“Family-Oriented Individualization” and Second Modernity

An Analysis of Transnational Marriages in Korea

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Abstract: This paper examines individualization from the perspective of transnational marriage as a concrete historical tendency in Korea today. Transnational marriage involves global risks, individualization and cosmopolitan change identified by Beck as three major driving forces of second modernity. The research questions asked in this paper include: First, how do global risks work as a driving force pushing the state and the individuals toward transnational marriage? Second, how has the process of transnational marriage taken place on both the institutional and the individual level? Third, what are the salient characteristics of the relationship between individual and family in transnational marriages? To sharpen analytic foci, conceptual distinctions have been made between the objective-structural and the cultural-discursive dimensions as well as between push and pull factors of the transformation. The central claim we have developed in this paper is double-front: on the one hand, individualization in Korea seen from transnational marriage tends to converge with the Western pattern insofar as we see this from an eye of push factors of global significance. On the other, due to the difference in pull factors particularly at the cultural-discursive level, individualization does not proceed in the way as found in the West, but it rather encompasses a delicate, culture-bound balance between individual and family community. The concept of ‘family-oriented individualization’ embraces the aspects of dynamic balance between individualization and reactivating community as a dual process of historical change in East Asia.

1. Introduction

This paper aims to reveal the East Asian pathway to second modernity by examining transnational marriage as a significant case of historical transformation today. Second modernity is here understood as complex processes of historical and structural change from ‘first-modern’ institutional configurations to ‘second-modern’ configurations by such overwhelming driving forces like global risks, individualization, and cosmopolitization (Beck 1992; Beck / Grande 2010; Beck / Beck-Gernsheim 2002). The impacts of this transformation are wide, deep, and penetrative. Second modernity manifests itself not only in the macro-historical transformations like transnational governance and market but also in micro-spheres of social relationships such as the family, according to Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002). In this context, this paper will study marriage and family life, particularly that of transnational marriage. Transnational marriage deserves our careful attention since it is closely related to global risks, individualization and cosmopolitization.

The major goal of this paper is to show that the Korean case of transnational marriage has taken a different pathway from the Western pattern in relationships between individual and family. The thesis that we want to present and defend is that there has risen “family-oriented individualization” in Korea. A good example can be found in the so called “wild goose families” (Lee / Koo 2006) as a Korean type of transnational families. These families express both individual dynamism and family solidarity to a great extent. Disillusioned by the quality of the domestic education system, husband and wife decide to send their children to foreign countries where opportunities for better education are available. This strategy of individualization means that parents would live geographically apart and one of them will live abroad with the children. In Korea most of these wild goose families involve fathers staying in Korea sending money and mothers and children living in another country for education. The father visits his family coming and going like a wild goose, hence the name. These Korean wild geese pursue indi-

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vidualized careers and competitiveness of the children in the global education based on the strong family ties across the borders. The high extent of individualization as a challenge to uncertainty is matched with strong family ties across the national boundaries, which is maintained despite long years of separation. This combination can hardly be conceivable in the West. Considering that wild goose families are made up of conventional marriage between people of the same nationality, we would like to show whether this will also hold for families of transnational marriages.

The major characteristics of family-oriented individualization in Asia are quite different from those offered by Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002: 96) when they referred to "a post-familial family", "patchwork families" or "elective family relationship", as the Western characteristics of individualization. Instead, a selective recombination of tradition and modernity to strengthen both individualization and affectionate community networks is a significant characteristic of the East Asian second modernity. We would like to present this finding based on empirical researches[1] to illustrate a non-Western pathway to second modernity.

2. Research Questions

We have chosen transnational marriage and family life as an object of analysis for the following reasons. First, it is a new phenomenon increasing sharply in Korea.[2] Transnational marriage represents a new form of marriage and family through which individualization is expressed clearly. Secondly, it is a global trend crossing national borders in a massive scale. Marriage and family belong to the most intimate human relationships in Korea as in many other countries. The conventional marriage has been presupposed to be made between people of the same nationality. We can ask, therefore, if the massive increase of transnational marriage signifies a meaningful social change towards second modernity.

In this context we will pursue the following three research questions: First of all, how do global risks work as a driving force pushing the states and individuals towards transnational marriage? Second, how has the process of transnational marriage taken place on both the institutional and the individual level? Third, what are the salient characteristics of the relationship between individual and family in transnational marriages?

Our analysis of transnational marriage in Korea has led us to raise a claim that the decisions of the female marriage migrants for transnational marriages signify *both* an individualizing *and* a family-oriented tendency. Their married lives indicate some radicalizing aspects of both individualized challenges to uncertainty and family ties across borders, creating a transnational field. We will call this kind of relationship individualization with affectionate community networks, which seems to be considerably different from what we find in the Western countries.

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1 The discussion of transnational marriage in this paper is based on Shim's previous research on this topic (Shim et al. 2007, 2008, 2010). Focus group interviews and in-depth interviews with Filipino and Vietnamese migrant women (2007), with Filipino, Vietnamese, and Mongolian migrant women (2008) and with Thai migrant women (2009 / 10), who have participated in the home visiting program for migrant women and their families, were conducted. More specifically, in 2007, focus group interviews with 16 (eleven Filipino and five Vietnamese) and in-depth interviews to four (three Filipino and one Vietnamese) migrant women were conducted. In 2008, focus group interviews to 19 (eight Filipino, four Vietnamese, and seven Mongolian) and in-depth interviews to ten (four Filipino, three Vietnamese, and three Mongolian) migrant women were conducted. From 2009 to 2010, focus group interviews with 24 and in-depth interviews with five Thai migrant women were conducted. The research was supported by the Korean Foundation for Women.

