432. Instead of a "culture of skills," Kant speaks of the "culture of mental agitations" (*Gemütskräfte*) in *On Pedagogy* AA IX: 475–476. See as well, *On Pedagogy* (AA IX: 449–450, 480), *Critique of Practical Reason* (AA V: 153) "Doctrine of Virtue" in the *Metaphysics of Morals* (AA VI: 386–387, 391–393: 444–445), *On the Common Saying: 'That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice'* (Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis) (AA VIII: 308–309), *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (AA VII: 327–330), and *Vorlesungen über die philosophische Religionslehre*: AA PR: 137. Moral culture is equivalent to what Kant calls *das Reich Gottes* (the Commonwealth of God) in Religion.

20 and 34),¹⁶² and this community does not engage in an objective, heteronomous finger-wagging in the face of the individual. Rather, this community encourages the individual to recognize the significance, power, and responsibility that s/he has for her/his own creativity. That includes the creativity of writing and reading of texts.

For Kant, then, the scriptures serve as a paradigmatic example both of human creativity and, hence, of how important a responsible reading of them is. The scriptures are far more than "symbolic representations" or husks that have been used for the "objective" presentation of mythic elements whose concealed purpose is to bring about humanity's divinization. The scriptures are typical of human creativity, and, as a consequence, both their generation by their authors as well as their interpretation by their readers are subject to human moral responsibility – as the case with everything that humanity does that transforms nature in ways that nature is incapable of doing on its own.

There is no more clear witness to this failed responsibility than the destructive history on the part of the *historical* religion that is Christianity. To be sure, Christianity as a *historical* religion is not alone in employing its texts to justify physical and psychological destruction whether it be of nature or of the "God-less." Yet, there is an antidote to this destructiveness right at the core of all *historical* religions as well as at the core of unjust, social systems of "civic law." That antidote is the creative capacity that brought about them all. Only if humanity is capable intentionally of initiating sequences of events that nature cannot accomplish on its own is it possible for there to be any moral responsibility whatsoever. If there is to be moral responsibility, then, we must acknowledge the significance and power of that autonomous freedom, and we need to cultivate that invisible culture, which we can call the Commonwealth of God, that recognizes the dignity of all and the sanctity of nature.

162. The Ten Commandments of Exodus 20 are relativized by the Ten Commandments of Exodus 34. The two sets of Ten Commandments are "the same" only with respect to the fact that they illustrate that there can be no social order without "civic laws" (social norms) that govern the relationships of individuals in their external affairs. That is, these commandments are *hypothetical* imperatives, not *categorical* imperatives. In addition, the two sets Ten Commandments, though, apply to two very different external circumstances: nomadic and sedentary. For each "civic law" to be applied "properly" (as they *ought* to be applied), there must be a "higher" law to which each individual is accountable *internally*, and only the individual can know whether or not s/he has conformed to the "higher" law. Exodus 20 appears to be grounded in the *invisible* deity of Exodus 3:14 with its grammatical accounting for the Tetragrammaton (YHWH) as of Moses. Exodus 34 appears to be grounded by the distinction between visible form (representations) and invisible content (concepts) with the social order being called to accountability by its invisible content through a system of sacrifice. In short, 'civic' law govern visible practices. However, 'religious' law governs invisible practices that structure the visible. Both civic and religious law are *hypothetical* with their 'narrow' focus on successful attainment of goals in the world. The moral law, in contrast, is *categorical* with its 'wide' principles to which both the 'civic' and 'religious' law are answerable. In short, neither set of the Ten Commandments is a set of *categorical* imperatives of morality. They are *hypothetical* imperatives. Both require a moral citizenry for their *proper* application.

Nothing (!) is lost of the scriptures, religious ritual, or even institutional structure – not to speak of music and art – when *theoretical* reason and *historical* religion embrace the capacities and responsibilities of *practical* reason to formulate what Kant calls *pure* religion that is concerned with the faith that grounds both *theoretical* and *practical* reason as well as *pure* religion. What is 'pure' about religion¹⁶³ is not a claim to superiority or a justification for the destruction of anything and everything that is merely *historical* in religion. 'Pure' here refers to all of those spiritual or imperceptible elements, capacities, and responsibilities that make it possible for humanity to be and become the species that it is *in history*. To be sure, *pure* religion does require a shift from the *hypothetical* (the mere determinations of objective circumstances) to the *categorical* (the elements, capacities, and responsibilities that are "above" but never separate from objective circumstances).

Pure religion requires a Copernican Turn no different than the Copernican Revolution's. The solar system was not diminished in any way by Copernicus' insight that its proper understanding requires the denial of the senses. Furthermore, far from the significance of humanity being diminished by the Copernican Revolution's placing the sun at the center of the solar system, humanity was enhanced as it was displaced from the center of the *physical universe* to assume the position of the center of the *epistemological universe* (the *knowing* universe). No other species (although it is possible that there could be another) possesses the elements, capacities, and responsibilities (to the degree) of humanity. However, even the Copernican Revolution remains incomplete as it has not grasped the centrality (!) of *practical* reason, that is, creativity and moral responsibility, for what it means not only to be able to "do" science but also for the significance of science for our species to be and to become human.¹⁶⁴

Far from having reduced moral principles to mere abstractions, anachronistically imposing ethical norms on a previous age, or failing to be able to account for the generation of the scriptures, Kant, as well, is the last one to quarrel with the natural sciences. *Pure* religion is anchored in the natural sciences to the degree that the natural sciences help us grasp by *theoretical* reason the rule-governed systems that make physical events possible and help us understand the material order that makes any and all *practical* reason and *pure* religion possible. Our successes with *theoretical* reason in identifying the invisible, lawful-order that governs physical causality, provide a heuristic analogy for our equal confidence in the invisible, lawful, moral order that governs autonomous freedom. In other words, Kant's Critical Idealism is far more complementary to the natural sciences than Strauß' insistence on the complementarity between the Hegelian Absolute Idea with the natural sciences. Rather than maintain-

163. On Kant's notion of 'pure', see 558, n. 109, on Kant's notion of 'pure religion', see 928, n. 189 and Chapter 9: "Missing Aesthetic Judgment:" 928, n. 189.

164. See McGaughey, "The Incomplete Copernican Revolution in Popular Legend, the Natural Sciences, and in Practical Reason (Morality)" available at <https://criticalidealism.org/incomplete-copernican-revolution-27-october-2016/>

ing the claim for science as Absolute Knowledge, understanding the natural order is crucial for humanity to be (and become) what it is (will be). The difference between Kant and Hegelianism is the Copernican Turn, which places humanity squarely in the historical world.¹⁶⁵

II) Strauß' Presentation of Carl Daub's Reading of Kant

In January of 1839, two years after the appearance of Strauß' *Streitschriften* that include a burning criticism of Hegelianism originally published in *Die Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, two years after the initial, failed attempt to appoint Strauß to the theological faculty in Zurich (not insignificantly, in part out of the refusal of a Schleiermacherian on the faculty to support the appointment) on the heels of "On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity" in which Strauß presented an initial formulation of religion independent of Hegel, and just as the Canton government of Zurich successfully named Strauß to the faculty of the University of Zurich, which led to the revolution in September, Strauß serially published a review article on Schleiermacher and the Hegelian, Carl Daub. I describe in Chapter 4, "Why Schleiermacher was not an Option" the bridge burning this publication represents with respect to Schleiermacher.

I have addressed Daub's criticisms of the arguments for God and his non-critical 'historical' reading of the scriptures in Chapter 5: "Traces of an Intellectual Crisis."¹⁶⁶ Here though, I address Daub's formulation of Kant's philosophy itself. Although originally a Kant enthusiast (in Kant's sense of enthusiasm),¹⁶⁷ Daub profoundly distorts Kant. Although Strauß expresses dissatisfaction with Daub when it comes to his rejection of the adequacy of his 'Hegelian' argument for God, biblical criticism, and the reduction of history to a 'dream,' Strauß at no point questions the inappropriateness of Daub's reading of Kant. Strauß' silence indicates acceptance, and, even in his writings as of the 1860s when he was 'leaning' Kantian, he never criticizes Daub's portrayal of Kant. In other words, Strauß' invoking of Kantian moral theory remains mediated across his career by his understanding of the human condition with respect to morali-

165. Birgit Recki emphasizes this theme that for Kant humanity "belongs in the world" ("*Der Mensch in die Welt passe*"). It is the lesson of practical reason, reflective judgment, generally, as well as aesthetics. See Recki, *Ästhetik der Sitten*: 84–85, 93, 97, 131; 135 (!), 139, 140, 145, 147; 156!, 178, 184, 186, 212, 213; 214, 216–217., 218, 219, 299, 301–2, 306, 316, 338 – even music and humor are reminders of humanity's place in the world (183). See also, Volker Gerhardt, *Immanuel Kant. Vernunft und Leben* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2007): 241, 272.

166. See Chapter 5: "Traces of an Intellectual Crisis:" the sections "Daub's 'Argument for God.:" 585 ff. and "Strauß' Criticism of Daub's 'Argument for God.:" 587 ff. On Daub's non-critical, historical reading of the scriptures, see 582, 77.

167. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub.:" 7; or was he more Fichtean?. See *ibid.*, 54. For Kant's understanding of enthusiasm (*Enthusiasmus*) and rapture (*Schwärmerei*), see: 27, n. 10.

ty and ethics from Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" and Daub's dismissal of Kant's 'reason' and 'science'.

Whereas Strauß points out that Daub was a student of Kant's ethics in his early writings, it was Hegel who 'liberated' Daub from his Kantian slumbers. When it comes to the relationship between science and its individual disciplines, Daub sees the history of science to consist of three ages with each guided by its own principle: a) the Age of Contemplation, whose principle consists of the symbolic faith of contemplation *grasped not by knowledge but by faith*;¹⁶⁸ b) the Age of Reflection (Daub takes Kant critique to be the quintessential representation of the 'Age of Reflection'), whose principle consists, unconsciously or consciously, of critical distance that comes with the limits of spirit in possession of its own concept or feeling¹⁶⁹; and c) the Age of Speculation (Schelling and Hegel), whose principle of knowledge consists of the inseparable relationship between divine and finite Spirit.¹⁷⁰ Daub recognizes, however, that these periods cannot be conceived as enclosed in definite boundaries of time as preceding purely divorced from the following or vice versa.¹⁷¹ Nonetheless, "Daub recognized as the task of his life to help lead theology out of the long Babylonian captivity, which Daub calls the Age of Reflection, into the promised land of Speculation, or, insofar as theology has always been contemplation (θεωρία, *theoria*) to lead it back to itself – as had happened for philosophy through Schelling and Hegel [...]."¹⁷² It is clear in Daub's *Theologumena* that as of 1806 he takes himself to be an Hegelian.¹⁷³

Strauß' presentation of Daub's reading of Kant is capacious, but I take the following three themes as sufficient for illustrating the degree of his distortions that make Kant unrecognizable, yet profoundly shaping of Strauß' grasp of Kant: According to Daub 1) Kant is a 'despiser of reason and science,' 2) Kant is concerned merely for subjective desire and self-interest;¹⁷⁴ and 3) Kant is riddled with internal contradictions:

1) Kant the Despiser of Reason and Science:

I proposed above,¹⁷⁵ that a helpful aid for grasping Hegel's charge that Kant's philosophy is merely 'subjective' is to take his meta-narrative of Double Negation that accounts for history and 'salvation' to be most easily grasped by treating Plato's Simile

168. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 101–102.

169. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 102.

170. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 102.

171. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 102.

172. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 103.

173. See Strauß' discussion of the 'idea' of God in "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 82 ff.

174. This is not a contradiction of my claim in the "Preface" that the anti-Kantians at the beginning of the 19th C did anything other than insist that Kant *had to have meant* what they mean by freedom. See the Foreword: 30.

175. See Chapter 8: "Hegel's Reclined Plato and Kant as a 'Subjectivist'" 811 ff. and Chapter 9: "Hegel on Beauty" 868 ff.

of the Line as horizontal rather than vertical. Plato divided the functions of the mind between 'understanding' and 'reason' with 'reason' above understanding because reason is concerned with the purely mental dialectic of contemplation (θεωρία, *theoria*) that enables the experience of the Good (in Hegel's case, Absolute Spirit), which is taken to be the causal source of all reality.

Daub (as well as Strauß) embraces Hegel's reading of Kant as limiting transcendental consciousness to the 'subjective' 'I' that is concerned only with the understanding of phenomena (Plato's lower segment of the mind in his Simile of the Line) that Daub speaks of as 'over against' (rather than 'below' according to Plato) the 'higher' consciousness that is reason. According to Daub, the ego, building itself up with a mass of experiences, all of which are other than itself – physical, historical, and similar notations – becomes more and more alienated from itself.

The perceived is an 'other,' a stranger to perceiving consciousness [McG.; Note the dualism] thus, if the perceiver is 'the true,' that which is sensed is 'the untrue,' and, insofar as it feels determined by this 'other,' the perceiver is alienated from itself. Consequently, the 'other' is its untruth. To save itself from this contradiction, an animal is, in part, driven by its instincts to assimilate or negate what it senses; in part, driven by the constant flow of sensations to transform them into [subjective] representations.

If now feeling and other sensing becomes thinking (that is, the 'I'), then feeling becomes self-consciousness, sensations become perceptions and experiences; and, as an animal seeks to prove its self-consciousness through sensation, so man seeks to prove his (*sic.*) self-consciousness through experience and to fill it with concrete content, which is the scientific principle of empiricism. In this way, though, the scientific principle of empiricism – as an *endless progress of more and more experience* – cannot reach the truth but only come closer and closer to it. Rather, the ego, building itself up with a mass of experiences, all of which are other than itself – physical, historical, and so on – experiences everything possible as 'other;' only itself, the I as such, it does not experience.¹⁷⁶ (emphasis added)

Kant, supposedly, is concerned with establishing the 'value of all experience' as 'other' by a subjective attribution of space and time to perception and laws to nature because experience as well as God can only consist of appearances within the finite 'limits' of reason.

Furthermore, Kant is ridiculed for claiming to be 'presuppositionless' but *presupposing subjective consciousness* as a *sui generis* synthetic unity of apperception:'

The self withdraws from experience into its pure thinking, and from this standpoint, in order to know the value of all experience, asks about the conditions of possibility of experience. These all have [...] their root in the self, its forms of perception and thinking: *the 'I' perceives space and time by projecting them into the world and thinks laws by projecting them into nature.* Because in this way it does not see purely, but always only with this subjective attribute, reality is not experienced directly at all but is only appearances. Yes, even the 'I' experiences itself only as an appearance. With this, however, experience

176. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 129–130.

is by no means annulled or reduced to worthlessness. Rather, it is only enclosed in its boundaries, in order to be valid within them all the more unchallenged. *Of the eternal, the sacred, the divine, no knowledge is possible, because they lie outside these limits.* Man hears the moral law alone in himself as a categorical imperative and from this derives a belief in God, which, however, can never have the status of knowledge. Thus, *criticism concludes with the knowledge that we can know nothing*, a contradiction that, by the way, is the necessary end point to that with which it began, in that it, which as criticism presumes to be presuppositionless, presupposes that: *I think, or the original synthetic unity of apperception, as something that is par excellence immediate and no longer requires any further derivation.*¹⁷⁷ (emphasis added)

Succinctly, Daub concludes: "*The self is no longer a slave of experience [...] but [...] is all the more the slave of itself.*"¹⁷⁸ (emphasis added)

Daub here is not only making a pseudo-philosophical criticism (NOTE: not Kantian 'critique'!) with respect to Kant's 'subjectivity,' but he also is making an *ad hominem* attack: *Kant is absorbed in an egocentric solipsism.* According to Daub, especially 'criticism' (again, not 'critique') is an activity of subjective delusion and alienation that, in Kant's case supposedly, not only is alienated from the world as 'other' and alienated from its own selfishness but also, deludedly, seeks to overcome its alienation by a self-absorption in 'criticism.'

Above all, Kant's exclusive submersion in 'critical understanding' of empirical phenomena denies 'reason', which Absolute Knowledge 'above' (or is it 'over against' on the reclined Platonic Simile of the Line?!) understanding. According to Daub/Hegel, Absolute Knowledge is the 'true' anchor of all 'science'/knowledge. In short, Kant is a 'despiser of reason and science.' "[...]. [T]he truth [supposedly of 'critique', but only 'criticism'] [is] the despair, which, admitting to itself the impossibility of knowing the truth, despises reason and science [...]."¹⁷⁹ (emphasis added)

177. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 132–133. Daub acknowledges that Kant's notion of apperception is finite, but, remaining true to his student Feuerbach's complaint that the Hegelians make the non-essential essential and the essential non-essential (see Chapter 5: "Traces of an Intellectual Crisis:" 605, n. 169, and 605, n. 166), Daub only views the *finitude* of Kant's notion of apperception as a non-essential subjectivity. Just as Hegel, who distinguishes between the absolute divisible-I over against the finite divisible non-I (see: 160) without recognition of the anthropomorphic conditions that provide the experience for the speculative claims for their Absolute correlates in Absolute Spirit, Daub doesn't recognize that Kant's finite apperception is the anthropomorphic basis for thinking of God as the Absolute Unity of Absolute Spirit beyond the world of perception. See Chapter 9: "Missing Aesthetic Judgment:" the section "Hegel on Apperception and Apprehension:" 865 ff.

178. In Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 134.

179. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 134.

2) Autonomous Freedom is Egocentric Desire and Self-Interest:

Daub takes literally Kant's label for humanity's 'highest' capacity of 'reason' as 'the feeling of pleasure and displeasure' to mean the 'capacity for sensuous desire' (*Begehrungsvermögen*¹⁸⁰) not only as self-absorption but inescapably and exhaustively governed by self-interest, which Daub calls 'sin.' As a consequence, he not only ignores Kant's notion of autonomous freedom-from and freedom-for (as did Hegel), but he distorts autonomous freedom into merely a pursuit of self-interest.

Having defined 'radical evil' as the 'freedom to invert' good and evil principles¹⁸¹ (NOTE: *not* the causal capacity of 'freedom-for' to initiate sequences that nature on its own cannot), Daub faults Kant for leaving unexplained 'the evil in nature,' which humanity then takes as an excuse:

[The excuse takes place] [...]when, by means of an inference proceeding from us, we conceive of nature as jointly guilty: equally, in regard to nature "we will judge that she, and every groaning creature, although they have nothing to regret, nevertheless [...] like those groaning creatures], with all lack of justification, has its apology." In short, that we are not innocent of the evil in us as well as nature is not innocent of the evil in her as soon as we begin to recognize ourselves and her. At the same time, however, we also recognize that we and she are not guilty. From this thought we immediately continue to judge in this way: *Something* that we (men, nature, and each of her creatures) do not have to answer for, it may feel it or not, bears the guilt that weighs on us, and without the same there would be neither a defensive venting in us nor a striving directed against nature and us in nature."¹⁸² (emphasis added)

Daub claims that this '*something*' that accounts for evil in nature and humanity is 'Satan,' who "purely out of Himself, turned away from God" not in the sense of dualism, but "[...] his evil being arose entirely from within himself, out of his bottomless [*grundlosen*] liberty [*Willkür*] [...]" Daub calls Satan 'his own creator, the most miraculous beast [*Scheusal*] in all of creation.'¹⁸³

Strauß asks: Is sin nothing other than finitude and finitude always and already sin?

By no means, according to Daub, but humanity is already null and void as far as it belongs merely to the appearance world. Humanity becomes evil only when the individual wants to be something for itself as this appearing individual being, when reflection is not at the same time a reflecting the absolute origin of her/his and all beings in God. *Not selfhood, but selfishness is sin.* Therefore, salvation for man is not, as for natural things, natural

180. On Kant's label '*Begehrungsvermögen*,' see:, n. 798, n. 308.

181. See Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 111.

182. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 111.

183. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 112.

death, as the dissolution of individuality into the general life, but the spiritual dying of individuality and surrender to the divine life.¹⁸⁴

As with Hegel, salvation means divinization that escapes the self-absorption of humanity in sensuous desire for which humanity and nature are both guilty and innocent because neither can be perfect.

Daub's blind spots are startling. Not only is evil *sui generis* and inexplicably an act of creation independent of the 'one' God, not only is the blatant dualism between God and Satan flippanantly denied, but all of humanity's teleological creativity is sinful because it is driven by desire. Finally, it all doesn't matter, though, because salvation consists in escaping 'finitude' and 'nature' to be absorbed into God's divinity.

3) Kant's Internal Contradictions according to Daub:

Strauß summarizes Daub's account of Kant's internal contradictions, which Strauß himself fails to see as truly ludicrous, as follows:

Throughout its course, [Kantian] critique moves in a series of contradictions: Nature is independent of the ego [McG NOTE: dualism], and yet, because the ego receives its laws from nature [McG NOTE: subjective constructivism], it is dependent on nature; likewise, its ego is independent of and yet again dependent on nature; morality is free of pleasure and happiness, and yet again reckoning on the corresponding amount of the latter, is, therefore, dependent on happiness; finally a God who is independent of humanity, but, because God is postulated only for the purpose of balancing human happiness with human worthiness, dependent on humanity. This sequence of contradictions, this dissimulation among all relationships, in [Kantian] 'critique' constitutes the root that is the fundamental contradiction of its essence: namely, it asks how the self comes to experience but not also how it comes to be selfhood. Instead of proceeding from thought and existence/Being as such, it already presupposes thinking as that of the self, which thus theoretically frees itself from experience [McG NOTE: by dis-interested theoretical reason], and, practically at least, strives to free itself from drives and passions [McG NOTE: by practical reason]: but only in order to place itself in an all the more decisive dependence on itself as the thinker.¹⁸⁵

The individual is a 'slave' to itself when it exercises its finite capacities, especially when it does so critically:

'[...] the self is no longer a slave of experience; but it is all the more enslaved to itself as critical. *The dependence of itself on itself, called the synthetic unity of apperception, is*

184. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 94. On Kant's notion of 'desire' (*Begehrungsvermögen*) and reason, see 798, n. 308.

185. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 133–134.

*at the same time, the independence of itself from everything that would not be 'I'*¹⁸⁶ the most decisive dependence of itself on itself. No matter how much it is indignant about its selfishness in the feeling of its dependence on its feelings, desires, and the like, about this, its dependence on itself, which is nevertheless the principle of its selfishness, it is not scandalized as long as the self remains critical.¹⁸⁷ (emphasis added)

III) Strauß' View of Kant in the *Life of Jesus Examined for the German People*

By the time of Strauß' second 'life of Jesus of 1864, Hegel is absent and a radically trimmed Kant has replaced even Strauß' 'Platonic Christian' understanding of religion in "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity."¹⁸⁸

The overwhelming bulk of Strauß' second 'life of Jesus' seeks to identify what is "left-over historically" once the mythic husk of the gospels has been identified and removed. There's not a great deal. There are stories with a historical kernel (e.g., Jesus was conceived, born, and died), but other than those mundane elements that, to be sure, confirm legitimate awe in face of the incredible mystery that is life with all its limits and potential, there are no miracles in the sense of violations of the laws of nature. What Strauß identifies as historical in the LJEGP is a profound set of moral teachings that requires a distinction between "what is true and obligatory for all time" and "what is only grounded in transient beliefs and circumstances of a particular time."¹⁸⁹ Strauß then adds: "[...] and *that which remains valid and obligatory is no longer valid because it is proclaimed to be divine revelation by means of a messenger attested by miracles but because it is recognized by reason and experience to be true in itself as grounded in the laws of the human species and thought.*"¹⁹⁰ (emphasis added)

186. This 'Not-I' terminology is an indication (?) that Daub's reading of Kant is pre-figured by Fichte.

187. Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 134.

188. See especially, "Concluding Remark" ("*Schlußbetrachtung*") of LJEGP: 621–627.

Although I agree with Robert B. Stewart that Strauß turns away from Hegelian to "moral categories" for understanding Christianity, Stewart leaves undiscussed what those "moral categories" involve, and his assertion in "From Reimarus to Dunn: Situating James D.G. Dunn in the History of Jesus Research" in Robert B. Stewart and Gary R. Habermas, eds., *Memories of Jesus: A Critical Appraisal of James D.G. Dunn's Jesus Revisited* (Nashville: B&H Publishing Group, 2010): 8, who cites to R. Morgan's "Strauss, David Friedrich" in D.K. McKim, *Major Biblical Interpreters* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1998): 367, that "Strauss died a committed materialist" is misleading if it means that he was a material reductionist and committed atheist.

It is one thing to acknowledge the necessity of, yet irreducibility to, the material world for any and all experience. It is quite another thing to assert that this recognition involves a rejection of theology. Granted, it involves calling into question any literal, anthropomorphic portrayal of God, but, even then, one must recognize the limits to reason and acknowledge that the value of a theological claim is not its *objective* truth but its significance for the *subjective*, conditions of possibility for experience, understanding, and the assumption of moral responsibility for one's decisions and actions.

189. Strauß, LJEGP: xvii.

190. Strauß, LJEGP: xvii.

Indispensable and also inalienable is what remains to us of a Christianity in which humanity is elevated above, on the one hand, objective religion of a religion of the senses [...] and elevated above, on the other hand, a religion of mere objective legalisms; in contrast to these, this is a faith that rules the world as spiritual and moral. Accordingly, [...] the service to which we obligate ourselves, like this [spiritual and moral] power itself, is only a spiritual and moral service of the heart and mind [...]¹⁹¹

Realization of the "spiritual and moral power," which is not only Christianity but also at the core of all religions, involves what can be identified as the two steps realizable by a history of *theology* and a *theology* of history: 1) The first step, grasped by Strauß in 1864, is that the history of *theology* separates what is natural (knowable by the natural sciences) from the supernatural (miracles) and the objective, synchronic and diachronic description of doctrines, rituals, and institutional structures and 2) the second step, not achieved by Strauß but is the elephant in the room across his career, is the *theology* of history that consists of respect for and the project of scientific understanding of the material conditions of all life and the on-going process of the moral improvement of the individual encouraged by a corporate, *culture of rearing* (not simply a *culture of skills*) in light of the imperceptible Commonwealth of God of imperceptible capacities and responsibilities that, in turn, guarantee the meaning, purpose and value of life for all, the conditions for democratic institutions and the pursuit of virtue, compassion, and justice grounded in the dignity of the individual, as well as international cooperation and a genuine cosmopolitanism.

With respect to *the first step* or *the history of theology*, Strauß writes that Christianity is a historical religion not because its perfection was miraculously manifest in an historical individual at some point in the past but because this 'pure' religion (by no means what Kant means by 'pure' religion¹⁹² is itself a consequentialist, historical process toward perfection. This 'pure' religion has not yet been achieved

[...] in its purity, at least, [...] and] the reason is that what for our age is, correctly so, most offensive from the old religious belief is the delusion of the miraculous. As long as Christianity is viewed as coming to humanity externally, Christ as someone who has come down from heaven, whose church is the institution in which the sins of humanity are removed by his blood, Christianity remains non-spiritual [...]. *Only when it is recognized that, in Christianity, humanity becomes aware of itself in a deeper sense than ever before, that Jesus is the person in whom this deeper consciousness first was realized as a determining power of his entire life and essence, that the forgiveness of sins is found, precisely, only in accepting this attitude by taking it on as one's own blood, only then is Christianity understood as really Christian.*¹⁹³ (emphasis added)

191. Strauß, *LJEGP*: xvii-xviii.

192. On Kant's notion of 'pure' religion, see: 928, n. 189. On Kant's notion of 'pure', see: 558, n. 109.

193. Strauß, *LJEGP*: xviii.

The historical nature of humanity in general and of Christianity in particular is what demands, in fact, that we move beyond the objectively miraculous for understanding religion to discern the difference between the non-essential (husk) and the essential (kernel), that is, deeper moral consciousness:

*When just once the concept is grasped that humanity and everything about it, religion not excepted, develops historically, then the awareness necessarily also occurs that, within this developmental process, there is no point that can be taken to be the absolute highest, that the manner of portrayal by the scriptures that arose more than one-and-a-half thousand years ago under extremely poor educational conditions no longer can be our manner of portrayal but that, if the scriptures are to be relevant for us, they must be subjected to the question of what is essential and what is not.*¹⁹⁴ (emphasis added)

The *second step* or the *theology of history* by Strauß' definition discerns what is essential and what is non-essential in religion. This consists in determining "the demarcation between that which is enduring in Christianity from that which is transient, the holy truths from the mere opinions of the time."¹⁹⁵ What is essential is concerned with the highest aim of humanity.

[...] [S]o certain as the determination of the human being is universal and achievable by all [that leads to the bliss that accompanies the fulfilment of the individual], so must the conditions [of possibility for this fulfilment] also be universal, that is, in addition to and prior to the will that sets itself into motion to achieve a goal,¹⁹⁶ every person is given knowledge of the goal [of fulfilment] itself, which can't be accidental, coming from external historical knowledge [objective], but must be a *necessary knowledge of reason that everyone can find in [her-/]himself* [subjectively].¹⁹⁷

Strauß cites directly here to Kant's *Religion*, Part Two, Section One: "Concerning the Rightful Claim of the Good Principle to Dominion Over the Human Being."

[...] Kant [distinguished] the ideal of divinely, well-pleasing humanity from the historical individual, Jesus, or, [stated otherwise] as it is possible in a creature of nature, [Kant] distinguished the needs and inclinations of the individual from ethical disposition (*sittliche Gesinnung*)¹⁹⁸ in its entire purity. *Elevation to this ideal is the universal duty of humanity.* Although we cannot imagine this ideal otherwise than by means of an image of a perfect

194. Strauß, *LJEGP*: xix.

195. Strauß, *LJEGP*: xviii.

196. Note: Strauß is subtly, yet no less decisively, rejecting 'Occasionalism'/'Voluntarism' here and embracing the priority of teleology, 'Intellectualism' over the will.

197. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 624.

198. It is not insignificant, in my opinion, that Strauß speaks here of ethical disposition rather than the propensity to self-select a good or moral principle by autonomous freedom to govern human agency. Note, especially, that Strauß equates his 'ethical disposition' with separation from the 'needs and inclinations of the individual'. In other words, Strauß is reading Kant but thinking Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" that separates 'moral duty' from 'ethical achievement'.

human being and although it is not impossible that such a human being once existed, the fact that we should all be like this ideal means that *it's achievement doesn't depend upon our knowledge that such a perfect human being existed but only that we maintain this ideal for ourselves, recognizing it as obligatory and making it the aim of our efforts.*¹⁹⁹ (emphasis added)

Strauß adds: "*The idea of human perfection first is given*, as in the case of other ideas, as a capacity, which requires experience for its gradual [McG: objective] realization, and it allows us to see its progress in the course of history."²⁰⁰ (emphasis added) In harmony with Kant's notion of 'moral worthiness' that is concerned with humanity's moral capacities, not its achievements, *moral perfection is a capacity* to develop morally as a species. In other words, although he continues to accept the notion of moral duty is ethically unachievable by the individual, moral perfection is no longer taken by Strauß to mean 'empty abstract moral duty' as in Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" because moral 'perfection' has to do with society's on-going discernment of the ethical rules required for successful, historical life.

However, moral duties/principles are not a 'given' in Strauß' perfect, moral capacity. They are social constructions that arise out of the needs and tasks of history, which allows Strauß to portray Jesus in 1864 as the 'highest achiever of moral teaching' in his day while acknowledging that crucial moral principles were absent because they were not part either of his personal context (nuclear family life) or their need hadn't yet arisen in history (economic life and politics). In other words, Strauß sidesteps the issue of "abstract moral principles" (*a priori* synthetic judgments, according to Kant) of Hegel's individual, 'moral duty', which would be 'empty ideas' according to the understanding of morality from the perspective of Hegel's "The Moral View of the World." Rather, moral principles are historical products of historical experience (*a posteriori* synthetic judgments in Kant's language).

This shift in the understanding of moral duty/principles, allows Strauß to accept that the Christ was not the first or the last to teach humanity of its inward moral duty, "[...] rather, as in Israel and Greece, on the Ganges and Oxus [of Central Asia], he had predecessors, so also he was not without successors. Far more, after him this example was advanced further, developed in all directions [...]"²⁰¹

199. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 624–625. Note: Strauß is not arguing as did Kant in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (AA V: 4*; see also AA V: 29–30) that acknowledgment of a moral principle is the *ratio cognoscendi* of creative, autonomous freedom, which in turn is why morality is required of transcendental consciousness as *ratio essendi* of morality ('if I should, I can'). Strauß remains stuck in Hegel's notion of moral duty in "The Moral View of the World" in which sensuousness seductions are the *ratio cognoscendi* of morality that demand perfection of the individual by achieving sovereignty over desire ('I should, but I can't').

200. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 625.

201. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 626.

Strauß acknowledges, though, that in the case of these others, "although found in some parts complete, in them the pattern as it was presented in the teaching and life of Jesus in other respects is only weakly visible or not even addressed."²⁰² However,

[o]ne finds completely developed [with Jesus] everything with respect to the purity of heart and life of the individual related to the love of God and of one's neighbor: although family life is pushed into the background by this teacher without a family; in contrast, his relationship to the state appears to have been passive; not only with respect to his career does he deflect economics, but he also demonstrably loathes it, and everything having to do with art and beauty with respect to the enjoyment of life remains completely beyond his horizon of concern. That these are essential gaps [...] no one should deny [...] ²⁰³ (emphasis added)

In other words, Strauß emphasizes the extraordinary character of Jesus' moral teaching, but he views it as part of a *historical process of humanity's individual and corporate, moral development*. He underscores, explicitly, the error of a morality of "positive, divine commands" that repress the "moral grandness" of humanity's nature:

Yes, given that, next to and above the moral ideal taught by Jesus, [and to the extent that] he himself remains as the [objective] God/Man in whom to believe is the duty of the individual and the condition for personal salvation although outside of and prior to the acknowledgement of this moral ideal within, that upon which everything depends is eclipsed, Jesus' moral grandness is stunted of its full effectiveness, and even moral duties that could only have value in that they lie in the nature of humanity's essence are transformed by the deceptive light of positive, divine commands.²⁰⁴

Strauß concludes that the task of the critic is

[...] to reconstruct as much as possible the image of the historical Jesus in its plain, human features [we can say, the history of theology], but when it comes to the healing of humanity to draw attention to the ideal Christ, to the moral ideal to which the historical Jesus, surely in many major features, was the first to bring to light but at the same time belongs as a capacity to our species as a universal endowment, just as its further development and fulfilment can be only the task and the accomplishment of all of humanity.²⁰⁵ (emphasis added)

Clearly, when it comes to appreciating the 'healing' significance of Jesus' moral teaching, Strauß is aware that a theological context is required if the 'incomplete' historical elements of Jesus' teaching are to be properly viewed and developed.

As in 1835, the theological context here in 1864 involves a subjective turn as the key to overcoming the seductions of objective sensuousness. For Strauß, humanity's

202. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 626.

203. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 626.

204. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 627.

205. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 627.

moral challenge remains the same as it was in his earlier writings although Strauß' subjective turn, is here centered in the religion capable of human achievement that Strauß calls "the religion of humanity" (*Humanitätsreligion*)²⁰⁶ that *as a species* is ever more 'successful' in suppressing its sensualism.²⁰⁷ However, this 'religion of humanity' is neither understood in the sense of Kant's *pure* religion of *practical* reason, nor to be equated with the *historical* religion of objective doctrines, rituals, and institutional structures. In contrast to Strauß, Kant's *pure* religion" is grounded in creative, absolute freedom as the *ratio cognoscendi* of morality, not merely the objective demands of moral duty as a heteronomous challenge to control sensuousness.²⁰⁸ Kant's *pure* religion is also not individualistic. It requires the imperceptible, inward community that creates a culture of rearing (not simply an objective, culture of skills) upon which, Strauß fails to recognize, the very "religion of humanity" itself depends.

Even if Strauß has not embraced Kant's *pure* religion, there is no call here in 1864 to reconciliation with the divine to be accomplished by the inward, mystic, Second Negation of Hegelianism beyond history accomplished by the individual philosopher or the human species. Nonetheless, in light of all that he had erroneously maintained, ignored, or of which he was unaware about Kant in 1835, for Strauß personally this vision of the "religion of humanity" achievable by moral effort is a revolution.

IV) Kant's Aesthetic Judgment: Distorted by Hegel, Overlooked by Strauß

In order to understand just what Strauß did and did not (!) grasp of Kant, it is not only necessary to present a summary of key themes from Kant but also necessary to provide an account of, especially, Hegel's (mis-)reading of Kant. As I have frequently stressed, Strauß has his understanding of Kant primarily through the lens of Hegel/Hegelianism shared by F.C. Baur, which influenced profoundly what he took to be valuable in Kant in 1864. Unfortunately, Strauß never revised the Hegelian reading of Kant by means of his own careful reading of Kant. For Strauß Kant was *pre-figured* by Hegel, Baur, and Daub, and Schleiermacher.

Along with Feuerbach,²⁰⁹ Strauß 'inherited' from the Hegelians, especially Carl Daub, the criticism of Schleiermacher's theology in which knowing and doing were grounded in the 'feeling of absolute dependence.' In contrast to Schleiermacher, reason

206. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 625.

207. See Strauß, *LJEGP*: 626–627.

208. Neither sensuousness nor reason can be the source of evil according for Kant. Sensuous would be 'too little' and reason would be 'too much.' See *Religion* AA VI: 35.

209. Strauß employs Feuerbach's framework of religion as 'feeling' and philosophy as 'reason' from Feuerbach's *Pierre Bayle nach seinen für die Geschichte der Philosophie und Menschheit interessantesten Momenten* (Ansbach: Verlag von C. Brügel, 1838).

and feeling, for Hegel/Daub, are subordinate to reason.²¹⁰ In "On the Transient and the Permanent in Christianity," as I presented in Chapter 5, Strauß first attempt at a theology after Hegel was a retrieval of the Scholastic, 'Intellectualist' tradition absent Hegel's narrative of Double Negation in which Strauß took religion to consist in unifying reason and feeling.²¹¹ Strauß does not have in mind here, though, that religion unifies Hegelian Absolute Reason with Schleiermacher's "feeling of absolute dependence. Rather, religion here means the combination of external skill and internal harmony (feeling) that is embodied by the religious 'genius.'²¹²

With Schleiermacher's 'feeling of absolute dependence' not an option for Strauß and in light of Feuerbach's eclipsing of reason as the core of religion because of the delusion of its anthropomorphism, the only obvious alternative to Feuerbach's materialism for Strauß because of his shadow across Strauß' entire corpus would have been Kant. However, given Hegel's pre-figuring of Kant as defender of a 'weak' and 'barbaric,' subjectivist reason as well as Daub's portrayal of Kant as a 'despiser' of reason and science, and the distinction between moral duty and unfulfilled ethics in "The Moral View of the World," *Kant also was no genuine option for Strauß.*

210. To be sure, Strauß acknowledges that Hegel claims to 'unite' reason and feeling with his distinction between *actual* representations (*Form*) and *true* content (*Idea*). See Chapter 5, "Traces of an Intellectual Crisis:" the final paragraph of the section "1837 : " 562. However, Strauß emphasizes in "Schleiermacher und Daub:" "Admittedly, there is always an undeveloped form of feeling in play, but in a scientific presentation, who is satisfied with feeling rather than carefully developed thinking?" (Strauß, "Schleiermacher und Daub:" 164–165) See as well, Feuerbach's "On the Evaluation of *The Essence of Christianity*," Michael Kryluk, trans., available at https://brill.com/view/journals/hima/27/1/article-p241_9.xml (21 February 2022): 242: "According to Hegel [...] sensation, feeling and heart are the *form* in which the content of religion, which comes from elsewhere, is supposed to immerse itself, so that it becomes the property of the human being. For me, the object, the content of religious feeling itself, is nothing other than the *essence of feeling*. This essential difference comes out in an extremely clear fashion already in the way that Hegel and I polemicize against Schleiermacher, the *last* theologian of Christianity. I [Feuerbach] do not criticize Schleiermacher, as Hegel does, because he turned religion into a matter of feeling, but rather only for the reason that he, out of theological prejudice, did not and could not come to draw the necessary conclusions of his standpoint; that he did not have the courage to see and to admit that objectively God himself is nothing other than the essence of feeling, if subjectively feeling is the main point of religion. I am in this respect so little against Schleiermacher that on the contrary he is an essential support who actually confirms my claims derived from the nature of feeling. For just this reason Hegel has not penetrated into the proper essence of religion, because as an abstract thinker he has not penetrated into the essence" of feeling. Let someone show me in all of Hegel's philosophy an idea or sentence from which, through explication or inference, the proposition of my book – indeed, one of its main premises – would follow: that Christ, i.e., the 'Christian' Christ, Christ as he was object of Christian sentiment [*Gemüt*], is the objective essence of the human heart (in distinction from the *historical* Christ, although this religious determinacy [*Bestimmtheit*] can, or rather must, also be treated as the reflection of an historical determinacy). Or [show me] an idea from which, for instance, the idea of my book could be inferred, that God, as the unlimitedly sensuous being, as the omnitemporal, that is, eternal, all-pervasive or omnipresent being, is nothing other than the essence of imagination [*das Wesen der Phantasie*]." (emphasis added)

211. See Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 102–103.

212. See Strauß, "Über Vergängliches und Bleibendes in Christenthum:" 102–103.

Unfortunately, as well, the core themes of Kant's *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*, reflecting judgment, beauty, the sublime, and the role of teleological judgment for finite consciousness' understanding of nature, were distorted beyond recognizability by Hegel.²¹³ Although it is precisely here in the third *Critique* that the extra-ordinary capacities of transcendental consciousness are profiled, Strauß does not mention Kant's discussion of aesthetic judgment. Consequently, beauty as the *feeling*, not knowledge, of *harmonious unity of the 'play' of concepts* of the mind, the sublime's infinity and power of transcendental consciousness over against nature, and the capacity of transcendental consciousness to grasp the imperceptible 'top-down' order required for understanding nature – all of which confirm the *'strength' of reason and Kant's commitment to open-ended scientific research, not to speak of the 'civility'* (far from barbarous) of *practical reason that anchors morality in autonomous, creative freedom, the dignity of all human beings, and a cosmopolitan vision of the future* – are ignored by both Hegel and Strauß as I address in Chapter 9: "Missing Aesthetic Judgment."

213. Taking the 'new' Fichte to be a proponent of 'speculative science's' definition of religion as union with God beyond the senses, F.C. Baur points out that Fichte's philosophy shifted from Kantianism with the publication of his *Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben* in 1806. See Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung* II: 692–693. In fact, both Fichte and Hegel make a Platonic reading of the 'good' and the 'beautiful' (rather than Kant's understanding of beauty). For Fichte, God as the unity of 'spiritual light' (*ibid.*, 61) fragments itself into an endlessness that, in turn, is reflected by the world of objects (*ibid.*, 62). Outside of God, nothing exists (*ibid.*, 69) and true knowledge (science) is the insight that all multiplicity is grounded in a unity (*ibid.*, 71). Already in *Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters* (1805), Fichte anchors his notion of 'the Idea' of "[...] the one, absolutely good, and eternally good, divine Being" ([Berlin: Volksverband der Bücherfreunde Wegweiser-Verlag, GmbH, 1924]: 300) otherwise than in the necessities of the Kantian Copernican Turn but in "healthy common sense, skepticism, and the struggle against rapturousness (*Schwärmerei*) and superstition" (*ibid.*, 308) as well as within the framework of Plato's heliotrope of the Simile of the Sun (*ibid.*, 311–312) that is confirmed by an inward "peace with the whole world, and joy [...]" (*ibid.*, 312). Furthermore, Fichte's understanding of the relationship between 'beauty' and 'genius'/'talents' comes from a Platonic perspective. See Fichte's *Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben* 1806). Hansjürgen Verweyen, ed. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2012)." Rather than Kant's notion of 'beauty' as the 'symbol of the moral' in the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* (AA V: 351–354), Fichte clearly is reading 'beauty' and the 'Idea' of highest Being/God as the Absolute One (*ibid.*, 61) under the influence of Plato's accounting for the 'Good' by means of Simile of the Sun in Book VI of the *Republic* and the *Philebus* 66a–67a. Fichte turns Kant's discussion of beauty and genius into the issue of the possession of particular 'talents' that separate persons rather than treating beauty as a universal 'capacity' of all finite, transcendental consciousness.

Chapter 9: Missing Aesthetic Judgment

Chapter Overview

Hegel's understanding of aesthetics is contrasted with Kant's. It is proposed that a re-evaluation of Kant's aesthetics as well as theoretical and practical reason of the last two chapters opens access to a rich alternative to either Hegelian Idealism or Strauß' Materialism of 1872. Eight steps are followed to unpack the differences between Hegel and Kant on aesthetic judgment.

- I) Hegel on Apperception and Apprehension
- II) Hegel on Beauty
- III) Hegel on the Sublime
- IV) General Remarks on Kant's Beauty and the Sublime
- V) Kant on Beauty
- VI) Kant on the Sublime
- VII) On Hegel's Reading of Kant on Beauty and the Sublime
- VIII) On Hegel's Insistence that Kant's Reason is Weak

The thesis is developed further that a valuable, heuristic strategy not only for reading Hegel's/early Strauß' meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit's Double Negation but also to grasp Strauß' criticisms of Kant across his career is to view Hegel's metaphysics and epistemology as a 'reclined Plato. This reading takes Plato's Simile of the Line not to be a stick drawing of a static, standing human being but includes 'history' by viewing Plato's line horizontally. I take Hegel to have added a top-down dialectic of 'First Negation' to Plato's bottom-up dialectic of 'return' to the Good, which is Hegel's Absolute Spirit.

Although Strauß early on rejected Hegel's meta-narrative of Double Negation, he retained, but dramatically modified, Hegel's claim that 'linear history' is 'necessary' for understanding the human condition.

I) Hegel on Apperception and Apprehension

Hegel equates 'apperception' and 'apprehension,' which is crucial not only for his understanding of the sublime but also for his equating of the sublime and beauty.

For Hegel, 'apperception' is 'apprehension,' as the *a posteriori* unity of *finite consciousness*, which Hegel takes to be causally 'necessary' for there to be conscious of an 'other' of nature's multiplicity and which, even if unaware of it, includes its own 'otherness' to finitude, that is, Absolute Unity/Absolute Spirit. In terms of Plato's Simile of the Line, Hegel takes *apperception as apprehension* to be what Plato calls the 'understanding' below 'reason.' With 'pure' reason as Absolute Unity/Spirit,¹ Hegel

1. Hegel, of course, doesn't grasp that his Absolute Knowledge of Absolute Spirit is an assumption because he doesn't understand that all causal 'explanations' are a deduction on the part of reflecting judgment demanded by phenomena that themselves are only the effects of causality. Finite consciousness has no direct access to causes, and a logic of dialectic is incapable, except by a *μετάβασις εις ἄλλο γένος dictum* (*Machtspruch*), of explaining the 'leap' across the gap between abstraction and representations. Hegel and Strauß overlook that Kant had already rejected the adequacy of dialectic to

provides a causal account of 'logical necessity' for Absolute Unity to become aware of Itself by the meta-narrative of Double Negation.

Given his reading of *apperception/apprehension*, Hegel claims that Kant understands 'transcendental apperception' to mean 'perceptual apprehension' below 'reason.'

[...] the transcendental nature of [...] the Kantian] categories [of the understanding²] is [...] that the 'I' is the unity which connects the empirical substrate of representations. This unity of self-consciousness is the transcendental unity of apperception; and the particular way in which this [empirical] substrate is connected in self-consciousness is a particular category [...] Kant says, these [categories] do not appear in perception [...] The [finite] thinking mind is thus the source [Quelle] of the categories, of the quite general determinations of thought [Denkbestimmungen]. In themselves these [categories] are empty, unrealized, and belong to thinking. [Categories] require a substrate in order that they may be realized.³ [According to Kant], [t]hey have a content [Inhalt] only through the given manifold substrate of perception; they are the relation, the bringing into unity of the manifold substrates, and have meaning only through their connection with these substrates. This realization comes to us from sensuality, from perception, from contemplation, from feeling, and so on.⁴ (emphasis added)

Here, then, we have an example of how Hegel shares metaphors with Kant but not the same meanings of those metaphors. Hegel is taking Kant's '*apperception*' to mean merely a dialectical synthesis of perceptible '*apprehension*' (*apprehensio*).⁵ However, Kant distinguishes illimitable '*apperception*' (*comprehensio logica*), the sublime, from limited perception (*Anschauung*) *comprehensio aesthetica*.⁶

Aesthetic judgment for Kant is not limited to 'art' [*Kunst*] or Rousseau's 'Second Nature' of humanly constructed 'culture' on top of nature. Rather, Kant takes the term 'aesthetic' from the Greek αἰσθησις, which means 'to perceive' in the subjective sense of experiencing appearances in consciousness. In other words, aesthetic judgment

establish the ultimate ground of all 'that is'. On Kant's rejection of dialectic for grounding the ultimate, causal ground of 'what is,' see *Critique of Pure Reason* 697 and Chapter 6: 670.

2. Kant distinguishes between the twelve categories of the understanding' (three each under 'Quantity,' 'Quality,' 'Relation,' and 'Modality' (*Critique of Pure Reason* B 106)) and the three 'ideas of pure reason' (the soul, cosmology/freedom, and God in his "System of Transcendental Ideas" (*Critique of Pure Reason* B 390 ff)).

3. Hegel's claim with respect to a 'substrate' is a classic example of what Kant means by subreption, a notion found already in his earliest writings that is retained across his corpus. See the "Preface:" 64, n. 84.

4. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* GW XX: 346.

5. See below: "2) On the 'Mathematical' Sublime:" 896". Kant distinguishes between *comprehensio aesthetica* as comprehension (*Zusammenfassung*) in reference to the sublime and *apprehensio* (*Auffassung*), which he takes to be the conceptual understanding that occurs by grasping perceived phenomena. In short, *comprehensio aesthetica* turns 'inward' to consciousness whereas *apprehensio* is focused 'outward' to the world. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 251–252.

6. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 254.

is concerned with the subject's capacities to perceive and understand objects.⁷ The 'how' of perception in aesthetic judgment requires a 'critique' to establish/deduce the *a priori* theoretical principles⁸ (not empirical process) required by understanding in order for perception to occur. Kant takes the core of aesthetic judgment to rest on a distinction between the two capacities of judgment: *reflecting* judgment (*reflektierende Urteilkraft*) and *re-producing* judgment (*bestimmende Urteilkraft*). In short, *'aesthetic' judgment for Kant is concerned with sense perception/comprehension (Greek: αἴσθησις), not what Hegel calls either beauty or the sublime.*

As the quote just above makes clear, Hegel takes *reflecting* judgment to be the individual subject's construction as 'origin' (*Quelle*) of the concepts that it applies to a set of phenomena. He fails to grasp Kant's portrayal of reflecting judgment as the 'deductive' search for the appropriate concept out of the imperceptible relationality⁹ of a set of phenomena of sense perception as the 'deducing' (but not creating and determining) of a concept that enables the understanding of the set of phenomena. Rather, Hegel not only turns Kant into a solipsistic, subjective constructivist in conformity with his reading of Fichte, but, *ignoring Kant's explicit rejection of 'constructivism' (Erdichtung)*,¹⁰ he also entirely ignores what Kant means by 'apperception' and the sublime as '*comprehensio aesthetica*.'¹¹

According to Hegel, as I present in what follows, both beauty and the sublime apply to 'reason' (absolute truth), not 'understanding' (subjectivity). They are indicators of the causal, 'logical' necessity of the 'highest unity' that is Absolute Spirit beyond all sensuousness.

7. See Kant, "VII. On Aesthetic Representation of Nature's Purposiveness" in the "Introduction" to *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 188–189 where Kant distinguishes subjective, aesthetic judgment from objective 'knowledge': "The only thing that is subjective about *the idea of an object*, that is, its relation to the subject and not to the object, is its *aesthetic quality*; but what serves or can be used to determine the object (for cognition) is its *logical validity*. In the knowledge of an object of the senses, both relations occur together.

8. On Kant's distinction between the '*theoretical* principles' of aesthetic judgment and the '*metaphysical*' principles of theoretical and practical reason and, see below: "On Theoretical and Metaphysical Principles:' 873 ff.

9. On Kant's notions of wit and reflecting judgment that employ the *Law of Association* to deduce concepts and to rein in wit's imagination to subsume phenomena under a concept, see "On Imagination, the Law of association, and Reflecting Judgment" at: 86, n. 26.

10. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B xxxix*.

11. See the distinction between *comprehensio aesthetica* and *apprehensio*: 866, n. 5.

II) Hegel on Beauty

Hegel presented the core element of his understanding of Kant on 'beauty' along with emphasizing Kant's 'failure' to understanding the significance of Absolute Spirit already in 1802.

According to Kant, an aesthetic idea cannot become knowledge, because it is a perception of the imagination, which can never be found adequate to a concept. An Idea of reason can never become knowledge [McG: but remains a 'regulative', that is, a necessarily 'assumed' idea], because it contains a concept of the supersensible, to which a perception can never be found adequate.¹² The former [is] an inexponible concept of the imagination, the latter an indemonstrable concept of reason.¹³

Noteworthy about Hegel's formulation of the issue of beauty is that Hegel is saying that Kant's denial of a concept for beauty is because humanity only has access to appearances, which would mean that Kant denies the reality of concept, universally, not merely for beauty. Furthermore, Hegel maintains that beauty for Kant is concerned with objective phenomena and ignores Kant's emphasis on the theme that beauty is a judgment *by and about the subject*. Hegel's formulation with respect to the Absolute Concept ignores Kant's insight that the three 'ideas' of reason (God, freedom/cosmos, and enduring identity of the self) are necessary *regulative ideas* (assumptions) that are required as the answer to the question: how are *a priori* syntghetic judgments possible, not as the Absolute causal explanation of all 'that is'.

According to Plato, beauty, the Good, and truth are at the pinnacle, and the very principle, of the imperceptible unification that is 'reality.' Plato writes in the *Philebus* that the 'Good' is placed 'above everything else' in conjunction with beauty, proportion, and truth.¹⁴ Because beauty is the highest value as 'proper measure and proportion' of multiplicity, it is the measure and proportion of all excellence.¹⁵ To be sure, Plato subordinates 'reason and pleasure' to the Good *because reason and pleasure are 'short of self-sufficiency' and the quality of being 'self-satisfaction' and 'perfect.'* However, their subordination to the Good is not because they are merely subjective assumptions and constructions. This Platonic understanding of the relationship among the Good in conjunction with beauty, proportion, and truth appears to govern Hegel's aesthetics.

