

7. Chapter: Second Case – The Republic of Singapore

7.1. Introduction

Following the analysis of the United Kingdom's counter-terrorism strategy and the assessment of the country's deployed programmes against the nine variables established in the new *Strategic Resilience* framework in the previous chapter, this chapter replicates the same approach for the case of Singapore as part of the multiple-case replication design⁸⁴⁴ adopted to test the relevance and validity of the *Rings of Resilience Model*.

7.2. Singapore's Counter-Terrorism Approach

Singapore's approach to counter-terrorism has to be understood in context of its history, geography, demography and political set-up.

The country has a small, but religiously and ethnically diverse population, with large minority groups living on a densely populated island without strategic depth, surrounded by large neighbouring countries. The historic memory of the Japanese invasion and occupation in 1942 is still recalled on the annual *Total Defence Day*. With it the country is reminded of its vulnerability and the consequential need to be strong, vigilant and prepared.

National Service (NS) for young men is an integral part of society and an important pillar for the security of the country. Full-time *National Service Men* (FT NSMen) can perform their duties in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), the Singapore Police Force (SPF) or the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF). Apart from being an essential element of Singapore's defence posture, the National Service is also a nation-building element, where over a period of two years all male Singaporean citizens and second-generation permanent residents from all religions and races, are deliberately mixed and together are sworn in on the nation. After completing the National Service, they remain in a reservist status (as so called NSMen) which obliges them to serve up to 40 days per year until the age of 40.

844 As described by Yin 2001, 49.

Singapore was first struck by international terrorism on its soil in 1974 when *Japanese Red Army* operatives supported by Palestinian extremists, bombed a petroleum facility and hijacked a ferry.⁸⁴⁵ The incident was resolved without bloodshed, but offering safe passage to the Middle East for the terrorists. Singapore had appeared toothless. It reacted by strengthening its police force numbers by extending the possibility of doing one's NS from the SAF also to the SPF to produce additional trained reserve police officers whom the country could call up in a crisis. Singapore also started the clandestine formation and training of a dedicated counter-terrorism commando unit.

This unit was put to test (and its existence first acknowledged) 17 years later in 1991 when it successfully stormed a high-jacked Singapore Airlines plane, killed the four Pakistani terrorists, and freed all 123 hostages unharmed.⁸⁴⁶

The attacks of 9/11 and the discovery of plots by *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI), an *Al Qaida* affiliate, to commit large-scale attacks in Singapore and the following apprehension of 15 alleged terrorists were a watershed moment for the Singapore authorities.⁸⁴⁷ Beyond the immense damage in blood and material destruction which the foiled attacks could have caused on the island, the Government saw the purportedly Islamic foundation of *Jemaah Islamiyah's* violence as an existential threat to the Singapore way of life of peaceful coexistence of the different religions and ethnicities.⁸⁴⁸

Singapore's society of 5.6 million people is extremely diverse and the bad memories of deadly religious and ethnic conflicts which shortly after its independence in 1966 had spilled over the border from neighbouring countries, are still present in the mind of this young nation and were revived through the so-called *Little India Riots* in 2013.⁸⁴⁹

The country's population today encompasses "*Buddhists (33.9%), Christians, (18.1%), Muslims (14.3%), Taoists (11.3%), Hindus (5.2%) and others (0.7%); some 16.4% are categorised as atheists. The country is also ethnically diverse, comprising Chinese (74.3%), Malays (13.4%), Indians (9.0%) and Others (3.2%).*"⁸⁵⁰ Since the days of the 1966 riots following independence,

845 National Security Coordination Centre 2004, 20.

846 *ibid.*, 20–21.

847 See Ministry of Home Affairs Republic of Singapore 2003.

848 *ibid.*

849 See Liang and Sim 2014.

850 Hussin 2018, 173.

Singapore has made maintaining interfaith harmony a foundation stone of its government policy as it has modelled itself as a secular, open, and cosmopolitan society.⁸⁵¹ This model was actively challenged by the *jihadi* threat of *Jemaah Islamiyah*.

To reduce the distrust and the potential fear of the Muslim community as a result of the jihadi terror threat which showed in other countries after 9/11, the Government undertook a number of efforts on the society level: It requested and received the unambiguous condemnation of extremism by Muslim leaders in Singapore who accepted their exceptional ability and thereby duty as Muslims to contradict and to exorcise those who misused Islam to advance their own violent ideology.⁸⁵² At the same time, the Government reached out to all major religious groups in Singapore with the objective of bringing their community leaders together to reduce fears and prejudices among them through dialogue in the communities.⁸⁵³

To promote these interfaith dialogues, the Government created *Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles* (IRCC) in all of its 84 constituencies.⁸⁵⁴ The Government was able to build on the existing organisational structure of the *Presidential Council for Religious Harmony* (PCRH) and the *Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act* (MRHA) it had enacted in 1990, as a reaction to an “increase in religious fervour and assertiveness” which had created inter-religious tensions, and to curb undesired political influence by faith groups.⁸⁵⁵

The MRHA allows the Government after consulting with the PCRH, to issue a restraining order to religious leaders and activists that it finds to be “causing feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will, or hostility between different religious groups; or promoting a political cause”.⁸⁵⁶ Since its introduction in 1990, no restraining order has been issued, but multiple religious leaders and activists received warnings that they would be liable to a restraining order if they did not change their behaviour.⁸⁵⁷

On the law enforcement front, Singapore cracked down on potential militants post 9/11 by utilising its legislative tools, especially the *Internal Se-*

851 Kwang 2019.

852 See National Security Coordination Centre 2004, 64–65.

853 See Hussin 2018, 175.

854 See *ibid.*, 178.

855 Government of Singapore 1989, 3.

856 Singapore Statues Online 2001, 7–8.

857 See Hussin 2018, 180–181.

curity Act.⁸⁵⁸ This is a remnant of colonial law which allows house searches without a warrant and the pre-emptive imprisonment of suspects without charge for up to two years, in order to protect national security.⁸⁵⁹ The country also strengthened its border security and its attitude towards immigration, expanded its regional and international security and intelligence cooperation and strongly supported all international counter-terrorism legislation at the United Nations.⁸⁶⁰

In 2003, it was not terrorists but the outbreak of the *Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome* (SARS) in Singapore that for a short time threw the country into crisis. Through concerted government efforts, stringent measures which included indiscriminate screening of all travellers and home quarantines and starting “*a national movement on educating the public on symptoms of the disease, how it can spread and urging them to seek medical attention should they develop the symptoms*”, the authorities were able to quickly mitigate the health threat.⁸⁶¹ It took much longer to resolve the social impact of wide-spread fear regarding public life and the economy.⁸⁶²

Due to the SARS experience and following a thorough terrorism threat reassessment, the Government decided to reorganize Singapore’s security architecture as to make the fight against terrorism a top government priority.⁸⁶³ The underlying structure would need to be conducive for a whole-of-government approach which required the coordinated and comprehensive action of all government departments. So, in August 2004, three months after the Madrid train bombings, the newly established *National Security Coordination Centre*, organisationally placed close to the top of Government, published the first National Security Strategy of Singapore, dedicated “*to the people of Singapore*”⁸⁶⁴ as a “*framework of reference for all of us*.”⁸⁶⁵

On 68 pages it laid out Singapore’s comprehensive whole-of-nation approach to counter- terrorism, to “*prevent terrorist incidents, protect our vulnerabilities and help us respond effectively should attacks occur*.”⁸⁶⁶ Naming a *jihadi* terrorist attack as the “Number One” threat to Singapore, the

858 National Security Coordination Centre 2004, 23, 46.

859 See Singapore Statutes Online 1987.

860 See National Security Coordination Centre 2004, 44.

861 The Straits Times 2016.

862 See Chew 2009.

863 See National Security Coordination Centre 2004, 31.

864 *ibid.*, 3.

865 *ibid.*, 59.

866 *ibid.*, 59.

document provided a detailed overview of the security situation, explained who the enemy was in this conflict, and why Singapore was in this fight.⁸⁶⁷

While it reassured the population by describing all the things the Government had done and was doing to mitigate the threat, it also unequivocally made it clear that the Government depended on the citizens' help in its effort to keep the nation safe.

Figure 42: Two historic Total Defence campaign poster.⁸⁶⁸



This request on the population to “play its part” is congruent with the principles of the *Total Defence* framework which had been introduced in 1984.⁸⁶⁹ The *Total Defence* framework postulates that for a credible defence, the responsibility for the nation’s security cannot just lie with the armed forces. Instead, security must be a shared-responsibility of the whole population, to ensure maximised defence and deterrence capabilities, because threats are non-conventional, and because Singapore is a small country

867 See *ibid.*

868 Images taken from Public Service Division at Prime Minister’s Office 2015.

869 See *ibid.*, 60.

without strategic depth and with a unique social fabric.⁸⁷⁰ This principle is well reflected in the earliest *Total Defence* campaign posters shown below.

The framework originally identified five intertwined areas apart from *Military Defence* which are important contributors to a “comprehensive defence” where the civil population can make important contributions. These areas are *Civil Defence*, *Economic Defence*, *Social Defence* and *Psychological Defence*.⁸⁷¹

- The *Civil Defence* component supports a civilian population who is fully trained in civil defence emergency preparedness and life-saving skills, and is competent and confident to be able to look after themselves and help others in a national emergency or crisis situation.⁸⁷² This self-efficacy should instil confidence in their resilience and should reduce the feeling of being threatened by an attack. It should also provide peace-of-mind to members of emergency services and law enforcement to perform their duty away from their families during such a crisis.
- The *Social Defence* component stresses the importance to preserve social cohesion in this multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. It endorses service “to the larger community and country” to form and strengthen social bonds, and the “active participation in volunteer work.”⁸⁷³
- The *Economic Defence* component posits that a well-functioning economy with an agile private sector and workforce that is able and willing to adapt to changes and challenges in its environment, is an important contributor to the safety and security of Singapore.⁸⁷⁴
- The *Psychological Defence* component emphasises the role of each citizen in helping to maintain national resilience.⁸⁷⁵ To safeguard the resilience of Singapore as a nation, each citizen is asked to do his part by preserving his confidence despite of adversities facing the nation and exhibit his patriotic spiritedness in action and words.⁸⁷⁶

In 2019, a sixth component was added: *Cyber Defence* which was renamed *Digital Defence* in 2020. This component urges Singaporeans to

870 See *ibid.*, 60.

871 National Security Coordination Centre 2004, 60.

872 See Ministry of Defence Singapore 2004, 2.

873 *ibid.*, 2.

874 See *ibid.*, 2.

875 See *ibid.*, 1.

876 See *ibid.*, 1.

- “Adopt good cybersecurity practices to safeguard our personal data, devices and systems,
- Be aware of phishing attacks and internet scams.
- Use social media discerningly and responsibly,
- Be vigilant against fake news and the spread of deliberate online falsehoods.”⁸⁷⁷

Focusing on the direct terror threat, the National Security Strategy asks citizens to contribute to comprehensive security by being vigilant of suspicious items and of suspicious behaviour and to report it.⁸⁷⁸ The citizens should also prepare themselves by acquiring the necessities, knowledge and training (e.g. first aid and equipment (e.g. emergency bag) to be able to look after themselves, their families and others, in case of an attack (e.g. improvised first aid).⁸⁷⁹

The private sector is equally asked to be on the look-out for suspicious items and suspicious behaviour and to invest in training, to improve protective security and to get the relevant security certification.⁸⁸⁰ The companies are also required to have proper disaster planning in place and to undertake the necessary steps to assure business contingency management in the case of an attack.⁸⁸¹

Religious leaders have a duty of speaking out against violent extremism, to report suspicious behaviour and to support national cohesion by religious moderation, respect and tolerance towards other faiths, in accordance with the adherence to the *Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act*.⁸⁸²

This distribution of core responsibilities of counter-terrorism between the authorities and the civil society remains in place in principle till today. But it has seen an incremental shift of more responsibility towards the population, as the terror threat assessment has evolved further. The population did however not automatically accept the increased responsibility, even after extended exposure to public appeals and public service announce-

877 Ministry of Defence Singapore 2020a.

878 See National Security Coordination Centre 2004, 62.

879 See Wong 2017.

880 National Security Coordination Centre 2004, 62.

881 See Ministry of Manpower Singapore 2020b.

882 See National Security Coordination Centre 2004, 65.

ment.⁸⁸³ Thus the whole-of-nation-approach presents itself as a concept rather than as a reality.⁸⁸⁴

This became apparent to the Government in 2010, when the authorities set up a public awareness exercise through which they wanted to test the public vigilance towards terrorist threats. The exercise was modelled after a terrorist incident in New York City's Times Square in the same year, where police was able to defuse a car bomb after a member of the public had spotted and reported a suspicious smoking vehicle.⁸⁸⁵

The result in Singapore where wired-up vehicles were left smoking suspiciously in nine central locations, was disconcerting for the Government: Of 7,200 people who were directly exposed to the rigged cars in the scenario, only 260 took notice that something about the cars was wrong, and only 52 of these alerted the authorities or nearby security.⁸⁸⁶ The visible complacency and the bystander effect was also reflected by poll results in the same year which showed Singaporeans did not feel that the country was under threat from terrorism.⁸⁸⁷

In acknowledgement of this finding, the Government focused on intensifying and systematizing its public education effort, from reaching primary school children to pensioners “*to establish a cultural norm of being vigilant and rejecting extremism and violence*”.⁸⁸⁸ Its most realistic option in the short run though, was accepting that it may need to rely on only a few alert and prepared individuals who would really step up, should the need arise due to an attack.⁸⁸⁹

On the law enforcement side, the Government has continuously adapted to evolving threats on a tactical level and on the strategic level. Different from its beginning in 1974, when it was decided to create the Counter-Terrorism Unit in secret, the Government now places a great emphasis on communicating its efforts to reassure the population and deter terrorists.

