

Between Propaganda and Public Diplomacy

Jazz in the Cold War

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Recent research demonstrates that jazz had an important function not only in the conception of United States foreign policy, but also of the State Socialist countries in Eastern Europe. In describing the US conception as a whole, public diplomacy plays an important role (Cull, *The Cold War*; Critchlow; Bayles). Focusing on music and jazz, we find terms like cultural diplomacy (Fosler-Lussier, “Music Pushed”), sound diplomacy (Gienow-Hecht, *Sound Diplomacy*), or jazz diplomacy (Davenport, *Jazz Diplomacy*). The variety of terms used by Western scholars describing the US efforts to use music—and specifically, jazz—in their foreign policy contrasts the Western lack of terms describing the conception of their State Socialist counterparts, which is labeled as propaganda. Although the term was also used in State Socialist scholarship (Lukin; Mazurek), there is a telling subtext in the use of the term in the Western academic circles. During the Cold War, a dichotomous notion separating “us” (meaning “The West”) from “them” (meaning “The East”) was in use in the countries of the Western world. Democratic countries of the West, often referred to as “us,” implement public diplomacy, whereas non-democratic countries, such as Nazi Germany during World War II or the Soviet Union and her satellites during the Cold War, simply spread propaganda (Colucci). This use of language had to do with the fact that Nazi Germany and State Socialist countries both used the term officially, for instance in official denominations. Joseph Goebbels’s ministry was officially called *Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda* (Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda) and State Socialist governments used the term as well. For example, in the Soviet Union, the term Agit-prop, a combination of the words “agitation” and “propaganda” was used as denomination of the main persuasion strategy since the beginning of this state.

According to this logic, the “free” countries of the West implemented “good” public diplomacy, and the “unfree” countries of the East implemented “evil” propaganda. This implies the idea that only the West has an elaborated concept of using culture as a means to promote its values abroad, but not the East, which only relied on propaganda and agitation without deeper ideological considerations. However, both US public diplomacy and Soviet propaganda were theoretically founded in academic discourses. In the Western world, political scientists and opinion researchers like Paul Lazarsfeld and Jacques Ellul started this discourse, whereas the State Socialist discourse was rooted in the foundational works of Marxist-Leninist theory. In the latter, and in stark contrast to how the term is understood in Western circles, propaganda is positive as it refers to the way governments communicate political goals to the people and, thus, transport basic ideological values to people (Bussemer; Kamiński; Kenez). In the Soviet Union, there was a solid academic discourse on the theory of propaganda. During the Brezhnev era in the 1960s and 1970s, an article from the *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Ėntsiklopediya* presents an overview of concepts in Soviet politics and culture (95). Is the Western depiction of Eastern “propaganda” simply nothing more than a stereotypical construction projected onto the “East” through a seemingly “objective” West, recalling the process of Orientalism criticized by Edward Said? Is not the Cold War period one of the best examples that the US and their allies in the West engaged in propaganda as well by spending enormous sums of money and implementing a large bundle of measures designed to transport their basic ideologies of freedom and democracy? While the English term public diplomacy does not sound as harsh as the seemingly evil word, is it not simply a euphemism? In this context it is telling that the term had a positive connotation in the US during the 1950s. The early jazz tours were discussed in US middlebrow magazines as “good propaganda” (Stearns). Would it not therefore be more honest to speak of propaganda actions of the Cold War superpowers rather than juxtaposing public diplomacy and propaganda?

Instead of using the terms public diplomacy (implemented by the US government) or propaganda (implemented by the State Socialist countries of the former Eastern Bloc), the aim of this paper is to compare what I will call, following Werner Wirth, strategies of persuasion with jazz (Wirth and Kühne). I will particularly focus on the Soviet Union and Poland, because these countries had a special position among the Eastern Bloc countries: The Soviet Union was the “homeland” of Socialist ideology and Poland was the country in the Eastern Bloc whose jazz scene was seen as a kind of “window to the West.” Rejecting generalized notions of US and State Socialist cultural politics with regard to jazz as a whole, I will compare the use of jazz as a vehicle for the persuasion of the

people in Eastern Europe. Specifically, I am interested in how US foreign and State Socialist domestic policies were implemented in the Soviet Union and Poland. Convincing the local populations was the shared goal of both the US and the State Socialist administrations; therefore, the measures taken are to a certain extent comparable as both governments used jazz as a means of persuasion. In how far were what we call public diplomacy on the US side and propaganda on the State Socialist side similar?

