Haushaltsüberschüsse, konservative Parteien und das Trilemma der Fiskalpolitik

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Bibliographische Infos

Cover der Ausgabe: PVS Politische Vierteljahresschrift Jahrgang 55 (2014), Heft 4
Vollzugriff

Zeitschrift der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politikwissenschaft

Jahrgang 55 (2014), Heft 4

Autor:innen:
Verlag
Nomos, Baden-Baden
Erscheinungsjahr
2014
ISSN-Online
0032-3470
ISSN-Print
0032-3470

Kapitelinformationen

Vollzugriff

Jahrgang 55 (2014), Heft 4

Haushaltsüberschüsse, konservative Parteien und das Trilemma der Fiskalpolitik

Autor:innen:
ISSN-Print
0032-3470
ISSN-Online
0032-3470
Kapitelvorschau:

Diese Studie analysiert die fiskalpolitischen Strategien konservativer Parteien in Ländern mit dauerhaften Haushaltsüberschüssen. Sie argumentiert, dass konservative Parteien eine Haushaltsausgleichsnorm als strategisches Instrument im Parteienwettbewerb einsetzen können, um politische Ziele wie die Senkung von Steuern und Staatsausgaben zu erreichen. Dieses Argument wird zunächst theoretisch mithilfe des Konzepts eines Trilemmas der Fiskalpolitik, dem alle Parteien ausgesetzt sind, entwickelt. Danach wird die Fiskalpolitik in Schweden und Australien seit den 1990er-Jahren empirisch analysiert. Dabei wird gezeigt, dass die dauerhafte Bewahrung von Überschüssen dort mit einem deutlichen Rückbau der Staatstätigkeit verbunden war und dass Parteistrategien dabei eine wichtige Rolle spielten.

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