As a reaction to the Madrid and 7/7 bombings in London for example, Singapore created a completely new police force, solely responsible for deterring, detecting and responding to attacks on its Metro network.⁸⁹⁰

883 See Nadarajan 2012, 55.

884 See *ibid.*, 56.

885 See *ibid.*, 54.

886 See *ibid.*, 54.

887 See *ibid.*, 55.

888 *ibid.*, 54.

889 See *ibid.*, 55.

890 See *ibid.*, 76.

After a new pattern of marauding terrorist firearms and bladed weapons attacks emerged, Singapore signaled its resolve by creating and deploying visible *In-Situ Reaction Teams* (IRT) in crowded areas, to complement already existing capabilities of *Rapid Deployment Troops* (RDTs), equipped with tactical response motorcycles for faster response times.⁸⁹¹

Since 2012, Singapore has also expanded its CCTV surveillance network by a total of 67,000 cameras.⁸⁹² These were installed in all public apartment blocks and multi-story carparks as well as in public spaces, like public transport walkways, hawker centres as well as neighbourhood and town centres. In 2019, another 2,500 locations across the island have been earmarked to receive 6000 more cameras over the next years, to support its counter-terrorism effort.⁸⁹³

By 2015, the experience of Daesh-inspired so-called lone wolf attacks in Europe and more cases of homegrown self-radicalizing in Singapore challenged the Government's patience and brought new urgency to its effort to "mainstream counter-terrorism" in the population.⁸⁹⁴ The new preferred patterns of terror attacks, using vehicles, firearms or bladed weapons targeting random civilians without prior warning, had made it extremely difficult for law enforcement to foresee and prevent attacks just on their own. As if this was not bad enough, the Daesh ideology promoted by the attacks was even more extreme and more religiously divisive than the AlQaida positions.

So in 2016, the Government doubled down on the activation of a true whole-of-nation effort when the Prime Minister himself announced the launch of the *Singapore Secure Movement* (*SGSecure*).⁸⁹⁵ Its stated objective is the strengthening and protecting of national cohesiveness and unity across races and religions, for it to become reality in everyday life.⁸⁹⁶ This will allow Singapore to "*bounce back quickly and resiliently after an incident*", preserving Singapore's way of life and religious harmony.⁸⁹⁷

SG Secure offers resources, training, and companionship to Singaporeans to build their self-efficacy in such a way that they know how to behave under threat of an attack, how to respond in the event of an attack and how

891 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019c, 2.

892 See Today Online 2016.

893 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019c, 2.

894 Nadarajan 2012, 54.

895 See Lee 2016.

896 See *ibid.*

897 *ibid.*

to cope in the aftermath, aiming at increasing overall vigilance, cohesion and resilience in the nation.⁸⁹⁸ The initiative is delivered through multiple channels, touchpoints and media in a whole-of-government approach and it visibly permeates most areas of public and community life.

This long-term effort complements Singapore's counter-terrorism deterrence posture (which has continuously increased its ability for direct denial and punishment) with indirect denial through the signaling of public resolve and community resilience. How credible the resolve and resilience is has not been tested in reality, but a representative national survey in July 2018 has shown that


*93% of the respondents believe that all Singaporeans will stand united regardless of race or religion, should an attack happen in Singapore. 96% of respondents were willing to help other Singaporeans affected by a terrorist attack here. Respondents were also confident that those around them will render assistance, with 76% believing that their neighbours will help them if they were affected.*⁸⁹⁹

Following from here, the author will look in detail at the different initiatives and measures the authorities Singapore are undertaking today to build or strengthen the societal resilience. These are visualized for a better overview on the opposite page.

898 See *ibid.*

899 Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019c, 7.

Figure 43: Overview of the Singaporean activities and measures assessed in this chapter.⁹⁰⁰



900 Author's own work.

7.3. Singapore Community Programmes

*There are a wide range of programmes that are catered to educate and support the general public in essential civil defence skills and knowledge. These include mass participation in exercises, visits to households, distribution of educational materials, training tools and community events.*⁹⁰¹

7.3.1. Training and Engagement

7.3.1.1. SGSecure Movement

SGSecure is a national movement launched in 2016, with the aim to prepare the public for the event of a terrorist attack. It calls on all Singaporeans to honour their own individual responsibility for Singapore's security by "*staying alert, staying united and staying strong*" in the face of terrorism.⁹⁰²

SGSecure offers information, resources, training and community to Singaporeans to build the self-efficacy to know how to behave under the threat of an attack, how to respond in the event of an attack, and how to cope and help others in the aftermath.⁹⁰³

The initiative is delivered through multiple channels, touchpoints and media in a whole-of-government approach, and it visibly permeates most areas of public and community life, as well as the private sector and schools. The activities include large and regular small-scale public exercises that can involve Counter-Terrorism Police, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), Civil Defence Forces, emergency services, volunteer emergency responders, businesses and special CBRN-defence units which are to underline the need for vigilance and to portrait resolve.

SGSecure focusses on three areas: *Vigilance, Cohesion, and Resilience*⁹⁰⁴

901 Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018c.

902 Government of Singapore 2016.

903 See *ibid.*

904 Government of Singapore 2018.

Vigilance

SGSecure encourages citizens to be vigilant in their daily lives and to be alert of suspicious behaviour, suspicious objects and of vehicles which may be connected to terrorist activity and report them to the police.⁹⁰⁵

Apart from media and events, the *SGSecure* message is delivered through visits of all 1.39 million households in Singapore.⁹⁰⁶ These visits are conducted by members of the police, SCDF, reservists and volunteers who inform residents of the terrorist threat and who spread the message of vigilance, cohesion, and resilience.⁹⁰⁷ According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, by end of 2018, one third of all households in Singapore had been personally visited.⁹⁰⁸ During these home visits, the teams also present the *SGSecure mobile app* and encourage Singaporeans to install it. This mobile application is an important component in the Government's effort to build greater preparedness, and it encourages all citizens to download it on their phones. Some of the mobile phone network providers agreed to pre-install the app on their devices.

The application has multiple functionalities:

- It allows the citizens to easily report suspicious items or activities directly to the *Police Counter-Terrorism Center*, complete with pictures and with the location data.
- It allows the citizens to receive security alerts and security-related messaging from the police and other *Home Team* agencies.
- In case of a crisis, it allows the Government to instantly warn and inform citizens by push message.
- It allows citizens to register as “*myResponder*”-volunteers who agree to receive alerts if minor emergencies like an incident with a cardiac arrest or a minor fire are reported in their vicinity, to allow them to promptly respond before the SCDF paramedics or fire fighters arrive.
- It allows citizens to locate the position of the next AED close to their location.

905 See *ibid.*

906 See Lee 2016.

907 See *ibid.*

908 Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019c, 3.

Cohesion

SGSecure also encourages citizens to work together to strengthen social cohesion across racial and religious lines in their daily lives in their community, neighbourhood, and their workplace to preemptively mitigate potential tensions, based on fear and distrust between different groups which could arise after a terrorist attack.⁹⁰⁹

During the home visits described above, citizens may for example be encouraged to join volunteer schemes in their community, run by partner organisations which help “*to sensitise, train and prepare residents in the neighbourhoods for a terror attack, including in skills such as First Aid and CPR-AED.*”⁹¹⁰

Resilience

SGSecure encourages self-efficacy by educating citizens how to behave if caught up in a terrorist attack, and how they can cope themselves or support the coping of loved ones in the aftermath of an attack.⁹¹¹ It also trains the citizens at the community level in First Aid and CPR-AED through the *Community Emergency Preparedness Programme*, offered by the SCDF. This is aligned with the Government’s effort to equip all residential building blocks with one AED and to ensure at least two trained citizens on each floor.⁹¹² Besides offering training in medical first aid, SGSecure also encourages citizens to get trained in “*Psychological First Aid*” as there is the understanding that “*psychosocial support in emergencies is best delivered as a community-based activity.*”⁹¹³ The Singapore Red Cross supports this effort by offering such training to citizens to enable them to “*provide Psychological First Aid to help people affected by an emergency, disaster or traumatic event*”.⁹¹⁴

What measures can authorities take away from the SGSecure movement that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

909 See Government of Singapore 2018.

910 *ibid.*

911 See *ibid.*

912 Lee 2016.

913 Government of Singapore 2018.

914 *ibid.*

- Authorities should conduct regular large and small-scale public CT exercises to build awareness and confidence.
- Authorities should encourage citizens to be vigilant in their daily lives and be alert of suspicious behaviour, suspicious objects and vehicles which may be connected to terrorist activity and report them to the police.
- Authorities should offer information, resources, training and community to citizens to build their self-efficacy to know how to behave under the threat of an attack, how to respond in the event of an attack, and how to cope and help others in the aftermath.
- Authorities should devise a technical solution that:
 - Allows the citizens to easily report suspicious items or activities directly to the counter-terrorism police with pictures and the location data,
 - Allows the citizens to receive security alerts and security-related messaging from the police and other *Home Team* agencies,
 - Allows the Government to instantly warn and inform citizens by push message.
- Authorities should encourage citizens to work together to strengthen social cohesion across racial and religious lines in their daily lives in their community, neighborhood and their workplace to preemptively mitigate potential tensions, based on fear and distrust between different groups, which could arise after a terrorist attack.
- Authorities should establish volunteer schemes in their community that increase the vigilance and develop preparedness of citizens.
- Authorities should encourage self-efficacy by educating citizens how to behave if caught up in a terrorist attack.
- Authorities should educate citizens how they can cope or support the coping of loved ones in the aftermath of an attack.
- Authorities should train the citizens at the community level in first aid and CPR-AED usage.
- Authorities should ensure that residents of large residential building blocks have access to an AED and are able to use it.
- Authorities should encourage citizens to get trained in Psychological first aid.

<i>SGSecure Movement</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	✓
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	✓

7.3.1.2. SGSecure Media Cluster

To assure maximum reach and a high number of impressions, the dissemination of the *SGSecure* campaign messages through the media has been of critical importance in addition to the house visits and community events (e.g. Emergency Preparedness Days). The *Ministry of Communication and Information (MCI)* steers this effort through a close cooperation with the media industry, including producers, editors and online influencers.⁹¹⁵

The so-called *SGSecure Media Cluster* is an important tool to help the Government “rallying the public together and in maintaining social cohesion and resilience during times of communal tension and/or emergencies.”⁹¹⁶ The specifics of the Singaporean media environment which is closely curtailed by the *Media Development Authority* and ranked 151st in Press Freedom according to *Reporters without Borders* in 2019, is conducive to the dominating influence of the *SGSecure Media Cluster’s* messaging.⁹¹⁷

In addition to dedicated counter-terrorism / vigilance content produced for television, cinema and *YouTube* channels, the *SGSecure* messages are also inserted into individual, fitting episodes of different established TV entertainment formats, on the various Chinese dialect and language programmes of the main Singapore TV Channels.⁹¹⁸ The *SGSecure Media Cluster* has also produced a number of travelling exhibitions to be shown

915 See Ministry of Communications and Information Singapore 2020b.

916 *ibid.*

917 Reporters Without Borders 2019.

918 See Ministry of Communications and Information Singapore 2017 ; These formats include dialect programmes, “Eat Already” (Jiak Ba Buay in Hokkien) and “Happy

in schools and at community events. Theatre plays have been produced in cooperation with the Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth (MCCY).

Apart from the *SGSecure* mobile application, the website *Gov.sg* has been designated by the MCI as the official information outlet for verified information and guidance to the public during a time of crisis.⁹¹⁹ From there the same information is also distributed through the official social media channels e.g. on *Twitter*, *Facebook*, *YouTube* or *Telegram*.

What measures can authorities take away from the SGSecure Media Cluster that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should take a concerted whole-of-government approach to communicating to the public about terrorism.
- Authorities should produce or initiate the production of dedicated counter-terrorism/ vigilance content for television, cinema and *YouTube* channels.
- Authorities should evaluate including counter-terrorism messaging into single episodes of different established entertainment formats.
- Authorities should create travelling exhibitions or theatre plays on the subject, appropriate to be to be shown / performed in schools, community events, or at other venues (e.g. shopping mall exhibition spaces)
- Authorities should establish trusted channels of information and guidance to the public during a time of crisis.

<i>SGSecure Media Cluster</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Build Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	✓
<i>Management of Fear</i>	✓
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Deliver Dedicated Support for Directly Affected</i>	

Can Already” (Hua Hee Tio Ho in Hokkien) on Channel 8, and the Channel 5 programme, “Steady Lah!”.

919 Ministry of Communications and Information Singapore 2020a.

7.3.1.3. SGSecure Community Network

Following attacks on places of worship in Europe, New Zealand, and Sri Lanka the Government expanded their *SGSecure* outreach to all religious and cultural organizations in Singapore (beyond those already organized in the *Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles*) to increase their preparedness for potential attacks. This has been done with a clear expectation by the Government that these religious organisations fulfill their obligation “under *SGSecure* for their followers and for the wider society.”⁹²⁰ By establishing the *SGSecure Community Network (SGCN)* the MCCY aims to “build stronger community networks and prepare places of worship to be crisis-ready.”⁹²¹

Under this programme, religious organisations receive security briefings and are taught about counter-terrorism frameworks which should enable them, under guidance from Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) experts, to develop their own crisis management plans for their places of worship, and to pass on relevant security advice to their members.⁹²² The groups are also included in CT exercises organized by the MHA, to test their preparedness and to practice their skills.