2 See section 5 of this paper.

3. Conceptual Clarification of Individualization

According to Beck, individualization indicates a categorical shift in relations between an individual and the society (Beck 1992: 127). Closely affiliated with various forms of collective welfare and security, individuals, when they face life-threatening risks as a consequence of a global risk regime, have almost no other option than being unleashed from all previous social bondages in industrial society, such as family, kinship, gender, and class; they by themselves become responsible for their survival. More specifically, Beck's original explanation of individualization shows the following three-dimensional process:

> *"[D]isembedding, removal from historically prescribed social forms and commitments in the sense of traditional contexts of dominance and support (the "liberating dimension"); the loss of traditional security with respect to practical knowledge, faith and guiding norms (the "disenchantment dimension"); and—here the meaning of the world is virtually turned into its opposite—re-embedding, a new type of social commitment (the "control" or "re-integration dimension")" (Beck 1992: 128; italics original).*

Fundamentally, we take this view to epitomize the Western experience of individualization within the cultural context of individualism and democracy. The term 'disenchantment' reminds us of a clear-cut break with the past aspired by Weber's concept of modern rationality. We think that the basic epistemological landscape in East Asia significantly differs from this model. However, we would like to start from this interesting observation by Beck. From there, we will attempt to redefine the conceptual framework of second-modern transformation by introducing two axes of distinction: the distinction between the 'objective-structural' and the 'cultural-discursive' dimensions, and the distinction between push and pull factors of transformation (Han / Shim 2010).

The two axes of distinction refer to the two deep-layers of reality with equally substantive consequences. The objective-structural layer is mostly, if not exclusively, about economic conditions upon which institutions are formed. The cultural-discursive layer is about the practical field of actions in which 'dispositive' and 'habitus' manifests itself.[3] The action-mediated expressions of collective anger, frustration, aspiration, and anticipation, and so on are deeply related to this layer. In addition to this, the second axis of distinction refers to the direction of energy flow in social change. If push factors are a force working behind individuals disconnecting them from previous institutional arrangements, pull factors provide forward-looking energy and meaning, inviting to proceed to an alternative development.

Beck and Beck-Gernsheim seem to have paid more attention to the objective-structural dimension although they refer to the problem of re-embedding. We propose here that the dynamic aspects of second-modern transformation in general, and individualization in particular, can be better grasped when we combine the axis of objective-structural and cultural-discursive conditions with the axis of push factors and pull factors. The outcome of this combination is as follows:

3 We hold the view that the cultural-discursive field of action is as material as the structural-objective field of the economy and, in this sense, we follow Foucault and Bourdieu. Furthermore, we assume that the pathways to historical transformation are greatly affected by the extent to which these two important layers with different function converge or diverge.

Table 1: Conceptual Framework of Individualization

	Objective-structural	Cultural-discursive
Push Factors	Global risks Dis-embedding	Breaking-away energy Survival uncertainty
Pull Factors	New Institutions Re-embedding	Forward-looking energy Justification

To clarify, the process of dis-embedding unfolds under the objective-structural conditions such as global risks which, as a push factor, unleash individuals from traditional and modern welfare arrangements. This objective-structural tendency gives rise to the collective experience of fear, anxiety, and disillusionment which originates from survival uncertainty. In other words, the cultural-discursive stream of disenchantment (Beck) works as a push factor. Re-embedding, in turn, can be made possible in reality when a new institutional arrangement is formulated and backed up by public policies and laws. For our discussion, this means the emergence of transnational marriage as a new institution. Yet the process of re-embedding cannot stop here since it requires a forward-looking perspective or motivational support from cultures, ideologies, and collective aspiration. Otherwise, the process of re-embedding may face serious misunderstanding, conflict and tension. Therefore, we want to argue that individualization can move well only when the culture-based pull factors operate reasonably well leading individuals to accepting and, if needed, justifying a new institution offered, that is, transnational marriage in our case.

Seen from this conceptual framework, re-embedding is as crucially important as dis-embedding for individualization. We see no problem with the issue of dis-embedding since it is exactly what is going on almost everywhere in the global risk regime today. The analyses of Japan (Suzuki et al. 2010), China (Yan 2010), and Korea (Chang / Song 2010) clearly demonstrate this. We have no intent to dispute about it. However, we perceive that this is only a half of the story to be investigated. What remains to be seen is where and how re-embedding is proceeding, and with what kinds of consequences.

4. Transnational Marriage and Second Modernity

Whether transnational marriage represents an example of second modernity can be examined by considering two aspects: mobility and family formation. First, with regard to mobility, it is necessary to study differences between old and new migrations. While migration in the old days was a one-time deal moving from the periphery to the center, in these days, it involves continuous movement between two countries, keeping the international network alive (Beck-Gernsheim 2008; Levitt et al. 2007). The current type of migration represents one of the most distinguished characteristics of second-modern transformation: a blur of national boundaries.[4]

Second, with regard to family formation, the Western experience allows us to distinguish between family in the first modernity and that in the second modernity (Shim 2010 b). The former would take the form of a nuclear family: 1) based on romantic love, 2) characterized by sexual division of labor and gender inequality in the family, and assuming 3) heterosexual relationship, and 4) people from the same nation. The latter, on the other hand, would take

4 Migration for work can also be considered as representing the characteristics of second modernity. However, in this paper I focus on marriage migration. The reasons are as follows: migrant workers can stay in the receiving country, particularly in Korea, for a limited time, and there are more men who move for migration for work; however, marriage migrants can stay as long as they want, and they do not come for labor but for marriage.

diversified forms of family: 1) based on confluent love, 2) characterized by gender equality, and neither assuming 3) heterosexual relationship only, nor 4) people from the same nation (Giddens 1992). Thus the family in the second modernity may be characterized by "marriage and divorce chains", "conjugal succession", "multi-parent families", "patchwork families", and "elective family relationship" (Beck / Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 96). It is a change from "living for others" to "a life of one's own" (Beck / Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 54).

In the West, institutionalized individualization seems to have been well supported by the cultural-discursive pulling energy such as individualism. Thus all conditions of individualization in Table 1 can be said to be present. However, in the cases where such pulling energy is lacking, it is an open question whether individualization can move in the way the West has taken. The so-called "individualization without individualism" in East Asia (Chang / Song 2010; Suzuki et al. 2010; Yan 2010) implies that the process can proceed, but in a significantly different form from that of the West. We need to be cautious of the danger of over-stretching the concept. Simply put, we need to ask whether it would be enough to explain the change in East Asia by a context-free umbrella concept of individualization alone.

