

Shifting Meridians of Global Authority

Who Is Pushing in Which Direction, and Why?

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Introduction

There is wide variation in the authority structures upholding the current international order, ranging from institutional authority in international organizations and courts, to authority held by states and transnational networks (Alter et al. 2018; Bogdandy et al. 2010; Peters/Schaffer 2013). What factors induce some leading actors and institutions to accept the withering of authority, while others stand up and resist authority transformation, is an open question. It appears to be certain, however, that the dramatic foreign policy shift during the Trump administration has undermined the traditional authority of the United States as a guardian of the liberal world order. Indeed, the Trump administration has attempted to overhaul the rules and principles of the international order that its predecessors established and nurtured to “strike better deals” for a significant minority among the current polarized American electorate (Jervis et al. 2018).

One of the distinct features of the authority of the U.S. global leadership role lay in the self-limitation of its material power by adhering to the universal norms, rules, and institutions within a liberal world order (Ikenberry 2001, 2011). And because authority is a relational concept, establishing rules-based relations between a leader and followers, U.S. authority hinged on the continuous willingness of subordinate actors to support America’s course (Bennett et al. 1997). Today, however, there is considerable evidence that international support for U.S. leadership among key audiences, its allies and partners, their societies and businesses, or tolerance by rivals and enemies, is diminishing (Wike et al. 2017; Shapiro/Pardiijs 2017).

We contend that these strains on U.S. authority have been at work for some time. They arise from several distinct but interconnected sources: First,

and most notably, over the past three decades international institutions have gained considerable authority for themselves, resulting in a substantial politicization of international authority in general (Zürn et al. 2012). Second, and relatedly, domestic institutions in liberal democracies, including the United States, have displayed variant but limited capacities to cope with the cultural and economic discontents of the liberal world order, most dramatically after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008. From a longer-term perspective, the spread of post-modern value systems, including a greater approval of diverse lifestyles, has evoked a cultural backlash in many industrialized countries, while economic pressures for businesses and employees, especially after 2008, have encouraged populist movements, parties, and politicians, to protect “the people” from abusive internationalized elites (Inglehardt/Norris 2016). Third, and more recently, strains in U.S.-led institutions, most notably its alliance system, have been exacerbated by the unintended consequences of expanding the geographical scope of U.S. authority through failed liberal interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya (Anderson et al. 2008; Wickett 2018). Fourth and very much related to the previous points, there is also a growing contestation and opposition towards central tenets of the liberal order, such as free trade, democracy, and liberal values, in non-Western countries and by their respective governments (Acharya 2017, 2018; Mounk/Foa 2018). Rising nationalism in both China and Russia, as well as various forms of populism in Europe, Asia, and Latin America inform strategies to frustrate democratic expansionism and bolster authoritarianism abroad (Tansey 2016; Weyland 2017).

In our reading, America’s turn towards populism under Donald Trump and the demise of the bipartisan internationalist consensus in the U.S. are thus manifestations of a larger trend: unfettered forces of globalization and the costs of U.S. authority expansion have corroded the authority of U.S. leadership and the liberal international order itself both in America, the West, and in many non-Western societies.

From a theoretical perspective, we argue that authority in international relations is constantly transformed on two levels: first, at the level of the state, where modern state authorities were made and are remade through war, trade, and other peaceful exchanges. Second, at the level of inter-state authority, where state authorities’ and other entities’ foreign policies, such as those of the EU, have reconfigured international authority, resulting in various distinctive configurations of legitimate statehood, rightful state actions, and institutional practices of interstate relations (Dunne/Reus-Smit 2017).

There are, of course, different incarnations of authority and domination in inter-state relations, i.e. distinct forms of relational hierarchies in international relations over time (Zarakol 2018). Some of these appear to be compatible with the current liberal order. But some of them are clearly not—for example, those which are primarily based on domination and military coercion because they violate the principle of authority production through self-determination on the state level. As a consequence, we argue that domestic shifts in authority production, i.e. towards illiberalism or authoritarianism, will impact the re-production of international authority.

How different powers choose to relate to the waning U.S. authority, and what kind of hierarchical order emerges through respective “relational shifts” is the focus of our undertaking. We presume that analyzing how and why authority is transformed on the domestic level is essential to better understand the course of new authority patterns on the international level.

