

Playing the Plant, and Other Stories

Embodied Mimesis as Material-discursive Narration

Siobhan Leddy

Since the theme of this volume is narration, I will begin with a particularly powerful instance: that of the individualized, atomized and neatly-bounded human subject. Although this rather anthropocentric story is not the only narrative of what it is to be human – humanity, after all, is a diverse affair – it is, nonetheless, an extremely pervasive one, and its dominance forms a central problematic in the feminist posthumanities (Åsberg and Braidotti 2018; Braidotti 2013). Taking a cue from such posthumanist scholarship, this chapter aims to trouble this dominant narrative of the human subject as not simply discursive – that is to say, as free-floating representation – but as *material-discursive*, performative, embodied and profoundly sensuous. However, there are some important caveats: This narrative of the human subject does not directly correspond to the *Homo sapien*, although it often coincides. Nor is it a universal genre; it neither applies to all humans at all times, nor does it ever saturate a person's being entirely. Rather, this narrative is a normative and performative ideal, specific to a particular anthropocentric and post-Enlightenment liberal imaginary. How, then, do material-discursive counter-narratives of the human proliferate? What tactics in material-discursive re-narrativizing are available to us?

Acknowledging, with Karen Barad, that words have often been “granted too much power” in how we understand the world and ourselves (2007: 132), and the sensuousness of matter granted too little, might we consider a far broader interpretation of narrative? Narrative, at least in any common-sense designation, tends to be understood as being composed of language: words are the stuff of stories. However, thinking with Vicki Kirby (2011), it becomes possible to consider narrative in far broader terms. Taking seriously Derrida's claim that there is “no outside of text” (ibid.: 73), Kirby makes a radical material-discursive intervention: How might we understand this expansive text beyond the human? Such an approach cannot be limited to discourse on human terms; it must, therefore, also include other kinds of creative and aesthetic expression. Indeed, Kirby proposes “[t]here is a serious suggestion that ‘life itself’ is creative encryption” (ibid.: 73). Offering examples, such as genetic encryption, or translations within the immune system, she asks whether we might understand *all* of life's creative, material and sensuous

enactments as a kind of text, where “[n]ature reads, writes, effectively articulates itself” (ibid.: 84). This makes it somewhat difficult to separate representational systems, such as languages, images or models, from that which they profess to represent. Barad, similarly, describes how discourse and matter are consubstantial in their performativity, an entangled inseparability, they describe, as I do, as material-discursive (2007: 132–185). They refuse the representationalism that posits language as merely symbolic of a separated material or natural reality, instead describing language and matter as inextricable forces of worlding: in their mutual entanglement, they enact the world. Building on these ideas, we can begin to take a broader approach to narrative that allows us to consider shifts in sensation, feeling and affect as narratively productive; in this dynamic narrative unfolding, “matter makes itself felt” (ibid. 2003: 810). Not only does this offer “a contestation of the excessive power granted to language to determine what is real” (ibid. 2007: 133), it also enables us to consider narration beyond the logocentrism of the literate or verbalizing human, into more-than-human and more-than-discursive domains. Thinking of narration as material-discursive also permits the following questions: What if the Cartesian partitions that often cleave humans apart from non-humans and environments, culture away from nature, mind from body, self from world are narrated not only through language, but also through sensation and affect? How is human exceptionalism tacitly narrated through and with the body? Shifting away from the logocentrism that burdens discussions of narrative and loosening our “exaggerated faith in the power of language” (ibid.: 133), we might also acknowledge how embodied and sensuous narratives shape the world and our collective knowledge about it. Conceptualizing narrative beyond solely discourse (as language on conventional human terms) means we can engage sensation and affect as narratively meaningful. This, then, raises a counter question: How might sensuous or aesthetic tactics *re-narrate* human subject-bodies in ways exceeding anthropocentrism, exceptionalism and neatly bounded atomization? Considering narration in expansive and material-discursive ways suggests that artistic and aesthetic practices can be considered as narratological, as they proliferate sensuous and tacit counter-narratives with and through the body. If meaning and matter cannot be definitively separated, as Kirby and Barad seem to suggest, activities that enact new configurations of sensation can also perform material changes to that subject-body, palpating the plasticity of the world.

