

Women's Involvement in Terrorism and the Criminal Justice Response: A Case Study of the 2018 Surabaya Bombings

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I. Introduction

1. Research Background

The involvement of women in Islamic extremism and the terrorist movement is a recent phenomenon in Indonesia, emerging since 2016 (Macfarlane, 2024). In 2018, Indonesia was shaken by the Surabaya bombing, where three families conducted simultaneous attacks at three locations (Faridz, McKirdy & Mackintosh, 2018). These incidents highlight women's increasingly active roles in terrorism, showing their participation is now on par with men. Despite an increased focus on women's engagement in Islamist terrorism and violent extremism following the emergence of the self-proclaimed Islamic State in 2014, the study continues to be primarily influenced by studies from Western contexts (Tabuchi, 2019; Patel & Westermann, 2018). It is therefore literature and policy discussions regarding the involvement of women in terrorism in regions like Southeast Asia need to be developed.

In the context of Islamist terrorism, men are typically expected to engage in violent jihad to defend the ideology or goals of their organizations. At the same time, women are assigned a supportive role, assisting men in their efforts and facilitating violence through supplementary functions (Margolin, 2019). Sara Mahmood (2019, p.13) has suggested that the rigid perception of masculinity associated with violence and femininity with nonviolence in terrorism contributes to three major misconceptions about women's involvement in terrorism in Indonesia. Firstly, there is an absolute and unchanging assumption that men are exclusively assigned to violent roles, while women's roles are inherently non-violent. Secondly, women are often perceived as secondary actors or recruits due to their presumed non-violent nature within a violent group, suggesting their limited relevance to the group's overall functioning. Thirdly, women's motivations are viewed as personal and gender-specific. For example, men are thought to

join extremist groups for political reasons, whereas women's involvement is attributed to personal (feminine) motives.

Various criminology theories illuminate the factors contributing to terrorism and violent extremism. The relevant criminological theory, for instance, the General Strain Theory suggests that terrorism often emerges when individuals face unjust collective pressures from significantly more powerful entities, and the resulting acts of terror have a substantial civilian impact (Agnew, 2010). Individuals with weakened social ties are more prone to engaging in violent extremist acts. When these ties diminish, the likelihood of committing crimes increases (Kruglanski, et.al., 2022). Thijssen (2023) suggests before radicalization, individuals often experience personal and social strain and uncertainty, making them vulnerable to identifying with violent extremists. This identification offers a sense of certainty and can justify violent actions against others. Aside from that incorporating gendered perspectives into criminological analysis is essential for understanding the unique experiences and motivations of women in violent extremism. Gender-specific factors, such as patriarchal norms, gender roles, and experiences of violence or trauma, may also shape women's pathways to radicalization and their roles within extremist groups. Exploring these gender dynamics can provide insights into the intersectional nature of violent extremism and inform more targeted prevention and intervention strategies (Alexander & Turkington, 2018). Furthermore, understanding these pathways can shed light on the specific vulnerabilities and risk factors that contribute to women's involvement in violent extremism.

By investigating and analyzing instances of women's involvement in terrorist groups, this paper aims to examine the place of women within terrorist violence, as well as to challenge conventional perceptions and constructs. To challenge these misconceptions, the following discussion explores the diverse roles, recruitment logic, and motivations of women involved in violent extremism in Indonesia. The first part of this paper explores the pathways of women as they engage in terrorist groups. The second part is to identify their stance in the terrorist organization either as active or passive members. Lastly, it examines the criminal justice response to the phenomenon of women's involvement in terrorism. This is a qualitative case study. The investigation focuses primarily on three female members of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) who were involved and survived following the series of bombing terror attacks in Surabaya, Indonesia. The data collected in this research is primarily taken from police investigation report

dossiers and the confessions of the three defendants during the trial, as recorded in the court decisions, as well as secondary data analysis.

