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THE INVENTION OF CITIZENSHIP AMONG YOUNG MUSLIMS IN ITALY¹

“Islamophobia” precedes the tragic events of 9/11, but, as in many other countries, it was above all after this date that some opinion-makers and politicians began to depict Muslims who live in Italy as potentially dangerous (Sciortino 2002; Rivera 2002; Schmidt di Friedberg 2001).² Faced with this difficult situation, the Association of Young Italian Muslims (GMI), an active group of youths born in and/or raised from infancy in Italy, entered the public sphere, participating in various activities involving interreligious and intercultural dialogue at the local and national levels. Through this work the group gained extraordinary visibility among the media in a relatively short amount of time.

The main innovation of these youths’ approach was that they did not limit themselves to “reversing the stigma” (Sayad 2002), that is to say, they did not simply deny the association of Islam to violence, declaring themselves to be Muslim pacifists. Their ambitious objective has been to change the framework and shift the discussion about Muslims in Italy from one concerned with safety issues to one focusing on citizenship. But what is the meaning of citizenship in their speeches and in their practices? What are the outcomes of their demands within the public sphere? How have Islamic associations for adults reacted to their activism?

In this chapter I attempt to answer these questions. I first introduce the Italian context in which Muslims seem to serve as a screen against which some Italians project themselves as a unity, and then show how the Association of Young Italian Muslims has opposed a representation of Italian identity based on a common Catholic matrix by declaring themselves Italian citizens of Islamic faith. Moreover, I analyze their various forms of belonging and

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- 1 This chapter is based on my doctoral thesis in sociology entitled “Difference as Opportunity? Young Italian Muslims and Demands for Citizenship” (supervisor: Chantal Saint-Blancat). Heartfelt thanks to Stefano Allievi for having introduced me to the stimulating research group composed by the authors of this book.
 - 2 See, for example, the long article “La Rabbia e l’orgoglio” (Rage and Pride) by O. Fallaci, which appeared on September 29, 2001, in *Corriere della Sera* (one of the main national newspapers) and later became a best-selling book. With respect to political forces, Lega Nord is the main agent of anti-Islamic xenophobia (Guolo 2003, 58–80). For the historical origin of the perception of Muslims as “enemies,” see Allievi, 2003, 143–144, and Khader, 1992.

participation, showing that they are Muslim democrats practicing “ordinary citizenship” in their everyday life (especially at the local level) and that their main feature is their commitment to the legitimation of a public representation of Italy as a multicultural and multireligious country. Finally, I illustrate how the visibility of this youth association is challenging the “defensive logic” of the previous generation.

Italy: A Catholic and Secular Country?

According to prevailing theories, Italy discovered cultural diversity with the arrival of immigrants.³ What had been a nation of emigrants until the 1970s became a country of immigration. And according to the collective representations circulating in the mass media, what was, from a religious point of view, a homogeneous country found itself confronted with a problematic alternative: Islam. And so with the settlement of immigrant families came multicultural policies: for example, there was experimentation with intercultural projects in schools, and linguistic and cultural mediators were introduced in hospitals and other public institutions.

Anthropologists Ralph Grillo and Jeff Pratt (2002) tell us a different story, maintaining that, basically, the Italian nation was born through a “policy of identity.” To quote Massimo d’Azeglio (1861), “We have created Italy, now let us create Italians.” In actuality, the country continued to remain plural, marked by profound regional differences and above all by differences between the North and the South, the famous “southern issue.” Jeff Pratt (2002) adds that this “hierarchised cultural diversity” in which the North stigmatized the South is the principal leitmotif of Italian history.⁴

This internal plurality also affects the sphere of religious belief (Garelli, Guizzardi, and Pace 2003, 299): for instance, 45.1 % of the Italian population believe that religious celibacy should be abolished, and more than half of the Italian population maintain that there is something true in all religions and,

3 Since the last regularization campaign launched by the center-right government, immigrants in Italy now total about 2,400,000; it is estimated that among them about 800,000 are Muslims (Pace 2004b). The original nationalities are extremely varied, though the most consistent group is that of Moroccans. As regards youths, the Agnelli Foundation gave an early estimate of young Muslims in 2004: they are thought to amount to around 300,000, of which 140,000 to 160,000 were born in or grew up in Italy. For a report on the statistics on Muslims and on the process of identity allocation, see Amiraux, 2004.

4 In Italian history there are other, even more stigmatized differences, such as the “racial” differences under the fascist regime. According to historian A. Del Boca (1998), up to the present day in Italy there has never been serious public reflection on Italian colonialism, and the myth of the “good Italian people” survives along with racist stereotypes.

therefore, that Catholicism cannot be the only true religion.⁵ Despite all of this, Italy continues to represent itself as a homogeneous society from a cultural and religious viewpoint. There are those who believe that Italian Catholicism might at its base be “a romantic idea” to be shared for the sake of unity (Pace 1998, 75–101).

Nowadays Islam is often socially constructed as the “unassimilable difference” and as the “internal enemy” against whom “Western values” must be defended (Rivera 2003). However, if Islam causes such apprehension in Italians, it is perhaps in part because it reopens issues that are controversial independent of the presence of Muslim immigrants. Once again, the outsider becomes a mirror (Hervieu-Léger 2000; Amiraux 2004) and reveals tensions already existent in Italian society, such as secularism versus the Catholic Church’s monopoly of cultural values (Saint-Blancat and Schmidt di Friedberg 2005).⁶ As evidenced during the recent referendum on assisted insemination (Law 40), when the Church aggressively intervened in the public sphere by inviting Catholics to stay away from the polls in order to prevent voter turnout from reaching the necessary minimum, the relationship between religion and politics is not a specifically Muslim problem but rather a general challenge for all Italians (Rusconi 2000, 2005).

Hence, starting from the hypothesis that Muslims serve as a screen against which some Italians project themselves as a unity (i.e., as a “Catholic country”), and imagining Italy to be modern and secular (as opposed to Muslim immigrants, with their “traditionalism” and “incapacity to separate religion and politics”⁷), let us see if and in which manner the Association of Young Italian Muslims has managed to question these collective representations, which have the effect of excluding them.