Much of the debate about the demise of the liberal order so far has focused on the extent of the decline and the causes that have brought it about.¹ Will the Trump administration destroy the U.S.-led order to make good on its promise to “make America great again?” Or, in turn, is the sustainment of global diversity, liberal and illiberal alike, a prerequisite for reconstructing American democracy at home? Is China committed to the open trading order that seemed to have served large chunks of its society so well, or is it predestined to dominate the Asian region (and how much beyond) (Johnston 2019)?

These are important questions. In this chapter, however, we are focusing on the causal mechanisms that transform authority relations on the domestic level and which, in turn, shape a country’s foreign policy towards authority relations on the international level. We contend that the current theoretical debate about the nexus between national and international authority ascription is biased towards systemic trends shaping domestic authority relations, e.g. in a “second-image reversed”-type of argument (Gourevitch 1978). By focusing on the interaction between systemic trends, globalization, and domestic trends such as populism, domestication, and economization, our chapter adds a new perspective to the debate.

The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we explore different concepts of authority and their nexus with respective international orders. We argue

1 Cf. Acharya 2018, Böller et al. 2018; Ikenberry 2018, 2017; Lake 2018; Nye 2017; Risse 2006.

that authority is a hierarchical relationship that hinges on the recognition of subordinate states and other actors such as transnational non-governmental groups. Domination, in turn, is also a hierarchical relation. But it primarily relies on threats and punishments to alter the behavior and/or disposition towards the superordinate state, thereby establishing international orders without significant institutions.

Taking these two concepts as a baseline against which the transformation of the current order can be gauged, the second section introduces four mechanisms of domestic authority transformation (politicization, domestication, populism, and economization) that are related to or caused by globalization, and that inform respective foreign policy choices to support, contest, or dissent from the current liberal order. The final section examines the distinct patterns of foreign policy choices, ranging from support to opposition or (re-)creation of a new order.

Authority, Domination and the Emergence of International Order

International relations scholars have long debated to what extent, in which context, and why the supposed anarchy between states is layered by rules, principles, institutions, and other manifestations of social relations. Different concepts, such as hierarchies (Lake 2007; Clark 2017; Zarakol 2018), hegemony (Keohane 2005; Hurrell 2007), international status (Paul/Larson/Wolforth 2014; Bially Mattern 2005) or international society (Bull/Watson 1984; Dunne/Reus-Smit 2017) seek to explain material differentiation and/or social stratification of international orders, as well as the resulting manifestations and contestations in that order.

Structuralist accounts of international order and authority foreground the relative positioning of actors in a system according to their material attributes. Geopolitical thinkers posit that powerful states create and sustain international orders that privilege themselves over others. International order, in this sense, entails international legal regimes and institutions only so far as they reduce the costs of governing for the most powerful states, such as in theories of hegemonic stability (Lake 1993). Or the order may be manipulated to the benefit of the hegemon by increasing the number of constitutive entities, so as to weaken a rising opponent, for example through competitive decolonization (Hager/Lake 2000). Contestation towards order, or revisionism as it is preferably called in the realist tradition, is then reduced to

the struggle for power and supremacy between dominant states, while lesser powers and non-state actors are bound to endure what they must (Davidson 2006).

Other “structuralist materialists” stipulate that the distribution of economic prowess, i.e. production capacity, vis-à-vis other classes and powers does instill distinct foreign (economic) policy strategies in states: economic supremacy upholds liberal trade orders in which free trade principles favor the hegemon over lesser powers. In turn, multicentric economic systems increase competition between great powers and spur control over lesser powers’ economic resources (Wallerstein 1980). Contestation, then, ensues when lesser classes and powers in the periphery challenge unequal trade and treaties with the center in order to limit or end their dependency on the latter (Stephen 2014).

Defining Authority

These two examples of structural mechanisms related to material differentiation among states pertain to hierarchical systems. They rely—not exclusively but mainly—on domination by more powerful vis-à-vis subordinate actors. The major difference of these types of hierarchies from those based on authority is the aspect of social recognition. Authority, in our reading, generates a specific form of social hierarchy: one which rests on the recognition of power towards the bearer of authority (Weber 2014; Lake 2010; Hurd 1999; Sennett 2008; Furedi 2013).

