Rüstungsexportkontrolle durch den internationalen Waffenhandelsvertrag

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Bibliographische Infos

Cover der Ausgabe: S&F Sicherheit und Frieden Jahrgang 36 (2018), Heft 3
Vollzugriff

S&F Sicherheit und Frieden

Jahrgang 36 (2018), Heft 3

Autor:innen:
Verlag
Nomos, Baden-Baden
Copyrightjahr
2018
ISSN-Online
0175-274x
ISSN-Print
0175-274X

Kapitelinformationen

Vollzugriff

Jahrgang 36 (2018), Heft 3

Rüstungsexportkontrolle durch den internationalen Waffenhandelsvertrag

Autor:innen:
ISSN-Print
0175-274X
ISSN-Online
0175-274x
Kapitelvorschau:

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) sets, for the first time ever, legally binding, international rules for arms transfers. However, due to several problems, in particular the lack of clarity of some of its central concepts, the ATT is far from a significant contribution to the reduction of irresponsible arms transfers. This is highlighted by a look at the arms transfers to the states fighting in Yemen. Among several other measures this article suggests that ATT member states make use of the annual conferences of states parties to debate their interpretation of the central concepts and criteria, with the goal of agreeing in a step-by-step process on how to apply them.

Literaturverzeichnis

  1. Borawski J (1986) Confidence-Building Measures: Rescuing Arms Control. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 10(1): 111-131. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-115
  2. Çayirci E and Marinčič D (2009) Computer assisted exercises & training: A reference guide. Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley & Sons. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-115
  3. German Federal Foreign Office Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty). Available at: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/abruestung/uebersicht-konvalles-node/ruestungskontrolle/kse-vertrag-node (accessed 22 February 2018). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-115
  4. Goldblat J (2002) Arms control: The new guide to negotiations and agreements. London, Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-115
  5. Grand C (2009) European Security and Conventional Arms Control: An Agenda for the 21st Century. In: Zellner W, Schmidt H-J and Neuneck G (eds) Die Zukunft konventioneller Rüstungskontrolle in Europa: The future of conventional arms control in Europe. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 144-151. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-115
  6. Kapanadze S, Kühn U, Richter W and Zellner W (2017) Status-Neutral Security, Confidence-Building and Arms Control Measures in the Georgian Context. Hamburg. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-115
  7. Koivula T (2017) Conventional Arms Control in Europe and its Current Challenges. In: Koivula T and Simonen K (eds) Arms control in Europe: Regimes, trends and threats. Helsinki: National Defence University, 113-132. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-115
  8. Mearsheimer JJ (1990) Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War. International Security 15(1): 5-56. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-115
  9. NATO (1984) NATO and Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_138256.htm (accessed 22 February 2018). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-115
  10. Neuneck G (2017) The US Missile Defense Systems, Europe and Russia. In: Koivula T and Simonen K (eds) Arms control in Europe: Regimes, trends and threats. Helsinki: National Defence University, pp. 35-55. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-115
  11. OSCE – Ministerial Council (2016) From Lisbon to Hamburg: Declaration on the Twentieth Anniversary of the OSCE Framework for Arms Control. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-115
  12. OSCE Lisbon Summit (1996) Lisbon Document 1996. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-115
  13. Rittberger V, Efinger M and Mendler M (1990) Toward an East-West Security Regime: The Case of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. Journal of Peace Research 27(1): 55-74. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-115
  14. Schmidt H-J (2004) Der Wandel in der konventionellen Rüstungskontrolle 1989-1996. Frankfurt am Main, New York: Campus. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-115
  15. Schmidt H-J (2013) Verified transparency: New conceptual ideas for conventional arms control in Europe. Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-115
  16. Schultz T (2017) NATO voices skepticism over size of Russia’s Zapad military exercise. Deutsche Welle, 14 September. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-115
  17. Spitzer H (2009) News from Open Skies: A co-operative treaty maintaining military transparency. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-115
  18. Sutyagin I (2017) Zapad-2017: Why Do the Numbers Matter? Available at: https://rusi.org/commentary/zapad-2017-why-do-numbers-matter (accessed 23 January 2018). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-115
  19. Tiilikainen T (2015) Reviving co-operative security in Europe through the OSCE. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-115
  20. Vuorio M (2017) INF Treaty – Present State and Way Forward. In: Koivula T and Simonen K (eds) Arms control in Europe: Regimes, trends and threats. Helsinki: National Defence University, pp. 97-111. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-115
  21. Williams I (2017) The Russia – NATO A2AD Environment. Available at: https://missilethreat.csis.org/russia-nato-a2ad-environment/ (accessed 25 February 2018). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-115
  22. Boothby, Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict, OUP (2009). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  23. Bothe et al. (eds), New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts Commentary on the two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2013). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  24. Boulanin/Verbruggen, SIPRI Compendium on Article 36 Reviews SIPRI Background Paper (2017), 1. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  25. Casey-Maslen (ed), Weapons under International Human Rights Law, CUP (2014). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  26. Coupland, Review of the legality of weapons: a new approach- The SIrUS Project, 835 IRRC (1999). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  27. Daoust et al., New Wars, New Weapons? The Obligation of States to Assess the Legality of Means and Methods of Warfare, 84 IRRC (2002), 345. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  28. d’Aspremont, Articulating International Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law: Conciliatory Interpretation Under the Guise of Conflict of Norms-Resolution, in: Malgosia Fitzmaurice (ed), The European Convention on Human Rights and the UK Human Rights Act, Brill, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2011). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  29. Diplomatic Conference on the/Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Protection of war victims : Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva conventions, Protection of war victims : Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva conventions. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  30. Droege, The Interplay Between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, 40 Isr. L. Rev. (2007), 310. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  31. Fleck/Bothe, Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, OUP (2013). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  32. Germany Defence, Law of Armed Conflict Manual – Joint Service Regulation (ZDv) 15/2, May 2013, available at https://bit.ly/2Kl6U30 (last visited 25 March 2018). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  33. Henckaerts/Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, CUP (2005). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  34. ICRC, A Guide to the legal review of new weapons, means and methods of warfare – Measures to implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977, 2006, available at (last visited 25 March 2018). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  35. ILC, Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties with Commentaries, Yearbook of the IILC, 2011, Vol. II, Part Two, UN Doc A/66/10 from 2011, available at https://bit.ly/2MnTdNx (last visited 25 March 2018). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  36. Ipsen/Menzel (eds), Völkerrecht, C.H. Beck (2014). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  37. Kalshoven, Reaffirmation and development of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts: the Diplomatic Conference, Geneva, 1974–1977, 9 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (1978). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  38. Lubell, Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict, 87 IRRC (2005), 737. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  39. McClelland, The review of weapons in accordance with Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, 85 IRRC (2003), 397. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  40. Parks, Conventional Weapons and Weapons Reviews, 8 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law (2007). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  41. Pilloud et al. (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1987). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  42. Pilloud, Commentary on the additional protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, International Committee of the Red Cross ; M. Nijhoff (1987). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  43. Vöneky, Die Fortgeltung des Umweltvölkerrechts in Internationalen Bewaffneten Konflikten, Springer (2001). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  44. Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, OUP (2013). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  45. Wolfrum, Obligation of Result Versus Obligation of Conduct: Some Thoughts About the Implementation of International Obligations, Looking to the Future, Brill (2010). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-126
  46. Altmann, J. & Gubrud, M. (2013): Compliance Measures for an Autonomous Weapon Convention. ICRAC Working Paper #2. 05/2013. https://www.icrac.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Gubrud-Altmann_Compliance-Measures-AWC_ICRAC-WP2.pdf [08.03.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  47. Alwardt, C. & Krüger, M. (2016): Autonomy of Weapon Systems. IFAR Food for Fought Paper. Februar 2016. https://ifsh.de/file-IFAR/pdf_english/IFAR_FFT_1_final.pdf [08.03.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  48. Arkin, R. C. (2009): Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots. Boca Raton: CRC Press. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  49. Asaro, P. (2018): Why the world needs to regulate autonomous weapons, and soon. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 27. April 2018. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  50. Beard, Jack M.B. (2014): Autonomous Weapons and Human Responsibilities. Georgetown Journal of International Law 45. https://thebulletin.org/military-applications-artificial-intelligence/why-world-needs-regulate-autonomous-weapons-and-soon [24.05.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  51. Bekey, G. (2008): Autonomous Military Robotics: Risk, Ethics, and Design. Lin, P., Bekey, G. & Abney, K. (eds.). 2008. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  52. Boulanin, V. (2016): Mapping the Development of Autonomy in Weapons Systems – A Primer on Autonomy. SIPRI. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  53. Brundage, M. (2016): Limitations and Risks of Machine Ethics. In: Müller, V. C. (ed.), Risks of artificial intelligence. Boca Raton, FL London New York: CRC Press. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  54. Campaign to Stop Killer Robots (CtSKR) (2015): Artificial intelligence experts call for ban. stopkillerrobots.org Webseite. 28.07.2015. http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2015/07/aicall/ [20.03.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  55. CCW (2014): Report of the 2014 informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Genf 2014 CCW/MSP/2014/3. 11.06.2014. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/048/96/pdf/G1404896.pdf?OpenElement [20.02.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  56. CCW (2015): Report of the 2015 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. CCW/MSP/2015/3. 02.06.2015. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/111/60/pdf/G1511160.pdf?OpenElement [20.02.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  57. CCW (2016a): Report of the 2016 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). 2016. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G16/117/16/pdf/G1611716.pdf?OpenElement [20.02.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  58. CCW (2016b): Recommendations to the 2016 Review Conference. Advanced Version. 2016. https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/6BB8A498B0A12A03C1257FDB00382863/$file/Recommendations_LAWS_2016_AdvancedVersion+(4+paras)+.pdf [04.03.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  59. CCW (2017): Report of the 2017 Group of Governmental Expert on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). Advanced Version. 2017. https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/B5B99A4D2F8BADF4C12581DF0048E7D0/$file/2017_CCW_GGE.1_2017_CRP.1_Advanced_+corrected.pdf [24.05.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  60. CCW (2018a): Chair’summary of the discussion […]. Zusammenfassung des Vorsitzenden der GGE-Diskussion zu LAWS vom 10-13. April 2018. Genf. https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/DF486EE2B556C8A6C125827A00488B9E/$file/Summary+of+the+discussions+during+GGE+on+LAWS+April+2018.pdf [24.05.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  61. CCW (2018b): Humanitarian benefits of emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, submitted by the United States of America, Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Genf 2018 CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.4. https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/7C177AE5BC10B588C125825F004B06BE/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.4.pdf [25.05.