Why the Association of Young Italian Muslims?

The Association of Young Italian Muslims (hereafter the “GMI”) is composed of about four hundred children of immigrants. The majority were born in Italy or were raised there since primary school. They are between 15 and

5 This internal pluralism within Italian Catholicism is rarely acknowledged. However, according to Garelli, Guizzardi, and Pace (2003, 297–298), cultural and political differences among Catholics have been present since the foundation of Italy: for example, there were papal extremists, but also modernists. These variances crossed over class divisions: think of peasant religiosity and of the social solidarity inspired by Catholics during the first workers’ movement, or of the liberal Catholicism of the enlightened bourgeoisie or of conservative Catholicism among farmers.

6 According to Sciolla (2005, 316), we are witnessing an increasingly pervasive interference of the Italian Church in issues of public or directly political interest along with the Church’s growing visibility in Italian mass media.

7 For the historical roots of these representations, see Said, 1991.

17 years of age; the association's leaders are somewhat older, between 18 and 24. Girls are both more numerous and more active in the association. The majority of GMI members are high-school students; the leaders (both male and female) attend university and are majoring in science or the social sciences.⁸

Most of the parents are Moroccan, but there is also a significant Syrian component among parents of the more active members. Other nationalities represented in the association are Egyptian, Palestinian, Jordanian, Tunisian, and Algerian. The members' fathers are for the most part factory workers, but there is also a significant number of doctors and entrepreneurs.⁹ Their mothers usually are housewives, but there are also maidservants and cleaners, intercultural mediators, social workers, and entrepreneurs.

The largest local sections of the GMI are those in Lombardy, where it has its headquarters in Milan; Emilia Romagna; Piedmont; Trentino Alto-Adige; Tuscany; and Umbria. The best organized regions are in northern Italy; in many regions of southern Italy there are no local sections of the GMI.

The social composition of the association mirrors in certain respects the population of the children of immigration in Italy: GMI's members are concentrated in northern and central Italy, and the most common nationality of origin is Moroccan.¹⁰ On the other hand, the association is interesting not because of its representativeness,¹¹ but because it is currently the only Islamic youth association active in Italy, because it came into being just ten days after 9/11,¹² and because it was able to give a voice to all the youths who are continually "called into question" as Muslims.

8 This case study is informed by my doctoral thesis work, for which I conducted qualitative research for over three years in the form of participant observation of the GMI, fifty in-depth interviews with children of immigrants born or raised in Italy (who now live in Milan), and four focus groups with young Muslims (militant and nonmilitant). My entry in the GMI was facilitated by a friend who became the first secretary general of the association (she answered for my seriousness). I met the other young people who were not GMI members in Milan, first in high schools and universities and second through "snowball sampling."

9 Whereas Syrian parents are doctors, parents of Moroccan origin usually are factory workers.

10 Because the stabilization of immigration in Italy is relatively recent, most "foreigners born in Italy" are much younger than GMI members and still attend nursery and primary schools.

11 The reality of young Muslims in Italy is surely much more diversified—one need only think of the many different nationalities of origin which are not represented in the association.

12 It was created from the ashes of previously existing Islamic youth associations (first, the group Islamic Youth; in 1999, AGESMI; and in 2000, The Mediator); with the exception of the latter all were dependent on the Union of Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy (UCOII), the main Islamic immigrant association and one of the organizations that requested a formal accord (*intesa*)

“Nowadays Islam is being bombarded in every sense and thus it is important to be practical and to be visible and make yourself understood with your words and behaviors ... We young Muslims feel extremely responsible because with every move we make and every time we speak we feel as if we are being observed. Even at school I have to watch every word I say because I feel like I am being watched ... I do not feel like all the others ... You are the only one with a veil at school ... you are like a reference point ... They look at us and say, ‘This is Islam.’” (Z. K., 17 years old, Syrian Italian, GMI member)

Some youths have in fact managed to make the best of a bad situation and to change this social pressure into an opportunity. Whereas adult Islamic associations still adopted defensive logics (by opposing “us Muslims” to “them Italians”), the GMI entered the public sphere and introduced a new, more inclusive category: “Italian citizens of Islamic faith.” Participating in various public debates and organizing activities for the children of Muslim immigrants, they have attempted to reach two main objectives:

1. An “external” objective: they aim to become involved on the local, national, and European levels “for the cause of justice, peace, and defense of human rights” (from the statute of the association, Article 3).
2. An “internal” objective: the GMI work to promote the identity construction of young “Italian and European” Muslims through educational activities aimed at promoting and deepening their faith.

What Kind of Citizenship?

In the course of three years of empirical research (2001–2004), the issue of citizenship has progressively assumed greater relevance, on the one hand because the GMI has had a central role in the discussions about belonging and the practices of participation,¹³ and on the other because the concept of “citizenship” has been invoked often enough by members of the association, to the point of becoming one of the slogans of the GMI.¹⁴ For instance, the fifth convention of the group (in Marina di Massa, December 25–27, 2003) was significantly entitled “New Citizens, Good Muslims,” and in the workshop in which they discussed what it means to be a Muslim Italian citizen it clearly emerged that it was not a “passport issue” but depended on “being part of a territory or not.” Also on that occasion diverse stories of discrimination and racism were shared, in such great numbers that participants proposed the

with the Italian government (Allievi 1994; Guolo 1999; Pace and Perocco 2000; Elsheikh 2001).

13 According to Delanty, 2000, belonging and participation are two key dimensions in a democratic conception of citizenship, which is based not upon ownership of rights, as in the traditional liberal model, but upon the fact of residing in a certain territory, feeling that one is part of it, and actively participating in social life.