2. Radicalism, Violent Extremism and Terrorism

At times, there is a tendency to confuse the notions of radicalism and terrorism. In this paper, the term radicalization is employed to describe the progression of forming extremist ideologies and beliefs. Randy Borum (2012) distinguished the difference between radicalism and violent extremism. Radicalization, the formation of extremist ideologies and beliefs, must be differentiated from action pathways, which involve engaging in terrorism or violent extremist activities. While ideology and action can be linked, they are not always correlated. Many individuals who hold radical beliefs and justify violence do not necessarily resort to terrorism. Similarly, numerous identified terrorists, including those associated with militant jihadism, may not be deeply religious and might possess only superficial knowledge of the radical religious ideology they profess to follow. To comprehend the process of radicalization leading to violent extremism, one needs to search beyond mere understanding of a religion or doctrine.

Violent extremism and terrorism are related concepts, but they have distinct differences. Violent Extremism, on one hand, refers to the adoption of extreme ideologies or beliefs that advocate for or justify the use of violence to achieve certain goals (Striegher, 2015; Borum, 2012). Violent extremists may hold radical views and ideologies but may not necessarily engage in terrorist acts themselves. They may support or sympathize with terrorist groups or ideologies without directly participating in violent actions. Terrorism, on the other hand, involves the deliberate use of violence or threat of violence by individuals or groups to instill fear, intimidate, or coerce governments, societies, or certain populations to achieve political, ideological, or religious objectives (Schmid 2004; Borum 2012). Unlike violent extremism, terrorism specifically entails the implementation of violent acts or the planning and execution of attacks targeting civilians, infrastructure, or institutions. While violent extremism encompasses the adoption of extreme beliefs that may or may not lead to violence, terrorism involves the deliberate use of violence as a means to achieve particular objectives. Terrorism can be seen as a subset of violent extremism, as it represents one potential outcome of extreme ideologies.

3. Islamism, Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Indonesia

Islamism, or similar ideological offshoots, are depicted as political doctrines rather than religious beliefs, characterized by a totalitarian agenda fueled by strong anti-Western and anti-democratic sentiments (Belt, 2009). The primary aim of Islamism is described as global domination through any means necessary. It is argued that militant leaders, especially since the late 1980s, have effectively utilized Islam as a platform to propagate this extremist ideology. This argument emphasizes the disparity between the majority of religious followers who do not embrace violent ideology and the fact that many proponents of extremism are not deeply devout or religious. Islamist terrorist, on the other hand, is an individual or group that employs violence or terrorism to achieve their Islamist goals. These individuals or groups may believe in using violence as a means to overthrow governments they see as unjust or to spread their interpretation of Islam. Islamist terrorists often target civilians, government institutions, and symbols of authority in pursuit of their objectives.

Indonesia has a long history of Islamic activism and political Islam dating back to the early 20th century (Arifianto, 2020). Various Islamist organizations have emerged, advocating for the implementation of Sharia law, Islamic education, and social justice. Some of these groups have pursued their goals through peaceful means, while others have adopted more militant tactics. Since the late 1990s, Indonesia has experienced waves of violent extremism linked to Islamist ideologies (Bruinessen, 2002). Groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), inspired by Salafi-jihadist ideology, have carried out numerous terrorist attacks in Indonesia, including the 2002 Bali bombings, which killed more than 200 people, mostly tourists (Ramakrishna, 2022).

The emergence of the Islamic State (IS) movement in Indonesia in 2014 sparked a resurgence of violent extremism in the country (Temby, 2020). Despite effective counterterrorism efforts by law enforcement, IS networks have suffered significant losses, leading to a shift in the structure of jihadism from organized groups to autonomous networks and cells, often facilitated through online channels. While support for violent extremism in Indonesia remains limited, pockets of IS adherents retain the capability to carry out lethal attacks against both civilian and government targets. Most of these attacks target Indonesian police forces, with religious minorities also being notable victims, such as in the Surabaya church suicide bombings of May 13, 2018. These attacks were undertaken by the terrorist cell of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah.

In 2014, JAD was officially established in East Java, and quickly attracted extremists from other groups (Habibullah, 2023). JAD in Indonesia has been linked to IS through ideological alignment and operational connections. JAD has pledged allegiance to IS and shares its extremist ideology, aiming to establish a caliphate based on strict interpretations of Islamic law (IPAC, 2021). This connection has manifested in various ways, including recruitment efforts, propaganda dissemination, and coordinated terrorist activities that reflect IS's global agenda.