That such material-discursive re-narration is possible at all is because – as Judith Butler tells us – despite its apparent stability, the human subject is a performative and incomplete process rather than any kind of stable or static being (2002 [1990], 1993). It is the overall tendency for subject-bodies to iterate and reiterate in non-normative or deviant ways, as unruly narratives and embodiments slip through the cracks. While performativity is not a conscious process that can be controlled or manipulated as such, the sheer plasticity and contingency of being, nonetheless, makes for ripe ground for experimentation.¹ The task at hand, then, is finding activities, sensations and material-dis-

1 Without conflating performance with performativity, we might still suggest that the sensational enactments that embodied mimesis can generate are materially-discursively meaningful, and, as such, able to intervene in the performativity of normative narrative. See, for instance, Butler 1993, 2002 [1990].

cursive re-narrativizations of the human subject that far exceed its anthropocentric and individualizing boundaries, instead, finding “the point of fusion between the self and his/her habitat, the cosmos as a whole” (Braidotti 2006: 154). There are ethical stakes to such an endeavour. If the human subject – materially – discursively narrativized as individual, discrete and separated from non-human/natures – can only engage with the world from a perceived remove, and as exceptional, we face an ethical imperative to seek out material-discursive counter-narratives of inseparable worldliness. We must seek out an ethical orientation *into* and *of* the world and refuse to retreat into the interiority of the self, as one learns to narrativize one’s own inseparability from environments, habitats, species, ecosystems and climates. While turning the human subject inside-out, so to speak, we might begin to challenge human exceptionalism and the material-discursive narrative of separation that often leads to apathy or so-called ‘doomerism’. Seeking out re-narrativizations of the human subject, therefore, is a project quite unlike liberal notions of personal self-improvement. It is, rather, to take responsibility for one’s own role in forging a more-than-human planetary politics.

Embodied Mimesis

I propose embodied mimesis as a material-discursive narrative strategy, able to unfurl more-than-human narratives with and through the body. But what do I mean by this, exactly? Embodied mimesis, as I describe it, is a creative practice of embodied role-play, in which one imaginatively mimics and assimilates to the movements, gestures and sensational capacities of non-humans. This should not be understood as simply a kind of copying, or a symbolic gesture representing an ontologically separated real. Mimesis as *material-discursive narration* avoids falling into what Barad describes as representation-ism, in which an image, model or likeness can only *stand in for* material reality, rather than perform as *part of* the real itself (2007: 46). Less a mediation, representation or copy, embodied mimesis is better understood as materially-discursively performative, profoundly intervening in the unfolding of the world. Enacted through and with embodied matter, it is a material-discursive narration belonging, as Michael Taussig puts it, “as much to body as to mind” (1993: 46). Taussig describes the mimetic faculty as a kind of yielding-knowing, in which one actively yields to one’s other; in this way, the mimetic faculty is quite different to forms of meaning-making enacted through, for instance, the aggressive domination of nature or others (ibid.: 46). As an active yielding to that which is not-me, embodied mimesis can, therefore, be understood as enacting narratives, meanings and matterings that are cooperative and sympoetic, rather than representationally domineering or grounded in mastery.

Embodied mimesis activates the imaginative capacities of the body by opening up ordinarily illegible or ‘impossible’ sensations. Doing so not only produces new meanings and narratives (my body can do X; I feel Y) but, furthermore, also rearticulates normative narratives we hold about our subject-body interiority, the exteriority of the other and the givenness of the boundary between them. This is because it enacts, through yielding, a process of becoming ‘more like’ that which is usually excluded into the realm of the absolute ‘not me’ (as the remainder of this chapter will show, this might entail mimeti-