THE US JAZZ STRATEGY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE COLD WAR

At the beginning of the Cold War, the US government intended to use classical music as a vehicle of persuasion rather than jazz due to the fact that until the end of the 1940s jazz was regarded as a music of lower value, and the US government thought they could only convince “Old Europe” with its traditions of high culture by exporting music from the high cultural sphere. As a result, the US mainly financed orchestra tours of representative ensembles such as the Boston Symphony Orchestra (Gienow-Hecht, “World”). However, the US government soon realized that jazz had a far greater persuasive potential than classical music in Europe. When Charles E. Bohlen, US Ambassador to Moscow in the early 1950s, informed the US government that the Soviet youth was hungry for jazz, he provided a powerful argument for the official promotion of this musical genre (Ritter, “Broadcasting”). Exploiting the appeal of jazz to politically destabilize the USSR, if not the whole Eastern Bloc, seemed to be an almost logical consequence.

This became possible because at the beginning of the 1950s, jazz began to be accepted as an official musical form in the US as initiatives like Norman Grantz’s “Jazz at the Philharmonic” concerts and other similar activities increasingly promoted jazz in American society. A new meaning of jazz evolved as it was no longer envisioned as a primitive form of music by an unloved minority but as a symbol for American core values including freedom, equality, and democracy. It was this ideology the US government wanted to promote by spreading US jazz abroad.

The government’s idea was not to entertain some scattered jazz aficionados, but to create a serious basis for a revolution through the promotion of jazz music, which reached a wider audience than diplomatic speeches and political rhetoric. Scholars such as Penny von Eschen and Danielle Fosler-Lussier have demonstrated that US administrations made intensive efforts in this regard (Eschen,

Satchmo; Fosler-Lussier, *Music*). Financed by the US State Department, numerous musicians and ensembles were brought into the Eastern Bloc to perform jazz (Davenport, *Jazz Diplomacy*).

In 1955, the US-financed radio station Voice of America (VOA) started a daily jazz program which was moderated by Willis Conover and could be listened to via shortwave in various Eastern European capitals, including Moscow (Ripmaster; Ritter, “Broadcasting”). The propagation of jazz was intended to demonstrate that the US did not only produce a better music and culture, but that it also had a superior political and economic system. Jazz music was supposed to accomplish what aggressive rhetorical strategies seemingly could not achieve: to win the hearts of the youth, to alienate them from communism, and to encourage them to actively oppose the Soviet Union.

THE STATE SOCIALIST JAZZ STRATEGY DURING LATE STALINISM

The end of World War II in Moscow was celebrated with Soviet jazz. On 9 May 1945, Eddie Rosner’s Belarus SSR Jazz Orchestra performed at Red Square as part of the end of war celebrations (Starr). Like their US colleagues, Soviet cultural policy makers were aware of the great popularity of jazz among young people in the Eastern Bloc countries. Since Socialist education of young people was one of the crucial tasks of the political intelligentsia, the negotiation of jazz turned out to be one of the most important tasks for them. But when the US changed from a World War II ally to the main enemy at the beginning of the Cold War, performing jazz in public was increasingly restricted.

As jazz began to be an accepted and even became an official form of culture in the US, the cultural politics of Josef Stalin and his culture minister Andrei Alexandrovich Zhdanov sought to remove jazz, the music of the new enemy, from public life in the Soviet Union. Jazz was depicted as having a minor quality and was viewed as a threat to the political promotion of communism (Gorodinskij; Šneerson). Musicians were deprived of their official status and, in some cases, were even sent to the gulag, such as Eddie Rosner (Pickhan and Preisler). Great efforts were made to implement counterpropaganda measures among the youth to prevent jazz’s corruptive influence. For instance, officials attempted to promote various forms of Soviet popular music to replace jazz. With his at the same time conformist and popular song compositions, sometimes including “harmless” jazzy elements, Soviet composer Isaak Dunayevskii played an important role here (Stadelmann), and the government sought to implement

shifting policies towards jazz in the other State Socialist countries accordingly (see Ignácz in this volume).

