

GLOBAL MEMORIES
BETWEEN DE- AND
RE-TERRITORIALIZATION

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Introduction:

Emergence of Global Memory Formation

Twenty-first-century globalism has increasingly shifted its focus from imagination to memory.¹ Yet, the globalization of memory is not a novel phenomenon of this century; rather, it represents a gradual process initiated in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. As displaced persons relocated and resettled across foreign lands after the war, their memories of the Holocaust, colonial genocide, Stalinism, and other atrocities migrated alongside them. In their new localities, people began to reflect on their own pasts through events unfolding on distant continents, giving rise to transnational memory formations, in which memories became entangled across borders.² Across the globe, vernacular and institutionalized memories of past traumas are now being shaped in conversations that span national, regional, and civilizational boundaries. Memories once boxed in specific local, regional, or national enclaves have become increasingly interwoven through practices of cross-referencing, adaptive imagination, unilateral re-purposing, active dialogue, translation, and victimhood competition.

The globalization of memories has created striking interconnections among ostensibly disparate histories. Holocaust memory became intertwined with the memory of transatlantic slavery, exemplified by W.E.B. Du Bois's visits to Poland and especially the Warsaw ghetto in 1949, which afforded him a 'more complete understanding of the Negro problem.'³ Reciprocally, memories of colonial violence have evoked the Holocaust and transatlantic slavery. For instance, the Japanese military's systematized sexual exploitation of 'comfort women' catalyzed renewed reflection on sexual violence at Nazi concentration camps. Also, later revelations of sexual

- 1 Aleida Assmann and Sebastian Conrad, *Memory in a Global Age* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 1.
- 2 Astrid Erll, 'Travelling Memory', *Parallax* 17/4 (2011).
- 3 W. E. B. Du Bois, 'The Negro and the Warsaw Ghetto', in *The Oxford W. E. B. Du Bois Reader*, ed. Eric. J. Sundquist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 470. This entanglement is traced back to year 1868 when a Yiddish translation of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* was published in Vilnius as *Di shklaveray oder di laybeygnshaft* (Slavery or serfdom) by Ayzik-Meyer Dik.

violence during the Yugoslav Wars sharpened the global awareness of the comfort women issue in reverse order.⁴

As post-colonial memory formations emerged within the globalization of memory, they began to contest mnemonic Eurocentrism with a rich archive of memories: the transatlantic slave trade, colonial violence, ethnocide, and gendered violence in the tri-continents of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The collapse of the Cold War accelerated this process, paving the road to global memory formation. Entangled memories of the Holocaust, colonial genocide, and Stalinist terror most notably mark the post-Cold War mnemo-scape.⁵ The memorial island at the Bergen County Justice Center in New Jersey eloquently exemplifies this emerging global memory formation.

Bergen County installed the comfort women statue as part of the International Women's Day celebration on 8 March 2013, and has now erected monuments commemorating the victims of American slavery, Irish famine, the Armenian Genocide, and the Holocaust alongside it.⁶ These monuments represent more than a physical aggregation of nationally territorialized memories. Rather, through mnemonic interaction in the host country, the dispersed memories of immigrants—many of whom bore no direct ancestral connection to these tragedies save for transatlantic slavery—became enmeshed, acquiring new significance as part of a relocated, globally constituted memorial consciousness. This process reveals how global memory formation develops as distant memories encounter, compete with, reconcile, cross-reference, and mutually affirm one another. Global memory formation operates according to a logic fundamentally different from the simple accumulation of separate national memories.

- 4 See: Michael Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Jie-Hyun Lim and Eve Rosenhaft, eds., *Mnemonic Solidarity: Global Interventions* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021).
- 5 Assmann and Conrad, *Memory in a Global Age*; Jie-Hyun Lim, 'Triple Victimhood: On the Mnemonic Confluence of the Holocaust, Stalinist Crime, and Colonial Genocide', *Journal of Genocide Research* (April 2020); A. Dirk Moses, 'Conceptual Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas in the "Racial Century": Genocides of Indigenous Peoples and the Holocaust', *Patterns of Prejudice* 36/4 (2020), 7–36.
- 6 '美정부 1호 위안부기념비 뉴저지서 제막식' (First Comfort Women Monument in the U.S. to Unveil in New Jersey), *Choson Ilbo*, 9 March 2013.