What measures can authorities take away from the SGSecure Community Network that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should support religious groups to develop their own crisis management plans for their places of worship and to pass on relevant security advice to their members.
- Authorities should also include religious groups in CT exercises to test their preparedness and to help them practice their skills.

920 Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth Singapore 2019e.

921 *ibid.*

922 See *ibid.*; See also *Security Advisories Booklet For Religious and Community Organisations* published by Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth Singapore 2019a.

<i>SGSecure Community Network</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

7.3.1.4. SCDF Community Emergency Preparedness Programme

The three-tier structured *Community Emergency Preparedness Programme (CEPP)* offered to Singapore residents, teaches essential life-saving skills and core emergency procedures, including the *SGSecure* skillset.⁹²³ Offered by the *Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF)*, the programme's focus lies on building the ability of the citizens to practically apply their acquired knowledge in case of an emergency.⁹²⁴

– *I AM SAFE* Module

The first module, now offered as an e-learning module taught in only 15 minutes, should enable the citizen to take care of himself, as well as his family and those around him in an emergency situation.⁹²⁵

– *RESPONSE READY* Module

The second module taught and trained in 3,5 hours, aims to equip the citizen with three basic emergency preparedness skill, first aid, CPR-AED and firefighting, to be able to provide initial emergency assistance in a distress situation before the SCDF arrives.⁹²⁶

– *LIFESAVER* Module

After a four-hour training in the third module, the citizen is assumed to be equipped with enhanced life-saving- and emergency preparedness

923 See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2020a.


924 See *ibid.*

925 See *ibid.*

926 See *ibid.*

skills. He is expected to be able and willing to volunteer to help save lives and render assistance in emergency situations.⁹²⁷

Figure 44 and 45: ⁹²⁸⁹²⁹ Promotion and sample scenes from Emergency Preparedness Days including staged police response to terrorist attack and engagement of residents at booth through police and volunteers.



To raise awareness for the programme and to provide practice for grass-roots volunteers and residents “on how to mobilize their resources and deal with large-scale emergencies within their neighbourhood”, the SCDF organizes dozens of community exercises, known as Emergency Preparedness Days, each year (48 in 2018) and is raising the numbers further in 2019 and 2020.⁹³⁰ The exercises are organized in coordination with the community’s *Emergency and Engagement Committee (C2E)* and the *People’s Association*. The hypothetical crisis scenarios generally include a terrorism segment which may also involve attacks with CBRN materials and are supported

927 See *ibid*.

928 Image taken from People’s Association *et al.* 2018.

929 Image taken from Ang and Desmond 2016.

930 Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018b ; Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019c.

by the *Singapore Police Force* (SPF). At the same time they are used as an opportunity to portray “*the readiness of SCDF and other Home Team agencies, as well as volunteers*” to deal with such a crisis, to the community residents.⁹³¹

Apart from the enacted scenarios on display, strong focus is placed on the residents to get hands-on-experience including extinguishing fires, applying CPR, to train “In-Place-Protection” and to test their knowledge of the public warning systems’ (PWS) signals and of decontamination procedures.⁹³² Their learning is supported through direct volunteer engagement, interactive tools, training simulators and modern education material as shown in the figures 49 and 50.⁹³³

*“Having residents trained in SGSecure core skillsets, will enhance the community’s ability to respond to emergency situations in their daily lives and to terrorist attacks should they occur.”*⁹³⁴

What measures can authorities take away from the Community Emergency Preparedness Days that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should organise regular emergency preparedness days in cooperation with the civil defence and first responders to raise awareness for and build self-efficacy in essential life-saving skills and core emergency procedures, including terrorism vigilance and preparedness among the citizens.
- Authorities should ensure that on emergency preparedness days citizens can get hands-on-experience including extinguishing fires and applying CPR, and that they can test and improve their relevant knowledge through interactive tools, modern education material and training simulators.
- Authorities should create and use the attention on emergency preparedness days to demonstrate their resolve and preparedness by tackling simulated crisis scenarios, which include a terrorism segment.

931 See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018b.

932 See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018b.

933 See *ibid.*

934 Ministry of Communications and Information Singapore 2017.

<i>Community Emergency Preparedness Days</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	✓

7.3.1.5. SCDF-PA Civil Defence Ready Homes Programme

To reduce the burden on emergency services during a crisis situation, the SCDF, National Fire and Civil Emergency Preparedness Council (NFEC) and People’s Association (PA) collaborate to increase the ability and preparedness of able citizens to help themselves. The *Civil Defence Ready Home Programme* encourages the 1.3 million households to assess their readiness to deal with emergencies as a social unit and guides them to obtaining the necessary civil defence skills to achieve the necessary crisis readiness.⁹³⁵

This includes efficacy in taking *In-Place-Protection* (IPP) measures in the case of the release of airborne biological, chemical or radiological agents stemming from a terrorist attack or an industrial accident, as well as the availability of readily pre-packed emergency bags, in case evacuation measures are required.⁹³⁶

The adoption of the above measures by the households is supported through media publicity, the distribution of easy-to-follow hands-on-guidance (e.g. *Civil Defence Emergency Handbook*⁹³⁷ and *Civil Defence Ready-*

935 See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2019b.

936 See *ibid.* ; Singapore Civil Defence Force 2019a.

937 Singapore Civil Defence Force 2019c.

Homes check-lists⁹³⁸) as well as through public education at community exercises, schools and workplaces.⁹³⁹

In addition, the SCDF also has gamified civil defence skills in its SCDF *Emergency Preparedness Center (EPC)*, an edutainment centre where families as well as groups can experience, learn and practice their skills in a playful manner.⁹⁴⁰

What measures can authorities take away from the Civil Defence Ready Home Programme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should provide self-help information and guidance to increase the ability and preparedness of able citizens to help themselves in their homes or in case of evacuation.
- Authorities should support the adoption of proposed measures through media publicity, the distribution of easy-to-follow hands-on-guidance (e.g. *Civil Defence Emergency Handbook* and check-lists) as well public education at community exercises, schools and workplaces.

<i>Civil Defence Ready Home Programme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

938 Singapore Civil Defence Force and People's Association 2019.

939 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019c ; See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018c.

940 See Hussain 2015.

7.3.1.6. SCDF Emergency Preparedness Centre

Opened in 2015, the purpose- built *SCDF Emergency Preparedness Centre (EPC)* “utilizes highly visual and interactive exhibits to impart emergency preparedness knowledge and skills to its visitors of all ages.”⁹⁴¹

It gamifies the *Community Emergency Preparedness Program’s* content through interactive features and through engaging hands-on simulations as shown in the image below. On 280 sqm this edutainment centre offers visitors an immersive experience into the different facets of personal emergency preparedness, whether dealing with fire, medical emergencies, extreme weather situations, terrorist attacks, chemical attacks or even war.

*Figure 46:*⁹⁴² Visitors learn firefighting skills in a gamified immersive way at the *SCDF Emergency Preparedness Centre*.



Photo: SPH

What measures can authorities take away from the SCDF Emergency Preparedness Centre that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

941 Singapore Civil Defence Force 2015.

942 Image taken from Chang 2015.

- Authorities should establish civil defence skills edutainment centres where families as well as school groups can experience, learn and practice their emergency preparedness skills in a playful manner.
- Authorities should consider making use of new *Virtual Reality* and simulation technologies to make the learning a *highly visual and interactive, as well as a desirable* immersive experience.

<i>SCDF Emergency Preparedness Centre</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

7.3.1.7. The Singapore Discovery Centre

The *Singapore Discovery Centre* (SDC) is an important public education component in the Government's effort to build a strong and resilient nation.⁹⁴³ This edutainment centre was designed by a renowned architect and comprises state-of-the-art facilities including outdoor areas, and cinemas with free entry for Singaporeans. The centre teaches about Singapore's national heritage and civic values in an engaging and entertaining way, which has also made it a popular tourist destination. The SDC caters for different segments of the Singaporean population:⁹⁴⁴


- 4) To Singaporean citizen and especially families,
- 5) To educators to whom it offers dedicated tours as well as dedicated resources,
- 6) To primary and secondary school student groups with dedicated tours,
- 7) To grassroots volunteer groups who receive special tours,
- 8) To uniformed groups and NS FT service men.

943 See Singapore Discovery Centre 2018c.

944 See Singapore Discovery Centre 2018b.

Total Defence and the *SGSecure* messages are included in the exhibitions and cinema movies that promote national resilience through civic engagement as shown in the image below.

Figure 47: Poster for the immersive 4-D homeland defence-scenario movie *Operation Lightning Crush* shown in SDC cinema.⁹⁴⁵



The *Total Defence* concept and *SGSecure* messages are also gamified: the visitor's survival skills and appreciation for Total Defence are put to the

945 Singapore Discovery Centre 2019.

test, for example in counter-terrorism paintball gameplays or immersive live-action “zombie apocalypse” pandemic scenarios as shown below.⁹⁴⁶

Figure 48: Excerpt from the school programme booklet⁹⁴⁷;

COUNTER TERRORISM PAINTBALL

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

1. Understand the importance of leadership, teamwork and communication
2. Encourage students to work together for a common goal

DURATION
3h (Programme is only conducted on weekdays)

NO. OF PARTICIPANTS
Min. 24 pax / Max. 40 pax (per session)
*Complimentary bus transport (T&C apply)



Students learning how to target accurately with the paintball markers

Figure 49: Promotion Banner for the Area 51o Zombie Apocalypse event.⁹⁴⁸



24 MARCH 2018

AREA 510

TOGETHER WE SURVIVE

S'PORE DISCOVERY CENTRE'S DEBUT THRILLER ADVENTURE EVENT!

WARNING EVENT MAY BE TOO INTENSE FOR CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 13. NO MASKS ALLOWED.

946 Zhang 2018.

947 Singapore Discovery Centre 2020.

What measures can authorities take away from the Singapore Discovery Centre Concept that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should support the delivery of civic education to different groups in society by setting-up dedicated state-of-the-art edutainment venues or events.

At these venues or events, topics like national identity or social cohesion are made tangible through gamification and are embedded into immersive and entertaining group experiences as they are perceived as desirable.

<i>Singapore Discovery Centre Concept</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

7.3.2. Volunteering

In Singapore’s community-based approach to counter-terrorism volunteering has long played an important role. From early on in its history, its security posture strongly depended on volunteers for its police force and on drafted recruits for its armed forces.⁹⁴⁹ From the beginning, the involvement of a high proportion of the society in the safeguarding of its security was chosen not only for its force-multiplying effect. It became part of the Government’s strategy to instill and strengthen a collective national spirit that could unite an ethnically diverse country.⁹⁵⁰ In Singapore today, the Government is actively promoting and demanding the citizens’ contri-

948 Singapore Discovery Centre 2018a.

949 See Public Service Division at Prime Minister’s Office 2015.

950 See Kwang 2019.

butions to Singapore's safety and security and is actively endorsing and recognising community volunteering as a means to

- Reduce community stereotypes and prejudices,
- Build bonds in and between communities,
- Strengthen feeling of connectedness and belonging,
- Develop personal resilience through increased self-efficacy and connectedness,
- Establish community resilience and cohesion based on the established relations.

At the community level volunteering is organised in two streams:

Volunteers for the SPF or SCDF who are qualified and willing to commit themselves to mandatory minimum numbers of hours of service per month, are coordinated by the *Home Team Volunteer Network (HTVN)*. The *HTVN* is operated by the *Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)* and coordinates all volunteer affairs across the different agencies in its area of responsibility. It integrates volunteers into the force structure of the SPF or SCDF as auxiliary officers where they work side-by side with “regular” officers across the island. All other volunteers who would like to contribute to grassroots organisations in their community, are supported and organised through *The People's Association (PA)*.

The *People's Association (PA)* was set up in 1960 “as a statutory board to promote racial harmony and social cohesion in Singapore.”⁹⁵¹ It aims to bring citizens from across different communities together to participate and volunteer in a multitude of different programmes, delivered by an extensive “network of 2,000 grassroots organisations” and by 100 community clubs supported by the PA.⁹⁵²

The PA especially encourages citizens to get active within their community and direct neighbourhood (which are all generally multi-ethnically mixed by design, following the Government quotas), and to “build bonds, promote neighbourliness and help one another in times of emergencies” by joining PA-supported communal interest groups, neighborhood support groups and emergency preparedness volunteer programmes.⁹⁵³

951 People's Association 2020.

952 *ibid.*

953 See *ibid.*

The PA's mission to promote racial harmony and social cohesion has also made it an important contributor to the *SGSecure movement*, by running emergency preparedness volunteer schemes. Through these schemes, the PA helps to “*sensitise, train and mobilise the community to prevent and deal with a terror attack*” and thus to mitigate the impact on the community.⁹⁵⁴

The schemes, programmes, local initiatives and interest groups are administered locally through so-called *Community Emergency and Engagement (C2E) Committees* which exist in each constituency. These committees are run by volunteers from the specific community within the PA framework and with support from various government agencies.⁹⁵⁵

*“During peace time, C2E Committees develop and maintain the Community EP plans, structures and systems. They organise exercises and EP activities to stay prepared and ensure operational readiness during emergencies. The C2E Committees also partner various government emergency authorities to educate public about Community EP. During times of emergency, C2E Committees coordinate community resources and grassroots emergency response efforts. Together with other grassroots organisations, they help emergency authorities defuse tension and restore public confidence and normalcy by disseminating critical information and collecting feedback.”*⁹⁵⁶

On the community level, the *C2E Committees* oversee and support different volunteers' programmes which again support community cohesion and resilience in the face of terrorist attacks. The shared “*objective of the [...] programmes is to help the community stay calm, be resilient during emergencies and return to normalcy as quickly as possible.*”⁹⁵⁷ By participating in the programmes, the PA hope that citizens will not only pick up the vocational skills they have been trained for, but also appreciate the importance of racial harmony as the bedrock for a strong national social fabric.