FAILURE OF US AND SOVIET GOALS

As we have seen so far, in the first decade after World War II the political function of jazz changed fundamentally on both sides of the Iron Curtain. For the US government, jazz became the most important musical genre to persuade Eastern Bloc inhabitants of US values, and for the Stalinist rulers jazz was regarded as dangerous. Despite these differences, both political administrations regarded jazz as a crucial means in the competition to convince people in the Eastern Bloc of their system's superiority.

At the beginning of the Cold War, the strategies implemented by both counterparts were antagonistic: the US administration started to promote jazz whereas the Soviet administration started to limit people's access to this music. Both sides formulated ambitious goals: while the US administration intended to use jazz in order to spread the political message of freedom, equality, and democracy, the Soviet administration wanted to cut off their population from any Western influences. Regarding these aims, both counterparts failed, as they soon had to realize that neither was the jazz propagation of the US the beginning of a strong movement demanding American freedom and democracy in the Eastern Bloc, nor did the governments of the USSR and their satellites succeed in totally preventing the public's contact with jazz.

Beginning with the post-Stalinist thaw in the mid-1950s, Soviet cultural policy makers realized their failure and implemented more elaborated policies regarding jazz. A bit later, their US colleagues realized their failure to implement their goals as well and adapted their policies accordingly. Setting aside their initial goals, from the 1960s onwards the USA and the USSR developed new, more differentiated methods of persuasion with jazz. These more elaborated strategies will be described below.

ROCK PUSHES JAZZ ASIDE IN THE LATE 1950S

One of the reasons for the change of strategies was the changing social and cultural function of jazz starting at the end of the 1950s. The years of the first important East-West encounters in jazz, such as the Dave Brubeck tour to Poland in 1958 (Hatschek) and the Willis Conover tour in 1959 (Ritter, "Broadcasting"), marked the beginning of a world-wide fascination of young music listeners with a new musical style, starting with the sensational success of Bill Haley's song "Rock Around the Clock."

From then on, a new pop music genre called rock 'n' roll not only occupied the hearts of young people, it also pushed jazz aside. Rock 'n' roll and the musical styles developing from its roots became the music of the youth, whereas jazz slowly transformed into a kind of art music, received less by younger audiences than by middle-aged people (Wicke). This development had important consequences for the use of jazz as means of a persuasion strategy in the East and West. Convincing the youth with jazz proved to be increasingly difficult because this was not the music they wanted to hear anymore. From the 1960s onwards, diplomatic efforts in the East and West switched from jazz to rock 'n' roll and rock.

Jazz, however, did not entirely lose its importance as a means of persuasion. From the 1960s onwards jazz listeners in the Eastern Bloc tended to be educated middle-class and middle-aged people with considerable social status and influence. Convincing them was an important purpose under the new conditions. Cultural policy makers developed convincing strategies for the youth using mainly rock 'n' roll and rock, and for older people using jazz. It is also because of this development that the generic goals of political leaders who relied on cultural forms such as jazz in East and West were replaced by rather differentiated models.

NEW JAZZ STRATEGIES IN THE EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES AND IN THE US

In the Eastern Bloc countries, the death of Stalin marked a starting point for more liberal jazz politics. In Poland, where the erosion of the Stalinist system started very early, the composer Henryk Czyż had already demanded the need for an idiosyncratic Polish jazz tradition in 1954 at a conference of the Polish Composer's Union (Tompkins). During the next decade, this idea was formulated also in other State Socialist countries. In the Soviet Union this idea officially

occurred relatively late, and was discussed at a greater scale in a meeting of the Composers' Union of 1962 (Gaut; Abeßer). Here, composer Dmitri Shostakovich demanded in a forceful speech the composition of jazz music by local composers in order to offer young listeners alternatives to the music of the capitalist class enemy (Ritter, "Negotiated"). Every State Socialist country developed its own model of implementing this new strategy. In general, restrictions against jazz were loosened, and composers were asked to develop stylistic ideas on how to create genuine forms in their own country.