14 Another “slogan” of the GMI is that of participation in public life motivated by faith, that is to say, to be “protagonists, with the help of God!”

creation of a “database on the state of Islamophobia in Italy” through the gathering of daily experiences of young Muslims. At the end of the discussion different proposals for “becoming citizens” emerged: knowing how to compare yourself to others at school and in the workplace, being present in the social realm, doing volunteer work,¹⁵ and participating in public events and organizing meetings and seminars for discussing the challenges facing society as a whole.

For these young people, as for young Muslims in other European countries such as France (Cesari 1998, 2003; Tietze 2002; Venel 2004), Islam is lived as one reference of identification, but not as the only one. Its importance is in bringing it to a level equal with other ones. As opposed to what their parents did and do, it is no longer simply a matter of claiming “the right to be different” (e.g., asking for mosques, Islamic cemeteries) but entails real and actual issues of citizenship.

The GMI’s calls for inclusion come on different levels: local, because these youths actively participate in the life of the area in which they live;¹⁶ national, because they feel Italian and want “formal citizenship” in order to be officially in possession of rights and duties. Moreover, there are symptoms of much larger claims, such as in the first steps that the association has been taking on a European level: the GMI is part of the European Federation of Young Islamic Associations and of the Youth Forum (which comprises lay and religious youth organizations from various European countries).

The GMI have faced the theme of “formal citizenship” many times, discussing it both inside and outside the association. For example, in one of the constitutive meetings of the National Youth Forum (in Rome on May 30, 2003), the GMI came up with the idea of starting a “campaign for direct access to citizenship for all children of immigrants,”¹⁷ in de facto support of a “citizenship of residency” (*ius soli* rather than *ius sanguinis*) of the sort in which civil, social, and political rights await those who are born in or live in a particular region or territory. This took a particularly innovative form in that the National Youth Forum concerned itself with opening a discussion on a European level as well, namely, within the European Youth Forum.

15 Some GMI members related their experience of volunteer work inspired by Christian associations. Furthermore, the GMI recently reached an agreement with lay environmentalist associations to organize communal activities.

16 The first GMI candidate (in Reggio Emilia, in the center-left Margherita Party) ran for office in the most recent town government elections, and the first public appearance of the new mayor of Reggio was organized with the GMI in order to strengthen a “pact of citizenship with Muslim youth.”

17 According to the law on Italian nationality, reformed in 1992, children born in Italy to foreign parents acquire the citizenship of their parents. They can request Italian citizenship within one year from their eighteenth birthday only if they have been continually residing in Italy from their birth up to the date of their application. On children of immigrants and citizenship, see Andall, 2003, 289–294.

However, in almost all interviews with GMI members, there is a growing conviction that formal acknowledgement is a lengthy procedure and that it can instead be constructed “from below,” thanks to the visibility of youths who become an active part of society. For instance, Latifa is active in various associations, among them the GMI, and works as an intercultural mediator.¹⁸ She participates in the public life of her region, expanding her social network as much as possible, in the conviction that this will help her to obtain formal recognition of Italian citizenship.

“I’m 22 years old, born in Morocco, and now a student of sociology in Trento. I’d like to be a researcher ... I try to meet a lot of people and to make myself known ... I am not an Italian citizen, even if I feel Italian ... You need to have a full-time job, years of contributions; it takes a long time ... I’ve been here for twelve years. I grew up here like other young people from Trento, but I have an unstable life ... I must find a job immediately, before graduation. If I don’t, I can’t study; my parents are unable to help me. I have permission to stay for educational reasons, and I don’t have a full-time job to make the request ... which they can then refuse to grant. Without knowing why ... It’s a problem that many of us feel; with the GMI we try to speak about it, to do something [...]”

National identification among GMI members, their “feeling Italian” despite their passport, does not exclude other bonds of belonging. As is common among many Italians, local identification—above all with the commune in which one lives—is very strong (Sciolla 2004, 57–66). There are certain GMI members who find motivation for their social commitment in “the love for the town in which they live.”

For example, Badra is 19 years old, of Syrian origin, and lives in Carrara, Tuscany. She is known locally because she wears a veil: since she has gone to school she has had to answer questions about Islam and international terrorism (e.g., “Do you know Bin Laden?”). Growing up she learned how to entertain contacts with Christian friends and, with the support of the GMI, to participate in local activities on interfaith dialogue and at demonstrations of the global peace movement. Badra says, however, that this is not enough for her. She wishes “to help society, beginning with her town,” in a very concrete way: for example, by achieving the repainting of the station wall. As an “active citizen,” she believes that the community can become involved in the decisions that affect them and appears to hope that the “participatory budget”¹⁹ of the town of Porto Alegre, in Brazil, will be implemented in her beloved Carrara, too. In the meantime, thanks to the support of her family, she is occupied with her studies at the university, because she thinks that without that she would end up “accepting things just as they are.” Badra hopes instead

18 “Latifa” is a pseudonym, as are all other names of interviewees and participants quoted in this chapter.

19 See the book by the Chilean sociologist Marta Harnecker, *Delegating Power to the People*, free for download at <http://www.verademocrazia.it>.

to be able to change them, beginning with herself and the region in which she lives.

“I think Carrara is very beautiful: the sea, the mountains ... I’d like to help society beginning with my city, you know? I don’t want to do things on a big scale ... That’s why demonstrations aren’t enough for me; I want to do something concrete. Because the little things can be changed, you can see it. Like with the station: I kept talking about it, and, I swear, they finally painted it! Honestly! They painted the whole thing and now you can arrive at the station of Carrara and see that it’s decent ... These things are very important to me. I’d love to know where all this money goes to ... What in the world is the city government doing? What is it doing for our city? What projects are there for improving the city? Because we are going downhill ... and this makes me sad. I’m interested in the experiences where citizens are aware of the expenditures and are given a voice ... These are things that affect us. I’d like to be informed, to participate ... I think they already do that in some other parts of the world [...].”

Although acting locally, some of the interviewed youths “think globally” and express transnational belonging as well, recognizing themselves in the composite social universe that has been called “movement of the movements” because of its many facets: it is a global movement for peace (Kaldor 2004), it is critical of the neoliberal model of development, and it aspires to an “other-worldliness” (Ramonet et al. 2004), practicing a sort of “globalization from below” (Pianta 2001).