Hegel, having 'reclined Plato' on the *chaise lounge* (κλίνη) of the Symposium¹⁶ and replaced the Platonic two-step (original and copy) account of creation by a historically

12. I take Hegel to be referring here to Kant's three 'ideas of pure reason' in the *Critique of Pure Reason* See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 395*.

13. Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen:" GW II: 323.

14. See Plato, *Philebus*: 65a.

15. See Plato, *Philebus*: 64d-e.

16. See Chapter 8: "Hegel's Reclined Plato and Kant as a 'Subjectivist'" 811 ff.

linear causal account of all ‘that is’, adds a ‘top-down,’ system of dialectical, causal explanation complementary to Plato’s bottom-up dialectic of epistemology.

For Hegel there are two forms of ‘unity’ or ‘synthesis:’ the singular, *a priori* unity/synthesis of Absolute Spirit and the multiple *a posteriori* unities/syntheses of dialectical apperception by finite consciousness. Hegel takes *the singular, a priori* synthesis of Absolute Spirit to be the ultimate, eminent causality of creation that *necessarily* generates a process of negation into multiplicity. The dialectical negations *within multiplicity* establish, eventually, the conditions for finite, conscious experience of the ‘point of indifference’ to return to Absolute Spirit.

One can map Hegel’s understanding of beauty and the sublime onto Plato’s discussion of beauty and the Good analogously to his mapping of reason and understanding onto Plato’s Simile of the Line. When one does, one is by no means surprised when one sees that Hegel equates beauty and the sublime. *All that is surprising about Hegel’s discussion of aesthetics is that he tries his best to squeeze Kant into his ‘Platonic’ framework.*

Hegel writes with clearly Kantian metaphors in his *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* as he accuses Kant of failing to grasp that ‘beauty’ and the ‘sublime’ are identical to the extent that Kant ignores the ‘higher unity’ of Absolute Spirit. Employing Kantian metaphors, Hegel formulates his (Platonic) notions of beauty and the sublime:

[...] the first rational word about beauty [is]: the sensual is one moment of beauty. Then, [the second moment is] *beauty must reveal the mental, the Concept.*

Beauty [das Schöne according to Hegel’s reading of Kant] is what is *presented without subjective interest*, – what is presented without concepts (determinations of reflection) as object of a general pleasure. It does not refer to any inclination, so the subject feels completely free in it [...]. *The sublime* [according to Hegel’s reading of Kant] is *the endeavor to represent an idea sensually, where at the same time the inadequacy, the inability of the idea to be grasped by the sensual is represented.*

[I]n the aesthetic capacity that is judgment [*Urteilkraft*], we see [McG: however, Kant didn’t] the immediate unity of the universal and the particular; for beauty is precisely this *conceptless, immediate unity*. Kant places it in the subject; and it is something subjective, or better, limited, – and as aesthetic also lower, insofar as it is not the conceived unity [Itself of the Absolute Concept].¹⁷ (emphasis added)

According to Hegel, though, the ‘sublime’ is *the higher a priori unity of Absolute Spirit*, which is the causal ‘necessity’ for there to be multiplicity and which, in turn, is the cause of finite awareness in the first place. However, just as Plato’s Good is the beautiful, so, too, Hegel’s sublime and beauty are equivalent.

The opening paragraph of Hegel’s “The Concept of Beauty Itself” in his *Lectures on Aesthetics* confirm the relationship between the Concept (Absolute Spirit) and the ‘idea’ of beauty. Hegel employs his epistemological structure of content (*Inhalt*)

17. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* GW XX: 378.

and form (*Vorstellungen*/representations) to establish the relationship between the Concept as 'true' content and beauty as 'real' form. Absolute Spirit and beauty are two sides of the same coin – 'true' Absolute Unity and the totality that is its 'real' multiplicity:'

We called *beauty the idea of beauty* [McG: Unlike Kant, Hegel's beauty is an idea]. This is to be understood in such a way that beauty itself must be conceived as an idea, namely as an idea in a certain form, as an ideal. Now *idea in general is nothing else than the Concept, the reality of the Concept, and the unity of both*. For the Concept as such is not yet the idea, although concept and idea are often used promiscuously; but [the idea is] only the Concept present in its reality and set in unity with It [the Concept] is idea. This unity, however, must not be imagined as a mere neutralization of concept and reality, so that both lose their peculiarity and quality, as potash and acid neutralize each other in salt, in so far as they have blunted their opposition to each other. On the contrary, *in this unity the Concept remains the dominant thing*. For It is in Itself already this identity according to Its own nature and, therefore, produces from Itself the reality as Its own, in which It therefore, because It is It self-development, gives up nothing of Itself, but realizes in It only Itself, the Concept, and therefore remains in unity with Itself in Its objectivity. Such unity of the Concept and reality is the abstract definition of the idea [of beauty].¹⁸ (emphasis added)

Hegel no more collapses together the Concept and beauty than Plato collapses the Good and beauty. However, Hegel makes it clear that, although there is a difference between the Concept and beauty, beauty is the 'actuality' (*Realität*) of the Concept whereas the Concept is the ultimate origin of all 'actuality.'

III) Hegel on the Sublime

Hegel formulates his elevated role of Absolute Spirit, the Concept, in his *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*. Speaking of Absolute Spirit as 'formless substance,' Hegel writes that:

[...] substance is elevated above the individual appearance in which it is to be represented, although it can only be expressed in relation to that which appears in general, because as substance and essence it is in itself formless and inaccessible to concrete contemplation.¹⁹

Hegel then adds:

[...] [A]t this stage, substance is regarded as immanent in all its created accidents, which are therefore not yet degraded as serving and as mere ornaments for the glorification of the Absolute, but are affirmatively preserved by the inherent substance. The poet, who sees and admires this One in everything and, like the things, also immerses himself (*sic.*) in this

18. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik* GW XIII: 145.

19. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik* GW XIII: 468.

view, is thus able to maintain a positive relationship to the substance with which he links everything.²⁰

Speaking of Absolute Spirit/Concept as 'God,' Hegel then claims that, properly understood, it is the origin and teleological goal all that is:

[...] [T]he power and glory of the one God [Absolute Spirit] we meet as real sublimity in Hebrew poetry. It abolishes the positive immanence of the Absolute in the created phenomena and places the one substance for itself as the Lord of the world on one side, opposite which the totality of creatures stands and, when brought in relation to God, [the totality of creatures] is set as the powerless and disappearing in itself. If now the power and wisdom of the One [Absolute Spirit] is to be *represented by the finiteness of natural things and human destinies*, then [...] the sublimity of God is brought closer to view by the fact that what is there [as the totality of creatures], with all its splendor, its magnificence, and glory,²¹ is represented only as *a serving accent and a passing appearance in comparison with God's Being and strength*.²² (emphasis added)

In his *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, as well, Hegel writes of the sublime that

The sublime in general is the attempt to express the infinite without finding an object in the realm of appearances which would be suitable for this representation. The infinite, exactly because it is put out of the whole complex of the representational for Itself as invisible, formless meaning and is made inward, remains inexpressible according to Its infinity and sublime over every expression by finitude.²³ (emphasis added)

The sublime is the imperceptible 'One' of 'formless substance' to all that is. In the experience of the sublime, "[...] substance is elevated above the individual appearance in which it is represented, although it can only be expressed in relation to that which appears in general, because as substance and essence *It is in Itself formless*²⁴ and *inaccessible to concrete contemplation*.²⁵ (emphasis added)

[The sublime] is the One that is substance in relation to the totality of appearances, which itself, as pure thought and is only for pure thought. Therefore, this substance now ceases to be able to have its form in something external, and, insofar. the actually symbolic character disappears. However, as unique in Itself, *It is only possible to perceive substance if It is conceived [...] as the creative power of all things [...]* [S]ubstance rises above individual appearances as such, as above their totality, whereby [...] it is purified from appearing particularity which is not appropriate to substance [...] This [external] presentation is sublimity, which is itself destroyed by that which interprets it, so that the interpretation of Its content [Inhalt] exposes the nullification [Aufheben] of that which is interpreted. We,

20. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik* GW XIII: 469.

21. In light of the opening paragraph of "The Concept of Beauty" above, Hegel's totality of finite, natural things in all its splendor, magnificence and glory is nothing other than the 'idea' of beauty.

22. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik* GW XIII: 469.

23. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik* GW XIII: 467.

24. The 'form' of the sublime/Concept is the totality of all representations, the very 'idea of beauty'.

25. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik* GW XIII: 468.

*therefore, must not, as Kant does, relegate sublimity to the merely subjective of the mind and its ideas of reason, but must conceive it as the content [Inhalt] represented as the one, absolute substance. (emphasis added)*²⁶

As the case with Kant's notion of beauty, Hegel's criticism of Kant's notion of the sublime, as I will show below, is exactly the same. Mapped onto Plato's *pre-figured* account of the Similes of the Sun and Line and discussion of the Good and the beautiful, to which I referred above,²⁷ it seems clear that Hegel derives his conception of the commonality between the sublime and the beautiful from Plato. *The sublime, according to Hegel, is the Good (Hegel's Absolute Spirit) that Plato speaks of as the unity above concepts (Republic 509b: ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας), yet conjoined with beauty because beauty is the 'proper measure and proportion (harmony) of all excellence' expressed by Hegel as the 'immediate unity of the universal and the particular,' which is the same as sublimity but 'lower' because the particularities of the experience of beauty are 'limited,' 'lower,' and 'not the conceived unity Itself' of the Good/sublime. Hegel faults Kant for placing sublimity and beauty into the subject as a 'weak,' psychological judgment of understanding, not as a grasp of Absolute Reason's 'strength' as the Absolute Concept, Absolute Knowledge, and Absolute Freedom.,*

IV) General Remarks on Kant's Beauty and the Sublime

An all too common attitude toward 'metaphor' and 'aesthetics' is that they are both merely 'frosting on the cake.' What 'really' matters are concrete facts not figurative embellishments. However, Kant demonstrates that *metaphor and the 'feelings' of 'aesthetics' experienced in beauty and the sublime are, actually, at the core of all experience, understanding, and exercising of responsible agency, not merely figurative embellishments or frosting on the cake baked out of merely empirical facts.*²⁸

Although neither consists of 'conceptual knowledge,' the ability to experience the feeling of the beautiful and the feeling of the sublime are not tangential but essential to humanity, according to Kant. *Contrary to a popular impression that Kant was simply a*

26. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik* GW XIII: 467–468.

27. On the Similes of the Sun and Line, see Chapter 8: "Hegel's Reclined Plato and Kant as a 'Subjectivist'" 811 ff. On the Good and the Beautiful in Plato's *Philebus*, see Chapter 9: "Hegel on Beauty" 868 ff.

28. On the centrality of metaphor in experience and understanding formulated in terms of Paul Ricoeur's theory of metaphor, see "Reality as Vitrally Metaphoric" in McGaughey, *Strangers and Pilgrims*: 263–266. Ricoeur's theory of metaphor can be mapped onto Kant's notion of 'reflecting' judgment. However, Kant goes much further than Ricoeur with his portrayal of the importance of the feelings of beauty and sublime, precisely as the *transcendental* principles (not *metaphysical* principles), for understanding the human condition as transcendental consciousness.

talking head' for whom all that mattered was dis-interested, 'rational thought,' the very core of Kant's philosophy is feeling.

Any reading of Kant that claims that Kant sought to eliminate any sense of 'interest' in understanding and agency fatefully ignores Section II of the *Groundwork* in which Kant claims that, far from eliminating 'interest,' we are incapable of discerning whether or not we are acting out of self-interest. What we can know, though, is whether or not we are acting *exclusively* on the basis of self- or communal interest. With his 'critique' of the *transcendental* principles of reason in addition to the *metaphysical* principles illuminated by the first two *Critiques*, Kant demonstrates that at the core of transcendental consciousness is not 'cold rationalism' but feeling.

1) On Theoretical and Metaphysical Principles

Immediately following his presentation of the core distinction between *reflecting* and *re-producing* judgment in the "Introduction" of the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*, Kant presents the even more crucial theme of the distinction between 'metaphysical' and 'transcendental' principles.²⁹ *Both forms of principles are a priori synthetic judgments that must be 'added' to experience because they are not directly given in phenomena.* The logic of *metaphysical* principles is: given a physical world, these supersensible principles are what are required for there to be anything like understanding and responsible agency in that physical world.

Kant's first two *Critiques* are a presentation of the not merely assumed but also required *a priori*, *metaphysical* principles for understanding (theoretical reason) (the goal of the first *Critique*) and responsible agency (practical reason) *in the world* (the goal of the second *Critique*). Without these *metaphysical* principles, transcendental consciousness cannot be and do what it is/does. Theoretical and practical reason require and presuppose the same *metaphysical* principles of concepts, which are organized under the 'categories of the understanding' and culminate in the ultimate goal of the first *Critique* that is what Kant calls the 'ideas of pure reason' (God, the enduring identity of the self, and cosmology/freedom). These three 'ideas of pure reason' are required for both theoretical (understanding) and practical reason (responsible, acgtive agency).

Kant's third *Critique*, the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*, is concerned not with *metaphysical* of theoretical and practical reason but with those *a priori transcendental* principles which *make possible transcendental consciousness itself.* rather than offering an account of the 'metaphysical conditions of possibility' In addition to, and simultaneously with, theoretical and practical reason with their focus on, and

29. See section "V. The Principle of the Formal Purposiveness of Nature is a Transcendental Principle of Judgment" in Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 181 ff. See as well, below: "On Theoretical and Metaphysical Principles:" 873 ff.

dependence upon, both phenomena and the ‘ideas of pure reason, transcendental consciousness has its own capacities that are required for the experience of phenomena but not reducible to the metaphysical principles *a priori* concepts of the understanding and ideas of reason in general. *Kant calls judgments concerning transcendental consciousness itself aesthetic judgments. They are possible, yes, only because transcendental consciousness perceives phenomena in a world, but their concern is not directly with understanding and responsible agency in the world.*

To be sure, as far as we have ever experienced, there is no *transcendental* consciousness independent of the *phenomenal* world so that neither *metaphysical* nor *transcendental* principles have anything to do with some field, territory, or domain³⁰ beyond the world of concrete appearances. Note: Kant is not describing a metaphysical dualism! However, there is no experience of a world of appearances/sensation, just as there is no understanding of, or intentional agency in, a world of appearances/sensation without ‘supersensible,’ transcendental consciousness that is *different, but not separated, from* the sensible world of phenomena. Nonetheless, in order for us to experience, understand, and exercise responsible agency as we do, we must possess capacities that are entirely *supersensible* yet complementary to, but not *separable* from, the *sensible* world.

As the case with the deduction of the *metaphysical* principles, the deduction of the *transcendental* principles of consciousness first requires an ‘analytic,’ the distinguishing (*diairesis/dihairesis/διαίρεσις*)³¹ between and among those capacities of judgment that make any and all perception (aisthesis/ αἴσθησις) possible for a supersensible consciousness. There are two foci for Kants ‘analytic’ of the *transcendental* principles of consciousness. When it comes to the *transcendental* principles of consciousness (that is, the conditions of possibility for the *internal* functioning of transcendental consciousness itself) Kant begins by an ‘analytic’ *within consciousness* analogous to the *metaphysical* principles that make possible theoretical and practical reason’s *understanding* of external phenomena. The two foci are an analytic of beauty and an analytic of the sublime.

Both of these analytics are followed with a ‘deduction’ of the legitimacy of the claims arrived at in the ‘analytic’ of beauty and the sublime. It is this step of ‘deduction’ that justifies Kant’s use of the notion ‘critique’ in the title of the third *Critique*. Just as the first *Critique*, *Critique of Pure Reason*, presents the ‘deduction’ of the *metaphysical* concepts of the understanding in theoretical reason and the second *Critique* presents the ‘deduction’ of the *metaphysical* causality of autonomous freedom in practical reason, the third *Critique*, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*, presents a *transcendental* ‘deduction’ of the three capacities of consciousness that are required

30. On Kant’s distinctions among ‘field,’ ‘territory,’ and ‘domain,’ see Chapter 1: 116.

31. On *diairesis/dihairesis/διαίρεσις*, see Chapter 3: “Academic Controversy:” the section “Academic Controversy Based on Criticism (*diairesis*):” 219 ff.

for both theoretical and practical reason to occur as they do. These three capacities of transcendental consciousness that are grounded in *transcendental* principles rather than being merely *metaphysical* principles are: 1) judgments of beauty; 2) judgments of the sublime; and 3) judgments of top-down, teleological purposiveness in nature.³²

I return below to unpack the relationship of beauty (as ‘symbol of the moral’) and the sublime (as ‘feeling for moral ideas’).

Judgments of beauty and the sublime are distinct, but related, supersensible capacities of transcendental consciousness, according to Kant. They require their own ‘critique’ and ‘deduction’ because, unlike theoretical and practical reason (with their metaphysical principles illuminated by the ‘critiques’ and ‘deductions’ of the first two *Critiques*), the aim of judgments of beauty and the sublime is not a judgment about phenomena but, rather, a judgment about imperceptible consciousness itself – although judgments of beauty and the sublime are stimulated by perception of phenomena (αἴσθησις/aesthesis/perception). Beauty is to the sublime as understanding is to reason (beauty : sublime : understanding : reason). Beauty is the internal, harmonious play of the mind absent concepts, yet with a claim to universality, whereas the sublime is the reminder that everything is dependent upon reason’s lawfulness.³³ Together, beauty and the sublime are key to grasping the incalculable strength and extra-ordinary ‘capacity’³⁴ of judgment (*Urteils-kraft*) even in the face of the threatening power [*Kraft*] of nature.

32. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* XX V: 193–194. Especially with respect to the judgment of teleological purposiveness in nature, Kant writes later in the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* “[... It] cannot rest merely on grounds in experience but must have as its ground some sort of a *a priori* principle, even if it is merely regulative and even if that end lies only in the idea of the one who judges and never in any efficient cause.” (V: 376) “[...] [T]his concept leads reason into an order of things entirely different from that of a mere mechanism of nature [...] An idea has to ground the possibility of the product of nature. However, because this is an absolute unity of the representation, while the matter is a multitude of things, which by itself can provide no determinate unity of composition, if that unity of the idea is even to serve as the determining ground *a priori* of a natural law of the causality of such a form of the composite, then the end of nature must extend to everything that lies in its produce. For once we have related such an effect in the whole to a supersensible determining ground beyond the blind mechanism of nature, we must also judge it entirely in accordance with this principle; and there is no ground for assuming that the form of such a thing is only partially dependent on the latter, for in such a case, in which two heterogeneous principles are jumbled together, no secure rule for judging would remain at all.” (V: 377).

33. Kant writes of beauty and the sublime: “[...] by means of [... the beautiful], freedom is represented more in play than as subject to a lawful business [...], whereas reason must exercise dominion over sensibility. [...] [I]n the aesthetic judgment of the sublime this dominion is represented as being exercised by the imagination itself, as an instrument of reason.” Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 268–269 Consisting of repulsion and attraction, the sublime’s repulsion is over the threat of the ‘abyss’ whereas its attraction is to ‘lawfulness.’ See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 258.

34. On my reasons for using ‘capacity’ of judgment rather than ‘power’ of judgment for *Urteilkraft*, see the “Introduction:” 86, n. 26.

In his *Anthropology in a Pragmatic Sense*, Kant described the distinction, yet similarities, between beauty and sublime as follows:

The sublime is awe-inspiring magnitude (*magnitudo reverenda*) according to the extent or degree to which approximating it (to be adequate to it with its forces) is *inviting* [pleasurable]. However, at the same time, the fear of one's own annihilation by comparison with it in its own estimation is a *deterrent* [displeasing] (e.g., the thunder above our head, or a high wild mountain); whereas, when one is safe oneself, gathering one's forces to grasp the phenomenon, and preoccupied with being able to reach its greatness, astonishment (a pleasant feeling through continuous overcoming of pain³⁵) is aroused.

The sublime is the counterbalance, but not the antithesis, of the beautiful: because the effort and the attempt to rise to the apprehension of the object [in a judgment of sublimity] awakens in the subject a sense of her/his own greatness and capacity [*Kraft*]; but the conception of it in the description or representation can and must always be beautiful. Otherwise, astonishment becomes [merely] deterrence, which is very different from admiration as an appraisal in which one does not get tired of being astonished.³⁶

Given the lack of a concept that governs judgments of beauty and the sublime, the *transcendental* principles investigated in the third *Critique* establish the central place of feeling permeating Kant's entire 'Philosophical Theology.' Because it is a judgment that has no concept under which the judgment of beauty can subsume the diversity of phenomena that it experiences as beautiful, the judgment of beauty is a *feeling*, not knowledge, of *harmonious unity of the 'play' of the mind's (!) capacities*. Furthermore, because it is a judgment that has no concept for grasping the mathematically, absolute whole of appearances or for grasping the power of autonomous freedom that can destroy the very nature that stimulates the experience of the sublime, the sublime is a *feeling*, not knowledge, of the absolute greatness and power of consciousness:

[...] in [...] the judgment of beauty] the judgment (*Urteilkraft*) relates the imagination merely to the understanding, as the faculty of concepts, but because the latter [the judgment of sublime] relates the imagination to reason, as the faculty of [pure] ideas, we require it only under a subjective presupposition (which, however, we believe ourselves to be justified in demanding of everyone), namely, that of the moral feeling in humanity, and so we also ascribe necessity to this aesthetic judgment.³⁷ (emphasis added)

Aesthetic judgment, then, has its 'logical validity' not because it is itself a judging by concepts but because it is concerned with sensation (αἴσθησις/aesthesis/perception) as a subjective experience of feeling.³⁸

35. Note Kant's invoking his 'negative method' here. See "Kant's 'Negative Method'" at: 45, n. 28.

36. Kant, *Anthropology in a Pragmatic Sense* AA VII: 243.

37. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 265–266.

38. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 189.

[...] [T]he subjective aspect in a representation [sensation], which cannot become an element of cognition [by concepts or ideas] whatsoever is the *pleasure or displeasure connected with it*; for through this I cognize nothing in the object of the representation although it can well be the effect of some cognition or other.³⁹ (emphasis added)

The 'subjective aspect' that is not conceptually experienced in appearances is the feeling of *pleasure or displeasure* that is connected with perception.⁴⁰ The experience of pleasure and displeasure precedes the cognition of an object as a judgment of 'purposiveness.'⁴¹ In other words, *judgment of 'purposiveness' as judgment of pleasure or displeasure is an original moment of perception* (αἴσθησις). One experiences pleasure (or displeasure, if absent) not only whenever one discerns 'purposiveness' as cognitive or lawful 'order' (one would want today to include statistical significance and algorithmic insight) in experience, but also even when one understands the purpose-less purposiveness of beauty, the terror and confidence of the sublime, or top-down, teleological purpose in order to understand living organisms. Where one encounters the confusion of not understanding or mis-understanding because one cannot grasp any 'purpose' in experience, one's experiences displeasure.

There is an experience of purposiveness when it comes to theoretical and practical reason in that they are both governed by 'pleasing' lawfulness. When theoretical reason dis-covers the conceptual and/or lawful order of perception, it is pleasing. When practical reason applies a moral principle to govern its agency, it is pleasing – even when the application of the moral principle is contrary to the personal interest of the agent.

Kant speaks of the pleasure associated with the grasping of imperceptible 'order' in phenomena as follows:

[...][I]t may certainly be thought that in spite of all the uniformity of things in nature in accordance with universal laws, without which the [mental] form of an experiential cognition in general would not be possible at all, *the specific diversity of the empirical laws of nature together with their effects could, nevertheless, be so great that it would be impossible for our understanding to discover in them an order that we can grasp [...]*

Judgment, therefore, also has a principle *a priori* for the possibility of nature, but only in a subjective respect, by which it prescribes a law, *not for nature* (as autonomy), *but for itself* (as heautonomy [as a subjective strategy of reflecting judgment]), for the reflection on it,⁴² This law could be called the law of the specification of nature⁴³ with respect to its *empirical*

39. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 189.

40. NOTE though: this is NOT Hegel's accusation that Kant is subjectivist! For Hegel, Kant is a subjectivist because he, according to Hegel, limits reason to 'understanding' on Plato's line simile.

41. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 189.\

42. On Kant's notions of 'reflecting' and 're-producing' judgment, see in the "Introduction:" 86.

43. Kant defined this 'Law of Specification' in the *Critique of Pure Reason*: "*entium varietates non temere esse minuendas* ('the variety of entities should not be reduced to randomness') B 684.

*laws, which it does not recognize a priori in nature, but assumes for the sake of an order of it that is recognizable to our understanding [...]*⁴⁴

There is no pleasure experienced merely in brute perception (although brute perception requires the presence of laws unawares) because in brute perception ‘understanding proceeds unintentionally.’

[...] [B]y contrast the [conscious] discovered compatibility of two or more empirical heterogeneous laws of nature under a principle that concerns them both is the cause of a very noticeable pleasure, often even of an admiration, even such that does not cease if one is already very familiar with [...] its object. To be sure, we no longer detect any noticeable pleasure in the comprehensibility of nature and the unity of its division into genera and species [...]. However, it [pleasure] must certainly have been there in its time and is [...] no longer specially noticed. – It thus requires study to make us attentive to the purposiveness of nature for our understanding [...] so that if we succeed [...] pleasure will be felt.”⁴⁵

The logic of *transcendental* principles is as follows: Given perception (αἴσθησις), these supersensible principles are what are required for there to be a transcendental consciousness capable of theoretical and practical reason with their own *metaphysical* principles that are required to experience the empirical phenomena that governs them. In contrast to such *metaphysical* principles, *transcendental* principles are concerned with capacities *inherent to transcendental consciousness itself* – not to understand the world or exercise responsible agency in the world. The *transcendental* principles are what elevate transcendental consciousness above nature and ground its esteem.

The three moments of transcendental consciousness that are grounded in *transcendental* principles rather than being merely *metaphysical* principles are: 1) judgments of beauty; 2) judgments of the sublime; and 3) judgments of top-down, teleological purposiveness in nature.⁴⁶

44. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 185–186.

45. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* XX V: 187–188.

46. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* XX V: 193–194. Especially with respect to the judgment of teleological purposiveness in nature, Kant writes later in the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* “[...] It cannot rest merely on grounds in experience but must have as its ground some sort of a *a priori* principle, even if it is merely regulative and even if that end lies only in the idea of the one who judges and never in any efficient cause.” (V: 376) “[...] [T]his concept leads reason into an order of things entirely different from that of a mere mechanism of nature [...] An idea has to ground the possibility of the product of nature. However, because this is an absolute unity of the representation, while the matter is a multitude of things, which by itself can provide no determinate unity of composition, if that unity of the idea is even to serve as the determining ground *a priori* of a natural law of the causality of such a form of the composite, then the end of nature must extend to everything that lies in its produce. For once we have related such an effect in the whole to a supersensible determining ground beyond the blind mechanism of nature, we must also judge it entirely in accordance with this principle; and there is no ground for assuming that the form of such a thing is only partially dependent on the latter, for in such a case, in which two heterogeneous principles are jumbled together, no secure rule for judging would remain at all.” (V: 377).

One might think that Kant is violating his own aphorism from the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 75 that ‘thoughts without content (perception) are empty’ because the notion of *transcendental* principles tells us nothing about particular perceptions, only something about transcendental consciousness itself. If, as the case with theoretical reason, the *transcendental* principle were to be required for the understanding of a perception or if, as the case with practical reason, the *transcendental* principle were to be required for specific, responsible agency, then the *transcendental* principle without empirical content would be an ‘empty’ thought because the supersensible, obviously, is imperceptible.

Nonetheless, even though *transcendental* principles are exclusively *a priori* judgments concerned with supersensible transcendental consciousness, *we have never experienced them as independent of perception*. Judgments of beauty begin with perception (aisthesis/ αἴσθησις); judgments of the sublime begin with perception (aisthesis/ αἴσθησις); judgments of top-down, teleological purpose in nature begin with perception (aisthesis/ αἴσθησις). However, unlike the conceptual order and lawfulness of nature (theoretical reason) and autonomous freedom and the law of morality (practical reason), or bottom-up causality in nature, generally, the ‘purpose’ of aesthetic judgment’s *transcendental* principle is *supersensible* within transcendental consciousness itself. *Transcendental* principles tell us something about our capabilities to experience taste (beauty), feeling (sublime), and heuristic, top-down causality (teleology in nature) *in the world*, but not knowledge about nature, morality, or the (divine) origin of top-down causality.

2) On the Place of Kant’s Reflections on Aesthetics in His Corpus

In addition to his concern for theoretical and practical ‘Philosophical Theology,’ Kant in the third *Critique*, the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* [*Urteilkraft*], establishes the centrality of the capacity of ‘aesthetic’ judgment (from the Greek αἴσθησις, perception). The label aesthetic *judgment* is not accidental because for Kant the issue is not the ‘object’ that stimulates the formulation of an aesthetic judgment but the capacities of transcendental consciousness that make such a judgment possible, in the first place.

Reflecting judgment is the central focus of Kant’s third *Critique*, but what is deduced by the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* as the conditions of possibility of both *reflecting* [*reflektierende*] and *re-producing* [*bestimmende*] judgment are three *transcendental* principles (that is, principles of ‘formal’ or mental, supersensible *purposiveness*), which are required for perceptual experience, generally.

The third *Critique* focuses on the *transcendental* principles of aesthetic judgment of beauty and the sublime with their confirmation of the profound role of feeling (pleasure and displeasure) for transcendental consciousness. In addition, Kant exam-

ines the *transcendental* principle of teleological purposiveness in nature.⁴⁷ I unpack the themes of the third *Critique* in what follows.

Transcendental consciousness does not possess 'by birth' concepts (understanding) or ideas (reason as a realm independent of the world of perception)⁴⁸ for processing sense perception as some kind of Platonic system of innate ideas. We also do not create concepts (not to speak of physical laws and moral principles) at will to require phenomena to be according to our conceptions, nor do we derive concepts directly from empirical phenomena (as the case with Nominalism). Rather, we dis- or un-cover concepts by means of deductive, *reflecting* judgment with respect to the relationalities that imperceptibly govern phenomena.⁴⁹

It is not as if Kant buried his notion of heuristic, reflecting judgment in an obscure text. He writes in the crucial third *Critique*: As an activity of *reflecting* judgment,

47. The ubiquitous presence of feeling of pleasure and displeasure of Kant's philosophy could not be in greater contrast to the description that Heinrich Heine, who viewed Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* as "[...] the sword by which Deism was executed in Germany." Heinrich Heine, *Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland* in *Der Salon*, Vol. II (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1834): 188. Heine offers a fictitious description of Kant's life some two decades after his death. "It is difficult to describe Immanuel Kant's life because he had neither a life nor a story. He lived a mechanically structured, almost completely abstract life of a confirmed bachelor in a quiet, remote alley in Königsberg, one of the oldest cities at Germany's northeast border. I don't believe that the huge clock on the city's cathedral accomplished its mighty, daily work more passionlessly and routinely than this citizen of the city, Immanuel Kant. Rising, drinking a cup of coffee, writing, teaching classes, eating, taking a walk, everything had its designated hour. The neighbors knew precisely that the clock struck 4:30 p.m. when Immanuel Kant exited his house in his gray cloak with Spanish cane in his hand heading toward the narrow Linden-alley that one has since named after him, "Philosopher's Way." He walked the route exactly eight times out and back, regardless of the time of year, and, should the weather be dismal or gray skies promise rain, one saw his servant, "old" Lampe, walking anxiously behind him with a large umbrella under his arm, like a quintessential picture of dutiful service.

There couldn't be a more dramatic contrast between the external life of this man and his destructive, world-crushing [*weltzermalmern*den – an indirect reference to Mendelssohn's judgment over Kant], thought! Truly, when encountering him, were the citizens of Königsberg to have suspected the comprehensive meaning of his thought, they would have experienced a far greater fear than answering to an executioner who only condemned people to death – but the good people saw in him nothing other than a professor of philosophy, and when he passed by at the stipulated hour, they greeted him warmly and set their watches accordingly." Heinrich Heine, *Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland*: 189–191.

48. Kant distinguishes between 'concepts of understanding' and the 'pure' ideas of reason as the key regions of the mind. He is surely influenced by Plato's account of the Simile of the Line in the *Republic* Book VI that I describe below in relationship to Hegel. However, Plato's distinctions among 'imagination,' 'understanding,' and 'reason' are a common property throughout the subsequent history of philosophical reflection – even as what is meant by 'understanding' and 'reason' is unpacked differently.

49. On concepts as deduced relationalities/functions rather than Platonically innate or Nominalistic constructions, see the "Foreword:" 20, n. 3, Chapter 5: "Traces of an Intellectual Crisis:" 575, n. 54; and Chapter 6: "Grand Narratives of Theoretical Reason:" 709, n. 204. On the role of the 'law of association' for deducing concepts out of the relationalities of appearances, see "On Imagination, the Law of Association, and Reflecting Judgment" at: 86, n. 26.

the business of *finding a universal* for a manifold "[...] is [...] *neither prescribing (vorschreiben) a law to nature nor learning one from it by means of observation (although that principle can be confirmed by the latter)*"⁵⁰ (emphasis added) as if the universal was perceptible in, and abstracted from, the phenomena.

The claim that ideas are innate and precede (creative) agency is a product of an anthropomorphic analogy that takes finite, human teleological agency (thought occurs before action because it establishes the 'goal' of action) to constitute the explanation of the origin of the entire cosmos by means of an infinite consciousness. In contrast, in acknowledgement of the hubris of such a claim, Traditional Christian Theology employs this analogy to assert that finite, human consciousness possesses only a fragment (image) of the system of *a priori* ideas employed by 'God'/Absolute Spirit to create the cosmos. Nonetheless, the primary analogate for consciousness is finite, human consciousness, which can only by slight of hand escape humanity's hubris.⁵¹

Whereas innate ideas grounded in a literal analogy that humanity applies to a Personal God elevate humanity to the 'throne of God' *analogically*, the claim that humanity 'constructs' and 'imposes' ideas/concepts/laws onto nature replaces the Personal God with humanity, *literally*. In other words, Traditional Christian Theology places the human on the very throne of God, and, were Kant to have claimed that the individual creates and prescribes concepts and laws (both physical and moral, as well as time and space) to *determine* the way that nature 'is,' he would have succumbed to the crassest of form of relativism, solipsism. In fact, though, he only claims that concepts and laws are 'given' indirectly through phenomena and have to be discovered in the mind by a species who possesses transcendental consciousness. Unlike Nominalism, though, Kant does not claim that humanity creates merely abstract ideas out of its experience of phenomena. To take abstractions to be only *a posteriori* human construction would overlook the assumption on the part of abstraction that the physical world is already organized according to ideas (by a teleological Mind/God!). Only if there already exists an order structured by ideas is it possible for abstractions to draw out those abstractions from the experience of phenomena. In dramatic contrast, Kant only claims that in order for transcendental consciousness to understand and exercise responsible agency in the world, it is required to approach phenomena and its own, finite, teleological agency *as if it were governed by an 'architectonic' of imperceptible, coherent concepts and laws*. Finite consciousness has an experience of ideas only because it possesses a supersensible capacity (the transcendental consciousness) that is 'above,' but experienced only as 'in,' an already organized physical and moral order.

However, to claim that a divine teleological Mind/God, therefore, must actually exist as the origin of that already organized physical and moral order is to overstep the limits to finite consciousness and to place humanity on the throne of God. Kant

50. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 186. See the "Introduction:" 86, n. 26.

51. David Hume had already said as much in his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*: 14–15.

rejects such literal, anthropomorphic projections and acknowledges only that there is a legitimate use of 'symbolic,' anthropomorphic projections not to claim to know something about a divine, teleological Mind/God but *only to aid our understanding and guide our agency in the world*.⁵²

According to Kant, the limits of our reason allow us to claim only that we must learn to 'un-cover' the concepts '*given*' to *finite consciousness indirectly through phenomena* that are required for us to 'make sense of' phenomena. Kant calls *reflecting* judgment the transcendental capacity to 'un-cover' concepts and physical laws of theoretical reason and moral principles of practical reason, as well as the 'ideas' of 'pure' reason (God, enduring identity, and cosmology/freedom).

Reflecting judgment is the mental activity of 'deducing the appropriate concept' out of the relationalities of appearances in order to classify a set of phenomena that we do not yet understand. Once one has discerned the appropriate concept, then one has established a *re-producible* judgment⁵³ upon which one can build further reflection. However, at some point, all *re-produced* judgments were *reflecting* judgments.⁵⁴

In addition to the *metaphysical* principles of the first two *Critiques*, *reflecting* judgment of the third *Critique* is itself an indicator of the incredible significance of transcendental consciousness. The critique of *aesthetic* judgment illuminates the supersensible, *transcendental* principle of *reflecting* judgment at the core of 'beauty,' the 'sublime,' and 'teleological purpose' in nature that are the ultimate, finite, transcendental conditions of possibility for theoretical (understanding of nature) and practical (agency of accountability).

From experience in the world, we have not encountered any other species that possesses transcendental consciousness of understanding what cannot be seen in phenomena to the degree that our species does, which is not to be confused with a

52. See Kant, *Prolegomena* AA IV: 356, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 353, and the warnings against anthropomorphic projections onto God in *Religion* AA VI: 64*, 141–142, and 168–169. Kant proposes speaking of a "symbolic anthropomorphism" when it comes to the "God question," in order to avoid the usage of "analogy." On the heuristic value for understanding of the anthropomorphic analogy for understanding biological phenomena as well as Kant's emphasis stressing that these projections onto the divine Noumenon in no way justify drawing conclusions about "divine predicates," only conclusions about what is necessary for finite, human understanding, see "Part Two: Critique of Teleological Judgment" in *The Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 359 f. and, especially as well, *Religion* VI: 64*.]

53. Kant doesn't claim that transcendental consciousness *prescribes* laws (or concepts) to govern nature, it *dis-covers* them by the heuristic strategy of *reflecting* judgment. Kant wrote a page earlier: "Understanding [...] possesses] a priori universal laws of nature without which nature could not be an object of experience at all; but still it requires in addition a certain order of nature [...], which can only be known to it empirically and which from its point of view are contingent. These rules [...] it must think as laws (i.e., as necessary [Kant's parentheses]), because otherwise they would not constitute an order of nature, *even if he did not recognize their necessity or could not ever see it.*" (emphasis added) Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 184.

54. On reflecting and re-producing judgment, see Kant, *The Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 179–180.

speciesism argument! Because we possess a kind of causal autonomy ‘above’ but compatible with nature, we possess a degree of practical reason not merely intentionally to act but also to assume responsibility for that agency in ways that nature cannot. Yet, theoretical and practical reason could be merely a parallel aggregation of two kinds of *a priori* synthetic judgment. The *critique* of mental perception of phenomena (*aisthesis*/ αἴσθησις) in and of themselves, not the *critique* of their content of understanding and responsible agency), that is, the determination of the *a priori* synthetic elements that constitute mental reflection for itself, allows the deduction of a transcendental capacity of *a priori* aesthetic judgment in addition to theoretical and practical reason with this transcendental capacity being necessary for both theoretical and practical reason.

The transcendental capacities of *aesthetic* judgment are the very core of transcendental consciousness, and they are anchored in *feeling* that drives *reflecting* judgments respect for lawfulness. No more, though, than practical reason's *autonomous freedom* is a merely spontaneous, random exercising of the will, the *feeling that drives aesthetic, reflecting judgment* is no random, vague, amorphous feeling. Rather, the feeling of *aesthetic* judgment is a pleasure and displeasure over *lawfulness* in experience, which, paradoxically, in the case of beauty has no conceptual order although great pleasure through the play of the mind's transcendental capacities, in the case of the sublime indicates an order that is unlimited and capable of ultimate destruction possessed by the same transcendental capacities, and in the case of teleological judgment allows those same transcendental capacities to approach nature *as if* it were ordered by top-down and not merely bottom-up causality.

Far from being merely *frosting on the cake* of empirical experience, *aesthetic judgment* and its *feeling for order* are at the very heart of theoretical and practical reason.

Kant came to recognize the presupposition of *reflecting* judgment in the first two *Critiques* as both a *heuristic strategy* for understanding (theoretical reason) and the exercising of autonomous freedom (practical reason). However, ‘aesthetic judgment (with *reflecting* judgment at its core) requires a ‘critique’ of its own. This is because there is a whole other set of principles, *theoretical* principles, that govern it that illuminate capacities of transcendental consciousness and the supersensible grounds to legitimate the ‘esteem’ and ‘strength’ of transcendental consciousness far ‘above’ the esteem and strength of theoretical and practical reason – as remarkable as the latter are. In other words, the ‘capacity’ [*Kraft*] of judgment is most profoundly apparent when it comes to transcendental consciousness’ capacity to make judgments of beauty, sublime, and exercise teleological judgment in nature, generally, and the key to aesthetic judgment is the ‘capacity’ [*Kraft*] of *reflecting* judgment that *drives* all *a priori* synthetic judgment as anchored in the *feeling* for order.

Our ability ‘to see things that are not there’ is the sharpest indicator that transcendental consciousness is not reducible to physical processes alone. Transcendental consciousness is able to *add elements* to the phenomena by means of *a priori* syn-

thetic judgment not directly given with the phenomena. It is this capacity to *add elements* to phenomena that makes it possible for transcendental consciousness to make sense of experience (theoretical reason) and to exercise responsible agency in the world (practical reason) to a degree encountered nowhere else in nature. *Reflecting* judgment, though, is the *imperceptible*, transcendental condition that makes transcendental consciousness both attractive and repulsive, precarious and dangerous as well as the source of profound satisfaction to the degree that it discovers lawful order in experience.⁵⁵ In the language of aesthetic judgment, transcendental consciousness itself is both attractive and repulsive – although absolutely dependent upon physical processes for its experience.

Remarkably, as thorough and rigorous as Strauß is in his reflections, he does not discuss Kant's critique of aesthetic judgment. He employed the third *Critique* only for its discussion of teleological purpose in nature as if teleological judgment was merely some kind of Platonic, innate capacity to reality,⁵⁶ but Hegel's *pre-figuration* of Kant so limited Strauß' appreciation of Kant that an investigation of aesthetic judgment was not seriously considered by Strauß.

55. Kant is as well aware of the precariousness of transcendental consciousness as he is of the destructive capacity of transcendental consciousness. See Kant's statement on the fragility and precariousness of the human condition in *Groundwork* AA IV: 425–426. However transcendental consciousness' precariousness is NOT to be overcome by Absolute Knowledge nor truth *κατ' ἀλήθειαν* (truth 'in itself') but precisely because without precariousness we could not experience, understand, and act *κατ' ἄνθρωπον* (truth 'for us'). See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 462–463 and *Critique of Pure Reason* B 767–768.

When one adds these limits to reason to a causality that is capable intentionally of initiating sequences of events that left on its own nature cannot initiate, one has in humanity's transcendental *autonomy* the conditions for destroying nature. Kant understood the danger of humanity's precariousness already in 1774/1775. See Kant, *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie* (*Lecture on Moral Philosophy*: 177: "If freedom is not restricted by objective rules, then the greatest wild disorder results, for it is uncertain whether man will not use his powers to destroy himself, others, and the whole of nature."

56. Strauß refers to the teleology of the 3rd Critique, but he claims that Darwin destroyed the notions of miracle and of "ends" (teleology) in Nature. See § 67 of Strauß, *Der alte und neue Glaube*: 210 ff. Strauß distorts the significance of Kant's comment on Newton and the explanation of a blade of grass to mean that Kant was claiming that no material causal explanation of organic nature is possible. See Strauß, *Der alte und neue Glaube*: 216. In fact, Kant didn't claim that there could never be a causal explanation of the organic, he only points out that no such causal explanation can come about without *presupposing* teleology in nature. See Chapter 7: "Practical Reason Elevates Theoretical Reason:" 783, n. 238. Furthermore, Strauß doesn't appear to grasp the "as if" nature of "law" in the natural sciences (especially for biology) that Kant insists upon but without embracing a literal anthropomorphism that is a teleological (physico-theological) argument for God (Kant defends only a symbolic anthropomorphism). This is surprising because of Strauß' embracing of the natural sciences as the "new", modern world view. He is not only a "materialist" (reductionist) when it comes to the sciences ("[...] *aus einem Hegelianer [sei Strauß] ein Sensualist und Materialist geworden* [...]") Ziegler II: 694), but he also has not grasped the significance of the Copernican Turn to *theoretical reason* much less the significance of *aesthetic judgment* in Kant. On Kant's 'Copernican Turn,' see the "Preface:" 47, n. 35.

Contrary to Hegel, Kant's reason is by no means 'weak' or 'barbarous.' *Reflecting judgment* with its transcendental principles, according to Kant, are precisely the key to the 'strength' of reason. The *strength of finite* reason is far more than instrumental reason alone but is the entirety of theoretical and practical reason (not the sovereignty and dominance of Hegel's Absolute Spirit). Yet along with theoretical and practical reason, this *strength of finite* reason is illuminated by finite reason's transcendental capacities of *aesthetic* judgment (beauty, the sublime, and teleological purposiveness in nature) that are the condition of possibility for *reflecting judgment*, which unites (as a function, not a substance) theoretical and practical reason in a *passion for order* and under the umbrella of *sensus communis*.⁵⁷ Hegel and Strauß not only left out of consideration crucial elements of Kant's presentation of *reflecting judgment*, but they also imposed a reading upon Kant thoroughly shaped by Hegel's claims for his own notions of the Absolute Concept, Absolute Knowledge, and Absolute Freedom. The consequence is a distortion of Kant that makes Kant unrecognizable, and Hegel appears to stand triumphant over Kant's philosophy of 'subjectivity,' 'empty ideas,' and 'weak/barbaric' notion of reason.

When Strauß was ready to employ Kantian material in his formulation of religion as morality in 1864, Hegel's meta-narrative project of Absolute Spirit had long since collapsed for him, but it, apparently, never occurred to him that Hegel's reading of Kant was fundamentally distorted. My claim is that in 1864 when Strauß drew on Kant for his understanding of religion, Strauß obviously had not personally studied Kant carefully. With no other understanding of Kant's practical reason than that which Hegel called 'The Moral View of the World' in the *Phenomenology* (but also found in his earliest Jena writings of 1802/3), Strauß was left with no other alternative for understanding the human condition than Feuerbach's materialism, which so shaped Strauß' final work in 1872. I claim here, contrary to Hegel and Strauß, that, rather than Kant's notion of reason being 'weak,' 'barbarous,' and dogmatic, it is Hegel who engaged in the futile attempt of a dove wishing to fly in a vacuum rejuvenated the dogmatic anthropomorphisms of traditional metaphysics in a reactionary defense of Scholastic Medieval Intellectualism and Occasionalism/Voluntarism.

V) Kant on Beauty

When it comes to beauty, Hegel has a Concept without representations in the imagination whereas Kant's understanding of beauty is that it is a judgment that has representations in the imagination but without a concept.

57. See the discussion of *sensus communis* and *sensus proprio* below: 901, n. 131.

Having reclined Plato on his side and added a top-down causal dialectic to account for the generation of all ‘that is,’ Hegel’s Concept is, essentially, Plato’s ‘Good.’ Plato’s ‘Good’ is entirely *without representations in the imagination* because it is ‘above Being: ἐπὶ κείνα τῆς οὐσίας (Republic 509b). Plato essentially equates the Good and beauty, and in this respect, as well, Hegel agrees with him.⁵⁸

In contrast, Kant calls the experience of beauty a judgment that is formulated *with representations in the imagination but without a concept*. Succinctly, *A judgment of beauty occurs without a concept*,⁵⁹ which for Hegel and Strauß is impossible.⁶⁰ There is no experience that is not derived and does not ultimately lead to the Concept that is the *raison d’être* as cause of all ‘that is.’

According to Kant, *one does not (and cannot) obtain understanding simply by ‘closing one’s eyes’* (to experience Hegel’s causal, Absolute Concept) *or by merely ‘opening one’s eyes’* (materialist reductionism, which without *a priori* synthetic judgments being added to perceptions is a mere aggregate without coherence). One has to experience a world (‘open one’s eyes’) and, simultaneously, *add imperceptible things to what one sees* (‘close one’s eyes’) in order to experience and understand, generally, and especially when it comes to a judgment of beauty. Although one cannot experience beauty, according to Kant, without a set of phenomena that one judges to be beautiful, the experience of beauty is *not* a judgment about the objective representations that stimulate it, but beauty refers to imperceptible capacities that cannot be given in the phenomena.

According to Kant, then, Beauty is a ‘transcendental principle’ (along with the sublime and the use of teleological judgment to understand nature) that is a necessary presupposition of aesthetic judgment in order for transcendental consciousness to employ reflecting judgment in order to, understand (theoretical reason) and exercise responsible agency (practical reason). Beauty is the ‘free play’ of those imperceptible *a priori* capacities possessed by transcendental consciousness, which are stimulated by the phenomena. The judgment of beauty is a quintessential example of an *a priori* synthetic judgment because it is a *symbolic* judgment *added to* a set of phenomena.

Kant justifies the need for the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* by observing:

[...Aesthetic judgments] are [...] subject to a critique with regard to their possibility because [...] their possibility] presupposes an *a priori* principle although this principle is neither a cognitive principle for the understanding [theoretical reason] nor a practical

58. See Chapter 8: “Strauß’ Kant Reading Over His Career:” 719, n. 26.

59. Kant calls ‘aesthetic judgment’ the conclusion of ‘purposiveness’ (lawfulness) in the free play of judgment (see the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 270, 217). On beauty as a judgment without a concept, see the “Analytic of Aesthetic Judgment; First Book; Analytic of the Beautiful” in *Ibid.*, especially, AA V: 207–208 and § 6.

60. On Hegel’s and Strauß’ mis-reading of Kant on ‘aesthetic judgment,’ see Chapter 8: “Strauß’ Kant Reading Over His Career:” “IV) Kant’s Aesthetic Judgment: Distorted by Hegel, Overlooked by Strauß:” 862 ff.

principle for the will [practical reason] and, thus, is not *a priori re-productive* [bestimmend] whatsoever.⁶¹

Kant here is accounting for his ‘third critique,’ following the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*, because beauty, the sublime, and top-down teleological judgment of nature are ‘transcendental’ principles of aesthetic (perceptual) judgment, not ‘metaphysical’ principles of theoretical and practical reason themselves. These ‘transcendental’ principles are not required directly for understanding of phenomena (theoretical reason) or for the responsible exercising of autonomous freedom (practical reason). Aesthetic judgments of beauty, the sublime, and top-down teleological judgment are quintessential occasions of *reflecting judgment* with respect to the capacities of transcendental consciousness presupposed by both theoretical reason and practical reason.

As an initial example of a *transcendental* principle, Kant points to the judgment that nature is ‘purposive’/teleological, that is, that nature is structured intentionally, top-down *for consciousness* (in order for us to understand nature, generally, and, especially, to be able to understand organic nature). However, the judgment that nature is teleological is nowhere derived directly from objects and events. Rather, it is a necessary heuristic strategy required by transcendental consciousness to be and do what it is/does. The judgment that nature is governed by purposiveness is an *a priori presupposition* of transcendental consciousness in order for transcendental consciousness to be able to understand phenomena that, absent transcendental consciousness, are incomprehensible. For example, in the case of nature’s purposiveness, the *transcendental* principle is *assuming heuristically an objective, universal, non-empirical cause* (intentional purpose) to phenomena as the *a priori* condition under which the cognition of the objects of nature (particularly, organic nature) is possible at all.

Neither teleological cause nor the laws that govern nature are given directly in sense perception. Yet, we must think of nature as governed by laws. Otherwise, nature would have no order.⁶²

The attraction to lawfulness and repulsion against lawfulness constitutes the profound depth of feeling in theoretical and practical reason, and they are possible only enabled by the transcendental principles of aesthetic judgment.⁶³ The very ‘discovery’ of a law for a set of phenomena is a source of pleasure whereas failure to identify a law is displeasing.⁶⁴ Establishment of an appropriate law is both exciting and confirmation of the judgment (without establishing a proof in fact) of purposiveness in nature. Pleasure and displeasure (attraction and repulsion) are at the core of experience because

61. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 191–192.

62. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 184.

63. Kant does not equate reason and feeling, but he identifies the ‘passion for order’ to be the fundamental motivator for reason. See Kant, *What does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?* (“Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren?”) AA VIII: 136 and 139*.

64. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 188.

transcendental consciousness encounters nature as so organized that transcendental consciousness is able to grasp its lawful order. Nonetheless,

[... The] transcendental concept of a purposiveness of nature is neither a concept of nature [theoretical reason] nor a concept of freedom [practical reason] because it attributes nothing at all to the object (of nature) but rather only represents the unique way in which we must proceed in reflection on the objects of nature with the aim of a thoroughly interconnected experience. Consequently, [...] we are also delighted (strictly speaking, relieved of a need) when we encounter such a systematic unity among merely empirical laws, just as if it were a happy accident which happened to favor our aim, even though we necessarily had to assume that there is such a unity, yet without having been able to gain insight into it and to prove it.⁶⁵

Kant distinguishes among three kinds of judgments of ‘purposiveness’ in *aesthetic* judgment concerned with transcendental consciousness itself. The *first* form of ‘purposiveness’ Kant calls a ‘purposiveness without purpose,’ that is, ‘*free beauty*’. The *second* form of ‘purposiveness’ Kant calls judgments of *the sublime*. The *third* form of ‘purposiveness’ is the requirement of transcendental consciousness that it approach organic phenomena *as if* governed by top-down teleological purpose.

In addition to the experience of pleasure because of the *metaphysical* principle of the Law of Specificity of concepts and lawfulness in nature, then, we also have the experience of a pleasure of purposiveness *although we make no claim to know* phenomena by means of either a concept or a law. This occurs in a judgment of taste/beauty.

According to Kant, the aesthetic judgment of beauty is an example of *reflecting judgment* that is ‘strange and anomalous’⁶⁶ because it contains no concept but is “[...] a feeling of pleasure (consequently not a concept at all [Kant’s parenthetical]) which [...] is [...] nevertheless to be expected of everyone and connected with [...] representation [...] ‘*as if* it were a predicate associated with the cognition of an object.’”⁶⁷

Unlike Kant’s observation in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (B 75) that thoughts without appearances are empty and perceptions without a concept are blind, in the experience of beauty we have a *judgment without a concept drawn about a subjective experience* that is stimulated by appearances, to be sure, but *not governed by an understanding of appearances*. In short, *we have a subjective experience without a concept that we take to be universal and that gives us pleasure*.