The following volunteering opportunities through the *HTVN* and *PA* are worth mentioning as means to strengthening *Strategic Resilience*:

954 Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019c, 3.

955 See People's Association 2019.

956 People's Association 2018.

957 People's Association 2019.

7.3.2.1. Volunteer Special Constabulary – Police Officer Scheme

*For over seventy years, Singapore has offered a Volunteer Special Constabulary (VSC) career which allows trained citizens to serve part-time in the SPF, vested with rights and duties equal to regular police officers.⁹⁵⁸ These VSC officers are operating across the *Police Land Divisions* and special units and may be deployed during major public events.⁹⁵⁹*

The VSC accepts qualified laymen and laywomen who will be trained to the necessary level. But also, NSMen, Singaporeans or Permanent Residents who previously did their two years in the National Service in the Singapore Police Force and have already been trained, are eligible.⁹⁶⁰ *“Each tour of duty could last from a 4-hour shift to a full shift of 12-14 hours, depending on operational requirements.”⁹⁶¹ Mostly, deployments will take place after office hours and on the weekends. There are currently about 1,200 VSC officers compared to about 9,500 regular uniformed officers in Singapore according to the most recent SPF annual report.⁹⁶²*

What measures can authorities take away from the VSC Police Officer Scheme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should welcome and direct the citizens’ desire to volunteer in their free time to serve for the community’s safety and security in a police auxiliary component.
- Authorities should consider the use of volunteer-based police auxiliary components which can support the regular force in regular tasks as well as during tensions.
- Authorities should promote the volunteer-based auxiliary component of community police to promote the idea of each citizen’s opportunities and responsibility to contribute to the security of everyone.

958 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019h.

959 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019i.

960 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019j.

961 Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019i.

962 Singapore Police Force 2019a, 69.

<i>VSC Police Officer Scheme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

7.3.2.2. Volunteer Special Constabulary – Community Officer Scheme

The *Volunteer Special Constabulary (VSC) Community* Scheme has been set up in 2018 to add more visible police presence in highly frequented areas, like shopping malls or markets or community areas.⁹⁶³ The VSC Community officers are usually deployed after office hours and on the weekends, in order not to interfere with the regular work of the volunteers.⁹⁶⁴

After a short period of training through the police, the volunteers are assigned as *VSC Community Officers* to Neighbourhood Police Centres. There they work alongside the regular police officers. On duty, the “*VSC (Community) officers will not carry arms but will carry a Police warrant card and be equipped with handcuffs, a baton and a communications set.*”⁹⁶⁵ Their uniform is similar to those of the NPC Community police officers.

What measures can authorities take away from the VSC Community Officer Scheme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should consider the use of a volunteer-based local community police. Auxiliary component to benefit from the local knowledge and agency.
- Authorities should consider the use of a volunteer-based local community police. Auxiliary component to benefit from additional eyes and ears on the street.

963 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019k.

964 See *ibid.*

965 *ibid.*

- Authorities should consider the use of a volunteer-based local community police auxiliary component to benefit from a visibly larger law enforcement presence that can reassure citizens and deter terrorists.
- Authorities should consider the use of a volunteer-based local community police auxiliary component to form better relationships between the police and the community.
- Authorities should consider the use of a volunteer-based local community police auxiliary component to increase the number of trained and prepared citizens.

<i>VSC Community Officer Scheme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	✓
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

7.3.2.3. Neighbourhood Watch Zone Liaison Officer Scheme

The *Neighbourhood Watch Zone (NWZ) Scheme* was launched in 1997 with the aim to instil mutual self-help and assistance among residents of the same neighbourhood.⁹⁶⁶ As *NWZ Liaison Officers* the volunteers coordinate the implementation of crime and terrorism awareness as well as of prevention programs and activities in cooperation with the local *Neighbourhood Police Centre (NPC)* and the residents of the NWZ.⁹⁶⁷

The work of the NWZ Liaison Officers is instrumental in the scheme to

- “Develop networks of resident volunteers in each neighbourhood that are essential partners of the Police in [...] [the] fight against crime and increasingly, terrorism,”⁹⁶⁸

966 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019g.

967 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019f.

968 *ibid.*

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- “Foster a culture of good neighbourliness through mutual self-help in ensuring the safety and security of residents in [...] [the] neighbourhoods,”⁹⁶⁹
- “Give residents a greater sense of security, participation and stake in the community.”⁹⁷⁰

What measures can authorities take away from the Neighbourhood Watch Zone Liaison Officer Scheme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should train and support volunteers as NWZ Liaison Officers to promote mutual self-help and assistance among residents of the same neighbourhood.
- Authorities should train and support volunteers as NWZ Liaison Officers to build up self-efficacy and perceived problem-focused coping skills in the community.
- Authorities should train and support volunteers as NWZ Liaison Officers to strengthen the relationship between the police and the community.

<i>Neighbourhood Watch Zone Liaison Officer Scheme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

7.3.2.4. Civil Defence Auxiliary Unit Officer Scheme

The SCDF has realized that in its current structure of regulars, full-time *National Service Men (NSF)* and *NsMen*, it was unable to sustainably increase its numbers to handle catastrophic attacks such as 9/11, another SARS crisis or the fallout from another *Sumatra–Andaman*-like earthquake

969 *ibid.*

970 *ibid.*

which had devastated life in the countries around the region. As a consequence, the SCDF decided to set up a volunteer scheme in 2006.⁹⁷¹ The scheme is modelled after the *SPF Volunteer Special Constabulary Scheme* and has the objective to raise *five hundred Civil Defence Auxiliary Unit Officers* to lend support in different areas, but especially in its emergency ambulance and firefighting services capacities and public Civil Defence education.

Through the programme, volunteers fulfilling a set of requirements are trained and then deployed alongside regular SCDF, NSF as well as NsMen in different occupations for a minimum of 16 hours of service per month.⁹⁷²

Different types of openings for auxiliary officers exist, based on their qualification and interest. In general, the openings can even be in operational front-line roles, i.e. at fire stations as *Auxiliary Emergency Medical Officers*⁹⁷³ and *Auxiliary Firefighting & Rescue Officers*⁹⁷⁴ who support firefighting, rescue and lifesaving efforts. Volunteers who already can prove existing extensive professional expertise in relevant areas like public education, fire safety or chemical engineering etc., may be eligible for joining a Senior Officer Scheme.

These volunteers can also be trained as *Auxiliary Public Education Instructors* or *Community Involvement Officers* and be deployed to SCDF Division HQ and there may support the Public Affairs teams in delivering the *Community Emergency Preparedness Programme (CEPP)*. In these roles they may „assist in civil defence events such as *Emergency Preparedness Days, Community Safety & Security Programmes, Community Exhibitions, Public Education Campaigns and Schools Emergency Preparedness Programmes.*”⁹⁷⁵

What measures can authorities take away from the Civil Defence Auxiliary Unit Officer Scheme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Civil Defence Forces should include volunteers into their force to be able to rapidly grow their number in frontline operations during large crises.
- Civil Defence Forces should include volunteers into their force to benefit from outside expertise in specialised areas.

971 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019e.

972 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019d.

973 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2020b.

974 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019e.

975 Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019a.

- Civil Defence Forces should include volunteers into their force to take over non-operational tasks like reaching out, educating and training the community.

<i>Civil Defence Auxiliary Unit Officer Scheme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	✓

7.3.2.5. Emergency Preparedness Programme

Through the *Emergency Preparedness Programme (EPP)* the PA “seeks to strengthen the understanding and ties between people of different races and religions, impart EP skills and knowledge with an aim to build a safer and more resilient community.”⁹⁷⁶ It equips volunteers from the community “with specialised training to respond to emergencies and assist the community in the recovery process.”⁹⁷⁷

The volunteers are organised in so called *Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs)*. Their training comprises:

- *Standard First Aid (SFA)*,
- *Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR)*, and
- *Automated External Defibrillator (AED)*,
- *Managing Crisis Behaviour (MCB)*, and other
- *EP-related courses to enable them to carry out duties in times of activation.*⁹⁷⁸

976 People's Association 2019.

977 *ibid.*

978 *ibid.*

CERTs lead community exercises in their constituency under the guidance of the Government emergency agencies, including SCDF and SPF.⁹⁷⁹ To make the exercises extremely relevant for their community, the *CERTs* can choose from different terrorisms-related scenarios to be trained in the exercises.

In time of crisis, the *CERT* members are the backbone of the initial crisis response at the community level before SCDF or SPF responders will arrive on the scene. Subsequently, they are also prepared to render further assistance to SCDF or the SPF responders on scene, if required.

During normal service, *CERT* members may also be deployed at large national events to provide “*simple first aid and crowd control duties*.”⁹⁸⁰

What measures can authorities take away from the Emergency Preparedness Programme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- The authorities should recruit, train and support local volunteers to establish a community-based group of first-responders or *Community Emergency Response Teams* whose members are able to man the initial crisis response at the community level and then are able to render further assistance after the Police or emergency services have arrived.

<i>Emergency Preparedness Programme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	✓

7.3.2.6. Save-A- Life/Community First Responder Programme

The *Save-A-Life* (SAL) initiative launched in collaboration between the Ministry of Health (MOH), the Singapore Heart Foundation and the

979 See *ibid.*

980 *ibid.*

People's Association is aiming at increasing the citizens' self-efficacy in case of a cardiac arrest, and at the general proficiency in first aid. To achieve this objective under the SAL initiative more than five thousand AED units have been installed in Singapore – with one AED in the lift lobby of every two blocks in public housing estates.

The locations of these public units as well as the location and accessibility data of another thousand units from private or other public organisations are stored in a national AED registry which is easily accessible through the *SGSecure* mobile application and the *MyResponder* mobile application.

To reduce the reserve of bystanders to act in an emergency, and to ensure the effective use of the AEDs the SAL initiative aims at training a total number of over 24,000 residents, equal to 300 residents per constituency, in CPR and AED skills.⁹⁸¹ The dedicated training is just one hour long and is called *DARE Plus* for *Dispatcher-Assisted first Responder (DARE) Plus*. It is offered step by step on CEPP and EP Days, as the AED units are installed in the neighborhood. Beside the CPR-AED skills, the DARE Plus training also teaches the *SG Secure Run, Hide, Tell* protocol, improvised first aid skills and the use of a fire extinguisher.⁹⁸²

Trained citizens are encouraged to register themselves as responders in their application, to be alerted by the SCDF in case of a cardiac arrest within a radius of 400 m. “*Nearest available AEDs Responders who are able to respond can choose to accept the notification and provide early intervention to the casualty, such as performing CPR and/or using the nearest available AED. SCDF's Ops Centre, may also ask responders to guide the ambulance crew by escorting them to the incident site*”.⁹⁸³

What measures can authorities take away from the Save-A-Life Initiative that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should undertake efforts to increase the citizens' self-efficacy in case of a cardiac arrest and their general proficiency in first aid as in the *Save-A-Life Initiative*.
- Authorities should encourage the ability and willingness of bystanders to act in a case of a cardiac arrest.
- Authorities should collect information on the locations of privately installed AED units and make them easily accessible to the public.

981 See ZOLL Medical Corporation 2018.

982 See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018g.

983 Singapore Civil Defence Force 2020c.

<i>Save-A-Life Initiative</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	✓

7.3.2.7. Citizens on Patrol Programme

The *Citizens-on-Patrol (COP) Volunteer Programme* introduced in 1999, increases the visibility of police patrols in the neighbourhoods as well as at major traffic junctions and in town centres.⁹⁸⁴

The patrols by COP volunteers who are identifiable through their special vests, are trained in the SGSecure model, crime prevention methods as well as in community emergency preparedness skills, and receive updates on the latest security threats or on suspicious persons the police may be looking for.⁹⁸⁵

So, on patrol the COP members are the eyes and ears of the police and will alert police officers immediately if they detect any threat, crime or something suspicious.⁹⁸⁶ Their presence on patrol is meant as a deterrent against criminals and hostile reconnaissance and also has a reassuring effect on the citizens. COP volunteers' activities also include the distribution of flyers on crime prevention and the support of SGSecure home visits. The seven hundred COP Patrols in Singapore are coordinated by the Neighbourhood Community Police. The volunteers are mostly aged between 40 and 60 years, usually being on patrol once or twice a month.⁹⁸⁷

What measures can authorities take away from the COP Volunteer Scheme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

984 See Koh 2019b.

985 See *ibid.*

986 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2020a.

987 See Koh 2019b.

- Authorities should recruit and train local volunteers in crime prevention and counter-terrorism preparedness methods as well as in community emergency preparedness skills, to increase police patrols and public information efforts in their neighbourhoods. These local volunteers additionally are the eyes and ears of the police and may alert police officers immediately if they detect any threat, crime or something suspicious in the neighbourhood. Their presence will have a deterrent effect on criminals and hostile reconnaissance and have a reassuring effect on the citizens.