We would like to present the experience of the transnational marriage in Korea from this point-of-view. The Korean case illustrates that individualization, concerning transnational marriage, remains deeply embedded in reactivating family networks, not simply in a traditional way, but quite innovatively. We call this tendency a sort of 'family-oriented individualization'.

5. Trends of Transnational Marriages in Korea

First, we want to show an overall trend of change in Korea. The number of transnational marriages began to increase in the 1990 s and has taken a great leap around 2003. The proportion of international marriages was only 1.2 % in 1990, but it reached 13.6 % in 2005, and 11.0 % in 2008 (Table 2) (Shim 2008).

Table 2: International Marriages, Numbers and Percent 1990-2008

year	total marriages	international marriages		foreign wives	
	number	number	%	number	%
1990	399,312	4,710	1.2	619	13.1
1991	416,872	5,012	1.2	663	13.2
1992	419,774	5,534	1.3	2,057	37.2
1993	402,593	6,545	1.6	3,109	47.5
1994	393,121	6,616	1.7	3,072	46.4
1995	398,484	13,494	3.4	10,365	76.8
1996	434,911	15,946	3.7	12,647	79.3
1997	388,591	12,448	3.2	9,266	74.2
1998	375,616	12,188	3.2	8,054	66.1
1999	362,673	10,570	2.9	5,775	54.6
2000	334,030	12,319	3.7	7,304	57.1
2001	320,063	15,234	4.8	10,006	62.9
2002	306,573	15,913	5.2	11,017	74.9
2003	304,932	25,658	8.4	19,214	75.1
2004	310,944	35,447	11.4	25,594	72.2
2005	316,375	43,121	13.6	31,180	72.3
2006	332,752	39,690	11.9	30,208	76.1

year	total marriages	international marriages		foreign wives	
	number	number	%	number	%
2007	345,592	38,491	11.1	29,140	75.7
2008	327,715	36,204	11.0	28,163	77.8

Source: National Statistical Office (2009)

Particularly, marriages between Korean men and foreign women have rapidly increased. In the early 1990 s, most international marriages were sealed between Korean women and foreign men (Table 2). Nonetheless, since the mid-1990 s, international marriages between Korean men and foreign wives were 46 % of all the international marriages in 1994; increased to 77 % in 1995, decreased during 1998 – 2000, and increased again since then.

Also the nationality of foreign wives is getting more diverse (Table 3). Due to the increased number of bachelors in rural areas who cannot find their spouses in Korea, marriage of such men has become a serious social problem. Thus local governments, religious groups, and marriage brokerage agencies have begun to arrange international marriages.

Table 3: International Marriages by Nationality of the Foreign Wives 1990-2008

nationality	2001		2002		2003		2004		2005		2006		2007		2008	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Japan	976	9.8	959	8.7	1,242	6.5	1,224	4.8	1,255	4.0	1,484	4.9	1,665	5.7	1,162	4.1
China	7,001	70.0	7,041	63.9	13,373	69.6	18,527	72.4	20,635	66.2	14,608	48.4	14,526	49.8	13,203	46.9
USA	265	2.6	267	2.4	323	1.7	344	1.3	285	0.9	334	1.1	377	1.3	344	1.2
Philippines	510	5.1	850	7.7	944	4.9	964	3.8	997	3.2	1,157	3.8	1,531	5.3	1,857	6.6
Vietnam	134	1.3	476	4.3	1,403	7.3	2,462	9.6	5,822	18.7	10,131	33.5	6,611	22.7	8,282	29.4
Thailand	185	1.8	330	3.0	346	1.8	326	1.3	270	0.9	273	0.9	531	1.8	633	2.2
Russia	157	1.6	241	2.2	297	1.5	318	1.2	236	0.8	206	0.7	156	0.5	110	0.2
Mongol	118	1.2	195	1.8	318	1.7	504	2.0	561	1.8	594	2.0	745	2.6	521	1.8
others	660	6.6	658	6.0	968	5.0	925	3.6	1,119	3.6	1,421	4.7	2.998	10.3	2,051	7.6
total	10,006	100.0	11,017	100.00	19,214	100.0	25,594	100.0	31,180	100.0	30,208	100.0	29,140	100.0	28,163	100.0

Source: National Statistical Office (2009)

In the 1990 s, most of the foreign brides came from the Yanbian area in China. This is mostly because they share the same ancestors with Koreans and are familiar with the language. Some local governments made an effort to match-make the bachelors through agreements with the Chinese local government or civilians (Lee 2005; Han 2007). The proportion of Chinese wives has been the highest, even though it has decreased recently: 70 % in 2001, 66.2 % in 2005, and 45.9 % in 2008. Also during this period, international marriages between Korean men and Filipino women increased through the promotion by the Unification Church; yet, it is also decreasing in proportion, from 7.9 % in 2002 to 6.6 % in 2008. This decline has something to do with the diversification of the nationality of foreign wives. Since 2000, the nationality of foreign wives has become more diverse and expanded to Vietnam, Thailand, Mongol, Uzbekistan, etc. The rise in the number of Vietnamese wives has occurred in the context of this diversification trend. The proportion of Vietnamese wives was only 1.3 % in 2001, but it has increased to 9.6 % in 2004, 18.7 % in 2005, and 29.4 % in 2008. This is the second highest figure next to Chinese wives (46.9 %).

6. Driving Forces of Transnational Marriages

6.1 Complex Risks as Objective Push Factor

The inclination towards transnational marriage with the present magnitude has emerged as unintended consequences of rapid and uneven development. It is thus crucial to examine why and where major risks have emerged affecting the family and how these risks are working as driving force of transnational marriage in Korea.