With his distinction between reflecting and re-producing judgment, Kant reminds us that a judgment involves the subsumption of a set of phenomena under a concept.⁶⁸ Yet, when it comes to a judgment of beauty, there is no concept under which we can subsume all of the phenomena that we experience as beautiful. Even the notion of

65. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 184.

66. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 191.

67. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 191.

68. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 179.

‘harmony’ is a metaphor, especially when applied to phenomena. There is nothing in common between what we call the ‘harmony’ that is beautiful of a rose and the ‘harmony’ that is beautiful of a sunset. ‘Harmony’ applies to the subjective capacities that make a judgment without a concept possible, not a judgment of subreption that says something about objects and scenes in nature as beautiful.

This is a ‘strange and anomalous’ judgment because the condition of possibility of its experience is thoroughly a *transcendental* principle and nothing of a *metaphysical* principle, which is required by the object. If it were a judgment necessitated by a *metaphysical* principle, it would depend upon something empirical for its content. Yet, here we have a purely subjective judgment that involves a reflective judgment of purposiveness in nature but is not derived from nature.⁶⁹ Nature is subjectively experienced as purposefully structured to give us the pleasure of beauty, which is an experience that is not governed by any concept or law.

In a judgment of beauty, we are not concerned with ‘a play of unity in sensations,’ which would mean a judgment of beauty is concerned with empirical phenomena, but a ‘unison in the place of the capacities of the mind:’

[...] [A]n aesthetic judgment is a unique [*einzig*] kind and affords absolutely no knowledge [*Erkenntnis*] (not even a confused one) of the object, which happens only in a logical judgment. The former [aesthetic judgment] by contrast relates the representation by which an object is given solely to the subject and does not bring to our attention any property of the object but *only the purposive form in the determination of the powers of representation that are occupied with it*.⁷⁰ The judgment is also called aesthetic precisely because *its determining ground is not a concept but the feeling (of inner sense) of that unison in the play of the capacities of the mind, insofar as they can only be felt [empfinden]*. In contrast, if one wanted to call confused concepts and the objective judgment on which they are based aesthetic, one would have an understanding that judges [merely] sensually, or a sense that imagines its objects [merely] through concepts, which together contradict one another. Understanding is the faculty of concepts, be they confused or distinct. Although to the judgment of taste, as an aesthetic judgment, also belongs (as to all judgments) understanding, it does not belong to it as the faculty of recognizing an object [*Erkenntnis*], but as the faculty of determining the judgment and its conception (without a concept)

69. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 350: “[...] [W]hat is at issue is not what nature is or even what it is for us as a purpose but how we take it in. It would always be an objective purposiveness of nature if it had created its forms for our satisfaction, and not a subjective purposiveness, which rests on the play of the imagination in its freedom, where it is a favor with which we take nature in and not a favor that it shows to us. That nature has the property of containing an occasion for us to perceive the inner purposiveness in the relationship of our mental powers in the judging of certain of its products [...] cannot be an end of nature, or rather be judged by us as such a thing; because otherwise the judgment that would thereby be determined would be grounded in heteronomy and would not, as befits a judgment of taste, be free and grounded in autonomy.”

70. That is, experience of beauty is with respect to the internal determination of the subjective judgment that the experience is a product of purposiveness.

according to the relation of the latter to the subject and its inner feeling, and that insofar as this judgment is possible according to a general rule.⁷¹

The 'unison' in an aesthetic judgment of beauty does not depend upon a unity in the 'object' but on the internal, harmonious 'play of the powers of the mind' in feeling (not knowledge) that we maintain as universal, not merely subjective. In other words, the unison is a deduction of the faculty of judgment, not by a concept of mere 'unity' or 'harmony.'

1) Beauty Grasped by means of the Four Moments of the 'Logic of Judgment:'

Kant's examination of beauty consists of applying the four moments of the 'logic of judgment,'⁷² independent of objects,⁷³ which are not to be confused for the 'categories of the understanding' that, unlike logic, are concerned with judgments governed by concepts in relationship to objects., Kant unpacks the logical elements of the judgment of taste, which is not a matter of conceptual knowledge concerning an object but of the subjective judgment without a concept as a 'harmonious play of powers of the mind' in terms of the notions of quantity, quality, relation, and modality.

Although in the 'Table of Pure Logical Functions' the first group is 'quantity,' Kant begins his investigation with the second group, 'quality.'⁷⁴ The judgment of taste's logical, 'First Moment,' therefore, of 'quality' establishes the 'subjective' role of the imagination and feeling in a judgment of taste that involves 'satisfaction,' which is in contrast to a judgment of understanding governed by representation that involves a concept.⁷⁵ However, the 'subjectivity' of a judgment of taste is *independent of self-inter-*

71. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 228–229. Kant contrasts this unity of the 'play of the powers of the mind' in contemplation that occurs in the judgment of beauty with the conflict between imagination and understanding in the judgment of the sublime. See *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 258.

72. Kant discusses the four moments of the logic of judgment in the "Table of Pure Logical Functions" of the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 95 ff. He distinguishes between the 'logical function of judgment' (*Critique of Pure Reason* B 95 ff) and the 'categories of the understanding' (*Critique of Pure Reason* B 106 ff).

73. As 'pure concepts of the understanding,' the categories of understanding are "[...] related *a priori* to objects, which general logic is incapable of doing." Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 105.

74. See Kant's note already in the title of the 'First Moment' of his analysis of the logical judgment of beauty in *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 203*. Although the logical function of 'quantity' is first in the table of logical functions (B 95), Kant explains (*Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 247) that he begins with 'quantity' in his investigation of the logic of a judgment of beauty because beauty is concerned with the (mental) 'form' of the object, which leads to a unifying 'play of the powers of the mind' in contemplation whereas the logic of the sublime is concerned with a 'formlessness,' which leads to a the 'greater unity' of the faculty of reason in the idea of the absolute whole as a consequence of a conflict between displeasure and pleasure. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* V: 259–260.

75. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 203–204.

est (not to be confused for *independent of desire* that drives the cognition of reason⁷⁶). In other words, the popular aphorism that ‘everyone has her/his own’ taste is valid with respect to what is ‘agreeable,’ which is grounded in private feeling and ‘restricted merely to her/his own person,’⁷⁷ but it is not valid when it comes to the ‘judgment of taste,’ which is taken to apply to everyone.

The judgment of taste’s logical, ‘Second Moment’ of ‘quantity’ emphasizes the universal claim made by a judgment of taste.⁷⁸ Something is beautiful not because we, personally, are interested in it, but we are interested in it because it is beautiful.

The judgment of taste’s logical, ‘Third Moment’ of ‘relation’ is concerned with the teleological aspect of a judgment of taste, its purposive purpose-lessness. Kant here emphasizes that we can distinguish between two kinds of ‘teleological goals:’ *forma finalis* (final form) and *nexus finalis* (final link). *Forma finalis* is the teleological goal established by a concept.⁷⁹ *Nexus finalis* is a teleological goal independent of a concept. Unlike desire, which is the will determined only by concepts, a judgment of taste must be thought ‘symbolically anthropomorphically’ by ‘assuming as its ground a causality in accordance with ends’ [...] ‘*insofar as we do not place the causes of this form in a will but can still make the explanation of its possibility conceivable to ourselves only by deriving it from a will*’⁸⁰ (emphasis added) This is a purposiveness not governed by ‘form’ (concept) but graspable by *reflecting* judgment (as a linking). The ‘linking’ that is the ‘harmonious play of the powers of the mind’ in a judgment of taste/beauty is grounded in the ‘pleasure’ of its judgment as ‘[...] a causality in [...] of its own], namely that of maintaining the state of the representation of the mind and the occupation of the cognitive powers without a further aim. *We linger over the consideration of the beautiful* because this consideration [in the mind] strengthens and reproduces itself [...]’⁸¹ Thus, aesthetic judgment of taste without a concept is a quintessential example of the ‘capacity’ of judgment (the *Urteilkraft*)

76. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 196–197 and 220. Hegel takes the ‘desire’ of cognition as an indicator of Kant’s self-deception when it comes to the claim for ‘independence of interest’ in morality and aesthetic judgment. For Hegel (and Daub, above) as a ‘subjectivist’ Kant’s theoretical and practical reason ‘must’ be *exclusively* driven by personal desire and self-interest. Neither Hegel nor Daub grasped Kant’s distinction between cognitive ‘desire’ and the eclipsing of ‘interest’ in practical reason and aesthetic judgment.

Apparently in Daub’s case, he has taken Kant’s label for reason as the *Begehrungsvermögen* to mean the capacity for sensuous desire rather than as the ‘appetitive capacity’ for ‘lawfulness’. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V. 198. On Kant’s notions of *Lust* (interest) and *Unlust* (aversion), see Birgit Recki, “Der Kanon der reinen Vernunft (A795/B823–A832/B859). ‘... Nichts Mehr, Als Zwei Glaubensartikel?’” In *Immanuel Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, G. Mohr and M. Willaschek (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998): 597–616, and *Ästhetik der Sitten*.

77. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 212.

78. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 211–212.

79. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 219–220.

80. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 220.

81. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 222.

[...] related solely to the subject, and the pleasure [it experiences] can express nothing but its suitability to the cognitive faculties that are in play in [...] reflecting judgment, insofar as they are in play, and thus merely a subjective formal purposiveness of the object. For [...] apprehension of forms in the imagination can never take place without *reflecting* judgment, even if unintentionally, at least comparing them to its faculty for relating intuitions to concepts.⁸²

Kant then distinguishes between two kinds of beauty: free beauty (*pulchritudo vaga*) and merely adherent beauty (*pulchritudo adhaerens*).⁸³

The first [free beauty] presupposes no concept of what the object out to be; the second [adherent beauty] does presupposes such a concept and the perfection of the object in accordance with it. The first are called (self-subsisting) beauties of this or that thing; the latter as adhering to a concept (conditioned beauty), are ascribed to objects that stand under the concept of a particular end.⁸⁴

‘Free’ beauty is the beauty experienced in nature. ‘Adherent’ beauty (for example, *appearance* of a human being, a building, a sunset, presupposes a concept of the end that determines what the thing should be, hence a concept of its perfection [...]).⁸⁵ The conclusion that Kant draws from *this ‘Third Moment’* is that “[b]eauty is the form of

82. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 189–190.

83. Furthermore, Kant distinguishes between the ‘free’ beauty that is nature and the ‘adhering’ beauty of art. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 301. “Beautiful art, unlike nature, is deceptive; as an art that can interest only through its end and never in itself” Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 301. In addition to being governed by a teleological concept, beautiful art requires technical skill, which nature does not require. Consequently, because ‘genius’ is a matter of ‘art,’ Kant’s entire discussion of ‘genius’ is focused on ‘adhering’ beauty, not ‘free’ beauty, which is the form of beauty that he distinguishes from the sublime. Kant says of *genius* that it “[...] is the talent (natural gift) that gives the rule to art. Because the talent, as an inborn productive faculty of the artist, itself belongs to nature, this could also be expressed thus: *Genius is the inborn predisposition of the mind (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art* [...] [E]very art presupposes rules [...] [However,] beautiful art[...] does not allow the judgment concerning the beauty of its product to be derived from any sort of rule that has a concept for its determining ground [...] Thus beautiful art cannot itself think up the rule [...] [N]ature in the subject [...] must give the rule to art, that is, beautiful art is possible only as a product of genius [...] The genius [...] cannot [...] describe or indicate scientifically how it brings its product into being, but rather that it gives the rule as nature, and hence the author of a product that he owes to his genius does not know her-/himself how the ideas for it come to her/him [...]” (emphasis added) Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 308. The genius neither produces her-/himself a concept/rule that governs her/his creativity nor can s/he explain how s/he ‘creates’ the beautiful art. The genius can only acknowledge the receipt of a ‘gift’ from nature. To be sure, the genius must cultivate the technical talent appropriate to the gift, but that capacity of technical talent is a general capacity given to all transcendental consciousness. See as well § “32) On Genius” in *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1055–1067; Olms ed.: 233–246.

84. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 229.

85. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 230. Kant places his discussion of ‘genius’ under adherent beauty not only because genius is teleological, that is, governed by concepts, but also because genius involves the cultivation of technical skills. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* §§ 43–54, especially §§ 43–46.

purposiveness of an object, insofar as it is perceived in it without representation of an end."⁸⁶ Succinctly, it is a judgment of purposiveness without a conceptual purpose.

The judgment of taste's logical, 'Fourth Moment' of modality is its function of 'exemplary necessity.' "The judgment of taste suggests assent on the part of everyone, and whoever declares something to be beautiful wishes that everyone *should* approve of the object in question and similarly declare it to be beautiful."⁸⁷ The subjective principle that drives this 'should' is 'common sense' NOT with respect to external phenomena but with respect to the 'free play of our cognitive powers' is a capacity shared in common with all.⁸⁸ Judgments of taste

[...] must [...] have a subjective principle, which determines what pleases or displeases *only through feeling and not through concepts*, but yet with universal validity. Such a principle, however, could only be regarded as a *common sense*, which is *essentially different from the common understanding that is sometimes called common sense (sensus communis) because the latter judges not by feeling but always by concepts*, although commonly only in the form of obscurely represented principles.

Thus only under the presupposition that there is a *common sense* (by which, however, we do not mean any external sense but rather *the effect of the free play of our cognitive powers*), only under the presupposition of such a common sense [...] can the judgment of taste be made.⁸⁹ (emphasis added)

Because of this subjective principle:

In all judgments by which we declare something to be beautiful, we allow no one to be of a different opinion, without, however, grounding our judgment on concepts, but only on our feeling, which we therefore make our ground not as a private feeling, but as a common one. Now this common sense cannot be grounded on experience for this purpose, for it is to justify judgments that contain a 'should:' it does not say that everyone *will* concur with our judgment that everyone *should* agree with it.⁹⁰

Kant's conclusion with the logical, 'Fourth Moment' of the judgment of taste: "That is beautiful which is cognized without a concept as object of a necessary satisfaction"⁹¹ that has the power of 'should.'

86. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 235.

87. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 237.

88. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 238.

89. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 238.

90. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 239.

91. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 240.

2) On Beauty as Symbol of the Moral:

The ‘harmonious play of the powers of the mind’ by means of *reflecting* judgment is what makes our experience of free beauty a symbol for the moral because it ennobles and elevates us and encourages our esteem of others:

[...] the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good [...] in which the mind is at the same time aware of a certain ennoblement and elevation above the mere receptivity for a pleasure from sensible impressions,⁹² and also esteems the value of others in accordance with a similar maxim of their judgment [...] In this, the faculty of judgment does not see itself, as is otherwise the case in empirical judging, as subjected to a heteronomy of laws of experience [...] [I]t gives the law to itself, just as reason does with regard to the faculty of desire [McG: practical reason (V: 198)]. Both on account of this inner possibility in the subject as well as on account of the outer possibility of a nature that corresponds to it, it sees *itself as related to something in the subject itself and outside of it, which is neither nature* [theoretical reason] *nor freedom* [practical reason] but which is connected with the *ground of the latter [autonomous freedom], namely the supersensible in which [... theoretical reason] is combined with practical [practical reason] in a mutual and unknown way to form a unity.*⁹³ (emphasis added)

However, this is NOT a ‘unity’ of a common substance or concept (for example, Hegel’s Absolute Spirit) but a ‘unity’ of *reflecting* judgment achieved precisely *without a concept* that, nonetheless, experiences a purposeless purpose in the ‘free play of our cognitive powers.’

Kant distinguishes between beauty and the sublime on the basis of their relationship to the moral. Whereas both ‘elevate’ humanity above (but not separate from) nature, beauty does so by freedom’s ‘play’ whereas the sublime does so by the mind’s ‘domination over nature by reason.’⁹⁴

VI) Kant on the Sublime

Although by no means limiting reflecting judgment to judgments of beauty and the sublime, Kant examines what appear to be outlier aesthetic judgments of ‘beauty’ and the ‘sublime’ along with the *sensus communis* of reflecting judgment to illuminate the theoretical principles of transcendental consciousness.

Although in Kant’s reflections ‘free’ beauty and the sublime are *subjective* experiences, not an aspect of objective phenomena themselves, both ‘free’ beauty and

92. That is, the pleasure/displeasure of *reflecting* judgment that is felt when it discovers or doesn’t discern a concept/law appropriate to the phenomena. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 188.

93. Kant, See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 353

94. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* V: 268–269.

the mental forms of the sublime illuminate different aspects of humanity's *finite*, supersensible, *transcendental* capacities *in the world*. Both beauty and the sublime are *stimulated by, but not grounded in, sense perception*.

When it comes to the 'sublime,' Kant distinguishes between the 'mathematical' and the 'dynamical' sublime to illuminate the paradox of transcendental consciousness' initial experience of its insignificance and weakness but, more importantly, subsequently, to experience its *superiority* (!) over-against nature. The sublime

[...] is related through the imagination either to the capacity of understanding [*Erkenntnisvermögen*] or to the capacity of the will [*Begehrungsvermögen*],⁹⁵ but in both relations, the purposiveness of the given representation is judged only with regard to the capacities (without an end or interest). Thereby, the first is attributed to the object as a mathematical feeling [of size] of the imagination, the second as a dynamical feeling [*Stimmung*] [of strength/power] of the imagination [...]⁹⁶

Neither the mathematical nor dynamical sublime refers to some external phenomena directly, but they are the two forms of aesthetic judgment⁹⁷ that say something profound about consciousness itself.

Given that there are no beginnings nor ends to consciousness, the mathematical sublime is the experience of the indivisible and illimitable consciousness itself. With respect to the dynamical sublime, is the experience of the extra-ordinary causal 'capacity' that nature cannot accomplish on its own, which in principle gives consciousness the power to destroy all of nature.⁹⁸ In other words, the mathematical and dynamical sublime are saying something about consciousness itself, not the external, objective content of phenomena.

Negatively, the sublime, then, is limit-less consciousness itself, which has no beginnings nor ends because there is no determination where its content start and stop in consciousness. Positively, the sublime is a unity because there is no divisible 'this' or 'that' in consciousness.⁹⁹ There is a supersensible, 'groundless ground' in which there are no limits/distinctions between and among concepts/ideas/laws that as ground is the condition of possibility not only for consciousness itself but also for any and all experience, understanding, and responsible agency in the world. This 'groundless ground' is a required *transcendental* principle of aesthetic judgment (in distinction

95. For a graphic of these capacities of understanding as well as the capacity of judgment, see Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 198. On the 'faculty of desire' [*Begehrungsvermögen*], see the 'Introduction' to the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 177–178.

96. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 247.

97. The sublime is ultimately concerned with the transcendental conditions that make a certain kind of sense perception (an unlimited universe and an overwhelming natural power capable of destroying the individual) in which the individual is reduced to "meaninglessness."

98. See Kant, *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie*: 177.

99. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 244.

from a *mathematical* principle of theoretical and practical reason) in order for there to be theoretical and practical reason, whatsoever.

In the experience of the sublime, Kant points out, what is at stake is not a judgment about the "object" but, rather, in the case of the mathematical sublime, at stake is an experience of the incredible, illimitable totality of consciousness itself and, in the case of the dynamical sublime, at stake is an experience of the sovereignty of consciousness over even nature's tremendous physical power.

1) Sublime Grasped by Means of the Four Moments of the 'Logic of Judgment:'

Kant examines the sublime on the basis of the same four moments of the 'logic of judgment' (not the 'categories of the understanding' that are concerned with judgments grounded in concepts in relation to objects¹⁰⁰), which he applied to the experience of beauty in nature, Kant unpacks the logical elements of the judgment of the sublime in terms of the notions of quantity, quality, relation, and modality.

He distinguishes between the 'mathematical' (size) and 'dynamical' (power/cause)¹⁰¹ sublime. The 'mathematical' sublime is the concern of the first two moments of the 'logic of judgment,' quantity and quality, whereas the 'dynamical' sublime is the concern of the last two moments, relation and modality. The 'mathematical' the sublime is concerned with 'unlimited greatness' whereas the characteristic mark of the 'dynamical' sublime is 'unlimited movement/power/causality' in contrast to aesthetic judgment of taste (beauty) because the characteristic mark of beauty is 'calm contemplation.'¹⁰²

2) On the 'Mathematical' Sublime:

The mathematically sublime is concerned with the '*absolutely great*' as 'beyond all comparison.' It can be neither a pure concept of the understanding, which would require comparison, nor can it be experienced in perception directly, which we could comprehend, nor is it an idea of reason, which would be a *metaphysical* principle of understanding.¹⁰³

The logical, 'First Moment' of the sublime is mathematical and consists of its 'quantity as a [*supersensible*] *faculty of mind that surpasses every measure of the*

100. As 'pure concepts of the understanding,' the categories of understanding are "[...] related *a priori* to objects, which general logic is incapable of doing." Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 105.

101. Kant remains true to his division in the *Critique of Pure Reason* between the 'mathematical' and the 'dynamical.' See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 110

102. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 247.

103. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 248.

senses.¹⁰⁴ Here he draws on a crucial distinction between apprehension (*Auffassung/apprehensio*), and comprehension (*Zusammenfassung* as *comprehensio aesthetica*).¹⁰⁵

In other words, a judgment of sublimity is not a mathematically 'ascribed' [*mathematisch-bestimmten*], objective judgment of magnitude "[...] but only an aesthetic (perceptual), subjective judgment of size "[...] because it is a merely subjective measure [*Maßstab*] on which *reflecting judgment* bases size."¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, it is a judgment about 'raw nature'¹⁰⁷ that is 'not mixed up with anything teleological,' for example as in art because the sublime is not present "[...] where a human end determines the form [...]"¹⁰⁸

That is sublime in comparison with which everything else is small [... Thus nothing that can be an object of the senses is [...] to be called sublime. Simply because *there is in our imagination a striving to advance to the infinite*, while in our reason there lies *a claim to absolute totality* [...] [T]he very inadequacy of our faculty for estimating the magnitude of the things of the sensible world awakens *the feeling of a supersensible faculty in us* [...] Hence, it is the disposition of the mind resulting from a certain representation as the concern of *reflective judgment*, but not the object, which is to be called sublime. [...] *That is sublime which even to be able to think of it demonstrates a faculty of the mind that surpasses every measure in the senses.*¹⁰⁹ (emphasis added)

To think the infinite requires a faculty in the human mind that is supersensible. This supersensible substrate Kant calls the noumenon in contrast to phenomena.¹¹⁰ It is only because of this supersensible substrate

[...] and its idea of a noumenon, which admits of no perception [*sinnliche Anschauung*] of the world as mere appearance, that the infinite of the sensible world is completely *comprehended in the pure intellectual estimation of magnitude under a concept, even though it can never be completely thought [...] through numerical concepts* [...] A] faculty [...] to think the infinite of supersensible intuition [...] is] an enlargement of the mind which feels itself empowered to overstep the limits of sensibility [...]"¹¹¹

104. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 250.

105. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 251.

106. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 249.

107. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 253.

108. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 253.

109. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 250.

110. In the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant calls this distinction that between *homo noumenon* and *homo phaenomenon* (AA VI: 418), which is not to be confused for his notion of "Noumenon" that is, the 'regulative' idea of pure reason, God, as the assumption of the necessary unity required for us to make sense of experience. See *Critique of Pure Reason* B 713–714.

111. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 255.

Rather than the sublime referring to empirical phenomena and events of perception, even "[...][n]ature is sublime in those of its appearances of perception [*Anschauung*] that bring with them the idea of its infinity"¹¹² solely *in the mind*.¹¹³

The logical, 'Second Moment' of the sublime is also mathematical as a 'quality'. The judgment of the mathematical sublime's 'quality' is concerned with the sublime's universality in two sense: 1) an experience of the limitless, supersensible subject and 2) a simultaneous repulsion and attraction.

The first sense of the mathematically sublime is that it is *for everyone* a *subjective* aesthetic experience of *objective* phenomena whose significance is what it says about the supersensible subject, not the perceptible object. He points out that the further perception proceeds in apprehension the less there is direct comprehension.¹¹⁴ Taking 'external space' as an example: the more our awareness of the expanse of external space increases, the less our ability to understand the phenomena. Rather than *comprehensio aesthetica* conceptually comprehending the expanse of 'external space,' it experiences that ever-expanding 'size' with a feeling, not a concept. This 'feeling' consists of a 'feeling of the whole' rather than an understanding of the whole. The 'infinite'

[...] is absolutely (not merely comparatively) great. Compared with [... the infinite], everything else [...] is small. However, what is most important is that even being able to think of it as a whole indicates *a faculty of the mind which surpasses every standard of sense*.¹¹⁵ (emphasis added)

The "feeling of the inadequacy of our capacity for the attainment of an idea that is a law for us is *respect*."¹¹⁶ Kant already emphasized the notion of 'respect' in his discussion of the 'First Moment' of 'quantity' when he observed that a judgment of the mathematical sublime is *not a mathematically re-producing [bestimmend] judgment* but a mere *reflecting* judgment of reflection about its representation, that serves a specific purpose of our epistemological powers [*Kräfte*], with which "[...] *we always*

112. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 255.

113. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 256.

114. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 252.

115. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 254. See as well: "[...] when a [mathematically conceptual] magnitude [*apprehensio*] in one perception [*sinnliche Anschauung*], almost reaches the outermost limit of our capacity of comprehension [*Zusammenfassung/ comprehensio aesthetica*] and, nevertheless, the imagination is challenged by mathematical concepts (for which we are aware of our capacity as unlimited) to aesthetically comprehend [*Zusammenfassung*] them by a larger unit, *we feel ourselves* trapped by aesthetic limits [perception]. However, the displeasure [as a result of our limitedness] is represented as purposive, nonetheless, when it comes to the necessary, adequate extension of the imagination with that which is unlimited in the capacity of reason, namely, *the idea of an absolute whole along with the purposelessness of the capacity of the imagination for the ideas of reason and awareness of them*." (emphasis added) Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* V: 259–260.

116. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 257.

combine a kind of respect with the representation [...]”¹¹⁷. (emphasis added) What is this ‘respect’ for the law and its relationship to ‘quantity’?

However, the second sense of the mathematically sublime is that it involves a profound ‘conflict’ of a rapidly alternating *repulsion from* (as it were an abyss) and *attraction to* (not mathematical excess but lawfulness) in one and the same object.¹¹⁸ The ‘quality’ of the mathematical sublime

[...] represents [...] the subjective, harmonious play of the powers of the mind (imagination and reason) as harmonious even in their contrast [... by means of] *a feeling that we have a pure self-sufficient reason*, or a faculty for estimating magnitude, whose preeminence cannot be made perceptible [*anschaulich*] through anything except the inadequacy of that faculty [repulsion] which is itself unbounded [attraction] in the presentation of magnitudes (of sensible objects).¹¹⁹

In short the ‘quality’ of the feeling of the mathematically sublime is a feeling of displeasure with respect to an object that is simultaneously positive and negative. It is positively ‘purposive’ because it brings the subject to realize that its own incapacity, which *causes repulsion* before the limitlessness of nature, reveals the *supersensible, unlimited capacity of consciousness to grasp the lawfulness that governs the totality of the supersensible*. It is at the same time the very same limited subject which *causes limitless attraction* to the supersensible capacity.¹²⁰ In other words, whereas *the logical estimation of magnitude mathematically* demonstrates the unattainability (displeasure) of a ‘totality’ through progressive sequence of perceptible units (*apprehensio*), *in an aesthetic estimation of magnitude*, in contrast, the numerical concept is insignificant and *comprehension (comprehensio aesthetica) constitutes the sole purpose of the sublime*, which is ‘the necessary enlargement of the imagination (pleasure) to the point of adequacy for the idea of the absolute whole [...]’¹²¹ (emphasis added) Aesthetic judgment of the sublime is the imagination’s enlargement as the source of intellectual comprehension beyond aesthetic comprehension (*comprehensio aesthetica*), “[... which is thereby,] purposive for reason, *as the source of ideas*, that is, *for an intellectual comprehension* [...]”; and the object is taken up as sublime with a pleasure that is possible only by means of a displeasure.”¹²² In short, nature is not sublime because, as far as finite consciousness can determine, it has no feeling of either the mathematical or the dynamical sublime. Only transcendental consciousness, in our experience, experiences such a feeling.

117. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*: AA V: 249.

118. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 258.

119. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 258.

120. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 259.

121. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 259. As an ‘idea’ of the whole it is a regulative not a constitutive idea of reason, which can only be grasped by an aesthetic judgment of sublimity of limitlessness.

122. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 260.

3) On the 'Dynamical' Sublime:

With the logical moments of relation and modality, Kant turns to the 'dynamical' sublime. Here the focus shifts from a concern with the 'size' of the sublime to the dynamic (movement and power/*Macht*) aspect of the sublime.

Dynamis as movement and power (*Macht*) is not a measure of size but an experience of causal efficacy. Something is moved either by something else with as much reality as its effect (efficient causality), or something is moved by something possessing greater reality than its effect (eminent causality).

The logical 'Third Moment' of the sublime is concerned with 'relation' (causality). As in the aesthetic judgment of taste (beauty), relation is taken with respect to the sublime as the sense of 'purpose.' Although he labels no specific paragraph as addressing the relationality of the dynamic sublime, § 28 is labelled "On Nature as a Power." In a first step of analysis of the 'relational' or causal significance of the sublime, Kant examines nature as an immensely, powerful causality, but our experience of the brute power of nature, while terrifying, also experientially shows us that *the supersensible capacities of transcendental consciousness are even more powerful*. In a second step of analysis of the 'relational' or causal significance of the sublime, Kant addresses the issue of the 'purpose' of the sublime for our understanding of our supersensible capacities.

Whereas the purpose of beauty is purpose-less, the harmonious play of the powers of the mind as a unity, the 'purpose' of the sublime is to confront transcendental consciousness with its 'vocation,' which is the realization of its supersensible capacities.

The sublime, then, is the experience of a supersensible power above nature that is at the core of humanity's transcendental vocation. This supersensible power is confirmed nowhere else in experience as it is in the terrifying experience of the brute power of nature. Yet, when such an experience is understood as the dynamically sublime, nature is experienced as having no dominion over the mind.¹²³ Nature is fearful, but one is not afraid.¹²⁴

Stated from the perspective of the sublime: nature demonstrates our insignificance (mathematically, for example, by the vastness of space; dynamically, for example, by the brute power of nature), but our supersensible capacities are superior to it because they are capable not only of feeling the immensity and the power of nature as a totality like we find nowhere else in nature to such a degree, but our supersensible faculties possess a causal power of autonomous freedom, the ability intentionally (and not merely instinctually) to initiate sequences of events that nature on its own cannot ever initiate.

123. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 260.

124. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 260.

Speaking of the brute power of nature first, Kant writes:

[...] we gladly call these objects [thunder clouds/lightening, volcanoes, hurricanes, raging ocean, lofty waterfall on a mighty river] sublime because they elevate the strength of our soul above its usual level, and allow us to discover within ourselves a capacity for resistance of quite another kind, which gives us the courage to measure ourselves against the apparent all-powerfulness of nature.¹²⁵

In other words, we find "[...] *in our own faculty of reason* another, nonsensible standard, which has that very infinity under itself as a unit against which everything in nature is small, and thus found in our own mind a superiority over nature [...]"¹²⁶ (emphasis added) "[We] recognize our physical powerlessness, but at the same time it reveals a capacity for judging ourselves as independent of it and a superiority over nature on which is grounded a self-preservation of quite another kind than that which can be threatened and endangered by nature outside us [...]"¹²⁷ In short, "nature is judged as sublime not insofar as it arouses fear, but rather because it calls forth our power [*Kraft!!!!*] [...]"¹²⁸

Nature is called sublime "[...] because it raises the imagination to the point of presenting those cases in which the mind can make palpable to itself the sublimity of its own vocation even above [*über*] nature."¹²⁹ The sublime not only makes our vocation 'palpable,' but it also establishes the 'necessity' of fulfilling our vocation. The judgment of the sublime's logical 'Fourth Moment,' then, is 'modality' (necessity). The issue here is: in what respect does necessity play a role in the experience of the sublime? The short answer is that the sublime is necessary for the encouragement of the 'culture of morals'¹³⁰ that is to be expected of everyone as 'common sense' (*sensus*

125. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 261.

126. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 261.

127. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 261.

128. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 262.

129. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 262.

130. On the distinction between the "culture of the will/moral improvement" and the "culture of skills," see *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* (AA V: 431–432) and: 848, n. 161.

131. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 293. Already in *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*: Kant distinguished 'common sense' (*sensus communis*) from 'plain, common sense' [der gemeinen Menschenverstand]. Common sense (*sensus communis*) "[...] must be shown in deeds by well-considered and reasonable thoughts and words, not by appealing to it [as does plain, common sense] as an oracle when no no rational justification of oneself can be advanced'. To appeal to plain, common sense when insight and science fails [...is the 'convenient method of plain, common sense'] that is 'an appeal to the opinion of the multitude, of whose applause the philosopher is ashamed.'" *Prolegomena* AA V: 259

Sensus communis and sensus proprio

In his *Menschenkunde* lectures, Kant distinguishes common sense (*sensus communis*) from proper (vulgar) sense (*sensu proprio*), which is not to be confused with concept deduction by means of asso-

communis). However, ‘common sense’ here is not a ‘vulgar’ shared agreement with others.¹³¹ What is ‘common’ in judgments of taste is the ability of *sensus communis*, “[...] to elevate ourselves above the senses to higher, cognitive capacities.”¹³²

Kant writes of *sensus communis*:¹³³

[...] the idea of a communal sense, i.e., a faculty for judging that in its reflection *takes account (a priori) of everyone else’s way of representing in thought, in order as it were to hold its judgment up to human reason as a whole [...]* [T]his happens by one holding [her-]/his judgment up not so much to the actual as to the merely possible judgments of others, and putting [her-]himself into the position of everyone else [...]¹³⁴ (emphasis added)

Kant lists the following in order to illustrate the ‘fundamental principles’ of taste:

1. To think for oneself; the Unprejudiced way of thinking (not to simply embrace passive prejudice but to engage in active liberation or enlightenment from ‘super-

ciation’ (*Vergesellschaftung*) (On “On Imagination, the Law of association, and Reflecting Judgment,” see; 86, n. 26): “We must prove even the judgment of our senses by the judgment of the senses of others; above all, our judgment of the intellect always needs to be proved by the judgment of others, for truth is agreement with the common understanding of man. Our judgment may have the support of appearances, but we cannot always know whether our thoughts agree with the objects; we must therefore take the external touchstone, the judgment of others, which we do not always use in things that we are accustomed to every day. However, in things that are only moderately doubtful we have recourse to the common understanding, and there we always have great suspicion in our judgment if it does not agree with the common judgment. Therefore we like to have people who accept our opinion; for we feel a distrust of ourselves when our opinion does not agree with the judgment of others who accept it. This inner vocation of determining every judgment from the point of view of the way of thinking of others is the common sense in human beings; consequently we can say that the *sensus communis* is the *bon sens*, that is, the agreement of the way of thinking of many people with one another. *Sensus communis* is distinguished from the *sensu proprio*, where no care is taken for the judgment of others; the disturbed man judges everything by the *sensu proprio* and can consider nothing from the standpoint of the *sensus communis*; he always consults only his private sense for other objects.” *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1013–1014 [Olms ed.: 184–185]

This deference to *sensus communis* is no embracing of communal systematic distortion. *Sensus communis* is grounded in the universal, *a priori* capacities of transcendental consciousness with its passion (*Begehrung*) for lawfulness. It is precisely the only set of ingredients for combating systematic distortion. (On systematic distortion, see in the “Conclusion:” “A Blind Spot in Dewey’s Hermeneutics:” 937 ff.)

Kant proposes criteria for *sensus communis* as: “1. To think for oneself; 2. To think in the position of everyone else; 3. Always to think in accord with oneself [in accord with one’s highest capacities – see *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie*: 180]. The first is the maxim of unprejudiced thinking, the second of broad-minded thinking, and the third that of consistency.” *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 293. See Kant’s *Menschenkunde*: 184–185 and *Anweisung* Olms ed.: 94.

132. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 293.

133. The ‘shared understanding’ that is *sensus communis* is not to be confused for the ‘association’ (*Vergesellschaftung*) that is the deduction of concepts. (On “On Imagination, the Law of association, and Reflecting Judgment,” see: 86, n. 26.)

134. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 293–294.

stition'). According to the table of the 'higher faculties of reason,'¹³⁵ this is *the maxim of understanding*.

2. To think in the position of someone else; the Broad-minded way of thinking from a universal standpoint. According to the table of the 'higher faculties of reason,' this is *the maxim of judgment*.
3. Always to think in accord with oneself;¹³⁶ the Consistent way of thinking. According to the table of the 'higher faculties of reason,' this is *the maxim of reason*.¹³⁷ [Consistency here meaning consistent with reason's metaphysical and transcendental principles, especially one's highest capacity of autonomous freedom.]

The 'Culture of Morals' is the imperceptible community across history that encourages the exercising of the moral capacities. Moral agency requires that there be 1) the capacity (*Anlage*) of autonomous freedom that is intentionally able to initiate sequences of events that nature's causal system on its own can never achieve and 2) a lawful order to autonomous freedom's causality analogous to the lawful order that is physical nature.¹³⁸ 3)

In the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*, however, Kant is providing an account of the required, complementary, common order between the causal systems between the two 'domains' (*ditio*) of nature and autonomous freedom.¹³⁹ *The complementary, common order between the causal systems is no common substance* because causality is 'no-thing.' *Equally, it is neither a 'concept' of the understanding*, which would require it to be a 'thing among things' *nor is it an 'idea of reason'* (God, the enduring identity of the soul, and cosmology), all of which are 'things' (God as Noumenon, not necessarily a Personal God but in contrast to phenomena; souls as multiple; and cosmology as the collection of things).

The issue for Kant, then, is two-fold: 1) Is there something about experience that suggests that it is possible that a complementary, common order between the causal systems of nature and freedom is more than wishful thinking or merely a demand of logic? Even more importantly, 2) on what ground is it *necessary* to acknowledge that complementary, common order between the causal systems of nature and freedom?

As the 'unifying link' between theoretical reason's understanding of the physical world (nature) and practical reason's responsible agency (autonomous freedom) in

135. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 198.

136. Already in his *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie* (1774/1775), Kant suggested that consistence with oneself refers to one's consistency with one's highest capacity, the capacity of autonomous freedom. See Kant, *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie*: 180.

137. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 294–295.

138. See especially the footnote 4* of the *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 4 where Kant calls autonomous freedom the *ratio essendi* (the essential ground) of morals and the moral law the *ratio cognoscendi* (the ground for recognizing autonomous freedom). See, as well, the 'Remark' at *ibid.*, AA V: 29–30.

139. On the differences among 'field,' 'territory,' and 'domain,' see Chapter 1: 116.

the physical world Kant clearly places 'aesthetic judgment' based on appearances (*aisthesis*/αἴσθησις), not things-in-themselves or even the *metaphysical* principles required for theoretical and practical reason.¹⁴⁰ The 'unifying link' between theoretical and practical reason, again, is no common substance or 'highest idea' of reason. Rather, it "[...] is the capacity (*Kraft*) of judgment [...] *about which one has cause to presume [...] a proper principle of its own for seeking laws [...]*"¹⁴¹ by means of *reflecting* judgment.¹⁴² This unifying link is clearly no concept or substance. Clearly, Kant not only is identifying the 'unifying link' as the very capacity (*Kraft*) of judgment as a heuristic strategy for achieving 'new understanding' but also is profiling that *reflecting* judgment has its own *transcendental* principles of the 'harmonious unity of the play of the mind's capacities *without concepts*' in judgments of beauty and the 'elevation of the imagination' to an *absolute* whole/totality of the supersensible in the experience of transcendental consciousness that, in turn, serve as the condition for transcendental consciousness' ability to *seek out laws and concepts* in unfamiliar phenomena.

With the fourth 'Moment of Modality' of the analytic or determination of the conditions of possibility of the Sublime, Kant establishes that it is the *transcendental* principle of the feeling (by no means a substance or an idea) for the sublime that is the condition of possibility for '*reflecting* judgment in its capacity to understand theoretical and practical reason as 'unified.'

Again, the 'synthesis' of the 'antitheses' of theoretical and practical reason is a *feeling*, not a substance or an idea. However, this is no capricious warm and fuzzy feeling with which we subjectively construct and with which we cuddle up in order to empower our confidence in our understanding and responsible agency. Rather than subjective, wishful thinking, it is an unwelcome feeling of terror (repulsion) and confidence (attraction) that generates our acknowledgement of a 'higher,' supersensible, *absolute* whole beyond all mathematical size and threatening power of nature, even beyond the 'harmonious, unifying play of mental faculties' that is beauty, which elevates the imagination 'above' nature and turns our initial displeasure into pleasure.

The sublime, then, as stimulated by an object of nature whose representation [*Vorstellung*] results in the recognition that the mind is incapable of giving an account (*Darstellung*) of the totality of nature by means of ideas.¹⁴³

140. In section "III. On the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* as a Means for Combining the two Parts of Philosophy into one Whole" of the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*, Kant observes: "[...] in the family of the higher faculties of knowledge [*Erkenntnis*] [that is theoretical and practical reason] there is [...] *an intermediary between the understanding and reason.*" Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* V: 177.

141. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* V: 177.

142. See Kant's distinction between reflecting (*reflektierend*) and re-producing (*bestimmend*) judgment in section IV of the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* V: 179–181. See as well, "On Imagination, the Law of Association, and Reflecting Judgment" at 86, n. 26.

143. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 268.

This effort [to think an absolute totality], and the feeling of the unattainability of the idea by means of the imagination, is itself a presentation [*Darstellung*] of the subjective purposiveness of our mind [...] and compels us to think nature itself in its totality, as the presentation of something supersensible, subjectively, without being able to produce this presentation objectively [...]

This idea of the supersensible, [...] which [...] we cannot further determine, so that we cannot cognize nature as a presentation [*Darstellung*] of it but can only think it, is awakened in us by means of an object the aesthetic judging of which stretches imagination to its limit, whether that of enlargement (mathematically) or of its power over the mind (dynamically), in that it is grounded *in the feeling of a vocation of the mind* that entirely oversteps the domain of [...] (moral feeling), in regard to which the presentation of the object [of the aesthetic judging of appearances] is judged as subjectively purposive.¹⁴⁴ (emphasis added)

As Kant had suggested earlier: "The sublime "[...] indicates nothing purposive in nature itself, but only in the possible use of its perceptions [*Anschauungen*] to make palpable in ourselves a purposiveness that is entirely independent of nature."¹⁴⁵ *This purposiveness, 'entirely independent of nature,' is humanity's vocation of exercising its supersensible capacities to experience, understand, and exercise responsible agency as a community in the world.*

4) On the Relationship of Beauty and the Sublime to the Moral:

Both the sublime and the beautiful have a relationship to the moral. Beauty 's relation to the moral is that its harmonious, 'play of the powers of the mind by means of a unity without any concept' that arises out of contemplation of appearances (aisthesis/ αἴσθησις) is a symbol of the capacity to self-select (but not create) a moral principle to govern agency that is not derived from the senses.

The mathematical sublime's relation to the moral is it constituting an experience of the unitary whole or totality of the supersensible, whereas the dynamical sublime's relation to the moral is the 'strength' of the supersensible over nature that comes with our autonomous freedom, which the ability to initiate a sequence of events that nature cannot accomplish on its own.

Whereas beauty is a symbol of the autonomous freedom of the moral because it demonstrates a supersensible play of the unitary power of the mind necessary for reflecting judgment but itself not governed by assigned concepts, the sublime evokes the experience of an esteem of the individual's and the community's experience of an absolute whole of the supersensible as governed by lawfulness.

The sublime consists merely in the relation in which the sensuous in the conception of nature is judged to be suitable for a possible supersensuous use of it. – The absolute good,

144. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 268.

145. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 246.

subjectively judged according to the feeling it inspires, (the object of moral feeling) as the determinability of the subject's powers through the idea of an absolutely necessary law, is distinguished primarily through the modality of a necessity based on concepts *a priori*, which contains not only a claim, but also a command of applause for everyone, and does not in itself belong to the aesthetic [perception], but to the pure intellectual power of judgment; It is also not attributed in a merely reflecting, but with a re-producing [*bestimmenden*] judgment, not to nature, but to [autonomous] freedom. However, the determinability of the subject by this idea, and indeed of a subject that can feel obstacles in itself in its perceptions, but at the same time superiority over them by overcoming the obstacle as a modification of its perception, i.e., through moral feeling, is nevertheless related to the aesthetic power of judgment and its formal conditions to such an extent that it can serve to make the lawfulness of action out of duty simultaneously presentable as aesthetic, i.e., as sublime, or also as beautiful, without losing its purity: which would not take place if one wanted to put it in natural connection with the feeling of pleasantness.¹⁴⁶

"The object of a pure and unconditioned intellectual satisfaction is *the moral law* in all its power [...]" which is *antecedent* "[...] in us over each and every incentive of the mind."¹⁴⁷ (emphasis added) Whereas *beauty* is the 'free play of our cognitive faculties' that 'requires us to love nature without interest'¹⁴⁸ (that is, the satisfaction of beauty with respect to nature is solely 'positive' when it comes to a judgment of taste/beauty¹⁴⁹), *the sublime* 'requires us to esteem consciousness 'positively' contrary to our 'negative,' sensible interest because of the displeasure (of insignificance or threat) that occurs in perceptions judged as inspiring the sublime.¹⁵⁰ That is, the satisfaction of the sublime with respect to nature is both 'negative' and 'positive.'¹⁵¹ Hence intellectually purposive, moral good judged aesthetically must not be represented so much as beautiful but as sublime, soaring above certain obstacles of sensibility by means of moral principles and, thereby, becoming interesting.¹⁵²

Beauty's freedom is represented 'more as a harmonious playing than as subject to lawfulness,' whereas with the experience of the sublime, the mind's dominion over nature is exercised by the imagination itself as an autonomous, causal, hence, lawful 'instrument of reason.

Feeling for the sublime "[...] cannot even be conceived without [...]moral feeling [*Stimmung*]; and, although the beautiful in nature likewise presupposes and cultivates a certain liberality in [...] thinking, that is, *independence of the satisfaction from merely sensory enjoyment, nevertheless by means of [... the beautiful] freedom is represented more as in harmonious play than as subject to a lawful affairs* [*Genshaft*], which is the genuine property of human morality, where reason must exercise dominion over sensibility. It is

146. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 266–267.

147. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 271.

148. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 267.

149. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 269.

150. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 267.

151. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 269.

152. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 271.

just that *in aesthetic judgment of the sublime this control [Grewal] is represented as being exercised by the imagination itself, as an instrument of reason.*¹⁵³ (emphasis added)

Unlike aesthetic taste (beauty), which we can expect of everyone, Kant recognizes that not everyone experiences the 'pleasure' of the sublime as elevating to a 'unifying, absolute whole above the perceptions that instigate the experience of terror that is the sublime. In what sounds initially like a ridiculous claim, Kant appears to dogmatically assert that the 'pleasure' of the sublime requires an openness to the moral, which is not directly given in the experience of the sublime and which *requires a 'moral culture'* to expand one's openness to the sublime. Unlike the experience of beauty, which we may expect of everyone, the sublime requires "a far greater culture, not merely of the aesthetic power of judgment, but also of the epistemological capacities [*Erkenntnisvermögen*] on which it is based [...]"¹⁵⁴ "The disposition of the mind to the feeling of the sublime requires its receptivity to ideas [...]"¹⁵⁵ However, not a disposition to just any ideas! Especially, "[...] *without the development of moral ideas, that which we, prepared by culture* [moral culture, not the 'culture of skills'¹⁵⁶], *call sublime will appear merely repellent to the unrefined person. S/he will see in the proofs of the dominion of nature [...] only [...] distress, danger, and need [...]*"¹⁵⁷ (emphasis added)

Although 'moral culture' is necessary for a judgment of the sublime in nature, the judgment of the sublime "[...] is not, therefore, first generated by culture and so to speak introduced into society merely as a matter of convention. Rather, [... *the sublime*] has its foundation in human nature, and indeed in that which can be required of everyone [that is, universally] and demanded of him along with healthy understanding, namely in the 'capacity' [*Anlage*] of the feeling for (practical [Kant's parentheses]) ideas, i.e., to that which is moral."¹⁵⁸ (emphasis added)

[...] [J]ust as we reproach someone who is indifferent in judging an object in nature that we find beautiful with lack of taste, so we say of someone who remains unmoved by that which we judge to be sublime that s/he has no feeling. We demand both [... taste and feeling] of every human being, and also presuppose it in everyone who has any culture – only with this difference, that *we immediately require the former [taste] of everyone because in it the capacity of judgment [Urteils-kraft] relates the imagination merely to the understanding, as the faculty of concepts, but because the latter (feeling/sublime) relates the imagination to reason, as the faculty of ideas, we require it only under a subjective presupposition* (which, however, we believe ourselves to be justified in demanding of everyone), *namely, that of*

153. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 268–269.

154. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* V: 264.

155. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* V: 265.

156. On the distinction between 'moral culture' and the 'culture of skills,' see 848, n. 161.

157. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* V: 265.

158. Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* V: 265.

the moral feeling in humanity, and so we also ascribe necessity to this aesthetic judgment."¹⁵⁹
(emphasis added)

The 'presumed necessity' of universal taste and feeling for morality on the part of aesthetic judgments '[m]akes us cognizant of an *a priori* [*transcendental*] principle in them. With respect to beauty, it is the *transcendental* principle of the harmonious unity of the 'play' of the mind absent concepts. With respect to the sublime, it is the *transcendental* principle of the *absolute whole* or *totality* of our supersensible capacity beyond all mathematical enumeration, yet, endowing us with a 'capacity' (*Kraft*) capable of destroying nature.

VII) Hegel's Reading of Kant on Beauty and the Sublime. Beauty and the Sublime are not Identical for Kant

Hegel faults Kant for having intentionally limited reason to 'subjective understanding.' The framework for Hegel's accusation is illustrated by Plato's line, which has reason 'higher' than understanding. Hegel claims to have reached reason, the highest religion of the mind, and he is charging Kant with being intentionally stuck in understanding, below reason.

Kant, however, does not frame his reflections on reason according to Plato's Simile of the Line. Wherever Hegel's scheme comes from, consciously or unconsciously, Hegel is pouring the new Kantian wine into old wineskins by squeezing Kant into a pre-figured framework that is inappropriate for understanding him.

'Reason,' according to Kant, is not 'above' understanding and the perceptible world of action. This is a *hierarchical relationship* of causality, according to Hegel's way of understanding 'theoretical reason' and 'practical reason' with reason (pure Absolute Spirit) being *the causal origin* of the true content and actual conditions that are the phenomenal world in which practical reason can exercise its agency.

For Kant, reason itself is divided into two domains of order/lawfulness: theoretical and practical reason. Neither domain of reason is 'higher' than the other with respect to one being the causal explanation of the other. Theoretical reason is concerned with the lawful order that makes it possible for a finite, imperceptible consciousness to be able to understand a world of perceptible phenomena. Practical reason is concerned with the lawful order that makes it possible for that same finite, imperceptible consciousness, intentionally, to be able to initiate sequences of events in perceptible phenomena that its own lawful causal order cannot initiate by itself. Theoretical reason is, then, concerned with 'what is' whereas practical reason is concerned with 'what ought to be.' Only a finite consciousness in possession of the imperceptible capacities of

159. Kant, Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* V: 265–266.

both theoretical and practical reason can be in a world the way that humanity is able. That conclusion does not exclude the possibility that there are other versions of finite, transcendental consciousness elsewhere in the universe, but, if there are others, they have to possess similar imperceptible capacities as we if they experience phenomena the way that we do.

When it comes to theoretical and practical reason, we possess ‘certainty,’ according to Kant, only to the degree that we can determine what is *necessary* (in the sense of required, not determining causation) for our understanding of, and responsible agency in, the world. Among those transcendental conditions of possibility is ‘God,’ but we leave the domain of certainty when we apply predicates to God that are not required for experience, understanding, and responsible agency in the world.

Hegel’s account of Kant in “Glauben und Wissen” as well as in his *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* take Kant’s discussion of ‘beauty’ in the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* to be the crucial indicator that Kant is a ‘mere’ ‘weak’ and ‘barbarous’¹⁶⁰ dogmatist,¹⁶¹ who failed to recognize that absolute ‘reason thinks itself’ through finite consciousness.¹⁶² Yet, far from weakening ‘reason’ and presenting a barbaric philosophy that denies absolute truth, Kant identified the necessary conditions required for any and all understanding and responsible agency that are illuminated in finite, conscious experience of beauty and the sublime to anchor transcendental consciousness in the world as a responsible agent.¹⁶³

Among the necessary conditions, that is among the certainties of understanding, are the capacity for judgments of beauty and the sublime, which along with the assumption of teleological purposiveness in nature are the *transcendental principles* of finite consciousness. Those *transcendental principles* along with the *metaphysical principles* of theoretical and practical reason are the cornerstone of reason.

The fact that the cornerstone of reason, according to Kant, is feeling rather than philosophy being merely of matter of detached, ‘talking head’ is a front-on, anticipatory ridiculing of Hegel’s Absolute Spirit, Absolute Knowledge, and Absolute Freedom. Furthermore, far from being a solipsistic ‘constructivist’¹⁶⁴ who takes each individual to determine the conceptual and lawful order of nature and responsible agency, Kant places ‘reflecting judgment’¹⁶⁵ as the connecting strategy that unites theoretical and

160. See Hegel, “Glauben und Wissen” GW II: 287–288.

161. See Hegel, “Glauben und Wissen” GW II: 319.

162. See Hegel, “Glauben und Wissen.” GW II: 327.

163. In other words, there Kant is by no means calling for an escape from sensuousness with his moral theory as do Hegel/Strauß. This Kant makes especially clear with his discussion of the sublime’s relation to sensuousness, see above in Chapter 8: 834.