Following the conceptualization of Zürn et al. (2012: 83–88), we find that authority is constituted by two layers of recognition: First, actors may grant authority towards other actors or institutions in general, if they believe that these bearers of authority produce a necessary common good for all actors within the order. Here, authority is grounded on the expectation of a specific expertise or capability that obliges the authority to deliver the good or assume a responsibility necessary to uphold the order. Second, subordinate actors recognize authority because they trust that a specific set of rules, norms, and institutions presents a rightful order.² This second layer refers to the traditional reading of authority as the legitimate exercise of power.

2 As Krieger (1977: 259) stipulates, “(i)ndeed, we may say that, if obedience is the counterpart of power, trust is the counterpart of authority.”

Thus, in both international and domestic relations, various actors can only articulate a claim for authority. This claim entails a particular demand. It seeks to implement rules and norms and create institutions which aim to preserve the former. Within these authority relations, both actors, those who are able to claim authority and those who are bound to follow, need to accept these rules and norms, and they need to regularly take part in its institutions to uphold the order. Within institutionalized relationships, actors who successfully claim authority are able to generate rules and norms that are perceived as legitimate and/or necessary within a given order by the other actors.³ Through interactions within this set of rules, norms, and institutions, there emerges a specific system of authority that produces compliance by participating actors. That way, authority also serves as a mechanism of social control (Hurd 1999). At the same time, systems of authority create (permanent) inequalities, both in terms of material distribution as well status and other social ascriptions; for example, the rights and responsibilities of different actors within the order (Clark 2017: 251). However, subordinate actors will accept this stratification as long as the leader also sufficiently obeys the rules and principles he established. Self-restraint is thus a significant factor to retain legitimacy in authority relationships (Lake 2010: 588; Deudney 2007).

It is important to note that authority will seldom be undisputed or uncontested. Nor will the specific order created by this authority pertain to all actors on a global scale (Reus-Smit/Dunne 2017: 37). It is thus an empirical question as to how far-reaching and expansive a particular claim to authority is.

International Authority as a Relational Concept

The feature of recognition and assent by subordinate actors recasts authority as a distinct form of hierarchy (Bially Mattern/Zarakol 2016: 627). Thus far, research on international hierarchies has primarily focused on power, status, and questions of the superiority of one actor compared to others. It includes authoritative rule and domination without the specific characteristics of legitimacy, such as accountability, transparency, participation, expertise, etc. In contrast to international authority, the concept of hierarchy is also more static, as it usually does not specify the corridor of acceptable actions that

3 In the words of Beetham (1991): “a given power relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms of their beliefs.”

groupings of authority delimit. Hierarchies thus typically pertain across policy areas, whereas authority structures, such as those of international courts, can be highly circumscribed both in functional and temporal terms (Alter et al. 2018). It follows that authority relations are continuously re-evaluated and re-made by actors as they are subject to constant contestation, transformation, and decline, as well as expansion. It also follows that legitimization as a central source of authority varies over time and policy areas as the accountability, transparency, and participation in authority relationships waxes and wanes. Hence, as employed here, the concept of international authority focuses on agency interaction rather than systemic configuration to account for the transformation of a social order (see Bially Mattern/Zarakol 2016: 625).

Consequently, we theorize (international) authority as a relational term that posits distinct roles taken by actors within a hierarchical system (see Lake 2010): leaders uphold existing rules, norms, and institutions, and are able to (re-)define them, but also need to show self-restraint, i.e. accountability and openness towards participation of lesser powers in order to root the common purpose in the belief systems of followers. Followers recognize the order by either participating actively in establishing the set of rules, norms, and institutions, or by accepting them and acting accordingly. Spoiler states then seek to actively oppose existing authoritative structures while providing no distinct concepts themselves. Other actors may seek to replace the leader either by filling a leadership vacuum within existing systems of authority, contesting the legitimacy of the current leader, or by creating new authoritative structures.