II. Women's Pathways to Terrorism

1. The Demographic Characteristics of Women Involved in the Surabaya Bombings

The 2018 Surabaya bombings were a series of explosions at various locations in Surabaya and Sidoarjo, East Java, on May 13-14, 2018. Three of these locations were places of worship: the Santa Maria Tak Bercela Church, the GKI Diponegoro Church, and the Surabaya Central Pentecostal Church (GPPS) Sawahan Congregation. The other two locations were the Wonocolo apartment complex in Taman, Sidoarjo, and the Surabaya Police Headquarters. The series of bombings in Surabaya in May 2018 revealed a new *modus operandi* in terrorism, where nuclear families became the direct perpetrators of the attacks. In these terrorist attacks, six women were involved. Three of them died in the bombings, while the other three survived and have been arrested by the police following the incidents.

Before discussing the pathways to violent extremism for women, it is important first to examine the demographic characteristics of the women involved in the Surabaya bombings. These characteristics include age, education, occupation, marital status, origin, and family background. All six female members of JAD involved in the Surabaya-Sidoarjo bombings are middle-aged adults, ranging in age from 34 to 47 years old. Four of them are married, each with four children. One is single, and the other is newly married. Four have working-class family backgrounds, while the rest are from middle-class families.

Their average educational background is high school, with two having attended higher education equivalent to a three-year diploma. With this educational background, two of them run businesses as Muslim clothing tailors and sell Muslim clothing and accessories, while the other four are

housewives. Most of them are not originally from Surabaya; instead, they come from smaller towns in East Java and West Java. According to the Indonesian National Counter-Terrorism Agency, East Java and West Java are among the top five provinces most vulnerable to the spread of terrorist ideology (CNN, 2022).

The length of time they were exposed to radical teachings varied. At a minimum, they were exposed for three years, even before marrying JAD male members. One exception is a woman who has been exposed to extreme ideology for more than a decade, starting during her college years. Most of them experienced intensified exposure to extremist ideology after their arranged marriages with JAD male members. The summary of the demographic characteristics can be seen in the following table

Table 1. Profile of Female JAD member involves in the Surabaya Terror Plot

Characteristics	The Female member of JAD					
	Betty Rinawati	Damayanti	Emil Le-stari	Tri Ernawati	Puji Kuswati	Puspitasari
Age (at the time of Surabaya bombings terror occurred)	38 years old	34 years old	39 years old	43 years old	43 years old	47 years old
Latest education	High school	High school	Associate degree diploma (DIII)	High School	Nurse Academy (Associate degree diploma/DIII)	High school
Occupation	Tailor and seller of Muslimah clothes	Seller of Muslimah clothes	Housewife	Housewife	Housewife	Housewife
Marital status	Single	Married	Married with four children	Married with four children	Married with four children	Married with four children
Origin	Cirebon	Nganjuk	Garut	Surabaya	Banyuwangi	Magetan
The proximate length of exposure to radical teachings	3 years	3 years	20 years	10 years	1o years	15 years

Characteristics	The Female member of JAD					
Connection with JAD's leader	Best friend and business counterpart of Damayanti (shared housing with Damayanti and her husband)	Wife of Agus Widodo (leader of JAD Jombang branch)	Wife of Ilham Fauzan (vice leader of JAD Surabaya branch). Ilham Fauzan had been shot dead during the raid.	Wife of Tri Murtiono (JAD leader)	Wife of Dita Apriyanto (JAD leader)	Wife of Anton Febrianto (JAD leader)

Of the six female JAD members involved in the Surabaya bombing incidents, three survived, while the remaining three were killed. Those who were killed included Tri Ernawati, Puji Kuswati, and Puspita Sari. Tri Ernawati, along with her husband and their children, carried out a suicide bombing outside the Surabaya city police headquarters. Simultaneously, Puji Kuswati, her husband, and their four children were killed while executing bomb attacks at three Surabaya churches. Puspitasari and her husband were killed in an explosion at the Wonocolo flat in Sidoarjo. The three surviving female JAD members were spared due to the different roles they played during the Surabaya bombings.