<i>Citizens-On-Patrol Volunteer Scheme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

7.3.2.8. Riders on Watch (ROW) Volunteer Scheme

The public transport system plays an important role in Singapore as car ownership is strongly discouraged by government laws due to the lack of space in the densely populated city. The number of commuters is continuously growing as the train network is expanded. As such, it poses an attractive terrorist target. Since the 7/7 bombings in London in 2005, the police has continuously worked hard to deter attacks on the city's transportation system through the creation of a dedicated transport police, the expansion of CCTV and through structural protective security measures.⁹⁸⁸

The Riders-On-Watch Volunteer Scheme is the latest effort to increase the security of the public transport system and takes a community policing approach, as it is typical for Singapore.⁹⁸⁹ Similar to the *Project Servator*

988 See Nadarajan 2012, 98.

989 See Singapore Police Force 2019b.

in London, the programme aims to increase the vigilance of the public transport users and to reduce the effort required to report and thereby also reduces the reluctance to report suspicious items or behaviour directly to the police.⁹⁹⁰ Registered users under the scheme will also receive real-time alerts to their mobile phone on “persons of interest” allegedly connected to a crime, which may include the suspect’s appearance and last whereabouts.⁹⁹¹ In addition, the police will also share latest security information concerning the public transport system which the riders are encouraged to share with their network of friends and family.⁹⁹²

What measures can authorities take away from the ROW Volunteer Scheme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should establish a volunteer-based public vigilance scheme on the public transport network to deter attacks and to minimise response times, by providing relevant threat-related information and raising alertness.

<i>Riders on Watch Volunteer Scheme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

7.3.2.9. Silver Watch Group Ambassador Programme

To improve the approach to the elderly in Singapore’s communities the *Silver Watch Group* (SWG) programme trains and supports so-called elderly *Silver Watch Group Ambassadors* who are to reach elderly citizens in the community and educate them about security threats, to provide

990 See Boey 2019.

991 See *ibid.*

992 See Singapore Police Force 2019b.

knowledge on crime prevention, to inspire them to get involved, and to “enlist their help as eyes and ears regarding suspicious or criminal activity” in the future.⁹⁹³

What measures can authorities take away from the SWG Ambassador Programme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should train and support elderly citizens (or other vulnerable groups in the community) to reach other elderly citizens (or other vulnerable groups) in the community and to educate them about security threats, provide prevention knowledge and to inspire them to get involved, and to “enlist their help as eyes and ears regarding suspicious or criminal activity” in the future.⁹⁹⁴

Silver Watch Group Ambassador Programme	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	
Impact Prevention & Reduction	✓
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	
Management of Fear	
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	✓
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	✓
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	

7.3.2.10. Community Engagement Programme

The *Community Engagement Programme (CEP)* was set up in 2006 as a “long-term effort to strengthen intercommunal ties and put in place response plans to help deal with potential communal tension after an incident or crisis that could affect [...] social cohesion”,⁹⁹⁵ as laid out in the *Social Defence* component of the *Total Defence concept*.⁹⁹⁶

Under the programme, community leaders from “grassroots organisations, education institutions, religious and cultural groups, businesses and

993 See Sachi 2016 ; See Lim 2013 ; AsiaOne Online 2014.

994 See Sachi 2016 ; AsiaOne Online 2014; See Lim 2013.

995 Public Service Division at Prime Minister's Office Singapore 2015.

996 See Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth Singapore 2020a ; See Ministry of Defence Singapore 2004.

unions, and the media and academia [...] are trained, prepared [...] [to] develop networks of trust to help manage and mitigate the effects of a crisis.”⁹⁹⁷ The aim is both to strengthen social cohesion and to build up resilience in the wider community.”⁹⁹⁸ These leaders will function as so-called CE Connectors who will support a resilient response to a possible sectarian terrorist attack and will quell the risk of communal conflicts in the future. To develop these advocates among the CE Connectors, CEP activities “include understanding cultural practices through exhibition panels set up at community events, visits to religious and cultural sites and dialogues with community partners.”⁹⁹⁹

The Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles established four years earlier in all 84 constituencies, are exemplary for community-level platforms tasked to promote CEP activities for inter-racial understanding and inter-religious harmony.¹⁰⁰⁰

What measures can authorities take away from the Community Engagement Programme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should train and support community leaders across relevant social, professional and religious groups to build networks of trust that could help them to better manage and mitigate possible community tensions that could occur after an incident or crisis that would negatively affect social cohesion.

Community Engagement Programme	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	
Impact Prevention & Reduction	
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	✓
Management of Fear	
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	✓
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	✓
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	

997 Public Service Division at Prime Minister's Office Singapore 2015.

998 *ibid.*

999 People's Association 2019.

1000 Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth Singapore 2020a.

7.3.2.11. Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles

To remove the influence of radical fundamentalism on parts of the Muslim community in Singapore which was discovered during the inquiry into the *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) activities in 2001, and to prevent a potential reactive co-radicalization of other faith- or community groups in the Singaporean society, the Prime Minister himself launched the establishment of interfaith dialogue platforms in all constituencies already in 2002.¹⁰⁰¹

The Government was able to build on the existing organisational structure of the *Presidential Council for Religious Harmony (PCRH)* and on the *Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA)*. These had been introduced in 1990 as a reaction to an “increase in religious fervour and assertiveness” which had created inter-religious tensions, and to curb an undesired political influence of faith groups.¹⁰⁰²

The newly established *Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles (IRCC)* consist of leaders from religious, ethnic and social groups from the local constituency as well as local business and educational organisations.¹⁰⁰³ Their members meet on a regular basis for inter-faith and intra-faith dialogues and networking sessions as well as on the national level for workshops and table-top exercises to train their shared understanding of crisis response, facilitated by the *Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth (MCCY)*.¹⁰⁰⁴

The *IRCC*'s tasks in peacetime and in time of crisis include:

- Building informal ties with all social, faith and cultural groups present in the constituency, that can function as bridges which foster the development of trust and friendships between the different groups,¹⁰⁰⁵
- Promoting racial and religious harmony through “inter-faith and interethnic themed activities” that help to deepen people’s understanding of the various faiths, beliefs and practices,¹⁰⁰⁶
- Devise crisis mitigation strategies to quickly defuse rumours or falsehoods in moments of racial or religious tensions,

1001 See Hussin 2018, 178 ; See Nadarajan 2012.

1002 Government of Singapore 1989, 3.

1003 See Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth Singapore 2020b.

1004 See Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth Singapore 2019c.

1005 See Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth Singapore 2019b, 2.

1006 *ibid.*

- Calm community tensions in case of a terrorist attack in Singapore and “assist in the recovery process, to help their communities and the nation return to normalcy.”¹⁰⁰⁷

Originally the *IRCC* meetings therefore were primarily focused on getting a better understanding and appreciation of the other religious and ethnic groups in the constituency and in all of Singapore. But the meetings’ scope has extended as the challenges to racial harmony in Singapore have grown. The *IRCC*’s activities have become more focused towards the communities with a variety of activities. As social media’s and the internet’s external influence on public opinion has grown, the *IRCC* also have started with support of the *MCCY* to create safe spaces for the discussion of touchy or contentious religion or race-related subjects.¹⁰⁰⁸ Their aim still is to be able to tackle prejudices and to create real appreciation and not simply permissive tolerance between groups.¹⁰⁰⁹

What measures can authorities take away from the IRCC that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should motivate the representatives of all religious groups to enter into a dialogue at the community level in inter-religious round tables to get a better understanding of other religious and ethnic groups in the community, to reduce held stereotypes, and to build informal ties and trust to work towards peaceful and harmonious coexistence.
- Authorities should also provide the necessary incentives and the environment for members of inter-religious round tables to feel comfortable to discuss touchy or contentious religion or race-related subjects with the aim to tackle prejudices and to create real appreciation and not simply permissive tolerance between groups.

1007 *ibid.*

1008 See Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth Singapore 2017.

1009 See *ibid.*

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<i>Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	✓
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	✓
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

7.4. Singapore School Programmes

Singapore's school system is an important government tool for educating its young citizenry and for nudging them towards its national values. The *SGSecure* messages and the civil defence preparations are incorporated in various formal/informal school programmes for students at different levels.

7.4.1. Teaching and Engagement

7.4.1.1. National Education

Singapore's *National Education* (NE) programme was first introduced in primary schools in 1997 and was overhauled in 2017 to assure the reliability and relevance in its delivery to students.¹⁰¹⁰ The NE focusses on instilling the following key dispositions in its young citizens:

1. "A Sense of Belonging:

To develop a deeper understanding of who we are, and a shared understanding of the values that are important to us as a nation.

2. A Sense of Reality:

To be aware of the contemporary realities — including Singapore's constraints and vulnerabilities — which affect us as a nation amidst the backdrop of a less predictable world.

1010 See National Library Board Singapore 2014.

3. A Sense of Hope:

Having confidence and optimism in Singapore's future and the resilience to face the challenges ahead.[...]

– The will to act:

*To be active citizens who have a collective resolve and a sense of shared mission towards building a Singapore for all.*¹⁰¹¹

The NE has not been created as a separate subject, but has been integrated into the existing curriculum, flanked by four annual commemorative days which are observed in schools: *Total Defence Day, National Day, Racial Harmony Day and International Friendship Day.*¹⁰¹²

What measures can authorities take away from the National Education programme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should ensure that the schools' curricula give ample consideration for the personal development of students in such a way that it instils personal confidence, emotional strength and resolve when faced with adversity. This should be underlined by a feeling of belonging and purpose through a sense of a shared (national) values and aspirations.

National Education Programme	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	✓
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	
Impact Prevention & Reduction	
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	
Management of Fear	✓
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	✓
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	✓
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	

7.4.1.2. Heritage Education Programmes

The acceptance and successful understanding of the *National Education* (NE) messages are also promoted outside of the classrooms by educational

1011 Pei Hwa Presbyterian Primary School (PHPPS) 2020.

1012 See National Library Board Singapore 2014.

visits (so-called *Learning Journeys*) to important national institutions and sites which should instill “*pride in Singapore’s achievements, to help them understand [...] [their] country’s limitations, build their confidence in building a better future for Singapore and nurture a sense of belonging to [...] [their] country.*”¹⁰¹³

These journeys include visits to civil defence and security institutions like the *Civil Defence Heritage Gallery*, the *Internal Security Department Heritage Gallery*, fire stations, or the *SCDF Emergency Preparedness Centre*. This is meant to inculcate the importance of personal preparedness and vigilance for the nation’s resilience in line with the essential citizenship traits according to the NE.

The values of national resilience are also taught to primary or secondary school students on experiential guided tours across the island, so called “*SG Time Travellers Trails*”.¹⁰¹⁴ On the trails, the history of these places is brought to life through inspirational storytelling from the nation’s history, describing cases of “*perseverance, trust and cohesion*” in the face of adversity.¹⁰¹⁵

What measures can authorities take away from the Heritage Education Programmes that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities could develop and apply narratives from the nation’s heritage to instill *pride in the mastered challenges of the past and confidence in the future* while teaching a realistic understanding of the nation’s limitations and challenges. These can inculcate the importance of personal preparedness and vigilance for the nation’s resilience.

1013 Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018e.

1014 National Heritage Board 2019.

1015 Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth Singapore 2019d.

<i>Heritage Education Programmes</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	✓
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	✓
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

7.4.1.3. Total Defence Social Studies Syllabus

To ensure the early preparedness of the population the Ministry of Education (MoE) has included *SGSecure* topics in the social study syllabus of primary and secondary schools.¹⁰¹⁶ In reference to *Civil Defence* being one component of the *Total Defence* concept, students are taught about the terror threat and how they can react to it.¹⁰¹⁷ Their learning is supported through text books, card games, mobile exhibitions, theatre plays, assembly talks and practical training of lock-down drills.¹⁰¹⁸ Students are also given basic fire and emergency preparedness and awareness training, with practical exposure during *Emergency Preparedness Day* exercises.¹⁰¹⁹

Apart from providing an established topical hub where other security communications like *SGSecure* can be “plugged into”, the *Total Defence* concept itself plays an important role in the students’ syllabus throughout primary school.

Learning about the principle of *Total Defence* in schools, is aided by the MoE through the provision of regularly updated teacher’s guides and diverse age-specific learning resources including:

- *Total Defence Exhibition Stories*,
- *Total Defence Puzzle*,
- *#WeAreTotalDefence Colouring Activity*,

1016 See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018f.

1017 See Tay 2017.

1018 See Ministry of Defence Singapore 2020b.

1019 See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018f.

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- *Total Defence Song,*
- *Total Defence Animation Videos,*
- *Total Defence Strategy Card Game,*
- *Total Defence Student Competition.*¹⁰²⁰

What measures can authorities take away from the Total Defence Social Studies Syllabus that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- The authorities could develop age-adequate adaptations of the nation-centric *Total Defence* concept which allows them to embed the terrorism vigilance and preparedness message into it, and thus make the concept easily absorbable for the pupils.

<i>Total Defence Social Studies Syllabus</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	✓
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

7.4.2. Volunteering

Singapore's schools and colleges place a great emphasis on co-curricular activities that contribute to community cohesiveness. By increasing their self-efficacy and connectedness through volunteering, students can develop their personal resilience. Their service to the community also supports community resilience, as the thus established relationships strengthen the bonds in and between communities and have a positive effect on the feeling of connectedness and belonging.

To support the national effort to keep Singapore safe and secure, pupils from upper primary level onwards are encouraged to learn first aid and

¹⁰²⁰ Ministry of Defence Singapore 2020b.

emergency preparedness skills and to share them with the community. The following paragraphs will introduce the different national programmes at schools and colleges:

7.4.2.1. National Civil Defence Cadet Corps Programme

The *National Civil Defence Cadet Corps (NCDCC)* was first set up as a uniformed group at secondary schools in 2005. All students in their primary year can apply to join the NCDCC through their school, similar to a co-curricular activity.