164. Again, a charge that Kant explicitly rejects in the *Critique of Pure Reason* B xxix.”

165. See the “Introduction:” 86, n. 26, Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 386–387, and *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 179–180 with ‘reflecting’ judgment consisting of the activity of transcendental consciousness that deduces (does not create!) the appropriate concept for a set of phenomena that is ambiguous for it. When ‘reflecting’ judgment successfully completes its task, it can

practical reason, and he explicitly rejects the claim that reflecting judgment is subjectively imposing a conceptual order on the world.

Hegel claims that Kant dogmatically eliminates 'Reason' as Absolute Knowledge and 'limits' reason merely to 'weak,' subjective understanding. However, not only has Kant already anticipated Hegel's Idealism and rapturous (*schwärmerische*) attempts¹⁶⁶ at Absolute Knowledge to be like a dove dreaming that it can fly in a vacuum, but also Kant speaks of 'limits' to reason are not because Reason Itself (independent of finite consciousness) is 'limited.' Rather, in order to experience, understand, and exercise responsible agency in the world, as it does, reason cannot be anything else but finite. Anything more is a deceptive employment of literal, anthropomorphic analogies in an attempt to place humanity (in Hegel's case, a 'Platonic' theoretical reason as a 'logical' process imminent to history) on the throne of God. In short, Hegel divinizes humanity and eclipses any 'real' significance to finite experience in the world. The phenomenal world is only a temporary 'place holder' that is a matter of indifference for Absolute Spirit's Absolute non-difference.

Hegel writes of Kant's subjectivist, 'feeling' that cannot reach 'true' objectivity:

[...] the objective, which is to establish the contrast, is itself equally subjective, does not belong to my feeling, but remains enclosed in the circle of the subject, in the pure 'I' of my self-consciousness, the area of thinking understanding. On the one hand, I have feeling content. On the other hand, I am active over against it. I do not leave it in its accidental determination but make it universal. However, this is also subjective, and so we do not recognize the thing by itself. On the one hand, there are determinations of feeling, which are connected with our organs. On the other hand, there are determinations of thinking, which are in my 'I,' so they are only appearances, which we recognize and determine. In this respect Kant's philosophy called itself idealism: we deal only with our determinations, we do not come to the In-Itself [An-sich]; we do not come to the truly objective [Absolute Spirit].¹⁶⁷

Hegel speaks of finite consciousness as the 'location' where Absolute Reason 'thinks Itself.' In dramatic contrast, Hegel complains:

[...] [For Kant] a true unity, an organic unity of an intuitive understanding, is not to be thought once and for all. *It is not reason that knows here*, but it is [...] *the principle of [reflecting] judgment, to think as if nature were determined by a consciousness possessing understanding.*¹⁶⁸

apply the already deduced concept to a new set of phenomena by making a 're-produced' [*bestimmende*] judgment.

166. On the difference between 'enthusiasm' and 'rapture,' see page 7, n. (footnote # will be inserted in this editing process)

167. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* GW XX: 351.

168. Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen:" GW II: 327.

According to Hegel, beauty and the sublime are equivalent because they both are the external, phenomenal side of internal, Absolute Spirit. Both beauty and the sublime are an 'idea' as the ideal of the totality of 'actuality' (the dimension of representations. The purpose of beauty and the sublime is to elevate humanity out of the world into Spirit as the point of indifference that is Absolute Spirit's Second Negation. In other words, Absolute Spirit is the unifying link between Absolute Freedom and nature. The contrast between Hegel and Kant on beauty and the sublime could not be greater.

According to Kant, neither beauty nor the sublime are concerned with external phenomena but with internal, transcendental capacities of consciousness. Beauty is explicitly not a concept or idea or a perceptible ideal. The unifying link between autonomous freedom and the will is reflecting judgment, not a 'formless' substance of Absolute Spirit. Both beauty and the sublime are inseparable from the moral with the former as the 'symbol of the moral' that confirms humanity's extra-ordinary conscious capacities of reflecting judgment and with the latter a confirmation of the magnitude and strength of theoretical and practical reason.

VIII) On Hegel's Insistence that Kant's Reason is 'Weak,' 'Barbarous,' and 'Dogmatic' or Hegel's Erroneous Insistence on What Kant 'Must Mean' by Theoretical and Practical Reason

Hegel's Reading of Kant on aesthetic judgment is a classic example of 'reading-in' (eisegesis/εἰσῆγησις) what is 'read-out-of' (exegesis/ἐξήγησις) a Text. Hegel succumbs over-and-over to assumptions that drive a 'blind,' hermeneutical circle. This closed, hermeneutical circle is manifest throughout Hegel's reading of Kant.

Hegel approaches Kant with a pre-conceived notion of Absolute Knowledge/Absolute Spirit as 'true,' objective (scientific) knowledge that is the ultimate source of Kant's philosophy of merely subjective understanding. Hegel reads Kant as aware of the 'ultimate source,' yet he chose to ignore it. Hence, Kant's reason is 'weak' and 'barbaric,' and his notion of Enlightenment as 'think for oneself' consists of nothing other than the pursuit of personal desire and interest. Because Kant's practical reason is exclusively shaping of empirical phenomena, it cannot escape the sensuous world. Therefore, it can never achieve 'freedom' above history.

By taking Hegel's reading of Kant as situating him on Plato's simile of the line at the level of 'understanding' (albeit, as a horizontal, immanent, historical, cataphasis/apophasis, logical dialectic that turns finite consciousness into the 'place holder' that is the 'point' of indifference returning to non-difference), one can 'see' that, according to Hegel, Kant has decapitated 'Reason.' Insisting that synthesis' must mean the product of a tripartite dialectical structure (thesis, antithesis, synthesis), Hegel claims that there is only one *a priori* synthesis of Absolute Spirit that becomes aware of Itself 'at the end of history:' the Owl of Minerva flies in the evening.

Kant's 'ignoring' of Absolute Being means, for Hegel, that he could not possibly grasp the 'true' meaning of 'beauty' and the sublime because Kant is unable to see them as two forms of the same 'truth' that shining through nature is the Absolute ground of Absolute Spirit/Knowledge. One can also 'see' the pre-figured dualistic structure that Hegel imposes upon Kant in Plato's distinction between Mind as 'Being' and the perceptible realm as transient copies of mere 'Becoming.' This compulsory dualism allows Hegel to read Kant as a defender of merely subjective, 'empty abstractions' because Kant's ideas/concepts (Hegel does not distinguish between 'concepts' and 'ideas' as does Kant) are not objective Ideas of 'the' ultimate Idea but only subjective creations of solipsistic consciousness that prescribe the way the world 'is.'

Reflecting judgment' can only be a metaphor for subjective 'constructivism,' according to Hegel. Furthermore, Hegel not only ridicules Kant's 'theoretical reason' as 'empty abstractions,' but he takes Kant to mean by 'practical reason' a merely 'analytical' concern with the 'empirical.' Consequently, Absolute 'freedom' is an escaping from sensuousness because finite freedom with its efforts at morality is entrapped in what Plato called the status of 'prisoner' in a world of shadows that circumscribes freedom.

Furthermore, the demand to fulfil perfectly the demands of 'duty' is truncated by the existential push-back of restricting nature's own 'freedom' that results in the individual's concrete situation transforming the 'I should' of duty into an 'I can't.' It is only Hegel's Absolute Spirit as the 'cunning of reason' that can accomplish the perfect realization of history's teleological goal by means of the dialectic of Double Negation – in spite of the limitations on finite consciousness.

In addition, reading Hegel philosophy as a con-figuration of Plato's Simile of the Line aids understanding of Hegel's distinction between 'theoretical reason' and 'practical reason.' For Hegel, 'theoretical reason' is the Absolute Unity of above the '*divisible-I*' of mental ideality (*Ideele*)¹⁶⁹ and over against the material world of 'practical reason,' which in contrast to Kant Hegel speaks of as the 'unreasonable many' of the '*divisible non-I*' that is empirical actuality (*Realität*). Hegel engages in a Platonic-Christian, anthropomorphic portrayal of God as Mind/'Reason' above 'Understanding' while silently, yet no-less dogmatically, claiming that all multiplicity (or the realm of practical reason's 'becoming') arises out of the 'divisible-I' (Absolute Spirit):

[... the] real opposite [to Absolute Unity] is, on one side, manifold being or finitude, and opposite to [... the manifold of multiplicity] is infinity as negation of multiplicity and positively as pure unity. The absolute concept, thus constituted, [... is] this unity [...] called pure reason. However, the relationship of pure unity to the manifold being that is its opposite is a double relation, [...] for if the existence of both were absolute, there would be no relation between them at all, and if the complete annihilation of both were set, there would be no existence of either. This partial existence and partial negation of both – the *opposing of a divisible-I to a divisible non-I in the I* [...] is the absolute principle of

169. On Hegel's distinctions among the non-divisible I, the divisible-I, and the divisible non-I, see 160.

this [Hegel's] philosophy. In the first [the divisible-I], the positive relation, pure unity is called theoretical reason whereas the negative relation is practical reason. Because in [... practical reason] the negation of the opposition occurs first [as a negation in the unity of theoretical reason], the unity [of theoretical reason] is the more existing whereas in [... practical reason] the opposition is first, that is, multiplicity is first, and the more existing, practical reason occurs as the real (*reelle*), but theoretical reason as the ideal (*ideelle*) [...] because in opposition, actuality [*Realität/reelle*] is multiplicity, but ideality [*ideelle*] is unity.¹⁷⁰ (emphasis added)

Hegel wrote of the difference between 'theoretical' and 'practical' Spirit in an "Addendum" to the *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaft*:

While, on the one hand, because consciousness has the object directly, it cannot be said to have urge, on the other hand, Spirit must be conceived as an urge because it is essentially activity, and first of all, it is a) that activity by which the apparently foreign object, instead of taking the form of something given, isolated, and accidental, takes on the form of something remembered,¹⁷¹ subjective, general, necessary, and reasonable. By making this change with respect to the object, Spirit reacts against the one-sidedness of consciousness, which refers to objects as immediately existing, and, not knowing them as subjective consciousness, it is thus theoretical Spirit. In this, the urge or drive for knowledge prevails. With respect to the content [*Inhalt*] of knowledge [for theoretical Spirit], I know that it is, that it has objectivity, – and, at the same time, I know that it is in me, that is, subjective. The object, therefore, no longer has the determination of a negative against the I, as it does from the standpoint of consciousness. b) The practical spirit takes the opposite starting point. It does not begin, as the theoretical spirit does, from the *apparently independent* object, but from its purposes and interests, that is, from subjective determinations, and only proceeds to make these into an object. In so doing, this spirit reacts just as much against the one-sided subjectivity of self-consciousness closed in on itself as the theoretical spirit does against consciousness dependent on a given object. Theoretical and practical spirit, therefore, integrate each other, precisely because they are distinguished from each other in the manner indicated. This difference, however, is not an absolute one, for the theoretical mind also has to do with its own determinations, with thoughts; and conversely, the purposes of the rational will are not something belonging to the particular subject, but something existing in and for itself. Both ways of Spirit are forms of reason; for both in the theoretical and in the practical Spirit is produced that in which reason consists: a unity of the subjective and the objective although in different ways. – At the same time, however, *these two forms of subjective Spirit have in common with each other the defect that in both of them the apparent separateness of the subjective and the objective is assumed and that the unity of these opposite determinations is first to be brought forth* – a defect that lies in the nature of Spirit because it is not an existing, immediately completed thing, but rather that which brings itself forth, the pure activity, the abolition of the presupposition, made by itself, of the opposition of the subjective and the objective.¹⁷² (emphasis added)

170. Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 455–456. On Hegel's distinction between the real (*reelle*) and ideal thought (*ideelle*) see the "Preface:" 46, n. 31.

171. Surely an echo, at the least, of Plato's notion of 'knowledge' as 'remembering' ('anamnesis') in the *Meno* 80 d and *Phaedo* 66 b–d.

172. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaft* GW X: 237.

Hegel goes on to speak of practical reason as containing the conditions for encountering Absolute Spirit in empirical, practical reason, but empirical practical reason on its own fails to understand Absolute Spirit because practical reason ‘remains absolutely opposed’ to the ‘ideal.’

[...] only the formal idea [as a representation] of identity of the ideal (*Ideellen*) and the real (*Reellen*) can be recognized in what is called practical reason, and this idea should be the absolute point of indifference in these systems; but the idea of indifference does not come out of difference, and the ideal (*Ideelle*) does not come to reality (*Realität*) for *in spite of the fact that the ideal (Ideelle) [content] and the actual (Reelle) [form] are identical in practical reason* [as concrete experience in the world], *the actual (Reelle) nevertheless remains absolutely opposed* [to the ideal].¹⁷³ (emphasis added)

In the presentation of "The New German Philosophy" in Part III, Section 3 of his *Vorlesungen über the Geschichte der Philosophie*, Hegel equates Kant and Fichte as ‘subjectivists’ for whom the ‘I’ is limited to judgments of Cartesian ‘certainty’ rather than the ‘truth’ of what Hegel calls Absolute Spirit:

The [subjective] ‘I’ is certain, but philosophy wants the true [Absolute Spirit]. The certain [for Fichte] is the subjective. That which is certain shall remain the foundation. What comes in addition is also subjective. The [subjective] form cannot be eliminated. We saw this ‘I’ also with Kant’s transcendental apperception:¹⁷⁴ ‘I’ is the source of the categories and ideas, it is a linking. All ideas, thoughts are such syntheses, – manifold things synthesized by thinking. Unlike Kant, Fichte does not go to work narratively by beginning with the ‘I,’ that is the great thing about him. Everything is to be derived from the ‘I,’ narration is to be abolished. – What is in me, that I know; it is pure, abstract knowledge, this is the ‘I’ itself. This is Fichte’s starting point. Kant takes up the assignments [*Bestimmungen*] of pure knowledge, the categories, empirically from [analytic] logic [resulting in a *posteriori* synthesis of ideas through dialectic], – a quite unphilosophical, unjustified procedure.¹⁷⁵ (emphasis added)

However, just as ‘ideas’ for Plato can be employed to ‘look down’ the line to the imagination to ‘make sense’ of representations of the copies and shadows that are the realm of empirical ‘becoming’ or ‘to look up’ the line by means of dialectic to contemplate (θεωρία, *theoria*) the Absolute Good ‘above Being’ (*Republic* 509b: ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας), so too with Hegel, ideas are employed to guide understanding and action ‘down the line’ *in the empirical world of practical reason – without awareness of their ‘more proper’ function in the higher realm of theoretical reason.* Furthermore, because, according to Hegel, the ideas of practical reason are generated (*werden*

173. Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" GW II: 456.

174. See above where I demonstrate that Hegel takes Kant’s ‘apperception’ to mean ‘perception.’

175. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* GW XX: 392–393.

gesetzt) by the subject¹⁷⁶ by an analytic that generates ideas by means of an *a posteriori* dialectic because they are not directly 'given' in perception, the 'common' take on understanding and ethical agency in the empirical world, according to Hegel, entirely neglects 'theoretical reason' and experiences the debilitating frustration and pain that its finitude and the limits of its empirical circumstances make it impossible for it to 'live up to' the 'pure' standard of moral duty contained in the necessity of moral principles.¹⁷⁷ In short, theoretical reason's "[...] moment of the Absolute is 'dispersed' (*zerstreut*) in the empirical that consists of a linear, dialectical sequence, and the empirical appears as fragmentary (*zersplittert*).¹⁷⁸ The consequence is that the absolute necessity of moral duty, which is 'established' (*gesetzt*) by the agent, is not Absolute Spirit Itself but the 'divisible non-I's' finitude within recognition that it occurs in the 'divisible I' of Absolute Spirit. Whereas moral duty is taken to be a 'truly absolute' expectation, it is, in fact, an unattainable perfection given the limitations of empirical nature.

Without any exegetical accounting in Kant and insisting that Kant speaks only of freedom 'freedom-from' with no acknowledgement of Kant's notion of creative, autonomous 'freedom-for,' Hegel insists that his own account of 'practical reason' and morality is what Kant means by practical reason and morality. Stated otherwise, Hegel takes practical reason to be 'analytical' absent any *a priori* synthetic judgment – with the exception of Absolute Spirit as its ultimate cause.: it 'must be the case' because Kant is a subjectivist].

Hegel's "Glauben und Wissen" concludes:

The pure concept [...] or infinity as the abyss of nothingness in which all being sinks, has to replace the infinite pain, which before was only historical in formation as the feeling upon which the religion of our day is based – *the feeling: God himself is dead* (that which was, as it were, only empirically expressed with Pascal's expressions: "la nature est telle qu'elle marque partout un Dieu perdu et dans l'homme et hors de l'homme")["Nature is such that everywhere, both in man and outside of man, it points to a lost God (and to the corruption of nature)"], *purely as a moment, but also not as more than a moment of the highest Idea*, and thus giving a philosophical existence to what was also, for instance, either moral prescription of a sacrifice of the empirical being or the concept of formal abstraction, and *thus giving philosophy the idea of Absolute Freedom and thus giving, as well, absolute suffering or speculative Good Friday, which was otherwise historical, and restore it itself in all the truth and harshness of its godlessness, out of which [...] the highest*

176. See Walter Tydecks, "Konstruktion des Subjekts und seiner Wirklichkeit nach der *Wissenschaft der Logik* von Hegel." 9: "Wenn Hegel von »gesetzt« oder »setzen« spricht, dann meint er damit, wie eine Aussage gesetzt wird, die nur innerhalb eines vorausgesetzten Bedeutungssystems zu verstehen ist." http://www.tydecks.info/online/logik_kraft_subjekt.html (29 August 2022)

177. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Betrachtungsweise " GW II: 457 ff. Here in 1803, Hegel already formulates what he calls "The Moral View of the World."

178. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Betrachtungsweise " GW II: 459.

*totality can and must arise in all its seriousness and from its deepest depths, at the same time all-embracing and in the most cheerful freedom of its form.*¹⁷⁹ (emphasis added)

In other words, for Hegel 'practical reason' is a distorted and mis-apprehension of Absolute Spirit for which God and nature are dead. It is only with the grasp and embracing of the absolute suffering of the speculative Good Friday (the grasping and positive embracing of the turning 'point to absolute indifference') that godlessness is replaced with 'the highest totality,' and one embraces, cheerfully, Absolute Freedom of liberation from sensuousness and the frustrated efforts of the ethical. Humanity is then divinized.

Platonic 'blindness' prevent Hegel from grasping the significance and strength (!) that is reason for Kant. The 'capacity' of judgment is what elevates transcendental consciousness (finite reason) above nature because it is the transcendental condition of possibility for theoretical and practical reason. Kant concludes:

In speaking of laws of duty (not laws of nature) and, among these, of laws for human beings' external relations with one another, we consider ourselves in a moral (intelligible) world where, by analogy with the physical world, attraction and repulsion bind together rational beings (on earth). The principle of mutual love admonishes them constantly to come closer to one another; that of the respect they owe one another, to keep themselves at a distance from one another; and should one of these great moral forces fail, 'then nothingness (immortality), with gaping throat, would drink up the whole kingdom of (moral) beings like a drop of water' (if I may use Haller's words, but in a different reference).¹⁸⁰

Why Strauß' Failed Kantian Turn Matters

Strauß appears never to have engaged Kant on aesthetic judgment. A key element in his increasingly materialistic metaphysics (although he himself acknowledges huge gaps in materialism) was his focus on 'culture.' I read Strauß' focus on Rousseau's

179. Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen:" GW II: 432–433.

180. Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 449. The passage in Haller's poem, "Unvollkommene Ode über die Ewigkeit" ("Incomplete Ode on Eternity"), is:

O God! You alone are the reason for everything!
 You, sun, are the measure of immense time,
 You stand by balanced power and constant noon,
 You never rise, nor will you set,
 A single moment in you is eternity!
 Yes, could the stable forces sink only because of you,
 Shortly, with a wide open throat,
 A universal nothingness would drink the whole cosmos,
 Time and eternity at once,
 As the ocean drinks a drop of water.

Second Nature notion of culture not as educational nationalistic Philistinism, as did Nietzsche, but as analogous to the understanding of 'religion' as a cultural expression of a 'people' (*Volk*) as emphasized by Hegel and Daub. An understanding of culture merely as Second Nature only takes culture to be an expression of intellectual skills.

Were he aware of Hegel's aesthetics, there would have been nothing in Hegel's that could have attracted him to aesthetics because for Hegel aesthetics is just another set of metaphors for Hegel's meta-narrative of Double Negation. There is, however, no indication that Strauß ever engaged Kant on aesthetic judgment. Certainly, Hegel's ridiculing of Kant's aesthetic judgment provided, unfortunately, no incentive to examine Kant on aesthetic judgment.

Absent a serious engagement on his own of Kant generally, and on aesthetic judgment in particular, Strauß' understanding of 'culture' as the (religious) *character* of a people (*Volk*) left him with only a truncated notion of 'reason' as *instrumental reason* that is, the cultivation of instrumental reason. In other words, from a Kantian perspective, his focus was on the *narrow*, perceptible 'consequences' of what Kant calls 'theoretical reason,' not on the imperceptible, capacities and *a priori* conditions of possibility for transcendental consciousness to be a creative, responsible agent in the world grounded in 'moral culture.'

The 'Return to Kant Movement' among his friends in the 1860s that resulted in his tepid engagement of Kant's moral theory in the 1864 *LJEGP* and the sketchy formulation of a 'religion of humanity' treats morality as it does *instrumental reason* in terms of perceptible consequences. Yet, his dependence for the understanding of moral duty and consequentialist ethics from Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" left his 'religion of humanity' as an ethics focuses on the *species* for any sense of moral improvement.

Not only is there no rigorous engagement on either Kant's *theoretical* or *practical* reason, there is no hint of the notion of 'moral culture' or the understanding of culture as 'the promotion of the moral will' that is grounded in the cornerstone of the *feeling of attraction and repulsion to lawfulness of reflecting judgment* in Kant's presentation of aesthetic judgment as the 'bridge' between autonomous freedom and responsible agency in the world.

Strauß' Kantian 'blind spot' is truly striking, and it contributed immensely to his turn to 'faith in materialism' in the 1872 *The Old and the New Faith*.

If we think that all we have to do is merely *open our eyes* to experience reality, then we are building our lives on sand, not a solid foundation. This is because merely 'opening one's eyes' involves a profound paradox. We can only perceive the effects of causality, not directly, causes themselves. Casual explanations are constructions (though, not creations) of *reflecting judgment*. They presuppose a lawfulness (both of theoretical and practical reason) that *attracts us to seek a causal explanation, in the first place*.

Because we have no direct access to causes in perception, out of which all quest for causal explanation arises and to which all causal explanation must return for its

validation (not proof!), the limits to our reason not only prevent us from proving or disproving our convictions but also requires our recognition that every other conviction with respect to causal explanation and reality enjoys the same advantage and disadvantage as our own.

This raises the specter that all causal explanations, 'properly' understood, are equal. If for no other reason, this superficial claim that is a popular form of 'pluralism' today, is reason enough to be chilled by the ignoring of Kant's Critical Idealism.

Critical Idealism's *necessary or required conditions of possibility, which make possible theoretical and practical reason as grounded in aesthetic judgment* opens before us an entirely different strategy for achieving understanding than merely "opening our eyes."

If all we must do is open our eyes to "see" reality, then it is patently absurd to say that the sun is standing still. Although there is no position that we can take on this planet to demonstrate it, every school child today "knows" that the sun is standing still and the earth is turning on its axis and travelling around the sun. The "fact" that we are rotating at some 1,000 miles/hour and travelling around the sun at the rate of some 65,000 miles/hour is ridiculous for those who insist that truth is merely a matter of perception.

What "must necessarily" be the case if we are to think that the sun is standing still and that we are moving at such imperceptible speeds when sense perception confirms exactly the opposite? To think so, we must not only be able, but also are required, (that is, it is *necessary*) to *add something to the phenomena of our perception of the sun in relation to the earth that is not directly present in our perception of them*.

Here we have with the understanding of nature an *amoral necessity/requirement*. It is a requirement demanded for proper understanding, but it is not a moral requirement that governs personal behavior. *Understanding of physical phenomena requires necessarily paying attention to the enduring order that always and already shapes nature*. That order may be a physical law but also a statistically significant outcome of investigation or an algorithm applied to the phenomena in those 'territories' where a physical law is not yet discernible.

In contrast, *moral necessity* does not always and already shape the behavior that it seeks to govern because that behavior is not grounded in nature per se but in the individual's ability intentionally to do something that nature on its own cannot do. In other words, nature imposes on the observer/agent the *heteronomous* physical and social laws/rules that govern it whereas the creative agent imposes on her-/himself the *autonomous, moral laws/rules* that govern her/his autonomous freedom "above" but never "separated" from nature, as far as we have ever experienced.

Heteronomous and autonomous necessity are not merely capricious assumptions of opinion about objective phenomena whether we're talking about nature or the scriptures. To be sure, they are assumptions, but they are *necessary/required assumptions* for there to be any understanding and proper intentional action in the world *in the first place*.

We can quarrel over the opinion whether the Christ is *exclusive* or *inclusive*, whether Jesus was a mere reformer of Judaism, a teacher of Socratic, Stoic, or Cynic wisdom, or the solution to Augustine of Hippo's original sin, as well as about any other set of religious convictions mediated by the scriptures. However, what we can't quarrel over is the requirement of our assumption of coherent order not only for our experience of the world but also for governing our own creative lives. This is why Strauß' work matters yet today.

The Significance of Strauß and Kant for Today:

Humanity has reached a crossroads that Kant anticipated but surely could not have consciously imagined. Kant wrote in 1775 that we in principle have the power to destroy the world. It took some 175 years, but, in 1945 with the unleashing of nuclear power, we realized that capacity. Our creative capacity is *instrumental reason*,¹⁸¹ that is, the degree to which we can *intentionally* cause events to happen that nature on its own could never achieve, has brought about in Rousseau's "Second Nature" not only the destructiveness of nuclear power but also material consumption and self-aggrandizement, all of which threaten to snuff out the very creative spirit that for millennia was devoted to survival.

As a species we appear to have placed all of our eggs in one basket: self-interest! The god of self-interest will protect us from exercising our capacity to destroy the world, and we believe, following the prophetess Ayn Rand,¹⁸² that self-interest is the driving mechanism that is going to bring benefit, particularly prosperity, to everyone.

When combined with the desire for recognition in the eyes of others and the worship of competition, we are like Cronos, a monster who devours its own children. Rather than think about humanity as a species, we celebrate and reward the achievements only of the few. The headlines (famous politicians, movie stars, musicians, moguls of industry and finance) live real lives, the rest of us are cogs in the machine graphically portrayed by Fritz Lang's famous movie "Metropolis." Yet, we wait in vain for a "savior" (a politician, actor/actress, sport's star, businessman, investment guru) because no individual can be a substitute for the many. If humanity is to be saved, it must save itself as individuals of an entire species by assuming responsibility for its creative agency!

What is wrong with self-interest, the desire for recognition in the eyes of others, and competition? Haven't they brought us the amazing accomplishments from which we all benefit? "Yes" and "No!" If we only look at outcomes, the answer appears to be: "Yes!" In a pragmatic age, of course, outcomes are all that matter. We live under the

181. Again, it is to be stressed that *instrumental* reason is only the *consequentialist* aspect of *theoretical* reason.

182. See Ayn Rand, *Atlas Shrugged* (New York: Random House, 1957).

mantra of Utilitarianism that the good is that which benefits the many. However, we forget that, as a finite species, we are incapable of calculating the actual consequences of our decisions and actions. Big data and algorithms are exponentially increasing the quantity of variables that we are capable of including in our calculations, but algorithms are only as good as their authors and *big data is a smoke screen that present us with the illusion that we can consider all the factors of a situation.*

Whether attributable to Mark Twain or the British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, "there are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics." *Statistics depend upon the assumptions that drive them*, and those assumptions are imprecise, by definition, and malleable, in fact. We can make statistics say almost anything that we want them to say. Statistics present us with the *appearance of order* that, of course, is necessary for us to understand phenomena, but they are not demanded by the phenomena as in the case of physical laws.¹⁸³

What has "brought us the amazing accomplishments from which we all benefit" is not self-interest, the desire for recognition in the eyes of others, and/or competition, but, rather, the one capacity that in degree is shared by all human beings and, as a consequence, is the anchor of dignity: autonomous freedom! However, freedom has become so equated with *spontaneous liberty of choice* that we have buried the significance of autonomous freedom under human accomplishments.

Autonomous freedom is not spontaneous liberty of choice! It is surely related to liberty, but one can be incarcerated in solitary confinement and still be free although one has lost one's liberty. Freedom is not simply "no one is going to tell me what to do!" Freedom is not even merely "choice," which only appears to be increased the more options we have between and among the physical toys available to us from which to choose.

Furthermore, *autonomous freedom is not just "independence" from tradition and the institutions that shape our lives.* Autonomous freedom is precisely the degree to which we are able, intentionally, to cause things that nature on its own is incapable of achieving. In other words, it is not self-interest, the desire for recognition in the eyes of others, or competition that have brought us all the toys that enhance our lives. It is autonomous freedom that is so concealed by its ubiquity that we take it for granted without considering its significance for understanding who we are and our responsibilities that arise because of this extra-ordinary capacity.

Though, surely, self-interest, the desire for recognition in the eyes of others, and competition have played a central role in all human accomplishment!? Of course! Their denial would be just as blind as the denial of autonomous freedom's role. Yet,

183. Kant speaks of lawfulness in experience applying to two 'domains:' nature and autonomous freedom. Where there is no possibility of discernment of lawfulness, he calls that region of experience a 'field' (*Feld*). Where lawfulness is not yet discerned, he speaks of a 'territory' (*Boden*). Transcendental consciousness has 'dominion' (*ditio*) over the two 'domains' of nature (theoretical reason) and autonomous freedom (practical freedom). See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 174.

whereas self-interest, the desire for recognition, and competition have their pragmatic rewards (and disastrous failures), it contains no corrective to hubris and self-aggrandizement. Yes, they are driven by "what is" and "what can be," but "what is" and "what can be" are incapable of aiding us in determining "what *ought* to be!" As far as we are able to determine there is no other species that even raises the question of what *ought* to be – precisely because we possess *autonomous freedom*.

Self-interest, the desire for recognition, and competition can be so overwhelming that they actually encourage us to suppress the very question of "what *ought* to be." We develop all kinds of strategies to squelch the issue. Most popular today is the notion that all moral principles are culturally relative. Yet, we overlook that this notion is a two-edged sword. Yes, it fosters "pluralism" and the embracing of difference as valuable, but it also leaves us complicit in the injustices caused of others AND of our own culture without any compass to guide the pursuit of virtue, compassion, and justice. Our legitimate desire to call out cultural imperialism in this manner leaves us incapable of criticizing ourselves as well as the other. The ground for legitimate questioning our own as well as the other's systematic distortions is *transcendental critique*, not insisting on merely celebrating superficial, empirical differences. Without transcendental critique, we are left with only the superficial descriptions of *diairesis* (the dialectic of identities and differences).¹⁸⁴ Transcendental critique grounds our understanding in faith in universal conditions and capacities with commitment to the architectonic of universal lawfulness (physical and moral). This is, of course, convenient because it allows us to ignore the negative consequences of human agency under the mantra: "We meant well!"

However, by ignoring the question of "what *ought* to be?," we also overlook a pernicious dimension to self-interest, the desire for recognition in the eyes of others, and competition that is in play with them. By suppressing their dependence upon autonomous freedom, each in its own way can contribute to destroying the very human dignity that they are meant to enhance.

This claim surely appears counter-intuitive: How can self-interest, the desire for recognition, and competition of the few that bring the pragmatic benefits enjoyed by the many be corrupting of the human species? Again, rather than look at achievements (or outcomes), we can benefit by looking at capacities (or inputs). In other words, human finitude does not consist of a zero-sum game in which finite resources can be counted up and distributed (or denied) with the "winners" being those who end up with the greatest quantities. Human finitude is precisely that entry into the "natural" system that is open-ended, not closed – until it turns its own finitude against itself! Self-interest, the desire for recognition, and competition can just as well be vehicles for finitude's turning against itself as they can be vehicles for positive enhancement of life. In fact, they can illuminate the ultimate challenge placed before us by our own

184. On *diairesis* (διαίρεσις), see Chapter 3: "Academic Controversy:" the section "Academic Controversy Based on Criticism (*diairesis*):" 219 ff. [166?]

autonomous freedom: the challenge of the difference between *what is* and *what ought to be*.

Autonomous freedom (not liberty!) is what makes it possible for us to even raise the questions of "dignity" and "what *ought* to be?" This is because only autonomous freedom contains the conditions that makes these questions *real*, not just an illusion. The question of "ought" can only arise where there is an alternative available to the agent who is capable of assuming personal responsibility for her/his actions. The mechanical causality of natural processes do not allow alternatives. You can't step off a cliff and expect nature to offer an alternative to falling. All of our understanding of "natural" events is dependent upon there being a "mechanical," predictable order to them – if not at the level of a physical "law" then as the result of a predictable, "significant" statistical outcome or in conformity with an (ultimately) humanly created algorithm. The anomaly confronts us with the challenge of "seeing" how it conforms to some "rule." Without this assumption, there would or could be no understanding.

Humanity's autonomous freedom plays with different rules. To be sure, it cannot ignore the "rules" of nature. However, *there is an openness to the natural system announced by autonomous freedom's ability intentionally to bring about things that nature cannot*. This openness introduces a dimension into the "natural" system that is incalculable and unpredictable – as much as behavioral patterns can be discerned. We can document how "most people" will act in a particular circumstance but ascertaining a pattern neither provides us with the precise determination of what any particular individual is going to do much less with moral, normative principles to govern behavior. In other words, we cannot get from "is" to "ought." Behavioral patterns are a form of determination of "what is" usually the case, but they neither can determine what will be the case – even if there's a "significant" statistical probability – nor, most significantly, can they determine what *ought* to be the case. Autonomous freedom in itself, of course, also cannot say what morally *ought* to be the case for someone else, but it does establish the condition for the individual's raising the question of the *moral ought* for her-/himself.

We can establish *legal oughts* for one another, and this is the task of societies, governments, and institutions. These *legal oughts* are concerned with rules that govern our shared world of things. *Legal oughts* are not themselves universal. They are rules that seek to protect *interests* between and among individuals and groups with respect to physical things. The civic law is different between and among cultures with the degree of universality to the rules that are the civic law depending upon the degree of universality to the interests of the agents involved.

Yet, there is a *necessary*, universal law that is "higher" than *legal oughts* and *civic laws*. This "higher law" is most manifest, positively, by the recognition that one can do everything legally and still perpetrate an injustice. This "higher, wider law" is most manifest, negatively, in that there are evils that one cannot legislate away, for example, racism, sexism, homophobia, etc. The norms that are in play with this

recognition of injustice and the identification of racism, etc., are *subjective*, universal norms grounded in human dignity and autonomous freedom, not in *objective*, *legal oughts* and civic laws. Combating injustice requires the subjective understanding of the *necessary* conditions of possibility that make it possible for all human beings to be and to become human. In short, combating injustice requires the acknowledgement of the dignity of all and the requirement of *internal* respect for the law (both physical and moral) by all.¹⁸⁵

185. The notions of dignity and respect for the law are the key, though not the only key, to rejecting the frequently expressed conviction that Kant was (must have been) a racist. Kant writes in *Determination of the Concept of a Human Race* AA VIII: 99–100: "The class of whites is not distinguished as a special species in the human genus from that of blacks; and there are no different kinds of human beings." (See Georg Geismann, "Kant's Alleged Racism: The Failure of Charles W. Mills (and all too many others)" at https://www.academia.edu/43558508/Kant_s_Alleged_Racism_The_Failure_of_Charles_W_Mills_and_all_too_many_others_, in addition to, Geismann, "Why Kant was not a 'Racist'." As if Kant's explicit acknowledgement that all human beings come from the same phylum and that there is no difference in species between whites and peoples of color, whom he called the same 'species' according to Bufon's rule of propagation, his epistemological distinction between appearances and things in themselves is a strong indicator that 'color' (appearance) was not a determination of the human status of an individual/group. See *On the Different Races of Human Beings* [Note: not 'species'] AA II: 429; 434–442. In addition to an argument against racism (and all other forms of prejudice based on sense perception) given humanity's 'universal' capacities, in Section "18) How the representations of perception jade us, and how they can be elevated so that they don't" of his *Menschenkunde* (AA XXV,2: 936–940; Olms ed.: 95–101) Kant offers an argument from the perspective of 'particularities' whereby diversity of particularities is crucial for extending human understanding. Equally significant is Kant's thesis from Section "17 On deception of the senses" (AA XXV,2: 928–935; Olms ed.: 85–95) in the *Menschenkunde* that 'deception' in humanity is both positive and negative. It is positive because it presupposes 'propriety' (*Sittlichkeit*) that can lead to morality (*Moral*). In this spirit, Kant says that "one must take people as they are" (AA XXV,2: 932; Olms ed.: 91) and "not become a moral purist" (AA XXV,2: 932; Olms ed.: 91) or else one sinks into misanthropy (AA XXV,2: 932; Olms ed.: 91). Although we should not wag a moral finger in the face of the other, deception is negative in ourselves because it hinders our dignity (true worth). "[...] [W]e must be careful to seek out [...] in ourselves in every possible way and try to destroy the false appearance in order to be able to value ourselves according to our true worth." (AA XXV,2: 933; Olms ed.: 92)

An important passage from the "Doctrine of Virtue" from the *Metaphysics of Morals* (AA VI: 467–468) clearly rejects judgments of the other based solely on appearances. Dignity and respect for the moral law are the key, imperceptible moments that define humanity as a species: "Remark: Given the title to what has just been discussed ["On Vices that Violate the Duty of Respect Owed to Other Persons], it is clear that what has been said here does not so much extol virtues as, more importantly, condemns their contrary. However, this lies in the concept of respect [*Achtung*] that we are obliged to demonstrate toward others, which is only a negative duty. – I am not [!] obliged to venerate others, positively [!], by demonstrating my esteem for them (merely observable as people). The only respect to which I am obligated by nature is that which comes from the law as absolute (*reverere legem*) [i.e., the moral law because it alone is "absolute" and "unconditional"], and this, not to esteem others generally (*reverentia adversus hominem*) or to render some particular obligation to them, is the universal and unconditional duty owed to other persons, which can be expected from everyone as the original respect [*Achtung*] owed to all.

"Other forms of respect, which need demonstration, that is, with respect to human nature [*Beschaffenheit der Menschen*] or the individual's particular circumstances, namely, age, sex, genealogy [*Abstammung*], strengths or weaknesses, or even the individual's status and prestige [*Standes und ... Würde*

There is no other species that remotely to the same degree can raise the question of *moral ought* because all other species of which we are aware are "determined" by natural causes to a far higher degree than humanity. We compromise our own dignity when we insist that adherence to *legal oughts* and the civic law are all *that is necessary* because this attitude undermines a fundamental and profound human capacity: the ability to take moral responsibility (not just legal responsibility) for our decisions and actions.

When we exercise our autonomous freedom intentionally to initiate a unique causal sequence that can change nature in ways that nature on its own cannot, we establish the conditions under which the question of "what morally *ought* to be done?" can arise. Precisely because the conditions for such a question are the capacity of autonomous freedom, grounded in but *above* nature, this causality on its own (independent of an agent) is *incapable of determining* (!) what *ought* to occur. However, just as so-called "natural" causal systems are predictable orders to which their events conform, autonomous freedom presupposes a predictable order to which its events conform. The difference is that natural, causal systems *must conform* whereas events initiated by autonomous freedom *can but they don't have to conform*. That is what makes autonomous freedom not only the condition for moral agency in contrast to merely, mechanical necessity but also the condition for our being able to talk of anything remotely like human dignity: that each and every individual possesses this inviolable and inalienable capacity and moral responsibility. The predictable order of autonomous freedom is the moral order, not the merely physical or legal order.

It is precisely the predictable, causal order of autonomous freedom that is capable of requiring us to act *contrary to our self-interest* in the name of a moral principle that we hold "above nature" and "above ourselves." Humanity appears to be the only species that (certainly to the degree) is capable of self-imposing a moral principle to govern its agency.

Yet, we quickly want to retort: "There are no moral principles that apply to all times and all places! There are only relative principles created by particular (not universal) social groups! There are no "Ten Commandments" that we can inscribe in stone and place in our courthouses!" However, the Ten Commandments" of Exodus 20 illustrate in perhaps an unexpected fashion precisely the point of universal, moral

mean "status and prestige" because "*Würde*" in the sense of human dignity from Section II of the *Groundwork* is absolute, not capricious], which in part are due to capricious dispositions, have no place and require no classification in the presentation of the first principles of the doctrine of virtue because here one is concerned only with the pure principles of reason." See McGaughey, "Was Kant a Racist? with Addendum on South Sea Islanders." <https://criticalidealism.org/was-kant-a-racist-with-addendum-on-south-sea-islanders-01-may-2017/>.

Thanks to Birgit Recki who cited the second of the two paragraphs of this "Remark" from the *Metaphysics of Morals* for a very different but equally laudable purpose in her *Ästhetik der Sitten*: 255, n. 43.

principles.¹⁸⁶ However, the latter (unlike the Ten Commandments) are nothing that can be used to confront the other with a wagging finger.

We only need to identify one moral principle in order to confirm that there is such a capacity of autonomous freedom (not liberty) because only autonomous freedom presents us with the conditions necessary for there to be a moral decision with respect to what morally *ought* to be. In other words, autonomous freedom is the *necessary/required* condition of possibility for there to be 'wide,' moral principles.

There is no social group that insists that lying is fundamental to its social order. Social groups can encourage deception "for a greater purpose" (for example, Sparta encouraged its children to steal) but such deception is always an exception, not a general rule, that confirms the rule honesty. Were lying to be a universally (!) acceptable principle governing behavior, then there could be no social order in the first place.

The "reality" of a moral principle can serve to recognize the *necessity* of autonomous freedom, but the *necessity* (not as predeterminism) of autonomous freedom is the condition of possibility for our experiencing a moral principle to govern our agency – even a principle that requires us to act contrary to our own (and our group's) self-interest. As Immanuel Kant pointed out in the *Groundwork*, this "circularity" (between a moral principle illuminating the capacity of autonomous freedom with autonomous freedom being the condition that makes the moral principle possible and necessary in the first place) is no "vicious circle" in which the *explanandum* blindly presupposes the *explanans*.¹⁸⁷

Experience is possible for us only if there are two *inseparable, yet irreducible, universal orders* to experience. If we are to adequately understand ourselves, it is *necessary* that our account of who we are in the order of things involves both physical and non-physical aspects: the 'sensible' and the 'suprasensible.' Because all events involve the 'sensible' and the 'suprasensible,' we are capable of understanding for all understanding requires both – given that "laws" and "concepts"/"causes" are inaccessible to the senses. In other words, there is a "circularity" but not *vicious* circularity to all understanding. What breaks the *viciousness* of circularity in understanding is *universal order*.

All understanding requires that we *assume* the two universal orders to experience. The relationship between autonomous freedom and the moral order is no different in this respect than the relationship between physical events and the physical order – although the two "orders" are irreducible one to the other! We are the species that can consciously choose to violate (or employ to achieve new ends) these two, universal "orders," but we are "successful" (not necessarily, materially successful) when we conform to both.

186. On the relativism of the Ten Commandments and their functioning as 'civic law' (the Doctrine of Right), not 'moral law' (the Doctrine of Virtue) see Chapter 8: "Strauß' Kant Reading Over His Career." 849, n. 162.

187. See Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 451–453.

The ability to act contrary to our self-interest, then, is an extra-ordinary capacity that serves as a species marker. It is what indicates who we are in the *order of things*. We are the species that can be (but is not required to be) moral. We can choose to be moral not because we fear punishment but because it is what it means to be human. We need no divine judge of Personal Theism to be moral, we merely (but it is a huge "merely") need to want to be human.

A moral system that is grounded in fear in the face of an "external" judge (either human or divine) is no moral system because it is not concerned with "doing the right thing because it is right" but, rather, with "doing the right thing because it furthers my 'interest' in achieving status and/or prestige in the eyes of others or of God in light of punishment and reward. Here we encounter the limit that illuminates the crippling aspect of "recognition" in the eyes of others as a motivator for human achievement.

There is no doubt that the desire to be recognized and rewarded by others for one's achievements is a powerful motivation. It can evoke amazing actions – even of ultimate self-sacrifice. Yet the desire for recognition and reward has a dark side that can motivate individuals and groups to perpetrate horrible atrocities both culturally systematic as well as specific horrifying actions. In short, the beneficial effect of recognition, status, and prestige depends upon those bestowing it being governed by a moral compass. In the absence of a moral compass to guide them, the dispensers of recognition, status, and prestige are, more likely than not, only agents of merely self-interest. Above all, they constitute for the individual an external "authority" over which the individual has no control and, most damaging for human dignity, they constitute an external "authority" that is substituted for the individual's own assumption of moral responsibility for her/his agency. However, recognition, status, and prestige all presuppose the capacity of creative autonomous freedom and personal moral responsibility that they are supposed to ground. Rather than fostering moral achievement, they undermine the very conditions that make the cultivation of moral achievement possible in the first place. Rather than establishing human dignity, they presuppose it.

Competition can be even further removed from the conditions of creativity and moral responsibility that make its remarkable human achievements possible. To the extent that the focus is on the goal of reward for the achievement of competition, competition becomes ensnared in the ambiguities of recognition, status, and prestige. We are all too familiar with the consequences: doping-, bribery-, payoffs-, fixed competition, tax evasion, team-, league-, division-, and even world governing-body financial scandals, etc. One creates and, manipulates data, steals theses, production techniques, and even products from students, colleagues, corporate competitors, exercises political power to move one's name to the head of the "authors" list (a metaphor for hierarchical status), and engages in character assassination to get to the "top." The end is taken to justify the means, and, as a consequence, the individual athlete, researcher, employee, etc., can easily, often subtly, be caught up in a whirlwind of moral ambiguity that cripples human dignity.

Humanity has reached a crucial crossroad in its development. More is at stake than humanity's creative power to transform nature in ways that nature is incapable of accomplishing on its own. As long as there has been "humanity," Kant reminds us in his *Lecture on Moral Philosophy* (1774/5), humanity in principle has possessed the power to destroy nature. More is at stake, then, than Ernst Jünger's "total mobilization" of technological functionality and efficiency or Martin Heidegger's "forgottenness" of technology in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*.¹⁸⁸ Since Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) and *Conjectural Origins* (1786), humanity has been called to take moral responsibility for its autonomous power over against nature. The crossroad that confronts us today is a shift from the use of our autonomous creative freedom from focusing on survival to pursue innovation merely for the sake of status and prestige fueled by competition. We are left with only the ledger in a zero sum game.

Our response cannot be simply to stick our head in the sand and wish for "the good old days." Nor is it enough to wait for divine grace to save us from ourselves or to wait for the epochal dispensation by the possibilities that are Being (or non-Being). The same ambiguous capacities that enabled survival in the past are what make for the ambiguities that drive self-interest, the desire for recognition, and competition today. There is no institutional or social situation to which we could "return" (certainly not "paradise") in which humanity's creative capacity was exercised "perfectly" and from which we have "fallen." Humanity as a species commences precisely at that point in time at which emerge not only its capacities but also the condition of moral responsibility. No institution, social situation, grace, or event (*Ereignis*) of Being can absolve the individual of her/his moral responsibility that is the consequence of her/his capacity of autonomous freedom.

This is why David Friedrich Strauss and the 1839 Revolution in Zurich, Switzerland, remain significant for today. It is not possible to prove that the literal reading of the Bible is wrong, but there is also no way to prove that it is right. However, even if the literal reading is right, the narrative of salvation that biblical literalists claim is found in the bible is simply not empirically there in the text. It is a narrative that the reader must bring to the text just as the gospel authors (and other 'Second' Testament authors) did in their collection of anecdotes and teaching from (and regarding) Jesus of Nazareth. Hence, the literal reading is in this respect a violation of the text.

It is also not possible to prove that the Rationalist reading of the Bible is wrong, but it, too, is incapable of proof that it is right. However, what matters is not the empirical evidence of some external authority – be it a text, an institution, or an economic system. *What matters is the conditions that make possible the creation of texts, institutions, and economic systems, in the first place. That condition is creative, autonomous freedom with its condition for moral responsibility.*

188. Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977).

Far more valuable than attainment of a supposed 'salvation' or the ubiquitous pursuit of money as the goal and measure of success would be the measurement of success according to the Copernican Turn. This turn is away from exclusive valuing of the perceptible to focus, instead, on imperceptible capacities and the encouragement of the individual's own imperceptible assumption of responsibility for understanding and agency. Such encouragement is based on the desire to be human as a participant in the internal Commonweal of God as the more valuable understanding of culture than a zero-sum game of financial ledgers. The *pure* religion of *practical* reason provides humanity with the only satisfaction that matters in life: the personal awareness that one made one's best moral effort under the profound limits that circumscribe the human condition.¹⁸⁹

189. *Pure* religion has its ground in *practical* reason, which result in *pure* religion being far more than a "reduction of religion to morality" as one might superficially conclude under the rubric of the fostering of a "culture of rearing" (rather than a mere "culture of skills"). On the notion of 'pure' in Kant, see: 558 n. 109.

There is one aspect of Christianity, forgiveness, that, unquestionably, is devoted to individual self-interest, not the creation of culture grounded in humanity's capacity to make its best effort – despite the possible consequences for one's own or one's community's self-interest.

Obviously, the very conditions of possibility for individual, moral effort are imperfect. The most popular forms of Latin Christianity specifically address this imperfection with two strategies that are embedded in its central doctrine and rituals: 1) The fact of imperfection is "explained" on the basis of an, at best, speculative translation of Romans 5:12, and since Augustine of Hippo in the 5th C has been called *original sin*. 2) The rupture between God and humanity that is captured by the notion of *original sin* demands by the logic of economy: payment of its debt. The debt that is owed for our inherited and personal errors needs to be paid in order for the individual to be reconciled with God for having violated God's gifts. That debt, according to Anselm of Canterbury's famous *Cur deus homo*, cannot be paid by the individual because the individual "owes perfection" to God so that, even were one to be perfect after the point of moral conversion, there can be no moral surplus generated by one's perfection. That *gap* between one's inherited and generated evil can only be paid by the *bloody sacrifice* of God's own illimitable, perfect son. Only this exclusive child of God is capable of providing the grace of *forgiveness* to enable reconciliation with God.

This narrative is found nowhere in the scriptures, but that, of course, does not mean that it is wrong. As we have seen, though, there is no way of determining whether or not the story is fantasy or fact. In the absence of certainty, we have two options: 1) faith in the veracity of the story or 2) concern about the story's debilitating impact upon the very capacities that are necessary for us to be and to become human beings.

The *pure* religion devoted to the "culture of rearing" indicates just how damaging these two pillars of self-interest in popular, Latin Christianity really are because they constitute an arrow in the heart of humanity's moral capacity, which in turn means an arrow in the heart of humanity's efforts to achieve justice through democratic institutions, international cooperation, and cosmopolitanism. One cannot serve two masters: self-interest and universal, moral principles. The latter most effectively are violated where self-interest is the exclusive principle that grounds one's decisions and actions. As we have seen, we can never escape self-interest, but we can know whether or not we are acting solely on the basis of self-interest.

Here, though, we encounter a serious question: If one is incapable of being perfect, why should one make any moral effort? The answer from the perspective of *pure* religion is as simple as it is complex: *because we can*. As far as we know, there is no other species with which we are familiar that comes remotely close to having the capacity to take personal responsibility for its decisions and actions. This is

as close to a species-marker as one can get. If we have the capacity, why should we intentionally seek to be less than what we can be?

Nonetheless, as long as it has not been beaten out of us or we have not trained ourselves to be impervious to it, concomitant with our imperfection is our experience of guilt in the form of regret and remorse for our failing to have lived up to our own self-selected ideals. Rather than guilt crippling our efforts, its value is that it is a spur to increase our efforts in order to avoid further guilt. Already in 1775 in his *Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie* (*Lecture on Moral Philosophy* (357), Kant proposed that remorse is the motivation to make a better effort in the future. See as well, the "Doctrine of Virtue" in the *Metaphysics of Morals* (AA VI: 435), the *Critique of Practical Reason* (AA V: 97–100), and *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* (AA V: 264).

Yet, where there is guilt, there is a desire for forgiveness. In the "Sermon on the Mount" (Matthew 5:24), one encounters a notion of the value of *horizontal* over *vertical* forgiveness. Whereas *vertical* forgiveness offers absolution top-down by God, which constitutes a "second wounding" of the victim by rewarding the perpetrator, *horizontal* forgiveness requires seeking out one's victim and cooperatively seeking a new range of possibilities together that can only occur through acknowledgement of the dignity of both victim and agent. Forgiveness can never mean "forgive and forget." See as well, McGaughey, "Über die Rolle der Religion in der moralischen Entwicklung" in *Braucht Werterziehung Religion?*, Hans Joas hrsg. (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2007): 101–135.

Conclusion: John Dewey and the Enduring Need to De-Mythologize the Hegelian/Straußian Reading of Kant

Chapter Overview

A reading of John Dewey's *German Philosophy and German Politics* demonstrates that those who take truth claims to be limited to consequentialist effects and/or who take understanding to be a self-correcting open-ended process succumb to the third-rail of hermeneutic, three-fold mimesis. Dewey's reading of 'German philosophy' perpetuates the pre-figured anti-Kantian and anti-Enlightenment narrative that shaped Strauß' mis-understanding of Kant. This Kant narrative is as much in need of de-mythologization as the gospels were for Strauß. The *genetic mythical principle* also applies to this Kant narrative. Here its focus is on the Kant-narrative talking points that make up a mere aggregate of disparate prototypical impressions which Kant 'must have' meant. The *genetic mythical principle* (*genetic narrative principle*) identifies in Kant's work the 'prototypes' and their architectonic that stimulated the misrepresentation of Kant analogously to the 'First' Testament prototypes that were gleaned by the gospel authors to record their (and their communities') impressions of what Jesus of Nazareth 'must have' meant. Furthermore, the third-rail of hermeneutical three-fold mimesis is identified as the ever present possibility of systematic distortion, which is the 'blind spot' of Dewey's 'empirical philosophy' and 20th C hermeneutics. This third-rail is the weakest link in the chain of Dewey's epistemology, which only appears to turn the 'vice' of the 'correspondence theory of truth' (open-endedness) into a virtue. A return to Kant identifies universal requirements (but not causal determinations) of consciousness that both make three-fold mimesis possible and offers a strategy of de-mythologization and *genetic mythical principle* to 'correct' narrative distortions albeit on a foundation of *necessary, non-epistemic 'faith'* (*Fürwahrhalten*). As the capstone of the "Confession as Conclusion," de-mythologization of both the gospels and Kant makes possible, the retrieval of 'pure' religion that is grounded not in anthropomorphic projections and eternal self-interest but the required conditions of possibility and capacities as well as the 'culture that promotes the moral will,' which make understanding and responsible agency in the world possible. Our self-understanding and nature hang in the balance.