So-called nonconventional participation (i.e., not related to political parties or politics) is in fact their “normal politics,” that is to say, the most common form of participation among these youths, as it is for Italians in the same age group (Albano 2005). It can take the following forms: participating in a procession or demonstration, collecting signatures for petitions, sending press releases or letters to newspapers, writing to public authorities, and participating in events related to local problems.

It is a “politics of everyday life” (De Certeau 2001; Ginsborg 2004), in which social actors express their power by means of small acts of autonomy: for example, by keeping themselves informed about events of public interest or by making responsible choices as consumers. Although these forms of participation are more common among urban youth (such as those interviewed in Milan), in the course of my empirical research I also found this kind of activism among GMI members living in small towns of central Italy. Such is the case of Farida, of Sirian origin, who lives in Macerata, a small town in central Italy. She is a cyber-activist who finds on the Internet the sociality that she misses in her provincial town.

“I’m 24 and I’m about to graduate, God willing ... I’d like to leave Macerata and run away from the South! I’d like to go to Rome or Milan: there are more people there, more things happening ... Because I’m an active person, I try to keep myself busy, but here it’s pretty hard! ... I was at the big demonstration on February 15th ... We were all there asking for peace, mostly young people ... Millions of people, young

people from all around the world who were asking for peace and justice! ... At home, I ask myself, 'What can be done?' ... So I surf the Internet and try to get a better understanding ... See, if I say 'No global,' you think about people who go around destroying ATMs ... I try it in a different way ... For example, the counterinformation I find on the Net, I take it to the university ... I really pester everyone to boycott products that finance Bush. It isn't easy ... Some of my classmates think that they'll die if they can't eat Kit-Kat! I've never heard of anyone dying from a lack of Nutella! But I've got some friends who help me make photocopies and hang up flyers ... On the Net I find advice about how to be active without leaving home ... There are mailing lists where you can find exchanges of updates about which products to boycott. You can even do it from Macerata!"

As we have seen, there can be different levels of belonging (national, local, and global) binding these youths to the rest of society. Their commitment is above all of a civic nature, and the prevailing form of citizenship emerging from what they say and do is democratic citizenship, based on active participation in the region in which they reside. However, when one observes the public initiatives in which GMI members participate as an Islamic youth association it becomes clear that the distinctive involvement of this organization has been in the domain of intercultural and interreligious dialogue in public space.

GMI activism in this realm has included participation in the following events: the annual interfaith meetings organized in Modena by the Associations of Italian Catholic Workers (ACLI); the "ecumenical days of Christian-Islamic dialogue," promoted over the last three years by some Catholic and Protestant magazines (*Il Dialogo*, *Confronti*, *Tempi di Fraternità*, *Mosaico di Pace*); the yearly summits of the Secretariat for Ecumenical Activities;²⁰ the various interfaith dialogue activities organized on a local level together with various Catholic groups (e.g., the Focolarini in Turin, the Giovani Impegno Missionario linked to the Combonians in Trento, the Comunità di Sant'Egidio in Rome); the "Un calcio alle differenze" project ("A kick in the face of differences" project); the "meeting of civilizations in a soccer game" at the Tre Fontane Stadium in Rome;²¹ the day for "positive interdependence in memory of 9/11," proposed by political expert Benjamin Barber and organized by the city council of Rome; the drafting of a common document with the Union of Young Italian Jews (UGEI) and ACLI youths entitled "Different Identities, Equal Rights" (2002); and the meeting called "Creators of a Plural

20 See AA.VV., *Abitare insieme la terra. Comunità ecumenica e giustizia* (Milan: Ancora, 2003), in which speeches from the 2002 meeting are collected (among them those of GMI's former president).

21 Organized to coincide with President Bush's visit in Rome by the Triciclisti (an informal association that sprung up on the Internet) and by GMI members, it had the following objectives: "promoting dialogue and constructive cultural exchange between peoples of different cultures; proposing new ways to solve international controversies." Among participating associations: the national association of sports champions, the national actors soccer team and the Italian association of referees.

Community: Young Italian Muslims, the Union of Young Italian Jews, FUCI and ACLI Youths in an Experience of Communal Life on the Themes of Politics, Religion, and Brotherhood” (in a Camaldolite cloister in Albano Laziale, March 19–21, 2004).

This last event gained even further significance because it was preceded just a week prior by the tragic terror attack in Madrid. The opening press release for the meeting stated: “In an age in which any religion risks becoming instrumental and seen as a cause of wars and conflicts, we want to reaffirm that communal living, sharing of the same spaces, mutual acceptance, and dialogue on an equal level are still possible. Religions are a resource for any society: they are society’s possibility for hope.” This experience was an important step in the strategy of social inclusion promoted by the association. In comparison with the dynamics of other meetings, in this meeting power was more equally distributed, and all of the interlocutors met and compared their experience and their ideas about the same issues, starting from the accepted point that they were unsolved matters for all three faiths. In other words, in Albano Laziale GMI members experienced what Baumann (2003) calls a process of “convergence,” in which social actors are able to cross borders (in this case religious borders), constructed by others and/or themselves, in order to reach common objectives: in this case, a transformation of the way in which “religions” are present in public space.

These youths have challenged together the monolithic representation of Italy as a Catholic and secular country, discussing thorny issues such as the relationship between religion and politics and the meaning of being believers and citizens at the same time. To convey the innovative nature of these meetings, it is useful to present contributions to a focus group (on March 19, 2004) involving around twenty young men and women active in Catholic, Jewish, and Islamic associations.²²

Young man from UGEI: “Where is the secularism of the Italian state? In public schools, in religion classes? In public television, where the pope is omnipresent in the news? In Parliament, where they are voting for the law on assisted insemination?”

Young woman from FUCI: “They are different things ... and there is independence from power structures: you can see it from the position the pope took against the war, a position differing from that of the Italian government ... which did not seem to be much influenced by it [...].”