The Ethical Reverberations of Global Memory

Globally entangled memories have awakened a crucial realization: *that tragic history can happen to me too*, even if it *has not yet happened to me*. This recognition functions as both a warning and an ethical imperative. It signals an unsettling awareness that, under particular historical circumstances, any of us might become—rather than merely an innocent victim of—a willing perpetrator. The future image of the continuum of complicity could be apocalyptic.⁷ The Holocaust, in this register, operates as a ‘global civil religion’, grounded in the desperate recognition that atrocities remain perpetually possible. Despite its mnemonic Eurocentricity, Holocaust memory has come to propound universal ethical and political principles that transcend arbitrary appropriations and mnemonic abuse.⁸ Indeed, the Holocaust has functioned as a generic memory template for genocides and human suffering across the globe.⁹ Many non-European memories now interact with the Holocaust as a touchstone for absolute evil—a metonym for crimes against humanity.

The year 2000 marked a milestone in critiquing territorialized memory and signaled its deterritorialization. The emergence of the global memory culture demonstrates empathy for the suffering of other nations—including former adversaries. The Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, convened from 26–28 January 2000, dramatically illustrates this shift. The unprecedented gathering of political leaders from forty-six countries—including heads of state and deputy heads of government—centered on a single theme: Holocaust education, remembrance, and research. In declaring that the Holocaust possesses ‘universal meaning’ and ‘must be forever seared in our collective memory’, the Stockholm Declaration established remembrance of the Holocaust as a global civic virtue.¹⁰ If the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen granted the French

- 7 Ever-resonant in my concern over the moral implication of global memory formation is Zygmunt Bauman’s caution that the historical lesson of the Holocaust is ‘not the likelihood that “this” could be done to us, but the idea that we could do it’, and Christopher Browning’s insight that saw a portrait of not an ordinary ‘German’ but an ordinary ‘man’ in the face of the Nazis. Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (with a new afterword) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 152; Christopher R. Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (with a new afterword) (New York: Harper Perennial, 1993), 189, 222–223; Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 9.
- 8 Jean-Marc Dreyfus and Marcel Stoetzler, ‘Holocaust memory in the twenty-first century: between national reshaping and globalisation’, *European Review of History*, 18/1 (2011), 75.
- 9 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, *The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age*, trans. Assenka Oksiloff (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006).
- 10 ‘Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust’, *Levandehistoria*, www.levandehistoria.se/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/The-Stockholm-declaration.pdf.

Revolution universal historical significance, the Stockholm Declaration set the remembrance of the Holocaust as global memory template.

Yet the global memory formation established in Stockholm faced immediate and consequential challenges. Within four months, Jan T. Gross published *Neighbors*, a work that profoundly disrupted dominant memory culture and continues to provoke controversy in Poland to this day. Gross, a Polish sociologist and historian who had spent decades in American exile following his involvement in the 1968 student protests, revealed that the Jedwabne pogrom of 10 July 1941 had been perpetrated not by Nazi occupiers but by local Polish neighbours. This disclosure precipitated a seismic shift in Polish memory culture, unsettling established narratives at epistemological, ontological, and ethical levels. By exposing the uncomfortable truth that ordinary Poles had actively participated in Holocaust violence, the publication irrevocably damaged the national self-image of Poland as a 'crucified nation', reverberating far beyond Poland's borders. That said, the necessity for Eastern Europe to confront such truths had already been articulated. In 1992, the Polish émigré philosopher Leszek Kołakowski presciently warned that a *Historikerstreit*—a critical historical reckoning comparable to the West German debates of 1986–1987—would prove essential for Eastern Europe's coming to terms with its Communist past.¹¹ Kołakowski cautioned that Eastern European memory culture had systematically evaded accountability for the Holocaust by sheltering behind victim narratives.¹² His insight was indeed ahead of its time.