2. Analysis of Women's Pathway to Violent Extremism Lead to Terrorism

How do they recruit? In Indonesia itself, religious gatherings (*pengajian*)¹ play a significant role in propagating the ideology of violence to potential members. Religious gatherings are often the primary tool used to recruit

1 'Pengajian' in Indonesia refers to a religious gathering or study session focused on Islamic teachings. These events can take various forms and are often held in mosques, community centers, or private homes. While there is some level of government involvement in promoting moderate religious teachings and preventing radicalism, 'pengajian' sessions in Indonesia are largely community-driven and not uniformly controlled by the government. The teachers of these sessions can range from formally certified scholars to respected community members, reflecting the diverse nature of religious education in the country. "Pengajian" can vary in size from small, informal gatherings to large, organized events. They play a significant role in the religious and social lives of many Indonesian Muslims, fostering a sense of community and ongoing religious education. 'Pengajian' sessions in Indonesia are organized by various individuals and institutions within the Muslim community. The organizers and teachers can vary widely, depending on the scale, setting, and purpose of the gathering. The role of the teacher in a 'pengajian' is crucial as they guide the discussions, provide religious

new members. However, it is important to highlight that not all religious gatherings ('*pengajian*') aim to radicalize people. Typically, religious gatherings held by radical organizations begin with lighter topics such as noble character or good morals. Gradually, they move on to heavier issues, outlining perceived injustices committed by the state against specific groups with selective quoting of supporting verses, as well as outlining perceived injustice on the condition of Muslims that are suppressed by Westerners or unjust political regimes. In response, individuals who sympathize begin to adopt the ideology espoused by the *Imam/Ustadz/Ustadzah*. Subsequently, topics covered in all religious gatherings ('*pengajian*') become more structured.

The narrative story as experienced by Emil Lestari, Betty Rinawati, and Damayanti is one example of how religious gatherings ('*pengajian*') has been misused by radical organizations in recruiting their members. The process of radicalization done by the organization is not direct, but it is gradual. Religious gatherings ('*pengajian*') has been also exploited by extremist groups to spread their ideology. Women who are victims of radicalization seem to be stuck in the same circle and do not expose themselves to other beliefs and opinions. Having a spouse who is a part of a radical organization can also be one of the factors behind the radicalization of women. However, that does not mean that all wives of terrorists are aware of their husbands' participation in radical organizations. Women who are radicalized also tend to socialize with those who also adopt the same radicalized beliefs. Therefore, it can be said that women's surroundings and social circle play an important role in the process of radicalization.

Previous research indicates that women's involvement in terrorism can stem from various motivations such as economic factors, ideology, gender constraints, patriarchal environments, revenge, personal relationships, rebellion, agency, or a desire for freedom and excitement (Kneip, 2016; Pearson, 2016; Biswas & Deylami, 2019). In this study, Damayanti's experience highlights patriarchal environments, while Betty and Emil's experiences underscore ideology.

Marriage is also utilized to reinforce the indoctrination of radical ideology among members. This is evident in the experiences of Damayanti and Emil Lestari. Marriage, infused with strong patriarchal elements, fosters

instruction, and help deepen the participants' understanding of Islamic teachings. The choice of teacher often depends on the focus of the session, the level of religious knowledge required, and the preferences of the organizers and participants.

a submissive wife. This dynamic is illustrated in Damayanti's story. Additionally, Damayanti's narrative story may support the notion that women often possess less political motivation and lack autonomy in their actions, influenced primarily by men, including her husband. However, a different perspective emerges from Betty Rinawati's story, where her political motivations stem solely from her own independent decisions, whether political or religious. As a single and independent woman, she maintains her autonomy in making political or religious choices.