Young man from GMI: “Let us think one step ahead. With the ongoing unification of the European Union we will have to consider issues on another level ... What will

22 The discussion group comprised two boys and three girls from the ACLI, one boy and one girl from the FUCI (University Federation of Italian Catholics), five boys and two girls from the UGEI, and three boys and four girls from the GMI. I had been sent by the GMI to serve as an observer of the discussion group, which was entirely self-managed.

secularism be like on a European level? Consider France. They forbid Muslims to wear the veil, but they celebrate holidays for everybody. Isn't it contradictory?"

Young man from UGEI: "We do not want crucifixes in classrooms because institutions have to be secular, but citizens should be allowed to wear the kippah, the veil [...]."

Young woman from GMI: "Think about Germany. If the teacher wears the veil, what should you do? Expel her? It is discriminating because she is not proselytizing!"

Young man from ACLI: "And think also of the issue of the Christian roots of Europe ... Either we mention everybody, or it is better not to mention any religion."

Young man from GMI: "I would like a plural society where there is room for all points of view, religious or not."

Young man from UGEI: "Yes, but crucifixes are historically a part of proselytism by the Catholic Church. If you want to see a crucifix you should go to church, not to schools or public offices. It is OK to respect Italian and European Christian traditions, but nowadays the Church has to get out of the way of institutions."

Young man from ACLI: "The European Union is born out of the endeavor to leave World War II behind us [...]."

Young man from UGEI: "[...] and maybe the Crusades too!"

Young man from GMI: "OK, religions have messed things up a bit ... But they can help dialogue and change. We at GMI do not want separation; we do not want different, separate schools, but common spaces where dialogue is possible."

The youths participating in this discussion engaged in "social criticism" through their religious difference (Colombo 2003): they questioned secularism and the level of democracy of the Italian state, and expressed their wish for a society that guarantees to a greater degree the right to religious freedom.²³ Together they demanded the introduction of a "pluralist teaching of religion" in public schools, because "nowadays Italian society no longer is only Christian" and because "only public schools can teach believers to also be citizens."²⁴

But what does it mean for these young believers to be citizens? During the same interfaith meeting, the GMI introduced the question to Catholic and Jewish participants who were discussing the ties between "religion and citizenship," not knowing that the young Muslims present did not possess Italian citizenship. A very interesting discussion developed and was then

23 On the limits of the 1984 agreement between the Catholic Church and the Italian state, see Pace 2004a.

24 This approach is currently being tested in Alsace Lorraine, in northeastern France, where different religious teachings are set in a broader framework of "education to values and citizenship" (Willaime 2000).

more deeply examined thanks to the participation of a young Jewish woman in a doctoral program in history at the University of Rome.

Young woman from GMI: “As regards religion and politics, young Muslims are working inside democratic states ... Yes, well what you hear about us wanting theocratic states makes no sense for young European Muslims ... We are pluralists ... It is written in the Koran that God created different tribes and peoples in order for them to get to know each other ... What is important are the relationships between those who are different ... That is the policy for a European Muslim and it is influenced by religious values, but in the sense that it is important to do good ... together with others. We are influenced by the way in which we are perceived; it’s necessary to move forward, to stop thinking about Islam and about immigration. Let us speak as citizens ... We must participate more ... citizenship is very important because it gives the sense of belonging to a country, the desire for its well-being. There needs to be a different policy ... They rejected my citizenship request three times, there is too much discretion involved ... It’s hard psychologically. Where would they send me? This is my home.”

Young man from FUCI: “Yes, there needs to be a different policy. I didn’t realize that you had these problems [...]”

Young man from GMI: “It’s not only her ... Listen, it’s terrible to be forced to stand in that queue en masse for a piece of paper ... It makes you feel ... inferior. It’s most upsetting for those of us who were born here.”

Young man from UGEI: “Well, there is a need for security ... With terrorism there is a need for ... checks ... but these are bureaucratic things that will be resolved with time.”

Young man from GMI: “Pardon me? I’d like to hear you explain more on this topic ... Because giving citizenship to young people like us is ... is ... arbitrary. It depends on the city you’re in. There is no general rule [...]”

Young man from UGEI: Yes ... well I come from Turin, San Salvario ... And there the Muslims are closed, they’re not like you ... There are illegal immigrants; there is petty crime [...]

Young woman from GMI: “The danger exists ... On the other hand, correct policies will make the youths more responsible.”

Young man from UGEI: “It’s not like there are only young people in San Salvario [...]”

Young woman from GMI: “We began talking about the young people in Turin and then it reverberates to the adults ... It takes time ... These are peripheral problems [...]”

Young man from UGEI: “Yes, actually. Also in France there are problems with young Muslims, I think. They are closed ... there are problems with anti-Semitism [...]”

Young woman from GMI: “We have contacts with other young Muslims in other European countries ... We compare ourselves ... and it is true that there can be closure. For instance, the English have a lot of complexes, they keep more to themselves ... and until just a short time ago they held different meetings for young men and young women! ... But here the earth is fertile, it can be worked ... We’re the first generation of young Italian Muslims ... We must use the time wisely ... being here isn’t enough. It takes ... an act of conscience ... To know our objectives.”

Young man from GMI: “It must be understood that there are Italian Catholics, Italian Jews, and Italian Muslims.”

Young man from FUCI: “Like the title of the meeting, “a plural community,” right?”

Young woman from UGEI: “I’ll give you a bit of Italian history that may help this discussion. Historically, in Italy religious minorities, the Jews and also the Waldensians, were not citizens like the rest (and they helped each other). Because the Waldensians were considered heretics they were persecuted by the Holy Inquisition ... The Jews were seen by the Church as the murderers of Christ and were discriminated against ... It can be said, however, that they were considered citizens, but with a few limitations ... There’s no need to complicate the issue though: the Church sought conversions, but it was only the racism of the twentieth century that attempted extermination ... The Jews came out of the ghetto during the Renaissance ... With the Risorgimento they thought they had participated in the unification of Italy ... so much so that until the Shoah they felt more Italian than Jewish ... The Jews were patriots, they couldn’t believe what was happening, with race laws—there were even Jewish Fascists! Now ... that blind faith in the state doesn’t exist ... It is important to understand history in order to be citizens.”