cally yielding to non-human life, such as an animal or a plant). That is not to say one can 'be', morphologically, identical to a bird or a tree as such. Embodied mimesis is not an endeavour to perfectly and fully inhabit the form or being of another entity; bodies, after all, are always and already unstable doings, rather than ontologically stable beings. Rather, embodied mimesis allows us to experiment with our performative and material-discursive narratives, re-narrating our subject-bodies as we soften our boundaries and yield towards that which is not-me. Embodied mimesis is not necessarily the experience of *being* the other, but a sensuous 'telling' of subject-body contingency and plasticity. As those performative boundaries that divide self from other, human from non-human or environment, become less determinate, the normative human subject – in other words, that which is held in place through anthropocentric boundaries and material-discursive narratives – also begins to come undone.

Becoming Sensor

Anthropologist Natasha Myers has been collaborating since 2016 with dancer and filmmaker Ayelen Liberona, as well as numerous urban Indigenous community members in and around Toronto, on *Becoming Sensor* (2017). This is a long-term artistic research project engaging with the plant life of High Park in Toronto, and the project concurrently advocates for Indigenous land management practices. *Becoming Sensor* generally aims to "do ecology otherwise" (ibid.: 78) and among numerous interventions, which include work with sound, image, 'kinesthetic attunement' and 'synesthetic installation', the project has also incorporated role-play exercises to be carried out in the park. These exercises are what Myers describes as "hypnagogic inductions, or guided visualisations, that can dilate our morphological imaginaries, altering our sense of our bodily contours, and what we can see, feel, and know" (2020a).

One such exercise, which Myers calls *A Kriya for Cultivating Your Inner Plant*, asks participants to imagine sensing as though they were a plant, engaging in embodied mimesis of plant sensoria. "Draw your awareness back up your stem and into your leaves," participants are directed; "You no longer have eyes, a nose, ears, a tongue, or nerves, but that doesn't mean you can't see, smell, hear, speak, taste or feel. Can you feel the play of light and shadow across your leaves?" (2014). It also directs participants to "[e]xperiment with light at dawn and dusk. Can you feel the energetic shift when the far-red light of the rising and setting sun clues your body in to the Earth's rotational rhythms?" (ibid.).

Myers explains this performance or 'kriya' (a term borrowed from yoga, meaning action or effort) as an exercise for overcoming the inherited notion that plants are humans' most radical other, and, therefore, bounded away from humans in ways that are entirely absolute, exterior and irredeemable. As she puts it,

[Plants] don't look like us, like animals do, and so there's this sense that they're this ultimate other to the human. But when we [...] really attend to their practices, we can actually begin to recognize almost the animal-like qualities that are part of plants and the plant like qualities that are part of humans. And so I spent some time developing

meditations that allow us to expand our sensorium [...] to expand our understanding of what the limitations of the human sensorium are. (Myers 2020b)

In these mimetic experiments for playing the plant, Myers encourages participants to harness the imagining body to generate non-normative sensational meanings and narratives. These sensational meanings disrupt what Myers calls the “conventional ecological sensorium” (2017: 78), which situates plants as radical others. This sensorium – which we might describe as the normative limitations, permissions and thresholds of the sensible – is aligned to a settler colonialism that renders more-than-human sentience as improbable and illegible; plants are deemed insensate and in their imagined inertia (yet another anthropocentric boundary, in which humans are imagined as superlatively sensate), are reduced to extractable resources. Conversely, the (ordinarily foreclosed) sensations that embodied mimesis opens up can help us to tell “new stories about lands and bodies” (ibid.). These “new stories” are not exclusively formed through language, but through sensations that deviate from normative anthropocentric narratives, exceeding the performative limitations and permissions that foreclose other ways of human-ing. Within the temporal flow of normative human-subject narratives, playing the plant offers an interruption and counter-narrative. In feeling oneself more like a plant, we can begin to reconfigure the boundary of human exceptionalism that holds the fortress of the human subject apart from plant life.