It is impossible to know just what David Friedrich Strauß thought, or any other person thinks. There is even a truly profound ambiguity when it comes to the individual's own thought. What appears to be certain, though, is that no one can experience, think, or act for someone else. When it comes to giving an account of the experience, thought, and actions of another, then, one is limited to the appearances that they produce *and to the imperceptible elements of finite consciousness that make possible those appearances*.

When I have asserted that Hegel, Baur, Schleiermacher, and/or Strauß have misrepresented or distorted Kant, my claim is not that I know the 'true' Kant. A reading of *pre-figured* sources is not 'true' or 'false.' I invoke Paul Ricoeur's formulation of a 'bad' and a 'good' reading. A 'bad' reading is 'narrow and far-fetched,' whereas a 'good' reading is 'coherent and offers a plenitude.'¹ Those 'bad' or 'poor' *con-figurations* of Kant are those that violate Kant's methodology articulated at the conclusion of the *Critique of Pure Reason*., especially the call for an architectonic. Rather, they have

1. See Chapter 2 "Strauß Who? What? Why does it Matter?:" 188 and footnote 88.

focused narrowly on individual themes as if Kant presented merely an aggregate of philosophical issues among which one can cherry pick *to criticize* (*by no means offer a critique* of) him, or they have anachronistically insisted that Kant ‘had to have meant’ what the interpreter takes him to have meant. I make every effort possible to demonstrate how Kant’s reflections are always embedded in a coherent whole and are no merely capricious aggregation. My reader, of course, can doubt the success of my efforts, but should s/he do so s/he is obligated to present more ‘coherent and plenitude’ reading of Kant.

On the Value of Engaging Strauß: Gospel Criticism and Metaphysics

In Strauß’ case the reader is unquestionably rewarded by reading his work, and no summary, not even this project, can serve as a substitute for reading him. This is not because he is an ‘oracle of truth.’ Rather, given the rigor and breadth of his scholarship, one acquires a treasure trove of information and insight and saves precious time because he identifies the crucial issues at issue in Christianity as well as their conundrums. Yet, the significance of his work is neither limited merely to his gospel criticism nor as a case study in Christianity.

His portrayal of the narrative character of the gospels does illuminate what is required on the part of the reader for understanding, generally, not just for understanding of the gospels themselves. Furthermore, his insight into the generation of the gospel narratives by their respective authors anticipates 20th C conclusions about the ‘gospel writer as creative author,’ not as objective historian.

In addition, though, Strauß provides the reader with beneficial resources to evaluate the anti-Enlightenment and anti-Kantian movement that developed already at the beginning of the 19th C. The reader is also rewarded by carefully following the trajectory of his metaphysical reflections not only by what Strauß ‘got right’ but also by Strauß’ requiring the reader’s wrestling with the issues that he ‘got wrong.’ His claims, ruminations, and, especially, his identification of what he took to be wrong or problematic in Kant, Hegel, and Schleiermacher not only present a valuable, insightful profile of their work but also highlighted where his reading requires correction. In other words, Strauß’ corpus saves the reader valuable time by its portrayal of the metaphysics of his day but also by challenging the reader to work through the open metaphysical conundrums of Strauß’ own reflections.

Last but no means least, Strauß’ corpus raises the inescapable question: If understanding precedes perception, then what guarantees ‘correct’ understanding? Stated in the terms of Strauß’ theological world: What is the ‘correct’ theological understanding that one must ‘necessarily’ bring to all experience, generally, and to the scriptures, particularly?

Dewey's Kant Reading Requires De-mythologizing. Just as the Gospels do for Strauß

This project has sought to present D.F. Strauß's gospel criticism and metaphysics by not only examining his own writings but also by examining the writings of those who influenced him. I have applied Paul Ricoeur's thesis of "three-fold mimesis"² that views all understanding as a process that always and already begins with a pre-figured 'narrative,' which is then con-figured by an 'author' and is followed by the reader's re-figuring of that author's narrative. Strauß' Kant understanding both illuminates the validity of the thesis of three-fold mimesis but also illuminates the danger of systematic distortion³ once distortion enters into the trajectory of narrative construction.

Strauß and Dewey share both the same two aspects of the mythic reading of inherited narratives and a dependence upon the distorting, Hegelian reading of Kant. The two aspects of the mythic reading that Strauß shares with Dewey are de-mythologization of narratives (the husk/kernel reading of narratives) and the *genetic mythic principle* (the generation of narratives on the basis of pre-figured prototypes or *genetic narrative principle*). Although with respect to narratives (*mythoi*), the *genetic narrative principle* anticipates three-fold mimesis, Ricoeur extends the principle to factual, historical accounts (*logoi*), which calls into question Strauß' conviction that there is an unequivocal distinction to be made between *mythoi* and *logoi*.⁴ This theme becomes particularly relevant when it comes to ferreting out systematic distortion in understanding.

Whereas Strauß applied his mythic reading to the gospels, he never directly engaged Kant sufficiently to recognize that the Hegelian reading of Kant itself was a distorted, mythic reading. Dewey's text and his reception among some is shaped by the same Hegelian pre-figuration of Kant that influenced Strauß and has persisted over 200 years. As with the gospels, then, the same hermeneutic of de-mythologization to identify 'kernels' at the core of 'husks' and identification of the '*genetic mythical principle*' that accounts for the writing of inherited narratives is required to address persistent distortions of Kant.

By de-mythologizing Kant, we can see that, unlike the gospel narratives, which are theological 'all-the-way-down' given that the gospel authors are theologians, not historians, we must heed Kant's call to identify, and grasp the ramifications of, the universal, finite, transcendental conditions of conscious experience, understanding, and agency generally, that are required in order for (finite, transcendental) consciousness to be able to understand phenomena and act responsibly *in the world*. In other

2. See in Chapter 1 "Methodology" the section "On Understanding as Three-fold Mimesis:" 104.

3. See Jürgen Habermas, "On Systematically Distorted Communication." *Inquiry*, 13 (1970): 205–18).

4. See Ricoeur, Paul, *Time and Narrative*, Vol. 3, by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988): 148–156 and, especially, Chapter 8, as well as, Ricoeur, "History as Narrative and Practice" in *Philosophy Today*, XXIX (3/4): 213–221.

words, this examination of Dewey is no knee-jerk Kantian apologetic that seeks to defend one, among the many, particular, Kantian narratives. Rather, it seeks to identify the universal, conditions and capacities of consciousness, which themselves constitute a larger, coherent 'architectonic' that applies to all experience, understanding, and responsible agency. These universal conditions and capacities constitute the key kernels of Kant's philosophical reflections.

Kantian kernels are no more true just because he says them than the biblical contents are true because they are in the bible. As Lessing pointed out,⁵ truth is in the bible because it is true, not merely because it is in the bible. What Kant allows us to see, though, is that we have 'truth' to the degree we can identify the necessities of finite, eminent transcendental consciousness.

Although Kant calls his philosophy 'empirical' because it commences with, and returns to, phenomena,⁶ he emphasizes that there are two ways that concepts arise in experience: 1) constructively (*a posteriori* 'empirical' judgments) and 2) synthetically (*a priori* assumptions *added to* the phenomena).⁷ However, the required *a priori* synthetic conditions and capacities that finite consciousness adds to empirical phenomena are neither merely capricious constructions of individual consciousness, nor merely abstractions of logic (a canon without an organon), nor merely empirically perceived⁸ by merely opening one's eyes, nor only the grasp of the hypothetical imperatives of particular, technical skills, nor certainly not any pre-determination of the individual. Rather, the required conditions and capacities of Critical Idealism are those *universal* conditions and capacities, which make possible any and all experience and require cultivation *by each individual* in order for her/him to develop her/his talents and to make her/his valuable creative and responsible contribution to our vulnerable, physical world.

Dewey's calls his philosophy 'empirical philosophy.' Its strategy for the acquisition of 'proper' understanding is an American, sociological theory of truth; what he calls:

[...] the American method of back-and-forth give-and-take discussion until final decision represented a workable consensus of the ideas of all who took part [...]

I [...] believe] that the method of achieving community by processes of free and open communication, which is the heart and the strength of the American democratic way of living and that the weaknesses of our democracy all represent expressions of failure to live up to the demands imposed by this method. Prejudices of economic status, of race, of

5. See Lessing's "The Education of the Human Race" in *Lessing's Theological Writings* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967): 83.

6. See Kant, *Prolegomena* AA IV: 293.

7. See Kant, *Logic* AA IX: 141.

8. On logic as a canon without an organon (merely abstraction) and mathematics (as embedded in causality and perception) as the trenchant example of a canon with an organon, see Kant's "The Concept of Logic" in *Logic* AA IX: 11–16. See as well, in Chapter 1: 49.

religion, imperil democracy because they set up barriers to communication, or deflect and distort its operation.⁹

It takes little reflection to see, though, that, especially when it comes to non-technical endeavors, the danger of distorted understanding is by no means avoided by 'free and open communication.' Jürgen Habermas, author of the theory of 'communicative action'¹⁰ and 'non-hierarchical discourse,'¹¹ acknowledges the danger of 'systematic distortion' of understanding that can and does occur among social groups.

On Dewey's Proposal of Kant's Prophetic Role in the Rise of Hitler and National Socialism

Dewey's *German Philosophy and German Politics* illustrates both the lurking distortions and dangers of 'sociological truths' established by the conclusions of social, 'proper' understanding. In the second, 1942 edition of the work, originally published in 1915, Dewey's new 'Introduction' continues the core thread of Dewey's analysis of German 'culture' to claim¹² that *there is a direct connection from German Idealism of the late 18th and 19th C to Hitler*.¹³

When it comes to German philosophy, though, Dewey's capriciously drawn line in the sand is Kant (he ignores earlier 'German' philosophy, e.g., Leibniz' dualism). Dewey recognizes that Kant is difficult reading,¹⁴ and he is self-conscious enough

9. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 46.

10. See Jürgen Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics* (1968), Jeremy Shapiro trans. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970): 91–94.

11. See Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981).

12. For a rigorous and thorough rejection of Dewey's reading of German philosophy and politics, see Georg Geismann, "John Dewey's 'Deutsche Philosophie und deutsche Politik' in *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft*, II (2001), 631–638.

13. Manfred Voigts takes a claim by Honneth as the guiding thread for his embracing Dewey's thesis of a direct line from Kant to Hitler as a consequence, among other themes discussed below, of Kant's purported 'Two-World Thesis,' which, as a consequence of Kant's categorical imperative being a merely subjective, empty abstraction, threw the barn doors open to the State as the legitimate implementer of 'duty' on its citizens. Voigts writes: "[...] Axel Honneth writes in his Preface [to Honneth's German edition of Dewey's *Deutsche Philosophie und deutsche Politik*] that Kant's rationality was independent of experience' (*erfahrungsunabhängig*)." (Voigts, "Immanuel Kant, John Dewey und die deutschen Juden: Ein Beitrag zum Zusammenhang von Idealismus, Nationalsozialismus und Judentum" in *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte*, 53/4 [2001]: 359.) Dewey claims that Kant's theoretical and practical reason are dualistic realms of concrete experience and abstract intellect (what Honneth calls Kant's dualistic "Two-World Thesis" – see below).

14. See Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 63. Whereas Kant directly suffered under the religious censorship of the state, he knew from the example of Hermann Samuel Reimarus that ideas can be so socially inflammatory that they can lead to social unrest rather than the calm engagement of thought. No one more illustrates the powder keg of ideas than David Friedrich Strauß. Kant's and Strauß' difference with Reimarus, though, is that they did not hesitate to publish their work that

about his reading in that he acknowledges that it is fortunate that "[...] few who read my attempt [at portraying Kant's thought] will have sufficient acquaintance with the tomes of Kantian interpretation and exposition to appreciate the full enormity of my offense¹⁵" against Kant. Yet, given that Dewey offers no corrections to his Kant reading, *his confession only enhances the offence because it turns the offence into deception*. Documenting how Dewey's portrayal of Kant is a scion of the intellectual 'tissues,' 'organs,' and 'blood'¹⁶ formulated by the (predominantly Hegelian) anti-Kantian and anti-Enlightenment at the beginning of the 19th C illustrates the enduring power of systematic distortions of Kant and the need for their de-mythologization and an account of the *genetic mythical principle* that shaped those distortions.

However, Dewey emphasizes Kant's role in the rise of National Socialism¹⁷ *not as a philosopher or social strategist but as a 'prophet'*.¹⁸ Yet, it is only by assuming (!) the capricious, *a priori* synthetic judgment that Hegel's reading of Kant is correct (and everything I've written in this project that precedes, as well as is found in, this

shook the foundations of the academic and, eventually (!), social status quo. Unlike Reimarus, both Kant and Strauß published their reflections but did so in a style of writing that was accessible to those who were truly interested in its revolutionary significance. In Strauß' case, it was the 'professional academics' who distorted his work and inflamed the passions of those who never read him. However, when it comes to inflammatory ideas, one ought never to overlook the self-interest that motivates an author's non-publication or turgid academic language.

15. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 63.

16. See below the text cited on 937 as n. 19.

17. Among those who read Dewey as maintaining that there is a direct philosophical basis in Kant for the rise of Hitler is Axel Honneth., for example, Honneth, "Logik des Fanatismus:" 59, 66–67. Honneth himself acknowledges that there is a 'debate' over the degree to which Kant aided and abetted the rise of National Socialism in a footnote: *Ibid.*: 67, 23. Honneth, though, chooses not to examine the accuracy of Dewey's claims about Kant in part with the side comment that it is not entirely clear whether Dewey is defending a continuity in the history of ideas or the 'perversion of a *Wirkungsgeschichte*'. See *Ibid.*: 58. Honneth appears to excuse any limitations in Dewey's argument by saying: "His interpretation of Kant conceals [...] neither [...] the great thought [...] nor the many theoretical mediation steps that were necessary in the first place in order to derive the conclusion of a national leadership claim from the original program of Finite, transcendental Idealism [i.e. Kant]." Honneth, "Logik des Fanatismus:" 66.

18. The closest Dewey comes to claim that Kant is the ultimate source of National Socialism is his statement: "Surely the chief mark of distinctively German civilization is its combination of self-conscious idealism with unsurpassed technical efficiency and organization in the varied fields of action. If this is not a realization in fact of what is found in Kant, I am totally at loss for a name by which to characterize it. *I do not mean that conscious adherence to the philosophy of Kant has been the cause of the marvelous advances made in Germany in the natural sciences and in the systematic application of the fruits of intelligence to industry, trade, commerce, military affairs, education, civic administration and industrial organization. Such a claim would be absurd. But [sic.] I do mean*, primarily, that Kant detected and formulated the direction in which the German genius was moving, so that his philosophy is of immense prophetic significance; and, secondarily, *that his formulation has furnished a banner and a conscious creed which in solid and definite fashion has intensified and deepened the work actually undertaken*." (emphasis added) Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 69–70. In other words, it is not correct to claim a direct line from Kant to Hitler, but it is correct to say that his vocabulary encouraged a trajectory of reflection that led to Hitler. This is guilt by association, not by evidence!

"Conclusion" argues that it is not!), which remotely justifies a legitimate inclusion of a 'prophetic,' 'Hegelian Kant' in the trajectory of German philosophy that led to Hitler. The Hegelian Kant is not Kant. The de-mythologized Kant narrative contradicts Dewey's and his interpreters' thesis of a remote connection between Kant and Hitler not only as a philosophy or social strategist but also even as a 'prophet.'

A Blind Spot in Dewey's Hermeneutics The Unrecognized & Dangerous 'Third Rail'

Dewey's embracing of an enduring systematic distortion of Kant constitutes a deeper implication for the nature of 'thought' than nationalism, authoritarianism, racism, and the 'professionalization' of philosophy. It illustrates the dangers of distortion that can, and does, enter into any and all discourse, and it calls for an answer that is not subject to systematic distortion. The appropriate strategy Without an understanding of 'pure' religion for identifying and addressing philosophical, systematic distortions is not the determination of a set of 'true' claims about the empirical content of experience but to examine all of experience (not merely the 'normal' and the 'anomalous') from the perspective of the universal conditions and capacities of finite, transcendental consciousness that make possible any experience of empirical content, in the first place.

Dewey, though, describes the effects of inherited narratives upon reflection, but he does not address strategies for avoiding the systematic, pre-determination of the individual's imagination and behavior that can, and does, occur because of the past development of 'experimental' understanding:

Above all, men [*sic.*] take the particular general ideas which happen to affect their own conduct of life as normal and inevitable. Pray what other ideas would any sensible man have? They forget the extent to which *these ideas originated as parts of a remote and technical theoretical system, which by multitudes of nonreflective channels has infiltrated into their habits of imagination and behavior.* An expert intellectual anatomist, my friends, might dissect you and find Platonic and Aristotelian tissues, organs from St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, Locke and Descartes, in the make-up of the ideas by which you are habitually swayed, and find, indeed, that they and other thinkers of whose names you have never heard constitute a larger part of your mental structure than does the Calvin or Kant, Darwin or Spencer, Hegel or Emerson, Bergson or Browning to whom you yield conscious allegiance.¹⁹ (emphasis added)

Dewey *acknowledges the embedded errors* that accompany the 'pre-determination of the imagination and behavior, but his perception of the errors depends upon their

19. John Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 56.

achieving the status of an anomaly that a community is called to address, just how the 'errors' are identifiable as an anomaly is left unclear.²⁰

Time heals physical ravages, but it may only accentuate the evils of *an intellectual catastrophe*--for by no lesser name can we call a systematic intellectual error. To one who is professionally preoccupied with philosophy there is much in its history which is profoundly depressing. He [*sic.*] sees ideas which were not only natural but useful in their native time and place, figuring in foreign contexts so as to formulate defects as virtues and to give rational sanction to brute facts, and to oppose alleged eternal truths to progress. He sees movements which might have passed away with change of circumstance as casually as they arose, acquire persistence and dignity because thought has taken cognizance of them and given them intellectual names.²¹ (emphasis added)

Dewey has ignored *the third-rail of "three-fold mimesis"* expressed by the aphorism: "A chain is only as strong as its weakest link." The weakest link of Dewey's 'chain' of 'empirical philosophy' is the lack of a strategy to expose systematic distortion in the 'habits of imagination and behavior' that make up the 'mental structure' of a community.

'Truth' judgments require strategies not only of 'criticism,' but also the strategy of 'transcendental critique.'²² Kant, however, was aware of (and offered a solution to) the dangers of the 'third rail.'

Today, one says that it is not good that everyone is allowed to think and to write what s/he wishes when it comes to theology. [However,] making one's thoughts public is a desire (*Trieb*) by nature. How should truth be identified when we hold our opinions to ourselves? This desire of nature, obviously, intends that the human species establish truth through public (*gemeinschaftlich*) discussion [the key to Kant's 'common sense']. A judgment is improved by the other. From this comes the inclination to have our judgments examined by others, which is a strategy that those who are wise never dismiss. Granted, general applause does not determine truth. Such applause is 'universal' only for a certain time and, shortly, that which was praised by all is determined to be in error. For that reason, the longevity of general agreement among different nations and ages is a greater touchstone of truth [...] Granted, as well, it is no advantage that the ancients maintained things that need to be tested and investigated. However, when something openly shared by all ethical (*gesittete*) nations at all times, this criterion is to be embraced as a more advantageous

20. On the significance of the 'anomalous' for challenging a cultural paradigm, see, Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970): 52–53 and 57.

21. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 57–58.

22. In addition to 'criticism,' which is, frequently, erroneously taken to mean merely destructive skepticism, a theory of self-correcting truth needs a commitment to 'transcendental critique'. Transcendental 'critique' turns the spy glass of critical reflection around to examine the structures of subjective consciousness that must be in place before one can formulate a judgment about external phenomena. It examines the conditions of possibility and capacities of finite, eminent, transcendental consciousness to identify what is *required* in order for there to be anything like an experience of the 'correspondence theory of truth,' in the first place.

touchstone of truth.²³ [Note: the tip to 'critique' is to 'practical reason,' the crown of Kant's 'critique' of reason.]

[...] [E]rror is worse than ignorance because ignorance is to be regarded as the *tabula rasa* of Aristotle [De Anima 420b 29 – 430a],²⁴ where one finds no knowledge at all, *but nevertheless capacities to attain such knowledge* [NOTE: the tip to 'critique' is the focus on 'capacities' (universal *Anlagen*) possessed by all transcendental consciousness]. There is no obstacle here [when it comes to these capacities], but in error there is a double inconvenience. First of all, I have to oppose error, and thereby bring the individual to ignorance, and, only after I have thus artificially brought her/him/them to ignorance, can I begin to establish truth. Nevertheless, universal providence has so arranged human nature that we can only arrive at truth by the path of error. We arrive at the truth through fantasies, delusions and errors, through prejudices, and by groping in the dark, where we are often persuaded, through imaginary deceptions that, only later, turn into nothingness, and never the same way as claimed in ignorance.²⁵ (emphasis added)

Yet, Dewey is too sanguine when it comes to 'criticism,' and his dogmatic 'empirical philosophy' eliminates from the get-go 'transcendental critique.' If a community only depends upon anomalous phenomena to shake its members out of the complacency of its systematic distortions, were there never to be an encounter with, or engagement of, anomalous data, it would never be compelled to engage in 'self-correction.' A commu-

23. Kant, *Menschenkunde*: AA XXV,2: 881–882; Olms ed.: 35.

24. According to the footnote in *Menschenkunde*: AA XXV,2: 878, n. 022, "γραμματεῖον ['that on which one writes'] was first translated as 'tabula rasa' by Aegidius" [Aegidius Romanus/Giles of Rome?; Ægidius Viterbensis/Giles of Viterbo?].

NOTE. Neither Aristotle, Kant, nor Locke take this *tabula rasa* to be literally 'blank'. However, from Locke comes the 'anthropological argument' for God, which depends upon the 'Principle of Sufficient Reason:' Something cannot come from nothing or else there would be only chaos. The 'anthropological argument' claims that the 'blank slate' of the mind is 'spirit' in contrast to 'matter'. Because something cannot come from nothing, matter cannot create 'spirit'. Hence, Spirit must be from God (Spirit) as ultimate eminent cause (see footnote below) of Personhood.

The 'anthropological argument's' 'antinomy' (dialectic) claims that God is either absolute mind or finite mind. The conclusion of the 'anthropological argument' for God is an *a posteriori* synthesis of analytical 'criticism' that is grounded in empirical evidence not an *a priori* synthesis of 'critique' that is grounded in necessary and sufficient conditions. Analytical criticism is grounded in a claim that maintains it can identify the cause of things-in-themselves. Kant called such a claim 'subreption' because we not only do not have access, directly, to appearances, not things-in-themselves, but also, and especially, because 'causal' explanations can only be a deduction from their effects, again, because we don't have direct access to things-in-themselves. In contrast, the resolution of the antinomy by 'critique' identifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for finite experience of appearances. These necessary and sufficient conditions for finite experience is that there must be an ultimate, eminent cause that initiates a sequence, which is to be distinguished from a finite, eminent cause that arises within a sequence (see the footnote below). However, in contrast to Locke, 'critique' does not allow for any literal anthropomorphic predicates that claim God to be a Person/Spirit.

25. Kant, *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 878–879; Olms ed.: 31–32.

nity's commitment to a merely dogmatic conviction to the exclusion of consideration of all options is the surest way to remain trapped in systematic distortion.²⁶

26. The open-endedness of ever-new theological insight in itself is no guarantee that it will not simply perpetuate systematic distortions. The historian may be satisfied with merely describing the disparate elements of a doctrinal narrative without ever feeling compelled or obligated to look beyond the distorting husks of history to identify their kernels. Nonetheless, in the 21st C to present a doctrinal teaching of any kind without criticism (not to mention the need for transcendental critique) is to engage in apologetics and is an abnegation of the responsibility of scholarship to inform its readers of the issues at issue.

A classic case is Brian Gerrish's *Thinking with the Church* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2010). Gerrish has every right to present a description of the historical 'husks' of church doctrine without de-mythologizing and/or exposing their theological kernels for the 'hows' and 'whys' of the doctrines. However, his book is no 'objective,' indifferent investigation of church doctrine and not simply because Gerrish's doctrinal preferences are obvious.

Gerrish declares doctrinal doctrines that he opposes as 'not well founded' without any accounting of the criteria to be employed for his claim. For example, on his way to Calvin's 'mediating' position on the Eucharist, Gerrish concludes with respect to both Zwingli and Luther that their positions were 'not well founded' *without a whiff of what would be a well-founded teaching of the Eucharist.* (*Ibid.*: 243)

In addition, Gerrish appears to be satisfied with Calvin's privileging mystery in experience over understanding, but he leaves the reader with no criteria for adjudicating among what he takes to be 'the' legitimate and illegitimate mysteries. Rather than present the metaphysical options for the 'how' of how Christ was present in the Eucharistic ritual, Gerrish states that Calvin "[...] was not greatly concerned to explain *how* Christ is present in the Supper, any more than Luther had been. Gerrish quotes Calvin: "I [Calvin] rather experience than understand it' [...]. He [Calvin] was prepared to marvel at what he could not comprehend. But [*sic.*] from Romans 8:9–11 [which equates life with 'spirit,' not the body] he did infer that participation in Christ must be the work of the Holy Spirit [...]" (*Ibid.*: 245–246). Yet, later Gerrish underscores that Calvin did have an understanding, not merely an experience: "Calvin [...] rejected transubstantiation as a novelty, agreed with the ancient writers [without giving an explanation *how*] who spoke of a 'conversion' of the bread: they meant not that its substance is annihilated, but that it is no longer common bread [...]. But [*sic.*] this understanding of the eucharistic conversion [...] was foreign to the thinking of the Tridentine fathers." (*Ibid.*: 256). When Gerrish refers to Calvin's "favorite expression" ("We become [...] flesh of his [Christ's] flesh and bone of his bone."), Gerrish stresses that this is because (this is a causal 'because') the union is wholly mysterious, it can only be represented by images and metaphors." (*Ibid.*: 246–247). Yet in his ironic, pejorative criticism of the conclusions of the Council of Trent, Gerrish writes: "The Mass is declared to be a truly propitiatory sacrifice by which the Lord is appeased [...]. *In this awe-inspiring mystery, the victim by which we are reconciled to God the father is daily immolated on the altar by the church through the priests.*" (emphasis added) (*Ibid.*: 256–257) By what criteria does one distinguish between 'wholly mysterious' and 'awe-inspiring mysterious'? Without addressing the issue of the ambiguity of causal explanations and providing criteria for adjudicating between and among 'mysteries,' the reader is left in pseudo-Dionysian mist wondering which mystery trumps understanding.

It is not as if there was no questioning of the 'mystery' of the Eucharist between Trent and 2010. Strauß critically addresses the Lutheran, Swiss, and Reformed doctrines behind the ritual (§94 and §95) in his *Glaubenslehre*: Vol. II: 558–602 – granted, Strauß only 'criticizes' them as an exercise of *diairesis*, not transcendental 'critique'. (On 'criticism' (*diairesis*) and transcendental 'critique,' see Chapter 3: "Academic Controversy and Reaction to Strauß' *Life of Jesus*" the section "Academic Controversy Based on Criticism (*diairesis*):" 178 ff..)

Rather than mere 'criticism,' Critical Idealism demonstrates the inadequacy of the assumption that experience alone is sufficient for understanding, not to speak of truth claims. Experience presupposes the imperceptible conditions that make it possible for consciousness to have any experience, in the first

Dewey dependence solely upon the anomalous in 'experiential philosophy's'²⁷ 'open-ended' understanding to 'correct' the errors²⁸ is a version of the 'correspon-

place, not to speak of understanding and responsible agency. A transcendental critique of the Eucharist *cannot, and would not, deny* either the gift of grace or the sacrifice/gift of the Eucharist. Such a denial is as questionable as any unequivocal affirmation of grace or the sacrifice/gift purportedly present in the ritual.

In addition to the epistemological limits to experience as a truth criterion, the fact that experience, grace, and sacrifice are so contaminated with anthropomorphic projection, that their teleological goal in Christian doctrine is so driven by personal self-interest of 'eternal life,' and that the causal efficacy of a sacrament is nothing provable (or disprovable) in phenomena but a judgment that finite, eminent, transcendental consciousness can only *add to* phenomena all allow question that we have an 'objective' account of the history of the Eucharist in Gerrish's work.

Alone, the ubiquitousness of anthropomorphic projection in Christianity and religions, generally, should give one serious pause. As I have frequently pointed out, anthropomorphic projection in religion is, at the least, an exercise in extraordinary hubris, and it involves the likelihood that humanity is worshipping itself. To be sure, Karl Barth formulated a popular claim that the 'Enlightenment' was an attempt to place human 'reason' on the throne of God. See Barth, *Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert. Ihre Vorgeschichte und ihre Geschichte* (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1981): 40, 53–56, 85 100 ff. However, humanity has placed itself on the divine throne for as long as it has been concerned with infinite, 'eminent' causality. On this side of the history of religions, 20th C Process Theology's Dipolar Theism based on 'Reformed Subjectivist Principle' is an anthropomorphic 'explanation' of God. Anthropomorphism profoundly shapes the dualism of *natura naturans* and *natura naturata* of the Scholastic Intellectualists and Occasionalists, and is older than the Quran, shapes and is older than the Christian Platonism of Augustine and the Church Fathers, shapes and is older than the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος (inner Word) and λόγος προφορικός (spoken Word) of Christian theology, older than the narrative 'Covenants' of the Judeo-Christian Testaments, shapes and is older than the Veil of Isis, shapes and is older than Euhemerus, shapes and is older than Plato's heliotrope of the Simile of the Sun, shapes and is older than Classical Greek Mythology, shapes and is older than the Bhagavad Gita, shapes and is older than Zoroastrian dualism, shapes and is older than Egyptian religion, shapes and is older than Perusha of the oldest known scriptures, the Vedas.

Causes are never experienced directly in the phenomena, which are only effects of their causes. The criteria for Critical Idealism, therefore, cannot be objective truth claims based on the scriptures (God's spoken Word in contrast to God's internal Word) or what God has objectively accomplished in, and through, Christ but the required conditions of possibility and capacities for there to be a *finite*, eminent causality in the world, which are the sole conditions for there to be anything like responsibility for agency. To be sure, the conditions of possibility for responsible agency *require* that the assumption of responsibility can be ignored in an individual's choice among the principle employed to give her-/himself permission to act.

Nonetheless, there is a place in Critical Idealism for the two core rituals of Christianity, baptism and the Eucharist, without their doctrinal burdens. See Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 199–200. The meaning of the Eucharist is appreciated by Critical Idealism as a ritual celebrating cosmopolitan (not sectarian) dignity of all humanity by a symbolic meal that is a mutual support structure that encourages (but is no in-your-face-finger-wagging) the 'culture that promotes the moral will' in the midst of the 'culture of skills' (see Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 431–432).

27. On Dewey's notion of 'experiential philosophy,' see Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 54 and 140–143. Dewey's 'experimental' philosophy makes a virtue out of the vice that no empirical knowledge is absolute. Rather than focus on the enduring errors and destruction of experimental philosophy, he emphasizes the possibility of 'correction'.

28. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 46

dence-theory of truth,²⁹ which takes ‘truth’ to be merely a matter of the correct correspondence between mental judgment and empirical phenomena. Although Dewey recognizes that, in light of the limits to consciousness, truth depends upon a commitment to self-correction on the part of individuals and communities, he overlooks the significance of the longevity of a conviction, which dulls the cutting edge of self-correction and can perpetrate systematic distortion. If one is satisfied with one’s truth, then there is no need for ‘correction.’

Dewey’s strategy for correcting the catastrophes requires that they, first, be identified. Yet, when it comes to a systematic distortion of social conviction, it is precisely its non-recognition that perpetuates its influence. However, if we only wait for anomalous data to shake us out of the complacency of systematic distortion, there may no longer be sufficient time for the human species to make the necessary corrections.

In contrast to a strategy of self-correction that depends upon the anomalous, an inescapable motivation for self-correction even without the anomalous is the consideration of the *a priori* synthetic judgments of theoretical and practical (not simply pragmatic) reason ‘grounded’ in the regulative, ‘pure’ ideas of reason. Although easily ignored, this motivation is inescapable because it is concerned with universal conditions and capacities for any and all conscious experience, understanding, and responsible agency in the world. To be sure, as with moral principles, so too with transcendental consciousness. Humanity (or any other species of finite, transcendental consciousness) is ‘free’ to ignore moral principles because the condition for there to be moral principles is *autonomous freedom* or the ability to cause things to happen that, left on its own, nature could never accomplish. Transcendental consciousness is all-too readily ignored because its conditions and capacities are ubiquitous wherever it occurs. Transcendental consciousness is always silently and unobtrusively functioning in the background of truth claims devoted to the open-endedness of the correspondence theory of truth.

On the Role of Nationalism in Dewey’s Reflections

A second, trenchant example of his perpetuation of systematic distortion is Dewey’s insistence on the ‘national’ character of the ‘movements’ that acquire ‘persistence and dignity’ in society. It doesn’t occur to him that the ‘movements’ that he identifies are anchored in distortions and require de-mythologizing.

Dewey’s *German Philosophy and German Politics* is a document that claims a ‘nationalist’ character to understanding. His stereotypical, philosophical, nationalistic

29. See the chapter “How Can We Distinguish Truth from Error?” by the ‘Boston Personalist,’ Edgar S. Brightman, *An Introduction to Philosophy* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1935): 31–66.

reductionism (American: Pragmatism;³⁰ English: Utilitarianism;³¹ French: Rights of 'Man';³² and German: Duty owed to the State and commitment to Technical Reason³³) and reading of Kant through Hegelian and Fichtean lenses are profoundly superficial, disturbing, and distorting. Such stereotypes are a classic confirmation of Habermas' notion of susceptibility to, and dangers of, 'systematic distortion,' which can lead to the destructiveness of so-called national, social and political self-interests governing policy.

The destructiveness that occurs when nationalist fervor snuffs out what Kant called 'cosmopolitanism' is no better illustrated than by the rise of nationalism in Europe and particularly in Germany as it sought unification in the second half of the 19th C. Without ever criticizing Dewey's 'Two-Kingdom' reading of Kant and true to his Hegelian convictions,³⁴ Axel Honneth suggests that Kant's 'Two-Kingdom' philosophy meant that the (capricious) *a priori* (formal) dominated over (concrete) sense perception and nature, which resulted in a *merely subjective*, 'cult of inwardness.'³⁵ From this set of assumptions (*a priori* synthetic judgments), Kant's notion of 'cosmopolitanism,' which is based on universal, human dignity because each finite, transcendental consciousness is grounded in imperceptible, *a priori* of autonomous, creative freedom, is easily reduced to the simplistic embracing of the equal worth of all (today, we call it uncritical pluralism and the 'feeling of being at home' everywhere in the world). In the second half of the 19th C in Europe, the 'Reality Politics' (*Real Politik*), which resulted in Bismark's Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 and established the German Nation under Prussian dominance, eclipsed and ridiculed the notion of human equality. In the name of 'nationalism,' the Franco-Prussian War was a slamming of the brakes on Enlightenment-inspired, Kantian 'cosmopolitanism.' Here we have a classic example itself of the power of a distorted, pre-figured understanding over the understanding of subsequent generations that can be perpetuated in perpetuity. Kant's 'cosmopolitanism' needs de-mythologizing that its originality can be grasped in a new age of nationalist-focused self-interest.

Dewey singles out particularly the Germans as products of their 'tissues' and 'organs' because of the crucial role philosophy plays in shaping 'their' national character.

30. See, for example, John Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed. (1st ed. 1915) (Freeport New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1942): 45–47, 140, 142–143, 145.

31. See, for example, Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 58–59, 117.

32. See, for example, Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 90–91.

33. See, for example, Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 17, 37, 59, 69, 86–87, 96.

34. Honneth is a Hegelian who reads Kant as a philosophy of subjective understanding whose ideas are merely 'empty abstractions,' because Kant fails to grasp the significance of monistic, Absolute Spirit and its dialectical logic of top-down causality as the originating source for all 'that is'. Hegel and Strauß overlook that Kant had already rejected the adequacy of dialectic to establish the ultimate ground of all 'that is'. On Kant's rejection of dialectic for grounding the ultimate, causal ground of 'what is,' see *Critique of Pure Reason* B 697 and Chapter 6: 670.

35. See Axel Honneth, "Logik des Fanatismus:": 56.

He writes: "Above all, the Germans, as we say, have philosophy in their blood. Such phrases generally mean something not about hereditary qualities but about the social conditions under which ideas propagate and circulate."³⁶

On the Distorting Narrative 'Prototypes' in Dewey's Kant Reading

What follows is a presentation of the distorting husks in Dewey's Kant narrative. Each philosophical 'pericope' is de-mythologized to identify its original philosophical kernel in Kant's writing. To be sure, the original 'prototypes' (the separate philosophical themes without awareness of their architectonic coherence) are found in Kant, but their distortions illustrate the role of the '*genetic mythical principle*' (the *genetic narrative principle*) that shaped Kantian interpretations. As inherited pre-figured prototypes, new authors write their new, con-figured narratives. The distortion here is that the new philosophical narrative is merely asserted to be 'Kant's 'original' philosophy.

I stress, though, that I am not claiming to know Kant's, Hegel's, Strauß', Dewey's, or anyone else's 'intention.' In addition, the claim that Kant's original philosophy has been distorted does not involve a claim that Kant's philosophy establishes the 'true, empirical facts.' A claim to know authorial intent is a violation of the 'intentional fallacy.'³⁷ Rather, I have made a 'reading' of these authors' texts, and what I claim is the conclusion required by the content and architectonic of those writings. Both the *in situ* of Kant's original, textual 'prototypes' and their meaning can only be recognized in the context of the architectonic of his investigation not merely of empirical 'facts' but far more importantly of finite, eminent, transcendental consciousness, which makes possible the experience of empirical facts. Dewey's Kant reflections, which come not from Kant's texts but from the anti-Kantian and anti-Enlightenment con-figuration already at the beginning of the 19th C, have *replaced a coherent architectonic with an aggregate of disparate, contradictory elements*, which are claimed to be Kant's philosophy. Here are some examples:

1) On Kant's purported "Two-Kingdom Thesis"

The Kant-distorting husk: In his opening sentence, Dewey presents a dualism that, obviously, is far older than Kant: "Mind dislikes to find itself a pilgrim in an alien world."³⁸ He proceeds to say that *this temperament results in the generating of 'ideas.'* In short, experience of imperceptible 'ideas' by the self in a perceptible world leads to

36. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 59.

37. See the section, "On Understanding as Three-fold Mimesis" in Chapter I: 107.

38. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 51.

dualism. Perception and concepts/ideas are taken to be related as ‘husks’ to ‘kernels’ to mean two different and independent dimensions of experience: body and mind. Dewey proceeds to offer only two alternatives: Either ideas are Platonic Realism’s *archetypal* ideas independent of the material world, or ideas are Nominalism’s *ectypal* abstractions (Critical Realism),³⁹ what he calls ‘experiential philosophy.’

Consequently, Dewey flips the traditional, Platonic prioritizing of abstraction over empiricism with his Nominalist claim that abstractions are just ‘names’ created by finite consciousness. Consequently, he presupposes and overlooks all of the imperceptible conditions and capacities of finite, transcendental consciousness that make possible the experience of phenomena from which all reflection arises and returns.

In other words, Dewey clearly has no grasp of the Kantian, third option that takes ‘concepts’⁴⁰ to be ‘given,’ imperceptible relationalities (neither innate essences nor subjective, abstract constructions) intentionally graspable by consciousness in order to make sense of experience. Without appearances there can be no concepts/ideas or even understanding of concepts/ideas. Yet, concepts/ideas are not an imperceptible perception (*sinnliche Anschauung*) of ‘eternal essences’ independent of appearances. Rather, concepts/ideas are relationalities within appearances identified by a temporal experience of consciousness out of the flow of appearances.⁴¹ Temporal experience of appearances begins with confusion and, out of the effort to ‘make sense’ of the confusion, consciousness processes for itself (but does not create) the imperceptible relationalities that structure the appearances.⁴²

39. On the accounting for the origin of universals as *archetypal* (Platonism) or *ectypal* (Nominalism/Critical Realism), see: “Foreword,” 20, n. 3 and the discussion of archetypal and ectypal ideas: 78. The former is radical dualism whereas the latter is radical monism. Nominalism/Critical Realism believes that it ‘explains’ ideas/concepts when it calls them human constructions of abstraction. Overlooked is that the phenomenal realm must already be structured by ideas/concepts in order for them to be abstracted out of the phenomena. Both radical dualism and radical monism fail to grasp the *necessity* (requirement) of *a priori* synthetic judgments (assumptions) in order for finite, eminent transcendental consciousness to experience the world as it does.

40. Kant distinguishes between ‘concepts’ of the understanding and ‘ideas’ of pure reason. Dewey collapses the two and, as an empiricist, rejects their finite, transcendental status, by definition not experiential deduction.

41. Kant points out that *a priori* synthetic judgments of causality (as well as all of the categories of the understanding) are nothing that we invent, only deduce: “We can only trace the connection of certain present constitutions of natural things with their causes in earlier times according to laws of action, which we do not invent, but deduce from the forces of nature as it now presents itself to us, only as far back as analogy permits [...]” *On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy* AA VIII: 161–162.

42. Ernst Cassirer’s career long investigation of epistemology describes in rich detail the presence of Kant’s notion of reflecting judgment that grasps the relationalities in appearances, not enduring conceptual entities. See for example, *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff* (1910): “[...] concepts are valid, not insofar as they depict a given rigid being, but insofar as they include a draft of possible unities that can be [...] progressively tested. 428. See, as well, *Ibid.*: 11–12, 17–18, 194–196, 445. Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit* (1906), 5 Vols. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1994): 316–317, 391–392. “Zur Frage nach der Methode der Erkenntniskritik. Eine Entgegnung” in *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie*, 31,

Ignoring the ancient mind/body dualism even older than Plato, the dualism of *natura naturans* and *natura naturata* of the Scholastic Intellectualists and Occasionalists, Luther's 'Two Kingdom Doctrine,' and the arch-dualist Leibniz, Dewey claims that the 'root idea' of German philosophy is the dualism of spirit/world or mind/body and is the prophetic, "decisive contribution"⁴³ *made by Kant*:

My conviction is that we have [...] the root idea [of German philosophy] in the doctrine of Kant concerning the two realms, one outer, physical and necessary, the other inner, ideal and free [...] [I]n spite of their separateness and independence, the primacy always lies with the inner.⁴⁴ (emphasis added)

In light of Kant's purported dualism between nature and freedom, what Dewey takes to be the *a priori* Kantian notions of autonomous freedom and its moral principles are by definition a 'trafficking in formal absolutes' that can only be heteronomously imposed on society: "[...] [W]hat [...] is at issue between a theory which is pinned to a belief in an Absolute beyond history and behind experience and one which is frankly experimental" is as follows: "[...] [A]ny philosophy which is not consistently experimental will always traffic in absolutes no matter in how disguised a form."⁴⁵ (emphasis added)

Kant's philosophical kernel: However, Kant explicitly rejects both dualism and heteronomous duty. Kant's explicit rejection of dualism comes already in the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 311–315!⁴⁶ In short, Dewey replaces Kant's autonomous duty with heteronomous duty.⁴⁷ As I point out below, the 'two worlds' of nature and freedom constitute the distinct, ontological realms of 'science' and 'morals' for Hegel's (!) "The Moral View of the World" in the *Phenomenology*, not Kant.⁴⁸

Dewey presents Hegel's reading of Kant, again, when he writes that duty is "empty and formal."⁴⁹ Hegel calls Kant's entire philosophy 'empty abstraction' because it is trapped in finite understanding without embracing Absolute Spirit.⁵⁰ Dewey adds that, according to Kant, the noumenal, "in spite of its sublimity," had only "the bare form of an empty law of duty" in contrast to finite reason's discovery of "the causal law

Neue Folge VI (1907): 458. Cassirer, *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen. Dritter Teil: Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis* (1923–1929) (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2002): 402–403.

43. See Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 63.

44. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 69.

45. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 113.

46. On Kant's purported dualism, see the "Preface," as well: 59, n. 71. On Kant's discussion of the rational and empirical as 'two stems' of knowledge, see the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 863.

47. See the "Addendum on Duty" to "Was Kant Anti-Semitic" at <https://criticalidealism.org/was-kant-anti-semitic-with-an-addendum-on-duty-36-pages-5-february-2020/> (4 April 2024).

48. See, for example, Hegel, *Phenomenology* GW III: 450–451 [Baillie trans.: 624–625]].

49. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 86.

50. See, for example, Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* GW XX: 346).

in external nature.⁵¹ Kant spent "his time gazing into a blank void."⁵² Dewey writes: "Kant's [...] logic compels him to insist that the concept of duty is empty and formal. It tells men [sic.] that to do their duty is their supreme law of action, but is silent as to what men's duties specifically are."⁵³

2) On Kant and the Protestant Reformation

The Kant-distorting husk: Dewey claims that Kant "[...] brought to consciousness the true meaning of the Lutheran reformation [...]."⁵⁴ This includes, according to Dewey, the claim that Kant embraced 'original sin.' According to Dewey, Kant claims that humanity is by nature evil, which Dewey says is Kant's "rendering of the doctrine of

51. See Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 137. Dewey implies here that humanity actually perceives in the phenomena the causal laws that govern phenomena. For Kant that is subreption and fails to recognize that causal explanations are *a priori* synthetic judgments (*a priori* assumptions) that one must add to the phenomena because finite consciousness can only directly experience effects, not causes themselves.

52. See Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 137.

53. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 86. This is a ridiculous assertion: Kant provides three criteria when applying a categorical imperative (*Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* AA IV: 421, 429, and 431): universality, treat self and others as ends and not mere means, and acknowledge that the other, also, is a self-selector (not self-creator) of moral principles to govern her/his agency ("harmonize into a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature" [*ibid.*: AA IV: 336 – see, especially, the footnote on 336*]). Usually, only the first form of the categorical imperative is mentioned, and it is frequently distorted. Rather than categorical imperatives being self-declared 'universals' that merely serve the individual's self-interest, as for example Hegel claimed, categorical imperatives are independent of the individual and required for the responsible exercise of autonomous freedom.

In the *Groundwork*, he provides four examples of categorical duties: don't lie (*Groundwork* AA IV: 422, don't commit suicide out of melancholy (*Groundwork* AA IV: 421–422; on 'melancholy', see Kant, *Menschenkunde* AA XXV,2: 1160–1163; Olms ed.: 340–342 and *Anweisung* Olms ed.: 44–45), develop one's talents (*Groundwork* AA IV: 423 and 429), and respond to the suffering of the other (*Groundwork* AA IV: 423 and 429–430).

In the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* V: 293–294, he also speaks of three maxims of the understanding (Kant,): 1) think for oneself (unprejudiced), 2) think from the perspective of the other (broadminded), and 3) not to act in a way that contradicts one's highest capacity (absolute freedom, consistent) In his lectures on philosophical anthropology delivered in 1790/1791 at the time of his writing of the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*, he called these three 1) thoroughness, enlightenment (*Anweisung*, Olms ed.: 25–26), 2) expanded (*Anweisung*, Olms ed.: 26), and 3) consistent (*Anweisung*, Olms ed.: 26)). Already in his 'pre-critical' *Lecture on Moral Philosophy*, he had stressed that this consistency was with respect to one's highest capacity that is creative freedom (autonomy). See *Lecture on Moral Philosophy*: 180. In the *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 390–39, Kant distinguishes between 'wide' moral duties and 'narrow' obligations of 'duties of right' (civic law, technical skill).

54. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 62.

original sin.⁵⁵ Furthermore, Dewey writes that Kant rejects the Enlightenment notion that humanity is good by nature.⁵⁶

Kant's philosophical kernel: However, Kant thoroughly rejects the notion of 'original sin'.⁵⁷ It is the case that, according to Kant, both good and evil are 'radical' options for the individual. Nonetheless, no individual is determined ontologically in advance to be merely 'good' or merely 'evil, which is the meaning of 'original sin.' Rather, according to Kant, humanity is always 'in a state of innocence,⁵⁸' and autonomous, creative freedom is an indelible and ineradicable, *amoral* good. It is 'good' that a species can exercise autonomous, creative freedom because without it we cannot be the species that we experience ourselves to be. Yet, this *amoral* good is no predetermination of the individual. Whenever the individual exercises agency, it is confronted anew with the choice between a good and evil maxim to guide its behavior. It is in this sense that Kant speaks of *radical evil* and (!) *radical good*.⁵⁹ Furthermore, Kant is no Pelagian because the issue for Kant is not 'how to get to heaven.' The issue is how to be a human being *in the world*.

3) On Dewey's Anti-Intellectualism

The Kant-distorting husk: Dewey defends a form of anti-intellectualism that denies *universal*, abstract reflection. However, he is an anti-intellectual not because he denies what he calls 'pure' ideas but because he dogmatically insists that anything that can be called a 'pure' idea must mean Platonic Realism.

Dewey's 'empirical/experiential philosophy' requires him to dismisses the notion of Platonic 'pure' ideas and Hegelian 'pure' reason. Not explicitly naming Kant but surely implying the notion of Kant's 'pure' reason as well as Hegel's own version of Absolute Reason, Dewey writes:

"I do not believe [...] that ideas, or pure thought, ever exercised any pure influence upon human action. I believe that very much of what has been presented as philosophic reflection is in effect simply an idealization, for the sake of emotional satisfaction, of the brutally given state of affairs [...]"⁶⁰

55. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 92.

56. See Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 92.

57. F.C. Baur pre-figures this claim that Kant embraced the notion of original sin. For both Baur's reading and Kant's rejection of original sin, see 79, n. 11.

58. See Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 41.

59. See Kant, See "Part One – Concerning the Indwelling of the Evil Principle *Alongside the Good* or *Of the Radical Evil in Human Nature*" (emphasis added) in *Religion* AA VI: 19 ff.

60. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 54.

"[...] there are no such things as *pure* ideas or *pure* reason. Every living thought represents a gesture made toward the world, an attitude taken to some practical situation in which we are implicated.⁶¹"

"Not all ideas perish with the momentary response. They are voiced and others hear; they are written and others read. Education, formal and informal, embodies them not so much in other men's minds as in their permanent dispositions of action. They are in the blood, and afford sustenance to conduct; they are in the muscles and men strike or retire.⁶²"

The Witness of history is that to think in general and abstract terms is dangerous; it elevates ideas beyond the situations in which they were born and charges them with we know not what menace for the future. And in the past the danger has been the greater because philosophers have so largely purported to be concerned not with contemporary problems of living, but with essential Truth and Reality viewed under the form of eternity.⁶³

As I pointed out above, Dewey's opening thesis statement is: "Mind dislikes to find itself a pilgrim in an alien world."⁶⁴ He proceeds to say that *this temperament results in the generating of 'ideas,'* which are either Nominalism's/Critical Realism's *ectypal* abstractions or Platonic Realism's *archetypal* ideas.

Kant's philosophical kernel: According to Kant, 'pure' ideas are not absolute, Platonic metaphysical entities independent of the world. Dewey's Platonic, pure ideas presuppose the dualistic, 'Two-Kingdom Thesis,' which Kant explicitly rejects. Rather than elements of a parallel universe, for Kant 'pure' ideas (and there are only three⁶⁵) are the ultimate, *entirely imperceptible, a priori* synthetic judgments (assumptions) required (not capriciously invoked) for theoretical and practical reason to be able to apply *a priori* synthetic judgments (assumptions) in order to make sense of, and to act responsibly in, a *perceptible world of appearances*.⁶⁶ The 'concepts' of the understanding (required assumptions identified through the twelve categories of the understanding) and the 'pure ideas' of reason only can be experienced, and grasped, as relationalities (not eternal and innate essences) only because finite, transcendental consciousness is *in the world* of appearances.⁶⁷

61. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 54.

62. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 55.

63. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 58.

64. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 51.

65. Dewey appears to be unaware that Kant's theoretical reason is concerned with 'categories' (not ideas!) of the understanding and does not recognize that in Kant's system there are only three 'pure' ideas of reason (God, the identity of the self, and the complementarity between autonomous freedom and the cosmos. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 700 and their heuristic value in *ibid.*, B 671–672.

66. On Kant's notion of 'pure' ideas, see: 558, n. 109 and 928, n. 189..

67. On concepts as deduced relationalities/functions rather than Platonically innate or Nominalistic constructions, see the "Foreword:" 20, n. 3, Chapter 5: "Traces of an Intellectual Crisis:" 575, n. 54; and Chapter 6: "Grand Narratives of Theoretical Reason:" 709, n. 204.

Dewey clearly has no grasp of the Kantian, third option that takes ‘concepts’⁶⁸ to be *necessary*, imperceptible relationalities intentionally graspable by consciousness (not innate) in order to make sense of experience. Consequently, Dewey’s empiricism presupposes and overlooks all of the imperceptible conditions and capacities of finite, transcendental consciousness that make possible the experience of phenomena from which all reflection arises and returns.

4) On Kant’s Thing-in-itself

The Kant-distorting husk: Kant’s embracing of the ‘thing-in-itself’ is taken by Dewey to prefer mystery to the ‘distinctness of earthly things.’ Quoting first the theologian, Otto Pflieger, that the German characteristic of ‘inwardness’ “[...] scorns to drag down the sublime mystery of the unknowable to the vulgar distinctness of earthly things,”⁶⁹ led some to take this characteristic to be a “prophetic anticipation of the Kantian thing-in-itself”⁷⁰ According to Dewey, Kant champions the mystical ‘thing-in-itself’ rather than grasping earthly things as they are.

Dewey writes: “[...] [A]ny philosophy which is not consistently experimental will always traffic in absolutes no matter in how disguised a form.”⁷¹ Given that there is no direct access to things-in-themselves and without acknowledgement of the inescapability of *a priori* synthetic judgments, which demand the strictest of criteria for their adequacy,⁷² this claim reduces all presuppositions (even Dewey’s) to absolutes without distinguishing among them with respect to their legitimacy, if any.