Korea is widely known for its successful economic growth through a state-driven, export-oriented industrialization supported by development dictatorship. With the strategy described as a "rush-to modernization" (Han 1995, 1998; Shim 1988, 1992, 1998; Han / Shim 2010), Korea has achieved record-high economic growth in the succeeding decades.[5] This development was followed by rapid urbanization; such is proved by the urban population, which was only about 18.3 % of the population in 1950 and increased to 80 % in 1990.[6] With this remarkable achievement, Korea has become one of the destination countries people of the region want to migrate to.

Originating from this pattern of development, four types of risks can be identified as push factors affecting family life, particularly in the rural area. First of all, due to severely uneven development between urban and rural areas, the rural standard of living has become lower than that of the city, and this tendency has become further aggravated. The price of grain products has been kept low to help urban workers to survive with low wages. The monetary value of rural land as assets has decreased. Moreover, the rural area is lagged far behind the city in terms of infrastructures and public services such as education, health, vocational training, and cultural activities. Thus peasants and rural residents are caught with a higher degree of poverty and deprivation.

Second, the Korean pattern of development has initiated heavy concentration of labor forces in cities, especially big cities. This is particularly true for young women. They leave for the

5 During the 1960 s and 1970 s the light industry sectors for export such as the textile, garment, and shoe industries increased and developed rapidly, whereas in the 1980 s the heavy and chemical industry sectors such as electronics, automobile, petroleum, etc. began to increase remarkably (Shim 1988, 1992). Thus, the Korean economy has continued to expand for the past 30 years, achieving its place as the eleventh largest economy in the world with a GDP of 540 billion dollars in 2002. The per capita GNP of Korea in 2008 is 19,751 US Dollars according to International Monetary Fund (IMF).

6 The urbanization rate was 18.3 % in 1950, 35.8 % in 1960, 49.8 % in 1970, 66.7 % in 1980, 79.6 % in 1990 and 86.2 % in 2001.

cities because there are more opportunities; cities need increasingly more labor force. They could get employment in factories of the light industry and in service sectors. They were welcome because they were docile, and they provided high-quality labor for cheap wages for the industries. Actually they were the ones who supported the export-oriented industrialization in Korea (Shim 1988, 1992). Also the sexual division of labor in the cities was less severe than that in the rural area, allowing more freedom.[7]

Embedded in this trend, thirdly, high-consequential risks began to manifest themselves in the unequal sex ratio[8] in the rural areas. The sex ratio of the marriageable population by age in 2000 for the country was 100.87 for the 25-30 age group, and 102.13 for the 30-34 age group. For the rural area called the *myeon* (village), however, it was 130.72 for the 25-30 age group, and 117.60 for the 30-34 age group in the same year. This clearly demonstrates the extreme inequality in sex ratio. If we look at the statistics more closely, we can notice that since the 1980 s, rural bachelors had difficulty in getting married (Seol et al. 2005: 31). This uneven sex ratio has led to the distortion of the marriage market. The emerging risk affecting

7 In urban areas as the main site of industrialization, the family has been one of the backbone institutions which supported the production and reproduction of the laborers. With the workplace and the family separated, the wife has taken care of the family. With sexual division of labor and patriarchy still firm in the family, the domestic work was for wives. Women in the family had to handle all the family affairs, from taking care of the husband, children, and the in-laws, to taking care of the household economy and all the household chores (Shim 2000 a, 2000 b; Chang and Song 2010). However, for the single young girls, the sexual division of labor was less severe.

8 Table 3: Sex ratio of the marriageable population by age and urban/rural residence 1960-2000

age	Year	whole country	Urban	Rural	
age	year	whole country	urban	eup (town)	myeon (village)
20-24	1960	106.50	100.49	101.63	110.23
20-24	1970	106.06	92.81	104.93	125.80
20-24	1980	104.12	89.49	109.72	151.61
20-24	1990	109.15	96.55	124.37	187.70
20-24	2000	111.44	105.84	122.66	161.82
25-29	1960	92.00	83.10	87.46	97.31
25-29	1970	99.04	99.63	93.04	99.57
25-29	1980	99.98	98.00	97.87	108.05
25-29	1990	99.46	96.49	99.23	123.15
25-29	2000	100.87	98.46	98.61	130.72
30-34	1960	87.68	85.96	85.12	89.05
30-34	1970	102.25	109.05	100.82	95.70
30-34	1980	105.53	105.79	106.15	104.44
30-34	1990	103.77	102.70	107.09	109.43
30-34	2000	102.13	100.61	102.80	117.60
35-39	1960	94.29	99.54	93.50	91.72
35-39	1970	97.44	103.77	98.59	91.86
35-39	1980	102.83	107.34	103.66	92.40
35-39	1990	106.13	105.72	111.55	105.60
35-39	2000	102.32	100.16	112.65	114.21

Note: sex ratio is ratio of male population against 100 women population.
Source: National Statistical Office, Population and Housing Survey, http://kosis.nso.go.kr (quoted in Seol et al. 2004)

the rural family is, therefore, not only about the poor living condition but also about the most basic function of reproduction or family formation itself.

Lastly, another aspect of risks can be seen in the distortion of marriage market in the context of the decrease in marriage rate, increase of divorce rate, decrease in birth rate, and change of attitude towards marriage. While the crude marriage rate fell from 10.6 in 1980, to 9.3 in 1990, 7.0 in 2000 and 6.5 in 2005, the divorce rate rose from 0.6 in 1980 to 1.1 in 1990, 2.5 in 2000, and 2.6 in 2005. The ratio of divorce to marriage also increased from 5.9 in 1980, to 11.4 in 1990, 35.9 in 2000, and 40.6 in 2005. The birth rate dropped, the total fertility rate dropping from 4.53 in 1970 to 2.83 in 1980, 1.59 in 1990, 1.30 in 2000, and 1.08 in 2005. The proportion of Korean women who think that they should get married reduced significantly from 30.5 % in 1998 to 21.9 % in 2002, and 21.6 % in 2006 (KWDI 2007). This unequal sex ratio together with the distortion of the marriage market, produced many rural bachelors who could not find their spouses in Korea.