Mia Bloom (2007), in her article titled "Women as Victims and Victimizers," suggests that women may not always be coerced by men into terrorism. Instead, their relationships with radicalized men can empower them to independently choose to join the cause alongside their partners. This suggestion aligns with the experience of Emil Lestari. Even though her husband is a leader in JAD, she had already been exposed to radical teachings long before meeting him. Therefore, her political and religious decisions were shaped through interactions during regular religious gatherings, as well as actively spreading radical teachings to fellow members. In addition, the spread of extreme ideology is not only carried out through weekly face-to-face religious study sessions. The role of technology is already evident in spreading radical propaganda/ideology, although offline study sessions remain the primary tool for spreading radical ideology. As experienced by Betty Rinawati, she received additional materials about jihad distributed through online study groups on WhatsApp and Telegram.

Examining cases in Indonesia reveals a variety of motivations for women's involvement in terrorism. The participation of both men and women in terrorist groups is shaped by a range of factors, including cultural norms, political considerations, and religious beliefs. Women do not exclusively join terrorist organizations to seek vengeance for their family members, pursue romantic relationships with male recruiters, or succumb to coercion by husbands or fathers.

There are differences between female and male members in terms of the indoctrination process. Female members only attend religious gatherings ('*pengajian*'). In contrast, male members, besides attending religious gatherings, are obliged to participate in *Idad*. This differentiation implies that gender-stereotyped views still strongly exist within the JAD organization itself. Particularly, the view that women are physically weak and therefore unsuitable for roles requiring physical strength and endurance persists. Despite this, it contradicts their teachings that do not differentiate between genders in the command to engage in jihad through terrorist attacks. In this

regard, the JAD group continues to involve its female members as active participants in terrorist attacks.

According to Sidney Jones (2018) the recruitment system of the JAD group is not as strict as another terrorist group like that of Jamaah Islamiyah. In addition to that, JAD are autonomous terrorist networks whose cells can operate independently to carry out terrorist activities. This statement corresponds to the story experienced by Betty Rinawati, Emil Lestari, and Damayanti. There are no strict conditions to be initiated as a member of JAD. As long as one declares sympathy and supports the struggle for the establishment of the Islamic State, the initiation process can proceed. In fact, for carrying out terrorist attacks, every individual who has been initiated is permitted to conduct attacks using any available means. Terrorist attacks do not need to wait for orders from JAD leadership. This is very different from the early 2000's when the terrorist group Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) had a clear command structure. The police, according to Sidney Jones (2018), face considerable difficulty in dealing with these JAD groups due to the lack of a clear organizational structure like JI.

III. The Actual Roles of the Female JAD Members in Terrorist Activity

The study conducted by Taskarina (2022) has identified the diversity of women's roles in terrorism in Indonesia, with many taking on multiple responsibilities. The most common roles are Assistance, Suicidal Bombing, and Financing. Furthermore, Leslie Dwyer and Elizabeth Rhoads outlined the various roles women currently play in terrorist networks. These roles include acting as logistics providers, liaisons between networks, children's tutors, and agents of da'wah and propaganda. Additionally, they manage social media, hide terrorists, assemble bombs, serve as suicide bombers, and participate as combatants (Dwyer & Rhoads, 2018).

Correspond to that, the actual roles of female JAD members in the Surabaya bombings are suicide bombers. The other three female JAD members in the Surabaya bombings are as follows:

Table 2. *The Roles and Membership Status at JAD*

	Betty Rinawati	Damayanti	Emil Lestari
Level/role of involvement within JAD networks	Hiding explosives, dismantling leftover bombs, facilitating/providing for JAD meeting, providing place for JAD meeting	Hiding explosives, dismantling leftover bombs, providing place for JAD meeting	Receiving the 3 boxes containing a set of bombs that will be used for terror plots, hiding explosives, Propagandists to garner sympathy
Criminal charged	Conspiring, receiving, possessing, carrying, having in one's possession, storing, transporting, concealing, using, any firearm, ammunition, or explosive material, and other dangerous materials with the intention of committing an act of terrorism, concealing information about the whereabouts of perpetrators of terrorism offenses, as well as providing assistance or facilitation to perpetrators of terrorism offenses.	Conspiring, receiving, possessing, carrying, having in one's possession, storing, transporting, concealing, using, any firearm, ammunition, or explosive material, and other dangerous materials with the intention of committing an act of terrorism, concealing information about the whereabouts of perpetrators of terrorism offenses, as well as providing assistance or facilitation to perpetrators of terrorism offenses.	Conspiring, receiving, possessing, carrying, having in one's possession, storing, transporting, concealing, using, any firearm, ammunition, or explosive material, and other dangerous materials with the intention of committing an act of terrorism, concealing information about the whereabouts of perpetrators of terrorism offenses, as well as providing assistance or facilitation to perpetrators of terrorism offenses.