Again it was Poland where a second element of this new jazz strategy was implemented for the first time (Friszke). The Polish regime started collaborating with the jazz scene and opened the path for the first large-scale jazz festivals. State institutions not only approved but also financed the first public jazz festival in Sopot near Gdańsk in 1956, and the most important Polish jazz ensemble of this festival, the Sekstet Komedy, received an official government grant (Brodacki). Until the second half of the 1960s, the most important countries of the Eastern Bloc launched their own jazz festivals. Among them were the Jazz Jamboree in Warsaw, which has been held since 1958, the Prague Jazz Days, beginning in 1964 (Zaddach), and the festivals in Moscow starting in 1962 (Ritter, "Negotiated"). All of these festivals were financially and logistically sponsored by their respective governments. Local jazz musicians were encouraged to present their compositions in order to demonstrate to the public that the State Socialist world was a promising field for fruitful jazz development. In order to emphasize that, open competition with US jazz at these festivals was created. In Poland, musicians from the US and other Western countries had been performing at the first public jazz events since the late 1950s.

1956 marked a turning point for US public diplomacy (Stöver). Not only had the Hungarian Revolution that same year failed, but the US strategy of aggressively encouraging an uprising in the near future, as it did in a Radio Free Europe (RFE) broadcast cast the US administration in a bad light. US officials had to learn that it would be counterproductive to demand an open fight for freedom and democracy because they themselves could not guarantee substantial help. As a consequence, the US State Department stopped the strategy of promoting jazz openly in order to create an oppositional milieu. Instead, officials continued to use jazz as a kind of advertisement for their own country. Sending jazz musicians to the Eastern Bloc from that point onward had the primary aim to create a climate that was friendly to the United States, which corresponded to the new political line of peaceful coexistence (Mania). What did the implementation of these new persuasion strategies by both sides mean for the development of jazz music and the jazz milieus in Eastern Bloc countries? The following

glimpses into several aspects show that, in effect, these new strategies created rather favorable conditions for jazz because of unintended and coincidental incidents.

INSTITUTIONS AND JAZZ PERSUASION STRATEGIES

The use of jazz as a component of state-organized persuasion strategies entailed the creation of new institutions or the reuse of existing institutions as places where the implementation of concrete measures of the persuasion strategy was planned. In 1956, the US created an Advisory Committee of the Arts as a sub-organization of the Office of Cultural Presentations, situated at the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. Likewise, a Jazz and Folk subcommittee were set up in 1964. Here, cultural policy makers were advised by leading radio journalists and jazz experts on the necessity or uselessness to send jazz ensembles abroad (Campbell; Ansari). In Eastern Bloc countries, public diplomacy strategies were conceptualized in state-organized Composers Unions (Tomoff). Resulting from the Marxist-Leninist understanding of culture as an important means for education (which was supervised under party and political power structures), every cultural activist including jazz performers and composers had to enroll in special arts unions. While it was illegal for any practitioner of cultural activities not to be a member of such an organization, approved membership meant official acceptance of one's cultural work and financial safety.

The discussion structure in both the US advisory panels and the State Socialist Composers' Unions was very similar: members of the government dialogued with composers, musicians, and media experts on how to cope with jazz and which measures were to be taken. Here, controversial discussions took place before final decisions were made. In both cases, the proceedings became classified, remained unpublished, and were distributed to commission members only for internal use.

Radio broadcasting is an additional example of how the implementation of state-organized persuasion strategies led to the creation or the strengthening of state-controlled institutions (Badenoch, Fickers, and Heinrich-Franke). Radio stations in Eastern Europe and other European countries were quasi-monopolistic institutions. In the US, by contrast, radio was a commercial field not controlled by the government (Hilmes). The founding of Voice of America as a government-financed station meant a break with this tradition (Heil) as the government spent considerable amounts of money in order to create a strong

presentation of US government politics on shortwave radio (Johnson). State Socialist governments, on their hand, strengthened the quality of their stations in order not to lose the monopoly on information in the ether (Mikkonen). In the emerging “radio battles,” jazz music broadcasts had their place (Ritter, “Kontrollwahn”). State Socialist radio promoters faced the problem of coping with the influence of Western shortwave stations (Roth-Ey). On the State Socialist side, the State-controlled radio stations began focusing on agents of cultural politics and their institutions for the transmission of information. In terms of jazz-based persuasion strategies, hosts of music and jazz programs were included to create effective strategies. The counterparts of America’s Willis Conover were the Soviet radio broadcaster Arkadij Petrov, the Polish moderator Adam Jaroszewski, the Hungarian host Janos Gonda, and others.