Young woman from GMI: “That is also our point: to have the same rights, to be Italian Muslims.”

Young woman from UGEI: “But you’ve been here for less time. Not since the birth of Rome! Many young Jews ignore history ... But they can’t afford to. Because to each one of us is asked, “Where were you born, in Israel?””

As opposed to other interfaith meetings in which the emphasis was on agreement, on mutual reassurance in the face of wars and other dramatic events, these young people were able to go beyond “a pleasant intercultural exchange” (Demorgon and Lipiansky 1999) and confront complex issues, succeeding in developing and comparing conflicting points of view. What is the relationship between Islam and politics? The response that many experts give reveals an essentialist vision of Islam, for which any political undertaking by Muslims—because they cannot “distinguish between public and private” and they have a “totalizing religious identity”—must be suspect and have as its secret agenda the “Islamization of the state.” The young woman from the GMI instead talks about democratic participation and a pluralism of values which guarantees the collaboration of all citizens for the “common good.” For her it is important that young Muslims be more active in the public sphere so that they can emancipate themselves from “how they are viewed,”

which is to say, as “foreigners.” Although she was born in Italy, she has been refused Italian national status, and her case is not isolated. Another member of the GMI adds that this is a status shared by “those who have been raised in Italy” (but born elsewhere). To not possess documents means, for example, having to undergo what seems like a ritual degradation: waiting for hours and hours in a queue outside Italian police stations (where residence permits are issued), amidst bureaucratic red tape and discretionary margins that have been denounced many times, even by Catholic associations.

Faced with this demand for citizenship, a young Jewish Italian showed his concern by saying that not all of the Muslims are like those present at the discussion: in his opinion, the checks are necessary in times marked by international terrorism and criminality by illegal immigrants. Speaking of his experience in a part of Turin where many immigrants live (Semi 2004), the young man asserted that the recent political choices that have been made in the name of “security” are legitimate. The point of view of the young woman from the GMI was that these problems might be better solved through more adequate social policies, especially those aimed at young people. The young man from the UGEI then proceeded to develop another conflictual point, reporting episodes of “anti-Semitism” perpetrated by young Muslims: Can what has happened in other countries also happen in Italy? According to a young member of the GMI, it is still possible to anticipate those types of slips: young Italian Muslims are the first generation in Italy, and the experiences of other countries can be useful. Again taking up the “strength” of the association (“we are Italian citizens”), a young woman from the GMI stated that the main challenge is cultural: it is necessary to understand that nowadays Italians no longer are only Catholics, but that there are also Italian citizens of Islamic faith. The final discussion with the young woman from the UGEI refers to the slower times of development in history: in Italy the Jews and Waldensians were not considered to be “citizens like others” for a long time. In order to obtain the same rights, they had to follow a path beset by obstacles. Not even someone like the young Jewish woman who considers herself autochthonous since “the beginnings of Rome” is protected from discussions that can exclude her and treat her as “foreign.”

As we have seen, there is a part of Italian society which continues to imagine Italy as a “monoreligious” country, but from below there are those who are trying to change this representation and demand citizenship in a secular, multicultural, and multireligious country. GMI members are Muslim democrats, and together with young Catholic and Jewish leaders they are challenging the strong resistance to change, not only from the outside but from the inside too. All of the youths from religious organizations who participated in the Albano Laziale meeting in fact declared that in their experience “intracommunity” dialogue is often more difficult than dialogue between “peers of different faiths” (that is to say, among youths from the ACLI, GMI, and UGEI). Moreover, they expected difficulties in “reporting to headquarters” the discussions that they had amongst each other. Let us

therefore consider the difficulties that GMI members are facing, above all with the previous generation and with adult Islamic associations.

Breaking Defensive Logics

Relations with institutions and the media have elicited lively debate both within the association and with other institutions representing Islam in Italy, particularly with the Union of Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy (UCOII). Young Muslims have, in fact, often met with opposition in the “control mechanisms which operate as guardians of the access to public space,” intended both as a space of representation and as a site of normative and institutional regulation (Amirault 2004, 125). But what can be done when faced with this censorship, with the “framework shifts” and the imposition of the “security framework”? GMI’s approach is to continue to act as active citizens, though one consequence of this approach is to face phases of deep crisis on the “home front.”

In January 2003 Interior Minister Giuseppe Pisanu publicly appealed to Muslims to make “a covenant with Muslim moderates,” declaring that “Italian Islam cannot be left to the mercy of its different souls” (*La Repubblica*, January 21, 2003). At first, GMI members tried to reframe Pisanu’s proposal in an interpretive framework in which Muslims are first of all “citizens.”

“We believe that the only way to accomplish a real “Italian Islam” is through the new concept of Islam and Italian Muslims as actual and complete citizens, although with a different faith ... We will be able to really say that Islam is well established when mosques are considered by all to be a part of the cultural legacy of towns and cities, as has already happened in other European countries. When Muslim citizens are subjects and not only objects of debate.” (*La Repubblica*, February 9, 2003).

In the same interview, the journalist obtained the following answer to the question of “who represents Italian Muslims”: “Parliament, beyond a doubt. For us ‘new citizens,’ the state and its institutions are the guarantors of our rights, of the rights of the community.” In a press release of May 24, 2003, in response to a new appeal by Pisanu, GMI members not only condemned violence but also declared that it is necessary to create “a society in which all can feel like citizens,” “based on equal rights and duties for all, in observance of individual freedoms and under the supreme guardianship of the Italian constitution.” In other words, GMI statements abandon the “security framework” and the “reactive” and “defensive” position of “Muslim moderates,” and instead take up a democratic perspective, demanding, along with an end to violence, an acknowledgment by the state of equality of rights and duties. But with what results?