Kant’s philosophical kernel: By insisting that we should take ‘earthly things as they are,’ Dewey succumbs to *objective subreption* that claims to grasp objective, empirical reality merely by opening one’s eyes.⁷³ This conclusion couldn’t be more antithetical to Kant, but that does not result in Kant valuing ‘mystery’ over appearances in the world.⁷⁴ There can be no awareness of the *a priori*, imperceptible conditions of

68. Kant distinguishes between ‘concepts’ of the understanding and ‘ideas’ of pure reason. Dewey collapses the two and, as an empiricist, rejects their finite, transcendental status, by definition not experiential deduction.

69. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 125.

70. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 125.

71. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 113.

72. See Kant’s ‘methodology’ of the discipline, canon, and architectonic of pure reason at the conclusion of the *Critique of Pure Reason* B 735–879.

73. On the notion of ‘subreption,’ see the “Foreword:” 64, n. 84.

74. Kant specifically defined ‘mystery’ in the General Remark of Part III of *Religion* (AA VI: 137 ff) as something unknowable and unable to be “communicated.” In contrast, *creative freedom*, itself, is not a “mystery” because it can be communicated to everyone. “[...] we will not be allowed to count among the sacred mysteries the reasons for the moral that are inscrutable to us, which can be communicated publicly but for which the cause is not given to us, but only that which is given to us for knowledge but is incapable of public communication. Thus freedom, a property that becomes known to man from the

possibility and capacities of finite, transcendental consciousness were there to be no experience of a world of appearances. Yet, the very fact that we can only experience appearances is the denial of dualism! Appearances are what require that we search for the imperceptible, *a priori* conditions of possibility of finite, transcendental consciousness that make any and all experience of appearances possible. Kant wrote: "My idealism concerns not the existence of things (the doubting of which, however, constitutes idealism in the ordinary sense) because *it never occurred to me to doubt the existence of things, only the mere perceptible representation of things [...]*"⁷⁵ (emphasis added)

5) On Hegel's influence on Dewey's Kant Interpretation

Dewey shares with Strauß two elements in common when it comes to his reading of Hegel. As did Strauß, Dewey rejects Hegel's metanarrative of Absolute Spirit as the alpha and omega of history that turns the particularities of 'empirical philosophy' into indifferent meaninglessness, and Dewey takes Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" to apply to Kant, and he reads Kant, generally, through a Hegelian lens that thoroughly distorts Kant. However, unlike Strauß, Dewey adds to his reading of Hegel the Fichtean notion of the State⁷⁶ as 'filling the empty void' of Kant's categorical imperative through its role of imposing duty on its citizens.

The Kant-distorting husk: Dewey's reading of Kant is clearly shaped by Hegel's anti-Kantianism ('subjectivism,' which for Hegel means 'without Absolute Reason') and anti-Enlightenment sentiment (that takes the Enlightenment injunction 'think for oneself' to mean pursue one's 'self-interests'). Hegel, who rejects Kant as 'limiting phi-

determinability of his will through the unconditional moral law, is not a secret because its knowledge can be communicated to everyone; but the cause of this property, which is inscrutable to us, is a secret because it is not given to us for knowledge." Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 138

Furthermore, Kant emphatically rejected mysticism, as well. Already in his *Vorlesung über die philosophische Religionslehre* (1774/1775), ed. by Werner Stark and Manfred Kühn (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004): 97, Kant spoke of mysticism as "self- annihilation"; see as well, Kant's discussion of Plato's mysticism in *Metaphysik Mrongovius* (XXIX: 950). In *Conflict of the Faculties* (AA VII: 54–58), he dismissively compared pietism and mysticism. In *The End of All Things* (AA VIII: 335–336), he called mysticism the "end of all understanding"; in *On a Recently Prominent Tone of Superiority in Philosophy* (AA VIII: 390), he called the mystical "the end of philosophy"; and in "What Real Progress Has Metaphysics Made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?" (AA XX: 310), he had warned of three dangers: turning theology into Theosophy; moral teleology into mysticism; and psychology into "pneumatics". See as well, Bernhard Jachmann's *Prüfung der Kantischen Religionsphilosophie in Hinsicht auf die ihr beygelegte Aehnlichkeit mit dem reinen Mystizism. Mit einer Einleitung von Immanuel Kant* (1800) (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1999).

75. Kant, *Prolegomena* AA IV: 293.

76. See Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 136.

losophy merely to understanding,' declares Kant's notion of reason to be 'barbarous' and "weak"⁷⁷ because Kant purportedly rejects Absolute Spirit.

According to Hegel, Absolute Spirit is ultimate cause required by dialectical logic and the Principle of Sufficient Reason (which claims that 'something cannot come from nothing'). Absolute Spirit is an ultimate, eminent causality that can create things that the natural order on its own cannot create by itself.⁷⁸ According to Hegel, Absolute Spirit is not only the ultimate cause of reality, it is a substitution for Divine grace as the silent, unrecognized 'cunning of reason'⁷⁹ guiding history to achieve the ultimate end of history as a 'hidden hand' despite all human and worldly failure, suffering, oppression, persecution, and exploitation.

Kant's philosophical kernel: However, Kant doesn't reject the Noumenon,⁸⁰ he merely warns against ignoring the 'limits to reason' to emulate the dove that 'dreams of flying in a vacuum.'⁸¹ Kant's reticence to speak of the Noumenon is not because he took it to be an 'indeterminate concept' but because such predicates, unless relevant to what can be known as *necessary* for the functioning of finite, transcendental consciousness, are dangerous flights of fantasy. Kant's reticence, then, is to avoid illusions.⁸²

The Kant-distorting husk: As with Strauß, Dewey does not grasp the significance of *a priori* synthetic judgment as *adding elements to* phenomena that cannot be perceived directly in the phenomena. For Hegel, Strauß, and Dewey, synthesis is only *a posteriori* as the conclusion of dialectic⁸³ so that, as Dewey stresses, all *a priori* synthetic judgment *must be* an authoritarian, top-down imposition on experience in contrast to Dewey's bottom-up 'empirical philosophy.'

Kant's philosophical kernel: As with Strauß, Dewey fails to grasp the significance of Kant's insight that logic is *a canon without an organon*.⁸⁴ Logic is a descriptive system, not a causal system. However, Kant's 'metaphysics'⁸⁵ of transcendental consciousness' finite, eminent causality that are *required*, *a priori* synthetic judgments because only

77. See Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen" GW II: 287–288.

78. When applied to Absolute Spirit, eminent causality is an anthropomorphic projection because the only place where we ever experience eminent causality is in the finite form of autonomous, creative freedom exercised by finite, finite, transcendental consciousness. See: 84, n. 23.

79. See Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* (1837) "B" GW XII: 49 [Sibree trans.: 34]) and *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaft* (1830) GW X: 30–32.

80. Hegel knows that Kant doesn't reject the Noumenon. See "Glauben und Wissen" GW II: 323, but Hegel claims that Kant, inconsistently employs the concept only to deny its validity because it as "an indeterminate idea of the supersensible in us."

81. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 8–9 and *Groundwork* AA IV: 462–463.

82. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 461–462.

83. On Hegel/Strauß and a *a posteriori* judgment, see: 633, n. 277. On Dewey and a *a posteriori* judgment, see: 948.

84. On Kant's distinction between a 'canon without' and a 'canon with' an organon, see: 558, n. 36.

85. On Kant's notion of 'metaphysics,' see in Vol. II: "Introduction:" "Kant's Defense of Metaphysics:" 542 ff.

the effects of consciousness are perceivable,⁸⁶ is a *canon with an organon*. Especially, all accounts of *causal explanations* are *a priori* synthetic judgments that must be *added* to phenomena because we do not perceive causes directly in phenomena, only indirectly.

Nonetheless, Dewey is no Hegelian despite his apparent drawing of pre-figured Hegelian criticisms of Kant. The strongest indicator of Dewey's rejection of Hegel is Hegel's emphasis on the spiritual escape from nature. Whereas Dewey plots Kant's moral theory on Hegel's "The Moral View of the World, Dewey thoroughly rejects Hegel's distinction

[...] between reason or *Vernunft* and *Verstand* or understanding. Reflection, inquiry, observation and experimentation to test ideas and theories, all that we of the lesser breeds call intelligence, belongs in the Hegelian scheme to mere 'understanding,' which reason scorns and leaves behind in its sublime flight.⁸⁷

"Understanding is the mode of mind which seeks precision and insists upon distinctions which are fixed' Accordingly it is at home in science (*mere* science as the Hegelian would say) [Dewey's parenthetical insert] and in all matters of calculation.⁸⁸

Ignoring Spinoza's substance 'Monism,' Dewey's view of Hegel is applicable, just as well, to Spinoza although Dewey ignores Spinoza in his narrative of German philosophy. Dewey writes of Hegel, 'the' Monist, as one who understands "[h]istory [... as] the manifestation of [...] [Absolute Spirit's] creative reason.⁸⁹ "Beneath and above" [finite] understanding is *reason* "[...] which *penetrates below distinctions to identities and rises above differences to unity*⁹⁰" (Absolute Spirit). (emphasis added) Although Hegel's Absolute Freedom and nature's freedom⁹¹ is analogous to Spinoza's adaptation of Scholasticism's *natura naturans* (substance's creativity) and *natura naturata* (nature's creativity) to substance,⁹² both Hegel and Spinoza are distinguishing between two kinds of causality: *eminent causality* ((a cause that is greater than its effects) and *formal causality* (a cause with as much 'reality' as its effects) .⁹³ which can only be distinguished as an *a priori* synthetic judgment because causes are only experienced

86. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*: B 106 ff.

87. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 42

88. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 42.

89. See Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 42.

90. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 42.

91. See in Chapter 6: "Grand Narratives of Theoretical Reason", section "d) Hegel and Kant on Nature and Freedom:" 697 ff.

92. See the Spinoza entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on-line at: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza/> (March 4, 2024), and the following two pages on Spinoza on-line: <https://www.elkewehrs.de/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Natura-Artikel.pdf> (March 4, 2024) and https://www.schwabeonline.ch/schwabe-xaveropp/elibrary/start.xav?start=%2F%2F%5B%40attr_id%3D%27verw.natur.naturansnaturata%27%5D (March, 2024).

93. On the distinction between *eminent* and *formal causality*, see 84, n. 23.

through their effects. Hegel grounds Absolute Freedom and nature's freedom in a dialectical logic when logic can only describe but not account for causality⁹⁴ – given that causality is always an *a priori* synthetic judgment (assumption) *added to* phenomena, which phenomena are only the effects of causality. If there is a distinction between Hegel and Spinoza, it is that Hegel is more a Scholastic Intellectualist and Spinoza is more a Scholastic Occasionalist although both have a *horizontal notion of reality* (not a top-down, causal hierarchy as with Plato). For Hegel, Absolute Spirit's 'creative reason' is the ultimate author, *natura naturans*, of history. Dewey doesn't use the term 'cunning of reason,' but that is the meaning here. Hegel's reason, not Dewey's experimental reason, functions in the background to achieve Absolute Spirit's ultimate objective of self-awareness as the Second Negation in finite consciousness.

6) On Dewey's Hegelian Kant Themes

a) Hegel's "The Moral View of the World"

The Kant-distorting husk: "The Moral View of the World" and Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" from the *Phenomenology*⁹⁵ (1807) serve as the pre-figured, moral theory that informs Dewey's con-figuration of Kant's moral theory. However, conveniently overlooked is that Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" applies to the Apostle Paul, Augustine, and Luther but not to Kant. In his earlier "Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts, seine Stelle in der praktischen Philosophie, und sein Verhältnis zu den positiven Rechtswissenschaften"⁹⁶ (1803), Hegel portrays Kant as a 'subjectivist' who creates her/his moral principles 'bottom up' as social constructions. However, four years later Hegel makes no direct mention of Kant and the notion of Moral Duty in "The Moral View of the World" insists that moral duties are absolutely *a priori* and, hence, top down.' It is Hegel's "The Moral View of the World," not Kant, who 'looks into an empty void' when it comes to moral duty. Hegel magnifies the void by pointing out that *the 'real' world (wirkliche Welt) of ethics prohibits the fulfilment of absolute, Moral Duty*. We can't be ethical, so we must depend on the cunning of reason to achieve the 'end of history.'⁹⁷

These accounts of Kant as a 'subjectivist' and as an authoritarian 'top-down' moralist⁹⁸ are contradictory: 1) A moral principle self-scribed by an individual can on-

94. See Vol. II: "Introduction:" "Kant's Defense of Metaphysics:" 542 ff.

95. See Hegel, *Phenomenology*: GW III: 442–452 (Baillie trans.: 615–627).

96. See Hegel, "Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts:" GW II: 516–517.

97. See "The Moral View of the World": 547 ff.

98. See Dewey's account of the categorical imperative as 'the drill sergeant' in Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 90.

ly be a relative individual or social construction,⁹⁹ and 2) a heteronomous imposition of moral principles 'from above' (metaphysical or theocratic) is 'empty and formal' because, according to Hegel, it is incapable of being adhered to in a finite world.¹⁰⁰ In fact, though, Kant is neither a bottom-up 'constructionist' nor a defender of top-down (theocratic) 'heteronomist.'

Kant's philosophical kernel: In stark contrast to these 'objective' attempts to ground morality either in social constructions or theocratic, authoritarian, heteronomous imposition, Kant's moral principles are 'metaphysically' necessary/required because they are 'given' with the *a priori* conditions of autonomous freedom that makes possible moral responsibility. Just as the causal order of nature is a 'given,' lawful order (physical, statistical, and algorithmic), so too, the causality of autonomous, creative freedom is a 'given,' lawful order (moral). The difference is that nature's lawful order functions 'blindly' whereas autonomous freedom's lawful order must be self-imposed. Moral principles are neither relative social constructions nor heteronomous principles 'from above' burdened with theocratic threat. They are the required canon of the causal agency of finite, transcendental consciousness just as the lawfulness of nature as a causal system required the canon of physical lawfulness. Finite, transcendental consciousness is the only species we've experienced on this planet that is capable of understanding these imperceptible canons of nature and morality anything close to the degree that finite, transcendental consciousness does.

Both Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" and Dewey's mapping of Kant's moral theory onto it are a blatant contradiction of what Kant means by the *autonomous* moral law that the individual embraces to give her-/himself permission to act. *Kant's criteria for categorical imperatives is not that they are (theocratic), heteronomous laws imposed from 'above reason' but that the individual evaluates her/his moral principle from the perspective of its universality, and not merely self-interest.*

b) Hegel's Reading of Kant as Freedom Conquering Nature & 'Personality'

The Kant-distorting husk: Furthermore, as I pointed out above, Dewey's conclusion that Kant's 'germinal idea' is a dualism that drives a wedge between Absolute Freedom and nature is found in Hegel, not Kant!¹⁰¹ Dewey writes that, according to Kant, morality seeks the conquest of nature.¹⁰²

99. See Hegel, "Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten" H" II: 460.

100. See Hegel, "The Moral View of the World" in the *Phenomenology* GW III: 442–452 [Baillie trans.: 615–627].

101. See Hegel, "Glauben und Wissen" GW II: 314, 322 and *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* GW XIII: 30–31; 34–35).

102. See Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 92. On the difference between Hegel and Kant on freedom and nature see: 694.

Kant's philosophical kernel: The case is, rather, that, according to Kant, practical reason (morality) is concerned not with the conquest of nature but with what 'ought to be,' not simply control over what 'is.' Only a species that can intentionally (and not merely instinctually) initiate sequences of events that nature, when left on its own, could never achieve is capable of taking responsibility for its agency. Of course, such *autonomous* freedom (not to be confused with the mere rejection of external authority) must have the liberty of choosing the moral principle that it invokes to 'give itself permission to act,' but every action is accompanied by such a selection (Kant calls it 'self-selection' – but not self-creation!¹⁰³). Only the individual can know what the moral principle was.

The Kant-distorting husk: Dewey writes about Kant's notion of 'Personality' that

[...] admirers of Kant [claim] that he first brought to recognition the true and infinite nature of the principle of Personality. On one side, the individual is *homo phenomenon*—a part of the scheme of nature, governed by its laws as much as any stone or plant. But [*sic.*] in virtue of his citizenship in the kingdom of supersensible Laws and Ends, he [*sic.*] is *elevated to true universality*. He is no longer a mere occurrence. *He is a Person*—one in whom the purpose of Humanity is incarnate.¹⁰⁴ (emphasis added)

Dewey writes further of Kant's notion of 'personality:'

Subjectivism means recognition of the principle of free personality: the self as creative, occupied not with an external world which limits it from without [the Hegelian notion of nature¹⁰⁵], but, through its own self-consciousness, finding a world within itself, and having found the universal within itself, setting to work to recreate itself in what had been the external world, and by its own creative expansion in industry, art and politics to transform what had been mere limiting material into a work of its own [...] Personality means that man as a rational being does not receive the end which forms the law of his action from without, whether from Nature, the State or from God, but from his own self. Morality is autonomous; man, humanity, is an end in itself. *Obedience to the self-imposed law will transform the sensible world [...] in a form appropriate to universal reason.*¹⁰⁶ (emphasis added)

Kant's philosophical kernel: This, also, is a Hegelian formulation of a Kantian theme. Kant's aim is not the transformation of nature according to capricious, subjective whims of 'free' humanity. His aim is to describe the conditions under which it is possible for humanity (or any other finite, transcendental consciousness) to intentionally create things and take responsibility for them that nature, left to its own devices, never could. Only because it experiences autonomous, creative freedom can (not

103. On the meaning of self-selection (*selbstgesetzgebend*), see Chapter 7: 765.

104. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 84.

105. See in Chapter 6: "Grand Narratives of Theoretical Reason" section "d) Hegel and Kant on Nature and Freedom:" 697 ff.

106. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 85.

merely may) humanity assume responsibility for its agency. No other species is held to account for its actions to the degree that humanity is capable of holding itself accountable.

Yes, Kant does place ‘personality’ at the pinnacle of a tripart structure of the self.¹⁰⁷ The fundamental element of the self is ‘animality,’ which is driven by merely physical appetites and instincts. Above ‘animality’ is what Kant calls ‘humanity,’ which is the pursuit of status and prestige in the eyes of others. Then comes ‘personality,’ which is to act on the basis of a moral principle without consideration of one’s or one’s social group’s merely self-interest.

Humanity’s dignity (absolute, not relative worth) comes precisely from its capacity to exercise autonomous freedom.¹⁰⁸ Respect for the individual is owed only to the degree that it is clear that the individual is acting on the basis of moral principles¹⁰⁹ – although certainty in that regard is something only that the individual can know. Respect, then, is a matter of ‘humanity’ (social status and prestige) whereas dignity is a matter of ‘personality (imperceptible, responsible exercising of autonomous freedom regardless of self-interest).¹¹⁰

c) On Humanity’s Moral Progress

The Kant-distorting husk: Dewey writes: “[...] [I]n Kant we find the idea of a single continuous development of humanity, as a progress from a reign of natural instinct to a final freedom won through adherence to the law of reason.¹¹¹” Dewey writes that, according to Kant, humanity’s actions are to be gradually permeated by rationality to achieve “[...] an equation between inner freedom of mind and outer freedom of action¹¹²”

Kant’s philosophical kernel: This is also Hegel, not Kant! Freedom is not a matter of being ‘won’ or ‘lost,’ according to Kant. According to Kant, freedom is an indelible and inalienable condition that can be neither ‘won’ nor ‘lost.’¹¹³ The ‘winning’ of

107. See Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 26 ff.

108. See Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 434–43, 449–450.

109. See page 662, n. 279: See the section “Kant’s Respect for the Law:” 797 On the centrality of respect [*Achtung*] for the law not merely as motivation for morality but as morality itself, see Birgit Recki, *Ästhetik der Sitten*: 272–278.

110. See Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals* AA VI: 467–468; see *Critique of Practical Reason* AA V: 81 and 81*.

111. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 120–121.

112. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 101.

113. Otfried Höffe calls it the key to the ‘one right by birth.’ See Otfried Höffe, “14. Das eine angeborene Recht” in *Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*: 236–251.

freedom¹¹⁴ is the issue for Hegel, and Absolute Freedom, and, according to Hegel, where it means to escape from nature's limitations on Absolute Spirit.

In the opening of "The Conflict with the Juridical Faculty" in the *Conflict of the Faculties*, Kant speaks of predicting the future as consisting of three options: decline (moral terrorism), progress (Eudaimonism or Chiliasm), or eternal stagnation (Abderitism¹¹⁵).¹¹⁶ *Kant himself draws a fourth conclusion. The only thing that is certain is change.* Given that the condition of autonomous freedom means that one is *always* confronted with a choice between good and evil principles when giving oneself permission to exercise creative freedom, all that we can be sure of is that there will be improvement *and* (!) setbacks. We can hope for 'progress' only with respect to the species¹¹⁷ although there are no guarantees. In light of the ambiguities of 'progress,' Kant stresses preference for evolution, not revolution.¹¹⁸

According to Kant, one does not acquire autonomous freedom or a moral attitude. Rather, there is no point in time that humanity's actions are not 'moral' because of the inescapable self-imposition of a maxim to govern one's agency. One can ignore morality by training, but one is never immoral. One's granting oneself permission to act always involves the application of a good or evil maxim to govern one's actions. Moral improvement is cultivating the habit of self-selecting good principles, but it is never a matter of either overcoming an ontological condition of 'evil' or of achieving 'perfection.' A finite consciousness cannot be perfect, but it can assume responsibility for its agency.

d) Hegel's Invoking Fichte, not Kant, on the State

The Kant-distorting husk: Drawing on the pre-figurations of Fichte and Hegel's agreement in this respect with Fichte,¹¹⁹ Dewey takes the 'empty abstract void' of Kant's categorical imperative to be filled-in by the State that demands the 'duty' of citizenship.

This mis-reading of Kant turns 'idealism' into a sociological imposition of state ideals on society. Embracing the reading of Kant as correct, Dewey quotes Fichte:

114. Dewey refers to 'winning freedom' at *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 33, as well.

115. Abderitismus is the German spelling of abderitism. Apparently, it is a Kantian neologism? However, there was a popular book, *Die Abderiten*, from Christoph Martin Wieland, published serially 1774–1780 in which the philosophy of the Greek Abderites is portrayed as stupid and foolish. Kant's *Conflict of the Faculties* was published in 1798.

116. See Kant, *Streit der Fakultäten* AA VII: 81.

117. See Kant, *Streit der Fakultäten* AA VII: 84.

118. See Kant, *Streit der Fakultäten* AA VII: 87.

119. On the strategies employed, generally by 'Romanticists' and 'Idealistic Philosophers' to 'fill the void' "between sense and reason," see Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 137–138. On Hegel's agreement with Fichte according to Dewey, see 128, 131–132, 136.

"The great promise of a kingdom of right reason and truth on earth must not become a vain and empty phantom [...],¹²⁰" which would be the case if duty was defined according to Kant's merely 'formal,' moral, 'empty abstractions.'

Dewey claims that Kant confronts us with only an empty, bland void when it comes to duty:

Kant bequeathed to the world an intellect devoted to the congenial task of discovering causal law in external nature [theoretical reason, but Dewey doesn't label it], and an inner intuition [apparently, not *intellektuelle Anschauung* but an inner sixth sense] which, in spite of its sublimity [Dewey nowhere addresses Kant's notion of the sublime much less aesthetic judgment, generally], had *nothing to look at except the bare form of an empty law of duty. Kant was kept busy in proving the existence¹²¹ of this supernal but empty region [...]* [H]e was not troubled by being obliged to engage in the [...] task of spending his time gazing into a blank void.¹²² (emphasis added)

Dewey emphasizes that Fichte is the philosopher who connects history and nationalism with the State,¹²³ but, once again, teachings by Hegel/Fichte are attributed to Kant.

Kant's philosophical kernel: By no means, though, does Kant claim (as does Fichte) that "[...] history is the realization of [...] absolute purpose [...]. History is the continuous life of a divine Ego by which it realizes in fact what it is in idea or destiny. Its phases are successive stages in the founding of the Kingdom of God on earth. It and it only is the revelation of the Absolute. Along with this growing deification of history is the increased significance attached to nationalism in general and the German nation in particular¹²⁴"

e) 'Ethics' as Adjudicating among merely Self-interests

The Kant-distorting husk: The notion that Kant's 'ethics' consists in adjudicating among self-interests can be itself seen as an echo of Dewey's dependence upon the pre-figured Hegelian reading of Kant cursing through Dewey's own philosophical 'tissues' and 'organs.' Not only does Dewey mis-represent categorical imperatives, he makes no distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives. He makes no distinction between what 'must' be done to achieve a technical end (a particular,

120. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 112.

121. Rather than 'proving the existence' of infinite, eminent causality as the ultimate ground of finite, eminent causality, Kant calls into question the legitimacy of the traditional proofs for God: cosmological, teleological, and ontological. Furthermore, Kant's deductions of *a priori* synthetic truths are not 'proofs' but identification of inescapable elements that a *finite* (!) consciousness must possess in order to experience a world of appearances (*sinnliche Anschauung*)

122. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 137.

123. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 121.

124. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 121.

'hypothetical' imperative) and what 'ought' to be done (a universal, 'categorical' imperative). Dewey collapses what Kant calls 'hypothetical' and 'categorical' imperatives. He writes that Kant's categorical imperative "[...] proceeds in man from a source *above reason*.¹²⁵" He takes Kant's idea of freedom to be "[...] *an absolute stranger to the natural and sensible world*¹²⁶[...] [In contrast,] science works by the law of causal necessity with respect to what is, ignorant of any law of freedom referring to what should be.¹²⁷"

Dewey writes: "Kant bequeathed to the world an intellect devoted to the congenial task of discovering causal law in external nature, and an inner intuition¹²⁸ which [*sic.*], in spite of its sublimity, had nothing to look at except the bare form of an empty law of duty. Kant [...] was not troubled by being obliged to engage in the unremunerative task of spending his time gazing into a bland void.¹²⁹" Dewey adds: "[...] [T]he *categorical imperative calls up the drill sergeant. Trafficking ethics, in which each gives up something which he wants to get something which he wants more, is not the noblest kind of morals*, but at least it is socially responsible as far as it goes.¹³⁰" (emphasis added)

The narrative that Kant's notion of 'freedom,' which is supposed to ground morality, is anchored in capricious 'empty abstractions' to which attribution of their status as categorical imperatives is a claim made by Hegel.¹³¹ Hegel's claim resulted in the Hegelian assertion that the Kantian promotion of freedom (as well as of Kantian Enlightenment as self-thinking) only means to pursue self interest. It is found in Carl

125. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 67. Note that Dewey claims that Kant's notion of the *categorical* (for Dewey, the 'dogmatic authoritarian *a priori*') comes from a source "*above reason*." There is nowhere to my knowledge where Kant makes a claim for a source of the categorical above reason. The three 'pure' ideas of reason *above understanding* are God, the enduring identity of the individual, and the complementarity of freedom and cosmology. Were Kant to have claimed a source for the categorical 'above reason,' he would have been making a claim that the source is above 'God'.

126. This claim for freedom's foreignness to nature is 'half' Hegelian, perhaps, but it completely ignores the significance of Kant's claim for the complementarity of freedom and cosmology as a 'pure' idea of reason that is among the ultimate conditions of possibility necessary for there to be anything like understanding in the world.

127. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 67–68. Kant's practical reason that is concerned with 'what ought to be' is also concerned with a 'law of causality'. However, it is not a law of causal necessity as the case with nature. It is a law compatible with the finite causality that is *autonomous* freedom. Every causal system is 'lawful,' but not every causal system is reducible to nature's causality. The 'necessity' that applies to the causality that is *autonomous* is not a *determining* necessity as in nature. Rather, it's a necessary requirement (condition, not prior determination from 'above' finite, *autonomous* freedom) for *autonomous* freedom to be free.

128. This is a misleading statement at the least to the extent that Dewey makes no distinction here between 'intellectual intuition' (*intellektuelle Anschauung*) and 'sensible intuition' (*sinnliche Anschauung*). He appears to be using the term 'intuition' as a form of sixth sense that one has innately of 'ultimate claims'.

129. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*: 137.

130. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*: 90–91.

131. On Hegel's claim that Kant's morality is capriciously constructivist, see 727; see as well, 657.

Daub's 1816 reading of Kant.¹³² Although unknown today, Daub was a key Hegelian, and he played a central role in Hegel's joining Daub in Heidelberg for two years prior to Hegel's call to Berlin.

Kant's philosophical kernel: Dewey's language here with respect to the 'authoritarian character' of Kant's categorical imperative's source *above reason* treats moral 'duty' as (theocratically) *heteronomous* in line with Hegel's "The Moral View of the World" in the *Phenomenology*. Dewey's and Hegel's language has nothing to do with what Kant means by *autonomous*, categorical imperatives.

7) On Ignoring of Kant's 'Culture that Promotes the Moral Will'

The Kant-distorting husk: With his failure to distinguish between 'categorical' and 'hypothetical' imperatives, Dewey only takes culture to be 'the culture of skills' and ignores Kant's notion of the 'culture that promotes the will.'¹³³ As a consequence of his distorted dualistic reading of Kant, Dewey has an inaccurate view of the notion of 'culture' in Kant. According to Dewey, "*Kultur* is sharply antithetical to civilization [...] Civilization is a natural and largely unconscious or involuntary growth [...] Culture [...] is deliberate and conscious [...] [C]ivilization meant simply social decencies and elegancies and outward proprieties, while morality, that is, the rule of the end of Reason, is necessary to culture. And [*sic.*] the real significance of the term 'culture' becomes more obvious when [Kant] adds that it involves the slow toil of education of the Inner Life and [...] depends upon long effort by the community to which he [*sic.*] belongs. It is not primarily an individual trait or possession, but a conquest of the community won through devolution to 'duty.'¹³⁴"

Kant's philosophical kernel: This portrayal of the meaning of 'culture' has nothing to do with what Kant says of the distinction between the 'culture of skills' (that is, learning of technical, hypothetical imperatives to achieve particular ends) and the 'culture that promotes the moral will' (that is, encouraging the individual to self-select moral principles in giving her-/himself permission to act).

8) On 'Ideas' and 'Categorical Imperatives' as Absolutes, Not arising out of Experience

The Kant-distorting husk: According to Dewey and as the case with 'ideas' and 'categorical imperatives,' *a priori* judgments that don't arise out of experience don't exist.

132. See Chapter 8: " 'Strauß' Kant Reading over His Career, section "Autonomous Freedom is Egocentric Desire and Self-Interest:" 855 ff.

133. See Kant, *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 431–432.

134. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 94.

Yet, Dewey claims that the only legitimate notion of an *a priori* arise out of experiential history!¹³⁵ Dewey is saying, then, that there is no such thing as a legitimate *a priori* judgment because all judgments that are legitimate are *a posteriori*.

Kant's philosophical kernel: This is clearly not Kant's notion of an *a priori* synthetic judgment (assumption). An *a posteriori* synthetic judgment is an 'analytical,' elucidating (*erläuternd*) judgment with respect to a set of 'given' phenomena whereas an *a priori* 'synthetic' judgment is supplementing (*erweiternd*) of the 'given' phenomena with imperceptible, mental elements that cannot be directly given with the phenomena.¹³⁶ *A priori* synthetic judgments are concerned with the set of *imperceptible* conditions and capacities that make it possible for (historical) agency in a world of perception in the first place, as well as much more, what make it possible for (historical) agency to improve on its efforts at moral excellence.

9) On Consequentialism as the 'Work of Reason'

The Kant-distorting husk: Dewey calls consequentialism the 'work of reason' and succumbs to the 'is'/'ought' fallacy because he doesn't acknowledge that one cannot get from 'what is' to 'what ought to be' any more than his insistence that one can get from particulars to universals. He writes: "A gospel of duty separated from empirical purposes and results tends to gag intelligence. It substitutes for the work of reason displayed in a wide and distributed survey of consequences in order to determine where duty lies an inner consciousness, empty of content, which closes with the form of rationality the demands of existing social authorities."¹³⁷

Yet his own socially relative pragmatism does the same. He assumes in a remarkably naïve way that 'what is, is what ought to be' without ever raising the issue of criteria for what 'ought to be.' Yet, other than in an immediate short term, one can never get from 'what is' to 'what ought to be' merely by measuring pragmatic consequences because one has no control over the consequences.¹³⁸ Here are a few examples of Dewey's claims:

"[...] [I]ntelligence must, with us, devote itself [...] to *construction of the ends* to be acted upon."¹³⁹ (emphasis added)

"We must have [...] a method checked up at each turn by *results achieved*."¹⁴⁰

135. See Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 140–143.

136. On the difference between an *a priori* synthetic judgment as supplementary (*erweiternd*) and elucidating analytic judgment (*erläuternd*) See in the "Preface:" 60, n. 77.

137. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 88.

138. See "§ 11 Practical Consequences as Criterion" in Brightman, *An Introduction to Philosophy*: 50–58.

139. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 142.

140. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 143.

Dewey raises the issue of criteria as follows: "[...] America means opportunity: we must now begin to ask: Opportunity for what, and how shall the opportunity be achieved?¹⁴¹"

He answers: "[...] [P]hilosophy [...] should *articulate and consolidate the ideas to which our social practice commits us* [to] clarify and guide our future endeavors.¹⁴²" (emphasis added)

Yet, his criteria amount to declaring particularities to be universal (precisely the absolutism that he claims to reject): "We must make the accident of our internal composition into an idea, an idea upon which we may conduct our foreign as well as our domestic policy.¹⁴³"

Kant's philosophical kernel: However, to ground moral criteria in social practice is to declare morality to be a matter of relative 'social construction.' To make the criteria of what is 'right' merely pragmatic success turns morality into a matter of accident and power. Most importantly, to turn the notion of the *a priori* into merely a matter of cultural, historical contingency¹⁴⁴ is to restrict the *a priori* to relative, social construction AND to declare all those *a priori* presuppositions that are not a matter of historical contingency to be dogma. For example, space and time, which one can never experience directly in perception but which one must presuppose as the imperceptible condition required for any and all perceptual experience are silently presupposed as the focus is on action and accomplishment.

10) Dewey suggest that "[a]n international judicial tribunal will break in the end upon the principle of national sovereignty.¹⁴⁵"

Kant also acknowledges that a World government will never be successful.¹⁴⁶ Nonetheless, he viewed the conditions and capacities of finite, transcendental consciousness to always strive for 'cosmopolitanism' in the sense of humanity everywhere possessing the same dignity given that its conditions of possibility and capacities of finite, transcendental consciousness are universal.

141. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 143. Missing here, obviously, is the question of 'what ought' to be achieved?

142. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 143.

143. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 144.

144. See Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 143.

145. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 144.

146. See Kant, *Streit der Fakultäten* AA VII: 85, 88. See, as well, Kant, "The Second Defining Article for Perpetual Peace" in *Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project* AA VIII: 354–357.

11) On Kant's Influence as Professional, Not Human

Dewey, however, makes a curious observation about Kant's influence: "[...] its importance has been professional rather than human."¹⁴⁷

Who is to blame for the 'professionalization' of Kant rather than there being a 'human' reception of his project? The final paragraph of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (B 864) is a call to aid in broadening the awareness of the universal conditions and capacities of finite, transcendental consciousness without which there can be no experience, understanding, or responsible agency in the world: "As regards those who adopt a scientific method, they have the choice of proceeding either dogmatically or skeptically, but in any case they are under obligation to proceed systematically. [He calls Wolff dogmatic and Hume skeptical.] The [third] critical path alone is still open. If the reader has had the courtesy and patience to accompany me along this path, he [*sic.*] may now judge for [her-/]himself whether, if [s/]he cares to lend [her-/]his aid in making this path into a high-road, it may not be possible to achieve before the end of the present century what many centuries have not been able to accomplish; namely, to secure for human reason complete satisfaction in regard to that with which it has all along so eagerly occupied itself, though hitherto in vain."

Dewey himself chose not to 'lend his aid' and to present his remarks *before an audience of academic 'professionals'* at the University of North Carolina, not before a 'lay' audience.

He (sarcastically) acknowledge that "[n]o position unlike [... Kant's] should be taken up till Kant has been reverently disposed of, and the new position evaluated in his terms."¹⁴⁸ He then proceeds to reduce Kant down to a "single, germinal idea," which he takes to be the *dualism of* "[...] *the world of sense*, the world of phenomena in space and time in which science is at home [...] and] *the supersensible*, [...] *noumenal world*, the world of moral duty and moral freedom."¹⁴⁹

Yet, whereas Kant rejects this dualism and emphasizes the inseparable, if irreducible, complementarity of the natural order and humanity's creative freedom to bring about things that nature on its own cannot bring about, Dewey insists upon a gap between nature and freedom (just as did Hegel). Having ignored the 'pure' idea of the Noumenal and, consequently, in order to avoid the 'irrational, self-contradictory' consequence that freedom, independent of nature, can 'come from nothing' (in violation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason), Dewey, as Hegel does in "The Moral View of the World" of the *Phenomenology*, maintains that Kant anchors freedom in 'the unqualified [heteronomous] demand of duty:'

147. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 138 (see 139, as well).

148. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 63.

149. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 63.

The moral law, the law of obligation, thus proceeds from a source in man above reason [this is Hegelian language]. It is token of his membership as a moral being in a kingdom of absolute ends above nature. But [*sic.*] it is also directed to *something in man which is equally above nature* [again, this is Hegelian 'Absolute Freedom,' not Kant's autonomous freedom inseparable from nature]: [... the moral kingdom of absolute ends above nature] appeals to and demands freedom. *Reason is incapable of anything so irrational, so self-contradictory, as imposing a law of action to which no faculty of action corresponds.*¹⁵⁰ The freedom of the moral will is the answer to the unqualified demand of duty [above nature].¹⁵¹ (emphasis added)

In short, Dewey is saying 'Kant' and thinking 'Hegel.' What Dewey leaves unsaid is Hegel's acknowledgement that such a 'kingdom of absolute ends above nature' is incapable of fulfilment, which is the segue for Hegel to invoke the 'cunning of reason' as a substitute for 'divine grace.'

Kant formulates the relationship between 'moral principles' and autonomous freedom as complementary, not a top-down relationship with moral duty demanding free will act in a certain fashion. The capacity to grasp moral principles is within. It is analogous to the capacity to grasp the lawfulness of nature within. However, this 'within' is no subjective constructivism. It is a matter of grasping what is 'given' by the Noumenon as the condition of possibility for there to be finite, eminent, transcendental consciousness in a world. Rather, by means of the Copernican Turn, Kant shifts the focus of morality from *absolute knowledge* of moral principles to emphasis the *experientially necessary* (but not causally necessary) *a priori* conditions of possibility not given directly in perception that are required in order for there to be autonomous, creative freedom in a world.

Dewey's, like Hegel's, reading of Kant on morality is contradictory. *Either moral principles being empty, subjective abstractions or they are the rational ground of an absolute freedom 'above nature.'*

According to Kant, *freedom's agency in the world makes moral principles a necessary assumption (a priori synthetic judgment).* Whereas as a causality, autonomous

150. This is precisely the crucial point that confirms that Dewey has not grasped the *Critique of Pure Reason's* central question or its answer. How are *a priori* synthetic judgments (assumptions) possible? Kant's answer is neither Hegel's Absolute Spirit, which Hegel substitutes for Kant's Noumenon, nor Hegel's/Dewey's notion of Absolute Duty 'above reason' that requires finite freedom of the will (free choice) to ground what, otherwise, would be merely abstract duty without action. A *a priori* synthetic judgments of theoretical reason (pure intuition and the twelve categories of the understanding), which understands 'what is,' and of practical reason (categorical imperatives that are invoked by autonomous freedom to assume responsibility for its agency), which alone can grasp of 'ought to be,' all require three ideas of 'pure' reason, which Dewey dogmatically assert don't exist. Nonetheless, without the 'ideas' of God/Noumenon, the enduring identity of the self, and the complementarity between creative freedom and the physical universe, Dewey himself would be unable to experience, understand, or exercise responsible agency.

151. Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, 2nd ed.: 67.

freedom is incapable of empirical proof,¹⁵² it is capable of ‘defense’ because without its assumption finite, transcendental consciousness can’t be the creativity that it is in the world. As with Descartes’ *cogito ergo sum*, whereby conscious denying that one is conscious presupposes one is conscious, so too, with finite, eminent causality: its denial is a form of confirmation – even though, as a category of the understanding, causal explanations are always something that must be *added to phenomena*, not empirically derived from the phenomena.

Kant speaks of a complementary relationship between creative freedom (which is not the mere choice of ‘free will’ but, rather, autonomous, creativity) and moral duty in that he calls autonomous, creative freedom the *rational essence* (the very reason) for morality whereas moral principles are what raise *rational awareness* of responsible, creative freedom in the world.¹⁵³

In other words, contrary to Dewey and Hegel’s “The Moral View of the World,” it is not that absolute, moral principles (duty above reason) ground an absolute freedom above nature and demand that the finite will act in a certain way, which would turn morality into a set of heteronomous imperatives, but that even a single moral principle requires recognition of creative freedom because there is no other purpose of a moral principle than to guide the exercise of autonomous freedom. In short, Dewey (and Hegel’s “The Moral View of the World”) insist that absolute moral principles precede freedom whereas, according to Kant, without freedom there would be no need for moral principles.

I have employed Dewey’s *German Philosophy and German Politics* to engage a pre-figured narrative of Kant to lay bare the genuine Kantian kernels at the core of a distorted set of narrative husks. However, Dewey’s reading is anything but new, and I have shown how the con-figured reading by the anti-Kantians and anti-Enlightenment movement at the the beginning of the 19th C provides enduring prototypes for portraying an aggregate of items that are supposedly Kant but have only metaphors in common with Kant. Absent a grasp of the inseparability of theoretical reason (understanding ‘what is’) and practical reason (determining ‘what *ought* to be’), which arises only in a world of phenomena as far as finite, eminent causality has ever experienced, philosophy (and humanity!) is merely a raft on a vast, open ocean being blown about by (popular) winds and ocean currents without a rudder. Kant himself writes:

We have [...] not merely explored the land of pure understanding, and carefully surveyed every part of it, but have also measured its extent, and assigned to everything in it its

152. Kant emphasizes in the *Groundwork* what he had already affirmed in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that freedom is incapable of proof/disproof because it is an *a priori* synthetic judgment, not an empirical fact. We only experience the effects of causes, not the causes directly in phenomena. In the *Groundwork* he adds, though, that autonomous freedom is capable of defense. See Kant, *Groundwork* AA IV: 459.

153. See Kant, *Critique Practical Reason* AA V: 4*: “[...] freedom is, after all, the *ratio essendi* of the moral law; however, the moral law is the *ratio cognoscendi* of freedom.”

rightful place. This land is an island, enclosed by nature itself within unalterable limits. It is the land of truth (enchanted name) surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native location of illusion, where many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting iceberg give the deceptive appearance of new lands, which ceaselessly deceive the romanticizing seafarer around them with ever new with empty hopes that engage him [*sic.*] in enterprises which he can never abandon and yet is unable to carry to completion. Before we venture out into this ocean in order to explore it in all directions and to obtain assurance whether there be any ground for such hopes, it will be well to begin by casting a glance upon the map of the land which we are about to leave, and to enquire, first, whether we cannot in any case be satisfied with what it contains or even must be satisfied with out of necessity should there be nowhere else land on which we can build; second, by what title we possess even this land and can be secure in the face of all opposing claims.¹⁵⁴

[...] [M]etaphysics [...] is a shoreless sea [because the mind has no measurable limits], in which progress leaves no trace, and whose horizon contains no visible goal by which the extent to which it has been approached could be perceived. – In regard to this science, which has itself almost always been only in the idea, the task presented is very difficult, almost to despair of the possibility of its resolution, and, should it succeed, the prescribed condition of presenting the progress it has made in a short speech increases this difficulty. This is because *metaphysics is, in its essence and final intention, a complete whole; either nothing, or everything. What is necessary for its final purpose cannot therefore be dealt with in fragments, like mathematics or empirical natural science, which always progress without end.* – Nevertheless, we will try.¹⁵⁵

12) On Kant's 'Pure' Religion

According to Strauß, 'limits' to reason are a capricious restriction of reason. He views limits to reason as drawing a line beyond which all 'rational' understanding ceases and one takes a kneel to ignorance (doctrine) or where one insists that all understanding is a subjective construction (Strauß' Kant). Such limits to reason in the name of 'faith' in things beyond reason (doctrine) by definition *weaken reason*. This is to view any and all claims beyond the 'limits' to reason as *epistemic* faith claims to know things that reason cannot know 'by itself'.

When it comes to the 'limits to reason' and religion, Strauß considers the options represented by the English Deists and German Leibniz-Wolffians, which contrast with his 'Hegelian' Kant. Whereas epistemology for the English Deists (Nominalism) and the Germans (Idealism) and are diametrically opposed, their systems depend upon the same lawfulness of reason but embrace limits to reason when it comes to religious doctrine. Although their epistemologies are so different (Idealism's innate

154. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 295. In the course of the next five pages, Kant presents the conclusions of the land survey up to this point in his text.; Search "Vorrede" to *Welches sind die wirkliche Fortschritte* AA XX: 259.

155. Kant, *Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte* AA XX: 259.

ideas in contrast to Nominalism's ideas as abstractions), both the English Deists and Leibniz-Wolffians limit reason to *strengthen* religion as they *weaken* reason.

If Locke himself, like Leibnitz and Wolf [*sic.*], had made an application of his philosophical principles to theology, which included the validity of revelation within certain limits, but by no means abolished it [...], it could [...] make little difference whether the laws and first principles of human thought were derived from innate ideas [Leibniz-Wolffian Idealism] or abstracted from facts of external experience [English Deist Empiricism/Nominalism] as long as one only took their application to biblical history and church doctrine seriously and did not stop at an arbitrarily set limit. The contradictions in the doctrine of the Trinity or in the story of the resurrection remained the same, whether the Laws of Identity or of Difference¹⁵⁶ [*Gesetz der Eistimmung und des Widerspruchs*: the Law of Excluded Middle that something cannot simultaneously be itself and not itself¹⁵⁷] was justified dogmatically [Leibniz-Wolff] or empirically [British Deists].¹⁵⁸

In contrast to the attempt by the English Deists and German Leibnitz/Wolffian s to *strengthen* religion empirically and/or dogmatically by *limiting* reason, Strauß, erroneously (as do many others), takes Kant's notion of religion 'within the mere limits to reason' to be a *weakening* of religion by *strengthening* reason in that Kant

156. Strauß calls this law one of the universally presupposed, 'fundamental rules of reason.' See *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 260–261.

157. See Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 402.

158. Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 260–261. At the conclusion of *Reimarus*, Strauß rejects the options with respect to the gospels presented by Reimarus: 1) Church doctrine grounded in miracles and 2) the Deist option that the apostles were deceivers and liars, and 3) the Rationalist claim that Jesus only appeared to be dead. See Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 405. Having long since rejected the miracles as the foundation for Christian faith and rather than take the disciples to be liars or to deny the death of Jesus, in 1862 Strauß turns to the Romantic (Herder) notion of 'fantasy' to account for heartfelt belief – even if wrong. See Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 404. However, he criticizes the error of Romanticism and Hegelianism for, ultimately, ignoring the natural, lawful order upon which they both depend. See Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 405–407. He invokes the 'mythic' reading of perceptible 'husks' and imperceptible 'kernels' (appearances and truth) to embrace the rational order (for example, the Law of Excluded Middle) upon which both Idealism (Christian Platonism) and Nominalism (Deism) depend. See Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 408–409. This is reminiscent of his "Ueber Vergängliches und Bleibendes im Christenthum." (1838). See Chapter 5: 1838 "On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity" 216 ff. Not yet having reached the Feuerbachian Materialism of *The Old Faith and the New Faith* (1872), his final statement at the end of *Hermann Samuel Reimarus* leaves open the task of uniting Romanticism and history: "The nineteenth century deprived itself from the outset of the fruit of great and glorious efforts, among other things also on the part of romantic effusiveness/enthusiasm with which it had broken away from the eighteenth [century options between miracle, falsehood, and a merely apparent death of Jesus]. The more [... the 19th C] ties in with the eighteenth, the more it recognizes itself called not to eliminate it, but to continue and supplement it, the more it can be assumed that it has grasped its task [to unite abstraction and particularities], the more confident we can hope that it will solve it." Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 409 In 1872 the 'solution' was materialistic reductionism in which consciousness is explained as a material process, despite the fact that there are huge gaps in the explanation and ignoring Kant's insight that all causal explanations are *a priori* synthetic judgments that must be added to (material) events.

supposedly squeezes religion into the, capriciously subjective, limits of mere human understanding.¹⁵⁹

Yet, Strauß nowhere addresses Kant's epistemological, 'third way' in contrast to Idealism and Nominalism. Kant understands 'universals' to be schemas of categories of the understanding drawn from relationalities in appearances that consciousness, in turn, employs to understand appearances as more than a mere aggregate of particularities. Universals are neither formal, 'objective' ideas/concepts as with Idealism nor subjective abstractions as with Nominalism), and his three 'ideas' of pure reason (God, the enduring identity of the 'soul,' and the complementarity of freedom and nature) are necessary transcendental assumptions incapable of direct experience in phenomena that are *required in order to make sense of, and appropriately act in, a world of appearances*.

In contrast, in *Reimarus*, Strauß even appears to be testing the waters of Romanticism's creative fantasy providing an alternative to treating the scriptures as simply 'true' or 'false'/facts or lies. However, his apparent conclusion with respect to fantasy is that, although it has the advantage of avoiding reducing reality to cold, calculating factuality, in the end as in the case of Hegel, Romanticism's abstractions ignore their dependence upon empirical grounding – both Hegel and Romanticism ignore any enduring significance to factual particularities for reining in their 'empty abstractions.'¹⁶⁰

Rather than embrace an Absolute Reason above understanding's limits or embrace an ultimate, eminent, non-empirical cause of the world (including consciousness), Strauß rejects all limits to reason by turning to Materialism. In other words, although his *The Old and the New Faith* rejects the conscious, ultimate, eminent causality of the Leibnitz/Wolffian s, his version of Nominalism, unlike the doctrinal limits placed on Nominalism by the English Deists, *places no limits on rational Nominalism except time. In time, humanity will grasp exhaustively the material reality that causally explains all of experience and understanding*. Strauß rejects any limits to reason's eventual grasp of 'reality.' His *unlimited Nominalism is reason's strength*.

In contrast, *Kant turns limits into reason's strength*. The limitation that we have only appearances of, not direct access to, the perceptible world paradoxically confirms that there are *some imperceptible elements of experience and understanding that cannot be capricious and subjective*. The finite, eminent, imperceptible elements of conscious experience are *universally necessary* in order for there to be any experience of, much less understanding and responsible agency in, a world of appearances. These elements constitute an entire system of imperceptible relationalities and are not reducible to merely the status of universal ideas/concepts as Idealism or Nominalism/Empiricism.

159. On the reading of Kant as a 'subjectivist', who limits reason to human 'understanding see in the "Preface:" 36, n. 7, 51, n. 47, and 305, n. 208. On Strauß' reading of Kant as a subjectivist, see 168, n. 209 and in Chapter 8: "3) Religion is morality that is 'grounded' only in 'empty ideas':" 820 ff. On Hegel's reading of Kant as a subjective constructivist, see 727. On Baur's reading of Kant as a subjectivist, see 656, n. 20.

160. See Strauß' conclusion to *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 408–409.

These elements do not deny an ultimate, efficient cause, but require that we know only those predicates of such an infinite, eminent causality that are *necessary* for us to experience a world of appearances as we do.

Ideas/concepts are experienced neither as separate from a world of appearances nor as independent singularities themselves. In short, *as far as we have ever experienced*, an idea/concept is inseparable from a world of appearances, never as an absolute singularity by itself alone although they are not directly given in perception. Their *imperceptible relationalities* are 'drawn out' of perceptions and applied to perceptions as *a priori* synthetic judgments that can only be grasped by, and in, finite, imperceptible consciousness. In other words, ideas/concepts can only be experienced and invoked in understanding as *schemas* that represent the relationalities inescapably present in particular sets of appearances. As a relational totality of appearances and relationalities, they constitute (but themselves by no means create) an *a priori* synthetic, causal system of understanding with two inseparable and irreducible, yet complementary, lawful orders: 'blind' nature and creative, autonomous freedom. Even without direct access to, hence, without being able to prove or disprove either lawful order, they are not capricious, subjective assumptions that 'limited' reason imposes upon appearances. Rather, they are universally necessary for there to be any rational engagement of appearances given the 'limits' to reason. The *strength* of reason's limits is the degree to which they are necessary (that is, required, not pre-determined) for finite consciousness to experience, understand, and exercise responsible agency *in the world*.

Six years before publication of *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason*, Kant wrote in the preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*: "[...] I have [...] found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.¹⁶¹" Faith that grounds religion is by no means limited to doctrinal religion but is at the core of human experience and understanding in theoretical reason (the grasping of 'what is'), in practical reason (the determination of 'what ought to be'), and in the exercising of reflecting judgment. In contrast to *epistemic* faith, here one is concerned with *non-epistemic* faith (*Fürwahrhalten*), which means commitment to assumptions that one cannot prove because of the limits to reason. In contrast, *epistemic* faith claims to know things beyond the limits to reason.

The question driving the *Critique of Pure Reason* is: How are *a priori* synthetic judgments possible? The answer is a classic articulation of *non-epistemic* faith: *A priori* synthetic judgment is possible because there are three regulative ideas (assumptions) of 'pure' reason: God, the enduring identity of the self, and the complementarity between freedom and nature. Without these three, necessary assumptions, there can be

161. Kant, "Second Preface" of the *Critique of Pure Reason* B xxx.

no experience much less understanding. The three regulative ideas of 'pure' reason are a matter of *non-epistemic* faith as a 'holding something to be truth' (*Fürwahrhalten*).¹⁶²

Furthermore, Kant distinguishes between two forms of justification when it comes to the difference between rational defense of a notion and a dogmatic claim. A rational defense he calls judgments *κατ' ἄνθρωπον* (according to a finite, human judgment) that are demanded by appearances. These judgments *κατ' ἄνθρωπον* are *necessary assumptions* in order to experience those appearances. A dogmatic claim he calls *κατ' ἀλήθειαν* (according to a dogmatic, truth claim). In other words, the entire edifice of 'Reason' is based on *necessary assumptions of 'pure' reason κατ' ἄνθρωπον*. However, this is no foundation constructed on sand. It is a foundation based on what is necessary for there to be anything like a finite, eminent, transcendental consciousness. When one tries to deny the faith of *Fürwahrhalten κατ' ἄνθρωπον*, then one demonstrates their necessity because one cannot deny them without believing in them.