East-West meetings in the jazz community were regarded as important by both sides so that journalists but also members of the secret service or other internal organizations related these events in detail. Perhaps the best example for this is the jazz festival in Tallinn of 1967, where American musician Charles Lloyd performed with his band while Willis Conover was present (Ritter, “Broadcasting”; see Feustle in this volume). After his return to the US, Lloyd described his simultaneous feelings of optimism and fear, whereas the key Soviet article on the festival praised the birth and international acceptance of a genuine Soviet jazz culture. US ambassador William E. Thompson ordered a detailed report of the event in order to judge its impact on US jazz persuasion strategies, concluding that Lloyd’s and Conover’s presence had been a great success for American aims (Thompson).

But for the Soviets, the Tallinn festival marked a breakpoint. On the one hand, the presentation of Soviet jazz was regarded as a success by Soviet cultural policy makers; on the other hand, communist party officers realized that with this festival they had begun to lose control over the cultural sphere, which they could not accept under any circumstances. Estonian organizers had invited Lloyd and Conover without being authorized by the Moscow leading party organizations to do so. As a result, the Estonian organizers of the festival were offended by their Moscow colleagues for having acted independently and without their permission, as an internal document of communist party control organs stated (*Materialy*). As a result, the organizers of the festival were expelled from their positions, and the already planned next edition for the following year could not take place. Even if Moscow’s political cultural actors regarded the festival as a success for the emerging Soviet jazz scene, they stopped its further development, instead aiming for the unconditional control of all jazz events in their country.

JAZZ FESTIVAL STRUCTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE: A WIN-WIN-SITUATION FOR THE COMMUNITY

After new jazz festivals had been set up in various Eastern Bloc countries since 1958, they soon became a working place for cultural policy makers from both sides (Applegate). Eastern European politicians supported these festivals logistically and financially because they wanted to demonstrate the modernity and openness of their own cultural sphere with regard to current and modern forms of music in accordance with the new Soviet jazz strategy. They also had a second aim: By fulfilling the wishes of their own national jazz scenes, they hoped to prevent them from developing anti-state oriented political actions. As jazz seemed to be relatively harmless after the rise of rock, political cultural agents in Eastern Bloc countries decided to cope with possible risks. Their colleagues from the West were willing to support these festivals, too. By sending jazz musicians or ensembles to these events, they intended to create or consolidate an America-friendly climate. Both political administrations thus shared an interest in continuing this festival structure.

As a result, a festival organizing mechanism evolved which was supported by activists from both sides. The jazz community of a given Eastern Bloc country created festival organizing boards that undertook concrete preparations for events. For logistic and financial support, the State Socialist governments provided help. If the festival board wanted to invite guests from the West, they contacted the US government either via US ambassadors in their countries or through personal contacts. VOA host Willis Conover played an important role in this as he could draw from a large network in Eastern Europe. After the festival, both sides celebrated the event as a success of their own strategies. Consequently, the organization of the following edition of the festival one or two years later was an almost logical step.

The best example for this mechanism is the Warsaw Jazz Jamboree which was held annually since 1958 throughout the whole Cold War period, only with a short interruption in the time of Polish martial law at the beginning of the 1980s. Here, the shared allocation of money by Polish and US or Western governments resulted in the performances of first-class jazz musicians in Warsaw being all but an exception. Likewise, the Debrecen Jazz Days festival in Hungary continued for decades. Other festivals were less long-lasting. The Prague Jazz Days, for instance, did not survive the end of the Prague Spring in 1968. But even in this case festival organization created a network of musicians, government employees, and media (especially radio) employees who used the

infrastructure of US public diplomacy and the public diplomacy of the Eastern Bloc countries for their own purposes.

EMERGING TRANSNATIONAL JAZZ SCENES IN THE EASTERN BLOC: A CONSEQUENCE OF COLD WAR COMPETITION?