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  62. Center for a New American Security (CNAS) (2017): Drone Proliferation: Policy Choices for the Trump Administration. Juni 2017. http://drones.cnas.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CNASReport-DroneProliferation-Final.pdf [25.04.17]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  63. Dickow, M., Dahlmann, A., Alwardt, C., Sauer, F. & Schörnig, N. (Dickow et al.) (2015): First Steps towards a Multidimensional Autonomy Risk Assessment (MARA) in Weapons Systems. IFAR Working Paper No. 20. Dezember 2015. Abrufbar unter: https://ifsh.de/file-IFAR/pdf_deutsch/IFAR-WP20.pdf [08.03.18] Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  64. Dickow, M. (2015): Robotik: ein Game-Changer für Militär und Sicherheitspolitik?. SWP-Studie 14/2015. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  65. Dickow, M., Hansel, M. & Mutschler, M.M. (2015): Präventive Rüstungskontrolle – Möglichkeiten und Grenzen mit Blick auf die Digitalisierung und Automatisierung des Krieges. Sicherheit und Frieden (S+F). 33. Jg. 2/2015 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  66. Geiss, R. (2015): Die völkerrechtliche Dimension autonomer Waffensysteme, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Studie. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/11444-20150619.pdf [26.03.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  67. Gibbs, S. (2017): Elon Musk leads 116 experts calling for outright ban of killer robots. The Guardian. 20.08.2017. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/aug/20/elon-musk-killer-robots-experts-outright-ban-lethal-autonomous-weapons-war [27.03.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  68. Guarini, M. (2011): Computational neural modeling and the philosophy of ethics. In: Anderson, M. & S. L. Anderson (eds.), Machine ethics. New York, NY: Cambridge Univ. Press. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  69. Henckaerts, J.-M. & Doswald-Beck, L. (2005): Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I: Rules, International Committee of the Red Cross. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  70. Heyns, C. (2013): Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions. UN General Assembly. A/HRC/23/47. New York: United Nations. 09.04.2013. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  71. Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2012): Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots. Human Rights Watch, International Human Rights Council, International Human Rights Clinic. 11/2012. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112_ForUpload.pdf [21.03.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  72. Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2015): Mind the Gap: The Lack of Accountability for Killer Robots. Human Rights Watch, International Human Rights Clinic. 04/2015. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms0415_ForUpload_0.pdf [21.03.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  73. ICRC (2014): ICRC Statement to Concluding Session CCW Expert Meeting on ”Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems”. Genf 2014. 16.05.2014. https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/8E6FED84C1D0308CC1257D1500522314/$file/ICRC_LAWS_FinalStatement_2014.pdf [04.03.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  74. Jenks, C. (2016): The Distraction of Full Autonomy and the Need to Refocus the CCW/LAWS Discussion on Critical Functions. In: Geiß, R. & Lahmann, H. (2016): Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: Technology, Definition, Ethics, Law & Security. Expert opinions delivered at the CCW informal meeting of experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems. Division Conventional Arms Control (OR10). Auswärtiges Amt 2016. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  75. Kurz, C. (2017): Interview: Die UN-Waffenkonvention und die „Killer-Roboter“. Netzpolitik.org, 04.12.2017. Aktualisiert 05.12.2017. https://netzpolitik.org/2017/interview-die-un-waffenkonvention-und-die-killer-roboter/ [21.03.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  76. Lewis, J. (2015): The Case for Regulating Fully Autonomous Weapons. Yale Law Journal 124(4). Jan.-Feb. 2015. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  77. Mackworth, A. (2011). Architectures and Ethics for Robots, in: M. Anderson & S. Anderson (eds.), Machine Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  78. Open Letter to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (2017), Future of Life Institute, 21.08.2017. https://futureoflife.org/autonomous-weapons-open-letter-2017/ [13.02.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  79. Richter, W. (2013): Rüstungskontrolle für Kampfdrohnen. SWP-Aktuell 29/2013. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  80. Schörnig, N. (2015): From Quantitative to Qualitative Arms Control: The Challenges of Modern Weapons Development. In: Global Trends 2015. Prospects for World Society. Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, Bonn. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  81. Sharkey, N. (2016): Staying in the loop: human supervisory control of weapons. In: Bhuta, N. et. al. (ed.) (2016): Autonomous Weapons Systems: Law, Ethics, Policy, Cambridge Univ. Press. Cambridge 2016. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  82. Sparrow, R. (2007): Killer Robots. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24(1). 2007. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  83. U.S. Army (2017): The U.S. Army Robotic and Autonomous Systems Strategy. Maneuver, Aviation, and Soldier Division Army Capabilities Integration Center. 03/2017. http://www.tradoc.army.mil/FrontPageContent/Docs/RAS_Strategy.pdf [25.03.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  84. U.S. Department of Defense (2012): Directive 3000.09, Subject: Autonomy in Weapon Systems. U.S. DoD, 21.11.2012. Aktualisiert: 08.05.2017. http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf [06.03.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  85. U.S. Department of the Navy & U.S. Marine Corps (2016): Naval Aviation Vision 2016-2025. 06/2016. http://www.navy.mil/strategic/Naval_Aviation_Vision.pdf [23.03.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  86. UK Ministry of Defence (2012): Joint Concept Note 3/2012 Future Air and Space Operating Concept, 09/2012. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  87. UNA-UK (2018): Minority of states block progress on regulating killer robots, 04.09.2018, https://www.una.org.uk/news/minority-states-block-progress-regulating-killer-robots [09.10.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  88. UN Office at Geneva (2018): Background on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/8FA3C2562A60FF81C1257CE600393DF6?OpenDocument [20.02.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  89. UN Office for Disarmament Affairs: Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ccwc 16.10.2018. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  90. Vignard, K. (2018): Manifestos and open letters: Back to the future? Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 26.04.2018. https://thebulletin.org/military-applications-artificial-intelligence/manifestos-and-open-letters-back-future [25.05.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  91. Work, R. (2016): Remarks by Deputy Secretary Work on Third Offset Strategy. Rede gehalten in Brüssel, Belgien. U.S. Department of Defense. 28.04.2016. https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/ 753482/remarks-by-deputy-secretary-work-on-third-offset-strategy/ [19.03.18]. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-133