According to Kant, then, faith and religion are by no means reducible 'merely to morality.' Life itself, experience, understanding, and the exercising of responsible agency are ultimately a matter of faith. Kant's notion of religion, then, is not tied to institutions, leadership hierarchies, creeds, and social traditions. Religion is not something one does as a *part* of life by participating in particular communities or performing specific rituals. Rather, 'religion' is concerned with be(com)ing human (finite, eminent, transcendental consciousness).

In the second "Preface" to *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason*, Kant calls 'pure' that religion 'within the limits of reason.' This is not an insistence that finite reason determines what religion is, and the 'purity' here is not a value judgment or a reduction of religion to morality. Rather, 'pure' is an epistemological judgment. 'Pure' religion, like 'pure' reason, is concerned with those transcendental elements that are not directly given with phenomena,¹⁶³ which are required for finite, eminent, transcendental consciousness to experience a world. Although Kant's 'pure' religion is concerned with transcendental elements not given directly in phenomena, this is no call to mysticism as a call to escape from the sensible world into the 'pure' realm of Absolute Spirit as the case with Hegel and the early Strauß.

Kant's 'pure' religion is also not concerned with the afterlife, *per se*, which is a dimension beyond the limits of reason. Neither does it deny or ignore the afterlife, though. To do so would be an exercise in hubris. Rather, the function of the afterlife

162. On Kant's notion of *Fürwahrhalten*, see *Critique of Pure Reason* B 848–859. On the difference between *κατ' ἀλήθειαν* and *κατ' ἄνθρωπον*, see Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 767–768 and *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment* AA V: 462–463. Strauß speaks of the distinction between an argument *κατ' ἄνθρωπον* and *κατ' ἀλήθειαν* and without reference to the importance of the distinction in Kant. See Strauß, *Streitschriften* II: 52.

163. On the notion of 'pure' in Kant, see 558, n. 109 and 928, n. 189.

in 'pure' religion is with respect to its role in encouraging the proper exercising of the finite, eminent capacities in this life.¹⁶⁴

As with the three 'pure' ideas of reason (God, the enduring identity of the self, and the complementarity of freedom and nature), 'pure' religion is never experienced outside of the limits of finite reason in a world, but neither reason nor 'pure' religion are human creations. Although recognizing that the predicates for ultimate cause are inescapably anthropomorphic, they are not literal human predicates applied to the Noumenon/God but *symbolically* anthropomorphic. The ultimate 'cause' of reason, religion, and nature is itself only indirectly experienced as its effects and, hence, a human judgment.

Kant's 'pure' religion is concerned with the entirety of the ingredients of experience that make possible reason and the exercising of reason in the world. In other words, it is inseparable from theoretical reason, practical reason, and aesthetic, reflecting judgment. 'Religion,' of course, is concerned with 'what ought to be,' but its practical reason is inseparable from the task of theoretical reason that seeks to understand 'what is.' That means that, just as reason does not create itself, God, or nature, other than to discern them as conditions for exercising a set of capacities, religion is nothing innate that ontologically determines whether an individual is 'good' or 'evil.'

No one can experience, understand, give oneself permission to act, or exercise agency for someone else. Understanding of experience, etc., is a project, not a condition, of finite, eminent, transcendental consciousness, and its product is the result of the individual's exercising *reflecting judgment* for her-/himself. In other words, religion adds 'belief' to those elements of the human condition that the individual must do for her-/himself.

Although only the individual can exercise her/his capacities, the individual is never in isolation. Even the eremite needs a supporting infrastructure that encourages her/his removal from daily life. Kant distinguishes between two forms of culture: the 'culture of technical skills' (Rousseau's 'Second Nature') and 'culture that promotes the (moral) will'.¹⁶⁵ 'Culture that promotes the (moral) will' consists of those who understand that both theoretical and practical reason have to be learned and practiced

164. On the issue of the notion of afterlife in Kant, see in Chapter 8: 837.

165. Kant presents the distinction between the 'culture of skill' and 'culture that promotes the (moral) will' in the *Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*: AA V:431–432. See the discussion of culture that promotes the will in Vol. II Introduction: 539. The 'culture of skills' (*Kultur der Geschicklichkeit*) "is insufficient to promote the will in determining and selecting its goals" (in the sense of *what it ought to do*). (*Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*: AA V: 432) In contrast to the "culture of skills, 'culture that promotes the (moral) will' consists in "[...] liberation of the will from the despotism of the appetites whereby we [...] become incapable of personal choice because we allow ourselves to be chained by animal instincts [...]" (*Critique of the Capacity of Judgment*: AA V: 432) In *On Pedagogy* (AA IX: 470, 480), Kant formulated the distinction as the difference between "physical" and "practical" culture and called for the development of moral culture above physical culture. See, as well, his comments on culture in the *Metaphysics of Morals* (AA VI: 391–393) and *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (AA VII: 329–330).

in a social context, not by removal from society. The ‘culture that promotes the (moral) will’ is not a culture separate from the ‘culture of skills’ but the dimension of practical reason within the ‘culture of skills’ that makes possible the determination of what ‘ought to be.’ Above all systems of particular, hypothetical imperatives (which include the civic law) are the broad, categorical imperatives that allow determination of what is ‘proper.’ Simply because one can do something technically does not mean that it ought to be done.

Kant’s definition of the church is an invisible entity:

An ethically communal existence under divine moral legislation is a church, which, to the extent it is not possible of direct experience, is called the invisible church [...] The visible church is the actual union of humanity as a whole that is committed to this ideal [...] The true (visible) church is one that displays the (moral) [democratic] Commonweal of God¹⁶⁶ (*Reich Gottes*) on earth to the extent that it is capable of being attained by humanity.¹⁶⁷ (parentheses from Kant; block parentheses from McG)

As an invisible, universal ‘church’ without division among institutions, guided by no other incentives than self-imposed categorical imperatives (without superstitions), grounded in autonomous, creative freedom (without social hierarchy and Illuminationism), is committed to universal lawfulness (not capricious and changing creeds), the Commonweal of God’s aim is the supporting of those who understand and seek to act on the basis of the invisible lawful order that governs all events.¹⁶⁸ This supporting infrastructure of the invisible church encourages the best, invisible efforts of its members to cultivate their talents and to assume responsibility for their agency while supporting them when they act on principles that are contrary to self- and communal-interests because the principles are ‘right.’ This ‘pure’ religion is at the core of all ‘historical,’¹⁶⁹ religious traditions and social orders so that it is a church universal.

The challenge that the de-mythologized Kant confronts his re-figuring reader ever anew is not a light challenge because the fogbanks of distorting mythic narration on the part of prior ‘clever’ Kant interpreters are as much a hindrance, if not more so, than Kant’s own presentation, which, if for nothing else, is, unfortunately, famous for its supposed turgidness. However, it is also not a frivolous challenge because our

166. Kant defines this Commonweal of God according to the four categories of the understanding: 1) Quantity: A numerical unity with no sectarian schisms; 2) Quality: a ‘pure’ union guided by no other incentives than moral ones (‘no nonsense of superstition and madness of enthusiasm’); 3) Relation: grounded in ‘freedom’ (with neither a social hierarchy nor Illuminationism) ‘as a kind of democracy through individual (creative) inspirations;’ and 4) Modality: possessing an unchangeable constitution of the universal, categorical imperatives of morality while recognizing that, as a public institution, it must conform to particular, hypothetical imperatives but with no arbitrary creeds, which lacking authority are ‘accidental’ (as opposed to ‘necessary’) and are subject to contradiction and change. See *Religion* AA VI: 101–102.

167. Kant, *Religion* AA VI: 101.

168. See *Religion* AA VI: 101–102.

169. See the “Preface to the Second Edition” of *Religion* AA VI: 12–14.

understanding of ourselves in ‘the order of things’ as well as the very survival of our species and preservation of this ‘land’ that we call home is at stake. Without an understanding of ‘pure’ religion, all ‘historical religion, which includes the cultural, institutional, and ritual manifestations of religion across the globe as well as internal mysticism, Hegel’s meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit, and the ‘reformed subjectivist principle of Process Theology, are merely humanity worshipping itself: an anthropomorphic fictionalized worship of ‘perfect’ humanity whose ‘experience’ and ‘final aim’ can only be ‘assumed’ and, hence, offer, perhaps, only the illusion of an absolute comfort and meaning in the face of the contingencies, ambiguities, oppression, persecution, and exploitation that is history.

Vol. II Appendix I: „Likely ‘Historical’ Elements of Jesus’ Life”

Introduction

Strauß wrote in the 1835 *Life of Jesus Critically Examined*:

[...] [W]hen we undertake to extract the historical contents which may possibly exist in narratives recognized as mythical, we shall be equally careful neither, on the one side, to place ourselves on the same ground with the natural interpreter by a rude and mechanical separation; nor, on the other side, to lose sight of the history by a hypercritical refusal to recognize such contents where they actually exist.¹

Equally significant, however, is Strauß’ observation that

[...] the pure historic idea was never developed among the Hebrews during the whole of their political existence; their latest historical works, such as the Books of the Maccabees, and even the writings of Josephus, are not free from marvelous and extravagant tales. Indeed, no just notion of the true nature of history is possible, without a perception of the inviolability of the chain of finite causes, and of the impossibility of miracles. This perception which is wanting to so many minds of our own day was still more deficient in Palestine, and indeed throughout the Roman empire.²

It is not to be denied that what dominates in Strauß’ writing is his emphasis on the unhistorical nature of the text. He maintains that that is because of the nature of the text and its claims, not his philosophical perspective. He offered four criteria (two ‘negative’ and two ‘positive’) for discerning the unhistorical in a passage. Negatively: [1]) "When the narration is irreconcilable with the known and universal laws which govern the course of events."³ [2]) "An account which shall be regarded as historically valid, must neither be inconsistent with itself, nor in contradiction with other accounts." Positively: [3]) "If the form be poetical, if the actors converse in hymns, and in a more diffuse and elevated strain than might be expected from their training and situations, such discourses, at all events, are not to be regarded as historical."⁴ [4]) "If the contents of a narrative strikingly accords with certain ideas existing and prevailing within the circle from which the narrative proceeded, which ideas themselves seem to be the product of preconceived opinions rather than of practical experience, it is more or less probable, according to circumstances, that such a narrative is of mythical

1. Strauß, *LJ*: 63.

2. Strauß, *LJ*: 74–75. See as well, Ziegler I: 225–226.

3. Strauß, *LJ*: 88.

4. Strauß, *LJ*: 89.

origin.”⁵ Strauß is careful to underscore that the likelihood of the unhistorical nature of an account is higher when two or more of these criteria apply to it.⁶

Nonetheless, where an account does not suffer from these limitations, Strauß acknowledged that in all likelihood the text was presenting historical material.

Strauß asks: “[...] [W]hat is the precise boundary line between the historical and the unhistorical?—the most difficult question in the whole province of criticism.”⁷ He proposes the following criteria:

Where not merely the particular narrative and manner of an occurrence is critically suspicious, its external circumstances represented as miraculous and the like; but where likewise the essential substance and groundwork is either inconceivable in itself or is in striking harmony with some Messianic idea of the Jews of that age, then not the particular alleged course and mode of the transaction only, but the entire occurrence must be regarded as unhistorical. *Where on the contrary, the form only, and not the general contents of the narration, exhibits the characteristics of the unhistorical, it is at least possible to suppose a kernel of historical fact; although we can never confidently decide whether this kernel of fact actually exists, or in what it consists; unless, indeed, it be discoverable from other sources. In legendary narratives, or narratives embellished by the writer, it is less difficult, – by divesting them of all that betrays itself as fictitious imagery, exaggeration, etc. – by endeavoring to abstract from them every extraneous adjunct and to fill up every hiatus – to succeed, proximately at least, in separating the historical groundwork.*

The boundary line, however, between the historical and the unhistorical, in records, in which as in our Gospels this latter element is incorporated, will ever remain fluctuating and unsuceptible of precise attainment. Least of all can it be expected that the first comprehensive attempt to treat these records from a critical point of view should be successful in drawing a sharply defined line of demarcation. In the obscurity which criticism has produced, by the extinction of all lights hitherto held historical, the eye must accustom itself by degrees to discriminate objects with precision; and at all events *the author of this work, wishes especially to guard himself in those places where he declares he knows not what happened, from the imputation of asserting that he knows that nothing happened.*⁸ (emphasis added)

In his “Editor’s Introduction” to the English translation of the *LJ*, Peter Hodgson gives the following summary of the material that Strauß took to be authentic history in the *LJ*:

5. Strauß, *LJ*: 89. The negative formulation of this criterion would be what is called the “*criterion of dissimilarity*” for discerning authentic historical material attributable to Jesus: “If the contents of a narrative strikingly contradict certain ideas existing and prevailing with the circle from which the narrative proceeded, then the likelihood is great that they indicate an historical element” Examples: 1) Jesus speaking of the messiah in the third person contradicts the early church’s insistence on his claiming to be the messiah. See Strauß, *LJEGP*: 222–230, esp. 223. 2) Strauß applies the criterion of dissimilarity to justify belief in Peter’s having denied Jesus – although he points out that the cock’s crow and three-fold repetition of the denial is “[...] legendary is not to be denied.” Strauß, *LJEGP*: 546–547.

6. Strauß, *LJ*: 90.

7. Strauß, *LJ*: 90.

8. Strauß, *LJ*: 91–92.

The birth infancy, and childhood narratives are largely mythical (§§ 17–43). But (*sic.*) there is no question that Jesus came under the tutelage of John the Baptist, whose proclamation of a coming messianic kingdom he continued once John had been imprisoned. It was from the influence of John that Jesus first began to formulate his own messianic project, but at first he did not identify himself with the messianic figure anticipated by John [the Baptist]. Jesus remained the disciple of the Baptist and continued to pay him homage, even when he had far surpassed his predecessor. (LJ, 233, 239, 246, 286–287.) Although there was a period early in his ministry when Jesus referred to the messianic Son of Man as a future figure, different from himself, he came eventually to identify himself with that figure. “Jesus held and expressed the conviction that he was the Messiah; this is an indisputable fact” (LJ, 284; cf. 281–83, 288–90, 656). Here Strauss is curiously uncritical and brief in assessing the evidence, and he has no hesitation in attributing to Jesus messianic claims and titles (Son of Man, Son of God *Christos*) that more likely are produces of the early Christian community. The mythical interpretation would seem to apply in an obvious way to the messianic claims of Jesus [...] Possibly for two reason, one historical, the other theological, Strauss draws back from the mythical interpretation at this point. The historical reason is hinted at briefly: “... the fact that his disciples after his death believed and proclaimed that he was the Messiah, is not to be comprehended, unless, when living, he had implanted the conviction in their minds” (LJ, 284) [...] The theological reason resides in the fact that Jesus’ messianic consciousness as interpreted by Strauss could be of only limited significance for Christian faith: his vision was restricted by Jewish theocratic expectations, which he attempted to spiritualize or depoliticize,⁹ but only by means of an apocalyptic fanaticism. Such a Jesus cannot have been the God/Man of orthodox faith, and we are driven to the speculative conclusion that the idea of God/Manhood is properly realized only in the human races as a whole.

[...] Insofar as he interests himself in the content and meaning of these sayings at all [from the teachings of Jesus], the suggestion is that they contain little that is essentially original or profound, and that in this as in other respects Jesus shared the limitations and prejudices of his age (LJ, 359). Although supposing himself to be the Messiah, Jesus did not intend to break with Judaism but merely presented himself as a teacher in the Mosaic tradition (LJ, 338–39) his pronouncement of eschatological blessings and woes (regarded by Strauss as unquestionably authentic) had much in common with Ebionitism (LJ, 337, 351); the parables were analogous to rabbinic literature in form and content (LJ, 348, ed. n. 345*); his high estimation of external poverty can probably be traced to the Essenes (LJ, 351, 358); his controversies with the scribes and Pharisees were thoroughly rabbinic in argumentation (LJ, 358) [...]

As his brief career drew toward its denouement, Jesus predicted (according to Strauss) that shortly after the destruction of Jerusalem and its temple and within the term of the contemporary generation, he would visibly make his second advent in the clouds of heaven as the messianic Son of Man and terminate the existing dispensation (LJ, 296, 585, 589–90, 596). Although he may at first have thought that he would attain his messianic glorification without the intervention of death (LJ, 565, see ed. n. 596*, 656*), he later came to recognize that suffering and death were part of the office and destination of the Messiah, the means by which the messianic age would be ushered in through the supernatural

9. Hodgson notes here: “Strauss consistently refuses, in contrast with Reimarus, to attribute a political or revolutionary role to Jesus, and he overlooks any possible relation of Jesus to the Zealots (LJ, 293–96, 331, 402, 558, 584).” (xxxii, n. 48)

power of God rather than by political revolution; and he sought to prepare his disciples for this eventuality (LJ, 572–73, 633–34, 565) [...]

Strauss’s treatment of the passion story need not be summarized in detail. He considers large segments of it to have been reworked from the mythical point of view of the early church [...] Nevertheless, he holds it likely that “Jesus on that evening in the garden experienced a violent access of fear, and prayed that his sufferings might be averted” (LJ, 640); that when queried by the Sanhedrin and by Pilate he openly acknowledged his messianic claim (LJ, 565, 670–71); and that if the cry of God-forsakenness is authentic (which Strauss doubts) Jesus would have died bitterly disappointed at the failure of his messianic plan (LJ, 687–89). That Jesus really did die, and was not physically resuscitated after a merely apparent death (as the rationalist claim), cannot be doubted (§ 139). [...] The empty tomb reports are shown to be the product of legend (§ 137), while the appearances of the crucified Jesus to the disciples are subjective visions or hallucinations, which may be interpreted psychologically as instances of primitive Christian enthusiasm (LJ, 739–44), and which also engendered the myth of his visible ascension into heaven (§ 143).¹⁰

In his own introduction to his *Glaubenslehre*, Strauß suggests that, above all is certain, that Jesus rejected ‚Alexandrian‘ ascetism (the Essenes), but even here Strauß acknowledges a hint of uncertainty – indicative of his awareness of the texts inability, historically, to carry the weight of dogmatic teaching and supports his understanding of the generative development of the gospel narratives by means of the ‘genetic mythical principle’:

“As near as we can establish with certainty from the New Testament, the point of view of Jesus and the disciples, is far from the morbid spiritualism (of asceticism) and had not yet forgotten the [this worldly] healthy realism of the ancient Hebrew religion and custom. The dark asceticism of the Baptist, his fasting and drinking of water, Jesus opposed with the principle of cheerful enjoyment of earthly pleasures (was he an Essene, or in tune with Philonian views, whom people called a ἄνθρωπος φάγος καὶ οἰνοπότης [a man who was a glutton and a drunk] because of that impartial enjoyment of natural pleasures? Matth. 11:19); in his contemplation of nature, in his way of taking the cares of this life kindly – nowhere does that gloomy background of Alexandrian teaching found.” Yes, to his way of thinking also belongs the contrast between this Aeon and the one to come is very curious, and all reality is transferred to the beyond. However, this is by no means a specific Alexandrian way of thinking [= Essene/Philonic], and the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, by which the form of this hereafter is determined, is even contrary to the spiritualism of Alexandria, although its spiritualizing influence could be found in the ἰσαγγελοι (like an angel) of Luke 20:36). That Alexandrian way of thinking is more pronounced in the aversion to wealth (Matthew 19:21 ff, James 5:1 ff), in the non-Jewish valuing of unmarried life by his own example (Matthew 19:12) as well as later in Paul (I Cor. 7:32 ff.) and the peculiar form of the opposition between ‘this world and the next’ as we find in Luke and the parable of the rich man – where suffering in this life will be compensated with joy in the next and vice versa – that is related to the later teaching of Ebionism, who as is generally known were influenced by the Essenes.¹¹

10. Hodgson’s ‘Editor’s Introduction’ in LJ: xxxi–xxxiv.

11. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 33–34.

What Christianity uniquely added to this material was the following:

The expected Messiah, the extra-human creature, has already appeared as a conceived human being by the Holy Spirit or as the incarnation of God’s Word [Logos]. However, rather than to liberate Israel by his own power and God’s miraculous assistance and the subjugation of other nations, instead of raising the dead to open the new age, he first renounced his higher power in order, in part, through ethical-religious teaching, by means of authentication by miracles, to make it possible for his people to enter the messianic kingdom, in part, through expiating their sins by freely choosing to suffer and die, in part through leaving the proclamation of the coming messianic age to appointed emissaries. Thus, after half completion of his messianic work, he withdrew from the human world to God, in order to return in full messianic power and majesty, when the invitation to participate in his kingdom, together with the gift of the Holy Spirit, will have been issued to all, to close the old world time by a general judgment, and to open the new time of immortal bliss for his believing followers by means of the most intervening natural revolutions.¹²

God appeared in the flesh, but he endured particular testings, renounced use of the fullness of his divine power, and experienced through persecution and suffering all that in this world constituted what is inappropriate for the divine. Furthermore, he took on the burden of the sins of his followers and dispensed his spirit on them. However, in light of their mortal and sinful flesh, these deeds could not bring about a satisfactory state but could only be the temporary pledge of future glory.¹³

Likely Historical Elements of Jesus’ Life and Teaching

In *LJEGP*, Strauß indicates more extensively some of the *likely* ‘historical’ elements of Jesus’ life and teaching as preserved in the Gospels – although this material is not sufficient for a biography or for establishing the certainty of Jesus’ teaching. Especially the teaching material is more an aggregate of elements integrated by what Strauß calls Jesus’ ‘internal religious authority’ without any accounting of the grounds for that authority. Without identification of an internal architectonic that both grounds and provides coherence to a set of material, one cannot escape what Jürgen Habermas calls ‘systematic distortion’ for the sake of a community’s self-interest:¹⁴

That Jesus came from Galilee and was born in Nazareth.¹⁵

12. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 34–35.

13. Strauß, *Glaubenslehre* I: 35.

14. See, especially, Kant’s discussion of the importance of an architectonic *Critique of Pure Reason* B 860–879 in his ‘transcendental methodology’ that consists of the strategies of the “discipline, canon, architectonic, and history of pure reason” in *Critique of Pure Reason* B 788–884 and Jürgen Habermas, Jürgen. “On Systematically Distorted Communication.” *Inquiry* 13 (1970): 205–18.

15. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 191.

That Jesus belonged to the lower class.¹⁶

That Jesus had both brothers and sisters.¹⁷

That Jesus’ originality, freshness, and distance from all influence by a ‘school’ suggests the probability of Jesus’ independent development.¹⁸

That Jesus was not perfect.¹⁹

That Jesus did not share John the Baptist’s threat of divine judgment.²⁰

That Jesus did not claim Messiahship (at least originally) but viewed himself as a prophet.²¹

That Jesus asked his disciples “for whom do the people take me to be?”²²

That Jesus originally taught in Galilee and only at the end of his career went to Jerusalem.²³

That Jesus taught that the ‘blessed’ are the poor, the mourners, the hungry and thirsty;²⁴ that true happiness is not achieved through power and conflict or insistence upon one’s ‘rights’ but through meekness, peacefulness, and patience;²⁵ that “[...] compared to the old world, this is an inverted world, in which the exterior and the presupposition of its conformity with the interior are not taken as a starting point, but the interior is regarded as the only essential thing, so much so that it is able to outweigh even an opposite exterior, and is even most willingly connected with such an exterior;”²⁶ that one should not insist on retribution but love, even of one’s enemies;²⁷ that God is to be understood to be a ‘Father’ over against humanity;²⁸ that, when humans are children of God, then they are all ‘brothers;’²⁹ that he taught the ‘Golden Rule’ as the main idea of humanity;³⁰ that he taught a serene lack of concern over food and clothing, contentment with a wanderer’s life, indifference to external status or shame, fondness for children, willingness to go the ‘second mile’ and to forgive seven times seven;³¹ that humanity is liberated from bondage into freedom in a purely spiritual and moral harmony with God;³² that he taught, although in the prophets but

16. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 191.

17. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 192.

18. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 194.

19. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 195.

20. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 196.

21. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 197.

22. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 198.

23. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 198. Strauß indicates that he shares this judgment with Baur.

24. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 204.

25. Strauß, *LJEGP* I: 204.

26. Strauß, *LJEGP* I: 204. See also, 205–206.

27. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 206–207.

28. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 206–207. Strauß employs the ‘criterion of dissimilarity’ here.

29. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 207.

30. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 207.

31. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 207.

32. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 207.

with an edge, that God expects mercy and not sacrifices (and the worthlessness of all external service to God),³³ that ever more non-Jews were included in his circle of concern.³⁴

That Jesus’ ‘sinlessness’ is understandable only in the sense that his character emerged ‘naturally’ out of himself without conversion and ‘commencement of a new life,’ which of course included, naturally, fluctuations and failures inescapable for consistent effort of self-improvement that makes understandable his own rejection of the predicate ‘good’ (Matthew 19:17; Strauß suggests that the original text has been redacted here to fit Pauline teaching).³⁵

In contrast to contemporary Judaism that viewed divine forgiveness to require sacrifices, Jesus forgave sins “out of the authority of his religious consciousness.”³⁶

That Jesus embraced the Mosaic law³⁷ internally and ‘spiritually,’ however rejecting all external formalities³⁸ and means of demonstrating one’s piety.³⁹ Jesus rejected, especially, the ‘sacrifice’ system of the Temple.⁴⁰

That Jesus did not speak of himself as the ‘Son of David;’⁴¹ he rejected worldly political power;⁴² that he never directly employed the title “Son of God”;⁴³ accepted the title of ‘Messiah,’ but as if to say: “Yes, I am the Messiah but not your royal Son of David; I am the Son of God, but He will glorify me by suffering and death, contrary to your expectations;”⁴⁴ that Jesus preferred the title “Son of Man” in the sense of “entrusted with high revelations but still weak and lowly”;⁴⁵ that his ‘messiahship’ was an internal, moral ideal;⁴⁶ that his goal was the elevation of humanity to authentic piety and morality “[...] by means of that spiritual and moral elevation in that new, no longer servitude but naïve relationship with God by which they will find their

33. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 210.

34. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 220–221.

35. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 208–209.

36. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 209.

37. Strauß, quotes here Matthew 5:19 (“[...] the man who infringes even one of the least of these commandments and teaches others to do the same will be considered the least in the kingdom of heaven; but the man who keeps them and teaches them will be considered great in the kingdom of heaven.”) *LJEGP*: 211.

38. Strauß cites Matthew 9:14–17 and the rejection of fasting, celebration with the bridegroom while he is present, and the need to put new wine into fresh wine skins to reject Essene asceticism and Pharisaic boasting piety based on the Mosaic Law. See Strauß, *LJEGP*: 213.

39. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 209.

40. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 214–215.

41. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 222–223.

42. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 223.

43. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 223–224.

44. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 224.

45. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 225.

46. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 229.

happiness, which is desirable in itself, [but] at the same time contains the natural germs of all external improvement.”⁴⁷

That Jesus originally thought of himself as a religious teacher/prophet but came to understand himself as having a martyr role to play;⁴⁸ self-understanding, perhaps, as a ‘teaching messiah,’ which given his Jewish tradition (Isaiah 50, 52, 53), was easily combined with the role of a martyr given the hate generated against him.⁴⁹

Viewed the Kingdom of God as a natural development of humanity’s spiritual and moral elevation although that did not exclude the possibility of another other-worldly epoch for the completion of the Kingdom⁵⁰

47. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 229–230.

48. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 227, 233–234.

49. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 233–234.

50. Strauß, *LJEGP*: 229–230, 240–241.

Vol. II Appendix II: Annotated 'First' Testament Concordance to, and Classical Legend References in, the 'Second' Testament Gospels

Based on:

Das Leben Jesu für das deutsche Volk bearbeitet (Leipzig: 'F.A. Brockhaus, 1864)

Available On-line at Google Books (January 2025)

Already in *Reimarus* two years earlier than *The Life of Jesus Examined for the German People*, Strauß reports Reimarus' judgment about the invocation of 'First' Testament material to 'prove' Christianity:

"Passages which are either not in Scripture at all, or are taken from apocryphal writings; passages which are wrongly translated, distorted by additions, omissions and alterations of words; passages which contain merely a figure of speech which, apart from the context, could also be applied to the events of the New Testament; passages which deal with quite different persons, things, times and histories, or in which only the heated imagination can find an allegorical, typical, mystical interpretation: Everything is just for the proof of Christianity, and yet it is then said of the interpretation: that Christianity occurred in order that what is written may be fulfilled." 369

18 items of general information on the structure of this document and Strauß' interpretive strategy:

1. Luke 24:44: "[...] everything written about me in the Law of Moses, in the Prophets, and in the Psalms, has to be fulfilled." Luke 24: 27: "[...] [S]tarting with Moses and going through all the prophets, he explained to them the passages throughout the scriptures that were about himself." (See also, Luke 22:27)
2. Material in "[]" is inserted by McGaughey.
3. Although Strauß usually provides only the "First" Testament citation without the actual text, most passages have been provided here.
4. "Critical" is used in Strauß' sense of "analytical" (διαίρεσις: divide a genus into its species, distinguishing between/among elements, separation of subject and predicate; hence, comparative), not "synthetic" (adding to phenomena the elements not given in the phenomena, directly, but necessary for experience and thought, in the first place).
5. The interpretive strategy of the Jewish people in the sense of immersion in their communal texts to draw out references to subsequent events belonged to the "way of thinking" at the time the gospels were written. (§58: 354)
6. Christians frequently sang the Psalms in worship (I Corinthians 14:26; Ephesians 5:19; Colossians 13:16; Acts 4:24–30). (§78: 490–491)

7. In addition to stories of cultural and national heroes and the schools of antiquity (Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Cynics, and the Essenes/Therapeutae), Jews and Jewish-Christians possessed their community's one book, the Greek *Septuagint*, to use to account for and "explain" experience, theologically (e.g., the "Chosen People" although an insignificant minority). This book consists of multiple texts generated over several hundred years that have employed earlier texts in the volume to ever-again come to terms with the events of each new age/situation.
8. Living in a world with a spectrum of religious traditions, usually tied to national/cultural identity (Egyptian transcendentalism, Greek Mythology [e.g., Apollo and Dionysius], Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism, Isis, Mithra, Roman hearth religion, [Samaritan] Gnosticism, and, by the end of the 2nd Century, even a hint of Hinduism and Buddhism), the framework for understanding experience, then, was "us" versus "them".
9. The motivation driving the gospel writers is: The Messiah had to have fulfilled all the prophecies of the "First" Testament remotely associated with the Messiah yet to come in an exemplary and superior fashion.
10. Not to be found in the "First" Testament are demon possession stories (§71: 426, §74: 446). Demon possession was the "fashionable" disease only with the Intertestamental Period. It was generally believed that the Messiah would have the power to cast out of demons. Jesus is portrayed not only as casting out demons in confirmation of messianic expectations, but he was also able to give his disciples the power to cast out demons.
11. Jump to the 16th Century: Mathematics has been a key strategy for understanding physical phenomena (Astrology/Astronomy) at least since Babylonian times with borrowings from India. Its most pragmatic effect was to aid sea and land travel. However, only with Copernicus (influenced by the Arab Islamic Astronomer Ibn al-Shatir?!), mathematics required denial of sense experience in order to understand *physical phenomena*, "properly". A mental, mathematical model demonstrates (logically) that the sun is not moving – contrary to any possible sense perception on this planet. Add Newton's law of gravity in the 17th Century, and the pathway opens to an entirely new way of understanding the world. This "new" world is grounded in the coherence of only indirectly perceptible, mathematical lawfulness. The scientist does not create her/his physical world, but that physical world requires an individual's mind for it to be understood. Based on the understanding of lawfulness, humanity magnifies its power to transform nature in ways that nature cannot do on its own, which is the necessary condition for the assumption of responsibility for its creative agency.
12. The most obvious shift in understanding the scriptural world, documented by Strauß, is that miracles are called into question because a miracle presupposes

the violation of physical lawfulness.¹ Strauß is not a medieval "Voluntarist"/"Occasionalist" (whatever God wills is "good" even if it violates the laws of nature) but stands in the tradition of "Intellectualism" (God must conform to His own, created, rational order). As if by miracle with the rise of the natural sciences, miracles cease to be miracles where there is physical lawfulness. Rather than the inexplicable being explained by a miracle, one seeks out (by means of experiment) how this particular, inexplicable event, can fit into the greater, coherent order of imperceptible lawfulness.

13. Strauß on the genesis of 'Second' Testament stories: "Of course, [Ernst Wilhelm] Hengstenberg [a Supranaturalist, biblical literalist Theologian] is of the opinion with respect to the symbolism of [...] Psalm [107:25–29] that Jesus actually performed the miracle of stilling the storm in order to give an actualized prophecy of protection by which to comfort his church in the face of all the hardships and dangers that should befall it down to the end of days. In general, Hengstenberg says that the symbolic acts of the Lord in the New Testament rest usually upon images of the Old Testament. So long as these so-called symbolic acts, as the case here, also are taken to include miracles, we find ourselves in complete agreement with Hengstenberg's statement even if we take it differently. Hengstenberg believes that such accounts are given by the Old Testament authors as images, and then they were actually performed by Jesus. Our belief in contrast is that such images have been condensed into actions that never actually occurred." (490–491)
14. In short, the central value (but by no means sole value) of Strauß' work is its demonstration of the genesis and development of miracle stories in the gospels

1. Strauß summarized Reimarus' six criteria for judging a miracle in *Hermann Samuel Reimarus* 1862: 1) "If the reported miracle clearly contradicts itself or the circumstances, the report of it cannot be true. Contradictory things are impossible." 2) "If the miracles narrated belong to a system, i.e. if they all serve to prove one and the same thing (the divine mission of a man, the supernatural origin of his teaching), we have no need to enter into the circumstances of each one in order to falsify them and show how much truth there is in them. If there are some among them where we can clearly perceive the inner impossibility or the selfish intention of the fiction, they must all be false [...] At the least, if the system, the doctrine they are supposed to serve, is demonstrably false, they fall away with it by themselves." 3) "Convincing proof that a miracle really happened lies with the narrator. If he does not provide it, we are not obliged to believe him [...] *Affirmanti incumbit probatio* [proof rests upon the affirmative]." [Absence of disproof is insufficient.] 4) "If the miracles were not believed by eyewitnesses and contemporaries, it is obvious that they originated in later times in oral tradition or through the fiction of writers." 5) "Deviations of different narrators with regard to the same miracle invalidate their testimony at least to the extent that nothing certain can be built on it." 6) "If miracles themselves are such monsters that they completely reverse the nature of things, and yet neither enlighten the mind nor do any good, then they belong to the tales of the land of milk and honey [Cockaigne], which do not deserve to be seriously refuted. But if they diminish the respect for God and his perfections or offend natural and international law, they belong to the realm of the devil and are inventions of the most mendacious and wicked people that have ever been on earth." Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 380–381.

in a world with basically one book to guide reflection by a minority community rarely in control over its own destiny.

15. Prototypes, not Prophecies: Biblical literalists claim that the 'New' Testament documents document Jesus of Nazareth's fulfilment of prophecies in the 'First' Testament. Ignoring the 'First' Testament tradition of prophecy grounded in Israel's injustices over against the poor and widowed, the 'New' Second' Testament tradition focused on the prophecies of future prognostication as proof of divine causal agency. Strauß illuminates the general interpretative strategy employed in the early Church, which was to build on prototypes found in the "Old" Testament to frame and articulate the meaning and significance of the "New" Testament experience. Especially by shedding light on the construction and further development of miracles stories in the gospels, Strauß clearly indicates the role of "Old" Testament prototypes for the "new" stories, but those prototypes were not limited to miracle stores. The scriptures are not merely capricious constructions of the gospel authors because they, in fact, contain particular, historical elements, but as general narratives they are "theology all the way down" as the "New" Testament authors shaped their accounts according to their theological conceptions – rather than presenting, disinterested, objective historical accounts of events.² Theology is taken here to consist of anthropomorphic analogies "according to human understanding" (κατ' ἀνθρώπων), not "according to absolute truth" (κατ' ἀλήθειαν).³
16. Strauß wrote in Pamphlet II of his *Streitschriften*: "The only question is whether [... the individual who invented and/or changed the gospel story] consciously and intentionally creates or expands the narrative. That the expansion can happen unintentionally, that illustrative features are added, numbers are determined or enlarged, that also by omitting mediating circumstances, by moving the times closer together, the natural can be given the appearance of the miraculous in the retelling, without the re-teller having a dishonest intention, or even the consciousness of a deviation from the truth; that, furthermore, through such changes, each of which is imperceptible in itself, the narrative can appear very substantially transformed in the third, fourth, tenth mouths, without any blame falling on a single one of the mediators: This, like everything else, can be denied, but it

2. Strauß emphasizes that "[...] even if the Old Testament and the sayings of its prophets are admitted as supernatural divine revelation, they do not lead us further than to a Messiah with certain marks and characteristics. We cannot know from the Old Testament that Jesus was this Messiah [with these select messianic characteristics that we chose to portray Jesus as the Messiah], but we must believe Jesus himself and the Evangelists who claim that those Messianic traits were realized in him; so that their credibility is supported in the Old Testament only in appearance by this line of argument [...]" Strauß, *Streitschriften*, II: 62–63. In other words, it is not the First Testament prophecy that proves Jesus is the Messiah but the theological conviction of the Evangelists that Jesus was the fulfilment of certain of the First Testament prophecies attributed to the Messiah, which governed the Evangelists' selection among the First Testament prophecies to apply to Jesus.

3. See Kant, See *Critique of Pure Reason* B 767–768.

can hardly be proven impossible. However, how not only the embellishment or reshaping of an originally historical basis, but also the formation from scratch of unhistorical legends about Jesus could proceed just as unconsciously and without evil intent, that I demonstrated in the second edition of my *LJ* in respect of such features, which lived in the Jewish Messiah expectation, and which therefore, as soon as Jesus was acknowledged as Messiah, were transferred of their own accord into his history [1. Volume, Introduction p. 96 ff; 1st ed.: 71 ff]. The same occurred with such narrations, which seem to have originated from figurative speeches of Jesus; about which one may compare the sections of my writing of Peter's netting of fish and of the cursed fig tree."⁴

17. Rather than engaging the scriptures as a text of descriptive, "*historical theology*" that establishes the historical "facts" that ground "faith," today the scriptures (and religion, generally) require a "*theology of history*" that *identifies the universal conditions and capacities* that allow for the experience of appearances in time, not beyond time. This is not a dogmatic "*theology of history*" grounded in a conservative or a liberal perspective, but a "*theology of history*" that is required for there to be a finite, eminent conscious experience in a world of appearances. Although for the "*theology of history*" the text cannot be read as history, this doesn't mean that there is no factual history that can be un-covered by exegesis. Scholarship can identify pericopes that *in all probability*, but never with certainty are an account an historical event at some time and place. The prohibitive, restricting limit of descriptive, "*historical theology*," though, is that there is not enough factual information to establish either what the actual teaching of Jesus was or to write a biography of him. Shifting to the "*theology of history*" means, furthermore, that the study of religion is concerned with far more than Departments of Religion and Theological schools serving only as 'travel agents' who book the destinations for their clients/students and need to know only as much as their clients about the journey and the process of booking. We need criteria for understanding that are *necessary*, not capricious and arbitrary, and, furthermore, are not declared to be *necessary* for the maintenance of a particular theological perspective. Rather, the criteria for a *theology of historical* understanding are *necessary* because without them there is no experience, understanding, and responsible agency in the world, whatsoever. Not only is the religious health of our children and students at stake, but the preservation of the very conditions of possibility for experience, understanding, and responsible agency is at stake. When it comes to the "*theology of history*," humanity acknowledges the inexplicability of the "givenness" of the universe as it seeks to apply responsibly its autonomous freedom for the husbandry of nature, respect for others, and creation of things that nature on its own could never achieve.

4. Strauß, "Die Herren Eschenmayer und Menzel" (1837). In *Streitschriften* II.: 58–59.

18. Strauß represents a major, if incomplete, step on the path toward the "theology of history" that one finds at what Immanuel Kant called the "core" of all religions.

Genealogies:

Chapter 1:

The Mythical Pre-History of Jesus

First Group of Myths

Jesus, the Son of David (§ 52: 323 ff.)

I & II Kings; I & II Chronicles: Descendants of David down to Zerubbabel, who led the Jews back from Babylon (§53: 324–325)

Genesis 5; 11, conclusion of Ruth, I Chronicles 1; 2: Ascendance of David back to Adam (§53: 325)

Jesus as the Messiah, Born in David's City (§55: 333 ff.)

Bethlehem:

Micah 5:2 (333): "But you, O Bethlehem [...], who are little among the clans of Judah, from you shall come forth for me one who is to be ruler in Israel, whose origin is from of old, from ancient days."

Critical Note: Bethlehem (Matthew: emphasizes Jewishness) is in Judea;

Nazareth (Luke: emphasizes Greek) is in Galilee (334)

Jesus as the Messiah is, like David, inducted

by a Prophet into his Office (§56: 340 ff)

Jesus as Messiah, like David ("every king can be called an anointed one or Messiah" [§62: 373]), inducted by a Prophet:

Spirit upon a new Leader: 1 Samuel 16:13; Isaiah 11:1 ff., 61:1; Joel 3:1 ff. (§56: 342)

Spirit: fire (Matthew 3:1)

Dove (Gen. 1:2) over the "face of the deep" hovering like a dove (§56: 342)

Dove as symbol of blessing in the Noah account: Gen. 8:8–12 (§56: 342)

Voice of blessing: Psalm 2:7 ("You are my son, today I have begotten you.") (§56: 343); Isaiah 42:1 ("Behold my servant, whom I uphold, my chosen, in whom my soul delights; I have put my spirit upon him, he will bring forth justice to the nations.") (§56: 344)

Critical Question: "If Jesus was conceived originally by the Holy Spirit, why need the Spirit descend upon him later?" (§56: 345)

Second Group of Myths

Jesus as Son of God (§57: 347 ff.)

Isaiah 7:14 ("Therefore the Lord himself will give you a sign. Behold, a young woman [term is not "virgin"] shall conceive and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel" ["God is with us"] (§57: 349)

Genealogies:

Critical Note: Typical in Greek world where gods are 'born,' connection between the Messiah and Virgin Birth is not pre-Christian Jewish (§57: 349)

Traditions of Divine Conception:

Pythagoras (Apollo) (§57: 350)

Plato (Apollo) (§57: 350)

Alexander the Great (Zeus) (§57: 350)

Augustus (Apollo) (§57: 350)

Critical Note: With Jesus, though, all sensuousness eliminated (§57: 350)

Angel of the Lord is Gabriel: Daniel 8:16; 9:21; Tobias/Tobit 12:15) (§57: 351)

Paradigm of disbelief over conception of a child: Abraham (Gen. 17:17), Sarah (Gen. 18:12–15), and Public (Gen. 21:6) (§57: 352)

The conception of Samson:

The barren wife of Zorah to whom an angel appeared to say, "Behold, you are barren and have no children; but you shall conceive and bear a son" (Judges 13:3) (§57: 352); [see: "the boy shall be a Nazirite to God from birth to the day of his death." (13:7)]

Appendix: Announcement of the Birth of the Precursor (§58: 352 ff.)

Samuel as paradigm of anointing of "King"/Messiah:

Off-spring of the House of Levi (I Chron. 7:26 ff.); presumably because later practice required the anointing to be performed by a Levite (I Kings 1:39) (§58: 352–353)

Mother of the man anointing the Messiah is to be a descendant of Aaron and namesake of Aaron's wife (Exodus 6:23) (§58: 353)

Prototype for Mary being related to the mother of the man who anointed Jesus:

The claim that the Messiah comes from the priestly class according to the order of Melchizedek (Psalm 110:4) (§58: 353)

As with Sarah, the mother of John the Baptist was long unable to conceive (Luke 1:7) (Gen. 18:11) (§58: 353)

Prototype for the announcement of Elizabeth's pending conception in the temple (Jerusalem) Luke 1:8–13): Samuel's birth was announced as his parents were on a pilgrimage to the holy mountain of Shiloh (I Samuel 1:3; 1:17) (§58: 353)

Prototype of an angel announcing the pending birth, missing in the Samuel story, is found in the account of the barren mother's conception of Samson (Judges 13:13) (§58: 353)

Name of the angel (Gabriel) in Luke's account found in Daniel 8:16; 9:21) (§58: 353)

Prototype of objection to the announcement of a pending conception because of the age of the parents: Abraham and Sarah (Gen 17:17; 18:12) (§58: 354) [see also account of the birth of Samuel (I Samuel 1:5)]

Genealogies:

Prototype for question "How shall I know this?" from Zechariah: Abraham's question in Abraham's vision (Genesis 15:8) (§58: 354)

Prototype for being struck dumb until the prophesized event occurred (Daniel 10:15–16) (§58: 354)

Prototype for the angelic determination of the name of the child: Ishmael (Genesis 16:11) and Isaac (Genesis 17:19) (§58: 354)

Prototype for avoiding wind and strong drink during pregnancy (Judges 13:4, 7, 14) (§58: 354)

Prototype of the prophecy that the child will hold a high office (Judges 13:5, 24 ff) (§58: 354)

Prototype of song of praise in Samuel story (I Samuel 2:1 ff) (§58: 354); songs of praise to compare: Luke 1:47 with I Samuel 2:1; Luke 1:49 with I Samuel 2:2; Luke 1:41 with I Samuel 2:3 ff; Luke 1:52 with I Samuel 2: 8; Luke 1:53 with I Samuel 2:5; Luke 1:48 with I Samuel 1:11, 67 ff) (§58: 356)

Prototype of "twins" in the womb struggling with one another in Rebekah account of Esau and Jacob (Genesis 25:22) and John the Baptist's stirring in Elizabeth's womb upon meeting the pregnant Mary (§58 352 ff.)

Birth of Jesus (§59: 356 ff.)

Angel appearing to shepherd(s) to announce revelation:

Moses (Exodus 3:1 ff) (§59: 357)

David called from shepherding (Psalm 78 :70 ff; 1 Samuel 16 :11) (§59: 357)

Roman Legends: Cyrus and Romulus raised by shepherds (§59: 357)

Angels appearing at night:

People of Israel comforted in darkness (Isaiah 8:21–9:1) (§59: 357)

Isaiah announcing to Ahaz the coming birth of a child to "a young woman" [not a "virgin"] (Isaiah 7:14) (§59: 358)

Whereas it is the father, Jacob, who "kept the saying in mind" with respect to Joseph (Genesis 37:11), it is Mary "kept all these things, pondering them in her heart" (Luke 2:19) (§59: 358) (§56: 390)

Jesus, the Incarnated Word of God (§60: 358 ff)

Double creation (Genesis 1:27 and 2:7 ff) (§60: 360):

[God created analogously to the way that human beings do. The act of creation is that God thought a system of ideas (the Logos/Sophia) followed by the second creation achieved by arranging the materials and initiating the proper sequences for the creation of a physical copy of the ideas. Double creation is the activity of an anthropomorphic deity and called in the High Middle Ages "Intellectualist" whereas in Strauß' time it was called "Rationalist" (Paulus, Schleiermacher, Bretschneider, and de Wette). Even God as creator of His ideas (Logos/Sophia) cannot create/act contrary to His rational (that is, lawful) order. Rationalism/Intellectualism was challenged in the High Middle Ages by Nominalists who viewed ideas as abstractions drawn out of phenomena and "named" (hence, Nominalism) by

Genealogies:

finite consciousness. Rather than the central and first act of creation being "ideas" (Logos/Sophia), for Nominalists the central act of creation was also accounted for by a different anthropomorphic analogy: exercising of the will. Because God is perfect, whatever He wills is perfect – even if it is contrary to any rational/lawful order. This school of theism was called "Voluntarist"/"Occasionalist" (will) in contrast to "Intellectualist" (ideas/law).

[Rationalists/Intellectualists take their anthropomorphic model of creativity from Plato's description of the world by the "Demiurge" in the *Timaeus*. Voluntarists/Occasionalists take their anthropomorphic model of creativity from Aristotle, who in his *Nicomachean Ethics* describes agency as always aiming toward the good. Whereas humanity is finite and its "aiming toward the good" is a matter of cultivating habits of moral virtue (seeking the "mean" between excess and deficiency), God always hits the mark of the good because He is perfect.

[In part, Strauß' radicality is that he rejects BOTH anthropomorphic theological options. On the one hand, he rejected the Rationalists of his day who tried to account for the miracles in the gospels as mistaken perception on the part of a public unaware of physical lawfulness and tended toward spiritualism (Justinus Kerner and Strauß' own father) and romantic mysticism (F.W.J. Schelling, Eduard Mörike, and Schleiermacher) as they focused on the "ultimate" origin/ground of experience rather than this world of "copies and shadows". On the other hand, he rejected Voluntarism/Occasionalism because it would undermine all human understanding of phenomena. If Voluntarism/Occasionalism were correct, events could occur capriciously by divine agency rather than having to always conform to a rational order/lawfulness.

[In his 1835 *Life of Jesus*, Strauß was a Hegelian. Within a decade he was disenchanted with Hegelianism. In the 1860s his circle of friends "returned to Kant," and Strauß did so in part, as well. However, although "on the way" to Kantian understanding of religion, I maintain that he did not fully grasp the Kantian theological model that stands as an alternative to Rationalism/Intellectualism and Voluntarism/Occasionalism.]

Philo's double creation [in *de opificio Mundi* 16, 75] (§60: 360)

[Strauß maintains that Alexandrian Jewish theology did not personify the Logos. (361) However, Paul Heinisch in *Der Einfluss Philos auf die älteste christliche Exegese. (Barnabas, Justin und Clemens von Alexandria)* (Münster: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Buchhandlung, 1908): 211, points out that for Clement Moses "is seen to be the prototype of the Messiah [...] the 'living law' [...]" Henry Chadwick in "St. Paul and Philo of Alexandria" in *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 48 (1966): 301 and note 8, points out that "[...] the language that he [Philo] uses about Moses is incarnational." David T. Runia in *Philo in Early Christian Literature* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993): 67, speaks of Philo's "incarnational

Genealogies:

language used of Moses; above all the language of Colossians reminds us strongly of Philo". See Philo of Alexandria, *de Vita Mosis* I: 29,48, 60–62, II: 10]

Paul: Jesus is the second Adam, the image of God, who in heaven stands over against the earthly Adam (I Corinthians 15:5 ff; II Corinthians 4:4) (§60: 360)

Colossians 1:15–17: "He [the Son of God] is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of all creation; for in him all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible [...] all things were created through him and for him. He is before all things, and in him all things hold together." (§60: 361)

Job 28:12 ff speaks of "wisdom" [Sophia = Logos] as the "place of understanding" "is hid from the eyes of all living [...] 'We have heard a rumor of it with our ears.'

God understands the way to it, and he knows its place [...] Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom; and to depart from evil is understanding." (60: 362)

Wisdom 8 and 9, writes Strauß, that wisdom here "[...] even if it was not the intention of the author, can be thought of as a personification." (§60: 362)

[Proverbs 3:13–20: "Happy is the man who finds wisdom (*Sophia* here plays the role that *Logos* plays in Philo and the Fourth Gospel), and the man who gets understanding, for the gain from it is better than gain from silver and its profit better than gold. She is more precious than jewels, and nothing you desire can compare with her. Long life is in her right hand; in her left hand are riches and honor. Her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace. *She is a tree of life to those who lay hold of her*; those who hold her fast are called happy. The Lord by wisdom founded the earth; by understanding he established the heavens; by his knowledge the deeps broke forth, and the clouds drop down the dew." (emphasis added)]

Third Group of Myths

Jesus, the Other Moses (§62: 368 ff.)

Mortal Danger and Rescue as Consequence of the Star of Bethlehem

Seutonius (69–140 CE): The theme of mortal danger and miraculous rescue of a child designated for great things is one of the fundamental themes of hero legends. (§62: 368)

Prototype of the star (Numbers 24:17) (§62: 372)

The Messiah was not merely the star of Jacob, he was "light" (Isaiah 60:1) (§63: 374) [Isaiah 60:19–21: "The sun shall be no more your light by day, and for brightness shall the moon give light to you by night; but the Lord will be your everlasting light, and your God will be your glory [...] Your people shall all be righteous; and they shall possess the land for ever [...]]

Gold and Frankincense (Isaiah 60:6) (§62: 375)

Bringing of gifts to a king who brings liberation from oppressors as well as justice (Psalm 72:10) (§62: 375)

Myrrh (Psalm 45:9) (§62: 375)

Genealogies:

"The account in the first gospel of the Magi and their star is the consequence of the combination of two messianic prophecies: Balaam and Deutero-Isaiah. From Balaam comes the star and that those who see it are astrologers; from Deutero-Isaiah comes the trait that they follow the star and brought gifts, gold and incense – to which the evangelist added myrrh from Psalm 45:9." (§62: 375)

Magi go First to Jerusalem

Prototype could be the Isaiah passages above (§63: 375–376)

Herod as the "second Pharaoh," who would have killed the designated child along with the others – were not a higher power to have intervened (Exodus 2:1) (§63: 376)

Murder of children (Jeremiah 31:15) (§63: 379)

Path to rescue leads out of the country (Exodus 2:15) (§63: 379–380)

Moses took his wife and children back to Egypt (Exodus 4:20) (§63: 380): Joseph assumes the role of Moses Matthew 2:20 ff) (§63: 380)

God "calls his son" out of Egypt (Hosea 11:1) (§63: 380):

"Granted, the passage speaks of the son of God; but God's Son was the Jewish-Christian exegesis of the Messiah Jesus; therefore, had God called his son out of Egypt, so must Jesus (and as a child in accordance with Hosea) have been in Egypt." (§63: 380)

Matthew is eager to demonstrate the fulfilment of prophecies by the accounts of Jesus' life (§63: 381)

Examples: Joseph's going to Bethlehem (Micha 5:1), a "righteous branch of David"

(Isaiah 11:1, Jeremiah 23:5, 33:15, Zachariah 3:8, 6:12) (§63: 381)

Aside: Jesus in the Temple (§64: 381 ff.)