According to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA),

*The purpose of the NCDCC is to nurture and develop young students into caring and responsible citizens through their participation in interesting and challenging Civil Defence activities.*¹⁰²¹

Great care is taken that the trainings are adequately structured for the target age, with a mix of theoretical learning, realistic training and stimulating experiences. *Total Defence* and *SGSecure* form important parts of the curriculum.¹⁰²²

Apart from getting trained themselves, cadets are expected to serve their community by advocating lifesaving skills in their school, to support local community engagement events and emergency preparedness days.

To those joining the NCDCC, it offers a multi-year structured personal and professional development path through secondary school which will take a Junior Cadet from acquiring self- and civil defence awareness, to mastering civil defence skills at an enhanced level, to leading cadets as a Cadet Leader, to finally becoming an instructor himself who as a Cadet Lieutenant will (hopefully) continue volunteering in civil defence upon graduation from his school.¹⁰²³

1021 Jurong West Secondary School 2019.

1022 Evergreen Secondary School 2020.

1023 See Evergreen Secondary School 2020.

Figure 50: NCDCC learning journey and framework.¹⁰²⁴



Post-graduation, the cadets are expected to play their part in the SGSecure movement as competent community first responders who are able to help themselves, their families, neighbours and community in case of an incident, making Singapore a more secure place.¹⁰²⁵

What measures can authorities take away from the National Civil Defence Cadet Corps that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- The authorities could establish youth sections of the civil defence force to raise self-efficacy in the student body, spread preparedness knowledge into the communities and schools and secure responsible future leaders for the civil defence force.

1024 Image taken from *ibid*.

1025 See *ibid*.

<i>National Civil Defence Cadet Corps (NCDCC) Programme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	✓

7.4.2.2. Civil Defence Lionhearters Club (Post-secondary Schools)

In its strive “towards building up the nation’s preparedness so that every individual can help themselves, their families and neighbours in times of emergency” the SCDF has encouraged the establishment of *Civil Defence Lionhearters Clubs* at colleges and universities since 2009.¹⁰²⁶

The objective of the *CD Lionhearters Club* is to “develop members into confident community first responders in support of the SGSecure movement.”¹⁰²⁷

To fulfil this task, student members of the *Lionhearters Clubs* (called *CDLionhearters*) are trained in the *Community Emergency Preparedness Programme (CEPP)* and the *Community Engagement Programme (CEP)*.¹⁰²⁸

Once trained, the *CD Lionhearters* may volunteer in different scenarios.

- In case of an emergency on-campus, *CD Lionhearters* may augment the campus emergency response resources by rendering first aid, support evacuations or provide initial victim support, before the SCDF arrives.¹⁰²⁹
- In case of communal tension on campus grounds, *CD Lionhearters* are asked to mediate in a role as *Community Engagement Ambassadors*.¹⁰³⁰

1026 Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2018.

1027 *ibid.*

1028 See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018a.

1029 See *ibid.*

1030 See *ibid.*

- *CD Lionhearters* are regularly deployed alongside SCDF officers to communities across Singapore, to help conduct *Emergency Preparedness Days* and to teach emergency preparedness and first aid skills to the residents.¹⁰³¹

In the past, *CD Lionhearters* have also been deployed abroad as part of humanitarian relief missions to assist in development and reconstruction projects. While this is rare, the potential opportunity is widely advertised in member recruitment activities. Learning about cultural sensitivities and foreign traditions as preparations for such potential missions is part of the *CD Lionhearters'* curriculum.

What measures can authorities take away from the Civil Defence Lionhearters Club that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- The authorities should encourage the establishment of community preparedness and community volunteer engagement activities at colleges and universities.

Civil Defence Lionhearters Club	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	✓
Impact Prevention & Reduction	✓
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	
Management of Fear	
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	✓
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	✓
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	✓

7.4.2.3. Junior Civil Defence Lionhearter Programme (Primary schools)

Launched in 2013 for primary schools, the SCDF has adopted a student-centric learning approach where upper primary school-level pupils who show leadership skills, are trained as *Emergency Preparedness Ambassadors*.¹⁰³² Through workshops run by the SCDF, they receive first aid and

1031 See *ibid.*

1032 See Tan 2013.

emergency preparedness skills training. Once trained, the pupils have the task to create interest in emergency preparedness topics and the importance of self-efficacy among their peers, at school as well as at home.¹⁰³³

The pupil's duties may involve:

- Serving as young Emergency Preparedness (EP) ambassadors,
- Hard Skills Training
- Soft Skills Training

What measures can authorities take away from the Junior Civil Defence Lionhearter Programme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- The authorities could introduce pupils at primary school level to the first aid and emergency preparedness skills and engage them through practical games and competitive activities that will help practice their leadership skills.

<i>Junior Civil Defence Lionhearter Programme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

7.5. Singapore Private Sector Programmes

Under the *Total Defence* concept, unimpeded economic development and uninterrupted business operations are a fundamental necessity for Singapore's overall security and prosperity.¹⁰³⁴ The Government has accordingly placed great importance to strengthening the vigilance and protective se-

1033 See *ibid.*

1034 See Ministry of Defence Singapore 2020a.

curity of businesses to prevent and deter terrorist attacks. It has further encouraged companies to invest in proper disaster planning and to establish robust contingency management procedures to reduce the impact of any attack and as a support to the businesses' ability to bounce back.¹⁰³⁵

While historically, following the *Laku incident* in 1974, the focus had been on strategic and critical infrastructure like the port, its petrochemical industry, the power grid or the transportation hubs (which following the incident received enhanced government protection), the shift in terrorist attack patterns to softer targets has made the government include more sites – especially highly frequented businesses and those operating in crowded areas.

The engagement of the private sector is conducted by the Singapore Police Force (SPF) and the *Singapore Civil Defence Force* (SCDF) under the guidance of the *Ministry of Manpower* (MoM) through a variety of education, training and volunteer programs which are presented on the following pages.¹⁰³⁶

7.5.1. Training and Engagement

7.5.1.1. SGSecure@Workplaces Programme

With the launch of *SGSecure* in 2016, existing and new efforts targeting the private sector have been brought under the *SGSecure's* umbrella.¹⁰³⁷ In a first step, the Ministry of Manpower (MoM) included *SGSecure* anti-terrorism preparedness elements into their existing health & safety workplace risk assessment programme *bizSAFE*, to ensure that businesses consider these elements in their future assessments.¹⁰³⁸

In line with the broad *SGSecure* objectives of a united nation, the *SGSecure@Workplaces* initiative has equally broad objectives

1035 See Ministry of Manpower Singapore 2020b ; See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018d.

1036 See Ministry of Manpower Singapore 2017.

1037 See Ministry of Manpower Singapore 2020c.

1038 See Ministry of Manpower Singapore 2020b.

*“To strengthen the vigilance and resilience of workplaces to withstand terror attacks, and other situations that may adversely affect the harmonious working relationships at our workplaces.”*¹⁰³⁹

On the practical level, the *SGSecure@Workplaces* programme encourages and supports businesses to invest in vigilance and protective security as well as in disaster planning and business continuity management.

By May 2019, over 60,000 companies had so far joined the programme and have registered a dedicated *SGSecure* representative with the MoM.¹⁰⁴⁰ This employee is responsible for rolling out *SGSecure* initiatives in the company, and to boost vigilance and preparedness of the workforce. The representative is supported by the MoM through *SGSecure Guidelines for Workplaces*¹⁰⁴¹ and a six-module training course¹⁰⁴² for self-training and teaching material for the employees. These guidelines are complemented by *Contingency Planning And Protective Security Advisories* as well as Contingency Planning checklists for workplaces and other premises, including building owners and tenants.¹⁰⁴³

The representative also has access to workshops and receives regular security updates and lessons-learned reports about recent terror attacks abroad.¹⁰⁴⁴

The *SGSecure Representative* may also initiate *SGSecure Responders* trainings for the company’s employees, through SPF and SCDF.¹⁰⁴⁵ During a crisis, the *SGSecure Representative* will coordinate the company’s response and act as the main point of contact for the SPF and SCDF.¹⁰⁴⁶ The *SGSecure* mobile application is used by police to alert the *SG Security Representative* of imminent danger (e.g. attacks on businesses in the vicinity).

What measures can authorities take away from the SGSecure@Workplaces that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

1039 Ministry of Manpower Singapore 2019b.

1040 See Koh 2019a.

1041 See Ministry of Manpower Singapore 2017.

1042 Ministry of Manpower Singapore 2020a.

1043 See Singapore Police Force 2017b.

1044 Ministry of Manpower Singapore 2020b.

1045 See Ministry of Manpower Singapore 2017.

1046 See *ibid.*

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- The authorities should introduce appropriate programmes which encourage and support businesses to invest in vigilance and protective security as well as disaster planning and business continuity management.
- The authorities should request companies to select a company representative who will coordinate the company’s response in the case of an emergency and act as the main point of contact for the SPF and SCDF.
- The authorities should liaise on a regular basis with the representatives and share security updates and training opportunities.

<i>SGSecure@Workplaces Programme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

7.5.1.2. Project Guardian Scheme

Project Guardian is a public private partnership modelled after the *Project Griffin*, now the *ACT Awareness* scheme in London. Its basis is the forging of effective working relationships between the Singapore Police Force (SPF) and the private security personnel and a company’s first responders, in an effort to effectively address a heightened terrorism threat.¹⁰⁴⁷ Through security briefings, trainings, workshops and joint counter-terrorism exercises, the private security sector is expected to broaden the police’s and the emergency services’ CT efforts by helping:

- To prevent and deter attacks through heightened vigilance,
- To limit the impact of any attack by mounting an initial response to a terror threat before the authorities arrive,
- To improve the self-help capabilities of their company, building or employer,

1047 See Singapore Police Force 2020c.

- To “effectively provide the necessary support functions during crisis: *Evacuation, Cordon Support, Crowd Control, Traffic Diversion [&] Emergency Communications*”¹⁰⁴⁸.

What measures can authorities take away from the Project Guardian scheme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should conduct security briefings, trainings, workshops and joint counter-terrorism exercises with private security personnel and company first responders to enable the private security sector to augment the police’s and emergency services’ counter-terrorism efforts by helping to prevent and to deter attacks through heightened vigilance, to limit the impact of any attack by mounting an initial response to a terror threat before the authorities arrive, to improve the self-help capabilities of their company, building or employer and to effectively provide support functions effectively during a crisis.

<i>Project Guardian Scheme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

7.5.1.3. Security-By-Design – Guidelines for Enhancing Building Security in Singapore

As a response to the heightened and evolving terrorism threat to the civilian infrastructure, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has shifted its focus on raising building security requirements for any new and ongoing devel-

1048 *ibid.*

opments under construction, as well as for existing buildings whenever they are repaired, altered or are to receive any extensions.¹⁰⁴⁹

Apart from buildings and developments which house critical infrastructure, “*buildings that are iconic or have high public footfall*”, like shopping centres or malls that are considered terrorist targets, are covered by the new rules.”¹⁰⁵⁰

These new building security requirements are published in the *Guidelines for Enhancing Building Security in Singapore (GEBSS)*.¹⁰⁵¹

“*The GEBSS describe concepts and provide detailed information for security-oriented building design. [...] The targeted audiences include but are not limited to, building owners, architects, structural engineers, urban construction developers, construction project managers, security consultants, security system designers and others engaged in the design and construction of buildings.*”¹⁰⁵²

“*General information is included to provide senior managerial staff and decision makers with an understanding of security concepts and to help emphasise the importance of physical design in security. At the same time, it also provides developers, engineers and architects with a resource for determining security-oriented design approaches to protect buildings against terrorist-related incidents.*”¹⁰⁵³

The implementation of the guidelines is facilitated through the mandatory assistance by accredited building security consultants. While previous elaborate guidance on building security existed, following it had not been mandatory.¹⁰⁵⁴ Compliance with the latest guidelines is controlled by the *Centre for Protective Security (CPS)* established under the *Infrastructure Protection Act (IPA)*, which took effect on 18 Dec 2018.¹⁰⁵⁵

What measures can authorities take away from the Security-By-Design Guidance that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should raise awareness and establish clear, detailed mandatory guidelines and information for “security-oriented building design”

1049 Ministry of Home Affairs Republic of Singapore 2018b.

1050 Singapore Police Force 06.2019, 1.

1051 Ministry of Home Affairs Republic of Singapore 2018a.

1052 *ibid.*, 10.

1053 *ibid.*

1054 See Cheong and Yangchen 2016.

1055 See Ministry of Home Affairs Republic of Singapore 2018b.

to all stakeholders involved in the operation, design and construction of buildings that may be affected by a terrorist attack.

- Authorities should assure the compliance with the mandatory security-oriented building design through appropriate legislation, accreditations, and supervision by a dedicated body.

<i>Security-By-Design Guidance</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

7.5.2. Volunteering

7.5.2.1. SCDF Corporate Safety & Security Programme

The SCDF *Corporate Safety & Security Programme* (CSSP) is the corporate version of the SCDF *Community Emergency Preparedness Program* presented on page 263 but targeted at the industrial and commercial sectors, especially those handling hazardous materials¹⁰⁵⁶

The programme's focus is laid on teaching fire prevention and emergency preparedness skills, but within a company setting. Companies trained under the programme are encouraged to cooperate with other businesses in geographic proximity in a mutual-aid scheme. They are also „encouraged to pool their resources and expertise to complement that of the SCDF.”¹⁰⁵⁷

What measures can authorities take away from the SCDF Corporate Safety & Security Programme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

1056 See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018d.

1057 *ibid.*

- Authorities should encourage industrial companies especially those dealing with hazardous materials, to cooperate in a mutual-aid scheme and pool their resources and expertise with other businesses in geographic proximity, to muster a better joint initial response to safety and security threats.