On the part of foreign women who seek transnational marriages, they are those suffering from poverty and unemployment in underdeveloped countries. The Northeastern Provinces of China, particularly the Yanbian areas, where most of the Korean Chinese brides come from, are not only rural areas but also some of the most remote regions of the country. Thus the discrepancy in development from the urban areas is big, and many suffer from poverty. The Philippines and Vietnam, where the proportion of the brides is the highest except China, show a low per capita GNP, 1,625$ and 818$ in 2008 respectively according to the IMF report. They migrate to relatively better-off countries in order to overcome the crisis (Kim 2006) or to realize the dream of better living conditions.

With these analyses it can be shown why and how rural bachelors in Korea became unleashed from the traditional marriage market and had to turn to the unfamiliar form of transnational marriage to get out of the risk of becoming unmarriageable. The weak position they hold in the marriage market is a consequence of an uneven, urban-centered, and rush-to strategy of development. Those people who could not find their spouses in the domestic marriage market have no choice but to turn to international marriage.

Likewise, it is also quite clear why and how young women whose families suffer from aggravating economic difficulties in Asia became pushed to leave their home countries for transnational marriage to get out of the trap of poverty. As a global risk, poverty operates as a push factor of transnational marriage especially for those young women.

6.2 Cultural Push Factors

This said, we would like to examine how push factors work at the cultural-discursive dimension of transnational marriage. Beck pays attention to disenchantment linked to the survival game. In the case of Korea, we find that the cultural tradition of patriarchy yields a particular anxiety which can be considered as an important push factor. The old patriarchal tradition of preferring sons to daughters is particularly strong in the rural area. In the patri-lineal system, only sons can succeed the family, not the daughter.[9] Once a daughter gets married, she used not to be considered as a member of the family anymore, but as a member of her husband's family. If a family has no son, they try to adopt a son, because they worry that the family line may be "cut off". Also, in the situation where no welfare state system is established, the son is the only one to rely on. The preference of sons has been extremely strong.

9 The head of the family system, in which legally only sons could be the head of the family, was abolished only in 2005.

However, young women do not like such rural bachelors. The rapid industrialization and urbanization had impact on them. The change of attitude of young women toward marriage and family is also a factor. The unchanged gender inequality made women with high education and gender equality in mind[10] fall in conflict (Shim 1998, 2000 a,b). Although many of rural bachelors left for cities, the eldest sons could not since they were considered as the successor of the family according to the patriarchal system. They were supposed to succeed the home enterprise which is mostly agriculture, and support their parents. This situation has created unbearable tension and anxiety; and this poses a problem hardly possible to be resolved along the traditional way of marriage. In this context, the parents and families of rural bachelors encouraged them to get married with foreign wives to succeed the family lineage, for example (Shim et al. 2007, 2008, 2010).[11] Thus the barriers to transnational marriage were removed while the door to transnational marriages was opened. In other words, unmarriageable rural bachelors were freed from the taken-for-granted institutions of marriage and family.

7. Second-Modern Transformation

So far we have examined the impacts of push factor on the structural-objective and the cultural-discursive dimensions of transnational marriage. We now proceed to pay attention to pull factor in the same way. As the issues of "unmarriageable rural bachelors" have begun to draw public attention as a social problem in Korea, the local government has tried to promote international marriage to resolve the lack of brides by recruiting women from abroad. Also the Korean government has legislated laws to respond to these "risks". Besides, the governments of the sending countries also have used policies encouraging the export of women labor including international marriage. These government policies have given rise to the increase of international marriage brokerage agencies. Also various media and cultural factors pull individuals to transnational marriages.

7.1 Emergence of New Institutions

The most important pull factor is a new institution of transnational marriage. Above all, the Korean government has legislated and/or revised the migration-related laws to support the marriage migrants to stay, work, and live in Korea (Shim 2010 a). At first it allowed women marriage migrants who get married with a Korean to acquire the nationality as soon as they get married. However, in 1997 the Nationality Act was revised so that a marriage migrant who gets married with a Korean can get a Korean nationality after two years' residence after the marriage and with the permission of naturalization by the Minister of Justice (Shim 2010 a).[12] The Immigration Control Act was also revised. Thus a marriage migrant who gets married with a Korean is issued with a "national's spouse" visa (F-2-1) and usually given one year of stay. Those who have this visa can get employment freely for all kinds of jobs regardless of professional or non-professional jobs with the "Stay and Activity besides Permit" from the

10 Women's education level has been heightened. And women's socio-economic participation rate also improved. Women's economic activity participation rate was 26.8 % in 1960, 36.5 % in 1970, 42.8 % in 1980, 47.0 % in 1990, 49.5 % in 1997, 47.0 % in 1998 (economic crisis period), 48.5 % in 2000, 48.9 % in 2005 (KWDI 2007). With this women's consciousness was also raised. Also many women-related laws were legislated to improve gender equality in Korea.

11 According to focus group interviews Shim conducted, it turned out that in many cases of transnational marriages, it was the parents who are more eager towards the transnational marriages.

12 Many Korean Chinese women wanted to migrate to Korea. However, labor migration is very difficult and many choose marriage migration. In the late 1990 s some of the Korean Chinese brides disappeared as soon as they got married and got the citizenship, and they were blamed for sham marriages. This means that they got married for another reason. Since Korean Chinese can speak Korean well, they can get jobs easily in services sectors. Thus the law was revised.

Ministry of Justice. When the period is over, marriage migrants should go to the district immigration office of the residence with the spouse, and have to apply for an extension of the stay (Seol et al. 2005: 34). Also marriage migrants who are not yet naturalized could become a beneficiary of the four insurances, i.e., national pension plan, national health insurance, unemployment insurance, and industrial accident insurance. The conditions are different according to which country they are from (Seol et al. 2005: 39).