The year 2000 witnessed further developments that reconfigured global memory formation. On August 2, the German Bundestag passed legislation concerning reparations for foreign nationals conscripted into forced labour under Nazi rule. The German Foundation Act, which enshrined the political and moral accountability of the German state and German

- 11 Michael Rothberg defines the *Historikerstreit* as follows: 'In the mid-1980s, the West German public sphere was the site of a dramatic debate about the merits of comparison. Featuring some of the most prominent intellectuals and journalists of the time—including Jürgen Habermas, Ernst Nolte, Michael Stürmer, Andreas Hillgruber, Rudolf Augstein, and many others—the debate, which came to be known as the *Historikerstreit*, raged across the pages of major newspapers such as *Die Zeit* and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* during the second half of 1986 and the first half of 1987'. Michael Rothberg, 'Comparing Comparisons: From the "Historikerstreit" to the Mbembe Affair', *Geschichte der Gegenwart*, 23 September 2020, geschichtedergegenwart.ch/comparing-comparisons-from-the-historikerstreit-to-the-mbembe-affair/.
- 12 Leszek Kołakowski, 'Amidst Moving Ruins', *Daedalus* 121/2 (1992), 56.

economic actors for the exploitation of forced labour, represented a watershed moment. For the first time, forced labourers from Belarus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, and other Eastern European nations, alongside Jewish and non-Jewish prisoners and prisoners of war from the France, Italy, Serbia, and the Soviet Union, gained access to reparations. The compensation programme, which took effect on 12 August 2000, extended what had previously been denied: what might be termed ‘mnemonic citizenship’ in Germany for thirteen million victims—approximately 8.4 million foreign workers and 4.6 million prisoners of war.¹³ Despite legitimate criticisms regarding compensation amounts and eligibility criteria, the German Foundation Act remains significant in compelling major German corporations—Deutsche Bank, Allianz, Daimler-Benz, Bayer, BMW, and Volkswagen—to acknowledge their accountability for forced labour, publicly acknowledge their complicity, and contribute resources to reparation programmes.

Finally, the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery (WIWCT) convened in Tokyo from 8–12 December, 2000. Modelled on the Russell Tribunal of the 1960s anti-Vietnam War movement, the WIWCT, though lacking legal binding force, exerted substantial political impact on global memory frameworks. Activists assembled from across the world to bring charges against ten leading Japanese political and military figures, including Emperor Hirohito, for crimes against humanity. Drawing on testimony from thirty-five surviving women subjected to military sexual violence, circumstantial evidence from former soldiers’ and officers’

13 This number is from the Foundation’s official report. See: Michael Jansen and Günter Saathoff, *A Mutual Responsibility and a Moral Obligation: the Final Report on Germany’s Compensation Programs for Forced Labor and other Personal Injuries* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009): 25, 27. The number has since increased to twenty million, including forced labourers in the occupied territories.

admissions, acknowledgments by the Japanese state, expert testimony, UN Special Rapporteur reports on sexual slavery, and archival evidence from the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, the WIWCT established that the Japanese Empire and its military had institutionalized a systematic sexual slavery apparatus.¹⁴

The tribunal's verdict—guilty of crimes against humanity for rape and sexual enslavement under the comfort women system—represented a significant intervention in global memory formation, beyond its formal legal authority. The list of lawyers who participated in the WIWCT exemplifies how the rage of global society against the sexual violence of Yugoslavia and Rwanda had extended into the recognition of the Japanese military comfort women system as a crime against humanity. Among those were Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, who served as the presiding judge of the ICTY, and Patricia Viseur-Seller, the Special Advisor for Gender for the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR.¹⁵ Their participation implies that the comfort women system during the Asia-Pacific War and the systemized sexual violence during the civil wars in Rwanda and Yugoslavia are grouped into the same category of crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court.

However, global memory culture, despite its deterritorializing impulses, has become increasingly caught between opposing dynamics. With the Holocaust occupying gravitational centrality, memories of the Global East and South have frequently articulated themselves through comparative frameworks, cross-referencing, calculating juxtaposition against, or rejecting of Holocaust narratives. Many non-Western memory activists have deliberately adopted these comparative strategies as a tactical means of establishing their own positions within global memory formations. Memories of human rights abuses in the Global East and South have achieved international resonance primarily when they have become interactive with or entangled with Holocaust remembrance as the ethical touchstone of memory itself. There exists a degree of contingency in how remembrance

- 14 Judges of the Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery, 'Transcript of Oral Judgment', articles 16–26, 27–28, 30–31, *Women's Caucus for Gender Justice*, 4 December 2001, iccwomen.org/wigjdraft1/Archives/oldWCGJ/tokyo/summary.html.
- 15 Maki Kimura, *Unfolding the "Comfort Women" Debates: Modernity, Violence, Women's Voices* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 6–8; Rumi Sakamoto, 'The Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery: A Legal and Feminist Approach to the "Comfort Women" Issue', *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 3 (2001): 49–50.

of transatlantic slavery, the Nanjing Massacre, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and comfort women has referenced Holocaust language.¹⁶ Yet, this seemingly random discursive nexus possesses genuine imaginative power in promoting deterritorialized memories.