<i>SCDF Corporate Safety & Security Programme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

7.5.2.2. Safety and Security Watch Group Scheme

Based on the identification of an urgent need for all buildings in Singapore to raise their level of protective security against potential terrorist attacks, the *Safety and Security Watch Group (SSWG) Scheme* was set up in 2006 to enable “commercial establishments located in close proximity to institute common safety and security measures to protect against a localised terror attack”¹⁰⁵⁸.

Under the scheme, which is jointly administered by the SPF and SCDF, building owners (or managers) are encouraged to register their building and join an SSWG, which is comprised of a group of buildings in geographical proximity.¹⁰⁵⁹

Representatives of the building owners (or managers if they are responsible for overall security) as well as key tenants form the SSWG committees which are administered by the local *Neighbourhood Police Centres (NPC)* and are handled by an *SSWG Police Liaison Officer (PLO)*.¹⁰⁶⁰ The PLO assists the building managers in the SSWG to conduct a security survey of

1058 Singapore Police Force 2019c ; See also Singapore Police Force 2020a.

1059 See *ibid.*

1060 See *ibid.*

their premises to establish a preliminary vulnerability assessment and to provide basic guidance for security enhancements. For more comprehensive guidance, building managers are encouraged to use the services of a professional security consultant.¹⁰⁶¹

During regular SSWG committee meetings, members can also discuss wider security issues and benefit from networking and best practice. On an annual basis, all SSWG committees meet at a joint conference to maximise the shared learning and to exchange experiences across sectors and industries.¹⁰⁶² Building managers from an SSWG are also able to participate in the *Corporate First Responder (CFR) Scheme*. Under the scheme, the building management can be granted access to the cordoned off area in the aftermath of an incident, to undertake the necessary actions for business continuity.¹⁰⁶³

What measures can authorities take away from the Safety and Security Watch Group Scheme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should encourage “*commercial establishments located in close proximity*”, for example within the same commercial complex or in neighbouring buildings, to register their building and join a Safety & Security Watch Group Scheme, administered by the police and the fire services.¹⁰⁶⁴
- Authorities should ensure that SSWG members in the scheme benefit from assistance to conduct a security survey of their premises to establish a preliminary vulnerability assessment and to receive basic guidance for security enhancements.
- Authorities should further facilitate the exchange among SSWG members on common safety and security issues to enable the dissemination of best practice in protecting against a local terror attack.

1061 See *ibid.*

1062 *ibid.*

1063 Singapore Police Force 2020b.

1064 Singapore Police Force 2019c.

<i>Safety and Security Watch Group (SSWG) Scheme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

7.5.2.3. Corporate First Responder Scheme

True to its mantra that the question of a terrorist attack in Singapore is not “if” but “when”, the Government urges businesses to complement their impact prevention efforts of target hardening or other protective security measures by additional impact reduction efforts as through contingency planning and impact mitigation strategies.¹⁰⁶⁵ A major component of this effort is the *Corporate First Responder Scheme*. Its objective is to increase the level of preparedness for the repercussions of an attack in the private sector, to enable it to return to business as usual as soon as possible in the aftermath.¹⁰⁶⁶

Businesses joining the Scheme are asked to form CFR teams comprised of “*key building personnel with local knowledge of the premises, systems and processes*” [who], may [...] be called upon to assist SCDF emergency responders in rescue and recovery operations and SPF in investigations. This will help expedite SCDF and SPF operations and hasten return to normalcy.”¹⁰⁶⁷

In exchange, CFR member businesses can nominate key personnel who will receive “*access to restricted sites post-incident when safety permits, even while rescue, recovery and post-incident investigation activities are ongoing, [...] to sustain essential business functions and take mitigation measures that will help maintain the businesses’ viability after the incident.*”¹⁰⁶⁸

1065 See Singapore Police Force 2020b.

1066 See *ibid.*

1067 *ibid.*

1068 *ibid.*

What measures can authorities take away from the Corporate First Responder Scheme that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should require businesses to help accelerate emergency services and police operations and “hasten return to normalcy” after an attack on their building, by setting up trained teams of corporate first responders, comprised of “key building personnel with local knowledge of the premises, systems and processes” [who], may [...] be called upon to assist [...] emergency responders in rescue and recovery operations and [...] [the police] in investigations.”¹⁰⁶⁹
- Authorities should incentivise the private sector to form Corporate First Responder Teams. Under the scheme the participating businesses will be allowed to nominate key personnel who will receive exclusive “access to restricted sites post-incident when safety permits, even while rescue, recovery and post-incident investigation activities are ongoing, [...] to sustain essential business functions and take mitigation measures that will help maintain the businesses’ viability after the incident.”¹⁰⁷⁰

Corporate First Responder Scheme	
Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills	
Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy	✓
Impact Prevention & Reduction	✓
Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact	
Management of Fear	
Coping-friendly Meaning Making	
Ensure Cognitive Clarity	
Strengthen Societal Cohesion	✓
Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected	✓

7.5.2.4. Industry Safety and Security Watch Group Scheme

To address the heightened vulnerability levels of certain industries to terrorism and the wider consequences for Singapore in case of an attack, the police in cooperation with the respective industry associations have de-

1069 *ibid.*

1070 *ibid.*

veloped the *Industry Safety and Security Watch Group* (iSSWG) Scheme.¹⁰⁷¹ This programme engages the companies in these system-relevant industries on their security in custom-made ways.¹⁰⁷² The industrial sectors which currently benefit from the programme are the chemical, manufacturing, financial, retail and hotel industries.¹⁰⁷³

ISSWG member companies benefit from:¹⁰⁷⁴

- Bespoke police statistics and intelligence briefings relevant to their sector,
- Alerts and updates on the terrorism threat picture that enable changes to their protective measures,
- Opportunities to network on, to share in and to assess the effectiveness of protective security procedures as well as business contingency measures in their industry,¹⁰⁷⁵
- Training of their private security personnel in SGSecure skills under the Project Guardian scheme,¹⁰⁷⁶
- Enhanced self-help abilities through emergency preparedness trainings by the SCDF, to form so-called *Company Emergency Response Teams*.¹⁰⁷⁷

What measures can authorities take away from the Industry Safety and Security Watch Group that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should address the heightened vulnerability levels of certain industries to terrorism and the wider consequences for the country in case of an attack, by collecting the businesses in industry groups and engaging them in a cooperative way. The measures in support of the key industries can include:
- The sharing of bespoke police statistics and intelligence briefings relevant to their sector,
- Providing regular updates and alerts on the terrorism threat picture which initiate changes to their protective measures,
- Training of their private security personnel in counter-terrorism,

1071 See Singapore Police Force 2019c.

1072 See Singapore Police Force 2017a.

1073 See Singapore Police Force 2019c.

1074 See *ibid.*

1075 See Yeo 2016.

1076 See Singapore Police Force 2019c.

1077 See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2018d See Singapore Civil Defence Force 2020b.

- Facilitating intra-industrial opportunities to network on, to share in, and assess the effectiveness of protective security procedures as well as business contingency measures in their industry,
- Enhancing the companies' self-help abilities through emergency preparedness trainings to form company emergency response teams.

<i>Industry Safety and Security Watch Group Scheme</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	✓
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

7.6. Singapore Victim Support

Singapore does not have a dedicated terrorism victim support program. Since its independence, Singapore has been fortunate to have been spared from casualties of terrorist attacks on its soil. It did not have to share the experience of mass casualty events from terrorism which the UK, France, neighbouring Indonesia or Sri Lanka had to go through after *jihadit* attacks in recent years. But since 9/11, Singapore has taken note of the newly developing terrorism threat scenarios and of the adjustments the affected countries made, to improve their first response as well as the after-care procedures, and the long-term treatment of survivors.

Since 2007, the country has been regularly conducting large-scale mass casualty event exercises where the multi-agency response to terror attacks is trained. Special emphasis is laid on the hospitals' emergency preparedness, occasionally including even scenarios where the hospitals are under terrorist attack themselves as shown below.¹⁰⁷⁸

1078 See Changi General Hospital 2016; See Mei 2017.

Figure 51: Press photo from Counter-terrorism exercises at Ng Teng Fong General Hospital.¹⁰⁷⁹



Figure 52: Screenshot from Home Team News by the MHA of the counter-terrorism exercises heartbeat at Ng Teng Fong General Hospital.¹⁰⁸⁰



1079 Image taken by Kevin Lim (The Straits Times) see Mei 2017.

First established in 2003 the year of the SARS outbreak in the country, Singapore today has several well-established trauma units with low mortality rates which meet the highest international standards.¹⁰⁸¹ Special care is taken of the aftercare which includes the “*psychosocial reintegration*” of the patients to avoid the “*adverse physical, psychological, social and financial effects*” of long absence from work.¹⁰⁸² Since 2017, speedy return-to-work as a treatment goal has been institutionalized through the Government’s Return-to-Work (RTW) programme at seven public hospitals, funded through the *Ministry of Manpower* and the *Workplace Safety and Health Council*.¹⁰⁸³

*This is done through a customised service approach with the assignment of an RTW Coordinator who will take an injured worker-centric approach in early intervention and support. The RTW Coordinator will consider the specific circumstances of the injured worker and [the needs of the] employer to develop a plan, in consultation with medical professionals, to support faster recovery and return to work.*¹⁰⁸⁴

To ensure better pre-hospital care, since 2020 virtual reality-augmented training for mass casualty events is part of the curriculum of all medical students and is currently being rolled out to all pre-hospital care providers, including SCDF and SAF.¹⁰⁸⁵

Beside medical first aid, psychological first aid is part of the SGSecure curriculum for community first responders as the authorities believe that the community is able to deliver psychological support in a crisis.¹⁰⁸⁶ To ensure that survivors of terrorist attacks and those indirectly affected, receive adequate support, the Ministry of Health (MoH) has trained volunteers since 2017 to serve in *Human Emergency Assistance and Response Teams (HEART)*. These are focused on supporting the psychological recovery of the community after an attack.¹⁰⁸⁷

Apart from providing direct psychological first aid to survivors on the ground in the case of an attack, applying the simple “3 L formula” of psychological first aid – “*Look, Listen and Link*”, the members of the

1080 Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2016.

1081 See Paulo *et al.* 2019.

1082 Minister of State Sam Tan 2017 ; See Paulo *et al.* 2019.

1083 Minister of State Sam Tan 2017 ; Hoe 2018.

1084 Minister of State Sam Tan 2017.

1085 National University of Singapore 2019.

1086 Ministry of Manpower Singapore 2019a.

1087 See Hamzah 2019.

HEART Network have an ongoing coordinating and piloting function.¹⁰⁸⁸ Over the whole recovery and coping phase, they should ensure a smoother government response to the patients' needs and should help to “*facilitate greater communication with medical institutions, which may encounter patients coming in with psychological trauma.*”¹⁰⁸⁹

There is no dedicated financially supporting compensation offered to victims of a terrorist attack in Singapore. Several financial assistance schemes however do exist for Singaporeans to cover healthcare-related costs as well as programmes for short- and long- term livelihood support for those who are unable to fend for themselves because of accidents, health problems or due to other incapacitations.¹⁰⁹⁰

What measures can authorities take away from the Victim Support in Singapore that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities should conduct mass casualty incident exercises regularly to test and continually improve the hospitals' emergency preparedness and the necessary multi-agency response.
- Authorities should make use of the capabilities of VR to prepare and train more first responders for mass casualty incidents in a cost and time-effective way.
- Authorities should aide the psychosocial reintegration process of injured survivors by establishing dedicated consultants who support the victims directly with advice and practical support in all steps on their way from the hospital to return-to-work.

1088 Er and Seng 2019, 2.

1089 Hamzah 2019.

1090 See Ministry of Health Singapore 2020 ; See Tan 2019 ; See Lai and Tan 2012.

<i>Victim Support Activities</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	
<i>Management of Fear</i>	
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	✓

7.7. Singapore Legal instruments


Singapore has enacted several laws which support the preservation of *Strategic Resilience*. The following assessment focusses only on the laws' applicability and effectiveness during terrorist incident or threats. It does not undertake a general evaluation of the adequacy or reasonableness of these laws under other circumstances.

Internal Security Act

The Internal Security Act (ISA) permits the issue of restriction orders without a warrant and of preventive custody orders without charges for persons believed to be involved in terrorism, for up to two years.¹⁰⁹¹ These orders may be renewed indefinitely or may be removed, after the person is deemed to have been rehabilitated.

1091 See Singapore Statutes Online 1987.

Figure 53: “The number of Restriction and Detention Orders issues under ISA against self-radicalised Singaporeans”, as of Jan 2019.¹⁰⁹²



After 9/11, the ISA has been used predominantly against radical jihadis. In 2002, 31 persons connected to the foiled attack plans of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Singapore, had been arrested under the ISA.¹⁰⁹³ Since that time, detentions under the ISA have been rare. The number of Restriction and Detention Orders issues under ISA against self-radicalised Singaporeans

But the number of issued ISA Restriction- and Detention Orders has increased with the rise of *Daesh*.¹⁰⁹⁴

- Through permitting preventive custody of persons who are found to plot attacks or who have travel plans to join the fight for *Daesh*, the act supports *impact prevention*,
- By putting restriction orders on persons who are found to hold and share radical views which threaten religious harmony in the country, the promotion of these ideas is stopped and *social cohesion* is *strengthened*.
- The act supports the *maintenance of meaning* by protecting *Just-World-Beliefs* in the population and thus is enabling an effective and strong government response to terror threats levelled against the over-all society.