The Korean government also established a Committee for Comprehensive Policy for Multicultural Family in 2005, and further legislated and revised related laws. The Basic Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea and the Multicultural Family Support Act were legislated in 2007 and 2008 respectively, and with that many multicultural families support centers were established. Also the Act on the Regulation of Marriage Brokerage was legislated in 2007, and the Government Instruction on Social Integration Program is operated (Shim 2010 a).

At the background of this change of the government policy, we find not only the issue of "unmarriageable rural bachelors" but also the problems of ageing society and low fertility. With rapid ageing of the population, Korean society has entered the phase of "ageing society" with people over 65 years old making up more than 7 % of population, and is approaching the "aged society" with people over 65 years old making up more than 14 % of population. The proportion of the breadwinners will decrease and that of those dependent will increase. The resulting decrease of the labor force is as serious a risk for a country as the decreasing fertility rate. The total fertility rate has dropped from 4.5 persons (1970) to 1.08 persons (2005). Korea shows not only the lowest, but also fastest decreasing fertility rate in the world recently. Thus the crisis of low fertility also has become a social issue. In this situation, transnational marriage has turned out to be an alternative which can solve not only the problem of "unmarriageable rural bachelors" but also the problem of low fertility.

The governments of many sending countries, in turn, have actively encouraged employment in other countries in order to reduce the foreign debts. In the Philippines, for example, they have a government institute called the Committee of Filipinos Overseas (CFO). Their role is to mobilize, educate and send out labor force. Actually the remittance of the foreign labor force sent to the Philippines was 14 billion dollars in 2006 which amount to 60 % of the foreign exchange reserves (Shim et al. 2007). Thus the CFO assumes the attitude of an onlooker or encourager towards the marriage migration of their women. The sending of migrant workers and marriage migrants is considered an important source of acquiring foreign money.

Thus, worse-off Asian women are filling the empty places of reproduction and caring work of Korean women in the rural areas, revealing the unequal development in the global capitalist system and the international sexual division of labor. The development gap between the developed and underdeveloped countries is getting wider; the marriage migration of the women of the underdeveloped countries can be understood in this context (Kim 2006; Lee 2004). In the poverty-ridden and unemployment-ridden society, women migrate to better-off countries through marriage in order to improve their and their families' economic situation. They are under the influence of the phenomena of globalization, migration, and gender.

The government policies friendly to transnational marriage provide a good environment for international marriage brokerage agencies which introduce the brides and bridegrooms, and carry out documents processing for them. Many international marriage migrations are realized through the intervention of such agencies. Until 1998, they were regulated by the Family Rite Act. However, it was abolished in 1998 and a new Family Rite Act was enacted in 1999. This means that such agencies have become a free business without any sanction until 2007 (Seol

2008). As a result, the number of such agencies has increased as well as the proportion of international marriages.[13]

7.2 Cultural Factors Pulling Individuals

Unleashed from the previous form of marriage, and pulled by the new institutions, where do women marriage migrants and unmarriageable bachelors get motivational support to join this new way of life? Our research reveals more difficulties on this issue than when we deal with the one of cultural push factors. We would like to suggest two kinds of cultural pulling factors.

One pull factor for the unmarriageable bachelors comes from their commitment to filial piety as one of the most important Confucian ethics in Korea and in East Asia as well. Filial piety represents a long-cherished habit of mind particularly in the rural area where the first son lives with his parents bound by affectionate feelings and emotions. The moral commitment and dedication to filial piety is still very high in the rural area. It is regarded shameful if one fails to do so. Given the lack of available spouses of the same nationality, transnational marriage offers a solution in this context; marriage migrant women share the similar cultural ethos of respecting parents. In other words, transnational marriage is not simply forced to take place by push factors but can be seen as a meaningful option from a forward-looking perspective as it makes it possible for the unmarriageable first sons to perform the important role of filial piety.

Inside this traditional aspect, there also are some individualizing aspects. That is, they receive not only the opportunity to get married, to get out of the status of "bachelors", but the one to get married with young and exotic foreign women. Transnational marriage involves greater uncertainty than the traditional one. For this reason, it involves individualizing challenges. For instance, they will have to learn about the cultures of spouse countries. Though they could have power over the foreign wives thanks to their payment for the marriage, they will have to learn how to combine different cultures in a more flexible way than in the past. These can be considered some individualizing and innovative aspects of transnational marriage.

For women marriage migrants, the situation is not so different. In some Asian countries they have a bilateral family structure, rather than patri-linear structure (Parrenas 2001; Yoon 2004). Thus the responsibility for the family is equally distributed for sons and daughters. This seems to be so, for example, in the Philippines and Thailand. Filipino women have family responsibility to support the family and when they choose migration, they seem to take this into consideration. Since marriage migration is easier and less costly than labor migration, many young women of the lower strata in the worse-off countries seek transnational marriages. And it turns out that, after the migration, many women marriage migrants try to and manage to send money to their home families (Shim et al. 2007, 2008, 2010; Shim 2008, 2009).

In addition to the responsibility for the family, they also show individualizing aspects. Leaving the family for a foreign country where she does not know the language, culture and people for marriage, is certainly a risky adventure, especially for young women. The fact that they take this course already means that they differ significantly from those who just follow the taken-for-granted course of marriage. They actively pursue individualizing choices while taking their role of responsibility for the family.

13 Some brokerage agencies use illegal means such as providing false information, forging documents, bribing the officials, etc. (Seol et al. 2005). This is so because international marriage brokerage is a highly profitable business. Many get married through marriage brokerage agencies and they have to pay big money for the arrangement. Thus later in 2007, the brokerage agencies working for profits underwent changes towards more regulation (Shim 2010 a).

Furthermore, there are a few who get married through dating and romantic relationships. They decide to get married even against the opposition of their families (Shim et al. 2007, 2008, 2010). Though most of the women marriage migrants get married through arrangements of international marriage brokerage agencies or religious groups such as the Unification Church, some of them claim that they are married because they fell in love with Korean bachelors in the first introduction meeting. Thus even in arranged marriages, they seek for some element of romantic love for marriage. This can also be regarded as individualizing characteristics.