Luke 2:52: "And Jesus increased in wisdom and in stature, and in favor with God and Man" (Judges 13:24; [I Samuel 2:16]) (§64: 384)

Jesus, like Moses and Samuel, Engaged His Higher Calling Early (§64: 387 ff.)

As August according to legend is said to have been laid in a cradle on the ground floor of the house by his nanny only to be missing the next morning and found at the highest point of the house (a tower), the story evokes a connection to his having been conceived by the Sun God, Apollo. That Jesus as a child is said to have disclosed his wisdom in his "father's house," the temple, is from the same genre. (§65: 387)

Similarly, Cyrus, raised secretly as a child of a shepherd, was revealed to be the son of the king by the way he played the role of the king with his young friends. (§65: 387)

According to Josephus, Moses' wisdom was unusual for his age, and Philo reports that Moses did not play with children's toys but only engaged in serious activities so that at an early age he demonstrated his wisdom as greater than his teachers. (§65: 388)

Similarly, Samuel (I Samuel 1:25) was a child the first time he was called in the night by Jehovah (3:1 ff) (§65: 388)

Genealogies:

At the age of 12 both Solomon and David were said to have issued wise judgments (§65: 388)

The Messiah Jesus Resisted the Temptation
to which the People Succumbed in the Wilderness
under Moses Leadership (§66:391 ff.)

Prototypes for Satan's testing of Jesus:

Hercules, Abraham (Genesis 22), and David (I Samuel 17) passed the test of temptation (§66: 391)

Israel failed (391); Israel was tested for 40 years in the wilderness to see if it would adhere to the Sinai law (Deuteronomy 8:2) (§66: 31)

Paul viewed "all this" as an example and warning in the end times (§66: 391)

David was "tempted" by Satan to hold a census of Israel (I Chronicles 22:1) (§66: 392–393)

In the Babylonian Talmud, Satan tests Abraham, and in the Prolog to Job, Satan tests Job (§66: 393)

1st Temptation of Jesus – Hunger (40 day fasting in the desert) (Matthew 4:1–4):

Israel complained in the wilderness over hunger (Exodus 16) and demanded meat (Numbers 11) (§66: 394)

Moses fasted 40 days on Sinai (Exodus 34:28; Deuteronomy 9 :9); similarly, Elijah on his way to Mt. Horeb/Sinai (I Kings 19:8) (§66: 394)

Deuteronomy 8:2–3: "And you shall remember all the way which the Lord your God has led you these forty years in the wilderness, that he might humble you, testing you to know what was in your heart, whether you would keep his commandments, or not. And he humbled you and let you hunger and fed you with manna, which you did not know, nor did your fathers know; that he might make you know that *man does not live by bread alone, but that man lives by everything that proceeds out of the mouth of the Lord.*" (emphasis added) (§66: 395)

Passage from Deuteronomy quoted by Matthew 4:4 (§66: 395)

2nd Temptation of Jesus – Test God by throwing himself from the temple (Matthew 4: 5–7) (§66: 395):

Jesus answer is a reference to Deuteronomy 6:16: "You shall not put the Lord your God to the test, as you tested him at Massah" (when they complained over lack of water Exodus 17) (§66: 395)

Paul warns against testing God (I Corinthians 10:9 ff.) compare with Exodus 17:1 ff and Numbers 21:4–5 (§66: 395)

Ahaz doesn't want to put God to the test (Isaiah 7:12) (§66: 395)

Israel "tested God" in the wilderness demanding food and water (Psalm 78:18.20) (§66: 395)

Israel demanded meat in the wilderness (Numbers 11) (§66: 395)

Genealogies:

God will provide protection that no evil will cause harm to "He who dwells in the shelter of the Most High" (Psalm 91:1, 11–16) (§66: 395)

In answer to the question "Who shall ascend the hill of the Lord? And who shall stand in his holy place?" (Psalm 24: 3), the answer is given "He who has clean hands and a pure heart, who does not lift up his soul to what is false, and does not swear deceitfully. He will receive blessing from the Lord, and vindication from the God of his salvation" (Psalm 24:4–6) (§66: 395–396)

3rd Temptation of Jesus – Idol Worship (Matthew 4:8–10) (§66: 396):

Prohibition against graven images: Paul I Corinthians 10:7 (Exodus 32:6) [Exodus 20:4]) (§66: 396)

Prohibition against worshipping other gods (Deuteronomy 6:13 ff) (§66: 396)

Chapter 2: The mythical History of Jesus' Public Life (402)

First Group of Myths

Jesus and his Predecessor (403)

Second Group of Myths

Jesus and His Disciples (§69: 409 ff.)

Elijah called his Servant and Successor Elisha (I Kings 19:19 ff) (§69: 409)

Third Group of Myths

Jesus as Miracle Worker (§71: 425 ff.)

Healings of the Blind (§71 425 ff.)

Isaiah 35:5–6: "Then the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and the ears of the deaf unstopped; then shall the lame man leap like a hart, and the tongue of the dumb sing for joy" (§71: 426)

In the Isaiah passage, there is no mention of healing lepers, but Elisha healed a leper (§71: 427)

Both Elijah and Elisha raised the dead (§71: 427)

Driving out of demons is also not found in the Isaiah passage or in the legends of the prophets "because in earlier times possession by demons was not the order of the day [...]" (§71: 426; see §74: 446)

Spiritual and Real factors in the Miracles: "What is said of healing of the blind, deaf, and lamed in the Isaiah passage has nothing to do with miraculous rehabilitation but somehow figurative and spiritual; in contrast the deeds of Elijah and Elisha are real miraculous works, and it was the real miraculous works that the later Jewish people expected of the Messiah." (§71: 427, see §74: 446)

In the passage attributed to Jesus (Matthew 11:5): "[...] the blind receive their sight and the lame walk, lepers are cleansed and the deaf hear, and the dear are raised up, and the poor have good news preached to them," "without question its original meaning as well as the healings and raisings from the dead were understood only morally and spiritually, as the effect of the preaching of the gospel to the poor; the evangelical legend took them to be real, as actual physical miracles [... although] in

Genealogies:

the fourth gospel the originally spiritual character of these miracles again came to the fore." (§71: 427)

Healings of the Lame (§72: 432 ff.)

Isaiah 35:6 and 3 ("Strengthen the weak hands, and make firm the feeble knees") offer the "First" Testament scriptural expectation of the Messiah (§72: 432–433)

In I Kings 13:4 ff, the affliction of the hand is first a punishment followed by a divine restauration of the hand whereas in the gospels the affliction is simply given and the miracle heals it. Nonetheless, Matthew 12:10 (Mark 3:3; Luke 6:6) uses the same language of the withered hand as in I Kings 13:4 "so that the imitation is difficult to misconstrue". (§72: 436)

Tacitus (d. 120 CE) tells of Vespasian's healing of a blind man and a man with a withered hand. (§72: 4536–437)

Healings of Lepers, Deaf, and Dumb (§73: 441 ff.)

Isaiah 35:5–6 (§73: 441; see as well §72: 432–433)

God afflicts Moses with a leprous hand only to restore it as a sign for the Hebrews in Egypt that he is sent from God (Exodus 4:6–8) (§72: 441)

Moses' sister, Miriam was afflicted by God with leprosy. Only with the appeal to Moses and his appeal, in turn, to God resulted in the healing of the leprosy after seven days of isolation from the community (Numbers 12:1–15) (§73: 441)

Referred to by Luke 4:27 is the healing of Naaman, commander of the Syrian army, of leprosy by Elisha (II Kings 5:1 ff) (§73: 441–442)

No healing of lepers in John's gospel (§73: 444)

Healing of deaf as proclaimed by Isaiah 35:5–6 (§73: 444, see §72: 432–433)

Healings of Possessed (§74: 446 ff.)

"First" Testament prophets did not speak of demon possession (§74: 446, see §72: 426)

"[...] belief in demonic possession and the power of the Messiah over them is particularly Jewish and Jewish-Christian [...]" (§74: 454–455)

Matthew 11:4 refers to the blind, the lame, lepers, the deaf, and resurrection of the dead, but not to demon possession

Matthew 17:14–21, Mark 9:14–29, Luke 9:37–43 report that the disciples were unable to heal an epileptic boy, but Jesus did. Elisha sent his servant, Gehazi, to lay Elisha's staff on a dead child, but the child "did not awake". Elisha came and raised a boy from the dead himself (II Kings 4:32–35) (§74: 451–452)

Demon and demonic refers "in classical Greek usage as by the evangelist John himself said (John 10:20) is equivalent to insane or mad" (§74: 452)

Involuntary Healings and Healings Across a Distance (§75: 455 ff.)

Naaman, commander of the Syrian army, suffered from leprosy, and Elisha sent a messenger to him saying that he should wash in the Jordan seven times. Naaman did and was healed (II Kings 5:10–14) (§75: 463)

Raising of the Dead (§76: 463 ff.)

Genealogies:

Not included in Isaiah 35:5–6, but both Elijah (I Kings 17:17 ff) and Elisha (II Kings 4:18 ff) raised persons from the dead (§76: 463–464)

A future resurrection of the dead is prophesied in Daniel 12:2; Pharisaic Judaism taught a future resurrection (II Maccabees 7) (§76: 464)

The Sadducees denied resurrection (§76: 464)

Whereas the prophet required repeated effort to raise the dead (I Kings 17:17 ff and II Kings 4:18 ff), Jesus simply took the hand of a child and restored her to life (Matthew 9:18 ff) (§76: 465–466)

Elijah and Elisha raised a boy from the dead, Jesus both a boy and a girl (§76: 468)

Resurrection of Lazarus (§77: 470 ff.)

John is unaware of the two resurrection stories (in addition to the Lazarus story) in the synoptics (§77: 476)

Lazarus story is John's creation (481); although Luke has a story of the poor Lazarus (Luke 16: 19 ff) (§77: 481)

Lake Stories (§78: 486 ff.)

Jehovah "rebuked" the Red Sea (Psalm 106:9): Synoptics use the same Septuagint word (Matthew 8:26; Mark 4:39; Luke 8:24) for "rebuked" (§78: 489–490)

"He [Jehovah] spoke, and raised the stormy wind, which lifted up the waves of the sea. They mounted up to heaven, they went down to the depths; their courage melted away in their evil plight; they reeled and staggered like drunken men, and were at their wits' end. Then they cried to Jehovah in their trouble, and he delivered them from their distress; he made the storm be still, and the waves of the sea were hushed." (Psalm 107:25–29) (§78: 490)

Multiplication of Loaves and Fishes (§79: 496 ff.)

Psalm 107:4–9 also gives an account of God satisfying the thirst and feeding His people in the wilderness: "Some wandered in desert wastes, finding no way to a city to dwell in; hungry and thirsty, their soul fainted within them. Then they cried to the Lord in their trouble, and he delivered them from their distress; he led them by a straight way, till they reached a city to dwell in. Let them thank the Lord for his steadfast love, for his wonderful works to the sons of men! For he satisfies him who is thirsty, and the hungry he fills with good things." (§79: 496–497)

Strauß refers to a rabbinic saying based on Deuteronomy 18:15 ("The Lord your God will raise up for you a prophet like me [Moses] from among you, from your brethren – him you shall heed."): "as with the first savior so with the last savior, one expected especially from the Messiah a new distribution of manna." (§79: 497)

Elijah miraculously increased amounts of flour and oil for a widow (I Kings 17:7–16) (§79: 497)

Elisha performed food miracles, especially (II Kings 4:42–44): "A man came [...] bringing the man of God bread of the first fruits, twenty loaves of barley, and fresh ears of grain in his sack. And Elisha said, 'Give to the men that they may eat.' But the servant said, 'How am I to set this before a hundred men?' So he repeated, 'Give them

Genealogies:

to the men that they may eat, for thus says the Lord, "They shall eat and have some left." So he set it before them. And they ate, and had some left, according to the word of the Lord." (§79: 497, 505–506)

In the wilderness with Moses, the people of Israel not only were miraculously provided manna but also quails (Exodus 16:13 ff) (§79: 498)

The people of Israel complained that there was little hope for sufficient provisions for such a large number in the wilderness, and God told Moses to tell the people "you shall see whether my word will come true for you or not" (Numbers 11:21–23) (§79: 500)

Water to Wine (§80: 506 ff.)

Whereas God provided water for the people of Israel in the wilderness (Exodus 17, Numbers 20), Jesus spoke rather of wine, provided a miraculous quantity of wine, and fulfilled the role of the groom providing for his guests (Matthew 9:17, 11:18 ff, 11:26, 29; John 3:29; Revelation 19:7, 21:2,9, 22;17 (§80: 506)

Only in the gospel of John, though, do we have the miracle of turning water into wine (§80: 508)

Curse of the Fig Tree (§81: 513 ff.)

Reference to the fig tree in the "First" Testament associated with apostasy (Hosea 9:10: "Like grapes in the wilderness, I found Israel. Like the first fruit on the fig tree, in its first season, I saw your fathers"; Micah 7:1–2: "Woe is me! For I have become as when the summer fruit has been gathered, as when the vintage has been gleaned: there is no cluster to eat, no first-ripe fig which my soul desires. The godly man has perished from the earth, and there is none upright among men" (§81: 513)

Fourth Group

The Transfiguration and Entrance of Jesus into Jerusalem (516)

The Transfiguration (§82: 516 ff.)

"In a Jewish text we read with respect to the story of Exodus 34:29 ff: "See, Moses, our teacher, happy memory, who although a mere man took on such a radiant countenance because God spoke with him face-to-face that the Jews dared not go near him" (§82: 516–517)

Gospel writers drew on the stories of Moses (Exodus 24:1 ff and 34:29 ff) (§82: 518)

Moses took three men (Aaron, Nadab, and Abi'hu) aside with him although only Moses came "near to God" (Exodus 24:1–2, 9) (§82: 518)

Six days Moses was enshrouded by a cloud on Mt. Sinai (Exodus 24:15–16) (§82: 518)

As Moses came down from Mt. Sinai, he was filled with anger over the apostasy of the people of Israel (Exodus 24:14) at the influence of Aaron (Exodus 32:21–24), Jesus encountered a possess child, and his first reaction is displeasure over the inability of his disciples to exorcise the demon. (§82: 518)

Several elements in the Transfiguration story are found in the Mosaic account on the mountain itself (Cloud: Exodus 19:16, 24:16, 18) (§82: 518–519)

Genealogies:

The address to the disciples has parallels in Isaiah 42:1 ("Behold my servant, whom I uphold, my chosen, in whom my soul delights; I have put my spirit upon him, he will bring forth justice to the nations" and Psalm 2:7 ("I will tell of the decree of the Lord: He said to me, 'You are my son, today I have begotten you.'") (§82: 521)

The command to heed Jesus' words is paralleled in Deuteronomy 18:15 ("The Lord your God will raise up for you a prophet like me [Moses] from among you, from your brethren – him you shall heed – ") (§82: 521)

Entrance into Jerusalem (§83: 522 ff.)

According to Daniel 7:13, the Messiah is to "come on the clouds of heaven" (§83: 523)

According to Zachariah 9:9, the Messiah will ride into Jerusalem on a donkey (§83: 523)

Exodus 4:20 reports: "So Moses took his wife and his sons and set them on an ass, and went back to the land of Egypt [...]" (§83: 523)

Matthew had a source for his "two donkey" in Zachariah 9:9 from mistaking the doublet of Hebraic poetry⁵ and in Exodus 49:11 ("Binding his foal to the vine and his ass's colt to the choice vine he washes his garments in wine and his vesture in the blood of grapes") (§83: 523)

5. In Pamphlet III of the *Streitschriften*, Strauß acknowledges that in the second edition of the *LJ* he removed his discussion of the two donkeys in Matthew 21:2–3 from the first edition of 1835 not because it made "[...] a mockery of the Holy One [Jesus] but lacked consideration for the weak." Strauß, "Die Evangelische Kirchenzeitung" in *Streitschriften zur Verteidigung meiner Schrift über das Leben Jesu und zur Charakteristik der gegenwärtigen Theologie*, III Heft. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1980: 29. In the first edition of the *LJ*, he attributed the translation error of Zachariah 9:9 to Matthew's author, who had to have misunderstood the role of doublets in Hebrew poetry. See Strauß, *Das Leben Jesu kritisch bearbeitet* (1st ed. 1835), 2 Bände (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2012) II: 290. Consequently, the author of Matthew could not have been an eye witness of Jesus' entrance into Jerusalem.

Strauß was a defender of the 'Griesbach Hypothesis' that viewed Matthew as containing more history than the other gospels. (See "Schriften über den Ursprung des ersten kanonischen Evangeliums" in *Charakteristiken und Kritiken. Eine Sammlung zerstreuter Aufsätze aus den Gebieten der Theologie, Anthropologie und Aesthetik* (Leipzig: Verlag von Otto Wigand, 1839): 279 and *LJEGP*: 97; see 489, as well.) However, he also agreed with Griesbach that there were prototype 'original gospels' from which the gospel authors drew. (See Strauß, *Ibid.*: 85–87; see 520 and 540.) Strauß' conviction that Matthew is the first written gospel rests on the 'Jewish-nationalistic' character of Matthew (see Strauß, *ibid.*: 116) and suggests that its author was closer to the sources (see Strauß, *ibid.*: 600–601. Strauß takes this 'Jewish-nationalistic' character of Matthew to indicate its author's characteristic theological 'tendency' and distinguishes its theological tendency from those of the other gospels. (See Strauß, *ibid.*: 114–115.) Nonetheless, that Matthew is taken by Strauß to be closer to 'history' than the other gospels by no means leads to the conclusion that it is an 'historical' account of the ministry of Jesus. Strauß quotes Reimarus: "[...] among all the writers of the New Testament there is none who mistreats the words of Scripture more violently than Matthew. For I [Reimarus/Collins] may freely say that there is not one of them who was concerned with the events with his natural mind who applies such fantasies as Matthew attributes to them." Strauß, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus*: 369

Genealogies:

Chapter Three

The Mythical Story of the Suffering, Death, and

Resurrection of Jesus (527)

First Group of Myths

The Meal in Bethany and the Passover Meal (527)

The Meal in Bethany and the Anointing of Jesus (§84 527 ff.)

The Passover Meal and the Introduction of the Eucharist (§85: 533 ff.)

John 19:37 ("And again another scripture says, 'They shall look on him whom they have pierced.'") to be compared to Zachariah 12:10 ("And I will pour out on the house of David and the inhabitants of Jerusalem a spirit of compassion and supplication, so that, when they look on him whom they have pierced, they shall mourn for him, as one mourns for an only child, and weep bitterly over him, as one weeps over a first-born.") (§85: 541)

Washing of Feet, including Prophesying Betrayal
and the Denial of Jesus (§86: 542 ff.)

Second Group of Myths

Gethsemane Soul Searching and Arrest (547 ff.)

Gospel of John's Take on the Story (§87: 547 ff.)

Arrest of Jesus (§88: 555 ff.)

Third Group of Myths

Examination and Judgment of Jesus (559 ff.)

The Trial before the High Priest
and Denial by Peter (§89: 559 ff.)

Death of the Betrayer (§90: 563)

II Samuel 17:23: "When Ahithophel saw that his counsel was not followed, he saddled his ass, and went off home to his own city. And he set his house in order, and hanged himself [...]" (§90: 564)

Zachariah 11:13: "Then the Lord said to me, 'Cast it into the treasury' – the lordly prince at which I was paid off by them." (§90: 565)

Psalms 109:18: "He used to wrap curses round him like a cloak, let them soak right into him like water, deep into his bones like oil." (§90: 567–568)

Psalms 69:23: "may their eyes grow dim, go blind [...]" (§90: 567)

Trial before Pilate and Herod (§91: 568 ff.)

Fourth Group of Myths

Crucifixion, Death, and Burial of Jesus (575)

The Crucifixion (§92: 575 ff.)

Isaiah 53 (taken to be account of rejection, persecution, and suffering of the Messiah) (§92: 578, 581–582)

Psalms 22 begins with "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" and proceeds with lamentation (§92: 578, 579–580, 580–581)

Genealogies:

Psalm 69 a cry for salvation (§92: 578)

Words from the Cross (§93: 583 ff.)

Psalm 22:1: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" (§93: 583)

Psalm 31:5: "Into thy hand I commit my spirit; thou hast redeemed me, O Lord, faithful God" (§93: 584)

Isaiah 53:12: "Therefore I will divide him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong; because he poured out his soul to death, and was numbered with the transgressors; yet he bore the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors" (§94: 585)

Miracles at Jesus' Death (§94: 587 ff.)

Murder of Caesar and eclipse of the sun (§93: 587)

Tearing of the Veil of the Temple: Legends concerning the breaking open of closed gates are told of Caesar, Claudius, Nero, and Vespasian (§93: 587)

Paul in II Corinthians 3:13–18 refers to Exodus 34:33–35 (§94: 588)

Earthquake image echoes Elijah's experience on Mt. Sinai (I Kings 19:11–12); though here the earthquake is connected to the opening of graves (§93: 589)

Piercing the Side of Jesus with a Lance (§95: 591–592)

Zachariah 12:10: "And I will pour out on the house of David and the inhabitants of Jerusalem a spirit of compassion and supplication, so that, when they look on him whom they have pierced, they shall mourn for him, as one mourns for an only child, and weep bitterly over him, as one weeps over a first-born." (§95: 591–592)

Of the Pascal Lamb, Exodus 12:46: "In one house shall it be eaten; you shall not carry forth any of the flesh outside the house; and you shall not break a bone of it." (§95: 593; see 595); breaking of legs of the crucified was common Roman practice; when not applied to Jesus, the substitute was the lance pierce (§95: 593)

Jesus' Burial (§96: 596 ff.)

Isaiah 53:9 (s. 1 Peter 2:22 – *Glaubenslehre* Vol II, 191 and sinlessness): "And they made his grave with the wicked and with a rich man in his death, although he had done no violence, and there was no deceit in his mouth." Jesus must be buried in the grave of a rich man. (§96: 597)

Isaiah 22:16: "What have you to do here and whom have you here, that you have hewn here a tomb for yourself, you who hew a tomb on the height, and carve a habitation for yourself in the rock?" is directed to an over-confident one whereas Isaiah 33:16 ("This man will dwell on the heights; his place of defense will be the fortresses of rocks; his bread will be given him, his water will be sure") is addressed to a just one. (§96: 596–597)

Daniel 6:17: Daniel was sealed into the den by a stone on which the king's signet was placed. (§96: 600)

Jonah 1:17: "[...] the Lord appointed a great fish to swallow up Jonah; and Jonah was in the belly of the first three days and three nights." (§96: 600) – [a prototype, but Jesus was "dead" only two nights.]

Genealogies:

Fifth Mythic Group

Jesus' Resurrection and Ascension (601 ff.)

Resurrection (§97: 601 ff.)

Ascension (§98: 612 ff.)

40 days after the resurrection (§98: 612, 615): echoes the 40 years in the wilderness by the people of Israel under Moses.

Psalm 110:1: "The Lord says to my lord: 'Sit at my right hand, till I make your enemies your footstool'" referred by Mark 16:19 (§98: 617)

Daniel 7:13: "I saw in the night visions, and behold, with the clouds of heaven there came one like a sone of man, and he came to the Ancient of Days and was presented before him. And to him was given dominion and glory and kingdom, that all peoples, nations, and languages should serve him; his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom one that shall not be destroyed." (§98: 617–681)

Raised to God: Enoch (Genesis 5:24), Elijah (II Kings 2:11; I Maccabees 2:58) (§98: 618–699)

Overlooked Theme by the Second Testament Authors

Deuteronomy 24:16 and Ezekiel 18:20: No one can be punished as a substitute for another! (Strauß, *Glaubenslehre*, Vol. II: 295)

Vol. II Appendix III: Grounds for Skepticism in Christian Doctrine. "The Threat" to Christianity is not the *Life of Jesus* but the *Glaubenslehre*?

David Friedrich Strauß was appointed to the theological faculty of the University of Zurich, Switzerland in January 1839. The appointment triggered a series of events that led to a Christian, populist coup in September that brought the loss of 15 lives and collapse of the Liberal government. Strauß was accused by the populists of 'destroying Christianity' by 'attacking' the history of the 'Second' Testament gospels and calling them 'myths.' Strauß was pensioned by the government and never entered the classroom (he donated his pension to the poor). Strauß' *Life of Jesus* in 1835 was actually a defense of what Strauß took to be the core doctrine of Christianity: the Incarnation. In 1841, though, he published a two volume work, *Christian Doctrine in its Historical Development and in Conflict with Modern Science (Glaubenslehre)*. In contrast to the *LJ*, Strauß' aim in his *Glaubenslehre* was to demonstrate that the internal logic of Christian doctrine, no philosophical position outside of it, threatened the collapse of its doctrinal teaching from the very beginning of the Christian movement.

From the earliest days of the new, Christian religious movement, there were internal tensions and contradictions to its doctrine that were never resolved. As the church gained status and authority, its doctrine was subject to the whims of power politics as much as theological truth. New challenges emerged from the internal logic of its teachings with the Protestant Reformation being only one moment in long series of challenges. Particularly, in the post-Reformation period with Socinians and Arminians, Jakob Böhme, Spinoza, the Rational Supernaturalists (Leibniz and Lessing), a new phase of criticism shook the foundations of church teaching. The most recent (at the time of Strauß), 'new' Speculative Metaphysics of Hegelianism, crowned this re-thinking of the events that led to Christianity. Hegel's logical meta-narrative of Absolute Spirit's Double Negation placed a new narrative of humanity's role in the achievement of Absolute Knowledge at core of Christian doctrine. The reported historical events of Christianity's origins were not taken to be empirical facts but representations of the 'truth of Spirit' behind and above all facts (representations).

As with his gospel analysis, Strauß is concerned to show in this material that understanding is driving the 'facts' rather than 'facts' driving understanding. Stated theologically: theology drives the determination of 'facts' rather than 'facts' grounding theology. Strauß' metaphysics in the *LJ* takes the accounts in the gospels as mythic representations of 'the truth' (stories, not facts), which is that Absolute Knowledge of Spirit achieved in the individual's consciousness is confirmed to be the goal of history. In the *Glaubenslehre*, Hegelian Absolute Knowledge has been rejected, but Strauß has no adequate metaphysics to replace it. The threat to Christianity in the *Glaubenslehre*

is not only the tradition's internal contradictions but also the lack of an adequate religious perspective as response to Christianity's internal collapse.

Strauß Ignored Kant's Methodology of Skepticism

The importance that I see in this material is how it illustrates Strauß' overlooked opportunity to grasp the value of the very first step of Kant's methodology: skepticism. Wherever the limits to reason are ignored, there's dogmatism. Given those limits, it is impossible to escape skepticism, and skepticism calls into question all dogmatism whether it be the dogmatism of Personal Theism, the dogmatism of the meta-narrative of Hegel, the dogmatism of Nominalism, or the dogmatism of the later Strauß' Materialism. They are grounded in a dictum (*Machtspruch*) and not on the required conditions of possibility for us to experience a world, understand it, and act responsibly in it.

Skepticism does not mean that that over which one doubts is false. It only means that the objective claims do not satisfy the criteria proposed by objectivity itself. Skepticism offers one strategy to achieve certainty, but that strategy is not to insist that one's objective claims must (!) be true even if we cannot empirically establish their truth, 'yet.'

Rather, skepticism's strategy is to seek to establish what conditions are required for there to be doubt in the first place. Skepticism brackets out the objective 'facts' to focus on the subjective 'conditions' for there to be anything like conscious experience, understanding, and responsible agency. This does not mean that skepticism leads to subjective relativism. On the contrary, skepticism is the first step to establishing the *universal* conditions and capacities common to any and all consciousness that make consciousness possible.

Rather than subjective relativism, the 'turn to the subject' establishes the objectively, *universal*, if subjective, elements that any and all consciousness requires to be conscious. Paradoxically, then, the subjective conditions and capacities of consciousness lead to objective necessities, even if those necessities, like all empirical claims to necessity, are incapable of absolute proof. *When in doubt, go for necessities, not certainties!*

What is *necessary* are the subjective conditions of possibility and the capacities of transcendental consciousness that make possible the drawing of (always tentative, no matter how convincing) 'conclusions,' for example, with respect to objective causes, substances, and the ultimate meaning and purpose of life. The 'objective' of subjective

necessities,¹ though, are not the objective causes, substances, and ultimate meaning and purpose of life, themselves. Those we can never establish with certainty.

The 'objective' of subjective necessity consists of the requirement that one *assume objective lawfulness* (physical laws, statistical significance, and algorithms) upon which any and all understanding of 'the facts' depends. This is the lawfulness embedded in any and all causal systems. In other words, objective, causal explanations are not necessary. *What is necessary is the subjective commitment to imperceptible, yet objective because universal, lawfulness that makes possible the conviction that a causal explanation is possible.* What drives the quest for understanding, then, is not the attainment of objective 'truths,' but the conviction that, despite our limits with respect to grasping those truths, all experience, understanding, and responsible agency requires that we assume a lawfulness that is both physical (objective) and moral (subjective). Subjective conditions and capacities necessarily must be combined with a conviction of objective lawfulness/order if we are to be(come) the species that we have the capacities to be(come). *Deny order, and there is no reason to seek understanding, much less assume responsibility for one's agency.*

The task of theology, then, is not to establish reasons for believing what one wants to believe, in the first place. Given the limits to empirical proofs the most lazy exercise of finite reason only seeks reasons for believing what it wants to believe. What is more difficult is to establish the necessities that are *not given directly with empirical phenomena* but, without which, there is no experience of any kind of phenomena. Theology 'seeks things that are not directly there' in perception. Those necessary things that theology and philosophy seek that are not there directly in perception, though, have little if anything to do with wishful thinking and self-interest. They have to do with the transcendental conditions and capacities required in order that any and all consciousness requires to be capable of intentionally doing and creating things that nature, left on its own, could never do or create.

Those universal, transcendental conditions and capacities are, obviously, nothing merely human. They include the 'givenness' of the universe and its significance, not merely the 'givenness' and 'significance' of individual egos. In fact, the conviction that causal systems conform to imperceptible lawfulness *requires* the conviction alone with that lawfulness that it and the universe are dependent upon 'God.' However, given the limits to consciousness/reason, all that we are capable of establishing with respect to 'God' are what the ultimate Noumenon must be in order for us to experience, understand, and to exercise responsible agency in a world.

In short, although incapable of being proved or disproved, all anthropomorphic predicates are driven by wishful and fanciful claims of the highest hubris that, as

1. Necessary, here, does not mean causally determining, according to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, but conditions required merely for experiencing. What the individual actually *does* with these conditions and capacities is caused to a degree by nature but also, to a degree, by the individual's *autonomous, creative freedom* 'above' nature. See the "Foreword:" 42, n. 22.

analogies to human experience, say more about humanity and increase the likelihood that humanity is worshipping itself for no other reasons than such anthropomorphic predicates are by definition incapable of proof or disproof, much less as necessary for finite consciousness to be and do what it does. *Theology needs to rein-in God talk in order to focus on those imperceptible things that are truly necessary.*

Doubts raised by the *Glaubenslehre*

What follows here is a sampling (with supplements) of Strauß' analysis and criticism of the history of Church doctrine in his *Glaubenslehre*. Its purpose is to demonstrate the grounds for legitimate skepticism over the doctrinal claims of the Christian church given humanity's limits. When it comes to empirical, objective claims, the limits to reason make it possible for one to believe whatever one wants. *No one can objectively prove that one is wrong. However, skepticism points out that no one can objectively prove that one is right!*

This conundrum is no justification, though, to say that we must accept any and all objective truth claims because they are incapable of proof or disproof. Such an attitude opens the door to persecution, exploitation, and injustice because it denies (in the name of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism) not to speak of silencing any and all criticism of racism, misogyny, homophobia, child abuse, human trafficking, agism, prejudice over national origin, religious allegiance, etc. If there's nothing but subjective relativism, then we are silenced in the face of conspiracy theories and lying manipulation, calculation, prediction, and control over others for one's (and one's tribe's) self-interest.

The way out of the conundrum is not to scream one's objective truth louder as a way of squelching skepticism or to question the character of those who defend a different objective truth claim. The way out of the conundrum is to seek to identify the subject conditions and capacities and the objective lawfulness without which we cannot be skeptical but which anchor understanding in necessary truths.

Themes that Demonstrate Limits to Reason

Paul invoked the 'limits to reason' to defend the truth of his experience of divine revelation by contrasting God's wisdom and human wisdom (I Cor. 1:20–21). His doing so is an application of attacking one's opponent with one's own weakness. As far as we have ever experienced, the only being who possesses 'wisdom' is humanity, and the claim for God's wisdom is only a projection of an imperfect, finite, human characteristic onto God as 'perfect.' In the current context and in dramatic contrast to

Paul, 'limits to reason' are viewed not as a weakness but as a strength of our species. Without limits, we could not experience, understand, or act responsibly in the world. Of course, with the recognition of 'limits' comes the recognition that humanity is, and cannot be, perfect or obtain Absolute Knowledge.

Strauß used F.C.Baur's *The Christian Doctrine of Atonement and its Historical Development from Most Ancient Time Down to the Present* from 1838 (*Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung und ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung von der ältesten Zeit bis auf die neueste*) in his *Glaubenslehre* of 1841. I present a summary of Baur's theses in the section "Significance of Baur's work on Atonement" in Chapter 5.² Although Baur's aim in *The Christian Doctrine of Atonement* is to establish his own version of Pauline Christology as not only a pre-Gospel theory but also the true Christology. Yet, once Baur's use of the metaphysics of the Hegelian meta-narrative of Double Negation is bracketed out, one is left only with antitheses of contradiction in Christian doctrine. The reader is encouraged to read the Baur summary prior to continuing.

What Strauß presents in his *Glaubenslehre* are a set of themes that, internally to Church doctrine, force skepticism with respect to objective faith claims (in truth κατ' ἀλήθειαν: absolute truth claims). This summary of themes, though, is not presented with the aim of undermining faith but to establish faith (in truth κατ' ἄνθρωπον: limited human truths)³ in necessities:

Scriptures: 'Revelation' is an anthropomorphic notion. Humans have to express their internal thoughts for them to be received by others. The history of scriptures is their serving as a record of how humanity has thought about 'ultimate' concerns on the basis of its own finite capacities. The text is not a factual record of historical events but a collection of stories that are stimulated 1) by an historical event (to communicate its meaning); 2) by a theological idea (to account for its significance); or 3) by a religious symbol (e.g., the Kingdom or Commonwealth of God). In other words, finite understanding drove facts, not facts infinite understanding.

Following what assumed to be Jesus' own strategy for understanding himself (see: Luke 24:27; 24:44; 22:37), Jesus/the Christ was understood to have suffered a certain fate for God's purposes, which were 'clearly' announced in the 'First' Testament: For example, several calamity Psalms (Ps. 16:8 ff. by Acts 2:25 ff.; Ps. 22:18) were re-interpreted by the gospel authors (Matthew 27:35; 39; 43; 46; and John 19:24; 28; Ps. 69:22 by Matthew 27:34; 48 and John 19:29); the sacrificial blood of Moses covenant in Exodus 24:8 was re-interpreted by Matthew 26:26 ff and Hebrews 9:18–19; the slaughtered Pascal lamb in Exodus 12:1–14 was seen the prototype of Jesus' death in Romans 3:25; 1 Cor. 5:7, 1 Peter 1:19, and Hebrews 9:12 ff.

2. See in Chapter 5: "Traces of an Intellectual Crisis:" the section "Significance of Baur's work on Atonement." 591 ff.

3. On the difference between truth κατ' ἀλήθειαν and κατ' ἄνθρωπον, see Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* B 767–768.

Messianic Expectations: Especially, when it came to messianic expectations, the 'Second' Testament is the product of gleaning possible references to the Messiah found in the 'First' Testament some of which were already articulated by the various messianic conceptions in the Intertestamental Period (time between the 'First' and 'Second' Testaments). to articulate early Christian understanding of Jesus and his status as the Christ: The messiah was conceived as a 1) *Political leader* ("New David") who would bring freedom and self-governance "forevermore" (Luke 1:32 f. Acts 1:6); 2) *a ransom to free people from sin* (Matthew 1:21) (but NOT by a suffering and dying Messiah himself but by means of divine judgment [Strafgericht] and the outpouring of the divine Spirit over the reformed remainder); or 3) that *the remission of sin and outpouring of the Spirit would be the task of a preacher of repentance* [Bußprediger] (according to Malachi. 3:32 f., see Luke 1:17) (but NOT by the messiah but his predecessor, Elijah). Jesus is portrayed as himself to be the predecessor (Matthew 4:17; Luke 24:47) associated with the belief in the future coming of the messianic kingdom. Later that predecessor role was attributed to John the Baptist.

The Messiah was conceived of as an individual as a 'mere' human being or a 'higher' being. The understanding of Jesus as himself the Messiah initially swung between two extremes: 1) *a human being* chosen by God (Ebionism/[Dynamic] Monarchianism) and; 2) *a divine being* who only 'appeared' to be human (Docetism); followed by the claim that 3) Jesus was God (as a result of his resurrection [Synoptics], of his coming 'on the clouds of heaven' in reversal of the direction portrayed in Daniel 7:13 or by his union with God prior to creation [Johannine Logos]).

God: Every (!) divine characteristic is the product (!) of anthropomorphic analogy: 'What God's attributes are and how 'He' knows, plans, and intentionally acts are all formulations by the species we know of who 'knows,' 'plans,' and intentionally acts. Divine characteristics (predicates) are all figuratively anthropomorphic.

Creation: Whether 'Intellectualist' (thought precedes will) or 'Voluntarist' (will precedes thought) (for example, Logos theology is Intellectualist; and Duns Scotus is Voluntarist), is conceived analogously thought (Intellectualist) and agency (Will). Thinking about God non-anthropomorphically requires acknowledging 'limits to reason' without taking those limits justify wild speculations.

Indifferentism: Forgiveness is the second wounding of the victim without any indemnity of the victim by the perpetrator, and history is meaninglessness when the goal is an eternal Afterlife ('orthodox' Christian teaching) and/or Mystical union with God (including Schleiermacher and Hegelianism). Indifferentism means that what actually happened in time has no real significance because in the Afterlife everything that has happened in this life is forgiven or merely the passing of fleeting representations required for one to encounter, internally, God/Absolute Spirit.

Furthermore, the dualistic teaching of an eternal heaven and an eternal hell is irreconcilable with a Monotheistic deity.

Salvation: Sacrifice for Remission of Sin formulated as an Economic Contract. Yet to whom was a debt owed?: Was it owed as a ransom (Matthew 20:28) to the Devil who had a legitimate claim to humanity because of its sin of having violated divine law (Colossians 2:14);

OR is the debt one owed to God 'Himself' (Isaiah 43:25), who until Jesus' coming had patiently tolerated humanity's affront to 'His' honor (Romans 3:25–26) with humanity's 'blasphemy consisting in violating the divine Spirit, not the law (Matthew 12:30–32; Mark 9:40, Luke 11:23, 1 John 3:16); OR does God arrange a disempowerment of the Devil by violently destroying the power of the devil, who had power over death (Hebrews 2:15), by breaking into the kingdom of the Devil to rob him (Matthew 12:29). With respect to the devil, was he *deceived* by God to release humanity (Irenaeus and Origen⁴)? Note the anthropomorphic character of the claim that God 'knows,' 'plans,' and 'acts' (by deception) like a human being! A truly omnipotent, God by no means had to murder 'His' Son or deceive the devil to 'free the souls' of humanity – The framework of early Church teaching is Manichaeism (reality is divided into a Good Kingdom and an Evil Kingdom) with the Devil's Evil Kingdom in control of this world.'

Cur deus homo: Anselm of Canterbury's (11th C) 'Why God became Man' defines sin as the 'failure to adhere to God's will' (an anthropomorphic conception of God with a 'will,' not to mention that such 'sinlessness' is *impossible* for a finite creature) by placing humanity above God. Creation, the Fall, history, salvation are all a game of God playing with Himself to achieve eternal applause (Isaiah 43:25).

Perfection, presupposed and insisted upon by Anselm is an anthropomorphic notion that only requires a 'perfect' cause because such a perfect cause is required to satisfy the Principle of Sufficient Reason (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*), grounded in humanity's own experience of finite, 'eminent' causality. Duns Scotus, the Voluntarist (what God wills is Good) saw no need for perfection, that is, a perfect, infinite cause greater than all of creation to cover humanity's infinite debt to God, only for something greater than 'the original sin' of Adam – based by Augustine of Hippo (5th C) on a questionable translation of Romans 5:12.

Restauration to what?: To the state of Adam and Eve in the garden? Then the whole process of 'Fall' and need for redemption would just begin again (Origen and Gnosticism); to the status of angels in heaven (Origen, Pseudo-Dionysius) 'above' humanity? Why create humanity in the first place? The Gnostic conception is that creation is an unfortunate mistake by God's creation of dualism so that God was powerless over the emanation of creation but powerful enough to reverse the process (influx) once it reached the darkest depths (Irenaeus' Recapitulation Theology) – Issue applies to both Covenantalism and Dispensationalism, of course.

Forgiveness and Substitution Theory of Atonement: Is forgiveness a 'natural,' internal process of individual responsibility and effort for moral improvement, or does forgiveness require objective, external assistance? The Substitution Theory of Atonement's anthropomorphic blindness (presupposes an anthropomorphic deity and ignores the finite, imperfect conditions necessary for a creature to be human): The individual can think, act, and make amends for her/his failures *only for her-/himself* – substitution for the other by means of accumulated 'merit' violates the human conditions of possibility for experiencing, understanding, and exercising responsible agency.

4. Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung*: 49.

Rituals:

1. Baptism: Presupposes the Fall [?] and the miraculous power of water to wash away sin (see issue of external, objective source for achieving forgiveness above); as remembrance and commitment of the community to raising the child in a moral community no need for a magic ritual
2. Eucharist: Reformation options for Eucharist (Luther, Zwingli, Calvin) 1) all presuppose anthropomorphic character of God and His Son's offices of high priest, prophet, and king; 2) Luther and Zwingli portray heaven as spatially located somewhere outside of this world (= Jesus is physically located at the right hand of God; Christ is either miraculously physically present in the wine and bread of the Eucharist = Luther; or 'remember as' in the Eucharistic elements = Zwingli, whereas Calvin maintains the contradiction that heaven is ubiquitous although ritual maintains unique presence); Roman Catholic and Lutheran teaching on the Eucharist can't avoid stercoranismus (recipient's own body turns Christ into shit); not to mention the problems with 'Concomitance' or the requirement that both Eucharist elements have the entirety of Christ present in them (e.g., fear of spilling the 'blood' to justify only distributing the 'body' is inconsistent, especially, in light of stercoranismus).

These themes are only a narrow slice of the conundrums, contradictions, and fallacies of Church doctrine. The entire edifice is constructed on the basis of a self-interested wish to 'eliminate guilt,' to 'explain,' and to 'escape from,' the death of the individual – while overlooking the victim(s) of one's 'sin.' Church doctrine is a history of objective claims made about God and humanity that appear to be confirmed by humanity's experience but are incapable as appearances to carry the weight of Absolute Truth placed upon them. The Copernican Turn of Critical Idealism offers an understanding of the human condition within the limits of finite reason that views humanity not as the player of a zero-sum game of self-interested consumption regardless of the consequences for nature or other human beings. Rather, humanity possesses a transcendental consciousness that, in common with all transcendental consciousness, is constitutes a breach in the blind, mechanical causality of nature. Transcendental consciousness is the place in the nature order where a finite, creativity can occur 'above,' but always in conformity with, nature. The *a priori* capacities and capacities of transcendental consciousness anchored in a world make it dependent upon nature but also upon an imperceptible culture that promotes the moral will. Not only is humanity not reduced to 'morality,' but 'creativity,' but also humanity's exercising of its autonomous, creative freedom requires its cultivating its theoretical reason by no means reducible to merely instrumental reason. Not only is a community required for the individual to exercise her/his capacities, but also Critical Idealism by no more denies than it affirms the afterlife because it is beyond the limits of our reason to adjudicate. Nonetheless, the afterlife, whether it exists or not, has an important role to play in motivating human creative, responsible agency in this world.

Above all, though, the attraction of lawfulness and the repulsion over against unlawfulness has nothing to do with a heteronomous moral law (either from God or as a social construction). Rather, the passion for order and the individual's ownership of her/his imperceptible granting of permission to exercise its agency responsibly result in the experience of *a powerful and motivating satisfaction* as it discovers ever more coherent order in experience even when its agency does not bring 'objective' success technically or ethically.

The conditions of possibility and capacities of transcendental consciousness as grounding the feeling of attraction of attraction to lawfulness (including statistical significance and algorithms) and repulsion when confronted with lawless chaos establish transcendental consciousness as final end of nature.⁵ As the final end of nature in this sense, transcendental consciousness is essentially religious but not as a specific institution that defends an objective creed and ritual as grounding the ultimate meaning of life or because humanity achieves 'worthiness' in the eyes of God. Rather, transcendental consciousness is essential religious because of the nature of its conditions of possibility and capacities and its potential to create a culture that promotes the moral will on the basis of the imperceptible, Commonweal of God. In short, the individual knows always and already inwardly whether or not it is 'worthy' of happiness. It needs no objective reward of happiness from society or God to establish its awareness of worthiness.⁶ Religion and transcendental consciousness, then, have the same aim: meaning and satisfaction in life through creative talents and responsible agency supported by a culture that promotes the moral will to exercise one's capacities responsibly.

One may formulate the attraction and repulsion at the core of transcendental consciousness so: The imperceptible conditions of possibility and capabilities of transcendental consciousness make attractive (!) the effort that is required for seeking understanding (theoretical reason) and exercising of responsible agency (practical reason). There is no more or less significant meaning or satisfaction in life than one's acquiring the symbols and skills (theoretical reason) that make for creative agency and accompany one's granting of permission to act responsibly on the basis of wide, moral principles (practical reason) – even when to do so is contrary to one's personal or communal interest and regardless of one's external success or failure. However, when the individual violates the physical order that makes it possible for such technical/pragmatic effort and/or violates the moral order on which her/his granting permission to act depends, it is not the repulsion of technical error itself or the objective/social censorship that is most searing but the internal self-repulsion (!) that haunts the individual far beyond the present moment of self-disappointment.

5. On transcendental consciousness as the 'final end of nature' not because of its accomplishments of technical skill or because of its moral success, but, rather, because of the capacity of practical reason to assume responsibility for its agency, which, in turns, drives its moral efforts as a member of a culture (community that promotes the moral will), see Chapter 5: "Traces of an Intellectual Crisis:" 632, n. 274

6. See Chapter 8: "Strauß' Kant Reading Over his Career:" "γ) Neither Happiness nor Pleasing God, but Worthiness of Happiness in History:" 830 ff.

The faith at the core of Critical Idealism, then, is: *When in doubt, go for necessities, not certainties!*

Appendix IV: Poems Published Posthumously

From:

David Friedrich Strauß, *Poetisches Gedenkbuch. Gedichte aus dem Nachlasse* (Commemorative Book: A Posthumous Collection of Poems), Eduard Zeller, hrsg. (Bonn: Emil Strauß, 1878)

Hegel and Schleiermacher

1.Hegel.

His system was cleverer than he was; that's why the students
Explained the master better than he understood himself.

2.Schleiermacher.

He was cleverer than his system; that's why the students
Who lack his Spirit cut such a poor figure.

circa 1844 (25)

Schleiermacher again.

The stone on which all stumbled
Yesterday as the pious –
How the times change! –
Is praised today as the cornerstone.
We are permitted
Confidently to share with heretics:
Before twenty years pass,
Even we will be among the saints.

A third time.

In his last moment
The disciples were seen coming to him:
Leave us your cloak
And your Spirit, like the prophets! –
He, as he saw their faith,
Granted only half:
The cloak of the church he left,
The Spirit he retained for himself.

circa 1844 (26)

Negative and Positive Criticism.

(Dr. [F.C.] Baur speaks:)

We are like no and yes, like storm and rainbow;
He says: it is not true; I say: it is a lie.

circa 1844 (27)

Old and New Faith
On the 1st Edition.

Apparently spoken fleetingly;
Fleetingly it wasn't:
Executed in so many weeks,
As it was thought through in years.

On the 2nd Edition.

Up, old warrior, leave off your fears,
And gird up your loins:
In the storm you began,
In the storm you shall end.

1872 (181)

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 - Absolute moral duty transformed into relative social constructions of ethical norms, but no ethical perfection 1872 646
 - A creature possessing needs and inclinations leads to the moral ideal - not Kant's autonomous freedom 1835 619
 - A 'genetic' moral theory 1864 167
 - Agrees with Baur - Schleiermacher & Hegel defend a dualistic, perfect versus sensuousness, morality 1835 296
 - Believer must die to nature and sensuousness 1835 202
 - *Be more than merely natural* & recognize all others as human beings - no mention of Kant's autonomous freedom, human dignity, or imperceptible Commonwealth of ends 1872 643
 - Defense against sensuousness is 'mental capacity' - no mention of Kant's 'practical reason' 1872 785
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 - Moral duties are subjective, social constructions 1864 860
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 - More we subject the capricious to an ethical rule the more what is superior arises out of the inferior 1872 643
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 - Only through cooperation does the individual become a human being - no mention of Kant's culture that promotes the moral will 1872 785
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 - Pollution cleaves to the individual only, and does not touch the race or its history 1835 777
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 - Unlike Kant, no perfectly achieved archetype, historically or philosophically, but arises in and through the historical experience of the individual 1865 622
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 - Be 'master of nature' means control over one's own sensuousness 1872 785
 - Bottom-up causality - a gradual development, an emergence of the higher from the lower 1872 643
 - Ceaseless change governed by order and law 1872 643
 - Consciousness is nature's turning inward on itself, not Hegel's Spirit's point of indifference 1872 168
 - *Continuance and harmony of the whole* is preserved through *contrasts & struggles* 1872 643
 - Despite addressing criticism of the subjugation of nature, framework is technological skill, not reflecting judgment 705
 - Employs himself the logic that incomplete understanding no contradiction of hyzoism 1872 286
 - History no longer God playing with Himself but nature playing with itself 1872 627
 - Hylozoism 1872 628
 - Lawfulness internal to nature, not Logos or Absolute Spirit 1872 645
 - Merciless wheels & soothing oil 1872 645
 - Narrative of nature's pessimism replaces Hegelian optimistic divinization of humanity 1872 627
 - No longer Spirit but nature wants to 'know itself' 1872 784
 - Spirit serves nature 627
 - Perfect in every moment turns history into meaningless indifference of particulars 1872 300
 - Perfection - becoming and passing away exist next to one another and complement one another infinitely 1872 640
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 - Species theme embeded in nature's material progress 1872 783
 - Substituted for both Hegel's Spirit and Schleiermacher's Feeling of Dependence 1872 642
 - The earth has always and already achieved its goal even if the earth ceases to be 1872 640
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 - *The new 'faith' is a faith in nature* 1872 636
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 - Strauß' faith is Nominalist 1872 640
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 - After *Glaubenslehre*, took 30 years to reach an alternative to Hegel 1872 627
 - Are humanity's creative achievements, sufferings, inflicted injustices meaningful to Hegel's God? 676
 - As student Strauß troubled 561
 - Christ event is beyond history 1837 288
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 - Daub's Hegelianism correct in placing reason above feeling 1839 580
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 - Dualistic circularity of Hegelian logic 587
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- If correct, true understanding arose out of false biblical representations 609
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- Most far-out Gnostic would not be ashamed of Hegel's meta-narrative 1841 676
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- No satisfactory account of the emergence of understanding of truth by the sciences out of falsehoods of history 1841 609
- Objectivity - the eternal movement by the universal making subjectivity only occurs in the subject as objectivity and true actuality 1841 287
- Rather the Symbolum Quicunque - the Athanasian Creed, than Hegelian superstition 1841 676
- Replaced by bottom-up grand narrative of nature turning inward on itself, not Spirit on Itself 1872 627
- Schleiermacher & Daub - unequivocal break with Hegelians 1839 577
- Strauß criticizes Hegel's claim Absolute Spirit created history to achieve consciousness of Itself 1872 638
- Strauß ridicules the anthropomorphisms of 'the new philosophy' - Hegel & Schelling 1872 637
- Three dialectics from Hegel - epistemology, Double Negation, theodicy 541
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- Vicious hermeneutical circle 1841 590
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 - Claimed he taught that adherence to moral ideal entitled one to consider oneself an object of divine pleasure 619
 - Claimed to teach that awareness of moral ideal alone would lead to unalterable adherence to it 1835 619
 - Claim for an infinite approximation towards the idea is 'deceptive' because unattainable 1835 620
 - Distorted Blade of grass conundrum 1872 884
 - F.C. Baur & Strauß read 'If I can, I should' to mean 'If I can, I must' 1864 616
 - Failed to distinguish between moral ideas and symbolic representations 1835 847
 - Failed to grasp the 'necessity' of Absolute Spirit as the single, a priori synthetic judgment 1835 621
 - Failed to reach Hegel's understanding of history as Spirit coming to awareness of Itself 1835 822
 - Failures of Kant's Christology 1835 821
 - Faulted for no genetic account of the writing of the scriptures 1835 846
 - Grounded moral principles in the text but anachronistically imputed morality of day onto the past 1835 841
 - His Christology is paradigmatic of Hegel's 'moral duty' in the *Phänomenologie* 1835 822
 - His Christology is unhistorical and unphilosophical 1835 821
 - Kant has become the average wisdom of the era 652
 - Long before scriptures, disposition to a moral religion as the pursuit of moral perfection was latent 1835 821
 - Moral consequentialist - historical perception of individual's conformity with the moral ideal 1835 619
 - Moral ideal ideal resides only in reason, not objectively in a single individual 1835 619
 - Morality
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 - Nominal similarity, ultimate difference 542
 - No such thing as 'actual', universal moral principles 1835 843
 - Nowhere criticizes Daub's portrayal of Kant 1839 851
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 - Only humanity's reason alone makes the 'world the object of divine Providence' 1835 618
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 - Pure religion frees the individual from materiality by means of a pure religion of moral ideas 1835 836
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 - Salvation is the development of its in-born powers and the experience of the corresponding quantity of satisfaction that arises from that development 1864 621
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