As a result of the new jazz policy, the Soviet Union encouraged the rise of a indigenized jazz scene: jazz ensembles were officially registered, and musicians could compose, perform, and submit their compositions to radio stations. In addition, the government opened special public venues such as bars or cafes that catered to the new jazz scene (Ritter, "Negotiated"). In their efforts to create their own jazz culture, both the government and the jazz community referred to musical traditions in the Soviet Union. In fact, composers of the 1950s and 1960s could harken to the works of such early Soviet jazz musicians as Leonid Utyosov (Akimov), Aleksandr Tsfasman, or the German-Russian Eddie Rosner (Pickhan and Preisler), who were famous in the Soviet Union but almost totally unknown outside the Soviet world. Jazz and jazz education were included in Soviet institutions of higher musical education, and soon the Soviet jazz scene included musicians and composers like Oleg Lundstrem, Vadim Lyudvikovskiy, German Luk'yanov, and many others. Additionally, the Soviet government used the community to demonstrate the high quality of jazz music in the USSR.

Similar to the US State department tours, Soviet jazz ensembles had been sent on tours abroad since the mid-1960s. First, they toured other State Socialist countries, such as the Czech Republic (Prague Jazz Days) or Poland (Warsaw Jazz Jamboree). Beginning in the 1970s, they also travelled to the West, as in the case of the famous Ganelin-Trio, which performed in the US in 1988 (Ritter, "Radio"). The development of local jazz scenes in Eastern Bloc countries was supported by the US government as well. For American politicians, the members of these scenes were important progenitors of a pro-American orientation and as such had great value with regard to their persuasive power.

One of the most important US-American supporters of Eastern European jazz scenes of that time was VOA radio host Willis Conover. His radio show earned him such a great reputation in the Eastern Bloc countries that festival organizers invited him to their initial festivals at the beginning of the 1960s. Conover provided logistical help through the shipping of records, organizational help by establishing contacts to American jazz musicians and jazz institutions in the US, and personal help by inviting individual musicians with grants to the US,

as for instance to the Berklee College of Music, and even sponsoring them. Although Conover continued to declare his engagement as purely private, he could not deny that his aims and the aim of US political-cultural agents were the same (see Feustle in this volume).

Perhaps the strongest consolidation of a national jazz scene in a country in the Eastern Bloc occurred in Poland (Brodacki). Starting with musicians like Krzysztof Komeda (Batura), and later with Zbigniew Namysłowski, Adam Makowicz or Tomasz Stańko, to mention only a few, Polish jazz became its own brand (Ciesielski). Soon Polish jazz gained a high reputation not only within the Eastern Bloc countries but also in the West, especially in the US. Besides being highly original, the Polish jazz scene managed to present an image of itself as politically independent, if not dissident to the political regime while at the same time benefiting from collaboration with the Polish government. Polish musicians as well as their Soviet colleagues were honored with medals by their governments. Adam Makowicz even received a medal of honor from the US. This demonstrates that both sides understood the consolidation of local jazz scenes in State Socialist countries as a success of their own respective persuasion strategies (Fosler-Lussier, “Music Pushed”; Hatschek).

LEARNING FROM EACH OTHER: CULTURAL COMPETITION AS INNOVATION TRIGGER

Comparing the internal papers of cultural promotion officers on both sides of the Iron Curtain, one finds processes of constant mutual observation and learning (Aust and Schönflug). A good example is the mutual observation of the use of jazz in American and Eastern European radio stations. The most famous jazz program of the US was Willis Conover’s *Music USA-Jazz Hour*, which was broadcast via shortwave every night throughout the entire Eastern Bloc. Since this program had a wide audience, Soviet cultural policy makers attached a certain political significance to it. Conover’s program as well as VOA as a whole was listened to and criticized not only by ordinary citizens, but by the Soviet government. They analyzed these programs in order to adapt their own persuasion strategies and their radio programs.