Almost one year later, Pisanu once again talked about the representation of Italian Islam and, as always, he did so by using an interpretive framework of “safety” and “war against terrorism.” Members of the “Council of Moder-

ates,” said the minister, would not be elected, but would be chosen for their “reputation as moderates” (*Corriere della Sera*, February 13, 2004). GMI members were among the “chosen ones.” Some months later, as a consequence of the Beslan slaughter, GMI members signed a “manifesto for life and against terrorism” together with other “Muslim moderates” (*Corriere della Sera*, September 2, 2004).²⁵ His signing of this document is one of the reasons that led former GMI president Anouar to turn in his resignation on December 11, 2004.²⁶

To understand what was at stake, it is useful to refer to the national convention “Young Muslims and the New Europe” (in Chianciano Terme; December 27–29, 2004) by means of a brief ethnographic account. After three years of participant observation, during which I had followed the development of national conventions and the gradual acquisition of autonomy by the youth association, I noticed that there was a strong tendency towards lack of leadership in adult associations. The resignation of their president certainly brought confusion in the higher ranks of the GMI—so much so that up to the last moment the program for the three days had been suspended. For example, the program was supposed to include the participation of “professors external to the Islamic community” and the organization of workshops in order to provide the youths with more room for discussion. In the end there was no time for group work, and it was always the same persons who spoke from the stage (and from the audience): the vice president of the Association for Islamic Culture and Education (ACEI) and the president and vice president of the UCOII—that is to say, three fathers of sons and daughters who also were participating.

Conflict was “tamed” through continual official declarations of “fraternity”: not only between generations, but also among the youths themselves. Even when new elections were called, the candidates felt the need to make a communal public statement: “We are not competitors, we are brothers.” Afterwards they had pictures taken of them embracing each other. In the face of an event that the media had presented in dire tones (e.g., the daily newspaper *Libero* interpreted the resignation of GMI’s president as the result of “Islamist threats”), the young leaders chose an approach that seemed to me to be aimed at “playing down the tones” and reassuring the very young participants (as at the other conventions, the majority of participants were in the 15- to 16-year-old age group).

I consider the following to be the most salient moments of the convention:

(a) the speech by the ex-president on the reasons for his resignation and the

25 The text of the manifesto can be found at <http://www.stranieriinitalia.it>.

26 Here, too, a pseudonym is used, even though it is easy to identify him because of his popularity (e.g., through frequent appearances on television, especially on a popular evening talk-show). He is 21 years old, comes from Casablanca, and grew up in Reggio Emilia. He recently moved to Naples, where he is pursuing a degree in Arabic Studies at the university. He writes articles for local newspapers and is very active in volunteer work (and has been since high school).

new elections; (b) the showing of the film *East is East* and the ensuing debate on “Muslim families”; (c) the round table between various leaders of Italian Islamic associations and the difficult “intracommunity” dialogue.

GMI: One of the Many Paths for Young Muslims?

Anouar resigned after one year as president, retracing the steps taken by the youth association (“We began within the UCOII, and then we sought more autonomy and founded the GMI”). According to Anouar, crucial points were “the process of taking responsibility and reaching self-awareness” among youths who want to “feel like protagonists” and the ability to “give a voice to those who did not have one.” Anouar was embittered because he felt that he had undergone a “campaign of pure defamation” and that he had received little support from within the association. Moreover, he wanted to stress that being a citizen means engaging in criticism and participating actively in social life. This is exactly what he tried to do.

“We can never be full citizens if we are not aware of the fact that we are. Dialogue is not a strategy or a tactic for interaction. Believing in the values of pluralism, freedom, and democracy means living by them. It means we are within society and we participate. We communicate with the media not to be in the spotlight, but because we really believe that we are citizens.”

The implicit reference is to the “fathers” who still adopt defensive logics towards Italian society and who blame the youth of having gone “too far” for personal ambition. Anouar invited all participating youths to feel free to “see it differently,” reminding them that in Islam there are four different juridical schools and that internal divergence runs deep. Only then, he argued, is it possible to discuss the problems they are facing without fear of betraying someone. “If there can be no confrontation and comparison, only defamation is left ... Islamic Brotherhood? Yeah, right!” Anouar did not spare his peers from criticism either:

“I thought that our vision was to become a launching pad to become full citizens ... Our internal debate is fundamental. Otherwise, we will not have the strength to be autonomous and drive our decisions home ... I will continue my commitment, I will try to be a critical mind and to support the GMI in another manner ... as one of the many possible paths for young Muslims ... May Allah accept and bless our journey. I hope that the brothers I am referring to will not feel offended but will instead take my words as a starting point to reflect together.”

Anouar believes that one can be a “good Muslim” outside Islamic associations as well, and he views his participation in and contribution to the GMI in

this new light: he will try to contribute to the good of his brothers by means of cultural criticism.²⁷

Although Anouar's speech definitely was disturbing, nobody took up the issues he had presented in order to challenge him. Some members of the leadership were evidently moved, though it seemed the interpretation circulating among them was that it was a matter of Anouar's "personal problems." By calling new elections, the leadership did not explicitly face the issues that had been raised, but it did express generic gratitude for what the former president had done. The central issue of autonomy from adult associations returned in the speeches of the three candidates, but in effect the conflict was passed over in silence. All were just concerned to declare themselves "autonomous"—though in full respect of their parents.

But how is autonomy *practiced*? For example, one of the candidates (the son of the UCOII vice president) said that he wanted to invest more in religious training—which in recent years was quite limited, as the association was more occupied with external issues. He suggested that they ... follow ACEI directives. Another candidate raised the issue of funding the association and he sought help ... from the associations of the fathers. In other words, the presence of the previous generation made clear that independence has not yet been fully attained. The speeches of the youths also revealed a reluctance to pursue actual autonomy by creating the necessary conditions to practice it.

The election was won by a 21-year-old man of Tunisian origin who studies political science at Padova University. His slogan ("Strong with our principles, positive in our society") seems to have pleased many of the participating youths: it made a twofold claim (as Muslims and Italians) in continuity with the history of the association. Perhaps what helped the new president the most was the emphasis he placed on the participation of youths at the local and regional levels to re-establish from the ground up the priorities and activities of the GMI.

