Austerität oder Abwertung? Warum Staaten unterschiedlich auf Zahlungsbilanzkrisen reagieren

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Cover der Ausgabe: PVS Politische Vierteljahresschrift Jahrgang 56 (2015), Heft 2
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Zeitschrift der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politikwissenschaft

Jahrgang 56 (2015), Heft 2

Autor:innen:
Verlag
Nomos, Baden-Baden
Erscheinungsjahr
2015
ISSN-Online
0032-3470
ISSN-Print
0032-3470

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Jahrgang 56 (2015), Heft 2

Austerität oder Abwertung? Warum Staaten unterschiedlich auf Zahlungsbilanzkrisen reagieren

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Autor:innen:
ISSN-Print
0032-3470
ISSN-Online
0032-3470
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Warum gelingt es einigen Staaten, Zahlungsbilanzkrisen erfolgreich durch Austerität und Strukturreformen zu bekämpfen, anderen Staaten jedoch nicht? Dieser Artikel argumentiert, dass die Globalisierung der Finanzmärkte die Verwundbarkeit der Wähler gegenüber einer Wechselkursabwertung in manchen Staaten stark erhöht hat. Diese verwundbaren Wähler sind daher eher bereit, schmerzhafte interne Anpassungsstrategien mitzutragen, um eine Abwertung des Wechselkurses zu verhindern. Wo diese Verwundbarkeit gering ist, ist eine solche Strategie jedoch politisch kaum umzusetzen. Eine vergleichende Fallstudie von acht osteuropäischen Staaten zeigt, dass die Verwundbarkeitsprofile der dortigen Wählerschaften die sehr unterschiedlichen Reaktionen dieser Staaten auf die globale Finanzkrise 2008-10 erklären können.

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