State-owned publishers issued books and articles in scholarly journals in order to differentiate the ostensibly higher quality of their own broadcasting programs from the “harmful” activities of the US (Kurčatov). In reality, however, they provided detailed analyses of US-broadcasting practices, aiming to adapt these methods to their own broadcasts. From the mid-1960s on, the Soviet radio

station Junost' launched a jazz program called *Radioklub Metronom*, for which Conover's show served as a blueprint (Kiseleva). Here, jazz from the Soviet Union, from other Eastern Bloc countries, and even from the US was presented in order to offer the audience an *ersatz* to Conover's program. In the concrete example of the observation of Conover's broadcast, this process of mutual observation was continued on the other side of the Iron Curtain. From the research department of VOA, Conover obtained copies of these Eastern Bloc publications which had concrete mentions of his broadcast so that he could respond to any attacks made on his show.¹

CHALLENGES OF SOVIET PERSUASION STRATEGIES: AMBIVALENT CONTACTS TO THE WEST

The crucial idea for cultural policy makers in all Eastern Bloc countries was the strong effort to maintain control over all phenomena of cultural life at any time. This was not only a consequence of the basic positions in the role of culture in Marxist-Leninist ideology, but also a question of concretely maintaining political power. In their attempt to implement persuasion strategies with jazz, however, this idea limited State Socialist options.

As a consequence, any attempts to open Soviet and State Socialist cultural life towards forms of culture coming from abroad automatically entailed an ideological threat (Gould-Davies). Tensions occurred between promoters of cultural opening, on the one hand, and defenders of state control, on the other. The history of jazz in the Eastern Bloc is therefore a history of rapid changes between acceptance and restriction of that music with sharp and abrupt changes of diametrically opposed positions, often within short periods of time, without the option of a clear long-term perspective. In many cases, the personal sympathy or antipathy of an individual state politician decided the policy regarding jazz in any given town and even throughout the entire country. In contrast to the German NS regime with its openly racist approach to jazz, State Socialist countries never officially prohibited jazz. Even under Stalinism, when jazz was excluded from the public sphere and heavily restricted, no formal act of prohibition was made.

1 See copies of Jurij A Lukin's papers in the Willis Conover Collection (WCC) at the University of North Texas. Conover's assistant Efim Druker marked sentences related to VOA and Conover's broadcast.

The more the cultural policy makers in any Eastern European Bloc country followed an ideology and believed in the need for strict control, the more their interpretation of a persuasion strategy with jazz caused problems for them. Among the Eastern Bloc countries, great differences in practical realization occurred. While states like Poland or Hungary allowed their own jazz musicians access to some tours in restricted ways in the West, for Soviet political-cultural actors even a tour of a Soviet jazz ensemble into other State Socialist countries proved to be a problem. For instance, when a Soviet jazz band performed at the Prague Jazz Days in 1965, they were accompanied not only by high-ranking cultural policy makers like the president of the Composers Union, but also by secret service agents (Ritter, “Broadcasting”). This strong fear of foreign influence also explains why State Socialist political-cultural actors accepted tours of Western jazz ensembles. For them, this was the smaller evil: it was better to have US jazz musicians touring around the Eastern Bloc than to allow their own people to travel abroad. In the former, control over the public was possible; in the latter, it was not. During the existence of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, this strong idea of control limited the general options of Soviet and State Socialist persuasion strategies with jazz.

CHALLENGES OF US PERSUASION STRATEGIES: JAZZ AND RACE

A constant problem of the US administration with their implementation of persuasion strategies with jazz was the need to deal with discrimination against African American citizens confronted by the Civil Rights Movement. US officials as well as their ideological enemies in the East knew perfectly well that racial inequality in the US was one of the main problems in propagating jazz as a model for American values and democracy (Davenport, “Jazz and the Cold War”; Dudziak; Eschen). Therefore, an important question was how to cope with this inevitable issue. Speaking of jazz automatically meant that racial inequalities had to be brought up, which could disturb the proper image of America as a country of personal freedom and equal rights. Documents from US administrations suggest a sharp contradiction between the restricted awareness of racial inequality in the state apparatus, on the one hand, and the fabrication of an overwhelmingly positive image for the world on the other (*Racial Issues*). Conover himself, who had actively fought for desegregation in Washington after World War II (and who was offended by a branch of the Civil Rights Movement calling themselves *Black nationalists*) (Kofsky, my emphasis), did not speak on

this issue in his broadcasts. If, in any case, racial inequality was spoken of in official media, it was amplified by the Civil Rights Movement, and was thus framed as a soon-to-be cured symptom in an overall democratic system.