Training Transhumanism

Training Transhumanism (I Want to be a Cephalopod) is a creative mimetic project developed by artist Miriam Simun aimed at aligning the human sensing body more closely with that of a cephalopod. Simun describes the project as fundamentally transhuman, but this is quite different to the transhumanism favoured by the denizens of Silicon Valley, who crave immortal human subjecthood through technological augmentation. Simun calls instead for a different kind of transhumanism: one of radical openness, relationality, sensory expansion and contingency. Simun looks to the cephalopod as “an evolutionary role model” (2019a), learning from and attempting to mimic its unique sensory abilities not only to open up sensational experiences ordinarily by anthropocentric body-narratives, but, significantly, to also contribute to a transhumanist project to transform the human subject-body.

Echoing Michael Taussig’s description of mimicry as “an ineffable plasticity in the face of the world’s forms and forms of life” (1993: 34), Simun’s approach to mimicry similarly emerges from her understanding of the body’s material plasticity and capacity for transformation, which has itself been influenced by her training in free-diving. Through the latter, the body’s capacity for breath can be radically transformed, with some divers able to hold their breath underwater for extraordinary periods of time. This is possible because, as Simun’s own diving instructor told her while holding the artist’s head underwater, “your urge to breathe is a lie” (Arts at MIT 2020). All one need to do is change the narrative of one’s body (I must draw a new breath every few seconds) and the material processes of the body are, thus, transformed.

Cephalopods – Simun’s model species – engage with their environments in extremely sensitive and adaptive ways. Each tentacle contains a complex and dispersed sensory system, with which cephalopods attune to their environment, sensing the presence of physical objects or chemical information so that they can respond and adapt appropriately (Mather and Kuba 2013). Their cognition – dispersed throughout their entire bodies – is largely sensuous, since much of their central nervous system is dedicated to perception and responding to sensations (Zullo and Hochner 2011: 26–29). When they sense changes in their surroundings, they mimetically adapt in form and colour, becoming more like what they are sensing with their soft, shapeshifting bodies and the chromatophores under the surface of the skin. They even mimic other organisms’ movement patterns. It is this sensory intuition and responsiveness, so Simun believes, that has led to their astonishing resilience (some of the earth’s oldest species are cephalopods). Their whole bodies are fully and reciprocally attuned to what surrounds them, what they are part of, and they exist in a state of ongoing sense-based communication. Simun, then, not only aims to mimic the aesthetic sensitivity of a cephalopod, but also its incredible capacity for mimesis.

We are asked to engage with the softer “squishy” parts of our bodies, the parts between the bones, in a performative guided audio workshop that forms part of the project, titled *Transhumanist Cephalopod Evolution* (Simun 2021). A soft voice guides us in this endeavour. We are asked to no longer organize ourselves around our skeletal rigidity but our invertebrate parts. The voice instructs us slowly: “pour your entire body into your tongue [...] find every wave, manner, direction, speed in which you can use your tongue”. How might the body follow the tongue if it were to lead the way?

Another aspect of the training pertains to breath. Since cephalopods expel air quickly from their bodies to propel themselves through the water, we are similarly asked to experiment with our breathing, testing and changing its velocity and rhythm. We slowly inhale large volumes of air deep into the lungs before quickly expelling it, as though we were using its force to push ourselves through water. This process can make one feel a little light-headed, and the voice warns us against losing consciousness: “we don’t want this”.

After these preliminary exercises, we are asked to move along the ground and around space, guided by our breath and vocal expulsions. We are requested to trace our fingertips and limbs around the floor, along the walls and over objects in the room. We are next called on to take a “molluscium position”, the mollusc being our last shared ancestor with the cephalopod, a starting point from which we might reconfigure our bodies. Imagine we have no head, the voice directs us; instead, try to “see” through your skin. Let gravity take over, we are told, let it flow and flop your flesh around, allow it to direct your attention without once engaging the muscles.