The Nexus of International Authority and the Domestic Level

While the existing international order prescribes certain rules, accepted forms of behavior, and incentives for states to follow (or lead), the inter-state level is related to the domestic level in several ways: First, governments in leading states need to find domestic support for the costs of providing authority in the international arena to fulfill special responsibilities expected from them (Bukanovsky et al. 2012). This support can become contested if domestic coalitions dispute material gains or the normative value of existing hierarchical arrangements (Shils 1982: 95). Second, contestation may be represented through “transmission belts” (Moravcsik 1997: 528) on the international level, i.e. through responsive institutions. Here, the domestic feedback loop pertains to leaders as well followers whose societies are affected by international outcomes. Only as long as domestic audiences view this arrangement as legit-

imate, i.e. if it can be legitimated in terms of their own beliefs (Beetham 1991: 11), will they support the authority. Also, if actors perceive that an authority acts detrimentally to the common good of the domestic order, contestation towards an international authority may emerge (Zürn et al. 2012: 87). Third, the impact of international authority or the lack thereof on the domestic level may alter domestic institutions, societal cleavages, and economic relations (Gourevitch 1978). Certain domestic actors might be privileged by the rules and principles predicated by an international order. Disadvantaged groups will therefore have an interest in opposing existing arrangements and submit their demands within the domestic political system. Fourth, domestic societies, functioning as authority audiences, provide a reservoir of ideas and interests that can be uploaded through transnational movements to the international level, thereby transforming international authority through non-governmental channels.

Gauging the degree of (international) authority is thus a nontrivial endeavor (Daase/Deitelhoff 2017; Simmerl/Zürn 2016). First, it involves the conceptual delimitation between dominance, legitimacy, and authority. Then it requires the empirical analyses of their mixture in existing international orders. Moreover, the interrelatedness between domestic and international authority relations necessitates a closer look at the social mechanisms forging them.

The Domestic Side of Authority Transformation: Politicization, Populism, Domestication, Economization

In the most general terms, authority is a relational form of power characterized by a range of supportive responses to an order. Legal authority, such as in international courts, rests on content-independent responses, which are not tailored to the recipient's interests (Alter et al. 2018). Political authority, such as the U.S. leadership authority, rests upon responses that are tied to a range of forms of recognition. Recognition itself can take various forms: input legitimacy pertains to the participation of subordinate actors in establishing the rules and norms delimiting the authority relationship between them and superordinate actors. Output legitimacy, in turn, is tied to the production of common goods, the provision of expertise, and accountability in providing that good by the superordinate actor. It follows that political authority is

based both functionally and temporally on a much more regular and symmetrical relationship than legal authority.

Our analysis starts from the acknowledgment that international authority vested in international organizations and regimes, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), and in the U.S. global leadership role are distinct, if intimately tied to each other. We argue that it is possible, if not probable, that some international authority structures may persist in the future without U.S. support, while others may not (Bower 2017).⁴ In turn, we suppose that various foreign policy responses by other powers are tied to the politicizing effects of the authority of international institutions—such as the European Union in the case of Hungary—that were up to now supported by the U.S. but are not genuine effects of U.S. authority as such. As a consequence, we hold that it may be worthwhile to distinguish between politicizing effects of international institutions and U.S. authority because the former may have considerably larger audiences than the latter.

Politicization

Out of the four concepts, politicization of authority is the broadest. Following Zürn et al. (2012), politicization of authority refers to a demand for, or the act of, transporting authority relations and their impact into the field of politics, making previously apolitical authority relations political (Zürn et al. 2012: 73). As an analytical concept, politicization thus neither narrows the range of actors or their structural positioning to each other, nor should it be understood as a unidirectional concept, implicating support or opposition by one actor towards a fixed authority structure. Concerning the range of actors involved, politicization may encompass various societal actors but also parliaments, which re-politicize authority relations that may have been deemed legal authority relations before (see the section on domestication below). With regard to the direction of politicization of authority relations, the concept encapsulates both the contestation and the support of international authority. More specifically, as Zürn et al. (2012) suggest, authority relations imply two different layers of recognition: on the first layer, addressees recognize that

4 The International Criminal Court and the shifting U.S. position towards it is one of the more prominent cases in which international authority structures persisted although various U.S. administrations openly opposed its establishment and very existence (see Fehl 2012: 95).

authority is per se functionally necessary to achieve a certain public good. On the second layer, authority is recognized if acknowledged as legitimate in the context of a given stock of beliefs in a community (2012: 83).