From the above table, all these roles taken by the female JAD members highlight the significant role women have in terrorist groups, a phenomenon that demands vigilance. In line to this, according to Lies Marcos (2018), attention to women can no longer be viewed merely in their function as companions and supporters of extremism, but must now be seen as principal actors.

Traditionally, a perpetrator is seen as someone committing an immoral, often violent act, while a victim is someone harmed by such actions. But are these classifications rigid? When examining women's involvement in terrorism, it is essential to consider the complexity of each case. In many conflict situations, women are automatically viewed solely as victims. However, it is important to investigate women's active participation in terrorist activities, highlighting their willingness to engage in violence and their roles as perpetrators. Yet, there are cases where women in terrorist groups can be both perpetrators and victims. While choices are made, the degree to which these choices are constrained, controlled, or influenced needs to be explored. Some women join such groups due to abuse, victimization, or coercion, leaving them with limited options (Bloom, 2011). In this study,

Damayanti case is as an example of a dualism victim-perpetrator situation. In a patriarchal marriage relationship, the decision made by Damayanti to pledge allegiance to JAD was heavily influenced by her husband. She did not even know of JAD's objectives. Damayanti was indoctrinated with the obligation to obey all her husband's words and commands. Every decision-making power was in her husband's hands, as a way to demonstrate her obedience to him. Furthermore, when there were explosives and bomb assemblies in their rented house, Damayanti had no other choice but to obey her husband and hide the explosives.

However, the idea with the erroneous view that women involved in terrorism are merely victims needs to be challenged. Women should be seen as independent agents who have the free choice to be involved or not. In Betty's case, she had been exposed to radical views long before marrying her husband. Before marrying Emil, her husband was a moderate young man. After marrying Emil, her husband became more devout and regularly attended religious studies. Emil even actively suggested what her husband should do when receiving explosive materials from terrorist networks. Similarly, in Betty's case, her participation in extremist religious studies was solely her own free choice. Her views were driven only by a desire to deepen her knowledge of Islamic teachings. In Damayanti's case, a strong gender relation is evident, with the marriage relationship being heavily influenced by a patriarchal culture, as seen in Damayanti's example.

The involvement of women in terrorism is a complex and multifaceted issue that can vary significantly based on individual circumstances, motivations, and the specific context of the conflict or extremist ideology. It is crucial to recognize that women cannot be solely seen as victims. Women can be perpetrators, but can also be both victims and perpetrators of terrorism. Their roles potentially evolve over time and across different situations.

IV. Criminal Justice Response to Terrorism: Are Female Terrorists Treated More Leniently Compared to Male Terrorists?

The Chivalry Hypothesis is a sociological concept that suggests leniency and protective attitudes towards women in the criminal justice system. It suggests that women are treated more leniently than men when it comes to law enforcement, prosecution, and sentencing. The hypothesis argues that this leniency stems from traditional societal views of women as weaker, more fragile, and less morally responsible compared to men (Anderson,

1976). Despite the intricate nature of women's involvement in violence, officials in criminal justice systems globally frequently presume that women who engage in violent acts are either unsuspecting victims of their circumstances or aberrant deviants from the expected norm (Bigio & Vogelstein, 2019). Criminal justice leaders occasionally perceive women as victims of terrorism irrespective of their motives, leading to fewer arrests for terrorism-related offenses and shorter-than-average sentences.