Another pull factor is related to the role of the mass media. The media is full of programs on tourism in foreign countries. More people from all over the world are following the trend, since, according to Arjun Appadurai, the media and the networks of migration allow for more information and thus for more "social imagination" about "possible other lives" at home and elsewhere (Appadurai 2005: 3pp). Particularly the attitude of the media and many local governments, corporations, and non-government organizations in Korea are exceptionally hospitable to women marriage migrants. The media competitively produce programs with internationally married, multi-ethnic families, calling them "daughters-in-law" of Korea taking good care of the parents-in-law.[14] Many local governments and civil societys join the race in making home visiting programs for internationally married families. This is probably because they are the ones who save the Korean society from the crisis of low birth. Thus the rural bachelors and their families are pulled to transnational marriages. And Koreans' not so favorable attitude toward international marriage, especially that of the rural families, is changing toward "being in favor, even though not so desirable" (Seol et al. 2005: 32).

For women marriage migrants, Korean television dramas and music also play an important role. Many Korean television dramas are popular in Northeastern regions of China, and other Asian regions, such as Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines. The dramas show the life styles of the affluent Korean middle class and the romantic love between a handsome young man and beautiful young woman. This has brought about so-called "Korean waves," which pull them out for marriage migration to Korea (Shim et al. 2007, 2008, 2010).

8. Balancing Between the Individual and the Family

In order to discuss the characteristics of transnational marriage, it would be helpful to consider the options which may be possible to the rural bachelors in Korea. Given the lack of available spouses of the same nationality, the unmarriageable rural bachelor has three options in principle. One is not to get married but to remain as a bachelor. The second is to migrate to a city, get married to a Korean woman and return to the rural area. The third is to get married to a foreign woman.

The first is the closest to the Western model of individualization. To get married or not is an individual choice. If significant others respect the individual right of self-determination, the likely course is individualization as we find in the West. However, in rural Korea, this is implausible since the parents and other significant others would not allow it. The second option is closer to a traditional way of living. It may involve preparation of migration, employment and living in cities, which might take several years. In addition, most of the urban women, better educated and with an idea of gender equality, do not want to get married to a rural bachelor. Yet this option is available. Thirdly, marrying a foreign woman is something in between the first and second option, involving both individualizing aspect and family-orien-

14 One of the representative television programs, for example, includes "Love in Asia" on the Korean Broadcasting Service.

tation. It is also feasible since the rural bachelor has enough money for transnational marriage, and there are many foreign women willing to marry Korean men.

We would like to present two aspects of "familial individual" as an outcome of transnational marriage in Korea. Familial individual can be observed in the local as well as transnational fields.

According to studies on the adaptation process of women marriage migrants (Shim et al. 2007, 2008, 2010; Shim 2008, 2009) women migrants with arranged marriages undergo a very one-sided adaptation process at first. Many of them live in the rural areas with in-laws in a patriarchal atmosphere. Sexual division of labor in the family is very rigid. Living together with the in-laws means not just more domestic labor, but also more emotional labor, which most Korean wives would not want to do. Nonetheless, these marriage migrants have no other choice. Most women migrants try hard to learn the Korean language, to cook and eat Korean food, and to adapt to the family relation, particularly with the in-laws (Shim et al. 2007, 2008, 2010; Shim 2008, 2009; Yoon 2004; Han 2006). They try hard, put up with, tolerate, and endure the cold treatment, disregard, discrimination, etc. Of course, it gets better when time passes by and the husband and in-laws recognize and trust them and or when a child is born (Shim et al. 2007, 2008, 2010; Shim 2008, 2009; Yoon 2004). On the other hand, there are some marriage migrants who get divorced[15] or run away with the help of NGOs of human rights discourse. But such are not common cases; most of them stay and do their best. Why?

The answer to this question is that the women marriage migrants do not seem to forget why they have come to Korea. They are in Korea for better economic conditions, happiness, and wellbeing of the family back home. They consider that their happiness is the happiness of the family back home. Thus they are willing to endure anything for that. They try their best to get the recognition and trust of the husband and the in-laws, enduring the gender inequality and sexual division of labor and conflict with the in-laws (Shim et al. 2007, 2008, 2010; Shim 2008, 2009).

Women marriage migrants are individualistic in the sense that they pursue their own course even taking the risk of being separated from their family, as a determined challenge to the survival uncertainty her family face. On the other hand, they are also very family-oriented. "Individualistic" because they came all the way from their home despite the various anticipated difficulties. "Familial" because they came for better living conditions of the family, and, with family responsibility, do their best for their new family and endure the difficulties for their families in the home country.

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15 As marriage with foreigners is increasing, divorce from a foreign spouse is also increasing. As shown in the following table. Divorce from foreign spouses increased from 1,866 in 2002 to 6,280 cases in 2006, 11,255 cases in 2008 showing a sharp increase recently. Divorce from foreign wives increased from 401 in 2002 to 4,010 cases in 2006, 7,962 cases in 2008, which is higher than divorce from foreign husbands. Divorce from foreign husbands increased from 1,465 in 2002 to 2,270 cases in 2006, 3,293 cases in 2008 showing a less sharp increase. And the proportion of divorce from foreign spouses among all divorces increased every year and reached 5.0 % in 2006, and 9.7 % in 2008.
If we compare the divorce rate per 100 marriages, the divorce-to-marriage ratio of transnational families with foreign spouses is still low, showing changes from 11.7 in 2002, 8.4 in 2003, 9.6 in 2004, 9.9 in 2005, and 15.8 in 2006, 22.5 in 2007, and 31.1 in 2008, showing a sharp increase in recent years. If we focus on the transnational marriages with foreign wives, the divorce-to-marriage ratio is lower, showing changes from 3.6 in 2002, 3.0 in 2003, 6.4 in 2004, 7.8 in 2005, 13.3 in 2006, and 19.6 in 2007, and 28.3 in 2008. Compared with the divorce-to-marriage ratio of total marriages, which is 47.4 in 2002, 54.8 in 2003, 44.8 in 2004, 40.6 in 2005, 37.6 in 2006, 35.9 in 2007 and 35.6 in 2008, this is still low, even though showing a decrease in gap recently (http://www.kosis.kr).
This can be interpreted in two ways. One is that foreign wives are adapting well, and the other is that they endure to live in the difficult environment, because they have no other choices.