For our purpose, we presume that contestation on the first layer, i.e. whether authority is considered legitimate per se, has other implications than contestation of consent on the second layer. Examples of politicization that affect elements of the hitherto existing order can be found across countries and policy fields. Recent studies show that political contestation increasingly affects foreign and security policies. Within the United States as well as within allied societies, military intervention decisions have become subject to partisan fights. Here, the old paradigm that politics “stops at the water’s edge” seems no longer applicable (see Wagner et al. 2018; Böller/Müller 2018). In these cases, the sobering results of democracy promotion abroad through interventions in Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan pertain to the first layer of authority regarding the production of common goods (i.e. security or democracy). Contestation by domestic actors regarding international trade agreements are then related to the perceived legitimacy deficit that concerns non-transparency, and the lack of opportunities to participate and voice concerns. These contestations, for example regarding the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (van Loon 2018), have made it increasingly difficult for executive actors within the liberal order to enhance and refine the liberal trade regime.

Domestication

Domestication can well be understood as a specific form of politicization, for it involves the deliberate effort by legislative and judicial branches to address the structural effects of international authority on the domestic separation of powers. Domesticating strategies originate from political actors, legislatures, and courts that seek to contain and re-direct the delegation of domestic competencies by executives to international institutions in a way to preserve the balance of power between the different branches of government (Harnisch 2006, 2009). Focusing on the German safeguards to preserve parliamentary and federal participation in European policy and the use of military force, Harnisch finds that both the Federal Constitutional Court, the Parliament (Bundestag), and the Federal Chamber (Bundesrat) sought to limit the federal government’s autonomy to cede competences to the European Union and/or NATO by imposing procedural hurdles (such as 2/3 majority require-

ments or prior constitutive parliamentary consent for the deployment of German armed forces) and normative limits by imposing structural safeguarding clauses, requiring a structural correspondence between Germany's constitution (domestic authority) and inter-state institutions, such as the EU or NATO (international authority) (Harnisch 2009).

In the case of France, domestication has also narrowed the maneuvering room of the French executive in pursuing an ambitious pro-integrationist agenda in the European Union (Schild 2008). Arguably, domestication has also amplified the German government's hesitancy to deploy its armed forces, resulting in German abstentions from U.S.-led coalition warfare in Iraq and Libya, as well as numerous caveats in the Afghanistan campaign. Similarly, after the 9/11 attacks (Harnisch 2015, 2011, 2004), the U.S. Supreme Court has become more willing to intervene in and review presidential decisions curtailing civil liberties, finding that some executive decisions were unconstitutional (Breyer 2016).

While they are part of the long-term trend towards politicization of international authority, domestication strategies may respond to both instances of U.S. authority and international authority assertion. In contrast to populism, domesticating responses are oriented towards the status quo, since they are rooted in the (dynamic) effort to re-balance the separation of powers of a given constitutional system in interaction with an emerging international legal political order. Moreover, domesticating agents are few and they accept the given political order, not the least because they are constitutive parts of it. This does not mean that domesticating strategies may not transform international authority, as in the case of the German policy during the Eurozone crisis (Harnisch/Schild 2014).

As the U.S. case shows, domestication processes may hinder the exercise of a leadership role to maintain the current authoritative order. Already before Trump, domestic actors within the U.S. Congress sought to avoid the delegation of authority to international bodies (for example, to the International Criminal Court) or blocked involvement in international regimes.⁵ This

5 Examples include arms control treaties such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 1999 and the Arms Trade Treaty 2013, or climate policies, regarding the Kyoto protocol 1999 and the Paris agreement 2015. In each case, Republicans criticized these policies because they would interfere with U.S. national authority and either voted down the treaty or precluded its ratification in the Senate.

limited the ability of the U.S. to influence those institutions and allowed other actors to assume a more leading role (e.g. Europe regarding climate policies).

Populism

Among the different concepts of politicization of authority, populism takes pride of place insofar as different strains of populism challenge national as well as international authority on both levels, i.e. the necessity of authority *per se* and the authority in a particular community. Populism—defined here as a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, the “pure people” and a “corrupt elite”—holds that politics should be an expression of the “*volonté générale* (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2007: 23) or a particular part of that people.⁶

The distinctive structures of populism shape how the transformation of domestic and international authority occur, as both levels are intimately connected. On the domestic level, populist leaders pretend to protect a selection of citizens—oftentimes representing only a fraction of society—from abusive elites, i.e. industrial monopolies, neoliberal takers, or corrupt government officials. Depending on the ideological trait of the underlying societal cleavage (racial, religious, economical), populism may comprise more inclusive groups, such as transnational working classes, or more exclusive groups, such as religious and/or ethno-nationalist communities. On the international level, some populists seek to safeguard “their people” from both domestic and foreign authorities’ predatory strategies to “exploit, rape or rip their own people off.” As a consequence, populist movements in Central and Eastern Europe do not contest but rather support the “America First” strategy of the Trump administration in order to legitimize their own struggle against the European Union’s authority (Shapiro/Pardijs 2017). In turn, because Trumpian populism is a response to the structural growth of international authority, such as in the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO, and the unintended consequences of U.S. authority assertion through liberal interventions—in particular after 9/11—it attacks central institutional pillars of both orders, such as the freedom of the press and the independence of the judiciary (national level), as well as the