Simun has designed three main training areas for developing a becoming-cephalopod sensibility. The first asks us to “see” with our skin, much like an octopus might, practised through activities such as the mollusc-like gravity movements described above. The second is a call to shapeshift, not only sense or perceive but, crucially, also respond and adapt to one’s sensational environment. The third training area aims to develop a distributed intelligence, akin to that of a cephalopod, whose cognition is not a process contained within any kind of ‘brain’ or ‘mind’ but dispersed throughout its entire body. In-

deed, it is precisely this full-body cognition that makes any kind of Cartesian mind-body split impossible: body is very much mind, and vice-versa.

This distributed body-mind also makes it impossible to conceptualize the cephalopod as though it were a singular embodied subject (as in a subject-body as narrativized in humanist terms). Since there is no central control region, different tentacles can even have different personalities. At times they might even work against one another. This means that, on the one hand, an octopus might be described as a single organism with nine brains, or, on the other hand, as nine different organisms cohered together. Such distributed mind-embodiment, simultaneously singular and plural, has major implications for any boundary that might ordinarily be drawn between self and other, or even interior and exterior. Philosopher of science Peter Godfrey-Smith notes that “uncontrolled movements by an object around you are usually a sign that it is not part of you [...]. If you were an octopus, these distinctions would be blurred” (2017: 56). It is precisely this indiscernibility between the me and the not-me, between internal self and external world, that Simun's transhumanist training project aims to encourage. Through practice and cultivation, Simun seems to suggest the narrative that separates self and other, insides and outsides, mind and body, can be re-narrativized as somewhat less clear-cut.

We see this distributed embodied cognition practised in *Your Urge to Breathe is a Lie* (Simun 2019b), a 25-minute film resulting from a collaboration between Simun, choreographer Luciana Achugar and synchronized swim choreographer Paola Tirados. The film follows a group of humans as they undergo Simun's transhumanist cephalopod training. We see limbs trace each other's outlines, in pairs and groups. Two tongues flip and roll as they face one another, the soft fleshy parts taking the lead. Bodies undulate and flop around the space limply, before coming together to move both independently and together, as part of a shared, yet distributed, body-intelligence. A leg's movement will take on the rhythms of another. In this fluid motion, whatever a body senses, it becomes more like, in a dynamic process of embodied mimicry. While mimicry might mean chromatic changes in cephalopods, for the humans in Simun's film, this manifests as legs first feeling out for one another, then calibrating their movements in synchrony, as they respond to one another with all the soft openness of the brain-body. Forms shift and move, together-apart, both many and one.

(Fig. 1:) Video still from Miriam Simun, *Your Urge to Breathe is a Lie* (2019b), 25'00".



(Fig. 2:) Video still from Miriam Simun, *Your Urge to Breathe is a Lie* (2019b), 25'00".



Mimetic Magic

Embodied mimesis offers a sensuous approach for re-narrating the human subject-body in two ways. Firstly, it proliferates non-normative and less anthropocentric experiences of sensation with and through the body by asking a simple ‘what if’ question: what if we could learn to sense more like a plant, for instance, or a cephalopod? The new kinds of sensuous experiences that such questions open up deviate from normative narratives of the human subject-body and its sensorium, and, therefore, already pose a challenge to the narrative that posits the human subject-body’s sensory capacities as given. Secondly, the mimetic body, as it becomes more like that which is not-me, also challenges the fixity of the normative boundary that holds self apart from other, interior from exterior, even

human from non-human. Much as an octopus' body occupies a less clear distinction between the me and the not-me in its distributed body-mind, a becoming-mimetic body is similarly relatively indeterminate. Mimicry is a particularly challenging method for producing meaning and knowledge, as Michael Taussig notes, since it blurs the distinction between percept and perceiver. "Is it conceivable that a person could break boundaries like this", he asks, "slipping into Otherness, trying it on for size?" (1993: 33). Both Simun and Myers seem to suggest so.