In terms of the criminal justice response in Indonesia towards females who are involved in terrorist activity, until 2016, very few women had been arrested for terrorism. They were generally charged with failing to report their husbands' activities (IPAC Report, 2017). What about the Surabaya bombings case? The following table presents a comparison of the criminal sanctions imposed on female and male perpetrators involved in the Surabaya bombing incident. The longest prison sentences were 12 and 10 years. These sentences were, given to Abu Umar and Agus Satrio Widodo, who played the role of ideologues, had taught bomb-making, and consistently encouraged all JAD members to remain steadfast in their commitment to jihad or martyrdom by attacking infidels, their places of worship, or government offices.

Table 3. Comparison of Criminal Sentences between Female and Male JAD members

Defendant	Eko Budi	Abu Umar	Agus S.W.	Sutrisno	Lutfi Teguh	Damay-anti	Emil Le-stari	Betty Rinawati
Gender	Male	Male	Male	Male	Male	Female	Female	Female
Statute (s) of convictions	Art.15 jo 7 jo 13	Art.15 jo 6	Art. 15 jo 6	Art.15 jo 7 jo 13	Art.15 jo 7 jo 13	Art15 jo 7 jo 13	Art15 jo 7 jo 13	Art15 jo 7 jo 13
Criminal Charged	4 years	15 years	12 years	4 years	4 years	5 years	5 years	5 years
Sentenced Imposed	3 years prison	10 years prison	12 years prison	3 years prison	3 years prison	3 years 4 months prison	3 years-6 months prison	3 years prison
Fine	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Super-vised re-lease	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Length of super-vised re-leased	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Meanwhile, three other men received identical criminal sentences of three years for their roles in concealing explosives for bomb-making. Three female members of the terrorist group were also sentenced to three years in prison, but with slight variations. Damayanti received a sentence of three years and four months, while Emil Lestari received three years and six months. Both received harsher penalties than Betty Rinawati. No explanation was provided for the discrepancies in the sentences, but it is likely due to Damayanti and Emil Lestari's marital relationships with the leader of JAD. All members of JAD involved in this case did not receive any additional sanctions in the form of fines and were not granted parole. Generally, judges impose lighter criminal penalties than those sought by prosecutors. Although the judges mentioned that the defendants' actions did not support the government's anti-terrorism efforts and caused public unrest as an aggravating factor, the judgments did not explain why the sentences were lighter than the prosecutors' recommendations.

From the table above, there does not appear to be a significant difference in the sanctions imposed on men and women accused of hiding explosives. The judges focused solely on proving their participation in concealing explosives. However, a deeper analysis reveals that the roles of the three women extended beyond merely hiding explosives. Emil Lestari, for example, also acted as a propagandist, spreading JAD's ideology. Meanwhile, Betty Rinawati and Damayanti repeatedly provided venues for JAD meetings. These roles differ from those of the three men, who were only involved in concealing bomb-making explosives. From this, it can be observed that there is a tendency to treat women more leniently than men. Given the actual roles undertaken by these women, the criminal sanctions should arguably be more severe or at least align with the penalties proposed by the prosecutors. Alexander & Turkington (2018) suggested that in handling alleged extremists, the criminal justice system needs to move beyond simple gender stereotypes and develop a deeper understanding of how both men and women engage with violent extremism. Relying on stereotypes of female victimhood, rather than assessing each case individually, impacts the processing of potentially dangerous individuals. In terrorism cases, bias against female offenders compromises the goal of consistent legal treatment and poses risks to national security.

V. Conclusion

Several factors drive women to commit extremist activities and join terrorist organizations, the most common factors are marriage, friendship, and kinship. It is crucial to avoid assessing these influences through the lens of traditional gender roles. As assessments of women's involvement in violence progress, it is crucial not to focus exclusively on gender constructs.

Women, like men, voluntarily join groups such as the Islamic State, motivated by similar reasons. They actively participate in both private and public aspects of terrorism. Although their actions might be influenced by male leaders, it is essential to recognize their autonomy and hold them accountable for their involvement in violence. Recognizing women's autonomy is crucial; they are equally capable of engaging in terrorism. Thus, it is important to be cautious in portraying women who are involved in violent acts.

Unequal treatment of terrorist offenders, regardless of gender, harms defendants, their communities, the criminal justice system, and broader efforts to combat violent extremism both in Indonesia and globally.

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