Simultaneously, even as Holocaust memory has become increasingly de-centred, it remains vulnerable to nationalist appropriation both within and beyond the West. Auschwitz has become a site of contested memory, as exemplified by the Polish-Jewish disputes over the cross at Auschwitz and the adjacent Carmelite convent.¹⁷ Reterritorializing the Holocaust memory through the nationalist appropriation was not a Polish peculiarity. The distance separating Holocaust cosmopolitanization from its vulgarization proves distressingly international. For instance, the Anne Frank fandom in Japan and the nationalist appropriation of Holocaust memory in Serbia demonstrate how the Holocaust has functioned globally as a mechanism of national self-exoneration, allowing perpetrator nations to deflect accountability for their own war crimes and ethnic genocides.¹⁸

Post-colonial Critique of Victimhood Nationalism

Nor is victimhood-based appropriation of the Holocaust uniformly justifiable. The official memory of Israel reveals how political calculation frequently infiltrates Holocaust memory, ostensibly to justify the ethnic displacement of Palestinians. As Menachem Begin, founder of the Likud party, defended Israeli aggression, protecting 'our nation, a million and a half

- 16 Jie-Hyun Lim, *Victimhood Nationalism: History and Memory in a Global Age* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2025), chapters 'globalization' and 'nationalization', 77-140.
- 17 Geneviève Zubrzycki, *The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in Post-Communist Poland* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 112.
- 18 Rotem Kowner, 'Tokyo recognizes Auschwitz: the rise and fall of Holocaust denial in Japan, 1989-1991', *Journal of Genocide Research* 3/2 (2001); Lea David, 'Holocaust Discourse as a Screen Memory: the Serbian Case' in *History and Politics in the Western Balkans: Changes at the Turn of the Millenium*, eds. Srdan M. Jovanovic and Veran Stancetic, (Serbia: The Center for Good Governance Studies, 2013), 65-69.

of whose children were murdered by the Nazis in the gas chambers' justifies necessary defensive measures. Countering international criticism, Begin declared that 'no nation on Earth can preach morality to our nation.'¹⁹

Victimhood nationalism has justified the nationalist appropriation of the Holocaust globally. Victimhood nationalism operates as a narrative template conferring moral superiority and political legitimacy upon nations claiming 'hereditary victimhood'—the presumed inheritance of ancestral suffering encoded in historical and collective memory.²⁰ This memory practice suffers from a catastrophic limitation: it suffocates fundamental critiques of colonialism, genocide, and the Holocaust through reductive binary thinking. The premise of hereditary victimhood, deeply rooted in popular memory, solidifies this binary opposition between perpetrators and victims, between collective guilt and collective innocence.

Rather than transforming the structural rules that produced historical tragedies, victimhood nationalism induces a dangerous desire to invert hierarchies—to preempt the victor's position, the perpetrator's advantage—while preserving the very logic that generated atrocity. Emotionally, victimhood nationalism issues in regret and denunciation of national victimization; yet it readily accepts the structural rules of colonialism and genocide so long as the positions remain potentially invertible. What is required instead is the exercise of historical self-reflection—the capacity to recognize one's potential to victimize others, thereby liberating oneself from the ideological prison of hereditary victimhood. Historical introspection of this kind should constitute the animating framework for cultural memory in the twenty-first century. Yet, victimhood nationalism, deeply inscribed in the national collective memory, fundamentally obstructs such critical awareness.

19 Tom Segev, *The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust*, trans. Haim Watzman (New York: An Owl Book, 2000), 399.

20 Lim, *Victimhood Nationalism*, 2.

The sinister lesson of the Holocaust is not that it can happen to us again but that we also can perpetrate such an atrocity.²¹ The genuine peril lies not in victimhood per se but in moral self-righteousness, which is almost automatically sanctioned by hereditary victimhood. The escalating memory wars that characterize our global present indicate that the globalization of memories increasingly operates through reterritorialization, anchored in victimhood nationalism as its organizing principle. From the perspective of memory praxis, engaging critically with this global memory regime of victimhood nationalism becomes imperative. History demonstrates that political regime change bereft of corresponding transformations in memory regimes remains fundamentally superficial. The strategy of pursuing international political transformation while preserving territorialized memory cultures has already exhausted its historical possibilities.