When we move to the 'transnational field' created by a series of movements between the old country and a new one, we come to realize that it involves networks of a social, political, economic and cultural kind (Beck-Gernsheim 2008; Levitt et al. 2007). More specifically, the economic field includes such activities as remittance to the home family; social field includes such activities as invitation of families from the home country and home visiting; and cultural field includes transculturation or migration mélange (Levitt et al. 2007).

As emphasized above, most of the women marriage migrants decide to migrate due to economic factors for better living conditions, for more opportunities, and to help the family in the home country. Thus their experience of the transnational field starts with economic support. As to the content, most of it takes the form of sending money or goods such as clothes, medicine, and others (Shim 2009).[16] They also engage in the social field which includes the interchange of the family and kin such as invitation of families from the home country and home visiting. This occurs mostly after child-birth: women migrants invite home family members for recuperation. Child-birth is an important moment for the women migrants and their families; they get trust from their husband, and their lives in Korea get stabilized (Shim et al. 2007, 2008, 2010; Shim 2008, 2009). Through this social interchange, both the husbands and the families from the home country could experience the society and culture of the other country.[17] Home visiting is another example of the interchange in the social domain (Shim et al. 2007, 2008,

Table 4: Divorce from Foreign Spouses

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
total divorces	145,324	167,096	139,365	128,468	125,032	124,072	116,535
divorce from foreign spouses	1,866	2,164	3,400	4,278	6,280	8,671	11,255
proportion among the total divorces	1.3	1.3	2.4	5.0	5.0	7.0	9.7
increase	-	298	1,236	2,002	2,002	2,535	2,584
increase rate	-	16.0	57.1	46.8	46.8	41.34	29.8
Korean men + foreign women	401	583	1,611	2,444	4,010	5,707	7,962
increase rate	-	45.4	176.3	64.1	64.1	45.1	39.5
Korean women + foreign men	1,465	1,581	1,789	1,834	2,270	2,964	3,293
increase rate	-	7.9	13.2	23.8	23.8	34.5	11.1

(unit : %)
Source: National Statistical Office, 2006. 2005 Marriage and Divorce Statistics. http://www.kostat.kr, March 13, 2008.

16 Frequency of support can be divided into regular and irregular. Some send a certain amount of money to the family in the home country on a regular basis. These are women who have no children yet, or have a job, or husband's support. But most of the women interviewed answered that they send money on an irregular basis or on a special occasion or when they have some spare money. Special occasions include when someone of the family in the home country is sick, or when the family has severe damage due to typhoon, or when there is an important family event. There also were some women interviewees who do not give any kind of economic support at all. The reason for no support was various; some of them did not give any economic support because they do not feel that they need to, since the family in the home country is relatively well-off; others did not because they were too poor and they could not; still others did not because the husband opposes the economic support.

17 There was one exceptional case of sending a child to the home country. She sent the baby to the home country because her family was too poor and she had to work and could not take care of the baby (Shim 2008).

2010; Shim 2008, 2009). By doing so, women marriage migrants expand global family ties across the national borders. These show the rise of what we would call "global familial individual".

9. Summary and Conclusion

Based on the analytic distinctions we have made and applied to our study on transnational marriage in Korea, we have come to the conclusion that despite many common factors such as push factors of global significance, East Asia differs significantly from the West with respect to the role of the cultural pull factors in the process of second-modern transformation. For this reason, in East Asia, the individual does not leave the family so deeply affected by disenchantment as Beck seems to assume. Rather, on the contrary, individualization goes well together with affectionate family networks. Needless to say, we should not generalize this observation hastily. It is possible to think of variations within East Asia depending on the specific combination of the two axes of objective-structural and cultural-discursive dimensions and push-pull factors. For instance, Japan may be considered to be ahead of Korea and China in terms of individualization when seen from the perspective of Beck and Beck-Gernsheim. Overall, nevertheless, East Asia can be characterized by concomitant development towards individualization and flourishing community networks as a distinctive characteristic of East Asian second-modern transformation.

Finally, we have tried to explore the implication of this finding for the question of re-embedding. Beck admits that individualization at this level involves "a new type of social commitment", that is, reintegration into a community. His concept of individualization is leaning towards what we may call a 'libertarian' community whose entry and exit are only dependent on individual choice. We may consider this as a consequence of radicalization of such principles of modernity as individual freedom and liberty. The whole cultural and emotional landscape of East Asia seems to be significantly dissimilar to this Western pattern of value configurations. The balance between individual and community, between reason and emotion, between modernity and tradition, and so on, has been deeply built into the fundamental structure of collective mentality and the way of life.

The relationship between individual and family in transnational marriage and life in Korea stands far from the typical characteristics of individualization suggested by Beck and Beck-Gernsheim. There seems to be no reason to consider the Western pattern of family change and individualization as the model against which the non-Western experience is to be measured. In contrast, we need to see East Asia representing a specific pathway to second-modern transformation with its distinctive characteristics. We take as an empirically open question to what extent East Asia converges into, and diverges from, the West. Individualization in East Asia may reflect specific combinations of the first and second modernity, including some traditional characteristics. Women marriage migrants continuously stay in the patriarchal family, though negotiating: expanding family ties across the national borders while pursuing their own individualizing and hence highly challenging initiatives. The relationship between individual and family seems to be exemplified by individualization with affectionate family solidarities both on the local and cosmopolitan fields. The concept of 'family-oriented individualization' embraces the aspects of dynamic balance between individualization and reactivating community as a dual process of historical change in East Asia.

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