1092 Image taken from Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019c.

1093 Ministry of Home Affairs Republic of Singapore 2003.

1094 See Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2019b.

What measures can authorities take away from the Internal Security Act that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities could pass appropriate legislation which enables the effective policing of the spread of radical propaganda and of views detrimental to the social cohesion of the society.
- Authorities could pass appropriate legislation which enables an effective and strong government response to terror threats levelled against the society.

Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act

The Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA) had been enacted in 1990 as a reaction to an “increase in religious fervour, missionary zeal, and assertiveness” which had created inter-religious tensions, and to curb undesired political influence by faith groups.¹⁰⁹⁵

The MRHA allows the Government after consulting with the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony (PCRH), to issue restraining orders to religious leaders and activists who it finds to be “*causing feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will or hostility between different religious groups; or promoting a political cause*”¹⁰⁹⁶. Those receiving such an order may be prevented “*from addressing orally or in writing any congregation or group of worshippers, or publishing any publication, or holding office in an editorial board of a religious group without prior government approval.*”¹⁰⁹⁷

Those found in breach of a restraining order, risk to be criminally charged under the *Section 298A of the Penal Code* for disturbing public tranquility or under the *Sedition Act*.¹⁰⁹⁸ The MRHA has proven to be so effective, that no restraining order has been issued under the MRHA since its first enactment in 1990, as those found in breach of MRHA have shown restraint after receiving an advance warning.¹⁰⁹⁹

- The act helps maintain social trust and cohesion by asking all religions for moderation, tolerance and respect assuring them that transgressions by any faith will be punished.

1095 Government of Singapore 1989, 3.

1096 Singapore Statues Online 2001, 7–8.

1097 *ibid.*, 8 ; See also Hussin 2018, 180.

1098 Lai 2019.

1099 Min and Mohan 2019.

- The act reduces the potential divisive impact of a sectarian terrorist attack as it obliges religious leaders to react with prudence and restraint to attacks and not to start a blame game with other races or religions.

What measures can authorities take away from the *Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA)* that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities could pass appropriate legislation which helps to maintain social trust and cohesion, by asking all religions for moderation, tolerance and respect assuring them that transgressions by any faith will be punished.
- Authorities should pass appropriate legislation which helps to reduce the potential divisive impact of a sectarian terrorist attack as it obliges religious leaders to react with prudence and restraint to attacks and not to start a blame game with other races or religions.

Administration of Muslim Law Act Section 87

Under *Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) – Section 87* which covers Muslim Religious School rules, Islamic education in Singapore is overseen by the *Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (Muis)*.¹¹⁰⁰ No individual or organisation may teach Islam or provide Islamic education in Singapore without a certificate of recognition by the Muis.¹¹⁰¹

Everyone who wants to teach, needs to be registered under the *Asatizah Recognition*

Scheme (ARS) by the Muis that assesses the professional competence in Islamic teaching and the compliance to the *ARS Code of Ethics*. This Code requires teachers to teach only moderate and non-divisive schools of Islam in a way that is mindful of “the well-being and the harmony of the [whole] society”.¹¹⁰²

Quranic teachers found to be lacking the qualifications for recognition under the ARS can benefit from strongly subsidised Quranic training (Specialised Certificate for Quran Teachers SCQT and Specialised Diploma

1100 See Singapore Statutes Online 2009, 11.

1101 See Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 2017, 1.

1102 *ibid.*, 4.

for Quran Teachers SDQ) which upon successful completion would allow them to apply again.¹¹⁰³

Islamic education centres and providers (IECPs) which want to be recognized under the scheme, need to prove that their curriculum and teaching materials comply to the ARS Code of Ethics, and are allowed to employ only teachers who are registered under the ARS.¹¹⁰⁴

Recognition is given for a maximum of three years after which it will be reviewed; IECPs or teachers found in breach of the ARS Code of Ethics, may have their recognition revoked at any time.¹¹⁰⁵

- The Act and its application in the ARS through Muis help to strengthen social cohesion by confining religious teachings to a value corridor which is observant of the preservation of the harmony and well-being of the whole society.
- Through its effective application and the expulsion of non-compliant teachers, the Act also reassures the non-Muslim population of the loyalty of the Muslim-community to the nation and prevents speculations and accusations which could bring distrust and fear.

What measures can authorities take away from the Administration of Muslim Law Act Section 87 that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities could pass appropriate legislation that helps to *strengthen social cohesion* by confining religious teachings to a value corridor observant of preserving the harmony and well-being of the whole society.
- Authorities could ensure through the effective application of religious teaching legislation and the expulsion of non-compliant teachers, that the non-Muslim population is reassured of the loyalty of the Muslim-community to the nation and *prevents* speculations and accusations which could bring distrust and fear.

1103 See *ibid.*, 3.

1104 See Hussin 2018, 175.

1105 See Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 2017.

Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Act

The Act passed in 2018¹¹⁰⁶, allows police during a “serious incident” or in the expectation of an impending incident to enforce the Act and order a halt to all communication and news gathering in or from a certain geographical area by the media or private citizens.¹¹⁰⁷ This can prevent the endangering of tactical police operations and may preserve their communication dominance.

- It can *prevent the wide-spread impact* of an impending attack by suppressing its media effect if the threat is turning into an event.
- It can *reduce the potential impact* of an unexpected attack by stopping the uncontrolled spread of the pictures of the event, aka “the terrorist propaganda”.
- It can help to *protect cognitive clarity* during an incident by preventing the dissemination of unverified footage and messages from an incident area.

What measures can authorities take away from the Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Act that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities could pass appropriate legislation which may prevent the impact of an impending attack by suppressing its media effect if the threat is becoming true.
- Authorities could pass appropriate legislation which may reduce the potential impact of an unexpected attack by stopping the uncontrolled spread of the pictures, aka “the terrorist propaganda”.
- Authorities should pass appropriate legislation which may help to protect cognitive clarity during an incident by preventing the dissemination of unverified footage and messages from an incident area.

Singapore Armed Forces Amendment Act

The 2007 Amendment to the Singapore Armed Forces Act grants soldiers during their deployment on homeland security duty, the same executive

1106 See Singapore Statutes Online 2018.

1107 See Hong 2018.

powers as exercised by police officers.¹¹⁰⁸ It has allowed the deployment of Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) personnel in joint patrols with the police (called deterrence patrols, as shown in figure below), thereby temporarily freeing police officers to be deployed to counter-terrorism operations and investigations when required.¹¹⁰⁹

All front line police officers receive a one-day joint training preparing them for joint patrols, while SAF personnel undergo a one-week training that covers „areas such as scenario-based simulation and live-firing for homeland security operations; search-and-arrest procedures [...]; knowledge of legal powers and rights of private defence; and retractable truncheon drills“.¹¹¹⁰

By January 2019, over 22,000 soldiers, both full-time service men and reservists (NSMen) had been trained for joint deployment, with 18,000 soldiers to be trained in each following year.¹¹¹¹ The Act helps to *prevent an impact* of terrorism by deterring attacks through a larger law enforcement presence. The Act further helps to *reduce the potential impact* of an attack by the Government’s ability to quickly surge the number of trained firearms officers in the street to suppress an ongoing attack. In addition, the presence of deterrence patrols in the street can reassure citizens that the Government is prepared to deal with any threat, thereby helping citizens to manage their fear of terrorism.

By deploying an SAF force including full-time national service men and reservists directly in the street to help to protect the citizens against marauding terrorist attacks, the *meaningfulness* of their service to the nation increases in the eyes of the soldiers and the citizens and can contribute to increased *social cohesion*.

What measures can authorities take away from the Singapore Armed Forces Amendment Act that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities could pass appropriate legislation that enables a larger law enforcement presence through the effective training and deployment of military personnel in joint deterrence patrols with police, temporarily freeing police officers to be deployed to counter-terrorism operations and investigations when needed.

1108 See Singapore Statutes Online 2000.

1109 See Loh 2019.


1110 Beng 2017a.

1111 See Beng 2017b.

The Infrastructure Protection Act

The *Infrastructure Protection Act (IPA)* passed in 2018¹¹¹², requires developers and owners of buildings with high footfall or of iconic sites which may pose attractive terrorist targets, to undertake protective security measures “*necessary to deter and deny attacks, and minimize the impact should an attack occur.*”¹¹¹³

Figure 54: *Infographic Infrastructure Protection Act published by the Ministry of Home Affairs, part one.*¹¹¹⁴



The necessary measures are defined by and based on the *Security-By-Design (SBD) review process* (managed by the *Centre for Protective Security (CPS)*). Each owner or developer have to commit themselves to them in order to obtain approvals for their developments or any planned repairs,

1112 Singapore Statutes Online 2017.

1113 Singapore Police Force 06.2019, 1–2.

1114 Graphic taken from annex to Ministry of Home Affairs Republic of Singapore 2018b, 1.

renovations or additions to existing buildings or sites.¹¹¹⁵ The measures required, as stipulated by the *Security-by-Design* assessment, may comprise “the deployment of security technology like CCTVs, security personnel, vehicle barriers, and strengthening the building against blast effects.”¹¹¹⁶

“MHA will also be able to direct owners of selected buildings to put in place additional security measures to guard against terrorist attacks. If a terrorist attack is assessed to be imminent, emergency orders can be issued to protect a building.”¹¹¹⁷

The private securities guards of these designated sites are also equipped with enforcement rights in the surrounding areas in order to prevent or disrupt pre-attack planning and hostile reconnaissance.¹¹¹⁸ They can stop people and request identification, “inspect their clothes, vehicles and belongings”, prohibit photos and temporarily evict individuals from the area.¹¹¹⁹

- The Act supports *impact prevention* by deterring or disrupting potential attackers.
- The Act may *reduce the impact* of an attack because of better structural protection at at-risk-sites.

What measures can authorities take away from the Infrastructure Protection Act that may be transferred to or replicated in another country?

- Authorities could pass appropriate legislation which supports impact prevention by deterring or disrupting potential attackers through hardened infrastructure and protective measures.
- Authorities could pass appropriate legislation which helps to reduce the impact of a potential attack as a consequence of better structural protection at at-risk-sites.

1115 See Singapore Police Force 06.2019.

1116 *ibid.*, 1–2.

1117 Ministry of Home Affairs Republic of Singapore 2018b.

1118 See *ibid.*


1119 *ibid.*, 1.

<i>Legal Instruments (summary)</i>	
<i>Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills</i>	
<i>Raise Individual & Organisational Self-Efficacy</i>	
<i>Impact Prevention & Reduction</i>	✓
<i>Limit Indirect [Psychological] Impact</i>	✓
<i>Management of Fear</i>	✓
<i>Coping-friendly Meaning Making</i>	✓
<i>Ensure Cognitive Clarity</i>	✓
<i>Strengthen Societal Cohesion</i>	✓
<i>Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected</i>	

7.8. Singapore Case Study Conclusion

The result of the analysis of the different programmes in place under the *Total Defence* counter-terrorism approach in Singapore, reflects the *nine critical tasks* for building, strengthening and preserving Strategic Resilience, that are at the core of the *Rings-of Resilience Model* proposed in Chapter Five, emphasizing its relevance.

Figure 55: Singapore’s different counter-terrorism activities fall within the nine critical tasks of Strategic Resilience.



Several of the programmes' activities fall into more than one category, meaning that they contribute to fulfilling several tasks at the same time. Consequently, running some programmes may be more effective than others.

A simple high or low number of contributing activities to one task does not allow to come to a simple conclusion about the level of resilience and preparedness created in the society, as this analysis has focused on government-driven programmes. It did not include purely civil society-run activities and institutions and nor did it take account of existing national peculiarities or strengths which in certain areas may make additional strong official efforts unnecessary.

The analysis does however give practitioners a hint where the Government's focus is currently placed and where there may be a need for additional effort or additional assessment to further improve Strategic Resilience.

Simply judging by the number of activities under each task category, the analysis shows a strong focus in Singapore on protective security measures that are concerned with *impact prevention and reduction*. These are backed-up by multiple efforts to raise the vigilance of the civil society and the private sector and their respective *self-efficacy*, should protective measures be breached and a terrorist attack occur. In line with the idea that keeping Singapore safe, is a shared responsibility, the effort to equip Singaporeans with the skills which enable them in assisting in the prevention of attacks and in mitigating the consequences, are delivered in a whole-of-government multi-agency approach across all sectors of the society and, are calculated to exude a strong deterrence effect.

Corresponding to the national *Total Defence* approach taken, these more technical resilience-enhancing measures are matched by an equal number of activities which contribute to building and sustaining the social resilience – through a *meaningful national narrative*, multiple programmes to *strengthen societal cohesion* and open official risk communication. Service to the community is applauded and rewarded, and safeguarding the cohesion of Singapore's unique multi-ethnic social fabric is at the core of its shared meaning. As a mandatory prerequisite, tolerance and openness towards other races, and beliefs and religious moderation are taught to Singaporeans from kindergarten up to national service. This common knowledge is helping with *emotion-focused coping*. The embrace of and adherence to these principles are encouraged in all aspects of life in Singapore.

Through a long record of good governance, of the effective managing of past disasters and of transparent communication the Government has gained high trust in the population. As a consequence of *consistent pro-active risk communication*, the *fear of a terrorist threat* is low and the potential indirect impact of an attack is expected to be limited. This is further aided by the close bonds with the main media outlets and by legal checks which curtail the negligent or malignant spread of uncorroborated inflammatory suspicions and accusations, as regularly encountered in the virtual space after alleged jihadi attacks in other countries.

Those *directly affected by an attack* do benefit from modern healthcare system which has been trained for mass- casualty events through pre-hospital care and trauma units. *Psychosocial reintegration* of trauma patients is aided by the support of dedicated *return-to-work consultants* and community-administered social and psychological support.