GMI: A Nonhostile Space to Express Oneself and Discuss Freely?

East is East is an ironic cinematic tale (Ferro 2005) about the intergenerational conflicts within a British Muslim family (the father originates from Pakistan). The showing was accompanied by strong opposition and criticism by those who saw the film as a provocation. According to them it was a "dirty film" containing obscenity and vulgarity. Others were instead interested in the story and tried to follow its thread despite the noise and chatter. With some difficulties, the showing was followed by an intense debate introduced in this way by the daughter of the UCOII's president: "Who among you feels that he is represented in this film?" Silence followed. "Nobody, so this film does not represent us. In the film there is a bad Muslim father and a good English

27 See his first book, *Salaam, Italia* (Reggio Emilia, Italy: Aliberti editore, 2005).

mother.” The UCOII’s vice president then added, “The Islamic family depicted in this film is the exception confirming the rule. Islamic pedagogy is the best. Next time you will choose a different film.”

Obviously, this “literal” reading of the film created an underlying misunderstanding (i.e., film = reality) and did not entertain them or make them laugh. This reaction was not, however, universal. A young man from a Moroccan family living in Perugia said that “these things happen every day” and that there was no reason to be shocked if it did not depict reality, because a movie inevitably conveys one point of view, that of the director. A young girl of Tunisian origin from Novara also spoke up for the film, explaining that “comedy always exaggerates things” but that it still can be useful to think about issues like mixed marriages, or the fact that the children in the film are *de facto* English but the father can hardly understand it—something that many young Italian Muslims can identify with. The opposing faction then stated that the film was “anti-Islamic” and that it was time to fight to change the image of Muslim families, telling stories in which “the best image of Islam” could emerge. Once again confounding film and reality, a woman from the Association of Muslim Women in Italy, who had some of her children in the room, added that “if the mother had been a Muslim there would not have been all those problems.” She later warned against “mixed marriages” and ended with a panegyric on “Muslim women.” A member of the leadership at this point tried to calm the situation by saying that the issues dealt with in the film were not “typically Islamic” but could just as easily apply to “a family of immigrants from Apulia in Germany.” He invited the audience to consider the GMI a “nonhostile space to express oneself and discuss freely.”

Clearly, showing and then discussing the film was an experiment in pluralism and democratic participation: a demanding exercise to try to break free from the apologetic “cages” of Islam which paralyze the thoughts of many Muslims, an attempt at (self-)criticism. It was possible to observe in action the issues raised by the resigning president. Of course, these challenges concern not only the GMI, as nowadays it seems particularly difficult for any Muslims to find a “nonhostile space to express oneself and discuss freely.” The considerable socioeconomic problems that many immigrant families face daily (Frisina 2005) and the prevailing interpretive frameworks of “security” and “culture” with respect to Islam surely do not help. As anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod (2002) has pointed out, in order to engage in self-criticism one needs time and tranquility. As long as the rhetoric on the “clash of the civilizations” and on “Muslim women in need of rescue” prevails, intracommunity debates and “transverse alliances” will be that much more difficult.²⁸

28 Discussions about the veil issue also suffer from this kind of approach, so much so that during the convention there were those who defined the veil as “the flag of Islam.” In this case it is not easy to discuss what it means, for instance, to be modest, because everything is interpreted through a framework of bearing witness against a society that stigmatizes Muslims. This is another example of how a

Towards a “Critical Brotherhood”

Of the association leaders invited by the GMI leadership, only Nour Dachan from the UCOII, Abu Soumaya from the ACEI, and Omar Camilletti from the great mosque in Rome (Islamic League) showed up. The latter supports the controversial “manifesto against terrorism” and was the first to speak up: “Let us not allow that only Islamophobics criticize us; let us do it ourselves, too. For example, let us not cover for the brothers who err, be it a matter of a violent father or a political issue.” He then invited the youths to study in order to “make of knowledge the distinguishing feature of Muslims” and to commit themselves to interreligious dialogue with Jews “because one must learn to distinguish between the Jews and the policies of Israel.” Dachan’s contribution was rather declamatory: “They thought we were done for, and instead here we are! Let us not compete amongst ourselves; we must cooperate together with the government ... Beware of journalists who sow discord! Long live the GMI, long live the UCOII!” The ACEI’s vice president also followed this defensive approach, taking a stance against the outside world and for a new alliance of Italian Muslims: “Those who do not hold Islam dear try to exhaust us ... We do not want youths who work only to make a show of themselves; we want youth who work for the good of all Muslims.”

The resigning president was in the room and, perhaps feeling that such speeches were in reference to him, intervened in the debate:

“The clash is not personal ... We are not within a family; we are talking about the activity of an association that is public and political! We all share respect for our parents and the value of a fraternal relationship, but we are members of civil society! We youths want the good of our society. Confrontation must not be private, for we must learn to answer for what we do in the society in which we live ... The media must not be demonized! We do not live in an Arab regime; we are citizens in a democratic state! ... And real pluralism requires rules and above all mutual acknowledgement [...]”

The young man was visibly tense and straining to measure the weight of every single word he spoke, but in exchange he got only a chilling response from the speakers on stage. The UCOII’s president refused to answer him, and Camilletti declared that he felt embarrassed and that he censored himself “out of respect for his senior brother from the UCOII,” thereby preferring to leave criticism for another time. What about his own encouragement to engage in criticism of and among Muslims just a few minutes earlier?

Observing the actions of the only “external” figure at the convention, Camilletti, the young participants perhaps have come to understand that “brotherhood” can lead to even a grown-up man being reluctant to openly express his dissent. “Intracommunity” dialogue was therefore merely hinted at. It was, however, the youths who felt a need for it, and the new GMI

defensive approach eventually paralyzes internal discussions and ends up legitimating a normative version of Islam.

president seems determined to follow this route towards a “critical brotherhood” in which there can be room for dissent and change.

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