The moment has arrived to problematize victimhood nationalism—to expose it as a power structuring truth production within global memory formations. Only the deliberate ‘sacrifice’ of victimhood nationalism can initiate the first genuine step toward transformative global memory regime change.²² Yet, territorialization remains inadequately addressed. Territorialized memories are not exclusively bound to the nation-state. As the mnemonic Eurocentrism illustrates, the territorialization of memories often extends across transnational regions and continents. It raises concern about how to provincialize the mnemonic Eurocentrism of the Holocaust by revealing multidirectional memories of colonialism, the Holocaust, and Stalinist crimes in the global memory space. This challenge remains formidable.

The Achille Mbembe debates, ignited in 2020 in Germany, signal a paradigm shift from the national history of the Historikerstreit in 1986/87 to the transnational history of

21 Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*, 152.

22 Considering that victimhood nationalism operates at this mnemonic junction where the empire and the nation, collective guilt and innocence intersect, Germany’s pretentious perpetrator nationalism is complicit with the victimhood nationalism among its historical victims. Especially when it builds a hierarchy among its victim groups, competition among victimhood nationalisms gets messier.

the Historikerstreit 2.0 in the post-Cold War era.²³ From a post-colonial perspective, the Mbembe affair reveals how German national conscience—rooted in Holocaust guilt—can paradoxically impede the transnational conscience necessary for reckoning with global colonialism. Breaking the taboo of Holocaust incomparability remains inseparably linked with the de-provincialization of German memory culture. A reconceived understanding of global colonialism permits us to situate the Holocaust within the continuous development of German genocidal campaigns in Africa and to locate German invasion and occupation of the Slavic East firmly within the Western European colonialist project.²⁴

Ultimately, the globalization of Holocaust memory has enabled a non-hierarchical appreciation of historical trauma's comparability, propelling memory studies beyond mnemonic Eurocentrism. Drawing on the applicability of post-colonial critique to memory studies, the post-colonial memory regime has cast doubt on Eurocentric self-reflection—the notion that the Holocaust functions as the perpetual point of return through which Western civilization reconfirms its humanist values. Echoing Zygmunt Bauman, Western civilization and West-led global modernity are not antithetical to the Holocaust; rather, they embed the structural possibility of the Holocaust. Thus, the post-colonial memory culture disrupted 'an age-old strategy of self-exculpation',²⁵ the convenient opposition between Nazi perpetration and Western liberal democratic innocence collapses.

If the Holocaust and colonial genocide are a risk inherent within global modernity itself, then the Holocaust becomes a global question transcending specific ethnic and national boundaries. Post-Eurocentric memory enables us to problematize the history of global modernity through a critical lens that recognizes the West as the implicated agent of colonial genocide and the Holocaust. Also, this critical angle simultaneously permits a critique of the nested Orientalism present among the 'lesser Whites' of peripheral Eastern Europe and

23 Per Leo and Kolja Unger, 'Historikerstreit 2.0 über Shoah: Historiker Per Leo fordert globale Perspektive auf NS-Verbrechen', conversation, *Deutschlandfunk*, 11 July 2021.

24 Jie-Hyun Lim and Eve Rosenhaft, 'Introduction', in Lim and Rosenhaft, eds., *Mnemonic Solidarity—Global Interventions*, 6.

25 Aleida Assmann, 'On the (IN)Comparability and Suffering in German Memory', *German Life and Letters* 59/2 (2006), 194.

Russia. In fact, ‘lesser Whites’ in Eastern Europe were not simply a victim of Western racial hierarchies but active participants in constructing and maintaining global whiteness.²⁶ Tensions between mnemonic Eurocentrism and post-colonial memory formations, however, continue to erupt throughout global memory landscapes.

Hannah Arendt, Frantz Fanon, and Achille Mbembe

After the eruption of the Gaza war in 2023, the paradoxes of contemporary memory politics became starkly evident. Israeli diplomats wore yellow Star of David patches to the 30 October 2023 UN Security Council meeting, condemning the Hamas attack. Across the Pacific, Palestinian diplomatic representatives in Tokyo compared Israeli weaponry to the ‘Little Boy’, the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, drawing explicit parallels between Israel’s military aggression and American nuclear bombing. Simultaneously, three Palestinian teenagers laid wreaths at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial for atomic bomb victims.