Jazz fans in Eastern Bloc countries had an entirely different approach to this issue than their US-American colleagues. Among fan cultures in the East, American jazz musicians were usually highly valued, and this value tended to be even higher if the musicians were black. In his book *Black Music, White Freedom*, which was first published unofficially in the Soviet *samizdat* in 1977, the Russian writer Efim Barban connected this idea to the Négritude Movement, thus giving it a theoretical conception (Barban). As jazz was considered an Afrodiasporic musical tradition, fan cultures in the Eastern Bloc projected onto black musicians the highest degree of authenticity and originality. The State Socialist government tried to benefit from this preference for black musicians. They installed their own ideological narrative as the real defenders of human values exemplified by their treatment of black people who could, according to them, live in peace only in Socialist countries, whereas they were oppressed and persecuted in the capitalist West. Soviet officials supported this argument by pointing to African American intellectuals and musicians who had embraced socialism such as W.E.B. Du Bois and Paul Robeson (Baldwin).

This official façade of interracial friendship and comradeship, however, obscured a variety of racist stereotypes and prejudices. Poland is a particularly telling example: positive opinions towards black people were found most of all in the small jazz community whereas resentments against them were widespread in other parts of society (Antoszek; Ząbek). For instance, so-called guest workers from sub-Saharan African countries experienced the silent but powerful everyday racism that existed under Socialism (Moskalewicz; Ferreira). Racial discrimination in the Soviet Union was spoken of in no single way during the entire Socialist period, nor was it addressed in the oppositional movements in Socialist countries. Thus, US officials did not speak about race because of the existing inequalities in American society, while USSR officials stressed this point in order to activate anti-American sentiments.

CONCLUSION

Both the US and State Socialist countries used jazz as a persuasion strategy in the Eastern Bloc for their ideological purposes. Yet, the basic conditions of its implementation by US actors differed with regard to the Eastern Bloc countries. This resulted in consequences for the argumentation on both sides. Especially at

the beginning of the Cold War, jazz was perceived as American music not only in the US, but also in Europe, if not in the whole world. Even after the consolidation of national jazz scenes in Eastern Europe, this perception remained. This meant that US political-cultural agents could spread their own music, albeit sometimes a bit naïvely, and their State Socialist counterparts had to accept it. In the words of Fosler-Lussier, jazz was the “music pushed” from the point of view of the US whereas it was “music pulled” from the view of the East (“Music Pushed”). The crucial problem of State Socialist cultural-political actors was that they were forced to use a “foreign” music as a means to persuade their own population of the supremacy of their own cultural and ideological model which, according to Marxist-Leninist ideology, per definition could not be the case. It was a demanding task to bring ideology and reality together, which proved to be a constant problem for State Socialism.

The US administration had a similar inconsistency problem with their ideology of democracy and freedom as they promoted Afrodiasporic popular music at a time when the question of racial equality remained unsolved. Even if these ideological inconsistencies could not be hidden totally from the public, the US government’s use of jazz as a crucial persuasion strategy in Eastern Europe worked out because Eastern Europeans knew little about segregation while the attraction of jazz music performed by black artists was extraordinarily high.

Looking at the implementation of persuasion strategies with regard to jazz itself, we clearly see parallels. After the failure of their initial actions during the 1950s, both counterparts explored differentiated models, but we find similarities in the institutional implementation of persuasion strategies. Both sides organized or reused think tanks to develop concrete measures. Radio was used by both sides as an important means for jazz transmissions. Tours by key musicians were regarded as important political endeavors which had to be organized and financed by the state. Thus, government-sponsored initiatives gave the jazz community a variety of options which, without the Cold War, might not have existed. It is telling that most of the Eastern European jazz festivals, having been so powerful over a number of decades, came into serious financial problems after the Cold War. Thus, jazz milieus benefited from this cultural competition. In a way, the Cold War did not so much disturb jazz’s development but rather proved to be an important stimulus. In this sense, the Cold War created its own cultural model, making the situation of constant threat in certain ways productive for musical developments (Gienow-Hecht, “Cold War Culture”; Langenkamp).

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