6 This concept builds on Shils (1956), who believed populism to be an ideology of “popular resentment against the order imposed on society” by a ruling class with a monopoly of power and property.

U.S. alliance system and the liberal international economic order (international level).

Economization

Economization pertains to the transformation of political processes into market-oriented forms of governance, as well as to the dominance of economic rationales in democratic policy making (Lazzarato 2015: 67; Best 2017: 383). An important source of the economization effects on domestic systems is the enlargement of norms, principles, and institutions upholding free trade regimes after the end of the Second World War, and the growth of global economic interdependencies. Capitalism within Western societies and international regimes, such as the Bretton Woods institutions, GATT, WTO, and regional agreements (NAFTA, EU) served as core pillars of the international authority structures led by the U.S. By these means, this liberal order was recognized as producing wealth for a large share of the electorate in participating societies, while stabilizing income expectations through its rule-based institutional structure both in the leading nation, i.e. the U.S., as well as subordinate states (Goldin/Margo 1992; Ikenberry 2011: 333).

Domestically, coalitions emerged between producer interest groups and organized labor in Europe and free trade-oriented elites on both sides of the Atlantic that, backed by the financial and service industries in the U.S., supported the expansion of this liberal economic order (Bailey/Goldstein/Weingast 2010). At the same time, social policies with different reach and form among Western countries were designed to cushion the detrimental effects of the capitalist order, to create what Ruggie termed “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie 1982, 1992).

More recently, the Global Financial Crisis (2008) and the Eurozone crisis (2010) have triggered substantial contestation and dissent by populist movements—for example, the “Tea Party” in the U.S.—with regards to core liberal principles and norms, such as the freedom of capital, goods, services, and persons. In Europe, governments sought to implement emergency responses to the sovereign debt crisis in several member states and craft new institutions to prevent a further deterioration of the Euro zone. However, as the resurgence of Euro-skepticism and the “Brexit” referendum show, the crisis deepened already existing societal cleavages and led to an overextension of domestic institutions that sought to attenuate economic risks. In the U.S., symptoms of the crisis—such as growing unemployment rates, mass default

of private homeowners, and growing federal debts—fueled dissent among the electorate with regard to the prospects and core principles of the hitherto supported liberal order. In addition, the growing disparities in the distribution of wealth hampered the legitimacy of the order and nurtured doubts about the necessity of the authority of liberal economic institutions and policies (Tooze 2018).

While the GFC affected Western as well as non-Western states, it further accelerated the relative decline of the U.S. and its Western partners vis-à-vis emerging economies. President Trump's "America First" policies are attempting to externalize the negative effects of this relative decline of the U.S. economy (in particular the de-industrialization and resulting decimation of blue-collar jobs) that caused domestic conflicts and triggered fears within the U.S. working class. At the same time, Trump's course spurs the corrosion of the supporting role of the U.S. for the authority structure it created by violating core principles of that order (Carnegie/Carson 2019).

Populist economic policies can thus be interpreted as an antidote against the economization of international trade and financial policies that should have been held accountable for the outbreak of the GFC (Boucher/Thies 2019). Populists claim that their protectionist policies will shield workers' interests from the effects of neoliberal open market strategies through authoritative political decisions, whereas strategies of economization are meant to protect corporate interests from governmental interventionism through the introduction of market-principles, such as self-coordination among corporations themselves.

Overall, politicization, domestication, populism, and economization are significant mechanisms that link domestic politics and international authority. As Table 1 summarizes, these processes are intertwined, but also pertain to distinct functional levels with specific sets of actors and symptoms of crisis.

