Was Ratingagenturen von Staaten fordern

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Bibliographische Infos


Cover der Ausgabe: PVS Politische Vierteljahresschrift Jahrgang 55 (2014), Heft 4
Vollzugriff

Zeitschrift der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politikwissenschaft

Jahrgang 55 (2014), Heft 4


Autor:innen:
Verlag
Nomos, Baden-Baden
Erscheinungsjahr
2014
ISSN-Online
0032-3470
ISSN-Print
0032-3470

Kapitelinformationen


Vollzugriff

Jahrgang 55 (2014), Heft 4

Was Ratingagenturen von Staaten fordern


Autor:innen:
ISSN-Print
0032-3470
ISSN-Online
0032-3470


Kapitelvorschau:

Ratingherabstufungen haben zu Kritik an den Bewertungsmaßstäben der drei großen -Ratingagenturen Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s und Fitch geführt. Doch was fordern diese Agenturen von Staaten? Die bisherige Literatur verweist auf nur einige wenige makroökomische Kennzahlen, auf denen Ratingagenturen ihre Länderratings basieren. Doch Ratingagenturen gehen darüber hinaus und fordern auch die Umsetzung konkreter Politikmaßnahmen von Staaten ein, wie dieser Beitrag in einer Textanalyse eines neuen Datensatzes mit mehr als 1200 Ratingentscheidungen seit 1995 zeigt. Für 72 Prozent aller Ratingänderungen führen die Agenturen politische Faktoren, wie Liberalisierungsmaßnahmen, internationale Abkommen sowie politische Stabilität und Wahlen, als zentrales Entscheidungskriterium in ihrer Begründung an.

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