The mnemonic conflict did not stop there. The University of Cologne announced the disinvitation of Jewish-American philosopher Nancy Fraser from her position as Albert Magnus Professor for 2024, citing her signature on the ‘Philosophy for Palestine’ initiative—a statement the institution deemed elevated Hamas’s October 7 attack to the status

26 See: James Mark, Anikó Imre, Bogdan C. Iacob, and Catherine Baker, eds., *Off-White: Central and Eastern Europe and the Global History of Race* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2024); Piotr Puchalski, *Poland in a Colonial World Order: Adjustments and Aspirations, 1918–1939* (London and New York: Routledge, 2021); Elżbieta Kwiecińska, ‘An “India of Europe”: Stanisław Szczepanowski (1846–1900) and Galician–Indian Parallels in “The Misery of Galicia”’, *Artha Journal of Social Sciences* 20/2 (2021), 57–73.

of 'legitimate resistance'.²⁷ When Masha Gessen was almost not awarded the Hannah Arendt Prize in December 2023, the *Guardian* sarcastically wrote that 'Hannah Arendt would not qualify for the Hannah Arendt prize. She would be canceled in Germany today for her political position on Israel and opinions about contemporary Zionism, which she remained critical of from 1942 until she died in 1975.'²⁸

On Black Sunday, many Hamas sympathizers on social media invoked Frantz Fanon's revolutionary theory to argue that the attack represented 'a direct and inevitable reaction to colonial oppression by Israel.'²⁹ Yet, Fanon's reflections on anti-colonial violence never constituted a blanket moral endorsement of indiscriminate violence against civilians. In fact, Fanon fought Nazism and collaboration in the name of universal human rights, and his vision of decolonization in principle reflects on the critical entanglement of colonial rule, anti-Semitism, and racism.³⁰ Nothing implicitly shows the paradox of today's global memory formation more than the recognition that neither Arendt nor Fanon would qualify for intellectual and political leadership within their respective contemporary territories. The memory formations that invoke their legacies often betray the critical principles animating their actual work.

Memory is not linear. Critical relativization and radical juxtaposition offer possibilities for deconstructing the hegemonic hierarchies embedded in global memory formations. Mnemonic

- 27 University of Cologne, 'Withdrawal of the Albertus Magnus Professorship 2024', www.uni-koeln.de/en/university/news/news-detail/withdrawal-of-the-albertus-magnus-professorship-2024.
- 28 Samantha Hill, 'Hannah Arendt would not qualify for the Hannah Arendt prize in Germany today', *Guardian*, 18 December 2023, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/dec/18/hannah-arendt-prize-masha-gessen-israel-gaza-essay.
- 29 Etan Nechin, 'Would Frantz Fanon Have Supported the Oct. 7 Massacre? His Biographer Isn't So Sure', *Haaretz*, 2 February 2024, www.haaretz.com/life/books/2024-02-02/ty-article-magazine/premium/would-frantz-fanon-have-supported-the-oct-7-massacre-his-biographer-isnt-so-sure/0000018d-63eb-d480-adbd-ebfbaa3a0000.
- 30 Danilo Schulz, 'Der Algerienkrieg als Matrix für den Nahostkonflikt? (I)', *Merkur* 78/904 (August, 2024), 28-32.

solidarity among conflictual memories does not emerge from imposing hierarchical ordering on a linear narrative. Instead, it sustains itself by maintaining critical tension among the cacophony of discrete memories that confront and intertwine within the global memory space.³¹ When memory of victimization departs from the zero-sum game of victims—relinquishing the reterritorializing impulse that privileges one's own nation's suffering while ranking others' afflictions as subordinate—and finally transcends victimhood nationalism, diverse and even conflicting memories can converge in what we might term genuine mnemonic solidarity.

31 For an alternative approach to mnemonic solidarity that is not based on antagonistic memories that rose from international conflicts or cosmopolitan memories that homogenize sufferings, see: Anna Cento Bull and Hans Lauge Hansen, 'On agonistic memory', *Memory Studies* 9/4 (2015), 390–404.