  92. Ablon, L., & Bogart, T. (2017) Zero Days, Thousands of Nights: The Life and Times of Zero-Day Vulnerabilities and Their Exploits. RAND Corporation. Retrieved from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1751.html Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  93. Amoroso, E. G. (2012). Cyber attacks: protecting national infrastructure. Elsevier. pp.4-33. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  94. Arkin, W. M. (1999, March 29). Sunrise, Sunset. Washington Post. Retrieved June 2, 2018, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/dotmil/arkin032999.htm Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  95. Avgerinos, T., Cha, S. K., Rebert, A., Schwartz, E. J., Woo, M., & Brumley, D. (2014). Automatic exploit generation. Communications of the ACM, 57(2), 74-84. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  96. Bull, H. (1966). The control of the arms race: Disarmament and arms control in the missile age. New York: Praeger. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  97. Bumiller, E., & Shanker, T. (2012, October 11). Panetta Warns That U.S. Is Vulnerable to Cyber-Pearl Harbor. The New York Times. Retrieved February 26, 2018, from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/world/panetta-warns-of-dire-threat-of-cyberattack.html Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  98. Burgers, T. & Robinson, D.R.S. (2016), Networked Authoritarianism Is on the Rise, in Sicherheit und Frieden/Security and Peace, 34(4), 248–252. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  99. Borghard, E. D., & Lonergan, S. W. (2018, January 16). Why Are There No Cyber Arms Control Agreements?, Retrieved March 1, 2018, from https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-are-there-no-cyber-arms-control-agreements Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  100. Boulanin, V. (2013, May 30). Arms production goes cyber: a challenge for arms control Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Retrieved from https://www.sipri.org/node/361 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  101. Bronk, C., & Wallach, D. (2013, March 26). Opinion: Cyber arms control? Forget about it. Retrieved June 2, 2018, from https://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/26/opinion/bronk-wallach-cyberwar/ Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  102. Cavelty, M. D. (2013). From Cyber-Bombs to Political Fallout: Threat Representations with an Impact in the Cyber-Security Discourse, International Studies Review 15(1),105-122. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  103. Craig, A., & Valeriano, B. (2016). Conceptualising Cyber Arms Races. In 2016 8th International Conference on Cyber Conflict Cyber Power, Pissanidis, N., Rõigas, H. & Veenendaal M. (Eds.),141-158, Tallinn: NATO CCD COE Publications. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  104. Dittrich, P., & Boening, B. (2017). More security in cyberspace: The case for arms control. Security Policy Working Paper, (9), 1-5, BAKS Federal Academy for Security Policy, Berlin, Germany. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  105. Freedom House. (2017). Freedom on the Net 2017. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2017 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  106. Floridi, L. (2007). A Look into the Future Impact of ICT on Our Lives. The Information Society,23(1), 59-64. doi:10.1080/01972240601059094 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  107. Galeotti, M. (2018, January 31). Size Doesn’t Matter for Spies Anymore. Retrieved March 01, 2018, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/31/size-doesnt-matter-for-spies-anymore/ Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  108. Galinec, D., Možnik, D., & Guberina, B. (2017). Cybersecurity and cyber defence: National level strategic approach. Automatika, 58(3), 273-286. doi:10.1080/00051144.2017.1407022 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  109. Glenny, M. (2011, October 12). The Cyber Arms Race Has Begun. Retrieved February 26, 2018, from https://www.thenation.com/article/cyber arms-race-has-begun/ Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  110. Goodin, D. (2008, July 21). Researcher’s hypothesis may expose uber-secret DNS flaw. The Register. Retrieved from https://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/21/dns_flaw_speculation/ Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  111. Healey, J. (2013a). A fierce domain: Conflict in cyberspace, 1986 to 2012. Vienna, VA: Cyber Conflict Studies Association. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  112. Healey, J. (2013b). The Lessons of Cyber Conflict History, So Far…. Atlantic Council. Excerpted from the introduction of A Fierce Domain: Cyber Conflict 1986 to 2012. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  113. Healey, J. (2016, November 1). The U.S. Government and Zero-Day Vulnerabilities: From Pre-Heartbleed to Shadow Brokers. Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs, Journal of International Affairs. Retrieved from https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/healey_vulnerability_equities_process Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  114. Hurwitz, R. (1999). Who Needs Politics? Who Needs People? The Ironies of Democracy in Cyberspace. Contemporary Sociology,28(6), 655-661. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2655536 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  115. International Data Corporation. (2017, March 29). Worldwide Spending on Security Technology Forecast to Reach $81.7 Billion in 2017, According to New IDC Spending Guide. Retrieved June 1, 2018, from https://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS42425417 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  116. Jellenc, E. (2012). Explaining Politico-Strategic Cyber Security: The Feasibility of Applying Arms Race Theory. In 11th European Conference on Information warfare and security: ECIW2012, (20), 151-162). Reading: Academic Publishing. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  117. Jenkins, H., Thorburn, D. (2003). Introduction: Digital Revolution, Informed Citizen and the Culture of Democracy, in Democracy and new media, 1-17, Jenkins, H and Thorburn, D. (eds.). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  118. Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception in international politics. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  119. Kaspersky, E. (2012, July 3). What Are The Top IT Security Threats? Retrieved March 01, 2018, from https://eugene.kaspersky.com/2012/07/03/worse-than-cheese-five-main-issues-of-it-security/ Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  120. Kehler, C. R., Lin, H., & Sulmeyer, M. (2017). Rules of engagement for cyberspace operations: A view from the USA. Journal of Cybersecurity, 3(1), 69-80. doi:0.1093/cybsec/tyx003 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  121. Kung, L., Kröll, A., Ripken, B., & Walker, M. (1999). Impact of the Digital Revolution on the Media and Communications Industries. Javnost – The Public Journal of the European Institute for Communication and Culture, 6, 29-47. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.1999.11008717 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  122. Kydd, A. (2000). Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the Hawk Perspective. American Journal of Political Science, 44(2), 228-244. doi:10.2307/2669307 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  123. Levy, S. (2001). Crypto: How the code rebels beat the government--saving privacy in the digital age. Penguin Press. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  124. Limnéll, J. (2016). The cyber arms race is accelerating – what are the consequences? Journal of Cyber Policy, 1(1), 50-60. doi:10.1080/23738871.2016.1158304 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  125. Litwak, R., & King, M. (2015). Arms Control in Cyberspace? (Wilson Briefs, pp. 1-8, Issue brief). Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  126. Macak, K. (2017, July 18). From Cyber Norms to Cyber Rules: Re-engaging States as Law-makers | Leiden Journal of International Law. Retrieved February 26, 2018, from https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/leiden-journal-of-international-law/article/from-cyber-norms-to-cyber-rules-reengaging-states-as-lawmakers/63A45029B685C11BBD9512AC0459FAE5 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  127. Maybaum, M., & Tölle, J. (2016). Arms control in cyberspace – architecture for a trust-based implementation framework based on conventional arms control methods. Cyber Conflict (CyCon), 2016 8th International Conference on, 159-174. doi:10.1109/CYCON.2016.7529433 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  128. McAfee. (2012, January 30). 57% Believe a Cyber Arms Race is Currently Taking Place, Reveals McAfee-Sponsored Cyber Defense Report. Retrieved March 01, 2018, from https://www.mcafee.com/us/about/news/2012/q1/20120130-02.aspx Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  129. Metz, C. (2016, June 03). Will Humans or Bots Rule Cybersecurity? The Answer Is Yes. Retrieved February 27, 2018, from https://www.wired.com/2016/08/will-humans-bots-rule-cybersecurity-answer-yes/ Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  130. Meyer, P. (2012) Diplomatic Alternatives to Cyber-Warfare, The RUSI Journal, 157(1), 14-19, DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2012.664357 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  131. Mimran, D. (2017). The cyberspace arms race: artificial intelligence & cyber security (Issue brief). The Forum Network (OECD). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  132. Modderkolk, H. (2018, January 25). Dutch agencies provide crucial intel about Russia’s interference in US-elections. De Volkskrant. Retrieved from https://www.volkskrant.nl/tech/dutch-agencies-provide-crucial-intel-about-russia-s-interference-in-us-elections~a4561913/ Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  133. Nakashima, E. (2017, November 15). Trump administration pulls back curtain on secretive cybersecurity process. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-pulls-back-curtain-on-secretive-cybersecurity-process/2017/11/15/f9a2e3ec-ca16-11e7-aa96-54417592cf72_story.html Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  134. Netanyahu,, B. (2017, June 26). PM Netanyahu addresses TAU Cyber-Tech conference. Retrieved from http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2017/Pages/PM-Netanyahu-addresses-TAU-Cyber-Tech-conference-26-June-2017.aspx Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  135. Noor, E. (2015). Strategic Governance of Cyber Security: Implications for East Asia. In Navigating Change: ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership in East Asia and in Global Governance, 150-163, Rizal Sukma and Yoshihide Soeya (eds), Japan Center for International Exchange, Tokyo, Japan. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  136. Nye Jr., J. S. (2011a). Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Security? Strategic Studies Quarterly, 5(4), 18-38. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  137. Nye Jr., J. S. (2011b). The Future of Power, Public Affairs, NYC, New York Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  138. Nye Jr., J. S. (2015, October 01). The world needs new norms on cyberwarfare. Retrieved February 26, 2018, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-world-needs-an-arms-control-treaty-for-cybersecurity/2015/10/01/20c3e970-66dd-11e5-9223-70cb36460919_story.html?utm_term=.0492eca3e247 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  139. Poulsen, K. (2001, June 15). Solar Sunrise hacker ‘Analyzer’ escapes jail. Retrieved from https://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/06/15/solar_sunrise_hacker_analyzer_escapes/ Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  140. Rid, T. & Buchanan, B. (2014) Attributing Cyber Attacks, In Journal of Strategic Studies, 38(1-2) Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  141. Rid, T., & McBurney, P. (February/March 2012). Cyber-Weapons. RUSI Journal, 157(1) 6–13.doi: 10.1080/03071847.2012.664354 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  142. Robinson, N., Gribbon, L., Horvath, V., & Robertson, K. (2013). Cyber-security threat characterisation A rapid comparative analysis (pp. 1-86, Rep.). Santa Monica, CA: RAND. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  143. Rosenzweig, P. (2015, February 26). Problems with Cyber Arms Control. Retrieved June 01, 2018, from https://lawfareblog.com/problems-cyber-arms-control Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  144. Science and Technology Facilities Council. (2018). A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION. Retrieved February 24, 2018, from https://www.stfc.ac.uk/files/digital-revolution-infographic/ Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  145. Schelling, T. C., & Halperin, M. H. (1961). Strategy and arms control. New York: The twentieth century fund. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  146. Schwartz, A. & Knake, R. (2016) Government’s role in vulnerability disclosure: Creating a permanent and accountable vulnerability equities process, discussion paper 04, Belfer Center for International Affair Harvard Kennedy School. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  147. Singer, P. W., & Friedman, A. (2014). Cybersecurity and cyberwar: what everyone needs to know. New York: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  148. Slayton, R. (2017). What Is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance? Conceptions, Causes, and Assessment. International Security, 41(3), 72-109. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00267https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00267 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  149. Smith, B. (2017, March 09). The need for a Digital Geneva Convention. Retrieved March 01, 2018, from https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/02/14/need-digital-geneva-convention/ Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  150. Stavridis, J. (2017, May 15). The United States Is Not Ready for a Cyber-Pearl Harbor. Retrieved February 26, 2018, from http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/15/the-united-states-is-not-ready-for-cyber-pearl-harbor-ransomware-hackers-wannacry/ Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  151. Stecklow, S., & Fassihi, F. (2009, December 11). Thousands Flee Iran as Noose Tightens. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB126049484505086861 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  152. Stein, J. (2013). Threat Perception in International Relations. In the Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology.: Oxford University Press. Retrieved 26 Feb. 2018, from http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199760107.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199760107-e-012. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  153. Tsipori, T. (2016, April 4). Israeli cybersecurity grabs 8% global market share. Retrieved May 31, 2018, from https://www.globes.co.il/en/article-israeli-cyber-industry-hits-the-big-time-1001114669 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  154. Tynkkynen, M. (2016). NEW TECHNOLOGIES – Risks and opportunities: Overview of the challenges and opportunities arising from new and developing technologies in risk management and workers’ compensation insurance., for The Finnish Workers’ Compensation Center, Analyses No 7E Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  155. Ullrich, J. (2004). The Disappearing Patch Window. Observations from the Internet Storm Center, SANS. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  156. U.N. General Assembly, 50th Session. Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification (A/50/37). 22 September 1995. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  157. U.N. General Assembly, 79th Plenary Meeting. General and complete disarmament (A/RES/51/45). 10 December 1996. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  158. UN General Assembly (2013, June 24th) Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, A/68/98. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  159. Valeriano, B., & Maness, R. C. (2015). Cyber war versus cyber realities: cyber conflict in the international system. New York: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  160. Vacca, J. R. (2012). Computer and information security handbook. Newnes. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  161. Walt, S. (1985). Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power. International Security, 9(4), 3-43. doi:10.2307/253854 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  162. Ward, D., & Morgus, R. (2016). Professor Cy Burr’s Graphic Guide to: International Cyber Norms, 1-26, New America. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  163. White House (2017) Vulnerabilities equities policy and process for the United States government, White House Report. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  164. Wirth, A. (2016) ‘The Cyber Arms Race Is On’: Lessons from the U.S. Presidential Election. Biomedical Instrumentation & Technology: 50 (6), 463-465. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  165. Wirtz, J. J. (2017). The Cyber Pearl Harbor. Intelligence and National Security, 32(6), 758-767. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1294379 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  166. Wolter, D. (2013, September). The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity. Retrieved June 2, 2018, from https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_09/The-UN-Takes-a-Big-Step-Forward-on-Cybersecurity#source Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  167. Zetter, K. (2015, May 15). Feds says that banned researcher commandeered a plane. Retrieved February 26, 2018, from https://www.wired.com/2015/05/feds-say-banned-researcher-commandeered-plane/ Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-140
  168. Anthony, Ian; Hart, John (2018): Strengthening the ban on chemical weapons: The case of Syria. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2018/strengthening-ban-chemical-weapons-case-syria Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  169. Barmet, Céline; Thränert, Oliver (2016): Syria and the Chemical Weapons Ban. ETH Zürich: Center for Security Studies (CSS) Policy Perspectives. Vol. 4 (8), S. 2. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  170. Barmet, Céline; Thränert, Oliver (2017): The Chemical Weapons Ban in Troubled Waters. ETH Zürich: Center for Security Studies (CSS) Analysis in Security Policy. Nr. 207. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  171. Becker-Jakob, Una (2013): Balanced minimalism: The biological weapons convention after its 7th review conference. Report, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  172. Bennett, Bruce W. (2013): The Challenge of North Korean Biological Weapons. Testimony presented before the United States House of Representatives; Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities; October 11, 2013; RAND Cooperation, Santa Monica, USA. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  173. Biosecure Ltd. (2017): Genome Editing and biosecurity. Background paper. URL: http://nas-sites.org/dels/files/2017/05/Biosecure-GeneEditingBiosecurity-Report-170925.pdf Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  174. Callaway, Ewen (2017): US defence agencies grapple with gene drives. Nature, 547(7664):388– 389. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  175. Chemical Abstract Service (CAS). Abgerufen am 26.02.2018. URL: http://support.cas.org Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  176. Clapper, James R. (2016): Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Statement for the Record by James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence. Senate Armed Service Committee. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/SASC_Unclassified_2016_ATA_SFR_FINAL.pdf. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  177. Clingendael report; van Ham, Peter; van der Meer, Sico; Ellahi, Maki (2017): Chemical Weapons Challenges Ahead: The Past and Future of the OPCW. Den Haag: Niederländisches Institut für Internationale Beziehungen Clingendael. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  178. Crowley, Michael (2016): Chemical Control. Palgrave Macmillan UK. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  179. Crowley, Michael; Dando, Malcolm (2015): The use of incapacitating chemical agent weapons in law enforcement. The International Journal of Human Rights, 19(4):465–487. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  180. Geissler, Erhard; Moon, John E. v. C. (1999): Biological and toxin weapons: research, development, and use from the Middle Ages to 1945. SIPRI. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  181. Guillemin, Jeanne (2006): Scientists and the history of biological weapons. EMBO Reports. S. S45-49. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  182. Hammond, Andrew M. and Galizi, Roberto (2018): Gene drives to fight malaria: current state and future directions. Pathogens and Global Health, S. 1–12. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  183. Higgins, Andrew; New York Times vom 27.09.2017: Russia Destroys Chemical Weapons, and Faults U.S. for Not Doing So. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/world/europe/russia-putin-chemical-weapons.html Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  184. Himmel, Mirko (2016): Das Biowaffenübereinkommen. Wissenschaft & Frieden. 3:42-45. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  185. Himmel, Mirko; Rempp, Gesine; Vill, Volkmar (2017): Eine Welt ohne Chemiewaffen? Wissenschaft & Frieden. 2:52-55. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  186. Holmes, Oliver; Phillips, Tom. The Guardian vom 24.02.2017: Kim Jong-nam killed by VX nerve agent, say Malaysian police. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/24/kim-jong-nam-north-korea-killed-chemical-weapon-nerve-agent-mass-destruction-malaysian-police Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  187. Leitenberg, Milton; Kuhn, Jens H.; Zilinskas, Raymond A. (2012): The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History. Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  188. Lentzos, Filippa (2016a): Increasing transparency in biodefence: A 2016 visit to a German military medical biodefence facility. EU Non-Proliferation Papers, Nr. 52. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  189. Lentzos, Filippa [Hrg.] (2016b): Biological Threats in the 21st Century: The Politics, People, Science and Historical Roots. Imperial College Press, London. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  190. Martinetz, Dieter (1996): Vom Giftpfeil zum Chemiewaffenverbot. Frankfurt am Main: Harri Deutsch Thun. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  191. Meier, Oliver (2017): Nichtverbreitung in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit. SWP Studie S9. Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  192. Meier, Oliver; Trapp, Ralf (2016): Russia’s Chemical Terrorism Proposal: Red Herring or Useful Tool? Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 7. Juni. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  193. Mirzayanov, Vil S. (2009): State Secrets: An Insider’s Chronicle of the Russian Chemical Weapons Program. Outskirts Press, Inc., Denver, Colorado. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  194. Müller-Färber, Thomas; Hiemann, Roland (2010): Das Verbot von Chemiewaffen: Fünf Hürden auf dem Weg zu einer chemiewaffenfreien Welt. Sicherheit und Frieden (S+F) / Security and Peace. 28. Jg., Nr. 1, S. 48-54. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  195. Revill, James (2013): A peer-review mechanism for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), New York and Geneva. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  196. Riches, James R.; Read, Robert W.; Black, Robin M.; Cooper, Nicholas J.; Timperley, Christopher M. (2012): Analysis of Clothing and Urine from Moscow Theatre Siege Casualties Reveals Carfentanil and Remifentanil Use. J Anal Toxicol, 36(9):647–56. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  197. Santoro, David (2017): Myanmar – A nonproliferation success story. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/report/myanmar-nonproliferation-success-story Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  198. Shaheen, Kareem. The Guardian vom 14. März 2016: ‘Almost 1,500 killed in chemical weapons attacks’ in Syria. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  199. Trapp, Ralf (2015): Lessons Learned from the OPCW Missions in Syria. https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/PDF/Lessons_learned_from_the_OPCW_Mission_in_Syria.pdf Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  200. Tucker, Jonathan B. (2006): War of Nerves. New York. Anchor Books, Random House. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  201. VEREX (1993): Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint. Bericht der VEREX-Expertengruppe. Genf, 23. September 1993. https://www.unog.ch/bwcdocuments/1993-09-VEREX4/BWC_CONF.III_VEREX_09.pdf Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  202. Warrick, John. Washington Post vom 10. Dezember 2017: Microbes by the ton: Officials see weapons threat as North Korea gains biotech expertise. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/microbes-by-the-ton-officials-see-weapons-threat-as-north-korea-gains-biotech-expertise/2017/12/10/9b9d5f9e-d5f0-11e7-95bf-df7c19270879_story.html Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  203. Zanders, Jean Pascal [Hrg.] (2013): The Future of the CWC in the Post-Destruction Phase. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Report Nr. 15. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-146
  204. Achilli, L., & Sanchez, G. (2017): What Does It Mean to Disrupt the Business Models of People Smugglers?, Retrieved May 25, 2018, from: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/46165/PB_2017_09_MPC.pdf?sequence=1 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  205. Bigo, D. (2006): Protection: Security, Territory and Population, in: J. Huysmans, A. Dobson, & R. Prokhovrik, The Politics of Protection: Sites of Insecurity and Political Agency. Routledge, pp. 84-100 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  206. Bob, C. (2010): The market for human rights, in: A. Prakash, & M. Gugerty, Advocacy Organizations and Collective Action (pp. 133-154). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  207. Campana, P. (2016): Explaining Criminal Networks: Strategies and Potential Pitfalls, in: Methodological Innovations, 9, pp. 1-10. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  208. Carbone, M. (2015): Beyond the Telemachus complex: courses, discourses and the 2014 Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, 53, pp. 83-92. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  209. Cuttita, P. (2017): Repoliticization Through Search and Rescue? Humanitarian NGOs and Migration Management in the Central Mediterranean, in: Geopolitics, 22. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  210. efe (2018): Italy to accept 41 migrants rescued by US ship Trenton, Retrieved June 28, 2018, from: https://www.efe.com/efe/english/portada/italy-to-accept-41-migrants-rescued-by-us-ship-trenton/50000260-3651975 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  211. Euractiv (2018): Afrikanische Union lehnt EU-Migrationszentren in Afrika ab, Retrieved October 20, 2018, from: https://www.euractiv.de/section/eu-aussenpolitik/news/afrikanische-union-lehnt-eu-migrationszentren-in-afrika-ab/ Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  212. European Political Strategy Centre (2017): EPSC Strategic Notes – Irregular Migration via the Central Mediterranean. From Emergency Responses to Systemic Solut, Retrieved May 25, 2018, from: https://ec.europa.eu/ epsc/sites/epsc/files/strategic_note_issue_22_0.pdf Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  213. Fernández, F. V. (2016): The European operations in the Mediterranean Sea to deal with migration as a symptom. From the Italian operation Mare Nostrum to Frontex operations Triton and Posseidon, EUNAVFOR-MED and NATO’s assistance in the Aegean Sea, in: Spanish Yearbook of International Law (pp. 93-117). Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  214. Giovinazzo, D. (2017): La Guardia costiera: “Le Ong non sono un fattore di attrazione per i migranti”, Retrieved May 25, 2018, from: http://www.eunews.it/2017/05/03/migranti-guardia-costiera-ong-non-sono-un-fattore-di-attrazione-per-i-migranti/84403 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  215. Guardia Costiera (2016): Search And Rescue Activity and Migratory flows in Central Mediterranean sea, Retrieved May 25, 2018, from: www.guardiacostiera.gov.it/en/Documents/search-and-rescue-activity/search-and-rescue-activity-and-migratory-flows-in-central-mediterranean-sea.pdf Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  216. Guardia Costiera (2017): Report on Search And Rescue Activity and Migratory flows in Central Mediterranean sea, Retrieved May 23, 2018, from: www.guardiacostiera.gov.it/attivita/Documents/attivita-sar-immigrazione-2017/Rapporto_annuale_2017_ENG.pdf Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  217. Harlan, C. (2018): The retreat of rescue ships from the Mediterranean is a sign of changing odds for migrants, Retrieved June 28, 2018, from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/the-retreat-of-rescue-ships-from-the-mediterranean-is-a-sign-of-changing-odds-for-migrants/2018/06/15 /099b74f0-6e61-11e8-b4d8-eaf78d4c544c_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_ term=.fb2b0f8ca0ab Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  218. Heller, C., & Pezzani, L. (2016): Death by Rescue: The Lethal Effects of the EU’s Policies of Non-Assistance, Retrieved May 8, 2018, from: https://deathbyrescue.org/report/narrative/ Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  219. Heller, C., & Pezzani, L. (2018): The Iuventa Case, Retrieved June 20, 2018, from: https://blamingtherescuers.org/iuventa/ Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  220. Human Rights Watch (2017): EU: Draft Code for Sea Rescues Threatens Lives. Leaked Document Would Tie Nongovernmental Groups’ Hands, Retrieved May 26, 2018, from: https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/12/eu-draft-code-sea-rescues-threatens-lives Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  221. IMO, ICS, & UNHCR (2015): Rescue at Sea. A guide to principles and practice as applied to refugees and migrants. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  222. IOM (2017): New Study Concludes Europe’s Mediterranean Border Remains ‘World’s Deadliest’, Retrieved May 2, 2018, from: https://www.iom.int/news/new-study-concludes-europes-mediterranean -border-remains-worlds-deadliest Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  223. IOM (2018): missingmigrants Dataset, Retrieved 05 30, 2018, from: https://missingmigrants.iom.int/global-figures/all/xls Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  224. Irrera, D. (2016): Migrants, the EU and NGOs: The ‘Practice’ of Non-Governmental SAR Operations, in: Romanian Journal of European Affairs, 16(3), pp. 20-35. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  225. Jünemann, A. (2002): From the Bottom to the Top: Civil Society and Transnational Non-Governmental Organizations in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, in: Democratization, 9, pp. 86-105. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  226. NY Times (2017): Doctors Without Borders Suspends Migrant Rescue Patrols Off Libyan Coast, Retrieved May 22, 2018, from: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/12/world/europe/doctors-without-borders-suspends-migrant-rescue-patrols-off-libyan-coast.html Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  227. Pallister-Wilkins, P. (2015): The Humanitarian Politics of European Border Policing: Frontex and Border Police in Evros, in: International Political Sociology, 9(1), pp. 53-69. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  228. Pallister-Wilkins, P. (2017): Médecins Avec Frontières and the making of a humanitarian borderscape, in: Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 36(1/2018), pp. 114-138. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  229. Panebianco, S. (2016): The Mare Nostrum Operation and the SAR approach: the Italian response to address the Mediterranean migration crisis, EUMedEA Online Working Paper Series, Retrieved 04 25, 2018, from: http://www.dsps.unict.it/sites/default/files/files/panbianco_EUMedEA_JMWP_03_2016__.pdf Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  230. Rah, S. (2009): Asylsuchende und Migranten auf See. Staatliche Rechte und Pflichten aus völkerrechtlicher Sicht, Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  231. Refai, A. (2017): When humanity is washed ashore of Europe: SAR operations in the Mediterranean, their challenges and roles in the context of the Refugee crisis, CERAH working paper, 48, Retrieved May 31, 2018, from: https://www.cerahgeneve.ch/files/4915/0841/8071/WP48-When-Humanity-Is-Washed-Ashore-Of-Europe.pdf Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  232. Roos, C., & Orsini, G. (2015): How to reconcile the EU border paradox? The concurrence of refugee reception and deterrence, Retrieved June 5, 2018, from: https://www.ies.be/files/4:2015%20Policy%20Brief.pdf Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  233. Schneider, P. (2016): Migranten und Flüchtlinge als Herausforderung für Deutschland und Europa, in: S+F Sicherheit und Frieden, 34(1), pp. 1-19. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  234. Schultz, T. (2017): EU backs Italy in stand-off with NGOs over refugee rescue, Retrieved June 6, 2018, from: http://www.dw.com/en/eu-backs-italy-in-stand-off-with-ngos-over-refugee-rescue/a-39546570 Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  235. Seehase, J. (2013): Die Grenzschutzagentur FRONTEX. Chance oder Bedrohung für den Europäischen Flüchtlingsschutz, Baden-Baden: NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  236. Tagesschau.de (2018): Containerschiff darf nach Italien, Retrieved June 28, 2018, from: http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/alexander-maersk-101.html Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  237. Tazzioli, M. (2016): Border displacements: Challenging the politics of rescue between Mare Nostrum and Triton, in: Migration Studies, 4(1), pp. 1-19. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  238. UNHCR (2012): Mediterranean takes record as most deadly stretch of water for refugees and migrants in 2011, Retrieved Mai 7, 2018, from: http://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2012/1/4f27e01f9/mediterranean-takes-record-deadly-stretch-water-refugees-migrants-2011.html Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  239. UNHCR (2013): Lampedusa boat tragedy – update, Retrieved May 23, 2018, from: http://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2013/10/524e8d2d9/lampedusa-boat-tragedy-update.html Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  240. Vasta, E., & Vuddamalay, V. (2006): International Migration and the Social Sciences. Confronting National Experiences in Australia, France and Germany, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159
  241. Watson, S. (2009): The Securitization of Humanitarian Migration. Digging moats and sinking boats, Abingdon: Routledge. Google Scholar öffnen doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-159

Zitation

Download RIS Download BibTex

Downloads

Download Kapitel (PDF)

Hinweis

Dieses Werk ist urheberrechtlich geschützt und darf nur nach den Vorgaben der Nutzungs- und Lizenzvereinbarung genutzt werden. Jede darüber hinaus gehende Nutzung des Werkes ist ausdrücklich untersagt und wird verfolgt.

Per E-Mail teilen

Medien