Grasping Foreign Policy Reactions to Shifting International Authority

Seen from a systemic perspective, the transformation of an international order sets in motion a realignment of role taking by other actors. However, as the previous section outlined, the concrete cues received by subordinate states are refracted through the processes that shape the authority production on

Table 1: Mechanisms of domestic impact of authority change

<i>Mechanism</i>	Functional level	Agency and antagonism	Symptoms of Crisis	Dynamics between levels and mechanisms
<i>(1) Politicization</i>	Society and Political institutions	Parties, societal groups	Break-up of bipartisan liberal consensus	Politicization (1) may fuel populism (2) and informs domestication strategies (3)
<i>(2) Populism</i>	Society	Elite v. public	Mistrust	Lack of transparency and blocked responsiveness of institutions (3) increases level of mistrust (2)
<i>(3) Domestication</i>	Political institutions	Government v. parliaments	Executive dominance	Attempt to provide governance of global economy (4) largely via executives (e.g. Euro crisis) increases de-parliamentarization (3)
<i>(4) Economization</i>	Economy	State v. corporations	Lack of control	Misallocation of wealth and growth (4) fuels populism (2)

the domestic level: politicization, populism, domestication, and economization.

Leadership transformation thus creates a window of opportunity for other actors to introduce their own claims for authority and pursue changes to the existing rules, norms, and institutions in accordance with their own ideas. In this case, actors need to possess alternative concepts of rightful rule that contrast to the status quo. These actors will thus adapt their foreign policy decisions accordingly and seek leading roles for themselves through the introduction of new rules, norms, and institutions that were not deemed acceptable before.

There might also be actors who, despite leadership transformation, are interested in preserving existing authority structures because their governments and/or societies profit from the existing order, value its normative principles, or because they are unwilling or unable to introduce new author-

ity claims. It follows that these actors will be pressed to take on roles which stabilize existing rules, norms, and institutions.

If authority structures disintegrate and previous rules and institutions break down without being replaced by new authority relationships, then (some) actors might seek to hedge against the resulting insecurity (as a vacuum of leadership and authority emerges). This way, even actors who are interested in upholding the status-quo will be forced to adapt their respective roles to the changing international circumstances.

Accordingly, as a first approximation to gauge variant types of foreign policy reactions to shifting global authority, we can differentiate between two dimensions (see Table 2). The first dimension concerns the question of whether actors are interested in upholding or challenging the status-quo of the rules, norms, and institutions that have been guaranteed by the reigning authority and have structured the previous order. The second dimension requires us to examine whether the actors are willing and/or able to assume a leading role by advancing claims of authority for themselves.

Table 2: Typology of foreign policy reactions to authority change with tentative examples

		Willingness to lead	
		<i>Leader</i>	<i>Follower</i>
Positioning towards status quo authority	<i>Status quo orientation</i>	France	Germany
	<i>Transformative orientation</i>	China	Russia

Conclusion

To sum up, we argue that it takes the convergences of two authority processes to stabilize international authority relationships: one within states, in particular within the leading states to legitimize and effectuate an executive branch to extract enough resources to sustain a global leadership role; and second, one (or more) authority relationships between states, to legitimize special responsibilities and duties between leading and following states. As both processes have come under significant pressure in the United States and between

the U.S. and international institutional authorities and lesser states, the current liberal international order is bound to be substantially transformed.

Here we have focused on the social mechanisms through which the effects of the transformation of international authority are refracted within the domestic authority structures. We contend that the four mechanisms (politicization, domestication, populism, economization) are all geared towards finding new equilibria between international and domestic authority structures. It is fair to suggest that some of the mechanisms are more transformational in kind and degree than others: Politicization may contest a new international authorities' impact upon domestic authority so as to uphold given domestic authority relationships, as in judicial rulings to limit an executive autonomy vis-à-vis its own or other citizens in the "war against terrorism." Or politicization may instill transformation on the domestic and international level as non-governmental actors use international authority so as to effectuate change in domestic authority structures. Domestication, in turn, is more conservative, as it seeks to preserve a given domestic authority structure. However, it may do so by projecting one's own domestic structures onto international institutions, such as in the case of the German Bundesbank model being transposed onto the European Central Bank structures. Populism, on the other hand, is a distinct transformational mechanism as it seeks to recalibrate both domestic and international authority structures towards the need of an (imagined) oppressed people that has been betrayed by its elites. Economization has proven to be no less transformational in the sense that it puts the interests of corporate actors first vis-à-vis governmental regulations, favoring market forces as regulatory instruments rather than governmental or administrative oversight.

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