Simun's cephalopod mimicry resonates with an earlier philosophical text: Roger Caillois' writing on morphological mimicry in insect species (1984 [1934]). Observing the incredible mimetic capacities of some insects (which, for instance, might closely resemble leaves or twigs), Caillois proposes that mimicry functions as a kind of natural "magic", operating according to the magical principle that "things that have once been in contact remain united" and that "like produces like" (ibid.: 25). Under such magical mimetic conditions, body and environment begin to blur, as the boundaries of the self are materially-discursively re-narrated (my phrasing) into something highly porous. Mimicry, for Caillois, is an act of "depersonalisation by assimilation to space", whereby the distinction between oneself and one's surroundings is diminished (ibid.: 30).

Yet, significantly, mimetic transformations are rarely absolute. Embodied mimesis is desiring, processual and relational, and embodied mimetic practices, such as Simun's, do not obliterate difference altogether, so that body and other, or body and environment, become an entirely undifferentiated unity (after all, *Training Transhumanism's* subtitle is "I want to become a cephalopod", not "I am a cephalopod"). There is no total collapse between exterior and interior, or self and other, even while there is a high degree of indeterminacy. We might even consider embodied mimesis as enabling difference and sameness to co-exist simultaneously, rather than as a binary opposition. In this tension between difference and sameness, we can begin to narrate our subject-bodies otherwise, playing with bodily indeterminacy to challenge numerous other binary categories too: me/not-me, inside/outside, mind/body, discourse/matter, human/non-human. Each of these binaries, under becoming-mimetic conditions, is revealed as a highly unstable material-discursive narrative, and, thus, "always open to contestation" (Barad 2003: 824). In this way, we can begin to challenge the anthropocentric subject-body's exceptionalism, individualism and boundedness, sensuously re-narrating human bodies in more-than-human ways.

Caillois' essay, written in 1934, remains caught up in the narrative of human exceptionalism. He describes mimetic processes in humans as solely manifesting in the psyche, or imagination, in ways contrasting with the transformations to body or morphology in insects or, indeed, other non-human species. However, Simun's mimetic training is built on the principle that the body is no less susceptible to mimetic transformation. She does not separate the imaginative dynamism of the mind from the plasticity and malleability of the imaginative body: Her approach to mimesis is a material-discursive one. This is not to say that the human body will, with sufficient practice, mimetically morph into a leaf-form the way an insect might. It is only to say that there is no essential difference between embodied mimesis in humans and non-humans – and certainly not one predicated on a mind/body duality. Embodied mimesis, in a generalized and more-than-

human sense, not simply an anthropocentric one, can re-narrate both meaning and matter at once, to varying intensities, in humans and non-humans alike.

Conclusion

We find in embodied mimesis a material-discursive tactic for (re-)narrating the human subject-body. As a body thick with desire, not held aloof from the world but sensuously yielding towards and with it, we can narrativize ourselves beyond anthropocentrism, individualism and exceptionalism, refusing the limited narratives we have inherited. Embodied mimesis is, to revise Taussig's expression, a yielding-narrating that tells of indeterminacy between self and other, interior and exterior. Environments or non-human species are neither radically exterior nor absolutely other, but both 'me' and 'not-me' at once. What a radical narration of being this could be.

However, it would be reckless to assume that embodied mimesis is entirely unambivalent in its potential. Heeding Judith Butler's words of caution regarding drag (itself a kind of embodied mimesis), while mimesis might "question the legitimacy of the command" (1993: 122) that polices subject formations or bodily boundaries, we must also remain aware of the ways in which those same norms may be inadvertently reproduced through mimicry. As Butler warns, "there is no necessary relation between drag and subversion" (ibid.: 125), and its existence may more ambivalently reflect our own implication in identity systems. Similarly, it is not impossible that more-than-human mimetic practices may inadvertently uphold the very boundary between human/non-human or self/other that they purport to oppose. Furthermore, might trying to 'sense like' a cephalopod (or indeed any other non-human entity) simply be another act of appropriation that reinforces human exceptionalism? As Alison Sperling asks, why do we even *need* to imagine an octopus in order to escape the limits of our own human-ness (2023)? If we are to engage with and develop embodied mimesis further as a method for materially-discursively narrating the more-than-human, these questions certainly raise ethical concerns worth interrogating in greater depth.

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